East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism

Keong-il KIM*

Like the attempt to achieve modernity, East Asian solidarity was an idea which was provoked by the contact with the West, and brought into being against the backdrop of the West’s imperialistic military incursions into the region. The concept of Asianism emerged as representing East Asian soli- darity. The West’s interest in the region resulted in a process of naming and conceptualization of the region, which was then reflected in the Japanese understanding of acting as a driver behind the creation of Asianism. That this concept originated in does not imply that other East Asian nations embraced it without modification. On the contrary, the process entailed active interpretations by the intellectuals of Joseon and which diversified and complicated the idea of Asianism. Likewise, the way in which East Asian nations perceived and responded to Asianism varies significantly. In practice, however, the debate surrounding Asianism in the region was dominated by Japanese and Chinese intellectuals, despite their being in opposite camps, while the contribution from intellectuals of the weaker countries, Joseon and , was scattered and fragmentary. China, Joseon and Taiwan were supposedly all characterized by anti-imperialism and anti- colonialism, but in reality the line was drawn between the stronger states, Japan and China on one side, and the weaker states, like Joseon, on the other. This division has left a lasting mark on regional history, and the effort to put

* Academy of Korean Studies 6 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

Asian solidarity into practice continues to prove troublesome not only for Japanese intellectuals but also for Chinese ones.

Asia, Asianism, East Asian solidarity, regional identity, East Asian intellectuals East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 7

1

Facing the inroads of Western imperial powers into the region during the late 19th century, the people and nations of East Asia endeavored to discover effective ways to ensure their survival. They took particular note of modernity and the enlightenment school of ideas from the West as the sources of the Western power, which subsequently prompted them to enthusiastically embrace Western civilization and ideas. However, they soon realized that westernization and modernization alone would not guarantee their survival, from which context, did naturally emerge the shared interest of the peoples and states of the region in building solidarity with each other. To varying degrees and levels of engagement, almost all East Asian countries went through such a process in the late 19th century. In , for example, the so-called enlightenment ideology was born in the period between the 1850s and 1870s, and became prominent during the 1880s and lasted until the 1910s. The pursuit of modernity and East Asian solidarity by East Asian peoples and states followed an orderly sequence in transitioning from traditional patterns into modern times: it was not an indigenous process, but rather provoked by the West. It is understandable that the movement towards modernity had its roots in the West, but it is quite ironic that East Asian solidarity, which is an inherently internal affair, was also driven by forces from the outside. In the same way, the term ‘East Asia’ was defined first by external interests concerned with the dynamics of influencing the 1 region, not by the people who actually lived in the region.

1 The point that ‘the Pacific as one region is an invention of the west’ is as applicable to Asia as one region. See Dirlik (1993), p.296. 8 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

This paper will explore the concept of Asianism as a representation of East Asian solidarity at a time when East Asia was in transition to modern times. As mentioned above, East Asian solidarity was triggered by external forces, but it is worth noting that the concept of Asianism ─ a specific program designed to bring about solidarity ─ originated in Japan, which was the first East Asian nation to successfully modernize. Just as the Western world’s interest in Asia led to the creation of the concept of ‘East Asia,’ the Japanese understanding of East Asia was a driving force behind the invention of the concept of Asianism. In this sense, Kim Min-hwan emphasizes that the Three Nations Co-Prosperity Theory, the initial formulation of Asian solidarity, was a theory that Japan exported to various other Asian countries in order to justify its occupation of other Eastern nations, and was not something 2 conceived by Korean intellectuals themselves. Yin Yan-sheng, a Chinese scholar, points out that the kinds of pan-Asian ideologies and sentiments held by Chinese intellectuals of the time were not established 3 independently, but had been profoundly influenced by Japan. At that 4 time, ‘the East’ was a word which principally signified Japan. Not just Chinese intellectuals, but Korean intellectuals as well, perceived the Oriental Development Company, a Japanese colonial organization, as a

2 Kim Min-hwan (1988), pp.75-76. 3 Yin mentions Chinese intellectuals going to study in Japan, connecting this with the subsequent occupation of Jiaozhou Bay by Germany, backed by its ally Russia, which then sent a warship to Lushun in Dec. 1897 to demand information about the tidal patterns of Lushun and Dalian. Chinese intellectuals had initially been encouraged to go to Japan in a charm offensive organized by the Japanese General Staff Office. See Yin (2005), pp.157-159. 4 Kim Hak-cheol, who was involved in the struggle against Japan as a member of the Eighth Route Army in Taihang Mountain, China in 1941, wrote a memoir featuring a line of a then-famous song: ‘Mother tells her son to take down the Japanese army (母親叫牙 打東洋).’ Here, Japan is interpreted as the Orient. See Kim Hak-cheol (1995), pp.245- 246. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 9

