AN EMERGENCY NEWS BULLETIN ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS FEB. 1966 50¢

NGUYEN HUU THO President of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam

I Two· PROGRAMS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM·

LANSDALE vs. T.HE ''VIETCO~G'' /

/ CONTENTS

TWO PROGRAMS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM ...... 3 John McDermott THE PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT 11 THE FOURTEEN POINTS (USA) .. 14 THE FOURTEEN POINTS (NLF) .. 15 THE PROFESSOR, THE POLICEMAN AND THE PEASANT...... 16 Martin Nicolaus LYND/HAYDEN/APTHEKER INTERVIEW THE DRV, THE NLF, THE USSR ...... 22 S.O.S FOR VIETNAM .... . 24 Dr. Vo Thanh Minh VIETNAMESE CATHOLICS CALL FOR PEACE ...... 25 IF HISTORY BEHAVED Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins The Lost Revolution by Robert Shapl'en...... 27 William Ross

••••••••••••••••• VIET-REPORT An Emergency News Bulletin on Southea~t Asian Affairs EDITORIAL Volume 2, Number 2 February 1966 ADVISORY BOARD Although the collapse of the Robert S. Browne Staughton Lynd Stanley Millet international junket for peace was foreseen from the start - undiplo­ Editor . Carol Brightman matically, by its own architects in Associate Editors . John McDermott Washington - it was instructive. In Martin Nicolaus Washington the Doves leapt at the Managing Editor. .. Carol Cina bait like Hawks. Never in the his­ Circulation ...... Joan Faber tory of the war had a "peace" in Vietnam been so popular, or so Business Manager . . William Ross misunderstood. Presumably, Hanoi Artist ...... William Blacklock would make its move (whatever that was supposed to be) if we Staff: Sam Bleicher, Wendy Dannett, Marvin Gettleman, Jeffrey could just sound like we really Kaplow, Susan Kaplow, Mary-· Larson, Peter Linebaugh, meant it. What the Doves failed to Palline Plum, David Rosenstein, Harvey Schaeffer, Ruth ask was, What did - and do we Sheref, Jan Stacy, Carol Sweeny, Mimi Wolfe, Diane Wolff. mean? It is important to clarify once ···············~·· more the real issues facing the U.S. ( 1) Who do we think we are fight­ Introduce us to new readers -- free. To absorb postal charges we must ing? (2) What future will we allow raise bulk order rates to: 15 to 100 copies, 15¢ each; 100 to 500 copies, the South Vietnamese? (3) What 8¢ each; 500 and over, 6¢ ~ach. Consignment rates ramain the same for future do we -see for ourselves in Individuals and Organizations: 503. Bookstores and Newsstands are urged to order through our· national distributor, Eastern News, 255 7th Southeast Asia? ( 4) If we should l Avenue, New York City, · ,, "win," what have we won? These -were Hanoi's questions, too. And Hanoi's conclusions -­ Published and distributed by VIET-REPORT, Inc. All correspondence although made with marked tenta­ should be addressed to VIET-REPORT, 133 West 72nd Street, New tiveness - are that by their deeds York, N.Y. 10023; telephone 799-0870~ Printed in the U.S.A. Sub­ they shall be judged. During the scription rates: $5 per year in US, Mexico, and Canada; $6 else­ lull the 'u.s. introduced 11,000 where. Single copies 50 cents. Copyright© 1966 by VIET-REPORT, new troops into South Vietnam; in Inc. Manuscripts must be accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped Saigon U.S. officials were pointing envelope. All contributio~s represent the opinion of their authors, which ai;_e not necessarily those of VIET-.-nEI,'ORT, Inc. , , (continued 011 p. 25)

