34

Support as a means of subordinatioN ’s policy on

Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga NUMBER 34 WARSAW MAY 2013

Support as a means of subordination Russia’s policy on Belarus

Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies

Content editors Adam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak

Editor Katarzyna Kazimierska

Co-operation Anna Łabuszewska

Translation Maciej Kędzierski

Co-operation Timothy Harrell

Graphic design PARA-BUCH

DTP: GroupMedia

Photograph on cover: Shutterstock

Publisher Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia

Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-62936-24-3 Contents

INTRODUCTION /5

I. Russia’s support for Belarus in 2012 /7

II. The strategic importance of Belarus for Russia /10

III. Belarus in Russia’s current foreign policy /14

IV. Map of Russian influence in Belarus /16

1. Russia’s control over the Belarusian economy /17 2. Russia’s influence on domestic political processes in Belarus /25 3. ’s reliance on Russia for security and defence /29 4. Coordination of foreign policy /30

V. Future outlook for Russian-Belarusian relations /32 sian economy, which would also, in effect, allow the Kremlin to Kremlin economy,the sian allow effect, in would also, which Moscow’s control Belaru long-term over the establish to is goal Russia. and Belarus between links the strengthen further objectives of the Moscow’sachieve to –particularly, foreign policy ultimately to away as such designedin therefore problems are Russia’s interests. national stopgapsolutions own its Belarusian to pursuing Moscow increasingly is Minsk, –by supporting changed of Russia’s have also mechanisms assistance bour. the addition, In dependence on neigh its Minsk’s increased havewhich further few years, past over by Russia the stipulated repeatedly changes implementationthe of of a number finalise to had has kashenko Moscow’s however, Lu support, come at has aprice. Alexander also. assistance political include to help and moved financial beyond intensified purely support the 2012, In for aid Belarus. Russian in arise we2011 have witnessing been since reason, Union. For European this the with integration er for options its clos would limit CES the volvement and CU the in ’s Moscow because hopes in that particularly Russia, in (CES). crucial The as seen is implementation projects of these Common Economic Union Customs the Space (CU) and the jects: keypro two to relation in objectives policy –especially current Moscow’s in prominently features also goods, Belarus and terials raw ma of Russian policy, transit the in and security foreign and in playsRussia’s roleMinsk significant highly additionthe to In Belarus. to Moscow attaches tance the impor reflects to neighbour its assistance to offer readiness Russia’s system. political continued Belarusian of the stability the helps maintain economic turn continue, to model in which Belarusian the allowing factor important become an has port Moscow’s Belarus. invested sup in for regularly years has Russia relations, bilateral their in frictions and conflicts Despite the INTRODUCTION ------

5 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 6 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 to Russia’sto demands. have accede no choice but ultimately gradually to will kashenko Lu Alexander deepens, support dependence on Russian Minsk’s Nonetheless, as by Russia. plementation stipulated of changes im despite the delays in Moscow Minsk ready support to is that means to Belarus attaches Russia importance the as relations, however, or not break-up lead asuspension to will of bilateral tensions, Theperiodic by conflict. marked be to likely are tions rela Russian-Belarusian years coming the in a result, As erned. are gov state Belarusian the of areas waythe other influence - - - - agreed in 2011. In December 2012, the ACF decided to transfer ACF decided transfer to the 2012, December In 2011. in agreed loan of billion a USD $3 instalment third the money was – this ty Economic Communi Eurasian of the Fund controlled Anti-Crisis Russian- the from million received USD $440 Belarus June 2012, In oil. heating biofuels and re-export to 2 1 Moscow to According I. $395 and USD $430 per 1000 m 1000 per USD $430 and $395 set at USD Republic was byof the Moldova gas by Ukraine sian and for price paid Rus the By 2012 way in of billion. comparison, $2 USD approximately state Belarusian the saving 2012, in USD $166 average of under annual just of an to 2011 quarter fourth the in USD $263 from dropped ly, bought price of by gas Belarus the Consequent from 2012. effective imports, gas natural on Russian discount a 40-percent granted been has Belarus November 2011, in signed of acontract terms For the loans. under example, terest low-in and raw materials of Russian pricing form of preferential comes the in The assistance mark. billion USD $16 the lates around budget oscil revenue Belarusian of the annual the that sidering con amount asubstantial is –this 2012 in billion exceeded USD $6 USD $2.5 billion Belarus earned products of such exports the of months 2012, six first the During sidestep to Russia’s tariffs. Minsk enabling export – for months anumber solvents thinners and Belarusian as ucts prod oil Russian re-export to Minsk allowed Moscow effectively 2011).objections, in official Despite raising less than 17% (almost average pays an tonne per of USD $404 Belarus 2012, in signed Under a four-year contract oil tariffs. export exempt from are oil of Russian purchases Belarus’s Union Customs to regulations,

Bondarenko, http://www.interfax.by/printable/exclusive/94718 Valeriy Belarus in Embassy Russian at the adviser senior the with Interview In response to Russian pressure, in July 2012 such exports were suspended. were exports such 2012 July in pressure, Russian to response In R u ss i a’s s 2 . Similar avoidance mechanisms have used been avoidance mechanisms . Similar u pp 1 ort f , the value of Russia’s assistance to Belarus of value Russia’s Belarus to , the assistance or Bela 3 , respectively. In addition, thanks , respectively. thanks addition, In ru s in 2012 ------

7 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 8 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 state-owned enterprises state-owned of privatisation the to relating those primarily agreement, loan conditions of the meet the fully to failed had Belarus that fact the hostile campaign against the Belarusian leader Belarusian the against campaign hostile adownright Moscow ran elections 2010 presidential the During have not friendly. been always lin’s Lukashenko with relations presidency. of points his However, crucial at Krem several the him backed has power from and Lukashenko move Alexander re to steps real any president. never Moscow taken has rusian Bela for support the political its demonstrated also has Russia another instalment of USD $440 instalment another 6 5 4 3 and business elite. In February 2012, a declaration of opposition a declaration 2012, February In elite. business and political Belarusian on imposed the EU/US the poses sanctions op West, Russia the and joy with Russia’s dealings his in support continues en to good. Lukashenko demonstrably president are Belarusian the and Kremlin however, the between relations the the project the for line credit aUSDbillion opened $10 since Moscow has Belarus. of power in plant anuclear construction for acontract signed the