5 manifestation of orientalism. The concepts of Asianism and Oriental Peace, which originated in Japan, were not incorporated unchanged by other East Asian nations such as Joseon (朝鮮) or China. The intellectuals of these countries reacted to Japanese Asianism in a variety of ways. Some embraced it uncritically, aspiring to represent it locally, which resulted in their aiding and abetting Japan’s invasions; while others saw in Japanese power a means to ensure the survival of their own mother countries despite the adverse consequences which might result. A great many intellectuals equated Asianism with Japanese imperialism, and rejected it, but there were a few intellectuals who accepted it as a worthy cause, taking the intentions of Japanese Asianism sincerely, and worked to realize Asian solidarity, though unfortunately with very little success. Sven Saaler has remarked that Asianism was developed in a space of discourse straddling national identities and a potential supranational 6 cooperation. Thus the focus of (East) Asian solidarity was situated in a space between peoples or states and the world order, so that the way in which East Asian nations perceived and responded to Asianism varies significantly. For example, Japan’s discussions about Asianism were largely focused on China, the other powerful country of the region, whereas China reacted by criticizing the Japanese initiative, but without denying Japan a dominant role in building regional solidarity. Smaller weaker nations like Joseon and Taiwan, meanwhile, had to focus all

5 This point applies to the concept of Oriental Peace too. If Asianism alludes to an ideological foundation or basis for solidarity, then Oriental Peace, which is the ultimate goal that it pursues, can also be considered to have originated in Japan. In this sense, Daehan Maeil Shinbo (大韓每日申報) made the criticism that “things oriental that the Japanese like to talk about are intended to expand the nation to integrate the entire East, while the oriental movement pushed by the is meant to let the Orient drown out the nation.” See Daehan Mail Shinbo, 17 December 1908. 6 See Saaler (2007), p.2. 10 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

available resources on their own national survival, and so could not afford the luxury of international relations policy at an East Asian regional level. There was some ferocious criticism of Asianism and a corresponding defense of nationalism in Joseon, for example, by Shin Chae-ho, but neither sophisticated plans nor substantive discussions grew out of this opposition. It might have been expected that China, Joseon and Taiwan, being all exposed to the threat of imperialism and colonialism from the Asianism initiated by Japan, would perceive and react to this threat in similar ways, but this was not the case. In practice, the debate surrounding Asianism in the region was dominated by Japanese and Chinese intellectuals, despite their being in opposite camps, while the contribution from intellectuals of the weaker countries, Joseon and Taiwan, was scattered and fragmentary. China, Joseon and Taiwan were supposedly all characterized by anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, but in reality, the line was drawn between the stronger states, Japan and China on one side, and the weaker states, like Joseon, on the other. Thus it was that Chinese intellectuals, as well as Japanese ones, were also constrained in their approach to Asian solidarity by the existential conditions of the peoples and the states within which they were set. Generally speaking, Asianism, which can be seen as a focused representation of Asian solidarity, was instigated by Japan in response to the Western imperialism invading the region, but it was not simply a one-way flow of ideas coming out of Japan. After going through a process of claim and counterclaim, interpretation and reinterpretation, by intellectuals throughout East Asia, Asianism developed a diverse and multi-layered set of meanings and ideas, and the other nations besides Japan, although they were all anti-imperialistic and anti-colonial, did not perceive or respond to Asianism uniformly. Lingering remnants of the East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 11

traditional regional order played a part in these distinctions, but the calculus of power was the most important factor, separating big and strong nations from small and weak ones. In this light, therefore, the discussions about Asianism in Joseon (and Taiwan) were probably more authentically disposed towards Asian solidarity than the self-interested perspectives of Japanese and Chinese intellectuals.

2

When considering the necessity for solidarity, it is appropriate to discuss the reasoning behind it. In other words, if Asianism is justifiable, it needs to be explained why the nations and people in this particular region, but not those in other regions, should be suitable for solidarity. Reasons often cited include geographical proximity, racial homogeneity and cultural similarity, these being the key factors that comprise regional identity. Conversely, a region and a race that represent specific cultural values and identity should be viewed as essential to the concept of Asian 7 solidarity. Saaler notes that pan-Asianism appeals to a set of preexistent factors such as culture and religion, language and script, together with 8 shared historical experiences, geography and race. A review of Japanese publications on pan-Asianism has identified the four most common factors as culture, ethnicity, geographical proximity and a sensibility 9 towards a shared destiny. Of course, these elements were all very important in justifying regional solidarity, but it is essential to understand that the implications carried by

7 See Jang (2000), p.112; p.116. 8 See Saaler (2007), p.2. 9 Ibid., p.10. 12 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

each of these factors, and also their effects, varied with the temporal and historical context. Thus, the elements which make up East Asia’s regional identity have undergone changes in meanings, displaying subtle variations at each point in time within the different historical context which have 10 prevailed since the 1880s. First, let’s look at the geographical condition; this factor can be characterized as the most unchangeable of all. In Fernand Braudel’s terminology, it belongs to the constant history of long durability (longue durée), and so it has had the most fundamental and lasting influence on Asian solidarity. More than anything else, the impetus which opened up East Asia from the closed land it had been in the late 15th century was the fact that Asia had its geographical boundary vastly enlarged. As the huge presence of the Western world loomed over their cognitive horizon, the intellectuals of East Asia, who had long been caught up with the traditional notion of ‘one state under the sun,’ were able to expand their notional space to the global level. Of course, things varied from country to country across the region. In the case of Japan, the early acceptance of Western civilization from the Netherlands near the beginning of the 16th century, meant that the Japanese were among the first to experience the expansion of space through contact with the West. This led to the Three Nations Co- Prosperity Theory, which emerged in Joseon. But whereas Joseon had rarely looked beyond the boundary of the three East Asian nations since early in the 1880s, the Japanese conception of Asian solidarity gradually expanded, reaching out beyond East Asia towards and the Islamic 11 states of the Middle East. As for the Chinese, they experienced a