2 Viet-Report TWO PROGRAMS pop· 'VS. FOR SOUTH VIETNAM POPULAR REVOLUTION

Communists have ,;let loose a revolutionary idea" in South Vietnam, according to paci­ fication expert Major-General Edward G. Lansdale. The job for the United States is to help Saigon find a better "idea," and sell it to the countryside. What follows is an analysis of both--from the texts of the architects themselves: Lansdale and the NLF. by John McDermott I. ness that at least at the present time, Hanoi The peace offensive is over. With the renewa( has no particular means to force the NLF to of bombing in the North all chances of nego­ bring an end to the fighting (Max Frankel, tiations for an end to the war have now vanish­ N. Y. Times, 1/1/66). Although the rapid in­ ed and the real adversaries - Washington and crease in North Vietnamese aid to the South in the National Liberation Front-have settled the past five months gives the Hanoi govern­ down to a new round of fighting, one which in ment some sort of leverage on the Front, the all probability will last many months. Not practical extent of that leverage is unknown - a before those months have elapsed and the fight­ cipher of considerable interest for the Admin­ ing has forced an adjustment in the positions istration. of either the United States Government or of the Similarly Washington now realizes that the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam Front has strong support in the South Viet­ (NLF), or both, will there again be opportuni­ namese countryside. Even Premier Ky has ties for mediation between the parties, and a acknowledged this .. Saigon, after all, represents beginning to the end of the ordeal of the only the Generals, and apparently not even all Vietnamese people. The positions of these two of them either. Open political opposition is ab­ parties, especially their estimates of one an­ solutely prohibited, though periodically it breaks other's intention's and capacities have now to the surface. Only in October three demon­ become more than ever the center of the Viet­ strators for peace were shot in Saigon's public namese conflict. There is the military issue, of square on a charge of "neutralism"; even the course, but far more important are the political Catholic refugees from the North, formerly one questions: namely, how does each relate itself of the pillars of the pro-war forces have become to the political life of South Vietnam? What appalled at the bloodletting and desire an end are their relative prospects for success? And, . of it •(see page 25). based on these, what might each reasonably 1 Still the Administration retains the belief that expect in the long run ' from the other? support for the Front comes only by default, that it is almost purely due to the mistakes and HOW THE NLF LOOKS shortsightedness of Diem and of the French ' TO THE U.S. before him. Of course, this is a comforting To observe now that the U.S. government fiction. It relieves officials of the responsibility has come a long way in recent years in devel­ of facing their own mistakes. They can escape oping a realistic attitude toward the NLF sug­ acknowledging how a failure of such propor­ gests a ' str'ange irony. Still, it is so, bu,t there tions , as the Vietnam failure stands as an remains' a great distance yet to be traversed, indictment of American competence in Asian and a persisting gap between realistic sp~cula­ affairs. Four administrations, seventeen years tion ;:i.~d conditioned practice. Washington of paying the bills, two wars, almost 2,000 seems finally to reeognize that the Front is American deaths and now a huge expeditionary largely independent ' of the North Vietnamese corps with still no end of it in sight; but Wash- re·gime in at least tWo important respects. The ington persists. ' ' judginent of. most· independent observers has Coupled with this official fiction is one which been that the South'ern rebellion is just that-a is equally reassuring: what support the Front rebelli , 1¢~'?" a"'..ar:e- grievances as a '· device t~ , seize power. This February .1966 3 belief also serves to reassure because it harbors the idea that once we Americans really get going, once we learn the knack of it, we can represent the real interests of the people and thus win their support and destroy the com­ munists. At the same time, Washington is demonstrat­ ing what appears to be a real interest in the immediate aims of the Front, namely the estab­ lishment of a "neutral and democratic" regime in the South. So far this recognition only reveals itself through curiosity about the Front's stated desire for a coalition government in Sai­ gon. G. Mennen Williams' recent interview with M. Boumedienne of Algeria was reported to be concerned with this proposition and, in addition, at least one private and unofficial emissary has explored this question at the implied request of "official circles'-'- in Washington. Nevertheless, the Administration believes that 2 & 3 ). The Front believes that Washington such a "neutral and democratic regime," such a desires the permanent occupation of South coalition, would be but a prelude to the seizure Vietnam, and statements such as those of of power by the Front's guiding force, the Secretary Rusk in his press conference of Jan­ People's Revolutionary Party pf South Vietnam, uary 21 (text in N. Y. Times, 1/22/66) and of the communists; and this is the core of its 'Ambassador Harriman in his ABC television distrust. The suspicion is not a matter of interview of January 23, strongly justify their political neuroticism oh Washington's part. belief. They ar:_e con,vinced that Washington's • From its founding in 1941 until early 1949, professed desires for peace are insincere and Ho Chi Minh's Vietminh posed as a noncom­ point to the continued U.S. build-up during the I munist nationalist movement and went to con­ peace offensive, particularly to the arrival of siderable efforts to maintain the pose (see the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division in that Sachs in sources). Ho dissolved the Indochina period (Liberation Front Statement of January Communist Party in 1945; in the same year he 5, 1966). What · it sees is a U.S. publicly refused to say whether or not he was a com­ refusing to recognize the Front as an munist (see Hammer). Early North Vietnamese independent entity; instead -- committed to its Cabinets included prominent roles for non­ destruction. communists, including the foreign ministry. As For themselves, the Front leaders obviously late as March 1949, Ho denied his govern­ believe that they represent the wishes of the ment was "communist dominated." Thereafter South Vietnamese people. Their success in the there followed a rapid shift into a radical nine year war against Diem and his successors Stalinist position so that by November 194 9 is most often cited as proof. In their view the Vietminh was openly proclaiming itself a South Vietnamese have " voted with their lives" communist-led organization, in evident response in support of the Front. As they put it: "Start­ to communist victories in China and growing ing with empty hands" they managed to destroy U.S. support of the French in Vietnam. Grad­ Diem and no successor can restore power to ually at first, and then more rapidly, the Party Saigon. The Liberation Army totaling less than moved not only to improve its control over the 200,000 together with its irregular forces, often Vietminh org!lnization but also to monopolize poorly equipped, has met, matched, and such control. Then, in the classic pattern, after often beaten the 800,000 man force of its purging all possible rivals, the communists opponents including now almost 200,000 troops turned to purging ' themselves, a process which of the modern, well equipped U.S. Army and increased in ferocity until late 1956 when Ho Marine Corps (see NLF• Statement of March had to call it to a halt. 22, 1965). For its part the National Liberation Front The leaders of the NLF appear to believe has equally good reason to mistrust Washing­ that they can force the . U,S. oul of South Viet­ ton. There is--for Washington-the embarrassing nam. Pursuing economic- analysis far more ' matter of the Geneva Agreements and the even sophisticated than t_hat ohiome of their Ameri­ more embarrassing reports of the International can supporters, they see the high cost of the Control Commission (see Viel-Report, Vol. I, nos. war as a definite disadyantage in the mind of 4 Viet-Report the "U.S. ruling circles." They appreciate the The growing U.S. military involvement in effect of American opinion against the endless the South seems designed in part to force the bloodletting -- both American and Vietnamese. It Front into still greater military dependence on is also clear to them that the U.S. cannot long the North. Then might a commensurate increase ~ tle up almost a third of its ground forces in an in Northern leverage over Front policies occur, isolated peninsula, thus stripping the nation of a leverage which the U.S. apparently envisions its strategic reser_ve. They appear to be well as a useful one. The air wa r in the South, informed on American opposition to the war already far more fearsome than the more and believe that in the long run it will be widely heralded attacks on the North, is to be decisive against" the Administration. greatly stepped up and a vast increase in In short, like the Americans who oppose them American ground forces -- perhaps as many as a they are convinced of the righteousness of their half-million more troops--is being seriously • cause and for them, too, this warrants an over­ considered (Frankel, N. Y. Times, 1/30/66). A whelming confidence and an intractable stub­ long war, perhaps of six or seven years dura­ bornness. tion, is now considered very possible by some administration ·officials. U.S. STRATEGY-- OLD AND NEW This intensification of the military effort in With the end of the "bombing pause and the the South is only part of a characteristic re­ peace offensive the Administration reverts to its sponse by our foreign policy officialdom when double-pronged effort to pressure the Soviet things .go badly: it is the perennial formula -­ Union diplomatically and Hanoi militarily, in continue what you are doing but do it more. hopes that they will exert maximum pressure As such it hardly deserves to be called a n ~w on the Front to give up its effort. However, strategy. No, the novelty of the new approach the Front is far more diplomatically isolated is not here. Rather it lies in a "new" emphasis than Washington believes, and receives only on pacification programs in the Vietnamese marginal assistance from the outside. (James countryside, a "new" attempt at what is called, Reston estimated it at only seven tons of sup­ euphemistically enough as we shall see, "win­ plies per month at the end of the summet, ning the minds and hearts of the people,. " about 4,000 tons less than the Vietminh were At the center of these plans is a figure from receiving fr()m the Chinese in June, 1954 [see an earlier day in Vietnam, retired Air Force Tanham j.) As Chaffard has indicated most of Major General Edward Lansdale, CIA man, that assistance, including the assistance of North former advisor to the temporarily successful Vietnamese troops, is effective only in the anti-Huk campaign in the Philippines, former Central Highlands, an area far from the poli­ intimate to Diem and the latter's chief U.S. tical heartland of the Front, the Mekong Delta. advisor from 19·54 to 1956.

