AIR U N I VERSITY REVIEW

THE DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY... OUR SPACE VENTURE AND ROLE IN THE WORLD...POLLUTION IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL ATMOSPHERE MAY-JUNE 1968

AIR U N I V E R S ITY REVIEW THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

T he Defen se Supply Acency...... 2 Lt. Gen. Earl C. Hedlund, usaf Our Spa c e Ven t ur e and Our Role in the World...... 13 Brig. Gen. Henry C. Huglin, usaf (Ret) P ollution in the Or g a n iz a t io n a l Atmosphere...... 26 Jerome G. Peppers, Jr. T he Air Force Man and the Cultural Value Gap...... 37 Lt. Col. Robert H. Drumm, usaf On the Limit a t io n s of Syst ems Analysis for Count er insur genc y Programs ... 42 Dalip Saund Military Affairs Abroad C iv ic Action of the .Argentine Armed Forces...... 53 Maj. Horacio A. Ratti, Argentine Air Force T he Soviet Drive for Strategic Superiority...... 59 Harriet Fast Scott Air Force Review Interactions Bet ween the Air Force Resea r c h Community and Technological Agencies...... 62 Maj. George F. Heinrich, usaf In My Opinion “W hat Did He Say?” ...... 68 Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Corbin, usaf T he Role of Mil it a r y Reser vist s in Civ il Defen se...... 70 Maj. David A. Singletary, AFRes Books and Ideas W it h Prejudice, W it h o u t Malice...... 75 Dr. Alfred Goldberg W ho Started the Cold War? ...... 82 Herman S. Wolk W hither Ger ma n y? ...... 86 Dr. Chester V. Easum S trategy, L ea der sh ip, and Refl ec t ion ...... 88 Capt. David Maclsaac, usaf The Contributors...... 94

the cover Address manuscripts to: Editor, A it Uni ce “Just what is, after all, the full range of an •ity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, Ma well Air Force Base, Ain. 36112. Printed I officer's responsibility?” one of our contributors Government Printing Office. Washington. D.( asks, and he concludes that “each officer must Subscriptions are sold by Air Universi decide for himself to what degree such respon­ i ? ° k Maxwell Air Force Bas sibilities” as leadership, strategy, and reflection M *12: y»fly *4.50. back issues * accrue to him. In this issue of the Review, our cents. USAF rscvminc pu bl ic a t io n 50- authors weigh these and such other areas of Air Force concern as logistics—by Lieutenant General Earl C. Hedlund, USAF; space—by Brigadier General Henry C. Huglin, USAF Vol. XIX No. 4 Mat-J une 1968 (RetJ; management—by Jerome G. Peppers, Jr.

HE Defense Supply Agency, which ob­ who were transferred for the most part from served its sixth anniversary in October the military departments with their missions, T1967, is one of several organizational and more than 1150 assigned military person­ innovations that developed as a result of new nel of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine techniques in management and new hardware Corps, dsa manages an inventory of about 1.7 for data processing. These improvements in­ million items valued at $2.9 billion, supporting cluded the Federal Catalog System, which annual “sales” (issues) totaling $1.9 billion made it possible to identify items by a standard prior to Vietnam. With the increased tempo numbering system; the high-speed computer, of operations in Vietnam, fiscal year 1967 sales which has the capability to process data rap­ totaled close to $4 billion, with procurement idly, perform numerous supply management in excess of $6.1 billion. The agency also calculations at frequent intervals, and sum­ serves as a central procurement agency for marize the results; and the high-speed data other supplies, principally bulk petroleum, communications network, which affords an which are delivered directly to service users. opportunity to centralize supply management Such items accoimted for $1.8 billion of the operations. Such developments permitted re­ fiscal 1967 procurement volume. examination of earlier military logistics systems. dsa’s supply management role is primarily Conceived in this environment, the De­ that of manager of secondary items, including fense Supply Agency (dsa) had two objectives repair parts and consumer supplies, in con­ set forth in its charter; first, to insure effective trast to the major end items of weapons and and timely supply support to the operating equipment managed by the military services. forces in mobilization, war. other national It supplies basic materials and great numbers emergencies, and in peacetime; and second, of repair parts and bits and pieces used in to provide this support at the lowest feasible the operation and maintenance of service- cost to the taxpayer. These objectives, in the managed weapons and equipment. order stated, govern all dsa operations and are It is important to note that the span of the criteria against which the agency’s per­ functions dsa performs for its assigned items formance is measured. is somewhat narrower than those traditionally The mission of the Defense Supply performed by the military departments. The Agency falls into three general areas: it is services retain control of qualitative require­ the wholesale source of designated common ments for items managed by dsa. They have supplies for the entire Department of De­ responsibility for research and development fense; it operates a consolidated contract and for the preparation and maintenance of administration service for all military depart­ specifications for all dsa items. They retain ments and the National Aeronautics and Space control over basic quantitative requirements Administration (nasa); and it administers cer­ through prescribed tables of allowances, load tain common logistic services and programs. lists, and the like. They also compute esti­ In the field of supply dsa represents a mated requirements for mobilization reserves consolidation of wholesale supply functions— and special programs, dsa computes replenish­ procurement, warehousing, and distribution- ment requirements for wholesale stocks; de­ in the common-use areas of food, clothing, cides how much to buy, how much to keep fuel, medical, industrial, construction, elec­ in wholesale stock, how best to distribute sup­ tronic, and general supplies. The agency has plies; and ensures that the required item is a work force of over 57,000 civilian employees, available to the military service retail supply

(Continued on page 6) Up to 800 railcars daily use the marshaling yard near the entrance to Defense Depot Ogden (Utah), a ;field activity of the Defense Supply Agency.

The shipping room of DSA’s Defense Documentation Center fills requests for about two million technical reports per year—a load equal to that of the postal service in a city of 35,000. . . . Military coats for special require- ments are made at the Manufacturing Directorate of the Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia.

6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

manager at the time the customer needs it. an assigned geographical area. Two special­ The present dsa system has maintained or ized depots handle only selected commodities: exceeded the high standards of supply effec­ one for clothing and textiles is co-located with tiveness established by the military depart­ the Defense Personnel Support Center in ments while continuing to reduce inventory Philadelphia; the other, for electronics, with investment and operating costs. The benefits the Defense Electronics Supply Center in of Defense-wide integrated management have Dayton. The Navy supply depots at Oakland been attained with minimum disruption of and Norfolk also function as specialized de­ the services’ logistical systems, dsa has fo­ pots supplying dsa items for the fleet and cused management attention on a segment Navy overseas installations, and these are the of supply that had often been neglected and chief sources of dsa material to Navy operat­ has applied to it the most advanced manage­ ing units. ment techniques and mechanized equipment In addition to its responsibilities for man­ at our disposal. Finally, dsa has ensured that agement of common supplies, dsa has the total Defense assets can be applied to the mission of administering several DOD-wide lo­ most urgent immediate need, regardless of gistics service programs. Among these are the the purpose for which they were procured. Federal Catalog, Materiel Utilization, Military There have been a number of examples of Standard Data or “MILs” Systems, and Co­ such action. Faced with a shortage of tropical ordinated Procurement. combat boots, tropical combat uniforms, and The Federal Catalog was a responsibility tentage for the forces in Vietnam, dsa mo­ of the former Armed Forces Supply Support bilized all Defense and industry capabilities Center, one of the first field organizations and secured priority determinations from the assigned to dsa. Maintaining the Defense por­ Joint Chiefs of Staff. All available supplies of tion of the Catalog at a manageable size is a these items were funneled into that theater continuing task, since some 40,000 new items for distribution to the troops on the combat are submitted for inclusion each month, and line in response to priorities designated by about 30,000 of these are actually admitted. the unified commander. Many of these are spare parts for support of dsa’s supply management functions are new major end items. There is a continuing carried out at six Defense Supply Centers, effort to delete older parts as equipment be­ handling, respectively, construction, electron­ comes obsolete. However, many Vietnam re­ ics, fuel, general, industrial, and personnel quirements have been met by retaining older requirements. Located in five major metro­ equipment in the inventory, which slows the politan areas, these centers serve as inventory deletion process. control points for their assigned commodities Retention of older items in the inventory supporting all Defense customers. Here de­ has also reduced the dollar value of materiel mands are electronically processed against utilization in the interservice utilization pro­ system-wide accountable records, and release gram. The services have found that they could orders are issued. Financial accounting, bill­ still use many items declared excess in previ­ ing, and collecting are likewise performed on ous years, and they have therefore not re­ a centralized basis. leased them, dod reutilization, much of it The distribution system that dsa employs effected through the dsa master computer at to move supplies from producer to user con­ Battle Creek, Michigan, decreased by $320 sists of seven principal and four specialized million during fiscal year 1967 to a new total depots. The principal depots are located at of $1.54 billion. Columbus, Ohio; Richmond, Virginia; Me- The Defense Industrial Plant Equipment chanicsburg, Pennsylvania; Atlanta, Georgia; Center, established at Memphis in March Memphis, Tennessee; Ogden, Utah; and Tracy, 1963, controls items of industrial plant equip­ California. They carry a wide range of dsa ment reported by the services as idle or excess items and support all military installations in to their needs. The center currently maintains THE DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY 7 primary inventory records of idle production Materiel Management Systems (sa mms), to equipment totaling almost 23,000 items with automate dsa supply management; and Mech­ an acquisition value exceeding $211 million. anization of Contract Administration Services Sendee requirements are screened against (mo c a s), to automate the contract administra­ these idle and excess equipments before new tion function. In support of these programs, procurement is initiated. This idle equipment dsa's Data Systems Automation Office is de­ is considered part of the dod industrial equip­ signing, developing, programming, and in­ ment resen’e. The balance of the reserve, also stalling data systems based on functional managed by the center, consists of some requirements and is delivering detailed com­ 31,600 items valued at $416 million. This por­ puter programs with appropriate documenta­ tion of the industrial equipment resen'e is tion to the field commands on a preplanned earmarked for specific mobilization require­ schedule of implementation. ments and is normally not available for The third major aspect of the dsa mission allocation. involves the operation of consolidated field The Defense Documentation Center (ddc) Defense Contract Administration Services was established as part of dsa in November (dcas) for most Defense contracts and for 1963, with the Armed Forces Technical In­ nasa. Organized in 1965, the dcas organiza­ formation Agency as its nucleus. Located with tion consists of a headquarters staff located dsa Headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, ddc in the dsa Headquarters; eleven Regions with is the central dod repository for scientific and offices at Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, technical information. Information generated Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Phil­ through contractor or in-house military re­ adelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco; and search, development, test, and evaluation an Industrial Security Clearance Office in projects is maintained at the center for dis­ Columbus, Ohio, dcas includes such functions semination to scientists and engineers work­ as preaward surveys, security clearance of ing in Defense and related fields. This service contractor personnel, administration of con­ helps to prevent unnecessary duplication in tracts, production and progress reporting, in­ scientific and engineering rdt&e activities. spection and acceptance of materiel, quality' In addition to services identified with assurance, accounting for government-owned specific dsa field activities, the agency has property furnished to contractors, and pay­ been designated as a focal point having re­ ment to contractors for goods and services sponsibility for administering Defense-wide delivered, dcas does not perform the procure­ coordination of certain standard logistic data ment function itself but does assume admin­ systems used by all the sendees: namely, istration of contracts in the field after they Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue have been executed by Procuring Contracting Procedures ( milstrip), Military Standard Offices. More than 275,000 prime contracts Transportation and Movement Procedures valued at approximately $50 billion are now- (mil st a mp), Military Standard Contract Ad­ assigned to the new organization for full ministration Sendees Procedures (mil sc a p), administration, and another 120,000 are as­ Military Standard Transaction Reporting and signed for partial administration. Accounting Procedures (mil st r a p), and Mili­ As a general rule, prime contracts for tary Supply and Transportation Evaluation major weapon systems remain under the Procedures (mil st ep). cognizance of the military- service having dsa is also developing three major com­ dominant interest. Many of the subcontracts puterized management systems for internal performed in support of the major weapon use within the agency: Mechanization of systems are, however, administered by the Warehousing and Shipment Processing regional offices of dcas. Other areas not in­ (mo wa sp), designed to automate the proce­ cluded under dcas cognizance are construc­ dures and transportation of the dsa depot tion contracts under the Navy Facilities and distribution activities; Standard Automated Engineering Command and the Army Corps A 16.000-pound guillotine cuts worn-out aircraft into pieces for smelting to aluminum ingots, which are sold to industry by DSA’s Defense Logistics Services Center. The operation, under Air Force direction, is conducted by a contractor at Tucson.

Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center is respon- sible for developing and maintaining central records of DOD’s inventory of industrial equipment and managing idle equipment. Among D1PEC storage areas is a huge underground one at Atchison, Kansas.

of Engineers, and shipbuilding contracts ad­ required to support them. To accomplish this ministered by the Navy Ship Systems Com­ mission a total of almost 10,000 quality- mand. assurance personnel are assigned to the eleven One of the most important features of dcas Regions throughout the United States. the dcas mission, and one of special interest Another mission of particular interest is to the Air Force, is the responsibility for the provision of technical management ser­ insuring delivery of military materiel of spec­ vices by personnel of the dcas Systems Support ified quality. The dcas organization is re­ Program. On contracts related to systems of sponsible for the inspection and acceptance high national priority and of special interest of many major items of military equipment to the military services, the Systems Support and most of the repair parts and supplies Program provides a focal point within the Ckeangotns cessels load material from the Defense General Buyers from the Defense Personnel Support Center Supply Center. Richmond, at a nearby deep-uater terminal. select beef for purchase by the military services.

The mechanized materials han- dling system at Defense Depot Ogden dtceru lute itemt from tilting trays into chute* for as many as 500 customers at one tune

oras organization where the program manager Air Force had an outstanding organization can obtain engineering information, evalua- and an effective system in the contract man­ tions. and recommendations The Systems agement area, dsa lias noted the fine esprit Support personnel are a management group of the Air Force people in this field and their onmted to production engineering, with the excellent career development and training capability to perform a wide variety of en- programs dsa likewise recognizes the im- gineering tasks jiortanic to the services of the proper per­ At the time oss assumed the contract ad- formance of this function and is doing its ministration services mission, the importance best to establish and maintain the same level of this function and the attention given it of excellence that has prevailed in the Air ivithin the Air Force were recognized. The Force. To this end, in planning for dcas, dsa 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW borrowed liberally from the Air Force system. 19 weapon systems; of these, 187,679 items Although dsa is not organized around have stock on hand, for an availability ratio weapon systems in the usual sense, neverthe­ of 96.6 percent. less it is the source of many items that are dsa has long been concerned about its vital to the operational readiness of virtually capability to support emergency and contin­ even' weapon system. Also, through its Weap­ gency requirements of the services. Mobiliza­ ons System Support Program, dsa does pro­ tion reserve stockage deficiencies existed at vide certain special management attention the time the agency was established, and the to those dsa items that are identified with financing of additional reserves since that designated weapon systems. The military time had been only nominal. Shortly after the sen'ices designate weapon systems for inclu­ buildup in Vietnam began, the need for posi­ sion in the dsa support program, and then a tive actions to cope with the surges in demand distinctive dsa weapon system designator or being experienced throughout the whole sup­ code identification is assigned. The military ply system became most apparent, dsa re­ services then identify DS.\-managed items sup­ quested increases in operating levels and in­ porting the selected systems to the responsible ventory investment to provide a cushion that Defense Supply Center. This information is would absorb the initial impact of further updated periodically to reflect additions and increases in demand. In fiscal years 1966 and deletions in the items supported. The program 1967 additional funding was obtained to fi­ became operational in July 1964 with three nance procurement of stocks to support in­ weapon systems and 23,700 DSA-managed creases in force levels and deployments. items. From this description of dsa’s mission, it Special data included in dsa’s record of is apparent that the agency’s workload in sup­ weapon system support items permit special port of Southeast Asia would increase roughly management emphasis to be given to these in proportion to the buildup of U.S. forces items. The program has the following dis­ in the area. This is bome out by a compara­ tinctive features: tive listing for a three-year period:

• All weapon systems support items are FY FY FY Planned centrally managed and stocked in the dsa dis­ Stock Fund Operations 1965 1966 1967 FY 1968 tribution system. Sates (billions) $ 1.9 $ 2.9 S 4.0 $ 4.0 Obligations (billions) 1.8 4.2 4.3 3.5 • A supply management review of On order, EOP (billions) 0.5 1.9 1.5 1.2 weapon support items is made at least every Requisitions & Tonnage - , 90 days. From this frequent review dsa can Handled • pick up even minor changes in usage trends Reqns processed (millions) 15.9 ' 20.0 20.4 21.6 and can quickly adjust procurement quanti­ Tons shipped (thousands) 1575 2385 2698 2062 Tons received (thousands) 1404 2567 3241 2052 ties to match. • Weapon systems support items are Despite this tremendous increase in work­ given priority in funding and procurement load, supply effectiveness measured in terms and are “red tagged" to expedite procurement of stock availability has held up fairly well. actions. It declined from an average of 91.4 percent in fiscal year 1965 to 87.8 percent in fy 1966 • Special emphasis is placed on reduc­ and 86.5 percent in fy 1967, but it is currently ing administrative and procurement lead times averaging about 90 percent. Both the on-time for these items. fill rate and the stock availability rate for the Since the primary purpose of a weapon past two years reflect repeated large-scale systems support program is responsiveness, increases in demands on the system and in­ dsa strives to maintain a high degree of readi­ ability to overcome the long procurement lead ness to react to demands from the operating time in receiving materiel into the system to forces. The current stock availability picture satisfy these demands. shows a total of 194,354 dsa items supporting When the Vietnam war started, dsa’s THE DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY 11

DSA W eapon Systems Support Program

Stock Weapon Systems DSA Items on Hand Percent

M-16 rifle 1 1 100 Hawk missile 16,372 15,784 96.4 Iroquois helicopter 2,880 2,729 94.8 Engine generators missile sites 9,900 9,273 93.7 Pershing missile 8,820 8,449 95.8 Chinook helicopter 5,302 5,050 95.2 Anti-mortar radar 745 723 97.0 Sheridan tank 1,510 1,442 95.5 Polaris missile 83,768 80,666 96.3 A-6 Intruder aircraft 10,582 10,336 97.7 A-5 Vigilante aircraft 7,168 7,035 98.1 P-3 Orion aircraft 7,623 7,446 97.7 Tacamo II 1,050 1,027 97.8 A-7 Corsair aircraft 4,266 4,141 97.1 Terrier, Talos, & Tartar missiles 24,663 24,207 98.2 Minuteman missile 4,982 4,783 96.1 F-4 Phantom aircraft 2,596 2,520 97.1 F-105 Thunderchief aircraft 2,003 1,944 97.1 KC-135 Stratotonker aircraft 123 123 100 194,354 187,679 96.6 B-52 Strato Fortress aircraft nominated--no cards received to date C-130 Hercules aircraft nominated--effective 1 Nov 1967

main problem was in clothing, but this situa­ items in order to increase the industrial base. tion has been overcome, dsa’s peacetime stock dsa also attempted the substitution of levels and available mobilization reserves sim­ commercially available items for long-lead- ply were not adequate to cope with the sharp time military items wherever feasible. It at­ surge in demand in the face of the fairly tempted to relax noncritical specifications in long procurement lead times applicable to this order to facilitate manufacture and provided commodity. While dsa had to ration issues to industry with advance procurement planning nonpriority activities, we were able to keep information by publishing forecasts of require­ up with the essential needs of deployed units ments. and recruit centers. In spite of these efforts dsa had continu­ Faced with long lead times and, in the ing difficulty in certain commodity areas, case of clothing, an industry already working notably clothing, in attracting suppliers with at maximum capacity, dsa took extraordinary sufficient production capacity to meet its measures to overcome its supply difficulties. needs. The booming civilian economy made Deliveries from existing contracts were ac­ it extremely hard to place orders by use of celerated wherever possible. Procurement spe­ normal procurement methods. When all other cialists sought out new suppliers of critical efforts failed, the agency resorted to the use 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW of rated/directed orders as authorized by the of the inventory managers and the military Defense Materials Production Act, to require services’ logistics staffs. As a result, many capable but unwilling manufacturers to fulfill requisitions were canceled or the quantities its requirements. Fortunately these actions reduced, allowing dsa to respond better to have been successful in broadening the indus­ genuine needs. trial base and correcting support difficulties. Another problem is in applying funds to procurements in a balanced way across the Int the spa n of a half decade, dsa has knit commodities board so that dsa can effectively together almost 60,000 military and civilian support service requirements. While it is un­ personnel into a highly responsive logistic derstandable that the rapid deployment of organization, which has demonstrated its large numbers of troops to foreign areas will worth under the severest tests of the Vietnam result in logistical upheavals, the Defense war. Even in the course of an accelerated dsa Supply Centers and dsa Headquarters are buildup of military forces, continues to striving to reduce or eliminate the ordering make progress toward its secondary goal of of excessive quantities of materiel as well as reducing costs through integrated manage­ duplicative requisitioning. ment. However, today more than ever before One of the findings made by a dsa team the principal focus of the agency’s effort is visiting Vietnam was that requisitions often on giving effective support to the armed had been prepared without considering the forces, wherever deployed. In this effort dsa quantities already due in on prior unfilled feels that its performance has earned respect requisitions. This was brought to the attention within the Defense establishment. Defense Supply Agency