10 See Kim Keong-il (2012), pp.29-34. 11 For example, Okakura Tenshin’s ‘Oriental Ideal’ shows this change well. In the Japanese theory of Asian solidarity, geography was an important circumstantial condition, and East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 13

fundamental change in their worldview, which had hither to been entirely Sinocentric, following the Japanese invasion and the anti-colonial resis- tance movement, together with the transformation of China into a socialist system. All this was in addition to the transition to modernity which changed China’s standing from being the center of the world to merely 12 one region among many. Despite this fundamental reordering, China still retains a Sinocentric scheme of the world, even now, and tends to perceive East Asia as nothing more than the eastern peripheral zone adjacent to the massive bulk of Chinese territory. Another factor, which is closely connected to geographical circum- stances, is the notion of destiny, which has, however, rarely been stressed as a determining factor of regional identity in the arguments for Asian 13 solidarity since the 1880s. Destiny was most often cited as being relevant 14 to the relationship of China with Joseon, geographically close to it. In the earlier discussions on Asian solidarity, destiny was often mentioned by Donga Dongmoon Hoe (東亞同文會, The East Asia Nations’ Association), established in November 1898 by the combination of Donga Hoe (April 1898), which had been set up by hawkish politicians, and Dongmoon Hoe (June1898), which had been established by Joseon specialists in Chinese affairs partial to the interests of . This organization

geographical proximity was essential for research involving the three East Asian nations, but lost its relevance when the scope was extended to Asia as a whole. See Jang (2000), p.125. 12 Yang (2005), p.86. 13 Saaler noted that, despite the three factors of culture, ethnicity and geographical proximity being largely limited to East Asia, around the time of the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War, other parts of Asia, including South Asia and the Arab world, were also becoming interested in pan-Asianism, which he attributed to this concept of destiny. See Saaler (2007), p.10. 14 For example, Tarui Tokichi, in attempting to build solidarity among Joseon, China and Japan, stresses that the three nations share the same ancestry, and thus the same destiny, with Japan. See Tarui (1893), pp.118-119. 14 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

argued that Japan and China faced a common crisis, and rather than allowing themselves to be divided by Western powers, they should join hands and work together in a difficult situation. Depending on the idea of ‘same culture and same race’ meaning that the two countries shared racial commonalities and cultural kinship, they argued for a community of shared destiny, asserting their relationship to be as naturally close as that 15 of lips and teeth (脣齒). Park Chi-woo also emphasized destiny, reportedly advocating the theory of East Asian Community from the 1930s onward. As a Marxist who would become a North Korean partisan after the liberation of Korea, he had attempted to independently interpret the theory of East Asian Community, which had originated in Japan, from the perspective of an intellectual based in colonial Joseon. He was critical of fascism, which pleaded for solidarity and unity based on blood and earth, calling it the ‘irrationalism’ of modern times. He warned against the possibility that the project of East Asian cooperation could end up by becoming a fascist ideology, being defined by ‘closed-off and exclusive’ boundaries relying on Japanese or Asian racial identity. To avoid this, he devised an alternative principle for solidarity to support East Asian Community in which the ‘indirect unity bound by realization of shared destiny’ replaced the ‘simple 16 and direct connection’ based on ‘directness of blood.’ Relatively speaking, race is generally characterized as naturally enduring and unchangeable, though less so than geographical circumstances. Within

15 See Kim Keong-il and Kang Chang-il (2000), pp.287-292. 16 His ‘shared destiny’ signals that he embraced the logic of East Asian Community as a ‘joint defense against the Western imperialism,’ primarily reflecting the interests of Japan. This kind of approach disregarded the positions of Joseon and China, and focused on the question of how to build solidarity among the nations, but the more important question of what the solidarity was for was neglected. Kim Keong-il (2012), pp.286-287. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 15

the theory of Asian solidarity, racism was the most straightforward and tangible of elements, with widespread popular appeal. Like the perception of ‘Asia’ as such, the recognition that its people belonged to the same race was not created from inside, but came from outside. Though it might be thought that the effort to establish a sense of emotional belonging by distinguishing one’s race from other races would be a basic instinct deriving from the innermost sphere of emotions, in fact it was finally engendered by the contact with the West. This racial identity was inspired by popular discourses such as the so-called Yellow Peril theory (黃禍論) which was introduced from America and Europe beginning in the 1880s, and further reinforced by the dissemination of ostensibly ‘scientific’ theories of race, including theories of social evolution and physical 17 anthropology. Over time, the racism of East Asia has passed through a number of phases, becoming multidimensional and contradictory. Just as for geographical circumstances, the way that countries understood race varied from country to country. Probably it was Joseon which adopted the narrowest sense of race; with a homogeneous population, and having never gone beyond the geographical space of East Asia, their primary understanding concerned the people of the three East Asian states who they perceived as being of the same race. China has a variety of ethnic minorities within its territory, and Japan also has some, so that their understanding of the Asian race, which had initially been limited to East Asia, was gradually expanded to embrace South East Asia, India, and Islamic countries. Furthermore, there were various different ways in which the three East Asian states reacted to the same racial imperative. As can be seen from