who have no access to official media in Belarus. in media official to access no who have politicians opposition Belarusian by made comments aired also grammes pro affairs current and bulletins news Russian of occasions, anumber On opponents. political of his of several murders the ordered had Lukashenko that suggestions included These opposition. Belarusian the by president the against made been have for years that of allegations aseries presented which (‘Godfather’), Batka’ ‘Krestniy titled adocumentary broadcast Russia’s NTV Beltransgaz, which generated the USD $2.5 billion planned for 2011. planned billion $2.5 USD the generated which Beltransgaz, in shares off sold only has government To ayear. the date, $2.5 billion worth contracts privatisation through out gradually carried be to was plan of the The implementation years. three within $7.5 of USD billion a total worth erty prop state of Belarusian privatisation the stipulates agreement The credit June and December 2011. December and June in transferred were million 440 and $800 of USD tranches two previous the 2013, January out in paid eventually was loan of the tranche The fourth rus-exacerbate-coun commentary/2012-07-23/will-construction-a-nuclear-power-plant-bela OSW Commentary, No. 87, on Russia?’ http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw- dependence energy country’s the exacerbate Belarus in plant power of anuclear construction the ‘Will Menkiszak, M. Kłysiński, K. See 5 . 4 . On 18 June 2012, Belarus and Russia also also Russia and Belarus June 2012, 18 . On 3 . The out paid money despite was 6 . At the moment, moment, Atthe . ------2012 at the start of his third presidential term. presidential third of his start at2012 the Mayin made visit, foreign first on his Putin Vladimir hosting of privilege the had sia’s Belarus addition, In Foreign Ministry. by Rus issued repeatedly been have also of for support Belarus Statements Belarus. and Russia, namely CES, the of members three all anegative on were having effect measures the that arguing sanctions, opposition the to their expressed Common Economic Space, they which Russian-dominated in the of member-states of the ministers prime by 2012 the March in issued astatement in expressed also leader was Belarusian the Medvedev. president with Dmitry Russian Solidarity then the and Lukashenko Alexander jointly filed by was sanctions the to -

9 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 10 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 Russia’s relations with the former Soviet Republics formerRussia’s Soviet the with relations in seewhat to would of mosteffective be model integration and ceded be Moscow to potentially could of sovereignty attributes lar particu which to extent of example the an and ground a testing both Union project remains State have the not achieved, been objectives of the original of the many project date.Although to integration regional mostadvanced –the Russia and of Belarus co-founded Union State also the It has initiatives. led integration Russian- of the all in part take to member-state CIS only the been the the reflects Moscow’s given time. any Belarus invest to in readiness at relations of these quality onhowever, the depending does vary level of the Moscow’s relations; bilateral countries’ engagement, of the feature aconstant Russia’s remains for support Belarus II. 7 post- the in integrationcore of processes the at been the has Union, Soviet collapse of Belarus Since the the area. the concerning involved decisions be should all in Kremlin the that fact the and power of area patronage West CIS over the the ofvince natural its post-Soviet it for con to easier Russia image territory. makes This the together binding acentre and superpower aregional as Russia West the with its relations In proof ofstanding. as geopolitical its Russia in seen often is The neighbour overlong-lasting western its domination foreign its partners. with economic relations Russia’s as well domesticpolicies,lin’s as and security foreign,

Act of Union State, during which the lawmakers considered creating the po the creating considered lawmakers the which during State, of Union Act Constitutional the at adopting made been have attempts Several countries. two of the integration economic and political deep envisages The treaty 1999. of 8December atreaty by established afederation, as envisaged ture, struc integration –asupranational Russia and of Belarus State The Union o The s The unchanging strategic importance f Bela f tr ru f s a , Moscow uses this influence to build an imagean of to build influence , Moscow this uses t eg or ic i R mp i uss ort a a nc of Belarus for Krem the of Belarus e e S oviet area oviet 7 . . It has . It has - - - - - rus in 2013 25% in much as by as rus Bela volume via the pumped of gas increase to plans announced capacity. at used near been Moscow has has infrastructure transit Belarusian pipelines transported 44.3 billion m billion 44.3 transported pipelines Belarusian 2011-2012 In Ukraine. via volume the transported of gas to limit dueto Moscow’smainly – significant desire role its ing remains be country, time for the atransit as of Belarus importance the long reduce the term in will pipeline oil BTS-2 the and pipeline gas Nord of Stream the launch the Although region. liningrad Ka West the to goods the to and and raw materials of Russian 10 9 8 role the in plays important an also territory Belarusian transmission lines carried 2.8 billion kWh billion electricity. of 2.8 Russian carried lines transmission Pskov. and Belarusian the 2011, In Bryansk ofgions , re Russian the States and Baltic the to electricity transmit to used is grid Belarusian the Meanwhile, Bosnia. and gary, Slovakia Republic, Hun Czech Poland,Germany, the in consumers to rus Bela through 21% The transited of is oil Russia’s exports. oil total ayear, for accounts of tonnes which crude aboutapp. million 50 carries hand, other on (Friendship) pipeline, oil the The Druzhba not possible. be will increase an such (e.g. countries transit Poland), other and Belarus both in capacity 23% of Russia’s exports gas total accounted for which Kaliningrad, Poland and Ukraine, Lithuania,

http://www.interfax.by/printable/news/belarus/124917

In 2012, Russia’s gas exports reached 178.7 billion m 178.7 billion reached exports Russia’s gas 2012, In area. post-Soviet entire the covering projects integration by other replaced been has and diminished somewhat has significance tegic stra its then, Since of integration. level envisaged the reach to failed far so has State the Union parties, both of interests national different and gration inte the of nature the on opinion of However, differences due to for 2005. planned was which State, Union the rouble) across (Russian currency mon acom on adopting agreement an signed Yeltsin Boris and Lukashenko der Alexan Presidents 2000, November 20 On president. State of aUnion sition lish/2012/06/09/ic_articles_259_178119/ http://www.regnum.by/news/1546830.html, http://naviny.by/rubrics/eng my/20130208/921879837.html, http://kaliningrad.ru/news/item/6569 gion receives around 1.2 billion m billion 1.2 around receives gion 10 9 , but without additional pipeline pipeline , but additional without . This means that the Belarusian Belarusian the that means . This 3 of gas a year; http://ria.ru/econo ayear; of gas 3 3 of gas per year per of gas ; the Kaliningrad re Kaliningrad ; the transit 8 to ------