UR ancestors for thousands of years undertaken by man, and it may also prove to have gazed on the moon and the stars be the most rewarding. O as beautiful, mysterious parts of the Quite naturally, there are critics, skeptics, universe in which our planet Earth exists. But and challengers of this great new venture, just now we are reaching out to them, and the as there are of nearly everything new and out solution of some of their mysteries is within of the ordinary. There were those who criti­ our grasp. cized Ferdinand and Isabella for spending We humans have always been the most money on Columbus’s voyages. All the major curious of all beings. We have sought to un­ efforts in man’s exploration of flight, from the derstand our environment and ourselves. We Wright brothers on, have been subject to respond to the challenge of the unknown, of criticism, skepticism, and challenge. adventure, and of exploration. We have often There are always more worthy projects been more willing and eager to set out on than there are funds, resources, and talents to new ventures than to wrestle with the mun­ match the needs. But there is no program to dane problems of our home environment. And meet other needs of ours that offers as much sometimes the knowledge, experience, and glamour, excitement, and prospect of solid new wealth which have come from our ex­ achievement in the long term as space; there­ plorations have helped to solve the problems fore, none is so competitive as to drain away that we turned our back on when we ven­ from our space venture its essential resources. tured forth. So it may well be with space, This space program of ours, far from being man’s greatest venture. a waste of resources, is likely to prove the Our ancestors always yearned to fly. We soundest, most worthwhile, and, in the long achieved and mastered this capability in the run, cheapest—because of the dividends it will air with the airplane in this century. Ten years pay—of all major ventures undertaken by man. ago the moment in our technological evolu­ Most of us are now diverted only momen­ tion arrived when the exploration of space tarily by news of another spectacular space became possible. The conjunction of knowl­ launch from Cape Kennedy or of astronauts edge, techniques, and resources occurred so walking in space. We find ourselves more and that we could set out upon exploration of the more accepting as ordinary our incredible heavens almost with greater confidence than achievements in space. Do we really compre­ seafarers centuries ago had when they set out hend the vast scope of our space venture and upon the exploration of distant oceans or our its potential impact on our society and our air pioneers had when they set out to master role in the world? flight in the air. This quest in space is requiring tremen­ Much of what we are doing in space has dous scientific, engineering, physical, and fi­ been developed from our experience of flight nancial resources. Yet it will cost us less than in the air, and in part because of this expe­ one percent of our gross national product and rience our achievements in astronautics are involve less than one-half of one percent of coming at a much faster rate and in much our labor force. But its impact is progressively broader scope than in aeronautics. Our great to affect all of us and in fact the whole world. venture into space is in many ways the most To better appreciate the scope and depth dramatic, difficult, and challenging quest ever of this undertaking, we should judge the OUR SPACE VENTURE AND ROLE IN THE WORLD 15 plans, purposes, achievements, and potential such older nations as Britain and France and values of our space program in the context the lack of many of our blessings in Soviet of the present world environment and our Russia. Since we did not seek this role, the role in the world. mantle of responsibility which goes with it rests uneasily on our shoulders. Like many parents and community leaders upon whom The World Environment and responsibility devolves, we chafe under our Our Role in the World role and have difficulty in accepting it ma­ turely. Yet, like parents and community lead­ The security and future well-being of ers, we cannot turn back the clock to our our nation depend in large part upon a com­ national adolescence, nor can we shirk our bination of our political wisdom, economic responsibilities unless we are prepared to see strength, military strength and our will to use other nations with quite different standards it, technological competence, and the image and objectives—many of which are inimical to we project. Our space activities contribute to ours—take over the world and us with it. Thus each of these essential factors except the first. we have no rational choice but to fulfill re­ Our primary goals are for a peaceful sponsibly the role into which we have been world where we and all other people can live thrust. So we must explore the frontiers of secure from aggression, either direct or in­ space because we have the capability to do direct by subversion; where diversity can so. If we do not, Soviet Russia will do it ahead flourish, with all people living under a gov­ of us and thereby may be able to dominate ernment of their own free choosing; and the world—to our peril and the peril of other where rising expectations of a better life have people who now live in freedom. prospect of fulfillment. We cannot avoid the fact that we are But these goals of ours are now unrealiz­ one of two superpowers in the world today able because of age-old greeds, animosities, competing in many fields. The other, Soviet and excessive nationalism which subvert them. Russia, despite her present relative quietude, Due also to these age-old negative fac­ is basically expansionist and committed to tors, the United Nations is disappointingly turn the world her way. Through the politi­ weak, and there is little prospect that it can cal wisdom of our policies, our military and be significantly strengthened in the immedi­ economic strength, and the will to use this ate future. It is wholly beyond our power as strength, we have so far succeeded in keeping a nation to strengthen the U.N. appreciably the Soviets from achieving their purposes because of the contrary objectives and ob­ either by open aggression or by their promo­ structionism of Soviet Russia and the irre­ tion of subversion. We are now faced with sponsibility and self-centeredness of many of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, the new nations in the world—and some of which in their definition means outdoing us the older ones, such as France. without open warfare by all means feasible. To preserve our future as well as the In their view this includes trying to create future of others who now live in freedom, we the substance or, if not the substance, the must keep strong politically, ideologically, illusion of a superior system to which the economically, technologically, and militarily. other nations of the world will be drawn by We did not seek this pre-eminent role of power or by coercion. And space is obviously power and responsibility in the world; we one of the major fields which Soviet Russia were projected into it by the combination of has picked for competition. the resources of our land, the talents and We have survived as a nation for the past industriousness of our people, our system of twenty-five years through our technological individual liberty, freedom of opportunity, superiority and the ability to project our and the incentive of rewards from our free strengths where they were vital to our na­ enterprise system, along with the decline of tional security. For twenty years our signifi­ 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW cant superiority in strategic power has been brilliant success immediately altered the image the main deterrent to general war and the in which the Soviets and we had previously main insurer of our security. Today space been regarded. Many people in the world represents a new arena of capability that were led to believe that the Soviets had out­ is potentially as important as, and perhaps distanced us and that their system was supe­ even more important than, previous arenas, rior to ours in applying science to technological including flight in the air. As we have been development. Further, their achievements gave secure in the past only by excelling in our the impression that the Soviets were ahead military, economic, and technological capa­ of us in missile development and accuracy bilities, so we can be secure in the future only and that therefore the balance of strategic- if we also excel in this new arena. power had changed in their favor; thus our We must recognize that leadership in previously accepted strategic military superi­ technology is a prime requirement of our ority was brought into serious question. The future as a major nation with our way of life. psychological consequences were doubts and We are in a highly competitive technological disarray among our allies and an increase in age, an age in which technology is advancing admiration and respect for the Soviets very rapidly. We cannot avoid casting the throughout the world. And the Soviets did space venture in a seriously competitive at­ their best to capitalize on these changed mosphere—an extension of our confrontation attitudes. and of our competition for survival and for Further, the Soviets became dazzled by the respect, if not necessarily the allegiance, their own achievements. As a result they of the peoples of the world. overrated their actual strength to the point Yet, if we were the only nation in the where they became bolder and more threat­ world or the only advanced major nation, we ening over places like Berlin. Only with our would certainly have undertaken the explora­ successful confrontation over their sneak move tion of space simply because the time for it of missiles into Cuba in October 1962 did we had come through scientific and technological end the dangerous illusion of Soviet superi­ development. Whenever he has become able, ority. Thus it was made clear that our security man has tackled the unknown. But had there —in fact the world’s security from the risk of not been strong competition from Soviet Rus­ general nuclear war—rested upon our main­ sia, our space venture would undoubtedly not taining a significant superiority over Soviet have been undertaken at the pace and with Russia in every major field of power. Space the scope that it has been. (In the long run, was clearly a new field in which adequate though, our exploration of space may well be effort was required on our part. less costly and more fruitful for having been We, too, had launched a satellite develop­ pursued at the pace we have set.) ment program in the early 1950s, but it was short on funds, interest, and priority. Two months after the Soviets launched their first Achievements, Purposes, Sputnik a much-publicized effort of ours, and Commitments Project Vanguard, failed in an attempt to place a 3l2-pound sphere into orbit. Finally, The space age was dramatically opened on the last day of January 1958, our first suc­ on 4 October 1957 by Soviet Russia’s launch­ cessful spacecraft, Explorer I, weighing 31 ing of Sputnik I, weighing 184 pounds, into pounds, was successfully shot into orbit. orbit around the earth. A month later Sputnik Within a year after the Sputnik launch­ II, weighing 1120 pounds and containing a ings we had set up the National Aeronautics live dog, was successfully orbited. With these and Space Administration and started to de­ two satellites the Soviets pulled off a political, velop a broad-based, scientifically oriented psychological, and technological coup that space exploration program. In the late 1950s, was to have profound implications. Their however, our space program was still a rela- OUR SPACE VENTURE AND ROLE IN THE WORLD 17 tively modest one, and its objectives seemed as possible we can prevent them from upset­ to be much more modest than those of the ting the strategic balance in missiles or anti­ Soviets. Further, a great deal of valuable time missile systems. So what other field can they had been lost, and the initiative rested for a turn to? Is it not still space? May they not long time with the Soviets; it was not to be hope that space will still provide them the until after 1962 that our achievements would best hope of a breakthrough and, thereby, of significantly surpass those of the Soviets, to beating us in power and prestige? start the swing of the political-psychological In the past few years the Soviets have balance back to us. markedly increased their expenditure of re­ Our space program figuratively “got off sources on space work; yet their achievements the ground” in 1961. After the one-orbit flight are not nearly as spectacular as our recent of Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, President Ken­ ones. This leads one to suspect that they are nedy set for the nation “the goal, before this striving mightily for some significant space decade is out, of landing a man on the moon development which would give them the most and returning him safely to earth.” power or prestige or both. This great venture has been strongly sup­ In Soviet Russia, most of the develop­ ported by the Congress and the American ments of space technology have been for mili­ people. In pursuit of this goal, we have made tary purposes, and many domestic references giant strides in space. In many ways we have by Soviet leaders to space accomplishments outdistanced the So\iets, and we have restored have directly related them to Soviet military in large part the image of American techno­ power. Clearly, their space activities have logical leadership and dynamism throughout been an integral part of their overall military the world. Yet our competition with the Soviets program, this despite the fact that in their in space remains just as vital as ever, even propaganda they claim that their space work though it appears currently to have subsided. is solely for peaceful uses and that ours is After the Cuban missile confrontation the solely for military purposes. The Soviets are Soviets apparently accepted for the time being simply not wealthy enough, nor are they so the realities of our strategic missile and bomb­ oriented, to spend their somewhat limited re­ er superiority. They have relaxed the pressures sources upon scientific developments for the in Europe and have occupied themselves benefit of mankind. Almost all their efforts in primarily with trying to deal effectively with major fields have been related to the building the disintegrating relationships with Red China of Soviet power and influence; they strive in and within the Communist movement around almost everything they do for political and the world, as well as trying to handle their psychological advantages. own serious internal problems. But it is hard Therefore, the soundest expectation is to believe that the Soviets have given up their that the Soviets are continuing to place the long-range goal of surpassing us in power and best of their technological resources into influence in the world. They still talk about achieving a major breakthrough in space and apparently believe their ideological dogma which will give them political, psychological, of turning the whole world Communist. To and, hopefully, strategic advantages over us. do that, they need not only transcending So, in all prudence, we cannot ignore the fact power but also the aura of success and a su­ that a good part of our effort in space is re­ perior system. The illusion of this they had lated to our competition with Soviet Russia for a few years after the first Sputnik, and for superiority in the world, which so vitally they now seem to be striving again for the affects our future. We must not lose this race. illusion or the reality: they have recently be­ There are no prizes for second-best in this gun deploying an antimissile system, and they world struggle. A position of second-best to are building and emplacing a much larger Soviet Russia could mean for us, at the most, intercontinental ballistic missile force. Yet the a loss of our way of life, or, at the least, a Soviets know that if we respond as effectively hazardous existence.

(Continued on page 20)

The Space Scene

A walk in space during the last Gemini flight (1) . .. Hurricanes observed on 14 September 1967 by Environmental Science Services Ad- ministration's weather satellite (2) . . . Gemini re-entry spacecraft (3) . . . Surveyor Vs own foot and footprint on the lunar surface as televised after its 10 September 1967 landing (4) . . . Tiros photograph of the south coast of Australia taken on 21 January 1966 (5) . . . The U.S. Gulf Coast from Gemini XI (6) 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

This may seem a hard and cynical atti­ our role of pre-eminent power and responsi­ tude. It is. But we should remember that there bility in the world. In this role we need to are still much more greed and selfishness in maintain pre-eminence in space. We need to the world than compassion and cooperation. continue our broad-based program of space We should lead in compassion, in assistance exploration. And we need to succeed in our to the needy, and in holding out our hands goal of being first on the moon. The first man in friendship. Yet life, liberty, and the pursuit on the moon will probably be the most fa­ of happiness still come basically from security mous man of this century, if not of this millen­ for our land and people, and this security nium. Who remembers the second man to comes from strength, foresight in keeping this cross the Atlantic after Columbus? Who re­ strength, and a clear, demonstrated wall to members the next one to fly the Atlantic after use that strength if necessary. These well- Lindbergh? tested factors apply in the realm of space. And wishing it were different will not make it so. Potential Values The Soviets and we, through the United and Dividends Nations, have agreed, along with the other U.N. members, that outer space will be used For all our effort, resources, and long­ only for peaceful purposes. Under this agree­ term commitments, what specifically are we ment we cannot place weapons in space. It really going to gain from space? What are the does not preclude the development of capa­ actual values of the space program to us as a bilities for reconnaissance, inspection, and nation and a people? What has been achieved verification of the nature of objects which are so far, and what is in prospect? placed in space by others. And this agreement The foremost value will be the preserva­ also does not preclude our developing missile tion of our way of life, our freedom, and the capabilities based on earth to knock out of stature and prestige of our nation in its un­ orbit any weapons that might be placed there avoidable pre-eminent position in the world. by the Soviets or any other hostile power. Space may well be the key element in the Therefore, we must continue to develop the future of the world and the key element in capability to destroy or negate any hostile our nation’s future. If we are to remain great, threat that might be placed in space, irrespec­ if we are to be true to the values, the goals, tive of the U.N. agreement. Naive trust in and the ideals for which we stand, we must another nation’s intentions and actions has led continue to accept the challenge of space with to national disasters, from the Trojan horse an effort commensurate with the greatness of to the Munich agreement. the challenge and with our broad-based, re­ Our space effort is now larger and more markable capabilities. fruitful to science on a broader basis than But beyond our security and prestige, a the spectacular exploits of Soviet Russia. major value of our space program will derive The scope—although not the quality—of our from the experience our government-industry achievement was reflected statistically at team is gaining in marshaling and managing the end of 1967 by our having successfully on a nationwide basis a complex of resources launched 514 spacecraft, of which 267 were consisting of highly developed equipment, still in orbit, whereas Soviet Russia had installations, and skilled people. The rapidly launched 252 spacecraft (less than half as expanding experience from this venture is many), of which 63 (less than a fourth as running deep through our national life. It will many) were still in orbit. Yet, regardless of pay great dividends as we tackle other great our lead, nothing can erase the fact that Yuri ventures of our society, such as the w'ar on Gagarin, not John Glenn, was first to orbit poverty, the renovation of our cities, the re­ the earth. versal of the pollution of our environment, Our space activity is now reflecting well and the exploration and tapping of the vast OUR SPACE VENTURE AND ROLE IN THE WORLD 21

food and mineral resources of the oceans. physiology. The building of rocket motors and We are profiting from our space achieve­ structures for the rockets and their payloads ments in other tangible ways, too. Our mete­ has resulted in new products and new manu­ orological satellites have brought us near to facturing processes. a quantum jump in capability to forecast Space has proved to be a vast new fron­ weather around the world. The geodetic satel­ tier for exploration and a great new laboratory lites have sun eyed our earth with more accu­ for scientific investigation. Our scientific dis­ racy by far than was possible by any other coveries are changing many theories that means. New sensors in satellites are developing could not be tested previously, and these the capability to scan the earth for minerals changes will affect our knowledge of the en­ and to sunrey crops and forest lands. Our scien­ vironment in which we live, with inestimable tific satellites are just beginning to acquire a value to us. great deal of new knowledge about our solar Our human urge to explore the unknown system, the sun, the moon, the planets, and and our drive to satisfy our scientific curiosity' the energy that comes from outer space, all of in the search for answers to national needs which will help to increase significantly our provide incentives which converge in our understanding of this earth we live on and the national space venture. And this venture is properties of the universe which affect our already having profound effects on the scien­ environment. tific, technical, educational, industrial, and The communication satellites are on the military aspects of our life. Yet our explora­ verge of creating a res olution in the spread of tion of space is still in its infancy; its effects information around the world. Within a few are going to multiply. The money, time, and years, all the people of the world can be in­ resources w'e will devote to it may well re­ stantaneously in contact through radio and dound a thousandfold to our benefit and to television. No longer should closed societies the benefit of all mankind. under totalitarian regimes be readily capable of keeping their people from knowing what the rest of mankind is doing and thinking. Potential Impact on The effect upon captive peoples and their International Cooperation leaders can be profound. The potential gain for freedom, for diversity, and for the free A great need of our time is for mankind competition of ideas should be immense. The to surmount the age-old causes of conflict and political, psychological, social, and economic war: greed for other people’s territory', racial impacts of this development may well be and ethnic animosities, and excessive national­ world-shaking. ism. The U.N. does many useful things but In early prospect are satellites for navi­ has been a disappointment in not fulfilling its gation aids to shipping and aircraft and for purposes, because of the conflicting objectives control of these means of transportation on a of many nations that have subscribed to the regional or worldwide basis. lofty ideals of the U.N. charter but have not In the process of creating satellites to do abided by them. Yet in the last tw'enty years these tasks and to put men into space, w'e there has been a slow'ly growing sense of in­ have also developed many new processes and terdependence, and international cooperation materials and have gained much new' scien­ in many fields has developed through U.N. tific knowledge. Microminiaturization of elec­ agencies, regional alliances, and bilateral ac­ tronics is one tremendous development. New tion. Technological developments have played materials for coping with the heating problem a major role in this growth of international on the re-entry of satellites have already been cooperation. For example, nuclear weapons used in common household items. The bio­ have markedly dampened careless or reckless medical instrumentation of man in space is drifting into war and thereby have promoted contributing to the understanding of human cooperation. Space exploration and related

(Continued on page 24) Space Hardware

Passive Geodetic Satellite, PACEOS, of the National Aero- nautics and Space Administration (1) . . . Early Bird (2) . . . Nozzles of the five engines of the Saturn V first stage (3) . . . Interplanetary Monitoring Platform (IMP-E) (4) . . . Telstar, superimposed against a starry background (5) . . . Syncom C, synchronous orbiting communication satellite (6) . . . Television Infrared Observation Satellite, Tiros, for weather research (7) .1*2 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW developments may result in putting strong to fully recognize their interdependence. pressures on mankind, especially on those who Robert Ardrey, in his book The Territorial live in closed societies with expansionist am­ Imperative, develops a thesis that man is bitions, to change their outlook and cooperate basically a competitive territorial being, that for the benefit of all. war in the past has provided a natural outlet In the execution of our space program we for man’s principal drives, and that compe­ have done a great deal to promote interna­ tition in space may be a useful way to channel tional cooperation. The Soviets and we are this competitive drive into relatively peaceful cooperating in the exchange of some informa­ channels—when nuclear weapons have made tion, although not yet to the extent that we major war unprofitable and irrational. If he have proposed and hoped for. We have under­ is right, our competition with the Soviets may, taken cooperative sounding rocket programs in itself, be serving a vital function. with twenty other countries and cooperative satellite programs with Britain, Canada, Italy, Germany, and the European Space Research O ur unavoidable pre-eminence in the world Organization. We have established mutually requires us to play our role responsibly or beneficial relationships in space work with else see our society decline. This role involves about seventy other nations; these include leadership in scientific exploration, techno­ nations that have provided facilities for our logical development, and steps to insure that tracking and instrumentation stations. Our no other nation, by a breakthrough, endangers sending experienced astronauts on educational the security of our nation and those dependent and goodwill trips to many places abroad has upon us. promoted a feeling of common interest in our Missile boosters, guidance systems, and space activities, as well as projected a fine other technological developments have made image of this country. possible the exploration of space, the greatest We have tried to share as widely as pos­ unexplored frontier. It is there. It must be sible with other nations’ scientists the results explored, and we must lead the venture. As of our space discoveries in order that they President Johnson has said: “The fate of the may profit in their research from our new free society—and the human values it upholds knowledge. Further, our meteorological, geo­ —is unalterably tied to what happens in outer detic, and navigation satellites are providing space, as humankind’s ultimate dimensions.” information of benefit to people throughout Our leadership in space is now linked to the world. our leadership in the world. Such leadership The commercial communications satellites should be broad-based, but it also must in­ that we are in the process of launching under clude leadership in the most dramatic accom­ the Communications Satellite Corporation will plishments. The most dramatic of all is to put create a service with a network of satellites a man on the moon. That will be regarded as that will be offered to many nations; already mankind’s most stupendous scientific and tech­ fifty have joined as potential users. nological achievement in this century and In many ways our space explorations and probably in history. The process of achieving achievements should assist our role in the it will give benefits to society in many fields, world and promote the attractiveness of our most of which we cannot now conceive; and way of life to the rest of mankind. Hopefully, these alone will justify the effort and the costs too, our achievements in space will help man­ many times over. kind bridge the political, social, and ideologi­ The overriding objective of our man-on- cal gap between the vistas which technological the-moon effort is a psychological one— developments are opening up and the archa­ Americans, products of a free society', will ism of many of man’s attitudes and institu­ have performed mankind s greatest feat. The tions. Space may well help close the gap value of this is incalculable for energizing between science and society by aiding people our own society and, equally important, for OUR SPACE VENTURE AND ROLE IN THE WORLD 25 the respect, confidence, and admiration which Our reaching out for the stars can inspire it will generate throughout the world. our greatest vision, courage, and ingenuity Human nature is sufficiently basic in the and can lead to a better era of peace and values it cherishes to be attracted to the prosperity on earth. But this can happen only leader, to the winner, to the one with out­ if the exploration of space is led by free men standing skills, devotion, and persistence to who will apply the benefits for man’s better­ excel. Outer space is now our testing ground ment and not for his enslavement. and our field of opportunity. Man may be infinitesimal compared with the sweep of the Santa Barbara, California universe, but our intelligence and skills ap­ plied with wisdom can unlock the secrets of space and enable us to adapt even better to our environment and play our role in the Acknowledgment world responsibly. The photographs accompanying this article were furnished by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. POLLUTION IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL ATMOSPHERE

J er ome G. Pepper s, J r . Thus, the actions and the interests at each level of management create an atmosphere. These actions and interests can be pollution- free or they can be pollution-prone. The organizational environment may fall at either of two extremes, foul or clean, or somewhere between. Such extremes might be IMPORTANT subject in the world shown in block form as follows: today is air pollution. Nations, states,

and municipalities are working on Organizational Environment hundreds of approaches to solve this problem. foul ______clean Some people say that the world’s human popu­ lation is slowly poisoning itself out of existence through continued pollution of our air supply. The threat is receiving increasing attention at all levels, and undoubtedly a sane and logical answer will be found. How many people, though, are concerned today about pollution of the organizational atmosphere or environment in which we work? Is it possible that our management “industry” is spewing pollution into the working climate The relative position of any organization at a rate beyond our clean-up capability? could be established by comparing the degree Ever)’ organization has an atmosphere or of “management pollutants” with the degree environment. This atmosphere is to a large of “management cleaners” in the organization’s extent conditioned by the actions and phi­ operation. We could then show the “pollution losophies of those who run the show. In our block” thus: civilian economy these people are called man­ agers. In our defense establishment they are Organizational Environment called commanders, directors, or managers. For simplicity, we shall refer to them all, whether in civilian enterprise or government, as managers. The manager sets the tone—creates the at­ mosphere—for his organization by the things he does, the requirements he establishes, the policies he sets, and the way in which he does these things. According to an old adage, “There is no greater fertilizer than the boss’s footsteps.” In other words, the boss’s attention and concern enhance or inhibit any action in Therefore, an organizational environment any organization. His interest acts as a fer­ in which pollutants outweigh cleaners would tilizer; his lack of interest acts as an inhibitor. be positioned to the left, tending toward 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

“foul.” The “clean” environment, positioned to ings and Public Law determine some limits of the right, would be one in which the cleaners manager actions. Moral values, ethical consid­ outweigh pollutants. erations, and spiritual backgrounds of our Pollutants are those things which hamper, society impose further limitations. Thus, the constrain, restrict, or otherwise limit human manager’s impact on the organization, while of development or the exercise of intelligent logic considerable scope and strength, is not with­ in action. Cleaners are those things which en­ out some applied and implied control. Even courage initiative, creativity, human dignity, so, the manager determines in which direction, and professional craftsman-like performance. within these control limits, the organization I would readily acknowledge that few if will move: toward “foul” or “clean.” any organizations would fall at either extreme In view of the fact that the manager does of the block. I would further acknowledge, not have full control over the environment, we and just as readily, that organizational posi­ might alter our “pollution block” to look like tion in the block would vary, depending upon this: current mission pressures and other factors. In fact, the organization would likely move up Organizational Environment and down the slant line as conditions, pres­ sures, and other stimuli are experienced. The foul clean movement would be in rather limited range, and an “average” position could be established. In actuality, of course, no organization would likely be on the extreme left or extreme right. A penal institute might approach the "foul ’ because of the need for absolute con­ trol and little personal freedom. Another or­ ganization near the “foul” might be one of the strictly disciplined religious orders. We might cleaners conclude, then, that all “foul” organizations need not be “bad in nature. An organization approaching the ultimate “clean might be a In this block, no organization reaches medical research facility in which there are either extreme: note that the more put into few organizational constraints and there is the cleaners, the less effect from the pollutants. maximum individual freedom to pursue the And this is my aim to this point: additional research goal. Another nearing the “clean” management attention and concern are needed might be a hippy commune in which personal if the organizational atmosphere is to be freedom is almost totally uninhibited. Here cleansed. we might conclude that all “clean” organiza­ tions need not be “good” in nature. the indicators The organizations in which most of us work would fall between the two extremes. There are indicators that may be used to The relative position would result from the measure the organizational atmosphere. Most acts, impressions, and attitudes of the various of them are controllable by management and, managers. Since all managers are human and therefore, are a likely reflection of the man­ subject to the variations of human emotions agers beliefs and inclinations. They relate to and reactions, our organizational environment the degree of cleanliness in the management will vary from day to day. Again, an “average” atmosphere. They can show the need for in­ location can likely be determined. vestigation and action if the manager is not Management environment is further varied satisfied with his position in the block. by the local interpretation and application of Seven primary indicators apply to all or­ definite limiting factors. Certainly, legal rul­ ganizations. The degree to which they apply POLLUTION IN ORGANIZATIONAL ATMOSPHERE 29

might be used as the measure of atmospheric been in units where everything is covered by pollution. None is completely go no-go, all policy, sometimes in sickening detail. Not only black or all white. Even so, general statements were all the possible major events covered by may sen e to permit organizational self-analy­ policy but so were all the unlikely events. In sis, and that of itself may be worth the total this organization the policy file, or manual, exercise. No organization will remain un­ grows visibly because each problem, no matter changed by a careful, conscientious, in-depth what size, results in a new or revised policy review of these indicators: publication. The “book” becomes so stifling Policies that individuals feel they need clearance and Procedures (process instructions) guidance before they can accomplish even the Rules or directives most basic task. Creativity, initiative, and in­ Instructions novation are subordinate to following the pat­ Duty assignments tern of set policy. It is in this type of organiza­ Areas of responsibility tion that people develop a “sheep complex” Communication. and follow their leaders with no thought ex­ In this discussion extremes will be em­ cept, perhaps, a hope for salvation through phasized in hopes of providing an adaptable reassignment. measure. It is understood that peculiar and The difference in the atmosphere of the specific needs of individual organizations may two extremes is usually quite obvious. At the dictate certain use of an indicator which is not opposite pole from the “detailed and many,” indicative of the manager’s personal philoso­ the "broad and few” present a different pic­ phy. That is, the manager may have little ture. Here we find a basic trust in people and leeway in one or more areas because of re­ in their wisdom and inherent desire to do the quirements of higher management. In these right thing for a successful association. The instances the manager must be even more policy guidance is limited in quantity, and that diligent in the indicator areas over which he which exists relies to large degree upon logical does have control. interpretation and application by the people. It is not the intent of this article to en­ The atmosphere is clear and clean. The people courage a manager to do anything he would sense the trust and confidence, and they act not normally do, except perhaps analyze his accordingly. Of course there are occasional organization’s atmosphere. If this analysis "goofs,” but these do not result in new policy shows the manager that he can help clean his even though they may require discussion be­ organization’s atmosphere, he would be ex­ tween manager and subordinate. Both ele­ pected to act—logically within the limitations ments (the leader and the led) learn from this, of his authority and the needs of his organiza­ and policy may be—and likely is—established, tion. even though it is neither spoken of nor related to in such terms. policies Most organizations will be maneuvering between these extremes. Some policy will be Policies establish settled courses of action established by higher levels of management, to be followed. The quantity of the organiza­ and the organization must fit into that guid­ tion’s policies and the amount of detail in them ance. Even so, within a given structure, a man­ constitute a measure of the atmosphere. The ager determines whether or not he will add to extreme left on our scale would represent de­ the policy already established. He determines tailed policies in great profusion. The far right the detail to which he resorts, This is his area atmosphere would contain few policies, and of management control in which he can affect those would be broad in scope, containing his organization’s atmosphere. The wise man­ little detail. ager will avoid the trap of extensive policy Most of us have worked in organizations documents because he will recognize the prob­ approaching both ends of the scale. We have ability of fouling the environment. 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

