Strategic Action Fields and Community Wind Energy in Denmark

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044

Who owns an energy transition? Strategic action fields and community wind energy in Denmark

Franziska Mey and Mark Diesendorf

UNSW Sydney

Abstract

This paper investigates the development of, and changes in, the field of community renewable energy in Denmark since it commenced in the late 1970s. The focus is on community wind projects. We use an organizational and institutional theory perspective following Fligstein and McAdam’s concept of strategic action fields. Within this framework we explore the rise, decline and revitalisation of CRE fields and respond to the research question of ‘how and why the field of CRE in Denmark changed’. Input data comprise document analysis supplemented by quantitative and qualitative data analysis. The results indicate the following: firstly, the mobilization of CRE action is closely related to normative elements of shared identification and objectives that go beyond environmental and technology motivations. Secondly the state dependence and growth trajectory requires some additional support structures that are able to reflect the unique nature of CRE projects. Thirdly, topdown measures accompanied by local approaches ensure that the acceptance of RE can be fostered through the CRE approach.

Keywords: community renewable energy; wind energy; Denmark; strategic action fields

1. Introduction

In the context of increasing anthropogenic climate change, market dynamics and public policy intervention, energy transitions are underway in many countries across the world. A phenomenon that has driven and accompanies these developments is community renewable energy (CRE). This is because new decentralised technologies such as wind and solar photovoltaic power allow citizens to engage collectively with and benefit from it. The Danish energy transition is potentially the most prominent and well-studied case for a successful shift from high dependence on imported fossil fuels to partial self-sufficiency with a high share of renewable energy (RE). The production of electricity from RE accounted for 56% of Danish domestic electricity production in 2015; the largest contribution came from wind energy (42% of electricity supply) making the country number one worldwide in wind power generation per capita that year (DEA 2016, REN21 2016). Furthermore, the country is referred to as one of the best examples of localised CRE ownership with the first wind energy cooperatives emerging in the late 1970s. Numerous studies highlight the role of the bottom-up movement and local actors as vital in the transformation of the energy sector in Denmark (Heymann 1995, Garud and

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044

Karnoe 2003, Toke et al. 2008, Toke 2011, Eikeland and Inderberg 2015, Sperling 2017), making it a classic study object for CRE developments.

This article explores the development of RE through the lens of the CRE sub-field activities focusing on social movement activities and public policy as factors for change. We apply elements of the strategic action fields’ approach which is coalesced in the ‘Theory of Fields’ by Fligstein and McAdam (2012), in order to shed a new light on the transition. Therefore we ask why did the Danish CRE sub- field emerge, how did it develop over time, and what conclusions could be drawn for other countries? Due to the Denmark’s large wind resource and advanced implementation of wind power, community wind energy projects are at the centre of analysis. The theoretical approach of strategic action fields allows us to trace the historical trajectory of the CRE sub-field by paying attention to critical milestones along the stages of emergence, settlement, and decline.

There is a consensus among scholars and policy makers that a just and rapid energy transition requires public support (Bulkeley and Fuller 2012, Fuller and McCauley 2016, Goedkoop and Devine-Wright 2016, Jenkins et al. 2016) . Several studies have established the close link between community acceptance and community participation in large-scale RE deployment (Jobert et al. 2007, Zoellner et al. 2008, Musall and Kuik 2011, Hall et al. 2013). Hence it is vital to understand how CRE actions emerge and can be sustained. The Danish example has inspired communities across the world yet in many countries CRE fields are still in early stages of development (Hicks and Ison 2011, Seyfang et al. 2013, Roberts and Kramer 2015, Mey et al. 2016). Hence this case study offers insights for other countries into the maturation process and continuation of CRE activities in constantly changing technology and political ‘environment’.

The Danish transition has been extensively discussed and analysed in the literature with the aim to identify the recipe of its success. In historic accounts the country case is used to illustrate the technological transition (Heymann 1995, van der Vleuten and Raven 2006, Karnøe and Garud 2012, Eikeland and Inderberg 2015) and aspects of the path dependency (van der Vleuten and Raven 2006, Karnøe and Garud 2012, Simmie 2012, Valentine 2013, Sovacool 2016). The policy design is elucidated (Lipp 2007, Sovacool 2013, Rüdiger 2014) for example by applying rational choice theory to explain interactions between politicians, their constituencies and institutions (Lund 2000, Toke 2002, Eikeland and Inderberg 2015). In numerous country comparisons, Denmark’s participatory, collaborative and bottom-up approach is highlighted as a distinguishing success factor (Garud and Karnoe 2003, Mendonça et al. 2009, Heymann 2012, Bauwens et al. 2016) while special attention is devoted to the influence of social movements and the local cooperative ownership structure (Bolinger 2001, Toke 2011). Our article builds on those studies yet expands the analysis in several respects. It considers the

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044 historic development from a CRE-centric perspective and traces CRE activities to the present, framing the analysis in the strategic action field approach. Thus, this analysis contributes to the growing body of literature under the CRE theme (Bolinger 2001, Walker 2008, Walker and Devine-Wright 2008, Walker et al. 2009, Hielscher et al. 2013, Seyfang et al. 2013, Yildiz et al. 2015, Mey et al. 2016, Schreuer 2016) and fills a gap with a long-term account of a CRE field emphasising the constant struggles in its trajectory.

The next section describes the theoretical framework and research method. This is followed in Section 3 with a brief discussion of the characteristics of CRE. The main body of this article is Section 4, which examines the evolution of the electricity field in Denmark and, within that broader context, the emergence, growth, and partial retreat of the CRE sub-field. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the findings and recommendations.