11 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 12 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 between corridor wide States. 80-km The barely Baltic nearby NATO find could it the problematicto deploy in forcesland its event of the in aconflict, that Russia’s means zone also security in The of inclusion troops. Belarus Belarusian and Kaliningrad on between cooperation based scenarios military cow create to Mos allows and exclave fore Russian isolation reduces of the the zone there security Russian into the The of inclusion Belarus km. 80 approximately only is Kaliningrad and Belarus between tance dis the Meanwhile, countries. two of the territories by the Russia from separated is and border Russian west of the km 300 around liesenclave The Russian significant. quite also is Kaliningrad to proximity close location in Belarus’s terms military strategic In of section NATOairspace. Moscow control to allow asignificant would Belarus, location in their to thanks which, kilometres, hundred of arange several with new missiles generation S-400 replaced by be to the likely are missiles few the years, next the Russia’s at protecting aimed border.fence system, western Over de air Russian of the part are Belarus located in systems missile andTOR-M2 zone. buffer PS S-300 The of security its part remains territory. from away own conflict Under its Russia’sBelarus optic, Russia-NATO moves zone location of and potential the any curity Russia’s Moscow’s extends Kaliningrad). se control over Belarus of exclave (except controlled by Russia forRussian territory the westernmost it the makes country’s location, which geographical policy ofview security defence and point of from the Russia to important is Belarus addition, In Kyiv. with tions helped Moscow objectives its negotia achieve in also has – which capacity for transit its on Ukraine relying to alternative a viable offered Russia has country role atransit Belarus’s as years, many fees. from transit competitive For benefits and cargo of transit its security Moscow, and the able is Minsk ensure to Russia between ties strong the to territory. Thanks Belarusian via transported ing be cargo 30% of transit around –with Europe and Russia between of goods transit road and route for shortest rail the also is Belarus . Of great significance is the is significance great . Of ------ceived as a failure of the Russian government. Russian of the ceived afailure as West, per be the would generally towards foreign policy rusian let acomplete alone of reorientation Bela Belarus, and Russia in the context of context Russia’s the in politics domestic Kremlin for the important also are Belarus with Close relations for radioelectronic warfare for radioelectronic element of ajoint into an system transformed being currently is centre communications Vileyka the while Oblast, Kaliningrad in opened was facility a since more modern significance military its lost has radar The Gantsevichi significance. ofpolitical purely are however, being, For facilities time hub Vileyka. cations the in the Fleet communi aBaltic and Baranovichi, near Gantsevichi tion in sta aradar facilities: military Russian two hosts Belarus dition, ad In invaded. be easily could region Kaliningrad the and Belarus 13 12 11 try aforeign coun do not consider Belarus 61% still while of Russians history’. Over 74% of Russians support closer ties with Belarus with history’. ties closer 74%support Over of Russians of ‘ prism the through perceived commonly is country the that stress to important is it itself, Belarus to regard With Russia. conditions in poor living level, offer onatsome apsychological least compensationthe for can, which the country’sstatus, superpower processes confirm these For Russians, Russia. in many support popular widespread post-Soviet enjoys the project across area integration tion of the

dalilis-drug-ot-druga http://www.levada.ru/02-11-2010/za-poslednii-god-rossiya-i-belarus-ot Centre, Levada Russian the by 2010 October in conducted poll Opinion http://www.newsland.ru/news/detail/id/804528/ Centre, Levada Russian the by 2011 October in conducted poll Opinion for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, Poland. Warsaw, Poland. Studies, for Eastern Centre at the Wilk Andrzej security of international aspects military for the fellow research the with consultation from benefited has paragraph This 13 . Consequently, any significant weakening of ties between tiesbetween of . Consequently, weakening significant any Slavic brotherhood’ and ‘shared Soviet ‘shared and ​​Slavic brotherhood’ 11 . . The implementa The . 12 ------,

13 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 14 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 instrumental in Russia’s in the with dealings become instrumental also has Belarus project, integration Eurasian the in By participating Union. European the and Ukraine between ties closer of possibility the or limiting, at least of blocking, ameans as time Russia’sing thesame and neighbour, overat influence western its away of as strengthen primarily seen being is structure these Ukraine’s into although CES, integration the and CU of the bility via the would help projects increase to engagement these with Ukraine’s region. CIS Kyiv entire the towards and policy Russian Common Economic objective now of Space become astrategic has relations of context Russian-Ukrainian the in important particularly is follow to region This suit. the in encourage to states signed other have de been structures integration newly Eurasian the created in from participating Belarus by ofobtained benefits The types of formulation Moscow’sthe post-Soviet entire area. the in policy in example an as used it projects, being is these in tive participant mostac the is Since goal. Belarus this achieving stone towards stepping- as seen is 2012, Common Economicthe Space January in 2010, of in followed establishment by the Kazakhstan and Belarus Union Customs of The of region. Russia, creation the the tion in Russia’s domina Union, but retaining European current by the achieved that to similar post-Soviet amanner of in the tries area coun the together bringing Economic Community a Eurasian Moscow’s CIS. the objective develop to is with ultimate relations gration project of the blocks one is building of the Belarus western neighbour. support for its in Russian increase into a significant translated current objectives implementation role the in plays of avital the also Belarus III.

p Bela ol ic , as Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union and the Ukraine’s, as Union the accession Customs and the to ru y R s in , which has now become a priority in Russia’s now in become apriority has , which of Russia’s foreign policy, recently has which u ss i a’s curr e f nt or E urasian inte- urasian e i g n ------troops with the S-400 anti-missile systems anti-missile S-400 the with troops Belarusian would arm and Belarus in missiles deploy Iskander it would that warned has Russian Europe, in shield ofments the deploy to proposal administration’s mobile ele Obama the and shield, missile of the construction for the revive to plans attempts Washington’s to response In defence shield. US missile over the with the United the S with for some significance Russia’s has also relations Belarus Finally, not provoke Brussels. from aresponse will initiatives integration its that assured rest sion, can Russia cohe EU’s the structural on maintaining focusing is and crisis economic its with dealing busy is EU when the at region atime the in influence geopolitical its formalising place in new structures By putting future. a possible the in of Western activity ofsphere al tradition its to safeguard post-Soviet the wants in – Russia region role not play asignificant will Partnership Eastern the that clear become it has and diminished, since has neighbours eastern its EU’s in the interest Although project. Partnership EU’s Eastern of the launch the and Europe, Eastern in interest EU’s growing the needto respond to Economic the been Union has of Eurasian concept implementation for current the of the impetus mediate im the although 1990s, the to post-Soviet back dates the in area 14 E