17 See Kim Min-hwan (1988), pp.67-68; Jang (2000), p.118. 16 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

the Three Nations Co-Prosperity Theory or the Three Nations Equilib- rium Theory, there was much support, in the late 19th century, for the view that states of the same race should join forces to fight against conquest by Western imperialism, but an ideologically contrasting position had been proposed in Japan much earlier. In 1885, with the Self-Strengthening Movement (洋務運動) in China floundering, and the failure of the Gaps in coup (甲申政變) in Joseon, Fukuzawa Yukichi, an advocate of civilization and enlightenment, had published his famous idea of ‘Abandoning Asia.’ He stated that ‘I reject the bad friends of the East,’ and proclaimed his 18 detachment from Asia. Immediately after Japan revealed its intention to invade other countries in 1905, in Joseon and China, there was fierce criticism of the idea of Asian solidarity, which prompted some slight modification of the theory. Further complications arose from the Russo-Japanese War, which 19 is commonly viewed as a racial war. This event, in which Japan, representing Asia, defeated Russia, representing Europe, is generally regarded as momentous not only in the history of Japan but in the history of modern East Asia. In broader terms, this war was interpreted as a conflict between civilization and savagery, with the civilized Japan defeating the barbarous Russia which was still an absolute monarchy. Thus Russia is associated with images of darkness, backwardness and despotism, and Japan is associated with a civilized society, technological advance and triumphant progress. This leads on to the remaining factor which needs to be considered when analyzing the theoretical foundations of Asian solidarity; the idea of civilization or culture. Compared to geographical circumstances

18 See Fukuzawa (1885), p.240 and also Sato (2006), p.293; p.306. 19 See Jang (2000), p.128; Park (2007), p.135. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 17

or the notion of race, which have already been discussed, civilization is very far from being an intrinsic aspect of peoples or nations, and through the working out of human involvement and human will at that time, the impact of civilization upon the idea of Asian solidarity proved ultimately to be the most influential. Decisive influence of civilization means that it ultimately took precedence over all those intrinsic constraints including race, because it had a more rational basis. This is well illustrated by Fukuzawa Yukichi’s remark: ‘I reject the bad friends of the East,’ indicating that he favored civilization as a yardstick over race. Indeed Japan, a nation of colored race, was recognized as one of the civilized countries of the world at that time, which shows clearly that civilization carried greater significance than race. Likewise in Joseon, civilization and enlightenment began to be recognized as the means to build a strong and rich country in the 1880s, which subsequently led to frequent appearances of such phrases as ‘enlightened civilization,’ ‘enriched civilization,’ and ‘advanced civilization,’ as well as contrasting words like ‘civilization’ and ‘savagery,’ in Hanseong Sunbo (漢城旬報), Hanseong Jubo (漢城周報) and Dongnip Shinmun(獨立新聞) 20 from the mid-1880s. However, in reality, the ideal role model for a civilized society could only be found in the developed countries of the West, which prompted and then consolidated the perception that Western civilization should be considered a truly universal civilization. In Joseon, the obsession with a civilized society, which refers to a rich and strong country as well as an independent and liberated nation, drove the acceptance of Western culture and materials as representing universal values and the ultimate aspiration. Embracing all things Western was regarded as synonymous

20 See Park (2007), p.122. 18 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

with being civilized, which created the notion that everything on-Western 21 was barbarous. Civilization was also viewed as equivalent to race, and the convergence of civilization theories with race theories resulted in a blatant racism in which races were ranked against each other, which led to discrimination. This convergence gave rise to several striking consequences. Firstly, now that civilization had entered the conceptual frame, race was no longer seen as something objective and neutral, but in more comprehensive terms as a feature carrying some inherent value. When Fukuzawa Yukichi called China and Joseon ‘the bad friends of the East,’ he was clearly expressing an essential value judgment; the civilized whites represented knowledge and virtue, thus ranking as a superior race to be held in high regard, whereas the blacks were despised as incompetent and untalented. Secondly, this kind of distinction and discrimination, driven by the supposed ‘level’ of civilization, was clearly relevant to the states of East Asia. Since China had been defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the idea of superior whites and inferior blacks had been projected into East Asia, creating a derivative idea that the Japanese were superior and the China were inferior. Set beside the enlightened civilization of Japan and putative eugenic superiority of the Japanese, the Ching were regarded 22 as the weakest type of people who deserved the most dreadful treatment. Kim Yun-sik of Joseon described the Russo-Japanese War as the world’s first war of justice, while Fukuzawa Yukichi characterized the Sino- Japanese War as “a war between a progressive and enlightened civilization 23 and savagery.” This is how the common view came about that the Sino-Japanese War was a war of civilizations, between civilization and

21 Ibid., p.123. 22 Ibid., p.125; Jang (2000), p.119. 23 Fukuzawa (1961), p.491. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 19

savagery, while the Russo-Japanese War was a war of races, between the 24 yellow and white. Lastly, in the process where a certain set of values was projected upon a race through the prism of civilization as an absolute standard, these values were separated from the temporal and historical context in which they had arisen, so that they began to be seen as unique qualities belonging to a specific race. Taken out of the context which had given birth to them, these values took on the appearance of abstract and inherent qualities unique to a particular race, as if they had been created in isolation. This can be considered as an aberration or a distortion of the empirical approach of modern Enlightenment which is so characteristic of progress and development, and these ideas regarding civilization and race therefore had a significant impact on the regional identity and the solidarity of East Asia.