2. Framework and Method

The strategic action field’s approach is concerned with stability and change in meso-level orders of social life. Originating in the works of Bourdieu (1977, 1996), Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), DiMaggio (1991), Scott (2014) and Fligstein and McAdam (2012), the approach focuses on interactions of individual and/or collective actors based on a mutual understanding of the purpose and the rules that characterise a field. Following Fligstein and McAdam (2012), the field is composed of incumbent and challenger actors who determine the field dynamics. These actors hold opposing positions and disparate resources: incumbents are characterised by wielding disproportional influence shaping the character of the field whereas challengers occupy niches with an alternative vision of the field. For the analysis of the Danish CRE development two aspects of strategic action field approach are considered as central: the dependences of fields on other fields and the abilities of socially skilled actors to fashion new and sustain existing orders.

The first aspect views strategic action fields as exposed to transformative processes due to their interdependence with other fields in which they are embedded or with which they overlap. Hence changes that occur outside an existing field can lead to significant crises within a particular field. Drawing on elements of social movement theory, Fligstein and MacAdam (2012) consider periods when fields are under enormous pressure as ‘episodes of contention’, in which actors try either to reproduce the existing order or to take advantage of opportunities presented to them to change the order. Yet, to bring about change the actors require capacities and resources and have to be able to mobilise innovative collective action. An important player in this regard is the state. Since their establishment, modern fields are largely dependent on the involvement of governments whose interest rests mainly on stability: state interventions usually benefit incumbent actors.

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044

To foster and sustain change, the field approach theorises a second aspect with the strategic actions by social actors. These are perceived as change agents who have been considered in other theoretical accounts as social, institutional or technology entrepreneurs (DiMaggio 1988, Fligstein 2001, Huybrechts and Nicholls 2012). Fligstein and McAdam (2012) emphasise the ability of socially skilled actors to frame visions, create shared identities, mobilise for collective action, and build political coalitions to induce and organise a field.

In the view of Hoffman (1997, 1999, 2001) fields must be seen as highly complex collections of constituents with varying and diverse influences, while historical processes and culture also have to be taken into account. The stability in a field is mainly associated with institutional environments that are created through coercive powers or political coalitions (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). This can imply a consensus about the relative position of incumbents and challengers, further contributing to the field’s settlement. An additional element to facilitate the order in a field are internal governance units that oversee the compliance with rules and support the reproduction of the system. Since Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) approach centres on the genesis of change, they argue that incremental change is the rule in even the most stable of fields. Hence the process of contention, mobilisation, and jockeying for position in the field can restart at any time.

Following this theoretical approach of fields, our analysis of the Danish case study is structured in chronological order following the emergence, growth, maturation, and decline of CRE activities. From this perspective, we expect that CRE fields are a temporary phenomenon if CRE actors are not able to secure continuous and tailored state facilitation. It helps to trace processes of change and stability within and outside the CRE field in a long-term perspective, which is almost unique to the Danish case. Except for Germany, other CRE fields across the world are quite young and so lack the knowledge regarding the settlement and change process. Thus, this case study can be relevant to other regions in understanding the particular role of CRE in the energy transition.

The paper’s analysis is based on a literature review of academic, government, and not-for-profit resources. In addition, empirical data was gathered to validate and deepen the understanding of the CRE field status. By applying a mixed method approach, multiple data was used to broaden the understanding of the research topic. Thus, this approach combines quantitative and qualitative research in a single study (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, Creswell 2014). It enables triangulation to improve the validation of the research findings. Therefore, quantitative data was obtained on community wind projects from the Danish Wind Turbine Owners Association (number of wind energy projects in community ownership, see Figure 1) and data on number and capacity of solar PV system installations derived from the website of Energinet 2017 (public company owned by Danish Ministry

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044 of Climate and Energy). We analysed 30 wind energy cooperatives listed by the DWTOA (DWTOA 2017). This included viewing all organisations’ websites and investigating information such as year of establishment, type of technology (offshore or onshore), output capacities (kW and MW), legal arrangements (sole or co-ownership), number of members or shareholders, and further relevant details about current activities of the organisation offered e.g. in annual reports. In addition, fourteen semi-structured interviews of experts were conducted. The interviewees were either centrally involved in the development of CRE in Denmark or worked for support organizations or local governments. The interviews took place between January 2015 and Feb 2017. Interviews typically took between 45 minutes and one hour. The interview partners were chosen on the basis of an online search, on the basis of references to organizations in academic and non-academic articles, and by asking interviewees for further references (snowballing). The interviewees are anonymised and listed in Table 1 with their affiliation and the time of the interview.

Table 1: Interview partners

Number of Affiliation of interview partner, time of interview interviewee 1 - Nordic, Folkecenter for Renewable Energy, Feb 2015 2 Nordic Folkecenter for Renewable Energy, Feb 2015 3 Engineer involved in Middlegrunden Vindmøllelaug, Feb 2015 4 Consultant, IT University of Copenhagen lecturer, Feb 2015 5 Holmsland Klit Turistforening and Hvide Sande Vindmøllelaug, Feb 2015 6 Europe University Flensburg, lecturer, March 2015 7 OOA Fonden, smiling sun, March 2016 8 Danish Wind Turbine Owner Association (Danmarks Vindmølleforening), March 2016 9 Samø Energy Academy, Feb 2017 10 Thisted Municipality, Feb 2017 11 Aero Energy and Environment Office, Feb 2017 12 Board member Danish Turbine Owners Association, CEO SPOK ApS, Feb 2015 13 Hjertebjerg Vindmøllelaug I/S, Feb 2015 14 Energirådgiver, Feb 2015

All interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. The transcripts were compiled and coded using a combination of deductive and inductive approaches. Our main focus was on the cultural, normative, and regulative elements that influenced the CRE field development process. Major disruptions in the field were identified and details from the mobilisation process evaluated.