uropean Union uropean threatening to its national security. national its to threatening particularly considered Russia which W. adesign George by Bush, proposed concept originally the to similar project, shield missile the to return would Washington of his victory, case in that time at the indicated dency. Romney for presi contender aserious was Romney Mitt when campaign, election US presidential 2012 the during significant particularly became issue This influence, including its position in Belarus, against against Belarus, position in its including ​​influence, . The idea of and for the countries’ ongoing countries’ for and tates the dispute building an economic community economic an community ​​building 14 . - - - - - 15 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 16 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 Belarus ofin its extent influence the increased markedly has Russia 2011-2012 in observed assistance defencecontrols Belarus’s policy. Theof Russian intensification fully the country. also inside processes It political influence to capacity foreign policy, the has and of Belarusian direction the economy.rusian Moscow To able is extent, determine to alarge development the Bela steer to of the potential realised, not fully though significant, possesses Russia aresult, As Belarus. place in taking processes theimportant influencemost over it significant gives that interdependence of mutual a system created has Russia countries, two the between post-Soviet the links strengthening economy the and governance of Belarusian areas its control over specific to increase striving consistently been concessions. For has now, years further Kremlin the seeking without however, readymean, Belarus invest to is in Russia that does not This instability. of economic times or in social pecially count on Moscow’s can Minsk es support, that mean Belarus with relationship special from derives its that Russia The benefits IV. the Belarusian . Air Belarusian the –namely, army Belarusian of the control its over parts formalised also Moscow Finally, WTO. has by onthe imposed Russia ulations Union by applying Customs reg and it to into the the country the by bringing especially someBelarus, ofin economic its influence institutionalise to managed has Russia addition, In plant. at the generated of electricity control export over the full it has that ing by ensur and Belarus of operation power in plant anuclear and construction of the supervision over the by taking Belarus tion in produc diversification energy of of geographical possibility the blocked Moscow has time, country. same At the the in tion of gas distribu and complete control transit by over gaining the also but Belarus to gas supply for exclusive the deal of an only natural not by securing country’sfectively monopolised market the gas sector. ef It energy has Belarusian the position its ened within

M ap o ap . During this period, the Kremlin substantially strength substantially Kremlin the period, this . During f R u ss i a n in fl u has come at – has aprice though e nc Bela e in . By actively ru s ------ACF EurAsEC loan are highly politicised, and money has been paid paid been money and has politicised, highly ACF are loan EurAsEC of an instalments individual the disburse to decisions the reality in although economic And recommended reforms. the menting applicant’s dependent on imple the in also is progress support whose Fund, Monetary International the to similar amanner in the In principle,operates ACF economiction of demands. specific contingent implementa on the increasingly for Minsk assistance financial any EurAsEC). make designedto been has The change (ACF Economic Community Eurasian of the Fund Anti-Crisis Moscow-controlled the through Moscow, granted are but instead by no longer are Moreover,directly offered loans stabilisation 15 16% 10% to production value of current the 2016 the from by subsidies forcedbeen to, for reduce example, agricultural its has Belarus regulations, CU/WTO goods. Under the imported from competition production inefficient against Belarus’s shield could that practices itventing implementing protectionist from policy, customs its to effectively pre changes ever, further means Russia’s how reflecting This, WTO, accessionthe organization. to setby the standards Union on Customs the would based be the of system legal the that agreed Belarus 2011 in time, same At the goods. Russian and to Kazakh market its to open had has Belarus that means also CU the of Membership tariffs. level ofthe Russian rates reflect 80% CU of the around it noted be should although that – organisation of the rules the with line in policy customs its bring in Belarus with influence overeconomic processes institutional erting for its capacity ex increased has Russia years, two past the In 1.1. 1.

Russia’s economy control over Belarusian the entry-wto entry-wto likacje/eastweek/2012-09-12/consequences-belarusian-economy-russia-s- http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub 2012, Eastweek, WTO’, OSW the into try of economy Russia’s en Belarusian for the ‘Consequences Kłysiński, K. See:

Economic integration Economic . By joining the Customs Union, Belarus undertook to to undertook Union, Belarus Customs the . By joining 15 . ------17 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 18 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 ransgaz shares Russia’s from of Belt came privatisation from proceeds purchase of Minsk’s 95% more than 2009-2012, Between companies. state due involvement its to of Belarusian privatisation ticularly the in par Belarus, investmentin of source direct main the is Russia 1.2. rouble May 2011. in Belarusian the of devaluation for ACF was, the by example, the on Minsk exerted the pressure of success of effects ofeconomicOne the the reforms. to decisions loan to link made been indeed some has attempt loan, conditions of the meet the fully to despite failure its out Belarus to 16 a steep rise in the number of Russian investors entering of the number Russian the in rise a steep investors. It see likely, is however, few will years next the that Moscow needn’t that competitionmeans non-Russian fear from supplies, energy on companies Russian dependence of local strong coupled the with Poor Belarus, investment conditions in Minsk. government out in the of waiting adopted astrategy has Moscow power. president limitation, exercise to the Given this by used my, continues mechanisms one be basic to which of the econo the manage manually to loss ability of the the and sector corporate Russia’s fearing Belarusian ofdemands, the domination not these to give to in tried far so has Lukashenko companies. tant country’s of the privatisation mostimpor the with press ahead to Minsk government in on the calling been For has Russia years Oboronitelnye Sistemy. consortium Russian the ducers through pro arms Moscow addition, In controls Belarusian MTS-Belarus). mobile operator the (Russia’stion sector in a49% stake has MTS telecommunica the in as well as country) the in stations petrol of owner anetwork of the of -Belarus, ownership full and refinery Mozyr the in stake (42.5% sector petrochemical larusian