3

Then, what factors did East Asian individual intellectuals actually take into account when they attempt to establish a theoretical foundation for East Asian solidarity? This paper will now review the positions held by several leading intellectuals. First, in Japan, Tarui Tokichi, the author of 25 Great East Asia Integration Theory (大東合倂論) which calls for solidarity among the three East Asian countries, Japan, Joseon and China, putting forth an argument for Asian solidarity based on racism. In his view, the

24 Jang (2000), p.128; Park (2007), p.135. 25 The book was published in 1893, but it was written the previous decade, in 1885, the same year when Fukuzawa Yukichi proclaimed his intention to “reject the bad friends of the east.” 20 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

only way to resist the hegemonic dominance of the whites was “an effort to unite all the people of the same race and build up power,” and he also asserted that “it is the natural way of the world to get together with people of the same race internally and compete against people of a different race 26 externally.” By contrast, Okakura Tenshin, an expert on history, who was well-versed in Vedic philosophy, Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism, set out the ideal of autonomous solidarity based around civilization. Building on the principle of Asian civilization defined in a broad sense which also encompasses religion, he proposed a theory about Asia which extends the boundary of Asia as far as India. Since he based Asian identity upon civilization and religion, his solidarity theory could not be further removed from most contemporary theories of Asian solidarity, which rested on racism or the necessity for building regional order. Furthermore, he rejected the mainstream approach of evaluating Japanese or Asian civilization according to the norms of Western civilization, offering instead an abstract, ideological, and romantic theory of Asia which pays homage to the cultural homogeneity of Asia itself. His theory aims to connect up with the natural sources of Eastern civilization, but was constrained by its rigid ideological framework. With this ideological baggage, his argument that ‘Asia is one’ could be easily appropriated to justify and glorify Asianism. In China, Sun Yat-sen had advocated Asianism since the Chinese Revolution of the 1910s. The version of Asianism which he advocated was initially much influenced by Japan, taking the position that the yellow race must unite to fight against the invasions of the white people, which is a

26 Tarui (1963), p.129. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 21

27 typical form of regional solidarity based on racism. He later modified this stance, and on November 28, 1924, during a visit to Japan, he delivered a now-celebrated address on Pan-Asianism at Kobe women’s high school. In this speech, he summed up Pan-Asianism as primarily a matter of cultures, or “a comparison and conflict between the Eastern culture and the Western one.” He also stated that “the Eastern culture is the royal way while the Western one is the rule of force,” asserting that the former seeks “the ways of human justice and morality” while the 28 latter pursues the “public good (功利) and its enforcement by authority.” Evidently, he came to favor defining regional identity in terms of culture and civilization rather than other factors like race. Li Dazhao was critical of Japanese Pan-Asianism, calling it “a euphemism for China’s propensity to annex other countries” and “another name for Great Japanism” and maintaining that it can be defined as essentially “imperialistic and militaristic overtures to invade other countries, 29 and also a seed to destroy the world system.” In his argument for Neo- Asianism based on the liberation and national self-determination of Asia’s weaker countries, he focused on the region and the race as the basis for regional solidarity. He added that in order to realize a true Asian solidarity, “keeping the friendship of the same Asia and the same race in mind, Asian people should cooperate with each other and fulfill their moral responsibilities for the world, thus ensuring the peace of the 30 world.” Lastly, among the Korean intellectuals of that era, it was Ahn Keong-su who expounded the idea of Asian solidarity in the most methodical

27 Bae (1996), p.12. 28 Sun Yat-sen (1997), p.174. 29 Li (1997), pp.163-164. 30 Ibid., pp.161-162. 22 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

31 fashion. He took geographical proximity as the most important out of the three components comprising the regional identity. Although he cannot be said to be completely free from the idea of racism so prevalent at that time as fixed part of all discussions about solidarity, racism was never mentioned in Japan Ching Korea Alliance Theory (日淸韓三國同盟論), 32 one of his most widely-read books. Ahn Jung-geun, who assassinated Ito Hirobumi, subsequently attempted to systematically develop Eastern Peace Theory whilst in prison. He likened the three East Asian nations ─ Korea, China and Japan ─ to a family of three brothers living in the same village, and went on to envision a world where the East and the West 33 coexist in peace. Despite espousing a subtle kind of racism, his later 34 development of Eastern Peace Theory transcended his earlier views. In the decades since these foundational discussions on Asian solidarity, the same elements of geography, destiny, race and civilization have continued to be adduced selectively, but the recurrent conflicts and rifts resulting from imperialism and colonialism have led to a fundamental skepticism towards the very idea of Asian solidarity as such, and this is the context of the theoretical difficulties facing Asian solidarity today, when even the concept ‘Asia’ has become hard to define. For instance, Wang Huih as argued that we need to confront the derivation of the concept of Asia and the ambiguities contained within its history, pointing out the difficulty of accepting any attempt to characterize Asia as one single culture. Confucianism alone, he suggests, cannot account even for China

31 Cho (2000), p.169. 32 Kim Keong-il (2012), pp.64-65. 33 He was never an overt racist in the sense of promoting hostile relations between races or supporting the subordination or exclusion of other races. See Hyeon (2003), pp.182-184. 34 Kim Keong-il (2012), pp.96-97. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 23