Although the limitations of our study rest with the small scale of the qualitative data, we believe that our approach is valuable since it combines different data sources and offers a new perspective on the energy transition in Denmark by applying strategic action field theory.

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044

3. The field of community renewable energy in Denmark

In order to gain some degree of empirical and conceptual precision about the CRE field in Denmark, we start by carving out the boundaries of CRE activities. From the strategic action field perspective, CRE initiatives are considered as meso-level, socially constructed orders, inhabited by individual and collective actors. CRE is considered to constitute a sub-field of the electricity sector, although it can also be considered to be a field in its own right. While there is no unique definition of CRE field, there are characteristics that identify a field’s structure and composition. In the case of Denmark, two main features define its CRE field: technology and ownership.

In Denmark, the technology aspect of the CRE field was strongly associated with wind power for the first years of the CRE activities. While the technology roots reach back to the late 19th century, the societal context of the 1970s accelerated engineering innovation and contributed to the commercialisation for mainstream application. The very early wind turbines were built at the small- scale of 5 to 7 kW. They were followed by a ‘standard’ generating capacity of 55 kW, while subsequent collectively owned turbines had capacities of 50 to 600 kW between 1980s and late 1990s. However, capacity and hence size increased rapidly after the 1990s and contributed to changing institutional environments and ownership structures.

The second characteristic specifically attributed to CRE is the organisational collective ownership that differentiates CRE projects from commercial projects. From 1970s to the mid-1990s, wind turbines were predominantly owned by grassroots actors – individuals and communities in cooperative structures (Helby 1998, Bolinger 2001, Olesen et al. 2004). In particular the long Danish tradition of cooperatives (Interessentskab or partnership), which originated in the cooperative movement in the 1860s (Jespersen 2011), led to homogeneity of the organisational form for community wind projects. At the end of 1990s, more than 175,000 households owned 80% of all wind turbines in Denmark, either on individual basis or as members of cooperatives (Wassink 2001 in Bolinger 2001).

An additional feature of the Danish CRE field is the normative understanding of the activities being alternatives to nuclear or fossil fuel-based electricity generation when environmental and social issues are at stake. During the maturation of the field in Denmark, the anti-nuclear position of early field actors was replaced by the issue of climate change. Furthermore, the process of field growth led to an increasing role of socio-economic motivations accompanied by an increasing professionalization of field activities.

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044

4. Episodes of emergence, contention and settlement of community wind energy

CRE activities are embedded in the broader electricity field, which was, until the early 1970s, characterised by a highly centralised electricity system with the majority of the electricity supply in the hands of a few large utilities governed by two partnerships: ELSAM A/S (1956, a collaborative body for the six largest power stations in the Jutland/Funen area) in western Denmark, and Kraftimport I/S (later ELKRAFT) in the east of the country. ELSAM A/S and Kraftimport I/S (ELKRAFT) were established as incumbent players in the field. As per definition of incumbent actors, those yield disproportional influence through material and political advantages and resources (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Consequently, their interests and views were heavily reflected in the structure and purpose of the field that was focused on an affordable and secure electricity supply based on fossil fuel sources.

4.1 Destabilising Changes: Oil Price Crisis of 1973 and nuclear power The key events that gave impetus to the emergence of the CRE field were the Oil Price Crisis and the nuclear power agenda pushed by incumbent actors in the energy sector and the government. While the first event created the more significant and destabilising shock for the electricity field and indeed the energy field in general, the second triggered large-scale public contention and mobilisation. Both events are discussed in turn:

The Oil Price Crisis of 1973 led to fuel shortages and significant electricity price increases in Denmark. The country was particularly hit hard due to its high dependence on imported oil and high per capita electricity consumption (Nielsen 1990, Rüdiger 2014). In 1973, oil was the principal fuel for electricity in Denmark, as well as for heating and transportation, however, for electricity generation it was rapidly replaced by coal in the late 1970s (International Energy Agency 2006). Rüdiger (2014) emphasised that a lack of national energy policy and planning characterised the Danish energy sector until the early 1970s, since the state primarily focussed on facilitating trade negotiations and supporting free access to electricity field for the different stakeholders. The political attitude was that the market can provide an abundant amount of primary energy at the lowest possible price and hence no interference is deemed necessary (Interview 2). But the Oil Price Crisis contradicted this assumption. Since the incumbent actors were unable to adequately meet public needs anymore, the government was forced into immediate action and a radical change of course. Energy security became a top political priority leading to a number of regulatory and normative institutional changes. Three sets of actions were taken:

(i) direct actions to reduce energy consumption through a ban on high intensive energy use and the introduction of mandatory energy efficiency measures (Rüdiger 2014);

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044

(ii) development of an energy strategy in four consecutive reports from 1974 to 1979; and (iii) change of the regulatory framework, specifically the Electricity Act, granting greater authority to the government over energy matters (van der Vleuten 1998, van der Vleuten and Raven 2006).

As part of the energy security strategy, the government accelerated plans to restructure and re- stabilise the electricity field with the introduction of nuclear power. This also played to the favour of incumbent actors, in particular ELSAM, who had progressed the selection of sites for nuclear power plants and intended to purchase the technology abroad (Heymann 1995, van der Vleuten and Raven 2006). Ultimately those developments gave impetus to the emergence of challenger actors who were represented by a group of students and activists related to the peace and environmental movements. A specific political opportunity opened for them when in early 1974 a parliamentary decision on nuclear power insurance was to be made (Interview 1). Enabled by the open and responsive political input structures of the Danish state, the activists called the attention of Members of Parliament to the threat of the imminent adoption of nuclear power without any influence by Parliament (Interview 1). This stirred resistance, in particular in the opposition party, and what had started as a proposed adjustment to the Nuclear Power Act of 1962 on liability matters became a heated public debate over licensing issues (Nielsen et al, 1999).