When the manager feels that many or what is commonly considered as bureaucracy more detailed policies are required, a basic at its worst. They are sometimes the result of communication fault may exist. There is a pos­ small people with large jobs. sibility that the manager’s urge for policy re­ The worst part about this sort of manage­ lates to his people’s inadequate response in ment action is that it hangs on through some effort area. Perhaps this inadequacy changes of managers and after a bit assumes results from the manager’s failure to achieve the sainthood of tradition or custom. At this adequate and satisfactory communication of point the procedure becomes almost untouch­ goals or objectives to his people. Perhaps, too, able, and real bravery is required even to the inadequacy stems from a deeper source of question the subject, let alone challenge it. The trouble—an organizational atmosphere that horror is that these things then become bigger makes the people feel unneeded, unimportant, than the people, and control passes from the or useless. If either of these conditions exists, human manager to the inanimate paper and its an increase in policy quantity or content will hallowed tradition. not correct the situation but, indeed, may In the “foul” atmosphere we find these worsen it. items unquestioned—even defended—by the manager even though he may never analyze the need or the result. At its worst, we find the procedures procedures still being followed, directed by Procedures (process instructions, if you management, even though the original need no prefer) are developed to describe a particular longer exists or has been radically altered. way in which management wants something These are the tradition-bound resource expen­ accomplished. They are needed, to some de­ ditures which return little gain in mission ca­ gree, in all organizations beyond the most pability. The people may—and usually do— simple or basic. The need is for a plan of activ­ recognize the futility and needless expense of ity (the procedures) by which management this directed activity, but they are unable to may control or affect progress toward meeting convince ( maybe even unable to communicate the mission need. with) management about it. Management con­ In terms of this article, the “foul” atmos­ tinues its way down the well-wom rut without phere would be one in which the manager ever considering the reason or, even worse, the creates and imposes an array of local proce­ cost. dures added to those directed by higher man­ A manager, eager to help clear the organi­ agement. These are generally actions which zational air, can do so by a hard-nosed ap­ the manager hopefully calls “guidance” or proach to these local procedures. Investigation “control.” They are often unneeded and more and a stem demand for proof of need can go often are used as disciplinary traps when the a long way toward changing the environment. manager is dissatisfied but can think of little Such a step requires an alert and curious mind, else to do. The people normally recognize plus a free and active communication flow these as unneeded, normally do not observe through which the people can suggest or their requirements, and almost always con­ recommend. sider them as irritants. Obviously, all procedural pollutants are These local procedures often contain very not of the manager’s own doing. Some of them specific details as to who does what, when, impact upon his organization from lateral ele­ and how. They may be classed, as they fre­ ments. Some impact from higher management. quently are, as examples of red tape and need­ These, too, require consideration and evalua­ less impositions which force activity into in­ tion. Each manager must insure that he, like efficient channels. Almost always they are his people, provides to the next higher element effective when followed; that is, they do those recommendations and suggestions which achieve the stated end. But they rarely do this could help clear the air. easily or efficiently. They form one base for Some procedures are vital; some are de- POLLUTION IN ORGANIZATIONAL ATMOSPHERE 31 sirable; some are foolish. No large or complex type, with special considerations, but em­ organization will be completely free of them. ployees just the same. The manager at one The manager’s challenge is to insure that all level is a worker ( employee) for the next those in his organization are vital and desirable higher level. He experiences the same frustra­ and that they all bear the close analysis for tions, pleasures, fears, needs, and wants as any current need. other employee. The things that annoy him or reward him will be very similar to those affect­ ing others. Why, then, should the manager not rules or directives consider his personal reactions when he is con­ Rules attempt to relate responses that sidering or evaluating a rule or directive? Why have been effective in the past. They should should he think his subordinates will react or permit the alternative of another response respond any differently than he under similar should conditions change. The need for this stimuli? alternative flexibility must be obvious and Evaluation of rules must consider the gen­ acceptable to everyone in view of the relative eral tone of the rule or directive. Those in the rarity of recurrent problems under identical “foul” zone will be predominantly negative in conditions. Yet, the usual view of the rule is, nature. They will contain positive guidance in “There! That solves that problem now and such negative phrases as: “You will not------,” later!” “It is forbidden t o ------,” etc. These rules will Rules are necessary in any organization, be explicit and exact in prohibitions and nega­ no matter what its goal or mission. The man­ tives and will either ignore or only broadly ager’s task is to determine what rules have to reference the positives, the things that should be established and to recognize and act when be done. As a result, the rules in this environ­ a rule is no longer needed or when it requires ment will restrict action, limit freedom, and change. Rules of wise management give pur­ choke initiative. Subordinates will be found in pose and direction to people but are flexible perpetual struggle with them. Morale, esprit, enough to allow these people to respond rapid­ and enthusiasm will be less than desired. Peo­ ly and effectively to changing situations. Less ple will fear to act, except as directed, because wise management permits rules to remain un­ failure will likely cause punitive or degrading changed regardless of changing conditions and actions. Even worse, failures, even minor mis­ fails to recognize the situation as the organiza­ takes, will likely result in additional rules. The tion slips into blind ritual. “foul” atmosphere therefore serves as its own Discussion with many managers indicates breeding pond, and the restrictive, negative they personally prefer an assignment with few rules beget more of the same. restricting rules or directives. They prefer a low quantity of broadly stated rules such as instructions those in the “clean” area. Yet these same man­ agers unhesitatingly state they do not feel the Instructions furnish direction. They are people working for them can effectively pro­ similar to orders or directives except that gen­ duce under the same type of guidance. Thus, erally they are verbal and relative to the job although they want limited rule or direction, of the moment. We all receive instructions they want to provide more quantity and great­ continuously throughout life. Our memories of er detail in rules for their people. The atmos­ parents, teachers, and contemporaries are phere comes to contain pollution agents, and tinged with our reactions to their instructions. the degree of pollution is determined by the The content and the method of expression wisdom of the manager. affect our attitude and our response. It is prob­ Managers are also employees. If they able that instructions form one of the major thought of this occasionally, perhaps more building blocks of our personality and our care, thought, and attention would go into career. their actions. They are employees of a special Each time a manager gives an instruction 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW he creates a part of his organizational atmos­ plishment or goal capability. Yet, some people phere. If he goes to extreme detail, he limits really do need very little instruction other than the range of action possibilities of the recip­ the “what” and some good background for the ient. Thus, he must learn to know his people “why” to answer the normal human curiosity. and their individual capabilities and knowl­ The effective manager recognizes those who edge so that he may tailor his instructions. need little instruction and those who need A major fault in instructing people is to more. He provides to each that which applies. assume that the same detail is necessary for This is not easy. It requires conscious attention everyone. One would not, for example, give and study and a methodical approach to learn­ the same flight instructions to a Lindbergh as ing individual capabilities and needs. The ef­ to a new pilot student. Capabilities, experi­ fort is rewarding in better personal relation­ ence, and backgrounds differ widely, and in­ ship, an increased respect on both sides, and structions must consider each in its proper improved management effort. After all, the light. Yet so often this is forgotten and a manager’s job is to arrange to get things done person is offended by overinstruction or pe­ through people. This understanding of people, nalized by underinstruction. together with tailored attention to their needs, Another fault of a manager is to rely upon will do just that, with a great big plus: im­ the authoritarian instruction in which he di­ proved and increased cooperation. rects, demands, or orders. No one likes to be ordered to do anything. People more readily duty assignments accept instructions couched in palatable terms, even though the instructions are no less posi­ Each person in an organization was hired, tive than an order might have been. But, here or assigned, for a specified job accomplish­ again, the manager often forgets and falls back ment. It should go without saying that each upon his “manager status” and resorts to an job is essential and important. Therefore, so order that so-and-so be done. Sometimes, in should each person be. Experience indicates his impatience or haste, these orders become that while jobs may be considered important rather ridiculous instructions. A prime example and necessary, many people do not consider is the early air base commander whose instruc­ themselves important in their jobs. The differ­ tions to his pilots, by order, said, “From this ence may contribute to retention problems and date, there will be no more crack-ups!” poor organizational morale. It should be plain that the “foul” atmos­ Some people refer to the job description phere will be one in which instructions are de­ as the greatest hoax and fable in history. A re­ tailed and specific. The normal situation is one view of randomly selected job descriptions in in which each job assignment is accompanied one’s organization might cause him to think by complex, explicit, time-consuming instruc­ this way also. Flowery phrases and high- tions about “what” and “how” with less atten­ sounding words are found in all, from menial tion ( probably considerably less) to the “why.” task to top-drawer executive position. In addi­ The instructions are given regardless of the ex­ tion, job titles often give an impression that perience of the worker and without considera­ differs widely from the actual on-job perform­ tion of previous accomplishment of the same ance requirements. One lecturer on this subject job. The intent, again, is to insure that goals tells of a change in title from “undertaker” to are met. The cause of the depth of detail is “mortician” to “grief therapist,” and he asks, likely a mistrust of the people or a basic in­ “Is the next step to be ‘professional boxer?” security feeling which the manager attempts What, really, is the job, and how can it be to alleviate by displaying his great knowledge. simply described? Is a “milkman” any more In most organizations it would be as bad effective as a “bovine products distributor” or to experience no instruction. The people would would that merely foul the environment again? stumble and fret in indecision which could be The problem, of course, is not merely the extremely expensive in terms of mission accom­ job description or job title. It could be said POLLUTION IN ORGANIZATIONAL ATMOSPHERE 33 the name is not the thing. Performance is what missing from the duty assignment and the en­ counts. If the man on the job knows what is vironment is more “foul” than “clean,” we note expected of him and has the capability to ac­ on-time arrival and on-time departure; very complish it, we can expect production if we little voluntary overtime will be noted. Few, provide the means. The secret of the difference if any, will be motivated to “see the job between enthusiastic professionalism and re­ through." After all, “They only pay me to do luctant amateurism is probably the way the job­ what I’m told, no more.” Further, the people holder feels about his duty assignment. In the may feel that extra effort will be looked upon organization on the “foul” side of our scale, with suspicion and motive may be questioned. we are likely to find duty assignments of such restricted nature that the people feel them to areas of responsibility be dull and routine. They lack the motivation of challenge and probably approach each ef­ There is an old adage, “Everybody’s fort from a viewpoint of personal security responsibility is nobody’s responsibility.” It rather than pleasure in accomplishment. means that if responsibility is too widely Work or duty assignments should be spread, people are apt to count on “the other aimed at mission accomplishment. The mis­ guy” to do what has to be done, with the sion, in all its ramifications, must be known to result that no one does it. There is some all the people in the organization. Knowledge natural truth in this. Unfortunately, many of mission requirements and confidence that managers have taken it so literally that every the manager is assigning jobs for that accom­ possible responsibility is painstakingly defined, plishment will go a long way toward adding detailed to great degree, and explicitly as­ to the will of the people. It is suggested that signed to one specific individual. In this if the manager is not convinced of job assign­ environment, close to our “foul” scale, the ment importance, the people surely will not be. elements of teamwork, cooperation, and co­ If the manager is convinced but his people are ordination find the going very rough. If they not, he has failed to accomplish part of his exist at all, they do so in spite of manage­ management function. If he fails to convince ment rather than because of it. the worker of his ( or the job’s) importance, it People like responsibility or accountabil­ is not beyond probability that the job or posi­ ity if it is properly placed and not beyond tion may be superfluous to mission require­ their capability for control. They do not like ments. it when it is too narrow or restrictive or when A high degree of “want” exists in the job it is too broad for fulfillment. Inadequately environment. People want to belong to a suc­ assigned or defined responsibility leads to a cessful organization. They want to feel impor­ self-protective atmosphere in which each per­ tant to that organization. They want to know son jealously insures his own clean hands but they are actively involved in a successful group passes all else because all else is “Joe’s job.” effort. They want to be recognized for the ca­ Voluntary commitment to assistance of an­ pabilities they possess. When these wants are other is rare under these conditions, and the not recognized or not met by management, will-to-do falters. We have all seen organiza­ esprit de corps falls and the individual’s feel­ tions in which necessary work remains undone ing about the job becomes dull, listless, and until the boss specifically assigns it. Why? discouraged. More than likely, responsibilities were ill- Every effort of management to increase assigned and no one felt he had reason to the challenge of the job, within reason, will assume the job requirement. This, too, ap­ result in greater personal performance and proaches our “foul” area. all the good that goes with such increased Some managers mistakenly feel that every involvement. One simple test is to observe the person must have a detailed responsibility organization’s pattern for reporting to and assignment. They feel that work flow—at least, departing from the job. When challenge is work assignment—then becomes almost au­ 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tomatic and administrative procedures are archy. The individual feelings within the streamlined. While this may actually result in group as to who is important, who is the un­ smooth administrative functioning, it gener­ named leader, who has the job knowledge, ally leads to little active and voluntary co­ etc., establish this ghostlike structure. It is in ordination above the minimum required for this informal structure that the individual individual job completions. It is possible that finds an identity and relates to the whole more broadly assigned responsibilities, cou­ organization. The health of the informal or­ pled with assurance that each employee knows ganization has much to do with the organiza­ and understands the organization’s goals, will tion’s success in meeting its goals. foster active coordination in addition to clean­ A major factor of the informal organiza­ ing the atmosphere. Under these conditions tion is communication. Knowingly or un­ the people know there is probably some over­ knowingly, the leaders of both the formal and lap of functional responsibilities, and they informal organizations do communicate. The know they must coordinate in order to ful­ freedom with which they communicate wall fill their job responsibility and progress to generally determine the efficiency of the orga­ achievement of organizational goals. nization as a whole. Attempts to channel We all want to feel important. If our communication or restrict it to certain people responsibilities are broad and we have ade­ or positions are stultifying. This frustration quate authority to fulfill them, we know we creates a real, sometimes permanent, bar to are important and we act with the common peak effectiveness and efficiency. good in mind. Our every effort is aimed at Successful management (effective and effi­ organizational success because we feel the cient accomplishment of established goals) organization is ours and its success will reflect demands communication, coordination, and in our success. The motivational influence of cooperation. The latter two, to large degree, such a climate is tremendous. depend upon the first. We might conclude that Managers are never successful alone. They a prime ingredient of successful management succeed only through the efforts of others. It is communication. The successful organization would seem, then, that managers would work wall provide for downward, upward, and lat­ at all times in all ways to insure that the eral communication because all are vital and efforts of others are contributing to successful essential. A sure sign of a “foul” environment and optimum organizational accomplishments. is restricted communication in any direction. It would further seem that managers would be Any manager who feels that he must insure constantly studying the people who work for only a clear channel for downward communi­ them to insure that the organization’s atmo­ cation is creating a major problem for his sphere is always conducive to effective, effi­ organization and adding to the environmental cient personal effort toward mission accom­ pollution. It is extremely important that we plishment. provide for, permit, and encourage upw-ard and lateral communication as well as dowai- ward, so the informal organization may live communication and participate productively. Serious management students recognize An indicator of pollution in the communi­ that within all formal organizations there is cation function is the degree to which man­ an informal organization. The formal is easily agement insists upon channeling. This is not viewed in the organizational charts. The in­ an argument for uncontrolled communication formal may be felt but not seen. It is often but merely a plea to prevent the delay-produc­ not recognized even by those who keep it ing, stifling insistence that all communication going. The informal organization is formed by must go, position-to-position. through a laby­ the personal relationships which exist within rinth of channels before action results. This, the formal, and it usually establishes a sepa­ often, is a major complaint against the tra­ rate status grouping from the official hier­ dition-bound manager w'ho sometimes is re­ POLLUTION IN ORGANIZATIONAL ATMOSPHERE 35

ferred to as "military-minded.” Those managers choice or they value security more than per­ in the Defense agencies, and in all government sonal involvement and satisfaction. The total agencies for that matter, must constantly be picture is unpleasant and undesirable. For­ alert to prevent a slip into this trap under the tunately, few organizations are this far to the guise of control. Again, this dictum is not left. But there are many which approach the aimed at acquiring a controlless communi­ extreme in some of the indicator areas de­ cation process. It is aimed at asking managers scribed. Managers in these units must act or to insure that unneeded, restrictive, and un­ face the probability of ultimate failure should imaginative processes, procedures, policies, individuality, initiative, or creativity ever be and rules are eliminated. required. We should encourage the passing of in­ On the right of the block we find an orga­ formation for job performance freely from nization in which the people display an avid person to person. The person who needs in­ eagerness to work. Their lives are wrapped formation to do his job should be able to up in their jobs. Innovation and creativity are obtain it from the person who has it until present in all activity. The organization is free minimum intermediate steps or processes. to accept and react to change with less reluc­ Therefore, for informational purposes, we tance to leave the traditional. Task failure is should encourage person-to-person contact not condoned but is understood and used as with little regard to position or rank within a learning and growth opportunity. The whole the organization and minimum requirement organization is concerned with insuring the to “stick to channels. ’ development of each individual, and organiza­ tional capability is steadily increasing. In­ volvement is great, and everyone has a sense organizational traits of vitality and participation. Unfortunately, The manager’s actions cause two types of not all organizations can be this extreme in results. One is production toward meeting the total. Some must, by virture of the mission, be organization’s mission. The other is impact purposely held more to the center. But most upon the organization’s atmosphere. In this organizations could move more to the right article I have discussed the second result, with than they are presently positioned and gain the thought that it affects the first to some immeasurably by the action. extent. Let us now' briefly review the traits we Management would do well to heed the might find in organizations at the two environ­ following encouragement: mental extremes earlier established. Use leadership and managerial skills to the On the left of the block we find an or­ fullest. Create the clean atmosphere which en­ ganization operating in conformity to a rigidly courages people to grow and develop. defined set of rules, processes, policies, and instructions. It maybe described as hidebound the key and tied to tradition. It would be the type of unit in which the people seriously state, The key to changing the organization’s “There's no reason, it’s just policy.” There is environment or atmosphere is the manager. resistance to the new or different. Ideas are He can change only if he wants to change. looked at with suspicion. A very low degree It may frequently happen that he wants to of creativity exists. There is a tendency toward change but lacks the idea, the thought, needed stagnation of thought and detached relation­ to energize his action. It may be that he is ship to the unit by the people. Task failure not aware that a change is needed or that a is feared, and the reward for failure is punish­ change might be beneficial. It may be that ment. Little concern exists for the growth of he is not fully aware of the things currently the people, and their development to greater “bugging” his people and those which irritate capability is slow or nonexistent. The people or inflame them. It is to this possibility that continue to work because they either have no we now address ourselves. 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Change is brought into being by action course, finally decide to reject the idea (in on an idea. Ideas are the lifeblood of progress, total or in part); but he owes it at least a and ideas will be the moving force of the logical, positive evaluation prior to that action. future just as they have been the moving force Suppose the Wright brothers had rejected of the past. Thus, every manager must be con­ the idea of flight through the “It’s been tried stantly alert for ideas from any source. before” approach? Suppose the Manhattan Ideas have no value unless they are acted Project had stumbled against the “It’s too big upon. To get action, the idea must be com­ for us” roadblock? Suppose the inventor of the municated. Therefore, the wise manager al­ hula hoop had listened to “It’s not really prac­ ways insures that in his organization there is tical.” These common objections to ideas are free communication, permitting anyone to usually given before the idea has really been present his ideas or thoughts to someone who evaluated. One wonders how many really can do something with them. earthshaking ideas have failed to materialize Obviously, not all ideas are good and not because they never made it through the jungle all ideas are currently useful, feven so, all of resistance. ideas merit attention and logical evaluation. The point is this: There is a very good This, perhaps, is the biggest attitude problem probability that any organizational environ­ facing the manager and his organization—and ment can stand management review and clean­ the one requiring the most continuous empha­ ing. Ideas are necessary to do this. As a sis and attention. manager, one must realize that he is not the A common tendency is to hastily—too hast­ only thinking man around, and he must pro­ ily— listen, incompletely evaluate, and quickly vide the climate which encourages idea devel­ reject ideas, particularly those which do not opment and the atmosphere which permits seem “big” in scope. Often one tends to rely sound evaluation and management action. on roadblocks or negatives when he listens to It is up to you, Mr. Manager! Where in or reads an idea presentation. A most difficult the scale is your organization now located, chore is the establishment of a positive atti­ and what are you going to do about it? tude toward idea evaluation. One may, of Air Force Institute of Technology

Bibliography Bennis, Warren G. Changing Organizations. New York: McGraw- Kaiser Aluminum Sews, Volume 25, Number Two/67, Kaiser Hill, 1966. Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, Oakland, California Brown, Warren B. “Systems, Boundaries, and Information Flow,” 94604. Academy of Management Journal, IX, 4 (December 1966), McConkey. Dale D. “The Results Approach to Evaluating Man­ 318-27. agerial Performance,” Advanced Management Journal, XXXII, Drucker, Peter F. The Concept of the Corporation. New York: 4 (October 1967). The John Day Company, 1946. McFarland, Dalton E. "Organizational Health and Company Goodwin, Herbert F. “The Exciting New Dimensions of Man­ Efficiency,” Business Topics, Michigan State University, XIII, aging Improvement Through Work Simplification,” Advanced 3 (Summer 1965). Management Journal, XXXII, 4 (October 1967). Whyte, William H., Jr. The Organization Man. New York: Simon Hoke, Peter J. "Airman Retention—Management’s New Chal­ and Schuster, 1956. lenge,” Air University Review, XVIII, 6 (September-October Wrapp, H. Edward. “Good Managers Don’t Make Policy Deci­ 1967), 74-75. sions,” Management Review, American Management Associa­ tion, November 1967.

IR FORCE personnel left over from dramatically shifting personal values of officers World War II and the Korean War and airmen in the late 1960s? A partial an­ A ^ view with alarm the values and atti­ swer may be seen in the genesis of our cul­ tudes of younger officers and airmen of the tural value system in the United States. The Vietnam era. This article attempts to provide values dominant during the first century and insight which may assist the reader to gain a half of American history were formed within understanding of this “emerging generation.” an agricultural economy based on a demand The current cultural value gap between for more goods than could be supplied. The older and younger Air Force men is not new population was largely made up of pioneers and is not restricted to the military. Similar and immigrants. It was widely scattered in gaps have been occurring for centuries. How­ small communities. In those days the military ever, past military generations did not en­ man lived from payday to payday, looking counter the shaq) technological and cultural forward to minimum comforts and basic change, in a short period of time, experienced necessities. by the current voungef generation of officers These conditions, which to a large extent and airmen. Because of the slow technological no longer exist, formed group perceptual pat­ and cultural maturation from one generation terns and values which were considered ac­ to another, past changes were difficult to per­ ceptable behavior of the day. Civil, military, ceive. Traditionally any disparity in values, and moral law were based upon this accept­ if recognized at all, was attributed to a strug­ able behavior. The majority of the population gle between generations for influence and supported these laws, and they became the independence.1 cultural guide for a given period. If this condition has been around since Today, material goods are supplied in early civilization, why is it so remarkable such large quantities that our economic sys­ today? I do not believe it is a matter of tem basically no longer supports the scarcity whether change has or has not occurred; it theory.3 A military man’s pay, like that of his is more of an accelerated change during a civilian counterpart, is determined by the short time frame compared to the rather slow pressures of an affluent society. change of the past. The problem of developing an individual Accelerating knowledge and technology identity under such conditions is overwhelm­ are major contributing factors. As one author ing. An insidious kind of value gap has devel­ so aptly put it, “It is small wonder that the oped between those values which the younger world’s information, which is doubling with man can identify with and measure himself each generation, has grown far beyond the by and the opportunities and challenges avail­ capacity of anv individual to comprehend it able to him for achieving this identity. This all.”2 disparity has generated large numbers of indi­ This acceleration has provided technical viduals who struggle to develop a feeling of breakthroughs resulting in more and better commitment to something worthwhile and to production of higher-quality goods at a lower the achievement of self-worth.4 In this con­ cost. The production output and its resulting temporary mode, competition for the basic profits are distributed to more and more necessities of life is de-emphasized. people. For centuries the achievement motive Just what does this have to do with the driving the military and civilian man was to AIR FORCE MAN AND CULTURAL VALUE GAP 39

gain sufficient wealth, power, or position to secure desirable material goods that histori­ cally were in short supply. The higher the achievement, the more an individual could accumulate scarce items that were not readily available to everyone. Values based on this concept generated perceptual sets and thought patterns such as “To work is good and to work even harder is better.’—The Protestant Ethic. In today's social/cultural environment, two distinct sets of values appear to be oper­ ating: traditional values and emergent values. Traditional values, those which are subscribed Figure 1. Psychosocial needs hierarchy format indicat- to by older officers and nco’s and which de­ ing degree of importance (value) to older generation veloped during the scarce-commoditv/scat- tered-population era, are “Puritan morality,” “work success ethic,” “achievement orienta­ tion,” and “rugged individuality.” In contrast, the younger officers and airmen lean toward are satisfied. According to McGregor, “Man emergent values, which appear to be “moral is a wanting animal—as soon as one of his relativism,” “sociability,” “immediate gratifi­ needs is satisfied, another takes its place in an cation,” and “group conformity.”6 unending process from birth to death.” He When conflicting views are held by older also says, “A satisfied need is not a motivator of behavior.”9 and younger military men, their ability to communicate is greatly restricted. In addition, With the cultural change from scarcity of their desire to cooperate toward a common goods to plenty and sociological advances purpose is sidetracked by the communication which provide the same relative availability conflict. of goods to nonachievers and achievers alike This gap between today’s older and to satisfy lower needs (i.e., welfare programs younger military generations appears to be to provide food, clothing, medical care, and greater than at any other time in civilized other basic needs), this pattern of psycho­ history. One set of factors causing this con­ social needs mav change structurally. (Figure dition is the changing emphasis on the per­ 2) sonal/ social needs of the contemporary military man. These needs, as set forth by Maslow and others, are: 1. Physiological (thirst, hunger, sex, etc.) Figure 2. Psychosocial needs hierarchy format when the lower needs are satisfied, depicting needs that are pos- 2. Safety (security, health, etc.) sibly important to middle or transitional generation 3. Social (identification, affection, etc.) 4. Egoistic (prestige, success, self-respect, etc.) 5. Self-fulfillment (desire for personal growth, self-actualization, etc.)7 Traditionally these needs are presented in a hierarchy. Figure 1 depicts this hierarchy and indicates the relative importance (value) of these needs.8 Under this concept, physiologi­ cal needs are basic, and self-fulfillment needs (which are never completely satisfied) are the highest and not important until lower needs 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

If the apparent value gap continues to expand, the hierarchy of needs influencing the future military man may eventually form a pattern of diminishing lower needs and ex­ panding higher needs. (Figure 3) Under this hypothesis, man would devote more and more energy to ego satisfaction and self-fulfillment: the emerging ethic. If overwhelming empha­ sis is placed on higher needs and they are then thwarted, the new crop of young officers and airmen may revert to behavior that is irra­ tional compared to the military standard of the day. External needs compensations would Figure 4. Psychosocial needs hierarchy modification of then emerge similar to such civilian compen­ older generation due to gains made toward the good life sations as the “hippy” movement, drugs, and bizarre dress (at least when viewed from the norm). Although the younger military genera­ tion may be heading toward the upper level self-fulfillment needs. It is loaded with the of the needs configuration, the factors causing individual’s subjective view of reality.11 this change may also have an effect upon the Some contemporary writers interpret older military generation. The older genera­ emerging existentialism in the form of assump­ tion (people over 35 years of age), because of tions, which may be useful in understanding strides made toward the good life, may be the emerging military man’s views. These receiving needs satisfaction approximating the assumptions are: configuration shown in Figure 4.10 1. The individual is responsible for his own The cultural value gap is also reflected in actions. current philosophical systems. Emerging exis­ 2. Man must regard his fellow men as ob­ tentialists philosophy, similar to the emerging jects of value and as part of his own concern. change in contemporary military man’s needs 3. Man exists in a world of reality. hierarchy, is also saturated with the individ­ 4. A meaningful life must remove as much ual’s intense awareness of his egoistic and threat from reality as possible, both physical and psychological. 5. Every person has his own heredity and has had experience unique to himself. 6. Man behaves in terms of his own sub­ jective views of reality, not according to some Figure 3. Psychosocial needs hierarchy format when the satisfaction of lower needs is guaranteed for the most externally defined objective reality. part by the social structure to the emerging generation 7. Man cannot be classified as “good” or “evil” by nature. 8. Man reacts as a total organism to any situation.12 Where does all this discussion lead? It appears that the current upheaval is generat­ ing a new culture that is evolving ahead of its time. Before 1970 over fifty percent of the U.S. population will be under twenty-five years of age. This fact indicates that our young Air Force will get even younger. The attitudes, perceptual sets, morals, and commitments of AIR FORCE MAN AND CULTURAL VALUE GAP 41

this younger majority demand to be under­ likely to flow from change. It is the respon­ stood. A bridge of understanding across the sibility of this leadership to encourage creativ­ generation and cultural value gap is impera­ ity and at the same time maintain restraints tive to our future military posture. The older on immature, short-term desires to the extent military generation’s needs and attitudes con­ necessary to assure the rights of others and trast with those of a younger military genera­ to conduct the important day-to-day tasks of tion who know only an affluent society, a the functional military establishment. growing welfare state, and a rapidly accelerat­ This is not a hopeless or unreasonable ing technology. Whether we like it or not, task for Air Force senior officers and non­ this younger group will inherit the Air Force. commissioned officers. After all, the younger The main effort to reconcile this value gap generation when faced with today’s over­ is the responsibility of the older Air Force gen­ whelming situation, like their forefathers, ap­ eration who form today’s leaders. This older pear to be just as frightened as they were by generation must realize that emancipation life itself—or inebriated by its sudden discovery. from tradition requires additional foresight on Warfare Systems School their part to anticipate the consequences