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Of The Nation's llfarch Toward True De11wcrac11 IL the "free world" in Vietnam. The NLF had moved into mobile warfare and seemed ready LANSDALE ON REVOLUTION. to stage military operations designed finally to In the October 1964 issue of the influential crush the Saigon Army . Little erpphasis was quarterly Foreign Affairs, General Lansdale then being paid the political a spects of the war published an article, "Vietnam: Do We Under­ (the collapse of the 1955-62 internal pacification stand Revolution?" which, though now some-­ plans acknowledged, but temporarily dismiss·ed ). what dated, is the fullest and most articulate Fitful efforts to keep the various members of the statement of the ideology of U.S. participation military junta from ousting each other by new in cor,p.munist-suppressing and nation-building coups, and to replace them by a civilian admin­ efforts, such as we are now engaged in in Viet­ istration which would mask the otherwise mili­ nam. The article itself appeared at a timely tary character of the effort, summed up \\'ashing­ juncture in the debate over our Vietq.amese ton's political involvement. Long-run decisions policy. The summer of 1964 was a period of on the U.S. effort in Vietnam were, of course. disastrous military and political setbacks for suspended by the presidentia.] ' . campaigl1',

Feb~uary 1966 although within the administration plans were already being made for an increased introduc­ Weakening the "Psychological" Bonds tion of U.S. tr~ops. General Lansdale's article of Six Years Ago in South Vietnam became a part of intra-administration debates and his subsequent appointment, as Ambassa­ dor Lodge's assistant for pacification efforts, "Another reason that past pacification plans did not work, officials add, is that the efforts were given lip in'dicates quite clearly the effect his views had service by everyone from United States Cabinet within the government then. members to junior military officers but were never The theme of the article is fairly simple: the given real priority." / U.S. must assume a more responsible direction Charles Mohr in the N.Y. Times, January 24, 1966 of the anticommunist political effort in South "A plaque of wood on each house indicates the Vietnam. Lansdale believes that the basis of number of people in the household, and their rela­ communist success in South Vietnam "consisted tionship lo the household head .... The primary rea­ of an idea and of an organization to start son for the plaques is the security problem. If giving that idea reality" (p. 7 5 ). Its aim was military or police officers find people residing in the household "i"ho are not shown on the plaque t~ere is to win the people of South Vietnam to its side cause for suspicion" (p. 10). "The inter-family groups " ... by destroying their faith in their own gov­ [consisting of about five families] are the smallest ernment and creating faith in the inevitability official units in the village. The function of the inler­ of a Communist takeover" (ibid.)." For Lans­ family chief is to report lo the [next higher] chief the dale, like Mao and his di_sciples, it is "people" number of visitors in his group. He records the name and length of stay in the hamlet of any outsiders ... . and not armies or weapons which are decisive The primary function of the inter-family g.roups ... is in the kind of war being waged in Vietnam. security. The heads of these groups are supposed to Thus a purely military response to_the problem watch the movements not only of non-residents, but is totally inadequate; the communists continue also those of the group members. Any irregularities to score success after success in spite of all our are to be reported lo the [next higher J chief, who reports to the village security officers" (p. 12). efforts, since such responses ... "There is constant suspicion that one's friends, neighbors, or comrades in arms may be Vietcong. -. - fall short of understanding that the Communists Since there are indications of justification for this have let loose a revolutionary idea in Vietnam and fear [sic], one of the government's most important that it will not die by being ignored, bombed or means of combatting the Vietcong, the use of in­ smothered by us. Ideas do not die in such ways formers, has been temporarily crippled.... Nine (p. 76). police and military organizations are located in My Thuan: (1) Rural police unit; (2) Surete (VBI) district General Lansdale recognizes a truth too sel­ agency; (3) One comi)any of Civil Guard; (4) The dom recognized by Americans generally, that , Self-Defense