4.2 Episode of contention and mobilisation for collective action When Parliament postponed the decision over nuclear power insurance, the newly established group Organisation for Information about Nuclear Power (Organisationen til Oplysning om Atomkraft, OOA) called for a general moratorium in 1974. This started the period of public contention and strategic actions by challenger groups exhibiting social skills to mobilise and sustain collective action. While the majority of the public was still neutral or pro-nuclear (see Table 2), OOA conducted an information campaign to educate the public on the issues of nuclear power (Interview 1). Since OOA was founded with the purpose to critically assess and inform people about all the problems connected with the use of nuclear power (OOA Website 1995), one of the first official steps of the organisation was to request sufficient time to have a public debate prior to a final decision on nuclear licensing. Nonetheless, aware of their powerful counterparts, the organisation took a considered approach reflected in their name choice as an organisation for something rather than against (Meyer 2000). This strategy is known for being used by skilled social actors to engage in brokering rather than blustering by presenting ‘themselves as neutral and as just trying to mediate between two groups’ (Fligstein 2001, p. 114).

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Table 2: Survey on public attitude towards nuclear power in Denmark. Proportion of people which would 1974 1975 1976 1977 1979 1981 1984 vote against or for nuclear power if a referendum was held tomorrow For nuclear 46 % 40 % 28 % 23 % 24 % 19 % 21 % Against nuclear 23 % 21 % 34% 42 % 55 % 61 % 64 % Don’t know 31 % 39 % 38% 35 % 21 % 19 % 15 % Source: adapted from Andersen 1990, p. 189.

The information campaign comprised collective actions in the form of grassroots initiatives across the country. Sørensen (2012) considers the innovative governance structure of OOA – relying on principles such as impartiality (or bipartisan collaboration with different stakeholders and politicians), inclusiveness, and participation – as key to its success. The collective action mainly built on local groups serving as platforms to discuss nuclear power as well as to advocate and influence local and regional institutions on the subject across the country. In the first year, 1974, 50 groups were formed (Interview 1). In the second year, the movement broadened and provided more room for solution- oriented ideas by the establishment of Organisation for Renewable Energy (Organisation for Vedvarende Energi, OVE). As a complement to OOA, the new organisation offered an alternative energy scenario by advancing the discussion and dissemination of information about RE (Dykes 2013). Its assembled members were not only activists but also engineers, scientists, and RE experts who progressed ideas and experiments of wind power deployment (Interview 2).

In 1976, the collective mobilisation was further stepped up when the government pushed for a finalisation of the nuclear legislation with the knowledge that a parliamentary majority was pro- nuclear (Interview 1). The government’s intention became obvious in the Third Energy Plan published in May 1976, which proposed to introduce nuclear power to provide 23% of the primary energy supply and almost two-thirds of electricity production by 1995 (Handelsministeriet 1976). RE was only to play a minor role with wind, solar, and imports of hydro power from Norway contributing 4% of the primary energy supply – and only 3.7% of the electricity production by 1995. Hence, OOA increased the pressure by distributing 900,000 copies of newspapers on the nuclear issue, collecting 170,000 signatures for another postponement of the nuclear decision and selling more than 200,000 badges and stickers. By that time, the number of local OOA groups had grown to 150 (Interview 1).

The innovative collective actions in Denmark were further bolstered by the development and usage of identity-forming elements, which were an important approach especially considering the non- membership structure of the organisation. In particular, the elements of the internationally renowned symbol of the anti-nuclear movement, the logo of the smiling sun, the marches of several thousand people to proposed sites of power stations (e.g. Stevns and Gylling NÊs) and to the Swedish border to

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044 protest against the Barsebäck power station, and the symbolically significant community action to construct the Tvind wind turbine in Western Jutland were important steps to maintain collective action (OOA Website 1995, Schanz 2011, Tvindkraft 2016).

Decisive for the political discussion and for the recognition of the field challengers as serious contestants were several publications and reports by Danish scientists and engineers. These served as an interpretive frame and guide to action for the proponents as well as a tool to further mobilise support. Fligstein (2001, p. 113) argues in particular that ‘framing’ is a tactic by skilled social actors ‘that help[s to] induce cooperation from people in their group that appeal to their identity and interests, while at the same time using those same stories to frame actions against various opponents’. Among the important publications were two wind power reports by the Danish Academy of Technical Science (1975, 1976) and the publication of the Alternative Energy Plan (AEP) in 1976 (Blegaa et al. 1977, Meyer 1995, Garud and Karnoe 2003). The AEP was the movement’s answer to the government’s proposal of a future nuclear-fossil energy supply. As an alternative scenario of a ‘decentralised more human society’, this new framing challenged the logic and organisational structure of the energy field by excluding nuclear power and emphasising RE (van der Vleuten and Raven 2006).

4.3 Settlement of the CRE sub-field The strategic action field approach associates the settlement process of a field with a commitment to see its principles institutionalised (Hoffman 1999, Fligstein and McAdam 2012). This applies to internal activities, which are, for example, reflected in the establishment of internal governance units to standardise practices and advocate for facilitative political conditions. It finds also expression in interactions with the wider electricity field and responses of government.