35 by itself. Duara notes that the creation of East Asian solidarity has followed multiple uneven paths, and that this very multiplicity of 36 development makes it totally different from the European case. Even today, when reciprocal exchanges have become more active and mutual understanding has become more extensive among Asian people, ‘Asia’ remains largely a domain which exists at the state level and primarily for the elites. Unfortunately, since the social movements of the region were led by the upper classes with their vested interests, ‘Asia’ has never become an issue of widespread concern. Against this backdrop, the intellectuals of East Asia have suggested a provisional and strategic approach towards Asia, in place of a regional concept which is highly liberal and self-contained. Thus, there is ‘East Asia as an intellectual 37 experiment’ as proposed in the East Asia theory of Korea, and Chen Kuan-hsing takes a similar view, declaring that we have to consider the hub of Asia as ‘a way’ to think and reflect upon the joint history of the region. Lately, he has been exploring forms of inter-referentiality and the way that experiences shared by adjoining areas with a common and intertwined history offer a more suitable reference point than areas which 38 are geographically more remote. Sun Ge has characterized Asia as ‘function,’ seeking an alternative solution in the face of modern issues. Meanwhile, Yamamuro Shinichi suggests treating the concept of East Asia as something experimental, since this concept does not exist a priori but rather is constantly being recreated. Sakai Naoki argues that the distinction between the West and

35 Wang (2010), p.987. 36 Duara (2010), p.981. 37 Following an idea proposed by Baik Young-seo, Arif Dirlik once talked about ‘Asia as a project.’ See Baik (2000), p.50, n. 5. 38 Chen (2010). 24 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

the East is not fixed but is actually fluid, recommending that we should strive to eliminate the exclusivity which is embedded within cultural, civilizational, and racial identities. On this view, we should not take the boundary of Asian people for granted, nor should we base the identity of Asian people on supposedly invariant features of an individual or a group of individuals that do not really exist. Instead, we should consider Asian identity as one resulting from a constantly changing matrix of socio- 39 economic conditions.

4

Asianism, the most distinctive manifestation of Asian solidarity, first emerged in Japan. Around the time of the fall of Nanjing in 1864, when the threat posed by Western powers against Asia became obvious, Asianism arose in Japan, stressing the unity and uniformity of Asia. As already mentioned, the intellectual establishment of Korea only began discussing about it from the 1880s. The confusion surrounding when and where Asianism originated is also reflected in the terms coined in relation to it. Asianism was called Great Asianism, Pan-Asianism, or the Monroe Doctrine of Asia, and in China, it was also dubbed Aseanism or Ajuism (亞 洲主義), while in Korea, terms with similar meanings such as Orientalism, the Three Nations’ Co-prosperity theory and the Three Nations’ Alliance theory were commonly used. In the case of Korea, there was presumably a gap between the initial interest in and discussions about Asianism by intellectuals and the wider

39 See Sun Ge (2003), p.8; Yamamuro (2003), p.202; Sakai (2003), pp.69-71; Kim Keong-il (2012), pp.58-59. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 25

public usage of the term. Searching for ‘Aseanism’ in newspapers and 40 magazines of the period at the Korea History Information Center41 finds 31 hits, with 20 results from newspapers and 11 in magazines. Three instances appeared in Hwangsung Shinmun (皇城新聞) in 1899 (July 22nd, 42 the first known usage), 1906 and 1909. The first modern newspaper in Korea, Hansung Sunbo, began publication in October 1883 (by the lunar calendar), but the term was not used until much later. Only from the 1910s did it start to appear in magazines, with occasional usage in Samcheonri (三千里), Sasang Huibo (思想彙報) etc. after 1934. By collecting the archives of old newspapers, another database has been built by the Korea Press 43 Foundation, and searching this produced 32 stories which used the term, the first in 1918, all from the Mail Shinbo (每日申報), a propaganda 44 newsletter run by the Japanese Government General of Korea. The term was not used in Hwangsung Shinmun, Daehan Maeil Shinbo, or Dongnip Shinmun around that time. There are far fewer search hits for ‘Orientalism’ which was commonly used with a meaning similar to Aseanism; eight newspaper articles from the Korea History Information 45 Center, and five articles from the Korea Press Foundation, that is, three from Daehan Maeil Shinbo and two from Maeil Shinbo. Daehan Maeil Shinbo printed two well-known articles by Shin Chae-ho criticizing Asianism in 1909, and the term appeared in Maeil Shinbo in 1920 and 1935.

40 As the search results for ‘Asianism’ is minimal, a discussion about it will be omitted. 41 http://www.koreanhistory.or.kr/. 42 The other 17 instances comprise 11 from Dong-a Ilbo (東亞日報) with 5 each in the 1920s and 1930s and 1 in the 1940s, together with 6 instances in other publications. 43 http://www.kinds.or.kr/. 44 There are 6 instances in the 1910s, 8 in the 1920s, 11 in the 1930s and 7 in the 1940s. 45 2 instances in Daehan Maeil Shinbo, 2 in Dong-a Ilbo, 2 in Manju Daily Shinmun (滿洲 日日新聞), and 1 each in Tokyo Daily Shinmun (東京日日新聞) and Shinhan Minbo (新韓 民報). 26 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