21-rus.pdf Priorbank report, http://www.priorbank.by/download/info/BIG_2012-08- Investment 16 . Russia has also established a presence in the Be the apresence in established also has . Russia ------17 gas on Russian particularly fuels, sil fos economy dependent on Russian entirely is The Belarusian 1.3. telecom Belarus. operator in largest Beltelecom –the and Plant BMZ, Metallurgical Belarusian the Azot, and ir Polim plants chemical the Belkaliy, plant processing and mining salts potassium the well as equipment BelAZ, of earth-moving manufacturer the and MAZ manufacturer lorry local the chase pur to like Moscow would Beltopgas. also distributor gas rusian Bela the and pipeline, oil Druzhba of the section Belarusian the refinery, the oil Mozyr in stake remaining the refinery, oil polatsk Nava companies: the energy mainly includes buying in interested particularly to be Moscow which appears ofThe enterprises list state. Belarusian the of running the finance to cash necessary the orderraise to in companies of state-owned sale the ceed with forced be pro to eventually will West, the Belarus of from support possibility the without and economic crisis, ever-deepening the ownership structures of Belarusian companies try coun the in gas ofplete natural control distribution over the com almost exercises and Belarus in infrastructure transit gas entire sole of now owner the is the Russia that means This pipelines. gas country’s of owner the remaining the Beltransgaz, Belarus’s the Russia’s in 2011, In a 100% stake acquired Gazprom territory. Belarusian across cuts which pipeline, gas transit Yamal the owns and Belarus, in infrastructure transmission gas entire supply prices and the gas volumes. now controls Russia almost both intensive economyenergy Belarus’s regulating by influence to company gives ability Moscow the Kremlin-controlled of the to Belarus gas sole supplier the ofbeen natural

cles/detail.php?ID=300388 http://www.cdu.ru/arti it consumes, gas 1% of the only produces Belarus . Only a small part of the internal gas distribution network distribution gas internal of the part asmall . Only

Energy 17 . Since 2005, G . Since 2005, . The monopoly . Faced with . Faced with azprom has has azprom ------­- - -

19 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 20 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 remains in the hands of Beltopgaz hands the in remains 20 19 18 cooperation between the two counties two the between cooperation of quality the to volume the of exports oil by Moscowused link to a year. Russia’s been has monopoly supply on the of Belarus to oil crude tonnes of million 1.8 fields produce oil own just Belarus’s to Belarus oil sole now supplier is the ofsia crude Rus Venezuela. from a result, oil As importing June cease to 2012 decided in Common Economic of the Space, launch Belarus the ing followcrude on Russian tariffs of export elimination the after and formula, pricing on the Russia a four-year with agreement the USD $398 charged by Moscow charged USD $398 the than higher tonne, significantly per setat USD $656 was Belarus The Venezuelan to supplies price shipped of Russia. oil the from oil on the overreliance the to alternative aviable as than rather independence, its assert to attempt Minsk’s more seen as be Venezuela. from move oil This however should purchasing began Minsk 2010, In oil. for of sources its crude instance, diversify to at least, able, is theory in Belarus pipelines, than other by means a complete sector. transported be monopoly Since can oil this in oil S buyout. for approval aRussian for obtain example, in to, order supplies businesses offgas selected to cutting odically peri companies by of specific government managers or onthe the on pressure exert to means the it has circumstances, exceptional in and users, end Belarusian to charged the price gas of influence However,lines. hegemonic its position gives power Moscow to the pipe gas over control of it Belarusian use the has full not making stage, Moscow is company At this also. this acquire to attempts

http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/532825/ imilarly, Belarus remains heavily dependent on Russian heavily dependent on Russian remains imilarly, Belarus http://news.tut.by/economics/329003.html – although unlike in the case of gas, Russia does not Russia ofhave gas, case the in unlike –although The company is also involved in the extraction of peat for energy production. production. for energy of peat extraction the involved in also is The company greater: USD $973 vs. USD $387 per tonne respectively. respectively. tonne per $387 USD vs. $973 USD greater: even was oil Russian and of price the Venezuelan in difference the 2012 In 19 18 . Consequently, after signing . Consequently, signing after – although Russia has made made has Russia –although 20 . . Meanwhile, . Meanwhile, - - - - state-owned Inter RAO UES RAO Inter state-owned Russian –by the Russia from imported is country the in sumed con electricity of about the 8-9% Only small. remains balance energy Belarus’s in electricity of Russian imports of direct share market electricity Belarusian controls the also Russia profitable. industry the render can aprice level that for maintaining necessary crude rochemical industry 22 21 ture, infrastruc remaining the owns of who actually less, regardless Nonethe infrastructure. processing oil and country’s transport the acquiring in interested remains Kremlin butpipeline the (Friendship) Druzhba of section the Belarusian the owns still also Minsk refinery. Mozyr (42.5%) the in stake aminority only Navapolatsk Mozyr.– in holds and Russia’s currently Slavneft’ control refineries its over both retain to managed has Belarus ity exports out of Belarus exports ity its control over electric secured has Russia time, same At the Belarus. in price of electricity the the level and of production both influence directly can Russia A gas. of natural burning the exclusively through generated is almost electricity sian Belaru sector, that however, fact this in the from Russia stems dependence on States. Minsk’s Baltic the and Ukraine from tricity elec import to infrastructure necessary the has also Belarus tion, addi byIn motivated economic is abroad purely from reasons. ity electric decision import to Minsk’s and fully needs electricity its meet to capacity technical the has –Belarus produced is ity locally

amounts of electricity due to the high cost gas required for the production. for the required gas cost high the due to of electricity amounts small only export Belarus lines, transmission necessary of the existence the and electricity surplus generate to capacity technical of its spite in Currently, RAO UES’ third largest foreign customer (after Finland and Lithuania). and Finland (after customer foreign largest third UES’ RAO Inter is Belarus Russia. to important very however, also is co-operation, this kWh – billion of 38 consumption annual an kWh, with billion 3,173 2011, In Russia already effectively controls the Belarusian pet Belarusian the effectively controls already Russia thanks to its monopolyto its supply on the of thanks 21 s a sole supplier of gas to Belarus, s a sole supplier to Belarus, of gas 22 . Meanwhile, over. Meanwhile, 90% of electric its . The 2011 agreement for the sale of . The sale for agreement 2011 the . The ------21 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 22 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 any countries outside the Customs Union Customs outside the countries any to gas Russian produced by burning of electricity export the trol powers con to the gives Russia that aclause included Beltransgaz 26 25 24 23 exports Belarusian about of 35% all purchases Russia fact, In dustries. in export Belarusian other abig on the impact has Moscow also 1.4. more than USD $870 million, accounting for accounting 6% approximately of million, USD $870 more than (worth 2011 in of Fortractors sale by Russia. the example, trolled electricity produced by Russia. electricity the competition with would direct not in be electricity rusian Bela the that would ensure Such coordination region. liningrad Ka the in NPP planned the from exports the with NPP Belarusian the from exports the coordinate to of but electricity, also export the profits newfrom company the notgenerated is manage to only UES Russia’s and Belenergo held by Belarus’s are venture RAO Inter joint the in stakes Equal power nuclear plant. Belarusian by the future generated the in electricity the including Belarus, within from electricity Russian and of Belarusian export forpacity the Energoconnect decided establish to countries the 2011, March power in plant of anuclear construction on agreement the intergovernmental of the signing of the time atproduction process. Meanwhile, the contribution to the to their proportion in electricity of Belarusian export the from profits the have share to agreed parties the that provision have public, not made it been of known is this details