In Denmark, internal CRE field structures solidified when groups of socially skilled actors strategically worked towards the implementation of alternative energy scenarios and the vision of the movement. The first structured approach was initiated by OVE. This organisation had started in 1975 as an informal network to engage RE proponents (including engineers and self-builders) in local structures similar to OOA and to advocate for RE on national level (Interview 1 and Interview 2). The growing actor network frequently held meetings and workshops (called ‘VIND TRÆFs’) and informed their stakeholder groups through the OVE magazine and handbooks. Their activities built on what Garud and Karnøe (2003) emphasise as the special nature of the ‘technology entrepreneurship’ in Denmark, which not only entailed the ‘discovery of opportunities by alerting individuals or speculation on the future but also the creation of new opportunities by a collective’ (p. 294). Garud and Karnøe (2003)

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044 found that technology entrepreneurship in Denmark comprised different actors active in ‘the domains of production, use, evaluation and regulation’. The official registration of OVE as an association and the establishment of the Danish Wind Turbine Owners Association (Danske Vindkraftvarker, DWTOA) in 1978 were milestones in the institutionalisation process of the field. These organisations can be identified as the first internal governance units while contributing to the distribution, monitoring, and standardisation of new wind turbine models. Their networks also served as platforms to encourage the purchase of early and still expensive wind turbines by idealistic visionaries (Tranaes 1996, Sørensen 2012). Another organisation that emerged in the field settlement period was the ‘Nordic Folkecenter for Renewable Energy’ (Nordic Folkecenter for Renewable Energy 2016, DWTOA 2017), which enabled activists and technology entrepreneurs to relocate from kitchen tables to an actual dedicated location to develop, test, and demonstrate small to medium-scale wind turbines (Interview 2 and Interview 3).

This internal field formation process was accompanied and followed by external field support that ensured the sustenance of action through regulatory measures and funding for mainstream application. While the strategic action field approach emphasises that it is in the interest of the state to create stability, it usually results in state interventions, firstly benefiting incumbent actors. However, the Danish incumbent industry was not able to re-establish stability in the field, since its strategy rested on nuclear power. So this issue was still unsolved. Hence, the government focussed on the rising actors in the electricity field, since they provided an alternative approach. Furthermore, those actors had already institutionalised the foundation of the new CRE field and hence became able to influence the government and advocate their principles there (Buen 2006). This enabled a benign political climate for a community focussed approach to RE deployment which enabled policy measures (Interview 2 and Interview 7). A new shared understanding of the CRE sub-field emerged, characterising its normative and regulative boundaries. The new settlement was reflected in the following major elements:

• All farmers and rural households could install a wind turbine on their own land. • Local residents could become members of local cooperatives in their municipalities or neighbouring municipalities. • Exclusive local ownership was a condition for operating permits. • Electricity utilities could only build large wind farms in agreement with the government and if they did not violate the wishes of farmers and local residents. • Private individuals could only own shares in wind turbines corresponding to the household's private consumption (6,000 kWh per year, extended to 9,000 kWh and to 30,000 kWh per

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044

person over 18 living in the household) (Garud and Karnoe 2003, Olesen et al. 2004, Mendonça et al. 2009).

The government adopted these principles in its policies. The first of these was tax-free investment grants for individuals and cooperatives in 1979. In the Energy Plan of 1981 (Energiplan 81) a long-term perspective for community wind energy projects was acknowledged. The plan offered the vision to install 60,000 small wind turbines (8.5% of the electricity production) by year 2000 (Energiministeriet 1981). In the following years the government furthered the growth of the field by introducing in 1984 an income tax exemption for revenue on shares in wind energy projects and a feed-in tariff (FiT) paying a fair price for electricity and so making it possible for the investments to be profitable (Hvidtfelt Nielsen 2005, Meyer 2007).

Another important step in the settlement period was granting CRE projects access to the electricity grid, bringing security over the connection process and its costs. This was achieved through a initially voluntary agreement between CRE field actors and incumbent utilities which became a law when CRE field developments reached its height in the 1990s (Meyer 1995, 2013, Mendonça 2007, Sovacool 2013).

4.4 Peak of the CRE sub-field and retreat The greatest activities of collective ownership were observed towards the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. In the following years, incremental changes to the normative and structural foundations of the field ushered a slow decline towards the end of the 1990s (see Figure 1). In the early 2000s, CRE field activities had reached a peak (Interview 7). Almost 80% of the total 6,300 wind turbines were in collective ownership or operated by single owners (including farmers) (Krohn 2002).

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Figure 1: Ownership structures of annual installed wind power capacities, Denmark, 1980 to 2008*

Source: Danish Wind Turbine Owners Association (2015) * According to Interview partner 4, the ownership structures were no longer captured officially after 2000.

We identify the following four principal factors that significantly altered the CRE field dynamics: Firstly, the conflict over nuclear power was settled by a decision to remove the technology from Danish energy planning in 1985 (one year before Chernobyl) (Karnøe and Garud 2012). While it was a great success for the anti-nuclear movement, the motivation for CRE field engagement shifted to focus on climate concerns (Interview 11). But with that, the CRE field ‘lost’ an important element of its identity and a driving force behind their local bottom-up activities. Secondly, structural changes comprised the technology advancement which contributed to a new perception of the economic opportunities of wind energy through larger scale (i.e. large-scale wind farms) and size of wind turbines (Sperling et al. 2009). This also had an influence on growing political ambitions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, to achieve their targets more rapidly, the government began to dilute the collective ownership principles by opening the doors for more single- private ownership and investors. Olesen et al (2004) stated that ‘it became possible for a while to buy a tiny piece of land suitable for windmill installation and add it to one's own property’, which led to bypassing the law on local ownership. In 2001, the new Liberal-Conservative government continued the large-scale approach and promoted a ‘sanitation program’ of the landscape (Sovacool 2013) with the introduction of a repowering scheme to install larger but fewer turbines (Meyer 2004, Munksgaard and Morthorst 2008, Sperling et al. 2009). Yet, while it was desirable to increase the growth rate of wind power and energy conversion

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044 efficiency, it augmented the pressure on cooperative ownership. Commercial actors benefitted the most from the incentives for decommissioning and repowering and hence were able to offer attractive compensation to cooperatives owning older turbines (Interview 8). This became a common practice among cooperatives since the late 1990s and mid-2000s (Interview 3).