Notes 1. Donald H. Blocher, Development Counseling (New 7. Norman R. F. Maier, Psychology in Industry (3d York: The Ronald Press Co.. 1966), p. 117. edition; Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 418. 2. Robert W. Sarnoff, "Communications: The Knowledge 8. Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New Industry," Commencement Address delivered at Washburn Uni­ York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 80-106. Cf. Charles D. versity of Topeka, 5 June 1966, Vital Speeches of the Day, McDerinid, "How Money Motivates Men,” from Business XXXII, 21 (15 August 1966), 671. Horizons, Winter 1960, pp. 94-100, in Max D. Richards and 3. Blocher, p. 118. William A. Nielander, Readings in Management (2d edition; 4. John R. Seely, Jr., “Guidance and the Youth Culture,” Globe, Arizona: Southwestern Monuments Assn., 1963), pp. Personal Guidance Journal, 1962, No. 41, pp. 302-10. 409-10. 5. Luther structured this as: the valuation of the fulfill­ 9. Douglas M. McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise ment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 36. moral activity of the individual could assume. From Max Weber, 10. Officer Motivation Study—Mete View, Hq United The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott States Air Force, Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analysis, Parsons (3d impression; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, Vol. II, reprint, 1 April 1967, p. A-62. 1950), p. 80. Cf. Ecclesiastes 3:22, The Jerusalem Bible (Garden 11. Blocher, p. 21. City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966>, p. 982. 12. C. E. Beck, Philosophical Foundation of Guidance 6. George D. Spindler, “Education in the Transforming (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963). The author draws American Culture,” in Blocher, p. 119. assumptions from existential philosophy of what he calls devel­ opmental counseling. Blocher, p. 20. o

ON THE LIMITATIONS OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAMS

D ajlip Saund

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\ N A r e c e n t issue o f Air University Review, States insofar as we are involved with East Major Joseph P. Martino presented the Emergia. The focus of the analysis is the thesis that counterinsurgency problems rural community in general and its propensity might profitably be attacked by use of the systo­ support or not support insurgency activities I tems analysis approach.1 The article broachedin particular. The rural community is treated some of the problems with which I became as a white box in the sense that analysis can involved during a recent field study of cross- be applied to the processes whereby inputs cultural interaction problems in northeast (the actions of the other subsystems which Thailand while living for some months in com­ affect the community) are processed and trans­ munities in an incipient insurgent district. formed into outputs (the actions of the commu­ While the suggested approach through sys­ nity which affect the other subsystems). Martino tems analysis deserves further exploration, in takes fleeting glances into the interiors of the this article I shall attempt to analyze its appli­ other subsystems, but for all practical pur­ cability and limitations in the counterinsur­ poses he treats them as black boxes for which gency situation with which I am acquainted. there is some input-output relationship of un­ Not having had any prior experience with specified internal structure and process. systems analysis, I attempted first to gain some Strictly speaking, the white box concept ground on Major Martino and found that most includes analogous models of internal struc­ works dealt with the mathematical techniques tures and processes which may be very differ­ of systems analysis and related methods. How­ ent from those of the real system but which ever, I did find a rand report which treated yield the same input-output relationship. How­ the philosophy, history, and methodology of ever, when one considers that the object of systems analysis at a more general level,- and systems analysis is not only to evaluate alter­ in my cursory comparisons I found nothing native courses for policy-decision puqx>ses but inconsistent between this report and other also to generate new alternatives and that we works consulted. I state this only to make do not yet possess analogous models which explicit the basis from which I discuss Mar­ have a high degree of reliability (of the type tino’s thesis. used, say, in analog computers, where direct Martino presents and illustrates his thesis analogies can be constructed for mechanical by analyzing the insurgency problems of a systems based on the identical form of the hypothetical country, East Emergia, in terms mathematical equations describing certain of an ecological system. East Emergia is pre­ electronic and mechanical processes), the dan­ sented as a typically tropical, newly emergent ger of using internally dissimilar white boxes nation in which insurgency had broken out becomes clear. We can never be sure whether or could break out in the rural areas, where our model is analytic or merely descriptive. significant modernization had yet to take Martino, wisely, did not attempt to simulate place. Martino takes into account four inter­ in his hypothetical analysis; he presented data acting subsystems: a typical rural peasant and processes of the type which might be ex­ community and its relevant social and physical pected m an actual Emergian community. environment, insurgents operating in the area, At one point Martino notes that “a com­ the established government, and the United plete model, including the monsoon rains, 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW would have to include the earth and sun as relating to variables that are not ordinarily well.” This statement contains an implicit handled as a whole by any of the established recognition that he is dealing with one vast disciplines. Where the historian, the econo­ integrated system which, to continue the log­ mist, or the physicist must handle large masses ical extension, includes the whole universe. of data, the questions they ask are rooted By excluding the earth and the sun, he is within their respective disciplines, and the saying in effect that the constraints he must methods of processing to arrive at meaningful live with (such as limits of his ability to carry and reliable answers have largely been worked off an encompassing analysis within a rea­ out by those disciplines. However, even sonable time allotment) and the degree of though the larger questions the systems ana­ accuracy demanded by his questions can be lyst attacks are not the same, he can find areas brought to a satisfactory balance by ignoring of overlap with these disciplines and enlist the certain variables. This is, in fact, the same aid of appropriately trained men to employ problem faced in any exploratory, analytic their respective methods to answer part-ques­ discipline. We are forced to divide up the tions. In a sense, he subcontracts out part of complex whole, by space or classes of phe­ his production and later assembles the parts nomena or what have you, into smaller units into a usable whole package. that we can handle. If the first level of dis­ The question Martino poses for the East section is not enough, we continue the sub­ Emergian rural community is: What kinds of division process until we come within the actions impinging on the community will re­ range of our capabilities of comprehension duce its propensity to contribute to insurgency and analysis. The particular questions we are efforts? This question is presumably set in the asking, whether they be those of the philoso­ context of some larger question of national pher, historian, humanist, scientist, or public policy which has generated other part-ques­ policy maker, dictate how and where the tions to be asked of the other black boxes of scalpel will cut. But the principles are always his system, but for the moment let us consider the same: carve away that which is irrelevant only his immediate problem. There are two to the questions asked; carve until the re­ avenues of attack. First, we can examine the mainder is of handleable size. array of resources at our disposal and ask how Returning now to the matter at hand, we we can employ them to meet our objectives find that Martino gravitated toward ecological of deterring insurgency activities. In this ap­ questions to ask of the rural Emergian com­ proach, our white box analysis would have to munity. Had he treated the Emergian govern­ select those resources that would most effi­ ment as a white box, his questions would have ciently meet the objectives. But such an ap­ concerned fiscal balance, political structure proach assumes an a priori knowledge of the and power relationships, national policy, and community we are going to operate on and the like. Though the general method for all is the dynamic processes pertaining thereto. It the same, there is a heterogeneity of the also makes an implicit a priori selection of specific questions asked and, therefore, of the resources. A second approach would be to kinds of relevancies that the scalpel must look at the problem from the point of view of separate. The requisite surgical techniques the community, try to learn its dynamics in­ will vary for each subsystem. ductively, and then ask what resources we This is, in fact, one of the unique aspects have and how we might apply them to effect of systems analysis, that while the basic meth­ the desired objectives. In this way, not only od of systematic pragmatic paring down to do we avoid making a priori assumptions but essentials is in common with existing disci­ we also do not preselect our resources. Fur­ plines that also seek to develop a rational and thermore, we are left freer to suggest new coherent picture of the world around us, a alternatives, one of the tasks of the systems systems analyst is faced with the problem of analyst. Martino used the former approach. integrating into one scheme a body of data To show the contrast, I shall use the latter. LIMITATIONS OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR COIN 45

Data of conditions presented here are 18 months in Thailand and acknowledges his taken from northeast Thailand and are not reliance on Thai data by calling the capital of hypothetical. They are, however, not unrelated East Emergia “Groongtape” (Krung Thep), to East Emergia, since Martino himself spent the Thai name for Bangkok.

T he village of Ban Na is an or­ known to the village as a whole, and other vil­ dinary peasant community located in central lagers do not resent his withholding credit Sakon Nakhon Province. Typical of surround­ from the bad risks. The shop measures roughly ing villages, Ban Na is a largely self-sufficient 15 by 20 feet and stocks such items as cloth, rice-producing community of some 1300 per­ cotton thread, kerosene, simple lamps made sons. The village proper is situated on a slight from beer cans, batteries, flashlights, transistor rise in the middle of lowland paddies, which radios, a few simple cosmetics, nails, candy, slope gently down to a brook that marks the tobacco, cigarettes, candles, medicines ranging village's northern boundary. On the other from bottle root potions to the latest anti­ three sides, the paddies are bounded by forest. biotics, brassieres, pencils, and writing tablets Most villages in this area are accessible only and books for the school children. by very poor cart tracks that become totally Of the 189 families, 172 own their own impassable during the rainy season. That was land, holdings ranging from 2 to 35 acres. the case for Ban Na until two years ago, when There is no absentee-landlordism in Ban Na, an all-weather road was constructed linking it and those families that do not have land are to the main district town, which is itself on transitional—newly formed, newcomers, those a new major gravel highway. who have just lost their land, etc. Most of the The primary occupation of all but one of peasants have many relatives in the village, the village’s 189 families is rice agriculture. but kinship bonds are not strong and are not This other family' operates Ban Na’s only shop, an important factor in village organization. which it opened several years ago. As far back One should lend rice to a relative in time of as the older people can remember, there has need without charging interest and perhaps always been at least one shop in Ban Na. The help him in giving a feast or when he is short shopkeeper deals primarily in cash but does of help at harvest time, but these are not bind­ let some credit. He say's he must be careful ing obligations. Each family makes its own not to appear stingy and by now has learned friends and rises or falls on its own merits. who the untrustworthy villagers are. They are The entire population of Ban Na is 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Buddhist, and the village supports one temple nan, the head of the tambon. Headmen and (wat) with its complement of half a dozen kamnan receive small salaries but are not civil monks and a dozen novices. Until two years sendee and are not rotated from their own ago several teachers who staffed the village communities. Organizationally, they are under school also lived in Ban Na, but when the the district officer and answerable to him. new road was built they started commuting Within the civil service organizational from the district town. The disadvantages of framework, power, authority, loyalty, and their living in the village include the costly mobility are predominantly vertical within the duty of acting as host to visiting officials, vul­ departments. Power and authority to make nerability to thieves and robbers, and lack of policy decisions are concentrated very heavily social companionship commensurate with their at the top, so that by the time the district level official status. The school goes through the is reached there is very little room for local fourth grade, and all children must, according initiative or flexibility in official duties or pro­ to law, complete all four grades. Even though grams, by American standards. Duties are the literacy rate is high, no one in Ban Na assigned, regulated, and monitored by the subscribes to a newspaper or periodical of any respective departments. The net result is that, kind, and written matter other than posters is though the district officer has nominal author­ very rarely seen. Knowledge of the external ity over all civil servants in his district, his world is gained primarily by word of mouth control over them in real terms is less than one or through the dozen or so radios in the village. would suspect from the deference and respect The Thai central government is organized shown him. The duty of the subordinate is around a dozen ministries, each of which is to serve the superior in a compliant, obe­ assigned specific functionally related responsi­ dient manner that is not conducive to the bilities. Ministries are broken down into de­ upward flow of ideas and suggestions. In partments, also along functional lines. Internal short, the Thai governmental system, which administrative control of the country is as­ has markedly changed during the past cen­ signed to the Ministry of Interior, and under tury, has incorporated many Western admin­ its Department of Local Administration Thai­ istrative and ideological elements, but it re­ land is divided into 71 provinces, each of mains basically a Thai system designed to which is governed by a governor appointed meet Thai needs. by the department. Provinces in turn are sub­ The role of kamnan is a minor one; the divided into about half a dozen districts, each effective point of articulation between villager under a district officer who is directly answer- and government is through the village head­ able to the governor. Governors and district man. In Ban Na he is a middle-aged man, officers have staffs of officers from other minis­ rather wealthy bv village standards and inter­ tries and departments that have local responsi­ ested in seeing his village “develop." It is bilities. In Ban Na’s district this staff consists through him that the district officer passes on of officers for education, health, police, for­ directives and information, and through him estry, agriculture, livestock, tax, community the village communicates its needs and prob­ development, post and telegraph, and land. lems. Actually, the headman does not possess Each of these officers, including the district any appreciable power by virtue of his posi­ officer, has his own departmental organization, tion, and his salary is barely enough to pay but this district level is as far as the civil- for the expenses of playing host now that the service-staffed national administration extends. teachers have moved away. He does not have The district Is divided into tambon (com­ under him a salaried staff or even a structured munes) of about twenty villages each. Each village government with clear lines of author­ village elects its own headman, under the ity. When he looks outside the village he sees supervision and with the approval of the dis­ a hierarchically organized governmental struc­ trict officer. The village headmen in each ture which cascades down through layer after tambon elect one of their number to be kam- layer until it lands on him. But when he looks LIMITATIONS OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR COIN 47

around him in the village he sees only peers about germs, viruses, and antibiotics; but he w ho are not obliged to take his orders or share does not indulge in vague and impressive pro­ his burden. The peasant of northeast Thailand nouncements about them as is done by the is a champion of his individual rights and pre­ American, who understands them no better rogatives. He often fools the stranger by his but depends on a doctor to effect his cure. acquiescence to overwhelming external power, The villager carries out his greater responsi­ which is misinterpreted as a sign of weak bility for effecting a cure by simply getting spirit but is rather a sign of peasant pragma­ and using the antibiotics, which were intro­ tism. The stratified Thai social system does duced about fifteen years ago and can be pur­ not extend into the village because concentra­ chased openly and cheaply from most shops. tion of power and wealth ends short of that But the villager also uses magical divining point, the village having more the character­ and curing, spirit curing, local root medicines, istics of an egalitarian society of individualists. and countless elixirs, potions, and powders The headman has his feet planted in two dif­ also purchased in the shops. The apparently ferent systems, and to a large degree his suc­ incongruous mixture of medical and nonmedi­ cess is a function of his ability to tap to two cal practices is no enigma to him, though, different tunes at the same time. since he sees each kind of sickness and ail­ The peasant tends to retain the techniques ment as a discrete entity requiring its own and methods handed down by his forefathers particular cure. He has no higher unified but not because he has an aversion to innova­ theory of medicine requiring him to bring all tion or new technological implements. One his practices under one abstract rubric. He can see many examples of adoption and inte­ is guided by empirical pragmatism. For fevers gration from the modem world in Ban Na— and infections he uses penicillin or streptomy­ radios, cloth, antibiotics, insecticides, bicycles, cin because he has learned by experience that an engine rice mill, to name but a few. How­ for these ailments these cures u'ork. And that ever, Ban Na is a homogeneous village; the is simply that. villager sees his secular tasks and problems in Ban Na’s year is broken down into three specific, concrete terms and does not have to major seasons: the rainy season from June bridge conceptual gaps by reverting to ab­ through September, the cold season from stractions or generalizations when discussing October through February, and the hot season or analyzing his problems with friends and from March through May. Rice is planted in neighbors. Furthermore, he has not had an May or early June, and its care demands the education that provides him with a general full attention of the peasant until it is har­ technological background such as most Amer­ vested in October or November. The rains in icans have. The result is that the peasant the northeast are irregular, and the peasant evaluates new ideas and things not in terms is constantly threatened with drought or flood of abstract concepts and theoretical projec­ —sometimes both in one season. The cold tions but in terms of the concrete specifics of season is the most relaxed and pleasant. There his world as he sees it. Until an innovation are many festivals and a great deal of social is shown to have very real and practical ad­ visiting as the roads are dry and travel can vantages for him, he is not attracted by it. be resumed. Most families grow gardens near For example, since the peasant is deeply the brook and collect fish from the receding concerned about the death and suffering ponds and drying brook. The hot, dry season brought by disease that threatens his family is devoted mainly to preparing for planting and neighbors, he focuses his attention on the rice. manifestations of sickness that he sees. In For four years running, Ban Na has not searching for cures he does not refer to com­ had a good harvest. This year (1966) the rains plex concepts of causes and mechanisms of started very strong and some paddies were diseases and medicines as is commonly done destroyed or badly damaged by flood. But by in Western countries. To be sure, he knows September the rains had stopped and most 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW of the rice suffered from drought. The vil­ been carried out through the administrative lagers measure their rice by the myn, a volu­ organization described above, but it has also metric unit roughly containing 12 kilograms incorporated the army and a new separate or about 25 pounds of paddy rice. It takes governmental organ called Accelerated Rural about 100 myn to feed three people for the Development (ard). Transportation and com­ year. The village thus needs about 43,300 myn munication facilities are being vastly im­ for its own consumption. The yield this year proved, and the road to Ban Na as well as was 37,579 myn or some 6000 myn short. Last the major road through the district town are year, when there was a severe drought, the products of the ard program. These roads total yield was only 15,007 myn. Ban Na is have a vital effect on villages like Ban Na, now an importer of rice. As one might suspect, since they greatly increase the mobility of the not all were hit to the same degree. This year, people and make it practical for them to pro­ 16 percent of the families had a yield of less duce for distant markets. than one-half of their own consumptive needs; Aside from policing and military efforts for last year 73 percent of the families were aimed directly at the insurgents, the army in this category. The possibility of their earn­ has also entered into development programs ing enough during the cold and dry seasons through its Mobile Development Units (mdu). to buy the needed rice is nearly hopeless. Such Some of these units are more or less stationary a family, after it has exhausted its ability to and direct their effort toward developing borrow from relatives or friends and to buy model villages and establishing basic services, with what money it could earn or gain from such as health centers, to attract the surround­ the sale of livestock, has two choices: either ing population to come and see the progress beg, or borrow from merchants. To beg, one in the hopes that they will be stimulated to must be suffering and the children sick and self-help. Other units, truly mobile ones, cover crying from hunger. In a village like Ban Na, areas encompassing perhaps 200 villages and a family has no chance to fool its neighbors concentrate their efforts on more modest de­ if it has been negligent or lazy, and most peo­ velopment programs in a few of them. Ban Na ple detest the irresponsible just as we do. No is one of this latter group of villages, and its one has starved to death yet in Ban Na, but mdu program has been very successful. The those who are diligent are looked on with mdu unit has been careful to engage only in much more sympathy and suffer less. This is programs selected by the villagers themselves beside the matter of pride, with which most and has limited its involvement to providing peasants are well endowed. As for borrowing, transportation facilities, which are beyond the it is done by selling rice futures. The rice capabilities of the villagers, and to using its merchants in the district town as well as many power as a basis for organization for com­ teachers buy futures at the going rate of 45 munal action, which is largely lacking within for 13, which gives the merchant a profit of the village itself. 246 percent on his investment within a few Development programs implemented months. If the peasant cannot pay at harvest through the established local governmental time, the interest jumps 100 percent, and he agents have been rather uneven in quality. pays 90 for 13 the following harvest. The kinds of problems found at the district This northeast region is the poorest and level are just what one might expect when a least developed in Thailand. These factors, large, efficient, and long-established adminis­ plus the region’s proximity to Laos, its large trative system begins to adjust itself to carry forest areas that are thinly or underpopulated, out new functions. Local officials will have to and the poor communications system, have implement new programs involving knowl­ contributed to making it the prime target area edge, relationships with the local population, of Communist insurgency. In order to head and procedures that are not entirely consistent off insurgency, the government has entered with prior conditions, and some officials will into a program of development which has react more effectively than others. The follow- LIMITATIONS OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR COIN 49 ing example should not be taken as necessarily fact often quite successful. It is presented be- typical of all such programs, which are in cause of its similarity to Martino’s thesis.

Two yea r s ago the district agri­ water anyway: if they had enough water their culture officer (dao) gave some commercial crops would be good, and they wished that fertilizer to a peasant in a neighboring village attention were focused on the important water in order to demonstrate its value. The program problem. The district officer recognizes the of fertilizer introduction was conceived and two main problems of his district as water directed by higher authorities, and the dao first and roads second. He has cooperated with could not or did not know how to carry out the community development officer in helping the program effectively. He did not instruct construct small dams and roads, but their on the proper use of the fertilizer or follow up combined resources are extremely limited. the experiment, and the results were very Consequently, most effort is in teaching better poor. Consequently, the peasants now think methods of raising chickens, using insecti­ that commercial fertilizers, collectively called cides, etc., which activities are of value and puj, are of no use. But the peasants do recog­ accepted by the peasant in general but are nize the power of natural fertilizers, which nevertheless secondary. Rather than force fer­ they call foon. They say that when it rains the tilizers onto the peasants because we think foon is washed down from the village into the they could be of value, perhaps we ought to bordering paddies and that is why paddies take a closer look at the people directly in­ near the village are the best, provided they volved—the peasants and the governmental get sufficient water. If the rains are very good, agencies that deal with them—to learn what the foon causes the rice to grow too high, their needs, ideas, and limitations are, and and the wind blows it down before it can be then use our efforts to fill the gaps in poten­ harvested. When the value of puj was ex­ tially productive programs. Without this closer plained by comparing it with foon, the peas­ look, we really don’t know what’s going on. ants pointed out that perhaps if they used puj While these data are not complete enough all their rice would grow too tall and be blown to serve as a basis for a full analysis of coin- down and much of the crop lost. They went directed activities, they are sufficient to show on to point out that their main problem was the lands of considerations that must be taken 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW into account in designing and planning an defined and subject to some kind of objective effective and efficient counterinsurgency pro­ and discrete measurement, coin activities, on gram of the type Martino proposed. Martino’s the other hand, involve a much higher order a priori assumption that the introduction of of social and cultural phenomena which are fertilizers would be positively received and not yet amenable to rigid delineation and utilized is not supported by these data, which quantification. Therefore, basic coin evalua­ show on the contrary that among some peas­ tions and policy decisions cannot utilize sys­ ants, at least, fertilizers clearly are not a tems analysis except as a supplementary tool strongly felt need. In fact, their weak intro­ in some of the subanalysts’ areas where its duction can serve and has already served as conditions are met. an irritant. This is not to degrade the potential Rather than leave the question here with practical value of properly used fertilizers to the conclusion that systems analysis is at best the peasant. The point to be made here is of very little value in corN planning, I should that the introduction of fertilizers is intended like to go on to argue that as a practical matter to affect the condition of the peasant in such it is of negative value. Consider that nowhere a way as to decrease his propensity to aid and did Martino even hint that the fertilizer as­ abet insurgency, and therefore his perspective sumptions and other related variables which is of vital importance. Even if a different goal he supplied were themselves at all critical. were involved, any effective program of local He gives us no clue as to how they are ascer­ modernization would have to take into ac­ tained, and one is in fact tempted to the con­ count the peasant’s values, beliefs, and atti­ clusion that he chose his variables for no tudes as well as the organization and character sounder reason than that they were the ones of those institutions that would play a part in that fit his systems analysis method. From the introducing and regulating the new materials, standpoint of coin planning, as opposed to ideas, and techniques. systems analysis, the fact that graphs of agri­ Let me make clear that the thrust of my cultural yield versus rates of insurgency re­ attack is not that fertilizers will not work cruitment or food consumption rates of peas­ among some peasants. Such an attack could ants can be drawn or tallied is of far less and should be rejected as senseless, nitpick­ interest than the process by which one identi­ ing, and quibbling. The point is that Martino fies these as the critical variables. Yet Martino’s made the a priori assumption that fertilizers paper reads very well. Given his assumptions, would have a positive response because he he argues his case cogently and shows how had to make that assumption. He had to make significant results can be produced. To one it because systems analysis cannot handle the unable to challenge his seemingly plausible complex, nonquantifiable variables concerning assumptions, his plan appears sound and work­ peasant values, social structure, governmental- able. Herein lies the manifestation of the peasant relationships, etc., that must be taken negative value of systems analysis for coin into account if a rational plan of preventive planning: because systems analysis is such a coin' action is to be followed. And the situa­ neat and simple method of organizing appar­ tion would have been the same whether Mar­ ently insoluble problems, it carries with it the tino had selected water, better rice varieties, temptation to bypass messy but vital aspects medical aid, roads, or what have you as the of the problem areas which it cannot handle. focus of the program. The dangers of systems analysis are perhaps Herein, then, lie the critical limits of sys­ greatest when presentations are made to ad­ tems analysis as a tool for coin planning. ministrators who are susceptible to seduction Every analytic system must make assumptions by quasi-rigorous analyses and who are too about the phenomena on which it operates, often uncritical of underlying assumptions. and no such system can produce an analysis any sounder than its assumptions. Systems In conclusion, I have argued that Martino’s analysis requires that variables be very clearly proposed use of systems analysis for guiding LIMITATIONS OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR COIN 51

coin efforts in such places as his hypothetical taken into account in planning coin programs. East Emergia does not show promise when Finally, I argue that the use of systems anal­ related to concrete data from a real situation ysis carries with it real dangers unless those that must have loomed large in Martino’s who use its results are well aware of its analysis. I have tried to show that the failure limitations. of his analysis lies in the inappropriate use 6570th Aerospace Medical Research of the systems analysis technique, which can­ Laboratories (AFSC) not handle the kinds of variables that must be

Notes 1. Joseph P. Martino. “Systems Analysis and Counter­ 2. E. S. Quade (ed.), Analysis for Military Decisions insurgency," Air University Review, XVU, 6 ( September-October (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1964). 1966), 23-33.

Major Martino replies

Professor Saund’s major points seem to be be tested against reality during this repetitive process. It was impossible to demonstrate this as follows: cycle at work in my article, both because of 1) Systems analysis forces one to make as­ length limitations and because the article was sumptions a priori about the problem because tutorial in nature, rather than an actual case otherwise one cannot perform the analysis. It study. Thus my choice of fertilizer as a solu­ is much better to study the real problem and tion was not forced by some inner necessity find genuine solutions which are culturally of systems analysis but by the fact that I acceptable. wanted to illustrate how to make a trade-off 2) The problems of coin are too complex between two approaches and had to choose and unquantifiable for systems analysis. something as a concrete example. In a real 3) Systems analysis is dangerous because it situation, many approaches would be ana­ can make a convincing case for an erroneous answer. lyzed, to assure that they were in fact genuine solutions and to see which of the genuine My comments: solutions had minimum cost. Cultural accept­ 1) This assertion, I believe, arises from an ability is merely one of the many criteria incomplete understanding of what systems against which a proposed solution must be analysis is. It is simply not so that systems tested, as part of the analysis. analysis starts with a set of assumptions about 2) I agree they are complex. So are most the problem and grinds out answers which problems. This is not a justification for failing may have no relation to reality. A proper sys­ to quantify those things which are quantifi­ tems analysis will include alternative cycles able. Hitch, in Quade, p. 329 (Saund’s note of studying a problem in its real setting, then 2), discusses this point in more detail. One of modeling the problem, making assumptions the major puqioses of my article was to indi­ where necessary. It is essential that the model cate that many more aspects of coin are quan­ 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW tifiable than one at first might suppose. By that Professor Saund was able to isolate in appropriate sampling techniques, it is possible my example the critical point about whether to estimate the impact on insurgent recruiting fertilizer was in fact the bottleneck limiting rates of such things as income, income change, rice production. Had some less explicit argu­ etc. Since these things can be quantified, they ment been used for (or against) fertilizer, or should be. Otherwise it is impossible to tell water, or whatever was proposed as the solu­ how our limited resources can be applied tion, it would have been very difficult, if not most effectively. If increased income turns out impossible, to determine whether a changed to have only a minor effect as compared with assumption would force a change in the final something else, effort spent on increasing solution. income would be wasted. I do not believe Professor Saund has made 3) I feel this argument is not valid. Almost a case against systems analysis in coin appli­ any method can be used, consciously or un­ cations. He has made a case against bad sys­ consciously, to support an erroneous case. tems analysis. I agree with him in this, not One of the virtues of systems analysis is that only for coin but for all other applications. the case it makes is explicit and open to oseph P. artino examination by others. Witness, for instance, J M Major, USAF Military Affairs Abroad

CIVIC ACTION OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES

Major Horacio A. Ratti, Argentine .Air Force

N countries that have relatively little influ­ election campaigns the vogue in political slo­ ence on world affairs in comparison with gans has been to promise more schools instead I the larger countries of the world, one of theof barracks, in disregard of the fact that each subjects which creates much disagreement barracks, besides its role of arms in defense concerns the necessity for and strength of of the country, is actually a school where use­ their armed forces. The subject is more con­ ful skills are taught and illiteracy is attacked. troversial in light of the fact that many of Many theories exist concerning tills prob­ these countries have had no armed conflict lem, and there are many different projects that for many years and do not have any foresee­ could be argued as providing adequate solu­ able problem of this kind which they would tions. What one cannot argue is the necessity be capable of resolving by means of force. of the existence of armed forces in countries Undoubtedly, from the first point of view, to which suffer social and political changes as a maintain armed forces in time of peace is a result of normal evolution and in which the very expensive burden to any country', and it armed forces act as a factor of order and is more critical in those countries that have moderation. economic and other urgent problems. Although the principal purpose of this Armed forces, in order to be worthy of article is not to judge the necessity of the the name, must keep up to date from the armed forces or the strength they must attain technical and operational point of view, and in countries which have not yet arrived at a this at present is very expensive. The purely high level of development, I want to point military action of the armed forces in peace­ out that I consider their existence well justi­ time does not appear to provide immediate fied, when employed in defense of the free­ concrete results. Unfortunately this seeming dom and sovereignty of these countries. failure does provide ground for the ideologies But parallel to the specific military aspect that would be pleased with the extinction or exists another one of active contribution that debilitation of these forces. Lately, in many the armed forces put into practice every day.