To sum up, the term ‘Asianism,’ including varieties of the word such as ‘Aseanism’ and ‘Orientalism,’ appeared in printed media for the first time in 1899, and sporadically thereafter, until it began to appear with relatively high frequency in the 1920-30s. Saaler claims that it was not until after the mid-1910s that the term ‘Asianism’ was widely used in Japan, 46 when it became a public rallying cry in journals and academic publications, but in Joseon the term was not in common use until later, from the 1920s. Still, in trying to grasp what Asianism really means, the early discussions about it by intellectuals carry a profound significance. Around the 1860s in the early form of Asianism, the pursuit of Asian solidarity was relatively more pronounced. However, from the1890s when, after its victory in the Sino-Japanese War, Japan became the only non-Western imperial power by colonizing Taiwan, the theoretical basis of Asianism became more about Japanese hegemony in Asia, and the emphasis on solidarity was lost. This was the period when the Japanese worldview became very Asia-focused, and moving with the tide of this ideological trend, Japanese intellectuals made a qualitative leap of the imagination, coming to regard Asia as one single entity. Asianism, therefore, encompasses two conflicting concepts which are mutually exclusive. The motivation towards Asian solidarity was triggered by the Western threats, and Asianism was established to deal with the physical and conceptual confrontation between the West and Asia. But the Japanese response to this confrontation undermined the movement towards solidarity by dividing the Japanese from other Asian states and

46 Saaler notes that this was sparked by the publication in 1916 of Great Asianism Theory (大亞細亞主義論) by Kotera Kenkichi. In the aftermath of World War I, Asianism penetrated deeply into the government and diplomatic service, at which point it finally became a realistic choice in foreign policy decisions. Thus Asianism has developed from an ambiguous, romantic and conceptual sentiment about solidarity into an ideology applicable to realpolitik. See Saaler (2007), pp.6-7. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 27

peoples; Japan sought Asian dominance, while others strove for national 47 liberation. Along these lines, Wang Hui argues that the concept of Asia in the 19th and 20th centuries contains two contradictory meanings. In effect, Asianism represents both the colonial ambition of imperial Japan and the demand for national self-determination by the oppressed peoples of the smaller weaker Asian states, so that both a colonial perspective of Asia and a social revolutionary perspective of Asia can be derived from 48 it. Prasenjit Duara also notes in his latest studies that at the turn of the 20th century, there were various undercurrents, including egalitarian and empathic emotions towards other Asians, beneath the pursuit of imperi- 49 alistic aspirations which drove the big wave of Asianism in Asia. In the history of Asianism, the 1890s are significant as the time when Japan’s self-identity was established; Wang Hui and Duara’s imperialistic outlook on Asia had been fleshed out with some details, and some of the versions of Asianism described in the previous chapter had been set aside. Tarui Tokichi championed the Great East Asia Integration Theory at just about the time that Japan was ready to go to war after building up its military capabilities to dispute over Asian hegemony with China. But his theory was more of a pacifist approach rather than a call to war, and it was swimming against the mainstream opinion gripping Japan at the time, where the social atmosphere was largely dominated by war-mongers. Presumably because of this, Tarui’s theory deeply affected intellectuals in Joseon and China who were interested in building solidarity among the three countries of East Asia. Yang Chicho wrote a preface to Tarui’s book and published it under the title Great East Asia Unification Loyalty Trust

47 Even if the analysis is limited to Japan, there also exists a conflict between a nation and its people, totalitarianism and democracy, as seen from the theoretical clash between sovereign rights and the rights of the people. 48 Wang (2003), p.180; p.192. 49 Duara (2010), p.970. 28 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

(大東合邦新義). He printed 100,000 copies in Shanghai, out of which about 1,000 copies were distributed to Joseon where they were popular enough 50 to be mimeographed and shared among pro-Japanese intellectuals. Other intellectuals, more critical of Asianism, condemned his theory as being not substantially different from the policy of military aggression because they thought his ideas are still based on the security and 51 empire-building of Japan, though superficially dissimilar to it. As for the Asianism of Okakura Tenshin, the Western academic establishment takes a positive view, hailing it as an archetypal example of 52 anti-imperialistic solidarity. Sun Ge of China remarks that, although Okakura’s theory was later used as a means to rally the general public behind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, it is not worth paying 53 much attention to. But Yamamuro Shinji of Japan emphasizes that 54 Okakura’s ideas were intended to present Asia as a single entity. These reviews and comments by Western, Japanese and even Chinese researchers are quite legitimate and interesting, but unfortunately, such analyses have never considered how Okakura Tenshin perceived Japanese colonies such as Joseon and Taiwan. Furthermore, Okakura’s focus on the common identity of the East is more like an ‘antithesis of the East against the West.’ This kind of self-assessment by Okakura is strongly tinged with ethnocentrism, pitting the East against the West, with the traditions and

50 Kang (1984), p.242; Jung (2006), pp.51-52; Kim Yun-hi (2009), pp.112-113. 51 Kim Keong-il (2012), pp.66-70. 52 Duara holds Okakura Tench in in high esteem for his cultural anti-imperialism and his work on Asian cosmopolitanism along with Rabindranath Tagore of India and Zhang Binglin of China, admiring his pursuit of alternative values to replace the dominant civilizational discourse of the West. Duara challenges the nationalist motives underlying his Asianism, but acknowledges Okakura’s sincerity in working towards Asia solidarity. See Duara (2010), pp.969-973. 53 Sun Ge (2003), p.73. 54 Yamamuro (2003), pp.161-162. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 29