Thirdly, the introduction of planning zones for wind turbines started to hamper community ownership (Nielsen 1996, Anker et al. 2009, Möller 2010, Sperling et al. 2010). In the early 1990s, government action was prompted by a growing public resistance resulting from the visual impact of the constantly growing wind turbines and the shift in the ownership structures with an increasing number of private developers moving into that space (Interview 2, Interview 5). As a consequence, municipalities obtained planning authority with responsibilities to develop local plans for the most economically and socially appropriate wind sites (Sperling et al. 2009, Möller 2010). Yet, the growing opposition led local authorities to become more reluctant to issue official development approval for wind energy projects. Hence, the open and participatory character of wind turbine ownership was increasingly curtailed. The top-down planning process and the desire to cluster wind turbines led to a situation where some people were able to benefit and others were left out (Interview 2). Indeed, the planning law requirement to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment resulted in higher upfront costs of the projects.

Fourthly, the radical change of the Danish RE policies in late 1999/early 2000s was another heavy blow to local collective ownership and wind energy deployment in general (Meyer 2004). This development followed on from increasing national pressure and EU obligations to deregulate the energy market and increase competition to decrease consumers’ electricity prices. The adoption of a neo-liberal approach by a new government in 2001 ultimately led to the complete abolition of local ownership principles (Sovacool 2013). Investors from across the EU were allowed to purchase shares in Danish wind turbines. Bauwens et al. (2016) point out that the policy changes undermined the principle that allowed those bearing the (visual) impacts of the wind turbines to also enjoy their benefits. Hence this situation fuelled a public debate that was characterised by increasing opposition towards wind energy (McLaren Loring 2007, Anker et al. 2009, Möller 2010, Egelund Olsen 2014). Furthermore, the government altered the premium FiT into a market price payment (Feed in Premium scheme (FiP)) with a minimal environmental bonus for wind turbines and finally, in 2004, ended the power purchasing obligations bringing wind investments almost to halt (Meyer 2004, Lipp 2007, Mendonça 2007, Mendonça et al. 2009, Maegaard 2013, Sovacool 2013). In summary, potential new CRE groups faced a significantly reduced FiT, without a guaranteed electricity purchase, significant restriction on wind turbine siting, and no additional incentives for a community wind ownership (Olesen et al. 2004,

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Möller 2010). With a lack of new projects and existing cooperatives consolidating or dissolving, CRE field activities consequently plummeted.

4.5 Revitalisation of the field? The incremental changes of the institutional environment had set a trajectory for the CRE field that would have ultimately led to its disappearance. Its strong dependence on government facilitation made it susceptible when the field’s principles were neglected. Yet, a revitalisation of the community ownership approach followed after the lean period between 2003 and 2008. The revival was enabled by a political turnaround in the Conservative government party which was accompanied by a re-evaluation of the economic and energy security benefits of RE technologies and Denmark’s leading position in the global RE market (Krogh and Christensen 2010). Additionally the Conservative Party (Venestre Party) was losing popularity while climate and environmental concerns were gaining (again) increasing national attention. Thus, the government adopted the new vision of Denmark as a ‘Green Winner Nation’ (Danmark som Grøn Vindernation) and introduced new climate and energy targets (IEA 2008, Danish Government 2009). In the wake of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009, the Danish government reinstated its concrete support for RE (Lund et al. 2011, IRENA 2012). In the Promotion of Renewable Energy Act 2009, the fixed premium payment for wind energy was increased, making CRE projects economically feasible again (Bauwens et al. 2016).

However, it would be premature to call this a re-settlement of the CRE field. The government approach is driven by ambitious targets committing Denmark to become a fossil-free economy, with the entire energy supply – electricity, heating, industry, and transportation – to be covered by RE by 2050 (Danish Government 2011, Danish Ministry of Energy 2015). At the centre of the Danish energy strategy are economic principles: cost effectiveness, minimal impact on public finance, competitiveness and opportunities in a connected energy markets (Danish Government 2011). To achieve this, one of the government’s approaches is to focus on offshore wind energy deployment. Onshore capacities are also considered and these require ‘the need to designate more locations suitable for new and larger turbines’ (Danish Government 2011). But the growing scale, visual, and acoustic impacts of the technology contributed to an increase of anti-wind sentiments and protests (Möller 2010, Stilhed 2017). According to the National Association Neighbours of Giant Wind Turbines, more than 260 anti- wind groups have formed across the country since 2009 (Stilhed 2017). The decreasing local community wind energy ownership further aggravated the situation. To meet those challenges and increase local acceptance, the government revitalised the principle of local ownership and offered a guaranteed fund for local community wind owners to conduct feasibility studies (Danish Parliament

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2009). The new option-to-purchase scheme gives the local population the right to purchase at least 20% of a new wind energy project, with residents within 4.5 km having a priority purchase right.