(Continued on page 56) Civic action of the Argentine Armed Forces extends from semitropical north ...... to the antarctic region at the southernmost boundaries of the Republic. 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Through lack of communication and the aus­ instruction of the illiterate portion of the pop­ tere procedures of military men, this aspect ulation. All these tasks and many others are has not had the general recognition it should well planned in order to obtain the best pos­ have. I am referring to the civic action of the sible results. At the same time care is taken armed forces, which encompasses many dif­ neither to interfere with other commercial ferent tasks, all of them directed toward im­ interests nor to limit the initiative of other proving community life by means of concrete private sectors when those sectors are capable and immediate objectives. It is well known of accomplishing these tasks. That is, the civic that to keep the armed forces at a high level action of the armed forces is executed to fill of operational readiness requires technical a vacuum in designated aspects of the national and operational capabilities, as well as con­ structure—a vacuum caused by insufficiency siderable human effort. If these capabilities or nonexistence of other public or private and efforts can give, at the same time, im­ organizations. mediate results in benefit to the community, A few examples will give an idea of the it is possible to obtain a working combination magnitude and importance of these works and in this aspect. Men and machines fidfilling their effect, direct and indirect, on the civilian their specific tasks of military training in community. peacetime also give back active benefits to General. The various units and organiza­ the people. In the Argentine Republic this tions of the armed forces in Argentina have double application of the armed forces has as their standing duties: been accomplished for many years. The large a. To provide elementary instruction to expanse of Argentina’s territory and the limi­ illiterate soldiers during the period of their tation of some of its resources have residted compulsory military service. in some regions’ not keeping pace with the b. To provide medical and dental care to rhythm of development of the principal zones. the civilian population residing near military At the same time that one finds modem urban installations. centers such as Buenos Aires and well-devel­ c. To teach manual skills to the soldiers oped provinces like Cordoba, he can find ter­ during their period of active duty. ritories such as the Patagonia where there is d. To provide transportation by air or sur­ a lack of an appropriate infrastructure, com­ face to people with serious health conditions, munications, schools, power plants, bridges, such as mercy missions, emergency evacua­ and other basic works. tions following disasters, etc. Because of their special nature, the armed e. To support public or community libraries forces are in a good position to aid in fulfill­ (the Air Force counts on 1,500.000 volumes ing many of these needed tasks without undue for this purpose). expense. Their organization and adaptability f. To provide voluntary supplementary aid and their noncommercial aims have enabled to public schools. (Almost every military unit the armed forces to accomplish many varied sponsors a primary school and furnishes vari­ objectives of national interest throughout the ous types of assistance.) spectrum of common welfare. Among these g. To contribute materials and surplus accomplishments have been the establishment equipment to technical schools. of new air routes to distant regions which h. To award incentive prizes to outstand­ initially are not economically feasible for pri­ ing students of primary and secondary' schools. vate airlines; the supplying of manual labor for i. To provide free transportation by air or harvesting crops; the construction of bridges, surface for students of primary and secondary roads, and telephone lines; free medical assist­ schools, to visit historical sites and other ance to indigent people; launching of rockets places of general interest. for scientific studies; free teaching of young Space research. The National Committee people on technical subjects; technical and of Space Research (cnie), the Institute of scientific research at a high level; and primary Aeronautical and Space Research, and the MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 57

General Supplying Agency of Aeronautics technical subjects. In addition, they are given (cmga) are organizations where civil and mili­ general instruction in the basic sciences and tary people work together in this new area. the humanities. Not only are these schools In the international field, these agencies have free but the students get an allowance for relations with the Committee on Space Re­ transportation, books, etc. When they finish search (cospar) of the International Council the courses, many of them enter the Air Force of Scientific Unions, with the International as technicians, and others go to work in pri­ Academy of Aeronautics (ia f ), and with the vate factories. These schools are a very con­ Inter-American Committee on Space Research venient solution for young people who have (c iie ). Since 1962 Argentina has taken part in neither the capacity nor enough resources to an international plan of meteorological inves­ follow other careers. tigation. In collaboration with the United Passive Air Defense (DAP). A passive air States, France, Japan, India, Pakistan, and defense organization exists in several coun­ Australia, several rockets were launched with tries; in the Argentine Republic it is a branch complete success. Many of these rockets w'ere of the Air Defense Command. Although many made in .Argentina by the National Agency civilian volunteers are involved in perform­ of Aeronautical Research and Manufacture ing the numerous tasks related to the passive (dixfia), which is a civilian/militarv institution. defense of the population, the structure of the Industries, denfia participates in a wide organization is formed by military men in range of scientific and technological activities. active service or who have retired. In spite Military and civilian personnel form a com­ of the fact that this agency has been created pact team and consequently accomplish then- to serve during wartime, it fulfills many duties tasks with great success. This agency con­ during peacetime. Its activities take place all tributes not only to the development of the over the country, contributing with labor, aeronautical industry itself but also to other means, and resources in order to prevent, re­ activities of great utility to the country. It has duce, or repair the effects of floods, earth­ built motorcycles, cars, rockets, tools, and quakes, or other phenomena. It collaborates many other products of national design. with other Latin American countries in prob­ State Airline. In order to take progress to lems of similar nature. very distant areas of the national territory and Air traffic control. Near Buenos Aires assist the development of important centers there is an early-w'aming and control opera­ in the interior, the Secretary of Aeronautics tion center w'hich centralizes information from created in 1940 a special promotional airline, several radar stations. This system was in­ designated State Airline (lade). Its principal stalled to provide air defense control to the mission is the opening of airways to those city and is operated and maintained by the places not attractive for private air transport. Air Defense Command. Although its primary The planes, personnel, and maintenance are mission is military air defense, the system also supplied by transport units of the Air Force. has the capability of providing general air From 1940 until 1964 lade accomplished traffic control for the capital city. This results 12,768 flights, flew 72.193 hours and over in the dual benefits of creating close and posi­ 11,538,125 miles, and transported 315,141 tive collaboration with civilian aviation orga­ passengers, 703,965 pounds of cargo, and nizations and, at the same time, of keeping 191,190 pounds of mail. The moment these military personnel trained in air defense tasks. air routes become feasible and attractive to Construction. The specialized units of the civilian airlines, they are readily turned over Army have done many different kinds of jobs to private enterprise. in recent years: Education. Each one of the big bases and a. Collaboration in the construction of sev­ agencies of the Air Force runs a school where eral polyclinics, small power plants, irrigation youths from 12 to 17 years of age are taught works, etc., saving the nation an amount 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW equivalent to $2,500,000 in U.S. money. Force grants one the immense and unique b. Installation of approximately 2000 miles privilege and honor that a man feels when he of telephone lines. is serving institutions of such great merit and c. Construction of approximately 250 miles historical significance: the privilege of partici­ of roads. pating in daily sacrifice for one’s country, in d. Construction of 50 bridges. the widest sense of the word. This privilege and the recognition of their countrymen con­ stitute the austere prize which military men View in g these facts and figures, one can ap­ desire for their own. preciate, in general, the magnitude of the Our anned forces are not, nor do they benefits that the civic action of the armed see themselves as, forces of privilege. Ever forces has produced in the last few years by since the wars of independence, they have means of accomplishments of national inter­ been marking their path with concrete works est. To these accomplishments can be added for the common welfare. Members of the another one which cannot be evaluated in armed forces come from all levels of our figures but which has a very real and positive society, and this gives them a special and subjective value, nonetheless. I am referring natural sensibility towards the problems of to the understanding and mutual help derived the people. In a simple and silent manner from the contact between people in general they fulfill greatly diversified tasks wadi sac­ and members of the armed forces. This under­ rifice and with love and devotion for their standing by the public is perhaps the most fellow men. valuable and appreciated outcome of the This special character of the men of the armed forces’ civic action, in that it helps to armed forces has made possible the success offset or diminish those negative effects of their civic action, so that many benefits created by such factions as antimilitary and have accrued to the nation. other reactionary' groups. Being a part of the Army, Navy, or Air Buenos Aires, Argentina THE SOVIET DRIVE FOR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY

Harriet Fast Scott

N THE FALL of 1967 the United States systems, this official publication of the Soviet I Secretary of Defense informed the public Military Publishing House informs that of Soviet fractional orbiting bombardment sys­ tems (fobs). The very few Americans who had One of our androcket complexes includes read the 1967 edition of Soviet Rocket Troops long-range pilotless interceptors. During prac­ were not surprised.0 According to this book, tice shots, with the help of such antirockets, Soviet military leaders had already advised the warheads of ballistic rockets were accu­ their public: rately intercepted while flying at cosmic speed. Still more effective are other Soviet antirockets. . . . into the armaments of the troops They can destroy warheads of ballistic rockets constandy come new kinds of weapons and at enormous distances from protected objects, combat equipment, among which are orbiting (p. 226, 1967 ed.) rockets, small caliber solid-fueled intercon­ tinental rockets on self-propelled launchers, It is seldom that one has an opportunity and also fully automatic complexes of strategic- rockets, characterized by exceptionally high to compare two editions of a book on such a reliability and combat readiness, (p. 5, 1967 vital topic, with such an interesting period ed.) of history taking place between publication dates. For in 1964, when the first edition ap­ While military' and civilian leaders in the peared in Moscow bookstores, Khrushchev United States were seeking a letup in the was still in power. The second edition ap­ nuclear arms race, the Soviets were stating: peared after the regime of Brezhnev was well A remarkable novelty is the solid-fueled under way and after new guidelines had been rocket of intercontinental and medium range established at the meeting of the XXIII Con­ on self-propelled launchers. Not one army in gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet the world has a similar effective weapon. Such Union in April 1966. strategic rockets constandy change their posi­ What are the significant changes that tion and cannot be reconnaissanced and de- have taken place in the Soviet Armed Forces troyed by the enemy. . . . between 1964 and 1967, as reflected by these Our stationary launch installations also have remarkable qualities. They are carefully two editions of Soviet Rocket Troops? The camouflaged from air and space reconnaissance 1964 edition had asserted: and are reliably protected from nuclear strikes. . . . Especially indicative of the might of our Speaking in 1960 at the Fourth Session of rocket troops is the fact that they can launch the Supreme Soviet of the u ssr , N. S. Khrush­ from underground, not one rocket, but can give chev has stressed that in contemporary condi­ a rocket salvo, (p. 100, 1967 ed.) tions war will little resemble previous wars. Now war will begin differently, if it begins, For those interested in antiballistic missile and unfold differently. In conditions when ®P. T. Astashenkov, Soviet Engineer Colonel, Soviet Rocket states have means of delivering nuclear weap­ Troop.*, ed. General Colonel V. F. Tolubko (Moscow: Military Publishing House: first edition, 1964, 234 pages, price 37 kopeks, ons over thousands of kilometers, war will initial printing 30,000 copies; second edition, 1967, 344 pages, begin first of all in the depths of the belligerent price 67 kopeks (about 75 cents], initial printing 11,000 copies). countries. In this, there will not be one capital, Colonel Astashenkov is the editor of the Soviet aerospace magazine Aviation and Cosmonautics. General Colonel Tolubko not one major industrial or administrative cen­ is First Deputy Commander in Chief, Strategic Rocket Troops. ter, not one strategic region, which will not In January 1966 there was considerable speculation in the United States concerning the purpose of Tolubko's visit to North Viet­ undergo strikes not only in the first days, but nam. even in the first minutes of the war. (p. 191) 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

This same paragraph was in the 1967 The major organizational change in the edition, with but one change in the first part United States armed forces after World War of the first sentence: II was the establishment of a separate Air Our press has stressed that in contempo­ Force. The Soviet Union, however, has formed rary conditions war will little resemble previous five services: Strategic Rocket Troops, Aero­ wars. (p. 278) space Defense Troops, Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Naval Forces. Each of these five The Soviets have reason to be so sensitive services (Vidi) has its own commander in to Mao Tse-tung’s accusations that Brezhnev chief. The Strategic Rocket Troops, created and Kosygin are, in fact, following a policy in 1960, always is referred to as the “main w'hich can best be described as “Khrushchev- service,” and its commander in chief, Marshal ism without Khrushchev.” No basic change in of the Soviet Union Krylov, takes precedence doctrine and strategy is reflected in the two over the other commanders. The next service, editions of Soviet Rocket Troops. The state­ Aerospace Defense Troops ( pv o ), provides ment is made in the first edition: protection against manned aircraft and missile Under the leadership of the Communist and space attacks. The antimissile component Party, a genuine technical revolution has taken ( pr o ) is referred to as the most important part place in the Soviet Armed Forces, (p. 2, pub­ of the Aerospace Defense Troops. The anti­ lisher’s note) space component ( pr o ) is mentioned with The second edition continues the explanation some frequency. of this revolution and its impact upon the It sometimes is assumed that the Strategic posture of the Soviet Armed Forces. Rocket Troops is the only Soviet service con-

SA-2 surface-to-air missiles MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 61 cemed with rockets. In fact, however, the weapons and of personnel. “revolution in military affairs” has resulted in Both editions of Soviet Rocket Troops the other four sendees being reorganized carry identical paragraphs on the Soviet con­ to give a central place to their own rocket cept of a future war if nuclear powers are capabilities. For example, the defense against involved: maimed aircraft in the Aerospace Defense With the nuclear rocket weapon present, Troops is based primarily upon the famed the content and order of direct preparation of SA-2 surface-to-air missile, which is now well the armed forces for war has changed. The known in the United States as a result of its great range of action of strategic rockets ex­ being supplied to North Vietnam. (In the cludes the necessity of moving them to the Soviet Union the SA-2 likely would earn’ a border, and permits carrying out strikes from nuclear warhead.) The antimissile and anti­ the place of their permanent basing. This raises space components of the Aerospace Defense the danger of the surprise unleashing of war Troops also are armed with nuclear missiles. by the aggressor in contemporary circum­ The Soviet Ground Forces have a Rocket stances and dictates the necessity to maintain Troops and Artillery Branch which provides constant readiness to frustrate and repulse a their tactical nuclear missiles. The tactics of surprise attack by the enemy. . . . The presence of rockets influences the co­ the Soviet infantry and tank units are based operation of various services of the armed primarily on tactical nuclear weapons, which forces. It is well known that the firing means would be fired by the Rocket Troops and of ground forces in the past had a range of .Artillery Branch, (p. 180, 1967 ed.) The rock­ 20 kilometers into the depth of the enemy loca­ ets, many of which are mounted on self- tion. From this it is clear what sort of fire sup­ propelled carriers, would not be effective port, for example, they might give to fleet weapons when using only conventional ex­ operation. Now it is a different matter—the plosives. ground troops and fleet can mutually support The Soviet Air Forces also utilize rockets. each other “with rocket fire” at a distance Aircraft of long-range aviation would launch which is very significant and incomparable air-to-ground rockets well outside the oppo­ with anything in the past. (p. 192, 1964 ed.; nent’s air defense network. Air-to-air combat p. 279, 1967 ed.) is fought with air-to-air rockets, armed with This book should be studied carefully by conventional warheads in North Vietnam but those who make or influence foreign and mili­ probably nuclear-armed over the Soviet Union. tary policy in the United States. Our military The submarine, carrying nuclear-armed leadership now is going to those officers who missiles, is the main strike force of the Soviet have had recent experience in Southeast Asia. Navy. Surface ships also are armed with Concerned with a technologically inferior op­ nuclear missiles. ponent, these officers may fail to see the sig­ This technical revolution is one major nificance of the Soviet drive for strategic aspect of the Soviet revolution in military superiority in all aspects of warfare, with affairs. There are three stages to the revolu­ emphasis on nuclear weaponry and missiles. tion: the first was the development of the If strategic superiority does pass to the Soviet nuclear weapon; the second, the combining Union, or if even parity is reached, dare the of the weapon with the missile; and the third United States risk a limited war on the Asian stage, which still continues, is the use of mainland, or elsewhere? cybernetics in command and control, both of McLean, Virginia Air Force Review

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE AIR FORCE RESEARCH COMMUNITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL AGENCIES

Major George F. H einrich

T IS well accepted that our future military tional Aeronautics and Space Administration security depends to a large extent on the programs designed to relieve these interaction continuedI rapid advancement of our tech­ problems. The Air Force programs are used nology. It is generally recognized that the by various components of the Air Force advancement of technology is strongly related agency charged with performing research, the to the quality and relevance of the basic and Office of Aerospace Research ( oar); the nasa applied research being performed. So it programs have been developed by the nasa would seem appropriate to examine the prob­ Office of Technology Utilization. Finally, I lems involved in the interactions between shall describe a program developed by an the research community and the technological individual component of oar, the Office of agencies® and to describe the programs de­ Research Analyses ( ora), and analyze it in signed to promote effective interactions. terms of the shortcomings brought out by the First I shall describe three simple models discussion of the simple models. of the interaction between science and tech­ nology and discuss problems inhibiting effec­ interaction models and problems tive interactions. Then I shall describe the Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, and Na- Simple models have been used in many disciplines to gain understanding of complex phenomena. For example, the field of econom­ °The research community includes the scientists engaged in basic and applied research; the technological community in­ ics has made extensive use of models, and this cludes those engaged in exploratory and advanced development. may explain, in part, the advancements in Within the framework of the Air Force, basic research respon­ sibility is assigned to the Office of Aerospace Research; techno­ understanding and the resultant better ability logical development responsibility is assigned to the Air Force to control economic processes. It must be rec­ Systems Command. It should be recognized that the distinction between commands is not an abrupt interface: AFSC labora­ ognized that there are drawbacks to using tories do perform research in addition to their exploratory development work, and OAR laboratories do perform some simple models, as they can never completely exploratory development work in addition to their research. describe or explain complex processes or inter­ For the purpose of this article, "research” is understood to include both basic and applied research. To appreciate the actions. However, models can be used to gain confusion concerning the distinction between basic and applied understanding of the dominant characteristics research, see M. D. Reagan, "Basic and Applied Research: A Meaningful Distinction?” Science, Vol. 155 (1967), p. 1383. of a complex process, which is an important AIR FORCE REVIEW 63

first step in the understanding of any complex their current technology or in their attempts phenomenon. to improve their technology. Let us consider three models of the inter­ Model B, which is similar to Model A, is actions between research and technology, all the more nearly correct model and shows that shown in Figure 1. When these models are research feeds a pool of knowledge which is analyzed in light of current events, many drawn on by groups or agencies performing problems inhibiting smooth and effective in­ exploratory development, advanced develop­ teractions between the research community ment, and systems engineering. Furthermore, and technology centers become evident. Model B recognizes that additional knowledge Model A assumes that the results of re­ is added to the pool or reservoir of knowledge search flow into a knowledge depository. The at each of the stages (i.e., exploratory devel­ knowledge depository consists of books, jour­ opment, advanced development, and systems nal articles, and technical reports. This de­ engineering) and that the research community pository is available for use by the tech­ draws on this pool of knowledge as well as nologists when they run into problems with the technological agencies. This model was

Figure 1. Interaction models between the re- search community and the technological agencies

Model C - interaction model for research and development

Model A - simple depository model

Model B - complex depository model 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW originated by Shapero.' It has received addi­ nificant research, and the relevance of research tional support from the recent report of the to furnishing military technologists with solu­ Materials Advisory Board.2 tions to important problems. Analysis of Models A and B, in light of An examination of Model C in light of the increase in money, people, and agencies the increase in r & d effort reveals that the same engaged in research and development, reveals problems for effective coordination exist that that there are many problems associated with were previously described for Models A and an effective working of the interaction proc­ B. These problems are proliferation of pub­ ess. These problems include: lications, delay in publishing of results, and (a) The explosion in the number of jour­ jargon or formulism used by a particular dis­ nals, reports, and books. For example, the cipline or phenomena-oriented group. In addi­ United States currently accumulates more tion to these problems, new problem areas than 100,000 government reports each year, exist: plus 450,000 articles and countless books and (a) Certain aspects of a particular phe­ papers.3 Technical people are overwhelmed nomenon are often understood only by the by the number of publications and can hardly researchers examining the phenomenon; the hope to stay abreast of all research advances researchers gained this understanding through in their field. the media of personal communication, un­ (b) The delay in the publishing of new published reports, or unpublished talks before research results. The interval between signifi­ learned societies. This type of communication cant theoretical or experimental results and network within the research community vir­ the publication of these results often exceeds tually excludes the technological agencies a year. This delay is due to the time it takes from understanding important aspects of a the researcher to write up his results in a phenomenon. form suitable for publication, the time re­ (b) The problem of when to inform the quired for the judging or refereeing of a technological agencies of a research advance. paper, the time to make the corrections result­ The research community does bring new work ing from the judging, and the time to print. to the attention of the technological commu­ (c) The use of a different jargon and spe­ nity. However, the timing or significance of cial mathematical formulism by each research this disclosure of new work is based on the discipline. As a result, systems engineers and value judgment of a researcher. Since re­ technologists often have difficulty interpret­ searchers are primarily phenomena-oriented ing the results of the researchers. and not systems-oriented, there is some ques­ Model C shows the research community tion as to their qualifications to make the as primarily phenomena-oriented. In other value judgment of timing, since the impor­ words, research is aimed at better under­ tance of the advance or discovery depends standing basic phenomena and developing upon its impact on present or future systems. models and theorems that describe these phe­ (c) In a manner similar to (b), technolo­ nomena. As shown by the model, research has gists often come up with new instrumentation little direct interaction with technology. As or techniques that would be of assistance to stated by the originator of this model, tech­ researchers. These techniques or instruments nology usually feeds upon technology, and are often available for a significant period phenomena-oriented science feeds upon phe­ of time before researchers become aware of nomena-oriented science.' There are indirect and start using these new tools. interactions between research and technology; (d) Technologists usually work in the world advances in one area will almost invariably of systems and complex interrelated processes. be transferred to the other area through proc­ It is difficult for them to express their prob­ esses that resemble symbiosis. The main prob­ lems in terms of phenomena and therefore to lems imposed by the lack of direct interaction express technological problems in terms mean­ concern timeliness, lack of recognition of sig­ ingful to the research community. Better AIR FORCE REVIEW 65 problem definition by the technologist, in organizing annual symposiums of researchers terms meaningful to researchers, could assist concerned with the examination of a particu­ the research community in its search for more lar phenomenon.8 Since these symposiums relevant research projects. allow the technologists to update themselves in one phenomenon area in the period of a few days, this colonizing effort promises to attempts to solve the interaction problem be very fruitful in terms of interactions be­ All these problems have been recognized, tween the research community and the tech­ and some steps have been taken to alleviate nological agencies, in addition to furthering an them. Considering non-Air Force agencies effective and high-quality research program. first, National Aeronautics and Space Admin­ Another program, with the aim of stimu­ istration and the Atomic Energy Commission lating effective interaction between the re­ both have active programs designed to facili­ search community and the technological tate and encourage the applications of then- agencies, is the research analysis program of research by other organizations, both govern­ the Office of Research Analyses. The research ment and private industry. Both the aec and analysis program includes two types of studies: nasa have information retrieval programs sim­ research-application studies, concerning de­ ilar to the dod program (the Defense Docu­ termination of the cost-effective use of a mentation Center system) that are aimed at recent research advance in a future weapon alleviating the problem of the publication system; and technological-barrier studies, to explosion. Both nasa and the aec have “cou­ indicate what advances are required in order pling” offices established at their research cen­ to make future aerospace systems more cost- ters. These coupling or application offices were effective. Thus, research analysis is defined as established to serve as a bridge between the the determination of cost-effective applications centers and industry. There are also other aec of the results of accomplished or ongoing and nasa programs that involve the use of research and the identification of promising symposiums, topical or state-of-the-art reports, opportunities for mission-relevant research. consultation sen-ices, and advisory boards; all Let us now consider the methodologies of these programs play a part in accomplishing both research-application and technological- effective interactions. barrier studies and how these studies address Several actions have been taken by the the problems of effective interactions. research agency of the Air Force, the Office of Aerospace Research, to alleviate the inter­ research-application studies action problem between the research com­ munity and the technological agencies. Like Research-application studies have their .aec and nasa, oar has established research origin with an advance in a particular research application offices at the laboratory level. area. The first step in a research-application These application offices are staffed by ex­ study, as shown in Figure 2, is to employ the perienced field-grade r & d officers, who have results of this advance in a component of a the responsibility of determining potential conceptual system necessary to perform a con­ users of oar research in the various Air Force tinuing or future Air Force requirement. The development and technological centers. As conceptual system is then compared with a collateral action, oar encourages its scien­ alternative (existing or proposed) ways that tists to spend an appreciable part of their have performed or could perform the same time coordinating or consulting with other function. An engineering analysis is performed agencies, primarily Air Force Systems Com­ to determine the effectiveness parameters. mand units. Specific missions are proposed, and the com­ One of the elements of oar, the Air Force parative systems are analyzed in terms of their Office of Scientific Research ( afosr), has ini­ effectiveness. Finally, the systems are priced tiated a “colonizing” effort, which consists of and compared with the previous results to 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Figure 2. Research-application study methodology

determine their cost effectiveness. Research-application studies cut through In application studies, the analyst works most of the interaction problems. With the with the researcher in order to conceptualize analyst and basic researcher working closely a component or subsystem, using as a basis together during the conceptual design phase, the phenomena under investigation by the the current and most relevant research data researcher. Next, the analyst turns to the are brought out, and the time lag and publi­ technologist to determine the effectiveness cation explosion problems are not so severe. parameters relevant to the component or Through coordination between analyst and subsystem and also to determine comparative technologist, effectiveness parameters are se­ devices to evaluate with the conceptual sub­ lected which the engineers and applied scien­ system in question. The analyst then works tists are familiar with and can easily evaluate. with planning agencies to determine future This eliminates the problem of jargon and ter­ missions for the conceptual and comparative minology. In addition, the technical managers devices. The devices are then evaluated in are given some insight to the cost effective­ terms of the mission requirements and cost ness of the various devices and thus are better in terms of the effectiveness parameters. able to structure their exploratory develop- AIR FORCE REVIEW 67

merit programs with due consideration to the prove the components’ performance or to relevance and importance of a new research develop new, superior components is then finding. considered to be the key to improved capa­ bility. The primary utility of barrier studies is technological-barrier studies to focus attention on critical areas of research. Technological-barrier studies normally These types of studies identify critical areas start with a sensitivity analysis of the effects for technologists, who then encourage direct of variations of subsystem characteristics on contacts between technological and research the overall system performance. In a sensi­ groups. These direct contacts help alleviate tivity analysis, reasonable increases in per­ the publication and communication problems. formance are postulated for the various sub­ Also, highlighted problem areas give insight systems. If the total system performance to research managers as to how to structure demonstrates a relatively large change with or reorient their research programs. a change in a particular subsystem perform­ ance, a teclmological barrier is indicated. Technological-barrier studies indicate It is obvious that there are many problems where advances are needed to make future concerning effective interaction between the systems more cost-effective. However, the bar­ research community, which is primarily phe- riers must be interpreted in terms of research nomena-oriented, and the technological agen­ opportunities for the research community. cies. These problems have been recognized, The translation of technological barriers into and progress is being made to alleviate them. research opportunities follows no set pattern. One approach is the research analysis pro­ One approach is to break down into compo­ gram of the Office of Research Analyses, nents the subsystem that affects the overall which should help alleviate some of the diffi­ system performance the greatest. Through co­ culties in effective interaction between the ordination with afsc and oar laboratories, the research community and the technological performance-limiting subsystem components agencies. are determined. Research necessary to im­ Office of Research Analyses

Notes X. A. Shapero. Diffusion of Innovations Resulting from nical Information Program, OAR 67-0009, Arlington, Virginia, Research. Stanford Research Institute, 1965. 1967. 2. Report of tile Ad Hoc Committee on Principles of 6. W. J. Price, '‘Concerning the Interaction between Research-Engineering Interaction, National Research Council, Science and Technology," Research Review, V, 10 (December Washington, D.C., July 1966. 1966), 1. 3. R. L. Lesher and G. J. Howick, Assessing Technology Transfer. NASA, Washington, D.C., 1966. 4. W. J. Price, W. G. Ashley, and J. P. Martino, Relating Acknowledgment the Accomplishments of AFOSR to the Needs of the Air Force, The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. T . E. AFOSR 66-2423, November 1966. Oberbeck for helpful discussions and a critical review of the 5. The Office of Aerospace Research Scientific and Tech- material presented in this article. In My Opinion

"WHAT DID HE SAY?"