The joint venture was registered in June 2011. 2011. June in registered was venture The joint www.tsouz.ru/db/stat/iCU201112new/Documents/EBY201112.pdf http:// source: billion, $41.4 of USD out of a total billion $14.5 USD 2011, In (1007), http://belmarket.by/ru/179/170/14260 i Rynok wPolszu’, most Belorusy in: ‘Energeticheskij T. Manionok, RAI Novosti, 10 January 2012, http://ria.ru/economy/20120110/536270547.html 2012, 10 January Novosti, RAI 25 Export . From Moscow’s. From point of view, however, of the purpose the 26 . The sale of Belarusian goods is to a large extent con extent alarge to goods is of. The Belarusian sale 24 – a joint venture tasked with building the ca the building with tasked –ajoint venture 23 . Although the exact exact the . Although , No. 23 - - - ­- - -

stopped Minsk from re-exporting petroleum products in August August in products petroleum re-exporting from Minsk stopped When Russia 40%. by another growing exports continued, with trend the eight USD $15.7ing of 2012, months billion).first the In (reach year previous on the times 2.1 more than increased EU the to exports of value Belarusian the 2011 in aresult, As oil. sian of Rus import for favourable the terms negotiated particularly it had Union, after European the to products of petroleum export the revenues from its increase significantly to managed Belarus 2011-2012 in addition, In production. ofpetitiveness Belarusian the com able is to affect Russia prices for Belarus, energy justing By ad produce to used them. low relatively of cost the to energy low thanks prices are low prices; their due and to their mainly competitive are exports Belarusian markets. goods other to sian Belaru of export the influence on asignificant has also Russia Minsk. to flights of Russian number the in increase an to agree to refused government Belarusian the after came sion flights of the The suspen 2012. March in Belavia carrier national Belarusian the Moscow-Minsk by operated flights all suspended Kremlin the when instance forcase the was This demands. specific to agreeing into Minsk put place pressure to in are restrictions the Sometimes products. dairy of Belarusian import on the bans but temporary occurring regularly the by domestic producers, exemplified as protect designed to are The measures on importers. restrictions placing by periodically access domesticmarket its to regulate to continues Russia hand, other the On manufacturers). of machine types various primarily (among are them governmentMinsk in up by the drawn list placed on products aspecial industrial rusian Bela purchasing in interested businesses Russian to loans ential have 2013prefer since offering also, been and Russia’s Bank VTB able Similarly, on lease favourable to Russia’s terms. Sberbank, were enterprises agricultural and farmers Russian that machines on Rosagroleasing’s of tractors list placed the had Russia that fact 27 to Russia) exports total Minsk’s

http://www.tsouz.ru/db/stat/iCU201112new/Documents/EBY201112.pdf 27 was facilitated largely by the by the largely facilitated was ------23 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 24 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 Sberbank, Alfa Bank, Vnesheconombank and Vneshtorgbank Vnesheconombank and Bank, Alfa Sberbank, Gazprombank, especially banks, majorrently, Russian the all sector. Cur banking Belarusian controls about ofRussia 25% the 1.5. M strictions or preferential conditions for Belarusian exporters, - re by either introducing that means of on dependence Russia S balance. recorded anegative trade Belarus 2012, 28 the Russians have for some time now been trying to acquire. In the the In acquire. to have for now trying been some Russians time the which refinery oil –an Naftan in a51% stake against loan the cure se to it agreed had but after only Sberbank, state-owned Russian the from loan received billion aUSD $1 producer Belaruskali ash pot Belarusian the 2011, In loans. the against security substantial economy. demand also development The Belarusian ofbanks the the influence effectively the banks projects, selected to offer loans able By being to down. turn to unable are banks Belarusian which projects, uneconomic political however, finance to banks, refuse Russian markets. Western from financial loans obtain to them it for easier makes which banks, of Belarusian ratings the than nies compa for loans Belarusian of foreign source currency main bank. largest country’s –the fourth- of Belinvestbank ment purchase for the govern Belarusian the from approval seeking currently is Bank banks. Belarusian in stakes or by acquiring subsidiaries their through either Belarus presence in their have established the level of the country’s financial stability and solvency.and stability level country’s ofthe the financial budget, on by extension, and Belarusian coming intorency the of amount on foreign impact the cur directly can Kremlin the exports, level of By the Belarusian adjusting tors Belarus. in

oscow can affect the health of the individual sec production individual the of the health affect can oscow Bank), and an 88% stake in Alfa Bank Belarus (). (Alfa Belarus Bank Alfa in stake 88% an and Bank), (VEB Belvnesheconombank in stake 97.4% (Sberbank), Belpromstroibank in (Gazprom), 97.9% stake Belgazprombank in stake 98% Bank, VTB in stake a71.4% include: Belarus in Russia by acquired assets important The most

. Their international credibility ratings remain much higher much higher remain ratings credibility international . Their The banking sector The banking The Russian banks operating in Belarus are the the are Belarus operating in banks Russian The uch ahighlevel uch Alfa Alfa 28 ------, so in the past) at least a dozen former senior Belarusian officials: adozen at formerBelarusian senior least past) the in so employ (orConsequently, currently companies have done Russian Foreign Minister. Belarusian as dismissed was Martynau after weeks just representative for Belarus special as Martynau Siarhei Gutseriyev –appointed –controlled by Mikhail company oil Russian for 2012, the example, October In corporations. sian by Rus individuals Belarusian of former high-ranking hiring the is practices regular the Among nomenklatura. Belarusian from the lobbyists recruiting consistently been has Russia 2.1. 2. institutions. banking on Russian extent a large to depend stability and its market financial Belarusian the that These developments market. show clearly securities Russian the government in bonds Belarusian issue to used also banks Russian country. the of power in plant anuclear construction bution the to contri million $500 Belarus’s USD Vnesheconombank finance to budget. Russia’s asked Recently, has Minsk Belarusian into the directly feeding of asource loans also are banks become. Russian potentially could loans on companies Russian ence of Belarusian however,case, overdepend the agoodof is example how risky This agreement. loan the from shares Naftan removed the bank and Sber in 2012 the loan able company refinance to was the end, Vasil Dauhaliou Titenkov Ivan Name in Belarus Russia’s influence on domestic political processes