However, the interview partners argued that the ‘20% rule’ was not effective (Interview 2, Interview 4, Interview 5). While it was well adopted in some areas, they found that certain wind developers provided too little or false information about the project risks and consequently discouraged potential community members from investing. One interview partner stated: ‘developers told me that why should we distribute 20% of our investment to people when we can add 20% dividend to our revenue’ (Interview 4).

The example of Thisted Municipality in the north-west of the country demonstrates the challenges associated with community support of new wind energy planning and approval. In the 1970s and 1980s, the region was well known for its localised approach to RE ownership with numerous energy cooperatives (Interview 6). Yet, in 2012, the local council received several hundred pages of complaints in the consultation process for the development of seven private wind energy projects with 40 wind turbines. The opportunity to own 20% of the shares in a wind project development was not a sufficient incentive as ultimately only two wind farms were approved (Bak 2013). Nevertheless, as stated by one of the interview partners, the 20% rule increases the acceptance – without it there would be undoubtedly bigger resistance. But, people are less excited about the projects today since it is all about the economics and planning approvals rather than the technology (Interview 10).

Thus, the top-down measures were lacking a significant ingredient for reinstating CRE engagement: for starters, better structural conception for the implementation, but, more importantly a normative identity-forming component that was in the early development of the field strongly associated with the social movement activities. The new institutional support structures, which are largely framed around individual financial participation, do not provide the shared meaning that mobilised collective action as the anti-nuclear campaign did before. Following the notion that strategic action fields represent ‘recurring games’ and the ‘rules, composition and the structure will be in play constantly’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, Fligstein 2013), we find Danish CRE actors in the process of identifying new shared understandings and ways to mobilise for re-settlement.

In our empirical data analysis, we identified four approaches for CRE mobilisation. Firstly, small and medium businesses engage in CRE to benefit from the local socio-economic added value. An example is the wind farm in Hvide Sande in the municipality of Ringkoebing-Skjern. In 2012, three 3 MW wind turbines were set up by the local tourism association in order to maintain the local harbour, a key tourist attraction, with the wind farm’s revenue. The project leader confirmed that the project is highly accepted in the local community, which he attributes to the local ownership of 20% held by more than

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400 shareholders in the Hvide Sande Nordhavn Vindmøllelaug I/S (Interview 13). The remaining 80% was financed by local banks.

The second approach involves partnerships with local authorities and municipal utilities. Since local governments are required, in their role as planning and approving authority, to deliver their share of the national government RE targets, there is an increasing potential for collaboration with CRE actors (Sperling et al. 2009, 2011, Möller 2010). Driven by an interest to increase acceptance for new RE developments (Interview 2, Interview 6, Interview 9), local governments can facilitate CRE initiatives and collaborations with large developers. Additionally, some local governments have set and identify with a local 100% RE target for which the islands of Samsø and Aerø serve as good practice examples in community participation and ownership. The local municipalities have been instrumental in the transition by setting local RE targets and ‘creating a positive development environment on the island’ as well as by engaging the local community (Interview 9 and Interview 10). A recent example is Provestenens Vindmøllelaug (Provestenens wind turbine cooperative), which was established in a partnership of a community organisation and municipal utility in 2013. One of the three 2 MW onshore wind turbines is owned by the community organisation which sold 4055 shares to 500 local residents and the wider community of Copenhagen (Provestenens Vindmøllelaug 2017). With the ‘20% rule’ community partnerships with large developers are likely to become the norm, yet commercial actors still need to appreciate the role of local communities in their projects (Interview 4).

The third approach to mobilise for CRE field activities is associated with new technologies such as solar PV, battery storage, and solar district heating as well as electric cars (Interview 9, Interview 11, Interview 14). Those small to medium scale systems have seen greater interest in the last years due to falling prices and government subsidies. For example, the number of installed systems surged from 4,100 in January 2012 to 76,800 in January 2013 with a capacity of 421 MW (Energinet.dk 2016). While the government curtailed the incentives for households in 2013, the continuously falling costs of PV systems support the business case for medium-sized systems in community ownership.

Lastly, collaboration among wind cooperatives and innovative new business models to facilitate their operations also contribute to mobilising CRE action. An example is the Vindenergi Danmark, a not-for- profit trading company, which offers fixed prices in power purchase agreements for individual and collective wind turbine owners. The organisation assists small and medium actors to decrease their financial risk by collectively, instead of individually, trading in the volatile spot market (Vindenergi Danmark 2017). Bauwens et al (2016a) state that two-thirds of all RE cooperatives trade with Vindenergi Danmark.

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5. Discussion and Conclusion

This paper discussed the questions ‘why did the Danish CRE sub-field emerge and how did it develop over time?’. To answer them, we presented an analysis in the previous section that followed elements of the strategic action field methodology. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the strategic action field approach has been applied to the analysis of CRE. Our empirical insights strengthen the validity of the strategic action field approach and demonstrate its suitability for studying CRE. This applies in particular to three parts: Firstly, external events serve as trigger points for emergent mobilisation and episodes of contention. In the Danish case study, those elements were clearly displayed while standing at the onset of the CRE field’s establishment. Secondly, the important role of social skilled actors and the foundation of internal governance units driving innovative collective action were demonstrated by the actions of the OOA, OVE and DWTOA. Thirdly, the power of the state shapes the prospects for stability and change in strategic action fields. This was shown in the way the Danish government fostered the institutionalisation of key principles of the CRE field and incentivised field activities through regulatory and financial support. Our research also contributes to future application of the strategic action field approach in understanding and explaining the development of community energy activities. The approach particularly lends itself to comparative studies of CRE across different technologies and different countries to investigate external or internal triggers, forms of mobilisation and government facilitation.