Major General Thomas G. Corbin

IR HARRY LAUDER once said the abil­ fuzzy ghosts of words as at present. Cryptic ity to hold an audience must be a gift, designations, contorted abbreviations, and ec­ or no Scotsman would ever possess it. lectic initials have permeated the language of This treatise holds out no promise of such government, research, and business since the a prize, though it does hope to illuminate cer­ beginning of World War II, largely as a tain pitfalls that must be circumvented to by-product of the information explosion in preclude losing an audience. Neither is this science and technology. a pedantic diatribe against present military The most insidious of these forms is the methods of communicating. Rather, it is a acronym. An acronym (from acro—meaning small cry, from a growing wilderness of mis­ extreme, plus nym—meaning name) is a word understanding and misinterpretation, protest­ (or nonword, but pronounceable) made up of ing a practice both insidious and deceptive. initials or syllables from a group of words The proliferation of acronyms, abbrevia­ ( moose—from Man-Out-Of-Space-Easiest, an tions, and initials in the propagation of mili­ emergency space escape system) or of the first tary information has risen to mind-boggling and last syllables of a group of words ( motel proportions. The transfer of information is —from MOtor and hoTEL). Many have be­ now made over a communications bridge come widely known and accepted as words in whose foundations rest not on a bedrock of their own right and are common coin of the knowledge but upon a precipitous alphabetic realm ( radar—from RAdio Detecting And conglomerate. The seriousness of this problem Ranging). is not fully appreciated. Indeed, the official Air The United States has not been alone in Force guide for making oral presentations (Air this convolution of language. Look to the Force Pamphlet 178-1-1) considers it worthy early twenties and we find the Soviets run­ of only a cursory examination. ning amuck with such tongue twisters as There has probably never been such fer­ amtorg, gosplan, and agitprop. If it seems tile creation and widespread use of these we have been surpassed in this arena of non­ IN MY OPINION 69 communication, worry no more, for we have ginning his presentation, the briefing officer closed the abcedarian gap. Consider: afaud— resorted to the use of acronyms and initials in the readily recognizable Air Force AUDiter explaining a point. Lapsing into parochial General, or afjkt—known to all as the Air jargon appears to be in vogue these days. Force Job Knowledge Test, or the truly im­ There are those who will accept it without posing defrepnama—for DEFense REPresen- question, either through stupor or as a display tative North Atlantic and Mediterranean Area. of supercilious sophistication. This day, Gen­ There seems to have been little or no eral ------was seeking specific detailed infor­ order in the creation of many such terms. mation. He questioned the briefer as to the Some of those in use today were obviously exact meaning of an acronym he had used. selected (after being squeezed, elongated, and The officer’s answer was deemed in error and diabolically tortured) for the resultant acro­ was immediately corrected by the operations nym ( care—Cooperative for American Remit­ officer of the unit, whereupon the unit com­ tances to Europe, action— American Council mander further corrected both. This exchange To Improve Our Neighborhoods). Some have brought forth the hasty departure of General a logical basis, and some do not. Some are ------. His parting shot to the unit commander borrowed words, some are nicknames; others still rings in the ears of those present: “Call are alphanumeric, and still others are a com­ me when you know what the hell you’re talk­ bination of these schemes. ing about!” The torrent of initials to designate gov­ An experience of this sort is reason enough ernmental agencies and procedures has in­ to develop habits of semantic clarity, for undated us with alphabet soup: sa c , tac, clarity is the handmaiden of understanding. TAWC, TARC, MAC, OSD, AFPR, AFATL, APRFE, Remember, the use of a familiar word has a apcc— and on ad infinitum. The miscellany greater impact than a strange one. Anatole ranges from the sublime ( halo— High Altitude France, the Nobel Prize-winning novelist, said, Low Opening) to the ludicrous ( apc—All Pur­ “The finest words in the world are only vain pose Capsule). sounds if they cannot be understood.” Will At times, these terse, descriptive, and Rogers also saw this. He said, “I love words (sometimes) easily remembered terms have but I don’t like strange ones. You don’t under­ without question become useful in the lan­ stand them and they don’t understand you.” guage as a means of referring to complex, My objective is not to place a yoke on multiworded concepts, projects, or hardware. creative expression but to free it from the (Confusing sometimes also. Remember the tethers of constrictive contractions. Let us not lieutenant who asked his crew chief why be drugged by this poison that is more dan­ his aircraft was being sent overseas to ir a n — gerous than opium or hashish—a poison that Inspection and Repair As Necessary.) stifles understanding and retards comprehen­ As each of our specialized disciplines grew sion. We are becoming addicted to the un­ in complexity, so too did the locutions neces­ fettered use of acronyms, abbreviations, and sary to describe them. As new heights were initials, without explanation, in our communi­ reached in reducing complicated data to more cations. manageable units, understanding correspond­ With Air Force Manual 11-2 listing more ingly reached new lows. What had begun as than 2500 authorized abbreviations and acro­ a shortcut to understanding has become a de­ nyms (approximately the number of words in tour around comprehension. a first grader’s speaking vocabulary) plus Recently, at one of our Southern bases other thousands of parochial unauthorized (best that it remain nameless), General------ones, it seems time to call for a change. Let and a group of senior officers were scheduled comprehension, not expediency, shape our to be briefed on the mission of a particular course. unit. Despite meticulous preparation, disaster Far from calling for a departure from struck. What went wrong? Shortly after be­ tradition, I suggest a return to the inspiring 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW example of past masters of language: Moses I fear we are forgetting how to speak found it unnecessary to refer to the Ten English. The time is fast approaching when Commandments as the “ tencoms”; Lincoln meaningful communication will be difficult, completed his Gettysburg Address handily if not impossible, unless measures are taken without resorting to acronyms; Hannibal ex­ to restore clarity to our working vocabulary. plained his conception of the Battle of Cannae Let us descend from our Tower of Babble to his lieutenants without once referring to his and begin asap! foes as tire roar (ROman ARmy). Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

THE ROLE OF MILITARY RESERVISTS IN CIVIL DEFENSE

M ajor David A. S in g l e t a r y

It is essential to view civil defense as an interrelated complex of nonmilitary as well as military functions necessary to prepare or mobilize the entire nation against possible war; to maintain the continuity of government functions and essential economic activities; and to facilitate the early resumption of peace­ time pursuits. The term “nonmilitary’ defense” is often used to convey the broad range of civilian activities that must be joined with the military for preparedness, defense, and re­ covery. A paramount aspect of civil defense is the degree to which state and local govern­ ments as well as civilian leaders are needed to participate in systems and programs in S PART of the military establishment order to make them work properly'. It is not Al. and as community leaders and citizens,a purely military problem although the mili­ reservists have many opportunities to promote tary establishment play's a vital role. Civil effective planning and mobilization for civil defense planning and the responsibility for defense. My purpose here is to delineate, in implementing plans rest to a surprising degree rather broad terms, some of the areas where on local leadership; and this fact is currently- such activities are possible and feasible and reflected in civil defense plans and organiza­ to suggest avenues of future approach. tional structure. If it is assumed that planning IN MY OPINION 71 functions which are now a part of the civil 4. Reservists could be used as a pool from defense program will be implemented, then which to select qualified people for full-time there will be created a critical requirement civilian employment in staff positions under for correlative planning, and more intensive civil service. Similarly they could be used on planning, at the state and local government a selective basis for recall to active duty in levels. Many of our current problems in civil uniform. defense relate to the fact that serious plan­ In addition to the military role, there is ning and research in the whole field of non­ a second and highly productive role that re­ military defense activities have only recently servists can play in civil defense programs. been initiated. There needs to be further re­ That is, in regard to the purely civilian as­ search, in depth, on many aspects of these pects of civil defense, reservists can, as civil­ problems; long-range planning and research ian community leaders, act as promoters of functions related to civil defense should be the program and fill positions of leadership augmented far beyond their present capabili­ in state and local civil defense programs. The ties. rest of this discussion will be directed at this particular role of the reservist, which is a contributions of reservists most important one. There are several unique contributions the reservist can make toward effective plan­ the reservist as a civilian leader ning and mobilization. He can act as a pro­ Leadership is extremely important be­ mpter and coordinator between the military cause without extensive public support it will and civilian considerations involved. This be impossible to achieve a desirable state of would be true in both the planning and mo­ readiness. The formal organization for civil bilization phases. With regard to the military defense at the federal level is designed only aspects of civil defense, reservists can act in to provide a framework within which the their roles in various reserve military units program can operate. A favorable expression to insure preparation of adequate plans for of national interest is urgently needed. Until participation of the units in the civil defense this interest is substantially heightened, there programs. Selected military' reservists may is little possibility that we can achieve a truly also be placed in positions of responsibility successful civil defense program even though within the civil defense organizations. In this substantial federal appropriations are pro­ capacity they could serve as part-time staff vided. There is a critical need for civilian personnel while at the same time pursuing community leaders in thousands of cities their normal civilian business or profession. across the country who are cognizant of the The advantages of using reservists to augment need for civil defense programs and who are full-time staff would be fourfold: willing to work toward that end. Reservists, 1. Trained people could be procured quickly because of their greater understanding of the from the reserve rolls without extensive re­ implications of a thermonuclear war, are in cruiting problems or assignment of military a position to comprehend the nature of the personnel who may be urgently needed for problems involved much better than the av­ other duties. erage citizen. Also, many reservists occupy 2. Use of reservists would entail much less various positions of leadership in their re­ cost to the government. Indeed, in some in­ spective communities in business, professions, stances individual reservists would be willing and local government and are active in civic to volunteer their time as a public service. affairs. Such people are in a position to greatly 3. Reserve assignments could be used as a influence the attitudes and actions of other means for acquiring expert consultant services citizens and strongly affect the degree of in a relatively inexpensive and expeditious public acceptance of civil defense programs manner. initiated at the federal level. 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the national plan federal, state, and local government agency The depth of the role of the reservist in would be required to provide whatever serv­ civil defense is apparent when the provisions ice it could during a period of national crisis. of the National Plan for Civil Defense Mo­ In order to make these operations a success bilization are reviewed. According to this it will be necessary to involve people who are plan, virtually all groups in the nation have not only well trained and dedicated to then- civil defense responsibilities. Individuals are civilian jobs but who also possess an under­ responsible for sheltering and sustaining them­ standing and appreciation of the strategic selves for at least two weeks and for con­ military problems involved. Selected reservists tributing to the general recovery effort. State can form the nucleus for such groups. and local governments are responsible for One of the pertinent characteristics of the their own survival, for giving civil defense national plan is that it is not self-operating, direction, and for helping to sustain their and a great many of the steps needed to make populations. The federal government is re­ it successful have not yet been taken. Al­ sponsible for direction and coordination of all though tremendous effort has gone into the civil defense efforts and for assistance in local program at all levels, our system to date has problems as soon as possible. However, in not developed the organization and trained most instances state and local organizations citizenry required even to bring an effective would be expected to carry on exclusively by response to alert signals. their own devices for periods up to five weeks. The stakes are high. Civil defense pre­ This could be a most crucial period indeed and paredness can reduce total casualties very one in which reservists can and must provide significantly in event of thermonuclear attack. active participation and leadership. One of the problems we are facing is the Executives and managers in industry, relative lack of experience this country has agriculture, labor, and finance, many of them had with any form of civil defense against officers in the reserve forces, are directly re­ enemy air attacks. This is one of the reasons sponsible for assisting the government in why it is very difficult to convince the aver­ planning and executing measures designed to age citizen of the need for extensive protec­ insure the functioning or restoration of essen­ tive measures. The fact that this nation has tial elements of the economy. Professional, never suffered a bombing attack, although a civic, service, religious, and social organiza­ fortunate circumstance, operates as a negative tions are expected to make such contributions factor in lulling people into complacency, as may be possible. Individual federal agen­ oblivious to the threat we are actually con­ cies are assigned temporary responsibilities fronted with at this time. until emergency controls can be activated There has been a great deal of specula­ and permanent responsibilities established for tion as to reasons for this country’s failure to eventual recovery. For example, the Depart­ face its civil defense needs. Contributing fac­ ment of Labor would handle manpower prob­ tors include the complex and unprecedented lems; the Department of Agriculture would nature of the problems presented; the new­ be responsible for food distribution; the De­ ness of the threat; the probability that an partment of Health, Education, and Welfare effective program would be costly; the as­ would engage in activities related to main­ sumption, perhaps wrong, that thermonuclear taining emergency health services; the De­ war is not very probable; the feeling that partment of Housing and Urban Development nothing can be done about a nuclear war; would seek to provide emergency housing and lack of Congressional support. These and and rebuild cities after widespread destruc­ other arguments have all been advanced at tion; and the Department of Transportation one time or another. However, it should be would promote movement of high-priority noted that Americans, when pressed on the shipments of people and goods during the question, usually come out strongly in favor emergency. Similarly, virtually every other of a meaningful civil defense program. IN MY OPINION 73

reservists in the shelter program opposition. Reservists can help by promoting a favorable image of civil defense in their By far the most important aspect of civil respective communities. defense activities relating directly to the pro­ tection of the population is the program for fallout and blast-resistant shelters. While the continuity of government threat presented by hydrogen weapons is great and may well grow greater, one of the Another important aspect of civil defense most promising lines of counter action seems that could benefit from participation by re­ to be the construction of shelters offering servists is the provision for continuing govern­ various degrees of protection. For a time, dis­ ment functions in the event of widespread persal and evacuation were the favored tactic destruction. There is much to be done in this of civil defense planners. However, the intro­ area. duction of more powerful weapons with their The importance of providing for the con­ greater destruction radius and of interconti­ tinuity of government under extreme condi­ nental missiles with tremendous speed of de­ tions has been recognized in the national livery has completely changed this concept. plan. It provides for establishment of lines As an alternative to dispersal, the protection of succession to official positions, safekeeping concept is rapidly gaining acceptance. The of essential records, establishment of control shelter program, if implemented on a wide­ centers and alternate sites for government spread basis, would solve some of the prob­ emergency operations, and maximum use of lems of civil defense, but it would introduce personnel and resources during emergency others. Various problems connected with shel­ periods. Most of the state and local govern­ ters would include danger of radiation, falling ments and federal agencies have acted in debris, blocking of entrances, ventilation, some way towards meeting these require­ water supply, food, and sanitation. Some of ments. However, full participation in the pro­ these problems have been subjected to exten­ gram by state and local government agencies sive research, but most have not. Perhaps one is lagging far behind the federal effort. Many of the most difficult problems is the engender­ city and county governments have made no ing of morale and community spirit within arrangements of this kind. The role that re­ the large community-type shelters where siza­ servists can play is to use their influence as ble numbers of people are forced into limited citizen leaders to emphasize the need for space for extended periods of time. Certainly developing effective plans for continuity in a vast amount of high-quality leadership is localities where they live or work. Reservists going to be needed in order to make such a who are local government officials or who program work with any degree of effective­ are otherwise authorized can themselves ac­ ness. Since people in shelters would probably tually prepare these plans. be dissociated from normal governmental functions for several weeks after an attack, it will be necessary for initial guidance and economic planning leadership to come from local sources. This Next to survival of the population, the much-needed leadership can come from a preservation of the national economy is per­ well-informed group of citizen leaders, which haps the most important segment of plans the reserve pools can contribute to a remark­ for national survival. Reservists who are busi­ able degree. ness or industrial leaders, economists, or gov­ Some criticism has been leveled at the ernment officials can play a vital role in the shelter program. A small number of people formation and implementation of economic have opposed it on grounds that it is too ex­ plans and policies related to civil defense. The pensive, ineffective for blast protection, and protection of the economy involves planning apt to give a false sense of security. However, in a great many areas. Among the more im­ efforts can and must be made to dispell such portant aspects are manpower, food, water, 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW fuel and power, clothing, transportation, com­ ness. These activities need to be significantly munication, and medical services. The Ameri­ expanded. can economy is somewhat vulnerable to at­ tack, but with advance measures taken to reduce risks there is a possibility for rapid T he po ssibil it y of increased use of reserve recovery from even large-scale destruction. forces and individual reservists in civil de­ The relatively little economic planning fense programs should be explored. Reservists accomplished thus far has been performed by can assist in creation and implementation of government agencies, but some notable cor­ plans for fallout protection, damage control, ollary work has been accomplished through and preparation for recovery, as well as par­ industry groups and individual companies. ticipate in programs of public information and A few companies have provided emergency education. headquarters, prepared lists of succession, There needs to be research and develop­ built underground structures, stockpiled ment activity beyond the scope of present equipment and supplies, conducted evacua­ efforts on many aspects of nonmilitary de­ tion drills for employees, and provided for fense. This should include, among other protection of vital records. Fortunately, there things, the design of systems incorporating are signs of increasing awareness by American various combinations of military and non­ industry, especially among the larger corpo­ military defense efforts and consideration of rations, of the need for civil defense readi­ various mixes of reserve forces that might be used in the process. Atlanta, Georgia Books and Ideas WITH PREJUDICE, WITHOUT MALICE

D r . A lfred Goldberg

ARS of the past have been of dimen­ Wsions that die mind of man could grasp. Above all, they had a human dimension that could be readily seen and understood. In the great conflicts of modem history—the T edder American Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, the American Civil War, World War I—man from strong romantic and escapist impulses. in the singular or the mass was still the meas­ It remains a huge and impressive event in the ure of events and achievements. This was true affairs of men, connected with the present and even in World War II, in spite of the enor­ the future by a continuous chain of circum­ mous impact of the machine and the vast scope stance. It provides us an opportunity to ob­ and intense violence. serve and ponder the thoughts, attitudes, de­ Perhaps of equal importance in creating cisions, and actions of men in a time that still a kind of near-nostalgia for wars of the past has great relevance in today’s world. Because is the common revulsion from a vision of war­ its effects are still visibly with us, it is the fare in the future—technological, dehuman­ stuff from which real learning and under­ ized, enormously destructive, full of unknown standing may be derived. terrors—that is too frightening for all but a For this reason, the enormous literature few to contemplate. So terrifying is this spec­ on World War II that has emerged in the ter that it has made past wars seem not only short space of two decades constitutes a bearable but almost attractive by comparison. treasure trove for those concerned with cur­ There are other compelling reasons for rent and future problems of war and peace. continued interest in World War II apart No portion of this literature has attracted 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW more attention—from layman and scholar alike war is Marshal of the raf Lord Tedder.f —than the revelations of the political leaders Among the surviving leaders only Portal, head and the military captains who bore the bur­ of the raf and Tedder’s friend and supporter dens of the higher direction of the war. These during the war, has not yet been heard from. men, most of them of moderate intelligence The others who have published—“Bomber” and normal prejudices, endowed with great Harris, Alanbrooke, Montgomery, Alexander, power but possessing limited information, Cunningham, Ismay, Slim—have made contri­ made the fateful decisions that affected the butions that help greatly to round out the lives and fortunes of most of the people of record as it was seen and understood by those the world. Their recollections and judgments who helped to make it. To be able to see the of men and events and their explanations of same great events and issues described, elab­ the whys and wherefores of great decisions, orated, and interpreted by many firsthand even if they are not destined to be as endur­ participants provides the historian and the ing as Thucydides, have meaning for us now analyst greater opportunities for understand­ and in the foreseeable future. ing, insight, and perspective than the indi­ This literature—autobiographies, biogra­ vidual participants could have had. Accord­ phies, memoirs, diaries—should be required ingly, the composite historical accounts and reading for the games theorists, computer sim­ analyses add up to much more than the sums ulators, and model makers who are so influen­ of the parts from which they have been con­ tial in politico-military thinking and planning. structed. This is more than sufficient justifi­ Our tremendous advances in science and tech­ cation for the publication of personal accounts, nology, our great triumphs over our physical even for the more self-serving ones, for these environment, do not obscure the inescapable too have something to offer, if only insights evidence that the greatest and most baffling into the character of the authors. of our problems is still man and his relations In this postwar outpouring, Churchill’s to his fellow men. We still have a great deal six volumes have been a touchstone against to learn about the human element in war which to test the others; but it has become that cannot be gotten from the immense im­ increasingly clear that he is sometimes wrong, personal collections of data that have been not infrequently biased, and often knows or amassed for the computers. Man is chiefly tells less than he should. This is not to be responsible for many of the uncertainties— held against him. It is simply impossible for the chance, the accidental, the irrational, the any one person—even Churchill—to compre­ uncontrollable—that continue to make war an hend, reconstruct, and present objectively the art rather than a science. manifold and intricately complex affairs in The British leaders of World War II— which he played such an important part. The true to the long-established literary tradition effect of the publications of the military lead­ among British politicians and soldiers—have ers has been to diminish greatly Churchill’s been especially prolific in taking up the pen role as a military strategist and leader and when they put down the sword. For this we to reveal the shortcomings that were not should be grateful, for of all the nations en­ apparent outside the inner circles. gaged in the war the British have told more Tedder makes a particularly important and they have told it better. Many of their contribution to the continuing re-evaluation of politicians and generals have written with Churchill, and he does it soberly, candidly, verve, candor, and an eye for the meaningful most explicitly, and without malice. He was that few Americans have matched. not overawed or bedazzled by the bright sun of The latest and best of the great British Churchill’s intellect and wit; he resented and military leaders to speak his mind about the opposed judgments, analyses, and ideas from

f Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, With Prejudice (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967, $10.00), 692 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 77 the great man himself when they seemed to accurately to the data available for study of him to prejudge the issues or to be lacking in the impact of politics and personalities on the merit. Nor was Tedder impressed by the conduct of a great war. The notion that the Prime Ministers penchant for rhetorical ex­ political and the military are separate realms hortations to his field commanders on oc­ is of course long since discarded. It was not casions when sober reflection and second true in the United States, where some of the thoughts would have brought better results. generals would have preferred it to be so and Such an occasion was the launching of the seemed to believe that it was. There was no abortive campaign to conquer the Dodecanese doubt on this score in Great Britain, not only in the fall of 1943 after tbe Italian surrender. because Churchill participated so compulsive­ To the commander in the area, General Wil­ ly in the making of military decisions but also son, beset by great problems of making do because of the prolific and complicated Brit­ with resources that Tedder and others had ish political connections in every part of the pointed out were inadequate to the task, world. Maintenance of the Pax Britannica Churchill sent stirring words: “This is a time over much of the globe for generations had . . . to think of Clive and Marlborough, and required a skillful blend of the political and of Rooke’s men taking Gibraltar.” More per­ military in which the former had properly tinently, it was a time for Wilson to think of predominated. Military men had become sen­ the soldiers, the landing craft, the support sitive to if not axjpreciative of the relationship. ships, and the aircraft that he desperately It was in an area where the British had needed but did not have. long been deeply involved that Tedder came Among the military men, Montgomery to his first high wartime command. The and Alanbrooke wrote intensely egocentric- Middle East was normally an exceptionally versions of their own roles and, too often, complex and unstable area of the world; in denigrating versions of the role of others in wartime the political and strategic problems the campaigns against Germany. Their favor­ of the region must have seemed like a Chinese ite whipping boys were Eisenhower and the puzzle to the British commanders who had Americans, but Tedder came in for his share, responsibility for the immense reaches from too. In his account Harris, who fought his Malta to the frontiers of India. From com­ own war, concerned himself with a justifica­ mand headquarters in Cairo over a period tion of his conduct of the raf bombardment of two years, 1941-43, Tedder had a key and campaign against Germany. Of all the leading sometimes dominant role in the series of cam­ British commanders, only Slim appears to paigns against the Italians and Germans under have had qualities comparable to those of Rommel in the North African desert; the Tedder as a man and commander. He, too, liberation of Ethiopia and the conquest of was successful in leading Allied forces, in­ Italian Somaliland; the long and bitter battle cluding Americans and Chinese, and in tri­ of Malta; the hopeless defense of Greece umphing over terribly ambiguous command against the Germans; the battle of Crete; the arrangements. While character, personality, capture of Syria from the Vichy French; the and intellect were no doubt major elements repression of a pro-Nazi revolt in Iraq; air in the success of both men as leaders of Allied cover for the Navy in the Mediterranean; forces, there is ample evidence from their the policing of Iran; establishment of indis­ performances that they also possessed politi­ pensable air routes across Africa; negotiations cal instinct—in which a capacity for survival with the Russians about raf air support in is fundamental—in the best sense of the term. the Caucasus; reinforcement of India to meet Without the inclination and the capacity to the Japanese onslaught; the Dodecanese cam­ submerge national and service instincts in the paign; air attacks against Italy and Axis-held broader requirements of coalition warfare, nei­ areas in the Mediterranean. The list could ther man could have been as successful. be longer, but it suffices to suggest the dimen­ Tedder’s book contributes strikingly and sions of the problems and the pervasiveness 78 A7R UNIVERSITY REVIEW of the political element. Political considera­ of the other services. It required much firm­ tions were often paramount, as in the Greek ness, plain speaking, and persistence, an im­ and Dodecanese campaigns and in the polic­ mense practical grasp of problems, and ing of Iran. refusal to be bound by accepted doctrines, In all these events, some of them life- customs, and red tape. By the end of the and-death issues for the British in the Medi­ North African campaign in 1943 he had terranean and many of them happening forged, tested, and secured acceptance of the concurrently, Tedder was a central figure concept of unified control by the raf of air who helped shape major decisions and ac­ operations either in combination with the tions. His stature grew with the passage of other services or independently. Montgomery time as events—disasters as well as victories— added his personal endorsement, and the much more often than not vindicated his Americans, profiting from their own North judgments and predictions. Many of his trou­ African experience as well as that of the bles stemmed not from the enemy but from British, promptly adopted the concept and tile British Army and Navy commanders with enunciated it as official doctrine. whom he was associated in Cairo and else­ The way toward unified control of air where in the area. A convinced and avowed power had thus been clearly pointed by Ted­ apostle of air power, Tedder succeeded even­ der and his chief operational commander. Air tually in gaining the respect and confidence Marshal Coningham. This was no small