Lobbyists in the Belarusian nomenklatura Belarusian the in Lobbyists sador to Moscow Moscow to sador Ambas Belarusian Administration of Presidential Head apparatus state sian P osition in Belaru - - Gazprom Itera office leaving after P lace of employment of employment lace

- - - - 25 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 26 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 Vasil Maciusheuski Vasil Maciusheuski Pasochau Siarhei Navumau Uladzimir Matskevich Uladzimir Drazhin Mikhail Yeryn Leanid Muliak Uladzimir Kokarau Valer Latypau Ural Paval Kallaur Yarmoshyn Uladzimir Viktar Rakhmanka Valer Kez Faryd Cancerau Name of National Bank National of Head Deputy Advisor Presidential Affairs of Internal Minister KGB of Belarusian Head Region of Mogilev Governor KGB of Belarusian Head of Belarusneft Head Minister Prime Deputy Administration Presidential of Head and Minister Affairs Foreign of Bela Head Deputy Prime Minister Railways of Belarusian Head general KGB general KGB P rusian National Bank Bank National rusian apparatus state sian osition in Belaru - - BPS-Sbierbank holding) (construction LenSpecSMU Rostekhnologii Sovkomflot Russneft Railways Russian Lukoil Lukoil Lukoil Vnesheconombank Gazprom Gazprom Gazprom Vnesheconombank Vnesheconombank office leaving after P lace of employment of employment lace pursue a pro-Russian policy. a pro-Russian pursue to by people dominated is willing constellation new political any completely Moscow’sbe out. in It therefore is ruled that interest low, is achange of such probability it cannot the although – and camp ruling Belarusian the within changes event of unexpected the in interests national its secure to attempting also is Russia presidentsian Belaru on the pressure of exerting means another as marily L 2010. in for Nyaklyayew Its support A Uladzimir and Kozulin Alexander elections: presidential past in rivals Lukashenko’s supported have businesses unofficially Russian Kremlin’s approval, the with that likely seems It also elections. to up running periods during particularly media, the in appear ally do occasion of Belarus) of Communists Party Kalyakin’s Siarhei or from Lebedko’s Anatol from Party United Civil (particularly lin Krem the to unopposed parties representing position candidates of op campaigns the funds Russia that suggesting reports theless, opposition Belarusian the lobby within a permanent Meanwhile, 2.2. goals for used political be could interests strategic representatives of ofRussian group local ly expanding constant this future the in that remains possibility the And ests. lobby effectivelygroup Russia’sprotecting economic inter apowerful is therefore creates practice What this Kremlin. by the economic policies the pursued with line in are es, whose interests enterpris state-owned mostly however, are companies these that stress, to It represented. important is well are companies vidual indi the of interests the that and ensure foremost hope first to companies Russian the officials, By employing former Belarusian ukashenko’s political opponents is being used by Russia pri by Russia opponents being used ukashenko’s is political

Belarus’s pro-Russian opposition Russia has not been engaged not been has to build attempts in Russia . Nevertheless, by backing other political figures figures political other by backing . Nevertheless, . lexander lexander in 2006 2006 in . None . ------27 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 28 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 Minsk to censor and replace any material critical of Belarus or its of Belarus critical material replace any and censor to Minsk a one-hour with delay, rebroadcast are allows which Belarus in remains rather limited. however,affairs, internal Belarusian to regard fluencewith for Russia’s vision state. the a Russian opinion-making in M reflect that worldview role local shaping in waysplayed the in a direct channels. Belarusian the than more be to tend popular and able Belarus, in (formerlyOne ORT), Rossiya (formerly avail NTV, and are RTR) Channel channels: television Russian main Three companies. dia now me completely are by media Russian dominated Belarusian up power step to soft its ing efforts. attempt be These Moscow developments will suggest might that Belarus. eastern in minority Russian by the Minsk in embassy Russian of support the the with run NGOs among the activity in saw 2012 Russia’s arise projecting in Belarus. power soft in useful need develop to the instruments ‘soft stressed power’ project –has the agency coordinating federal –aRussian Rossotrudnichestvo Kosachov, appointed recently ever, head of the Konstantin that suggest, how country.reports the Unofficial in NGOs no Russian centres). eight such hosts also There are Ukraine (neighbouring culture and promotion for language –acentre the of Russian tre Cen Mir Russkiy asingle without CIS the in country only the remains Belarus protected. Russia’s are that interests national ensure to policy different altogether an pursuing tiveness, while attrac cultural and proximity of ideas cultural using then and – by creating power Belarus effort soft to in scious project its far, So however, any area. connot made has Russia cultural Russian the with identify to likely quite also are they that means of which everyday communication, alanguage as Russian use population 90% of the more than census, latest the to According society. Belarusian influence to considerable potential has Russia 2.3.