The findings in this paper point to three additional aspects: While it has been found that social movements are an important factor for the emergence of a field, they are equally important throughout the life of a field, particularly when institutional support for core interests of the CRE field is at stake. These findings offer a different perspective from that of Toke (2011), who finds in the case of Denmark that the anti-nuclear (industry opposition) movement becomes less relevant with the existence of a technology production movement. Yet, normative elements related to issue framing and creation of shared identities to mobilise action and resources are required to sustain a CRE field. This is concurrent with what Bomberg and McEwen (2012) derived from their Scottish case studies stating that, while structural resources (including government measures) can facilitate or hinder mobilisation of CRE actions, the use of symbolic resources was a key element for their effectiveness.

In Denmark, the initial driver of CRE actors to implement alternatives to nuclear power was superseded by the goal to mitigate climate change. However, this motivation for bottom-up action weakened when the Danish government resumed the role of a global ‘green pioneer’ with a focus on efficiency and cost reduction and further institutionalised actions on climate change. Bomberg and McEwen (2012) find much mobilisation potential in CRE that goes beyond environmental concerns

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044 and is associated with the desire for self-reliant communities. Additional motivations are associated with socio-economic benefits in the context of regeneration and strengthening the resilience of regional and rural communities (Walker et al. 2007, Hicks and Ison 2011). Different studies confirm that CRE initiatives offer clear advantages over external, commercially driven developments by contributing to local economic added-value, including revenues, employment and income (Lantz and Tegen 2009, Warren and McFadyen 2010, Munday et al. 2011, Gottschalk et al. 2016, Okkonen and Lehtonen 2016, Hicks et al. 2017). For example, a community owned wind farm in Germany can deliver eight times the value to a local community than a project from an external developer (Gottschalk et al. 2016).

We have seen that a number of communities in Denmark have already built a shared understanding of those aspects. Sperling (2017) emphasises that the Island of Samsø was able to address issues of unemployment and population decline through the deployment and local ownership of various RE technologies. However, we believe that further research is necessary to better understand the potential of socio-economic added-value of RE in community ownership in order to build a new narrative and to provide motivations and arguments for bottom-up initiatives to broaden the movement in Denmark. This is in particular the case since the government measures in 2008 to revitalise CRE activities were insufficient to re-mobilise for broader CRE actions, because those measures focus on individual financial gains. Thus, CRE actors are in a process of identifying new opportunities and shared meanings to mobilise for re-settlement.

The findings in this paper offer some considerations for the future of CRE in other countries. The CRE field in Denmark relied strongly on state facilitation. This dependence made the CRE field vulnerable to the incremental changes in the institutional environment that were focussed on the advancement of the technology rather than the aspect of community or business ownership. We found that the growth trajectory, expressed in the increase of wind turbine sizes and political ambition, contributed to a neglect of CRE’s social principles. However, community support is needed to realise the Danish government’s vision of 100% RE by 2050. This is also true for other countries with RE targets. Yet, top- down measures such as the ‘20% rule’ may fall short of igniting CRE field activities, especially because of the multifaceted and flexible nature of the phenomenon (Walker 2008, Walker and Devine-Wright 2008, Hielscher 2011, Holstenkamp and Degenhart 2013, Becker and Kunze 2014). While, the Danish government’s policy has demonstrated its potential, it could be improved by additional support structures for the CRE field. The role of intermediaries that broker the relationships between community members and other stakeholders and institutional bodies has been emphasised in a number of studies (Hargreaves et al. 2013, Bird and Barnes 2014, Ruggiero et al. 2014, Seyfang et al. 2014, Sperling 2017). Our findings from the settlement period of Danish CRE field also indicate that

Subsequently published: Energy Research & Social Science 35 (2018) 108–117; http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.044 such organisations are crucial to help consolidate, grow and diffuse innovations while coordinating support for this diverse sector. Hence governments should consider the support of local and field level organisations to help grow and stabilise CRE fields in their countries.

Although the analysis identified unique features to the Danish case, conclusions can be drawn for the development of CRE fields in other countries. Firstly, the mobilisation of CRE action is closely related to normative elements of shared identification and objectives that should go beyond environmental and technology motivations. Secondly the state dependence and growth trajectory requires some additional support structures that are able to reflect the unique nature of CRE projects. Thirdly, top- down measures should be accompanied by local approaches to ensure that the acceptance of RE can be fostered through the CRE approach.

Acknowledgement

We thank the Cooperative Research Centre for Low Carbon Living for a research grant. We also thank Laurence Delina as well as the three anonymous reviewers for their efforts and very valuable comments to improve the manuscript.

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Interviews

Interview Affiliation Partner # 1 OOA Fonden, March 2016 2 Nordic Folkecenter for Renewable Energy, February 2015 3 Nordic Folkecenter for Renewable Energy, February 2015 4 Board member Danish Turbine Owners Association, CEO SPOK ApS, Feb 2015 5 Europe University Flensburg, Lecturer, March 2015 6 Thisted Municipality, February 2017 7 Danish Wind Turbine Owner Association (Danmarks Vindmølleforening), March 2016 8 Hjertebjerg Vindmøllelaug I/S, Feb 2015

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9 Samsø Energy Academy, Feb 2017 10 Aero Energy and Environment Office, February 2017 11 Energirådgiver, February 2015 12 Engineer involved in Middlegrunden Vindmøllelaug, Feb 2015 13 Holmsland Klit Turistforening and Hvide Sande Vindmøllelaug, Feb 2015 14 Consultant, IT University of Copenhagen lecturer, Feb 2015