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Air Com- mand, confers with Major General Carl Spaatz, USAAF, Commander of the Northwest African Air Forces. BOOKS AND IDEAS 79 achievement in the crucible of Middle East­ ity of the military leaders of both countries ern and North African warfare in 1941-43, to transcend their service and national inter­ when British ground and naval commanders, ests and to accept the higher loyalty. and American too, fought frantically to con­ Tedder stands with Eisenhower as pre­ trol or direct the use of portions of the always eminent among those who made the coalition limited and often inadequate resources of work from the beginning. The experience he men and airplanes which too often were all had acquired during the Middle East cam­ that stood between them and defeat or stale­ paign of 1941-42 in dealing with British mate. commanders, with the Americans, and with By the time Tedder joined forces with British and American political representatives Eisenhower early in 1943 in Algiers, as com­ constituted a rich and unusually edifying po­ mander of the Allied air forces in the Medi­ litical education. From the beginning of his terranean, he had already demonstrated the association with Eisenhower and with Eisen­ qualities of leadership, imagination, and prac­ hower’s perennial chief of staff and alter tical wisdom that had gained him the respect ego, Walter Bedell (“Beetle”) Smith, Tedder and confidence of his colleagues, including showed his understanding of the total envi­ the Americans who had fought under his ronment, including the political, and how it command against Rommel. It was at this time affected and shaped not only the use of air that he first came under the surveillance of power but the use of the overall military a shrewd judge of men, Harold Macmillan, capabilities. This acute comprehension, his then British political representative in French capacity for intellectual persuasion that made North Africa. .After a meeting with Tedder him exceedingly effective in high-level con­ in February 1943, Macmillan wrote in his ferences, and the objectivity that often caused diary: him to side with the Americans against his Tedder is really a most interesting man. He British colleagues in some of the great strate­ has the rare quality of greatness (which you gic issues of the war gained for him more can’t define but you sense). It consists partly of respect, cooperation, and admiration from the humor, immense common sense and a power Americans than was accorded any other Brit­ to concentrate on one or two simple points. But ish military leader. It also gained him the dis­ there is something more than any separate trust and criticism of some British military quality—you just feel it about some people the leaders, especially Montgomery, with whom moment they come into a room. And Tedder he differed frequently, and also Alanbrooke, is one of those people about whom you feel it.0 who usually supported Montgomery. Some of The establishment of the combined Anglo- his British critics went so far as to hint at American command in the Mediterranean lack of loyalty to his own country and his under Eisenhower in 1943 marked the begin­ own service. Early in 1945 Alanbrooke and ning on a grand scale of the close military Montgomery preferred that Tedder’s role as collaboration that helped so much to make Eisenhower’s deputy be even more circum­ possible final victory' over the Germans. It scribed than it was. Churchill also wras was not immune to the strains that inevitably sometimes annoyed with Tedder and on one affect politico-military collaboration between occasion abused him in a note to the British countries; it suffered the individual and na­ Chiefs of Staff for not properly representing tional jealousies, suspicions, fears, and selfish British interests at Supreme Headquarters. motivations that affect most human and inter­ There is reason to doubt that Tedder would national relationships. Tedder w'as most sen­ have been Portal’s successor as head of the sitive to these differences and makes clear Royal Air Force after the war had Churchill what a delicate thing such a close coalition instead of Attlee been Prime Minister. is. The success of the military collaboration When Tedder became Deputy Supreme unquestionably owes a great deal to the abil- Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force •Harold Macmillan, The Blnut of War. p. 221. in January 1944, one member of Eisenhower’s 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

immediate staff described the position as being like that of an ambassador without portfolio. It was a particularly difficult and trying post, for if the Allied command ar­ rangements in the Mediterranean had seemed complicated, the arrangements in Europe must often have seemed like a maze. This was espe­ cially true of the air forces, which were the object of a tug-of-war between the Americans and the British at several levels—the Com­ bined Chiefs of Staff and sh a ef , the British .Air Ministry and sh a ef , and the tactical air commanders versus the bomber barons. It was here that Tedder made great contribu­ tions by helping to bring order to a situation that was potentially chaotic and by exercising strong direction of the diverse and sometimes conflicting elements of Anglo-American air power. His great ability in organizing and directing large-scale Allied air forces could not be matched by anyone. Tedder deserves also the major share of the credit for driving through, against the doubts and disinclination of Churchill and the British War Cabinet, the plan for bombing the French and Belgian rail systems in the months immediately preceding the landings in Normandy. This was a major political issue which was resolved in Tedder’s favor only with the support of President Roosevelt, but Tedder had persisted when it might have been the better part of discretion to defer or compromise. Events proved him right, for there can be no doubt that the interdiction campaign contributed immensely to the suc­ cess of the landing and the subsequent build­ up, without incurring the heavy French and Belgian civilian casualties that had been predicted. Although he insisted on the priority of the demands of the land battle, Tedder whole­ heartedly supported the strategic air cam­ paign against Germany. His chief concern was to secure the best balance in the alloca­ Tedder and Brigadier General Patrick W. Timberlake, tion of air resources among the missions Commander, IX Bomber Command, U.S. Middle East assigned. Unlike the strategic and tactical air Air Forces, confer at an RAF mess hall in the Middle East. commanders, he viewed the air battle as a whole and related it to the land battle. He understood the interaction of the different air missions and sought to mesh them in the BOOKS AND IDEAS 81 pursuit of larger objectives than their imme­ One cannot help being struck by the diate ones. Thus, although he insisted that the strength of Tedder’s feelings about his Medi­ strategic bombers give priority to transporta­ terranean experience as compared with his tion targets over oil targets during the pre­ European experience. In part it was a matter assault and assault phases of Overlord, he of the scale of the conflict. The war in the readily acceded to and even encouraged the Mediterranean, in spite of its complexities, opportune use of the bombers against German could be comprehended and was within the oil targets on several occasions during the grasp of the commanders. It was Tedder’s month before D-Day. Tedder had no doubts conviction that “but for the lessons leamt . . . that strategic bombardment played an indis­ [in the Mediterranean] victory in Europe pensable role in the defeat of Germany. would not have been gained so speedily or Once the land battle was joined on the at such little cost." (pp. 687-88) In western Continent, Tedder became involved in the Europe in 1944-45, not only was the war on major strategic issues that were chief sources a far vaster scale but the political and per­ of disagreement between the British and the sonal issues were greatly complicated and Americans. Most of the issues centered on exasperating. Moreover, the opportunities for Montgomery and had political repercussions an individual, even one so bold and clever as with nationalistic overtones. The most impor­ Tedder, to exercise controlling influence were tant of these included the timing and proper much less than they had been in the Mediter­ use of forces in efforts to break out of the ranean. Normandy beachhead; a southern France The role of Deputy Supreme Commander landing versus an invasion of the Balkans; the was much less satisfying to him than being allocation of resources to securing the ap­ air commander in the Mediterranean. The proaches to Antwerp; priorities for the thrust vibrant, confident buoyancy of the Mediter­ into Germany; and control of the land forces ranean years is missing; there is a feeling that during the Battle of the Bulge. On most of he was not entirely at ease as the No. 2 man, these issues, Tedder sided with the Americans that the ambiguities of the position precluded against Montgomery, who was generally sup­ enjoyment of it. As Tedder himself put it, ported by Alanbrooke and less directly by there “was little that was cheerful or exhila­ Churchill. rating about the last stages of the war.” (p. By this time Montgomery' had become 688) The proportions of the book itself are a national hero in Britain. He dealt directly the best evidence of this feeling: more than with the British Chiefs of Staff and on occa­ two-thirds is devoted to the Mediterranean, sion the Prime Minister. It is worth noting that and that is by far the livelier, more personal, Bomber Harris, too, enjoyed a personal rela­ more open, and more interesting part. There tionship with the Prime Minister during most is also a feeling of purpose, of doing, and of of the war that undoubtedly enhanced his accomplishment that must have been exhila­ prestige and afforded him a degree of inde­ rating to a man at the peak of his professional pendent action unusual for a subordinate and intellectual powers. commander. Tedder had neither the standing Although the title is characteristic of the nor the influence of Montgomery among his witty, ironic, and sometimes cynical Tedder, countrymen. Yet he not only supported the the book is anything but expose. Tedder is Americans—Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, and indeed critical of many of his contemporaries, Beetle Smith—against Montgomery, he often including Roosevelt, Alanbrooke, Harris, De urged Eisenhower to stronger measures to Gaulle, and Wavell. But he is almost diffident bring Montgomery into line. Tedder’s coura­ and often oblique, and his criticisms are al­ geous persistence in his views and advice in most always in the context of particular events the face of certain disapproval from most of and issues. Accordingly, with only a few ex­ his British political and military superiors ceptions, he does not give us assessments of must be regarded as the measure of the man. men in the round but rather glimpses of them 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW in the toils of a crisis or a military operation. wrote, he was able to document what he did To be sure, his scrupulous regard for chapter not know firsthand, and he very carefully did and verse, eschewing generalities, makes for so. We have, therefore, the Tedder of World responsible, hardheaded criticism, but it may War II, not some scrubbed and dressed-up also deprive us of some broader judgments version of the man and the events concocted that could be helpful to a better understand­ twenty years after. ing of the men and the war. But Tedder’s Oscar Wilde said that “to be understood- technique in this regard is consistent with his is to be found out.” Many are the men of overall approach and his intellectual integrity. World War II who have been found out— Moreover, his judgments of people, although often from their own words. Tedder reveals deliberately narrow in focus, represent strong much about himself in his book, and the essences, for he had strong feelings about findings are greatly to his credit. There is them and these feelings sometimes transcend none of the self-justification, vainglory, and his restrained, underwritten sentences. Thus posturing that mar the works of many of his we have Tedder’s opinions “with prejudice” contemporaries. There is a detached and dis­ but without malice. passionate quality that underscores his basic This perceptive account of great events objectivity and sincerity. He is genuinely de­ has the ring of truth about it. Tedder relied serving of sober respect and admiration for little on memory. He was able to reconstruct a superb job done under exceptionally trying events, sometimes in detail, from contempo­ circumstances. There are exceptions to Emer­ rary sources, including his journal, his mes­ son’s epigram that “every hero becomes a bore sages to and from the Air Ministry, and his at last.” Tedder, who would have been the correspondence with his raf chief, Portal. first to disclaim the hero’s role, is such an Because he also used much of the pertinent exception. literature that had appeared by the time he Santa Monica, California

WHO STARTED THE COLD WAR?

H erman S. W olk

... It is only with the progress of historical anniversary should fall during a time in which science on a particular subject that men come another one of those “great debates” is raging really to recognize that there was a terrible knot among those who deal with and think about beyond the ingenuity of man to untie. . . . In American foreign policy. We have apparently historical perspective we learn to be a little more entered one of those cyclic periods when the sorry for both parties than they know how to be very intellectual roots of U.S. foreign policy for one another. are being called into question. .And although —Herbert Butterfield at first glance it might appear that the war in Vietnam is the reason for this questioning, a deeper probe might also lead one to believe that, while Vietnam is certainly one of the UNE 21, 1968, marks the twentieth anni­ reasons, it is not by any means the sole versary of the Berlin airlift. There is a rationale. J certain ironic propriety in the fact that this The last few years have been witness to BOOKS AND IDEAS 83

a plethora of books about the Cold War. How Hiroshima and Potsdam (Simon and Schuster, did it start? What is its essential character? 1965); Richard J. Barnet and Marcus S. Raskin, Is it over? At the risk of formulating a dan­ After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War gerous generalization (something these books in Europe (Random House, 1965); Edmund are not devoid of), one might conclude that Stillman and William Pfaff, Power and Im- most of the recent works have been written potence: The Failure of America's Foreign by what we might term either “consensus Policy (Random House, 1966); and Ronald historians or “revisionists.” Both terms may Steel, Pax Americana (The Viking Press, 1967). be somewhat unfair to some of the writers, Professor Louis J. Halle of the Graduate but one or the other seems to fit a majority Institute of International Studies in Geneva of them nicely. Another caveat: It should be and late of the State Department’s Policy recognized that the word “consensus” remains Planning Staff has now given us a somewhat one of that coterie of words that have come different work which—while falling in the cate­ into vogue in recent years and that remain gory of consensus—is not easily categorized.! curiously unsatisfying. Other such words— This fact in itself speaks volumes for Halle sometimes flowing with overbearing regularity because he has written a book which is deeply from those who pontificate on the George­ thoughtful, detached, and enriched by a kind town cocktail circuit—are “viable,” “commit­ of melancholy wisdom. ment,” and “sophisticated.” One ought to Halle says that since the end of the beware. eighteenth century four wars have been fought The consensus historians have argued that to maintain the European balance of power. essentially the Cold War was a result of ine­ The fourth is the Cold War. According to luctable circumstance: the Second World War Halle, the Cold War was the product of an decimated Europe, shattering the structure of “irreducible dilemma” in which men were power that had contained the Soviet Union, lashed to the circumstances of the historical and into that v acuum Stalin moved, with the flow. “The essence of history ... is the con­ result that .America and its allies felt com­ trast between the immensity of its movement pelled to move in response. In general, sup­ and the limitations of the individuals who, porting this thesis have been Marshall D. often with the greatest gallantry, put them­ Schulman, Beyond the Cold War (Yale Uni­ selves at grips with it.” (p. xii) Or, again: “I versity Press, 1966); Charles Burton Marshall, am not one who thinks that great men make The Cold War: A Concise History (Franklin history. Still, I would rather not do without Watts, 1965); and both Raymond Aron and them.” (p. 117) Hans Morgenthau in manv of their works. The author views the Cold War more in On the other hand, the revisionists have nationalistic than ideological terms: argued that the U.S. was at least equally if The behaviour of Russia under the Commu­ not primarily to blame for the evolution of nists has been Russian behaviour rather than the Cold War. Professor D. F. Fleming, in his Communist behaviour. Under the Communists massive tome The Cold War and Its Origins Russia has continued to behave essentially as (Doubledav, 1961), led the revisionist attack it behaved under the czars. There has been by charging the U.S. with caprice and with the same centralization and authoritarianism. a gigantic misreading of history. The Cold There has been the same conspiratorial ap­ War, said Fleming, was a direct outgrowth proach to international relations. There has of American interventionism, militarism, and been the same profound mistrust of the out­ our almost pathological obsession with anti- side world. There has been the same obsession Communism. Several more recent revisionist with secrecy and with espionage. There has works are Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: been the same cautiousness, the same capac­ ity for retreat. There has been the same effort

fLouis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper & Row, 1967, $6.95), 434 pp. 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

to achieve security by expanding the Russian The weakest part of The Cold War as space, by constantly pushing back the menac­ History is Halle’s treatment of the evolving ing presence of the foreigners across the confrontation in the Far East. Indeed, he Russian borders, (p. 11) comes very close to a blanket condemnation Thus, according to Professor Halle, the of American Far Eastern policy since the Cold War amounted to a “historical necessity” Open Door. His judgment that Mao Tse-tung, to which Communism was a secondary rather even early in his career, disdained Communist- than an essential element. type discipline is certainly open to question, With Europe prostrate after World War as is his view that both the Red Chinese II and millions of Russians under arms, it was under Mao and the Kuomintang under Chiang a great mistake, says Halle, for the U.S. to fought the Japanese equally. The idea that demobilize immediately after the war and the Communists after the war possessed the completely dismantle its military machine. “Mandate of Heaven" but few guns and little Although the view has been held that Wash­ ammunition is not only surprisingly naive but ington was oblivious to power politics at the contrary to fact, which is that the great stock close of the war, the author—who was at the of weapons of the crack Japanese Manchurian time in the State Department—maintains that Army fell into the hands of Mao with the help Washington’s major preoccupation was never­ of the Soviets. theless with “the deadly straggle to contain Halle is guilty of contradiction in stating the Soviet Union that could already be fore­ that it was not a foregone conclusion that the seen." (p. 39) The explanation for this dichot­ Communist Chinese would be unfriendly to omy is that by then it was too late to persuade the U.S. while almost in the same breath the public of the necessity of restoring a bal­ observing that “Mao’s new regime regarded ance of power. the United States as the enemy. . . (p. 200) By this time, men were being driven by The author does recognize that it would have circumstance. Stalin probably felt that there been “unseemly” for the U.S. to recognize had always been a Cold War and that it would Peking at the same time the Chinese were continue after the war as before. The U.S. torturing and killing American missionaries and Britain, on the other hand, did not feel and jailing the American Consul General in encircled; they viewed the situation in more Mukden. global terms. The Grand Alliance might be “Another impediment to the acceptance continued, as President Roosevelt saw it, in by the American people of the new regime’s the form of the United Nations. The trouble legitimacy . . . was the Communist label that here, as Halle sees it, was that far too much it bore, a label that was bound to subsume was expected of the U.N. It simply could not the whole of reality as mythically conceived deliver on such a grand scale, especially as an by people of limited intellectual sophistica­ alternative to international power balance. tion.” (p. 201) It remains debatable whether The Berlin blockade in 1948-49 was the this was a matter of “sophistication ’ (that first great battle of what was already an overt word again!) at all. Curiously, this doubt is Cold War. Here Halle makes what he feels to stated by Halle himself in his limited indict­ be an exceedingly important point—one that ment of Mao’s actions and brutalities. But then places him firmly with the so-called consensus the Korean War starkly sharpened the confron­ historians. Berlin showed, for the first time in tation and ended any possibility whatsoever the Cold War, that nuclear weapons had in­ of an American rapprochement with Mao. deed revolutionized strategy, for if the U.S. Halle’s interpretation of the Korean conflict had not possessed nuclear weapons and long- seems to lack the sure feel he displays on range air power, the Soviet Union “would not European matters. have been deterred from using its local mili­ As far as military-political policy is con­ tary superiority to take West Berlin by force.” cerned, the author refutes the widely accepted (p. 166) thesis that the Eisenhower-Dulles policy was HOOKS AND IDEAS 85

solely one of massive retaliation (What of It is exceedingly difficult to summarize Hungary, Lebanon, Taiwan?), which was sub­ and evaluate in a brief review the philosophi­ sequently replaced by the opposite policy of cal and historical content of Halle’s work. It flexible response under the Kennedy Admin­ is much more than a history of the Cold War; istration. Dependence on the nuclear deter­ it has much to say of world politics and the rent, according to Halle, diminished as the interplay of international relations—and, above U.S.S.R. developed its own nuclear arms, and all, of the folly of mankind. Where Halle lines this diminution was already well advanced up strongest with the consensus is in his judg­ by the time of Dulles’s “massive retaliation’ ment that the Soviets took the initiative in the speech of 12 January 1954. At any rate, Dulles Cold War. The West, in general, reacted to reduced the implications of that speech in an this thrust, with both sides locked into the article in Foreign Affairs the following April. flow of historical inevitability. Halle implies that the Defense Establishment Has the Cold War ended? Although op­ was not in fact completely foundering when timistic about the future, Halle really doubts the Kennedy Administration came to power. it. Surely it is difficult to answer in the affirm­ There seems to be some evidence already that ative when America and Russia confront each historians will in the future look with a jaun­ other in Europe, the Middle East (perhaps diced eye upon those publicists who have the most explosive locale of all), and Asia. No already depicted with finality the alleged doubt many of the revisionists would disagree. bankruptcy of the Eisenhower defense poli­ The conflict of interests between the U.S. and cies. Much that was done in the 1960s in the U.S.S.R. persists. The international politi­ Defense could be traced back to the mid and cal schism is deep. And, in many respects, late 1950s, not the least of which was Secre­ Germany still remains the crucial issue. In tary of Defense Thomas Gates’s pioneer estab­ itself, this melancholy realization conjures up lishment of the integrated targeting staff (Joint the divisiveness of the Cold War conflicts. Strategic Target Planning Staff) at Headquar­ To those revisionists who argue that the ters Strategic Air Command. U.S. is imperialistic, interventionist, and mili­ Louis Halle echoes such contemporaries taristic, I would point out that a close reading as Raymond Aron and Marshall Schulman— of post-1945 history indicates that America and, not insignificantly, also Professor Arthur has not pursued domination but has—sooner Schlesinger, Jr.—when he speculates that if it or later—resisted it. Indeed, a case can be is correct to regard the Cold War as World made that the United States, far from being War III, then we must at least note that it has too assertive, has been too reactive and de­ been quite different from the two tragic and fensive. And, of course, the pitfall presented costly World Wars of this century. to those who claim that we have been guilty The reason for the difference, I think, is that of globalism is that by condemning America the revolutionary’ new weapons of the nuclear as a global policeman they end up arguing age are so deadly that their use cannot be against U.S. intervention in principle anywhere. seriously risked. . . . It follows that, so far at Finally, Professor Halle, with his learning least, we have much to thank nuclear weap­ and wisdom, reminds us that the future will ons for. Whatever the future may hold, their not yield itself any more readily than the advent upon the scene has so far spared us past. For, despite the arrogance of predicting much. It has kept the Cold War cold. (p. 8) with any sense of finality what the year 2000 Again, in his conclusion, he observes that the will hold for a frail humanity, we simply inhibiting influence of nuclear weapons makes cannot conceive of the possibilities or sur­ the Cold War “historically unique.’ They prises that lie ahead. have so far prevented a general conflict, and But of course none of this relieves us from in them “lay the hope of the world, no less discharging our responsibilities despite our than its peril, as it moved on into an unknown ignorance and fallibility. That is the human future.” (p. 418) predicament—and there is no way out. Silver Spring, Maryland WHITHER GERMANY?

Dr . C hester V. E asum

R. W il h e l m Wolfganc Schutz is an reasonable to suppose that . . . ?” “This would D acknowledged evangelist for the idea naturally lead to . . ” “This should . . ” “This of reunification of Germany. The title of his must . . . ” There is also exhortation here, in recent book, Rethinking German Policy,f is a plenty. provocative come-on: What German policy, The author stresses the point that neigh­ theirs or ours? The policy of Germans with boring states need have no fear of a Germany regard to reunification, or the policy of the so reconstituted. Such a new Germany would rest of the world with respect to the same be a peace-loving state not only in the nature problem? If the former, then the policy of of things, having been formed by a process which Germans, those of the Federal Republic of peaceable change without the use of nu­ of Germany (“western” Germany) or those of clear weapons, possessing and seeking none, the so-called German Democratic Republic but by its own nature. It would be, of course, (“eastern” Germany)? And as a matter of fact, a loyal member of the North Atlantic Treaty despite the plenitude of official statements Organization and of the United Nations, hav­ about the attitudes of people living in the two ing been reconstituted within that framework. divided Germanys, would it be more accurate In an attempt to make his proposals ap­ to use another plural and speak of two German pear as practical and specific as possible, Dr. peoples rather than one, even yet? Schutz proposes that the term of the German For the past ten years Dr. Schiitz has federal parliament (Bundestag) be extended to been chairman of the board of trustees of an five years, to make it coincide with the federal organization which calls itself “Germany In­ president’s term in office, and that a series of divisible.” With true missionary zeal and faith ten-year plans be drawn up to serve as Ger­ in the solvent power of right reason, he per­ many’s contribution to the reform of nato, sists in the hope that, as reunification can take on the assumption that there will be some place only with the consent and cooperation withdrawals from nato in 1969. of Soviet Russia and the United States, these The author further suggests that Ger­ two parties can and must soon see the light many might well recommend to the United and come to the point of mutual consent and Nations the appointment there of a high cooperation to that end, in realization of their commissioner for human rights and that the own interest. This would mean not the con­ U.N. send medical service units to trouble quest, annexation, or absorption of one part spots such as, in 1967, Cyprus, (p. 72) He of old Germany by the other but rather the further suggests the active expansion of a sys­ voluntary political reunion of both Germanys tem of treaties of recognition and friendship on a basis of complete equality and of mutual with the emerging nations on a basis of self- respect and consent. Differences could be determination. (p. 76) amicably worked out for the sake of the His final general proposals are ambitious enormous mutual advantages to be derived indeed. “The objective, therefore, is a peace- from the reconstructed federal union. A con­ conference for World War II and also be­ vincing act of faith is presupposed. tween the nato and Warsaw Treaty nations. There is an enormous amount of hypo­ The neutral European powers should be in­ thetical reasoning and writing here. “Is it not vited to observe the proceedings and to exer-

fWilhelm Wolfgang Schutz, Rethinking German Policy: New Approaches to Reunification (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, $5.50), 154 pp. Berlin Wall cise a moderating influence, and the Secretary brings it into sharp contrast with the pessi­ General of the United Nations should be mistic, though to me more realistic, position asked to participate. This would enhance the of the German philosopher Karl Jaspers.f The attention paid to the principles of self-deter- German original of the Jaspers book Wohin mination and human rights. . . .” (Emphasis treibt die Bundesrepublik? was more en­ mine.) (p. 123) thusiastically greeted by the German reading “Does it not follow from this that the dis­ public, which is largely composed of persons armament conference at Geneva and the Dis­ free from official responsibility, than by those armament Commission at New York may offer holding public office, who are sobered or ren­ one of the channels for our proposals?” (p. 124) dered more conservative—depending some­ “We should even consider how far it what upon tire point of view. might be possible to extend a world disarma­ Professor Jaspers points out that many of ment conference into a world peace confer­ the specific provisions of the constitution of ence.” (p. 132) the federal republic were written with an eye To me, the author’s “rethinking” seems to to avoiding the weaknesses of the Weimar consist of some stubbornly unrealistic, con­ constitution, such as multiplicity of parties by tinued or repeated, wishful thinking of the fission due to the theoretically democratic pacifist one-worlders of the past quarter of a system of proportional representation, and the century. There is nothing that I recognize as irresponsible dismissal of a chancellor with­ a really new or practical approach. out a designated successor. Such precaution­ A summary review of the hardy, though ary checks upon the free expression of the to me rather unrealistic, optimism of this book people’s political will, he says, have outlived

fKarl Jaspers, The Future of Germany, trans. and ed. E. B. Ashton, Foreword by Hannah Arendt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, $4.95), xvii and 173 pp. 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW their usefulness. The Hallstein doctrine, he Germans have to answer for the fact of says further, is also useless. Hitler’s rule.” Without suggesting how the popular will To Jaspers, what is done is done. The is to find expression except through parties, Oder-Neisse Line is final. The one who threat­ the author deplores what he regards as the ens the peace is the one who wants to change present tendency of the professional party existing boundaries, not the one who wants to leaders to form self-perpetuating salaried preserve them. The special status of the Soviet oligarchies which make up the party lists of zone of occupation is final as long as Russia candidates with less and less reference to wants it to be. Germany must cease to threaten the passive party memberships—a process by her eastern neighbors and must recognize that which the parties committed suicide once from their point of view she has an evil past before. to live down before they will cease to regard Most of all the voice of the German reunification as a threat. Jeremiah deplores what he calls the “touch of The reader’s sympathies seem likely to mendacity” (p. 59) that poisons German polit­ ride along with the advocates of reunifica­ ical life, at the center of which is the great tion; but any short-term bets will probably be fundamental lie “that the Germans were never placed on Professor Jaspers. really Nazis,” whereas according to him “all Lincoln, Nebraska

LEADERSHIP, STRATEGY, AND REFLECTION: OR, "WHAT’S AN OFFICER TO DO?”