Impact on society The strong presence of Russian media in Belarus has has Belarus in media of strong presence Russian The oscow’s opinions on international affairs and oscow’s affairs opinionson international All of the Russian programmes shown shown programmes Russian of the All ------training. For example, in 2012 fewer than 800 people began officer people 800 began For fewer 2012 in than example, training. of army terms evident in also is on Russia reliance force. Minsk’s air complete gives Russia controlformally Belarusian over the defence, on air joint a2009 agreement which ratified Belarus 2012 February in addition, In independent operations. pursue to it impossible for makes Belarus practice in which command, forces completely ground own its of Minsk end abolished 2011, of Russia’s command the der forces. Subsequently, ground at the un army Belarusian the Union effectively brought State,the has of agreements out integration under carried grouping of troops, forces. The armed regional Belarusian of the command tion and army Russian of the part facto a de forces are armed Belarusian the terms, operational for on Russia security.In reliant become entirely has Belarus 3. Belarusian on the haveimpact an also The campaigns Minsk. with objectives dealings its in current its achieve to termination of Moscow’s signals as serve president, de and on the pressure of exerting ameans as used invariably are television on Russian campaigns Anti-Lukashenko regime. Belarusian of the critical highly already are individuals such generally –and online mation of infor type look to for this willing who of are society members those reach only therefore can government. Suchprogrammes menklatura kashenko’s most loyal supporters. loyal kashenko’s most one Sidorsky been of had Lu that fact government, despite the head of his president dismissed Belarusian ko. the Soon after, Sidorsky Siarhei replace Lukashen could Minister Prime rusian Bela then the suggested that and campaign anti-Lukashenko an conducted media Russian election, presidential 2010 Belarusian run-up the the camp. to In ruling Belarusian the in reshuffles to led have media already Russian the sent out through The signals economicinterests. their to protect efforts their by intensifying relations bilateral in of apossible crisis signals the to respond rus, M insk’s reliance oninsk’s defence for Russia and reliance security who, fearing a destabilisation of the situation in Bela in situation of the who, adestabilisation fearing . This applies to all aspects of the opera of the aspects applies. This all to no ------29 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 30 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 the two countries, which also generated additional revenue generated for additional also which countries, two the between trade in role took intermediary on of the an Minsk tions, rela Russian-Georgian in crisis of the aresult As Georgia. with relations its jeopardise to not did want Belarus Ossetia. South of Georgia’s sovereignty ofthe Ab regions breakaway recognise to refused has despite Russia’s Belarus expectations, objectives its realise to harder it finds much M areas those in and interests, have Russia conflicting and of however foreign where are policy Belarus areas There rights. human and of on issues democracy focus when discussions especially OSCE, or the UN –for at the example prove useful very can support where of such vote support positioncontexts its in to objectives. Consequently, count always on Minsk can Russia Russia’s with consistent indeed are foreign policy interests tional Moscow’s na with Belarus’s mostcases, matter. In on views the line in invariably affairs, a common position on international agree delegations the which during countries of both ministers Russia by position urged the adopts generally foreign policy,In Belarus 4. subcontracting to limited usually is manufacturers arms role Belarusian of the tories, local while fac come Russian from ammunition weapons and all Essentially troops. of equipment by Belarusian used types the evident in also dependence on Moscow is Full soil. forces, on Russian often armed Russian the with cooperation in only equipment organised is and of troops involving numbers large training operational while, Mean recruits. to its training tactical offer only units army Currently, schools. Belarusian military at Russian courses such attended individuals 600 as many as while Belarus, in training 29

Coordination of foreign policy Eastern Studies, Warsaw, Poland. Warsaw, Poland. Studies, Eastern for Centre at the Wilk Andrzej security of international aspects military the for fellow research the with consultation from benefited has paragraph This . There are regular consultations between the foreign the between consultations regular . There are 29 . . For example, khazia and and ­khazia oscow oscow - - - - 30 member-states est Euron of representation all equal ensure to things, among other where it seeks, forum, Partnership Eastern at the spokesperson Minsk’s role as important an also plays coffers.Georgia state delegation has so far been excluded. been far so delegation has

ship programme. ship Partner Eastern the in participating countries of the parliaments the and Parliament European of the consists Assembly Parliamentary The Euronest 30 – the body from which the official Belarusian Belarusian official the which body from –the - - 31 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 32 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013 has very limited capacity to resist Russian demands. Russian to resist capacity limited very has –A mechanisms Kremlin’s support of the nature dependence-building due and the to by Minsk, ready made have pay to forwill Moscow’s concessions of help. the al aresult As Belarus price that on the rather presidency. focus will Disputes Russia’s his to that knows vital is support Lukashenko because oscow and M and Moscow of diplomatic between suspension relations a temporary Nonetheless, play to by Moscow’s on Minsk pressure of increased rules. riods pe deteriorate during will countries the between relations eral Bilat conflicting. fundamentally are interests national Minsk’s the long-termand since of Russia’sflict, goals Belarus policy on however, relations, lead con to may also The Russian-Belarusian West. the and Belarus between ofrelations improving risk the minimise domesticpolicy, order to criticised, in highly current, his pursue to encourage Lukashenko may further Russia regime, rusian Bela for support the political its by continuing fact, In Minsk. ly, against Western never is sanctions going Russia the back to foreign policy. pro-Russian of Minsk’s Consequent guarantor the is West, Isolated by the Lukashenko Lukashenko. to support offer to continuedits likely also is Union. Russia Customs the Economic Union 2015 in and/orEurasian Ukraine’s accession to of the launch before the happen Russia’sto in unlikely is policy change Any Minsk. with relations its in good faith demonstrate to apriority, seek Moscow will remains project new to members, of this expansion the and integration, Eurasian while term, near the budget. in Russian It that of the seems part small a relatively is to Belarus helping Moscow’scommitment since so financial support count on Russian permanently can Minsk Russia, to of Belarus importance strategic the to Due V.

r Futur ela tion e out the conflicts will not lead to a permanent or even not permanent to a lead will conflicts the insk s l . A breakdown in relations cannot happen happen cannot relations in . Abreakdown ook f or R u ss i a lexander L lexander n . This is particularly particularly is . This -Bela ukashenko ukashenko ru s i a n ------crease M crease in to primarily seek will Russia Belarus, with relations its In work - frame of amultilateral basis on proceed the will countries two the integration between formal the future, near the In change in Minsk. or of aleadership transformations ones, independentof future new of creating control and mechanisms existing the cementing to aview with countries, the of between interdependence system the to extend country. would essence, like power the In Russia in of transition a affect directly to long the term, in scene, and cal politi Belarusian the over influence would able be Russia gain to government’s powers on economic decision-making rusian issues, Bela the economicMoscow policies. Minsk’s By shape to limiting overdependence would on allow Russia Minsk’s combined with policy, monetary own its which pursuing from prevent Belarus in Moscow. controlpowersstaying fiscal would This all – with Union of State the rouble acommon currency as Russian adopt the to Belarus persuade to be Russia’slong objective run, will ultimate the In competition businesses. create could foror which Russian and/ strategic as seen are which companies by acquiring ticularly Moscow in the framework of the integration process. integration of framework the Moscow the in by post-Soviet established the area within relations international principles of the overall into Belarus with relations fit bilateral its to try Union will State. the Russia within and relations bilateral of framework the within enjoying been it –which has Russia with relationship going is however, lose to special relations, its Belarus bilateral their in integration project of Eurasian the By prioritising policies).customs and fiscal, common financial, or by introducing markets, up their opening (by Russia and Belarus link manently per implementation the of will solutions that require Union, will Economic Eurasian of the launch the nomic Space, ultimately and . The creation of the Customs Union and the Common Eco Union the Customs . The and of creation the oscow’s control over the Belarusian economyoscow’s control overBelarusian the A ga t a W a i e r z bow s k a-Mi azga , par ------33 POINT OF VIEW 05/2013