civilizations of the West depicted negatively when compared to those of the East. More seriously, as that kind of ethnocentric bias was projected inwards to Asia, it was used to put a spotlight on Japanese supremacy and originality. Indeed, it was precisely these characteristics of Okakura’s representation of Asia ─ an emphasis on Japanese superiority, along with criticism and denial of the value of Western civilization ─ which were used to give theoretical support to Japan’s promotion of Asianism and the implementation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the 55 1930s. In China, the Great Asianism proposed by Sun Yat-sen called for building “a culture of peaceful liberation of all peoples’ based on his ‘royal way,” which recognized all the suppressed Asian peoples as a common asset which could be used to fight against the strong and prosperous 56 European nations. Given that it was intended to challenge the invasions of the Western powers, Sun’s Great Asianism has been seen as different 57 from Japanese Asianism. Although in his much renowned Kobe speech, Sun mentioned ‘Asian peoples suffering in pain’ and the ‘peaceful liberation of all peoples,’ and this seems to have been a token gesture. As a matter of fact, he had no interest in Joseon affairs, and doubted the resolve and ability of the smaller weaker nations of Asia to gain liberation. Underlying his views is the Sinocentric understanding of territory, as well as the attitude, long-held in China, that all the surrounding nations are 58 naturally subordinate to China.

55 In fact, Okakura called for “systematic cultivation of patriotic passion and systematic preparedness for a war” in order to eliminate a “malign tumor” i.e. Europe, and he wanted a ‘Pan-Asian Union’ to be built for this purpose. See Hiraishi (1994), p.281; Kim Keong-il (2012), pp.72-75. 56 Sun Yat-sen (1997), pp.177-178. 57 Bae (1996), p.12. 58 Ibid., pp.14-15. See also Baik (2000), p.5; pp.57-58; pp.150-151. 30 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

An opposing position to the above-mentioned theories can be found in neo-Asianism of Li Dazhao. Unlike Sun Yat-sen, he proposed solidarity based on the liberation and national self-determination of the small weak nations of Asia. Depending upon this Asian solidarity, he suggested 59 extending it into a world confederation, in which respect his ideas envisage a sort of utopian globalism. But despite basing his ideal of Asian solidarity on the liberation and self-determination of weak countries, Li’s vision still rests on a Sinocentric perspective. Starting from the premise that ‘without China, there is no Asia,’ he argued for “the reconstruction of China that represents the Asian civilization and the revival of the 60 Chinese people.” This way of thinking, very much centered on a big and powerful country, is echoed not only by other Japanese and Chinese intellectuals reviewed above, but even by those scholars studying the same issues today.

5

Engagement with a people and commitment to a nation are concepts which have emerged in modern times, but East Asia has traditionally defined itself through the fetishistic admiration of its supposedly superior 61 people and by the oppressive power of the central state. Thus, the idea of Asianism, which considers Asia as a single entity and calls for an enhanced Asian solidarity is a useful way to criticize and confront these established modes of thought. But historically, Asianism shifted focus from alliance-building in the early days to later providing theoretical

59 Li (1997), p.165. 60 Ibid., p.161. 61 Duara (2010), p.971; p.980 and Wang (2010), pp.987-988. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 31

support for the invasions of imperial Japan. It was seen as dissenting idea in Japan, and was gradually embraced by rightist politicians. In this context, Tozhaka Jun criticized Asianism as being an evolution of Japanism saying 62 that it was basically Japan-Asianism. With the exception of a few intellectuals, Asianism was mostly condemned or ignored in Joseon and China. Consequently, the great cause of regional solidarity suffered profound and enduring damage, which severely undermined efforts to build regional cooperation and develop reciprocal exchanges in East Asia after the Second World War. Following the Japanese defeat in 1945, Asianism was denounced as a variant of fascism or supra-nationalism, but before long, Japan accomplished successful post-war national rebuilding and economic rehabilitation, and this prompted some to revisit the idea, the most prominent being Dakeuchi Yoshimi in the 1960s. Since then Asianism has received intermittent support, both from right-wing anti-American autonomy activists and pro-American anti-communist ideologues, as well as from ‘new leftists’ critical of cult-like socialist political thinking and some from the inner circle of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. In late 1980s, renewed interest in regionalism emerged in (East) Asia against the backdrop of significant changes in the geopolitical landscape. These changes included the remarkable economic growth of East Asian countries, the movement towards reform and some degree of openness in China, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War. The idea of Asian regionalism was raised in Japan as well as in China, where many saw the advantages of China, a political power, and Japan, an economic powerhouse, joining forces. These arguments for Asianism have taken many complex and varied forms, but have never broken free

62 Tozhaka (1977), p.148. 32 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA

from the specter of Asian hegemony, whether by China or Japan, which historical experience suggests as an all-too-likely consequence. With the international order becoming more multipolar and multi- dimensional, these discussions often take the form of political theories, or they are explored as potential solutions to the environmental crisis and to some of the many other serious issues facing humanity in these modern times. It remains true, however, that Asianism has problems of escaping from accusations of sensational racism, and Japanese versions are usually disguised as a broad regionalism even though they are anchored in a Japan-centric worldview which harks back to the previous Japanese attempt to seize control of Asia, which was packaged as Asianism. Likewise, China finds it difficult to ignore its traditional Sinocentric outlook, so that any Chinese version of Asianism is suspected of seeking to reestablish the hegemony of the Middle Kingdom. It is a manifest lesson of history over the past century that, whether it was intended or not, Asianism and similar theories, whenever they have been proposed in East Asia, have always been used to justify or rationalize the aggressive ambitions of the most powerful countries of the region. East Asian Intellectuals and the Historical Context of Asianism 33

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