Captain David MacIsaac

EW would deny that the single overriding two theories of strategy are not compatible, F responsibility of an officer is the exercise then neither of them is a valid general theory”? of leadership. But how many would agree that And finally, most of us would surely agree “any officer’s work week should comprise about that crew members who might be called upon 50 percent execution and the other half study, in a war situation to deliver nuclear weapons if he is to make the best use of his force”? should know their weapon system inside out. Then, to raise the ante a little, not many of us But would we all agree that if airmen “continue would deny that some familiarity with the to think and act in the patterns on which air history of strategic thought is important for war has developed into nuclear war, they will an officer. But would we all agree that “if any have fallen away from their true function as BOOKS AND IDEAS 89 protectors of the civil population, and will Pentagon.4 In all, there are 26 short chapters, have delivered them over to mass slaughter”? averaging about ten pages each and covering Just what is, after all. the full range of everything from the meaning of one's com­ an officer’s responsibility? Is it limited to him­ mission to the things one should keep foremost self, his family, his outfit, and his men? Or in mind when leading Americans in combat. does it extend in some measure beyond his The book’s main purpose “is to stimulate immediate circle and assigned tasks? These thought and to encourage the average young are just a few of the questions raised in three officer to seek truth for and in himself.” This recent books, all by military men, each ad­ is a worthy aim, and those who know' General dressing on a different level the basic question Marshall are aware that he has never lost of what it means to be a military officer in sight of it. this age. Any book like this must face up to the The first of the three (in order of appear­ basic question of w'hether leadership can be ance) and probably the least controversial is taught. The author’s assumption is that it can, General “Slam” Marshalls essay on leader­ if the spirit is willing and the student is not ship.! This book has a long history and is the village idiot. Basic to this assumption is probably known to many readers by its earlier a conception of leadership that emphasizes title, The Armed Forces Officer. The original diligence, thoroughness, knowledge, and work. version appeared in November 1950 as an offi­ The officer who strives ahvays to carry out cial Department of Defense publication. It assigned tasks completely and on the basis of was revised and republished under the same accurate command of his data has w'ithin him tide in December 1960, bearing the following the essential attributes of leadership. All the official designations: dod Pam 1-20, da Pam rest—manner, voice, bearing, imagination, ini­ 600-2, xa vpers 15923A, af Pam 190-1-12, and tiative, magnetism—all these he classifies as navmc 2563. These early versions, prepared more superficial traits, capable now and then under contract to dod for use as a leadership of lifting a man into a position of leadership manual, did not bear the name of the author. but not of keeping him there under severe In 1966 General Marshall again revised and stress. Seen in this light, the officer wdio would expanded the book, this time for commercial most successfully win the loyalty of his men publication. He gives three reasons for doing is the one w'ho would never forget two favor­ so: first, Vietnam has added to our experience; ite maxims of the wise teacher: “Example is second, “writing for official purposes usually not the best w'ay to teach, it is the only w'ay” compels restraint [and] it seemed worthwhile and “You can’t fool the kids.” to review, write, and publish under auspices To diligence, thoroughness, and command that would relieve all doubt”; and third, “it is of the data, one must add the willingness to my feeling that in a work of diis kind the accept risk: “The readiness to accept risk and reader has the right to know who is speaking.”1 the capacity for completing assigned or chosen Let me state at the outset that the most w'ork, around these two fundamentals may be recent version is the best. While the same developed the aura, the manner of leadership, basic chapters remain largely intact, their its technique, its system. If they are missing, order has been rearranged2 and their titles are there is no hope and the article must in time more dowTi-to-earth.3 And while it is true that be exposed as counterfeit.” And in all of this, post-1960 material has been added here and “there is nothing else that serves as well as there, one suspects that many of the other the natural manner, with some polishing of the “changes” are in fact elements of the original surface here and there and a general tighten­ draft that were blue-penciled for one reason ing at the comers.” Paraphrased, the argument or another during the clearing process at the might run like this: Don’t tell them how, show'

fS. L. A. Marshall, Brigadier General, U.S. Army (R et), The Officer as a Leader (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966, $6.50), 288 pp. 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

them; do it every day in matters large and I f an officer is sometimes puzzled small; then, in the test of combat, the moral by the issues raised in a discussion of leader­ authority already accrued will draw them to ship, he is often even more adrift on the sub­ your purposes, and you need pray only that ject of strategy. He need not feel alone, for, your courage will meet the test. like “the Renaissance,” “strategy” is a term This is the bedrock on which the book is that must be defined each time it is used. That built. Individual chapters fill in the details— there is no general agreement as to its mean­ knowing your men, the nature of discipline, ing or implications is one of the major points speaking and writing, counseling, instructing, raised by Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, Deputy dealing with people. No absolute rules are cinc, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.! “The lit­ offered. In each area some general postulates erature of war and its strategies,” Admiral are discussed and examples are given. Selec­ Wylie writes, “is poverty-stricken.” After ad­ tive anecdotes reveal the author’s skill as a mitting that we have indeed a surfeit of battle raconteur. Trenchant observations challenge studies, military' histories, and particularized the reader on page after page: “strategic analyses,” he insists—and rightly so • The fault in the average lieutenant —that warfare, taken in its widest sense, re­ colonel is that he has long forgotten how greatly mains a w'oefully neglected intellectual disci­ words of encouragement and advice from that pline. It lacks not only a defined intellectual level weighed with him when he was wearing framework but an accepted vocabulary as gold bars. (p. 10) well.5 As a direct result, he contends, soldiers, • There are no dull lecture topics; there sailors, and airmen continue to look upon their are only dull lecturers. A little eager research particular approaches to warfare as having will enliven any subject under the sun. (p. 88) some general, or absolute, validity'. « . . . authority is contingent upon re­ Admiral Wylie directs his criticism to spect far more truly than respect is founded both professional officers and the academic upon authority, (p. 151) community; the common error he charges • The sorriest vice that may afflict the them with is a failure to recognize that the leader at any level is the compulsion that makes study of warfare “merits a place in the intel­ him want to have a finger in every pie, the lectual w'orld as a matter worthy of more than deciding voice in every problem, the inability technical study.” He does not propose to offer to leave anything alone, (p. 158) a definitive answer to the question he raises, • The sign of superiority in any officer but he does offer some ideas on how to begin. at whatever level is his confidence that he can He begins by defining analytically two make another good man to fill any vacancy, operationally different kinds of strategies: (p. 195) “sequential strategy,” a series of discrete steps These excerpts should make it obvious or actions, each growing naturally out of, and that this is much more than a “how-to-do-it” dependent upon, the one that preceded it book for beginning lieutenants (and, to be (e.g., the Central Pacific drive across the Pa­ sure, if conscientiously read and reread it will cific in World War II); and “cumulative strat­ help them much more than the typical military egy,” in which the entire pattern is made up guidebook ever will). Indeed, any officer of of a collection of lesser actions, not sequen­ whatever grade who thinks he can still learn tially interdependent (e.g., tonnage warfare something about leadership and who will try waged by submarines). Citing World War II, this book simply as a guide to introspection he shows how sequential strategies formed should not be disappointed. And he certainly the initial basis for action but came to be will not be bored. supplemented by cumulative strategies (e.g., f j. C. Wylie, Rear Admiral, USN, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967, $4.00), vii and 111 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

bombing). Yet this occurred without conscious horse back out in front of the cart and devise analytical differentiation between the two ap­ a general theory of strategy applicable to any proaches. Might we not improve our overall war situation, w'hether the practitioner feels at prosecution of a war. he asks, if we see what home with it or not. we are doing well enough at least to label it As a step in this direction he concludes accurately? “If w-e could judge the progress by offering a series of basic assumptions on and the effect of our cumulative strategy, not w'hich a valid general theory might be devel­ only would we control an . . . element . . . oped. His arguments are closely reasoned, that up to now^ we have been forced to leave carefully qualified, and reflect hard thinking.6 largely to chance, but we might more effec­ The goal he seeks is a worthy one but is, he tively shape the conditions existing when the admits, “a tall order.” His ideas, offered in a war is over.” True enough, but is it possible? genial and utterly undogmatic manner, are What about Vietnam? I would argue that meant—like S. L. A. Marshall’s on leadership— “search and destroy” operations and “pacifica­ to spark creative thinking in others. If we con­ tion” programs are both cumulative strategies; tinue to impose predetermined strategies on a friend say-s, “No, each is sequential." But new and unanticipated war situations, he perhaps this disagreement sen es only to make warns, we will not only be guilty of w'asted the point that definitions and an agreed analyt­ effort but run the risk of losing control over ical framework are needed. our effort. “Some method of bringing intellec­ Moving onto a larger stage, Admiral Wylie tual order into strategy,” he concludes, “is argues that there are today four “generally long overdue.”7 recognized major theories of war strategy.” These he labels the continental, maritime, air, and Mao theories. He then discusses each of T oday’s airmen cannot long study these in turn, his principal purpose being to modem strategy' without coming up against show that no one of them is necessarily' a valid the grimly stark questions raised by die possi­ general theory. The continental theory' pre­ bility of nuclear war. Should nuclear weapons supposes that victory hangs on the defeat of ever be used in warfare, there would be no one armed force by another in battle. The question where an officer’s duty lay. But what maritime theory' assumes that sea communica­ about right now, what about the “interim tions are a necessary- element of influence in period”—if that’s what it turns out to be? Is the conflict. The air theory confuses destruc­ it any part of a serving officer’s responsibility' tion w'ith control, tacitly assuming that the to assure that nuclear weapons are in fact not former can produce the latter. The Mao theory introduced into a war situation? This is the requires the existence of a rural peasantry- essential question raised by another senior amenable to political manipulation and mili­ officer, one who first met war face to face at tary action. The point in all this, he suggests, the Somme and Passchendaele. is that none of these is a general theory of Lieutenant General E. L. M. Bums, a Cana­ w'arfare. “They are specific theories, each valid dian who since 1962 has served his government under specific conditions and diminishing in as its adviser on disarmament, has written an validity as the limits of reality within which impassioned, sobering, and provocative book they function depart from the tacitly identi­ whose title, M egamurder, sums up its theme fied ideal on which they are predicated.” In in one word.) To speak of waging war widi short, w-hat Admiral Wylie seems to be saying nuclear weapons, he argues, is delusory' dou- is this: We must stop trying, whether con­ bletalk; for a nation to engage in such a war sciously or not, to make war situations fit into would be equivalent to waging war upon pre-established patterns; wre must get the itself. “The military should realize that the

fE. L. M. Burns, Lieutenant General, Megamurder (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967, $6.95), xv and 297 pp. 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW greatest threat to the survival of democracy weapons, and “megamurder” will result. is no longer the Russians or the Chinese . . . Many since Clausewitz have recognized but rather war itself. It is nuclear war against that, once battle is joined, warfare tends to which the military must protect their fellow- take on a momentum of its own. What Gen­ citizens. . . . Unless we can find a way to eral Burns has done is apply this observation prevent such a war, we shall be delivering to the history of one particular form of war­ millions upon millions of our fellow-country­ fare. And no matter how many errors may be men to death.” Were this to happen, the found in his presentation, or in his judgment military would be guilty of forfeiting their for that matter, it is perhaps well that he raison d'etre, which is the protection of the has done so. If we look at modem air doctrine civilian population. in its entirety, we see that widespread agree­ Many officers, especially airmen, will be ment exists concerning most of its functions. irritated by General Bums’s book. He will be No one argues against the need for air trans­ accused of prejudice, bias, and “slanting the port or reconnaissance, for control of the air­ evidence” by some; of muddle-headedness by space over areas to be defended or attacked, others. But before working up a head of steam for weapon systems capable of providing these for attacking his arguments, one might well necessary adjuncts to battle. But strategic remember that it was General H. H. Arnold bombing (including mid-range cumulative in­ who concluded his Third Report to the Secre­ terdiction campaigns) remains an uncertain tary of War with these words: . . the mission science. Surely to some extent it always will of the armed forces of the United States should be, since any bombing decision involves a be not to prepare for war, but to prevent war large-scale prediction of the future conduct of —to insure that peace be perpetuated.” Al­ the enemy, a prediction that involves at a though he does not cite .Arnold in this context, minimum evaluations of both the enemy’s Bums is effectively asking what we have done means and his will. to accomplish that task. What can be done to improve our real The book as a whole is a contemplative knowledge of bombing and its effects? Many history of aerial bombardment, combined with starts have been made in this direction since a descriptive and historical analysis of postwar World War II, but none has been very suc­ disarmament negotiations. The author sees the cessful. Perhaps one new starting point might two as closely related, with strategic air theory be a full-scale Air War College study of Gen­ wedded to nuclear weapons by well-meaning eral Burns’s theory on the humanly induced but confused men. A point he raises that inevitability of escalation when bombing is should concern airmen is his argument that applied as a strategy. Such a study might whenever aerial bombardment is adopted as prove or disprove his theory, or it might a strategy it tends inevitably to escalate. Cit­ well reach some middle ground. In any case ing World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, he questions would be raised and faced up to, tries to show that bombing in itself, whilp it questions that have not as yet received the may start out with limited aims and specific concentrated study they deserve. In a brief targets, tends to be slow in producing the postscript General Burns paints the moral desired effects. Then, anxious to do their part clearly: and do it well, air commanders begin to rec­ ommend the removal of previously imposed As armaments continue to increase in number and power, the negotiators at Geneva begin limitations, hoping—indeed, often promising— to have the feeling that they are like men thereby to produce significant results on the standing over a fused mine. They see the fuse overall war situation. So begins a process, he burning, they know the mine that can destroy argues, which continues step by step until hundreds of millions is there. How long the bombs are falling on population centers. We fuse may be they do not know, but they do have experienced several such spiraling proc­ know that if it is not cut, sooner or later the esses; sooner or later one will involve nuclear mine will explode. And still they find them­ BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

selves disputing over whether the fuse should responsibilities among many. Each officer must be cut with an axe . . . or by shears . . . decide for himself whether and to what de­ who will make the first cut, and so on. The gree such responsibilities accrue to his own fuse keeps on burning.8 person, his own conscience. Whatever atti­ St. Augustine might well have been speaking tudes or positions he assumes on the questions to General Burns when he wrote: “Let those raised in these three books, there can be no be angry with you who do not know with argument with Lieutenant General Sir Win- how much anguish truth is sought.” throp Hackett’s observation that the solutions to today’s problems demand more and more good minds in the profession of arms. L ea der sh ip, strategy', and reflection—three Durham, North Carolina

Notes 1. He adds that the committee which empowered the proj­ the overloading of packs. ect in the first place agreed on this point, but that "some Penta­ 5. Some members of the so-called “strategic community" gon bureaucrat discovered that a Department rule required are already at work on this problem. See, for example, Urs anonymity. While it is foolish to argue a priori with a system, Schwarz and Laszlo Hadik, Strategic Terminology: A Trilingual that rule merely dilutes the force imparted by oneness of con­ Glossary (New York: Praeger, 1966). The introduction notes ception.” that "the language began to be confused and corrupted by out­ 2. In the newest version there is an obvious effort to get siders who put it on in order to look like insiders, and by first things first. For example, “Knowing Your Job as a Leader" those lesser insiders who were unconsciously impelled to make moves up from Chapter 13 to Chapter 4. it more difficult to understand, more obscure, in order to exclude 3. “The Problem of Career” replaces “Planning Your the profane." (!) Career"; “Your Code as a Leader" replaces “Forming Military 6. For this reason it would be unfair simply to list these Ideals"; and, significantly, “Speaking and Writing” replaces assumptions in a simplified form. See his Chapters 7, 8, and 9. “Writing and Speaking.” 7. General d’Arm6e Andr6 Beaufre takes an approach 4. This is a guess on my part, based on the fact that several similar to Admiral Wylie's when he csills for the conscious of the “additions" fit so well into the overall flow of the narra­ formulation of a "total strategy" (Wylie’s "general theory of tive and are the sorts of things that get blue-penciled. Let the war strategy”) that includes political and economic forms of curious reader compare pp. 155, 173, 179, 201, 203-4, 220, action. See his latest book, Strategy of Action (London: Faber 225, and 232 with the corresponding pages in DOD Pamphlet & Faber, 1967). 1-20 (the 1960 edition). Also, some Army friends advise me that 8. The five-page postscript that concludes with this para­ the three added maxims on p. 275 could never have been ap­ graph has been omitted from the American edition. In the proved by the Marines, especially number XXVII concerning Canadian edition it appears on pp. 264-68. Tbe Contributors

Military Scientist with TEMPO, Gen­ eral Electric’s Center for Advanced Studies, Santa Barbara, California. After graduating from the U.S. Mili­ tary Academy in 1938, he took flying training and during World War II commanded a B-29 group, Twentieth Air Force, based on Tinian. His post­ war assignments were in the Far East and Europe, where he served eleven years with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ultimately as Deputy L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Robert H. L ie u t e n a n t Gen er a l Earl Clif­ U.S. Representative to the NATO D rumm (M.S., Jackson College) is ford Hedl un d (Ph.D., University of Military Committee and Standing Chief, Behavioral Science in Manage­ Illinois) is Director. Defense Supply Group, 1959-63. General Huglin is ment Division, Professional Personnel Agency, Alexandria, Virginia. Com­ a graduate of the National War Col­ Management Course, Warfare Systems missioned from ROTC, he completed lege (1957) and a member of the School, Air University. Other assign­ pilot training in 1942 and served as Council on Foreign Relations, New ments have been in Korea, 1948; a fighter pilot, group commander, and York, and the Institute for Strategic Guam, 1949; Personnel Planning, Hq deputy wing commander in the Pacif­ Studies, London. He has been a com­ Air Training Command, 1953—56; ic and European Theaters, 1942-47. mentator on the Pacifica Foundation Hawaii, 1956—59; Aerospace Medical When his P-38 was shot down over radio network on the subject of U.S. Division, AFSC, Brooks AFB, Texas, Europe in April 1945, he was taken involvement in world affairs and a 1959-64; and Flight Test Center, captive but later escaped and made contributor to Air University Review. Edwards AFB, California, from 1965 his way back to the American lines. until his current assignment. Colonel Postwar assignments have been with Drumm is a graduate of the Defense the Joint M ilitary Transportation Management Systems Course of the Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Naval Postgraduate School and the 1948—51; as Chief, Air Transport Air War College Seminar Program. Division, Directorate of Transporta­ He lectures extensively on behavioral tion, Hq USAF, 1952; student, Naval science and management theory. War College, 1953; Director of Trans­ portation, Hq Far East Air Forces, to 1956; at Hq USAF as Deputy Director of Transportation to 1959, as Director to 1961; Deputy Com­ mander. Ogden Air Materiel Area, Air Force Logistics Command, Hill AFB, Utah, to 1963; and Commander, Warner Robins AMA, AFLC, Robins AFB, Georgia, until his assignment to DSA in 1966.

M ajor Jer o me G. P epper s, J r ., USAF (Ret) (B.G.E., University of Omaha) is a faculty member, School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology. He entered D alip Saund (B.S., California Insti­ the Air Force in 1940, serving in en­ tute of Technology) is Assistant Pro­ listed status until 1942; then he fessor of Anthropology, California served as a warrant officer until called State College, Los Angeles. After to active duty from the commissioned graduating as an engineer in 195S, reserve in 1951. He filled maintenance he switched to anthropology and en­ assignments in Hq Strategic Air Com­ tered the University of California at mand, 1951—55 and 1958—62. Since Los Angeles, where he studied until his retirement in 1964, he has been 1965, meanwhile teaching anthro­ teaching at AFIT SOSL, principally pology. While on the staff of the in DOD Maintenance Management Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, Air Information Systems courses. Major Force Systems Command, Wright- Peppers is a graduate of the U.S. Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1966—67, he Army Senior Officers Preventive Main­ did research on cross-cultural inter­ tenance Course and of Industrial Col­ action processes and training systems, B rigadier Gen er a l Hen r y C. lege of the Armed Forces and Air spending six months in northeast H uglin, USAF (Ret), is a Senior University courses. Thailand. Commander, 1st Air Division, SAC; student. National War College; Com­ mander, 4060th Air Refueling Wing, Dow AFB, Maine; Commander, 81Stli Strategic Aerospace Division, Lincoln AFB, Nebraska; and Deputy Director, then Director, Legislative Liaison, OSAF. preceding his present assign­ ment in 1966.

M ajor Horacio A. R atti, Argentine Air Force B.S., -Argentine Air Force M ajor Geo r ge F. Heimuc h iUSNA; Academy . in Allied Fit hi nge Officer M.S., Air Force Institute of Tech­ at the U.S. Air Force Academy 1965— nology; M i., George Washington 67, now serves at Headquarters University ) is an operations research Argentine Air Force, Buenos Aires. analyst. Office of Research Analyses. Commissioned in 1950, he was first Office of Aerospace Research. Hollo­ assigned to AAF Radar Maintenance man AFB. New Mexico. Commissioned School. Buenos Aires. Other assign­ in 1954. he then took pilot and navi­ ments have been as student. RAF gator training and served five years Badar Operation and Maintenance as a crew member in the Strategic School; student. Argentine Air Com­ Air Command. .After graduation from mand and Staff School, squadron com­ AFIT in nuclear engineering in 1963. mander of a radar surveillance unit, he serv ed two years with the Solid Buenos Aires, aide to the Secretary State Physics Lab of the Aerospace of the Argentine Air Force; and in Laboratories. He received his present the Argentine Air Defense Command. M ajor David A. S in g l e t a r y . AFRes assignment in July 1966 upon gradu­ M S.. Georgia Institute of Technol ­ ation from the Air Command and ogy is a stall planner with the De­ Stair College. partment of Housing and Urban Development. Tucker, Georgia. After being commissioned through ROTC in 1951, he served a tour with the 64th Troop Carrier Wing and since has remained active in the reserve program. In 1961 hr was assigned to Hq Continental Air Command, in the Office of Construction and Real Property. DCS Civil Engineering. In 1963-65 he was employed as an installations planner, Directorate of Civil Engineering. Hq Air Defense Command. Since 1960 his work has been related to civil defense, urban planning, and metropolitan regional development.

Dr . Ai.i in i> Gniomm. (Ph.D.. Johns Hopkins University) is a staff member of the Social Science Department of the RAM) Corporation, Santa Monica, California He was formerly Chiel of Harriet Fast Scott hu lived and M ajor Cmui. Thomas C. Corbin the Current History Branch of the traveled extensively throughout the fUSMA) is Commander, USAF Spe­ USAF IfistoriiiU Division. He has Soviet I'm on at wife of Colonel cial Air Warfare Center. Eglin AFB. been a lecturer at the University of William F. Scott. V S. Air Attache. Honda. He ciunpleted pilot training Maryland and the University of 1962-64. Her Bueno In the Russian in 1942 and served In the European Southern California. He is the editor her with language and familiantv Theater 1945-45 as Deputy Com­ and coauthor of A Union/ of tin- U.S. Russian military writing have been mander. later Commander, 386th Air force, 1907 1957 and coauthor refbcted u» arti. In to Military Rat1 leu Bomb Group iB-28|. Postwar assign­ ot Tin Arun/ Air Fonts in World and In wfacfSont and IllnilltV it ii ment! have been as Air Inspector. Wur II lie has ulso

C aptain David MacI sa a c (A.M., H er ma n S. W olk (M.A., American Yale University) is presently working International College) was a historian toward a doctorate in history at Duke for Hq Strategic Air Command for University under the Air Force Insti­ seven years prior to joining Hq USAF tute of Technology, and this summer Historical Division Liaison Office, he will return to duty at the U.S. Air Silver Spring, Maryland, in 1966. He Force Academy. He was commissioned served in the U.S. Army information in 1957 through AFROTC. His assign­ and education program during the ments have been as Chief, Personnel Korean War. He has taught history D r . C hester V. E asum (Rhodes Control Branch, 4245th Strategic for two years and lectured on strate­ Scholar; Ph.D., University of Wiscon­ Wing, Sheppard AFB, Texas, 1959- gic nuclear deterrence and political- sin) is Visiting Professor, Department 61; Chief, Officers Branch, Military- military matters related to the Cold of History, University of Nebraska. Personnel Division, Hq Sixteenth Air War. His articles have appeared in After teaching at Culver Military- Force, Torrejon AB, Spain, 1961-64; Air Force and Space Digest, Military Academy, he was at the University of and Instructor, Department of His­ Review, and Air University Review, Wisconsin from 1930 to 1964, when tory, USAFA, 1964-66.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “Isolationist Critics of American Foreign Policy: A His­ torical Perspective” by Dr. Paul S. Holbo as the outstand­ ing article in the March-April 1968 issue of the Review. EDITORIAL STAFF L ieu t en a n t Colonel Eldon W. Downs, USAF, Editor J ack H. Mooney, Managing Editor Majm Robert G. Spa r k ma n , USAF, Chief, Acquisition Branch E dmund O. Barker, Financial and Administrative Manager J ohn A. W est c o t t . J r ., Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston, Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L. Mido si May Patter#**.. Assistant Editor, Portuguese Language Edition W il l ia m J. De Paola, Art Editor and Illustrator F ir st Lieu t en a n t Jer r y R. S tringer, USAF, Editorial Project Officer

ADVISERS

C olonel Mer r itt G. G arner, Hq Military Airlift Command C olonel Alfred J. L yn n , //

ATTENTION

Air University Review is published to stimulate professional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents re- flect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi- tors and are not to b* construed as carrying any official sanction of the Depart- ment of the Air Fore* or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AI R FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

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