Corps district unit;· (5) The Cantonal the great idea for which all Vietnamese "north ' Self-Defense Corps unit; (6) The Village Self-Defense and south" are ready to give up their lives is Corps unit; (7) The Village Guard-Youth ( 18-35 years national independence. of age); (8) Village Guard-People (36-50 years of age); (9) Commando Training Camp of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (1,000 trainees)" (p. 18). The tragedy of Vietnam's revolutionary' war for " ... the village chief serves as Chairman of the independence was that her 'B'enedict Arnold' was Farmer's Association, the Social Welfare Committee, successful. Ho Chi Minh _. _ and a small cadre of the Village Youth Organization, the Farmer's Union, disciplined Party members trained by the Chinese the Women's Association, the Agricultural .Affairs and Russians, secretly changed the goals of the Committee, the Community and Rural Development struggle. Instead of a war for independence against Committee, the Students-Parents Association, Civic the French colonial power, it became a war to Action, and the Government Employees League" defeat the French and put Vietnam within the neo­ (p . 23). ) "Political groups such as the National Revo­ colonial Communist empire (p. 80). lutionary Movement, the Youth of the Republic of Vietna'!l, or the Government Employee League. are In the early years after Geneva, Ngo Dinh quasi-voluntary organizations. These are officially Diem scored victories for genuine Vietnamese recognized government sponsored groups. Their main goals are the generation of enthusiasm, the independence, but gradually he grew distant gaining of a large active membership, and the crea­ from the people and this, according to Lans­ tion and maintenance of a dynamic leadership" dale, combined with communist terror weakened (p. 28). the "psychological" bonds between the people " ... each person [in My Thuan J carries an identi­ and the government, and brought success to the fication card issued by the provincial and district authorities to facilitate control'.' (p. 80). communists and the overthrow and death of -- Survey in April 1960, My Thuan: The Diem (p. 81 ). Study of a Delta Vi'llage in South Vietnam, by John Donoghue and Vo Hong Phuc, The Vietnamese have . since been unable to Saigon, 1961 (mime-0). build the political sinew necessary to stave off the commuqist qr~ve: Thus Americans must take (j Viet-Report a heavy part of the responsibility" ... in finding of the Philippine effort and of both the Japanese the motivation for conducting a successful and German post-war occupations offer evidence counter-insurgency effort" (p. 77). He acknowl­ that this difficulty can be overcome. (Ibid.). edges there are difficulties involved in motivating What then mus~ we do? such an effort but offers the Malayan experience and that of the Philippines as an example of At this point in time and experience, perhaps the 0 - most valuable anq realistic gift that Americans can past successes (ibid. ). The problem is to find a give Vietnam is to concentrate above everything cause which the people will fight for. When the else on helping the Vietnamese leadership create "right cause" is found and "used correctly" the the conditions which will encourage the discovery battle is won, for then ... and most rapid possible development of a patriotic cause so genuine that the Vietnamese willingly will ... the anti-Communist fight becomes a pro-people pledge to it 'their lives, their fortunes, their sacred fight, with the overwhelming majority of the people honor (p. 82 ). then starting to help what they recognize as their own side, and the struggle is brought to a climax. Lansdale is uncertain just what that cause When the pro-people fight is continued sincerely by should be. He describes it only abstractly: its leaders, the Communist insurgency is destroyed (p. 78). Among the attributes of such a cause are that it shall give hope for a better future for each Viet­ Lansdale understands that the result of U.S. namese, that it shall provide a way for all Viet­ assistance without U.S. political tutelage is likely namese to work for it, and that it shall have such to result in a dictatorship (p. 79 )-- an excellent integrity that it will induce Vietnamese leaders to point--since U.S. aid enables the rulers of the start trusting one another (pp. _82-82 ). recipient nation, ensconced behind their U.S. Of his immediate suggestions, the most im­ trained army and police and propped up by portant is that we should encourage the Viet• U.S. largesse to their bureaucra~y, to ignore namese to stabilize their government. Once domestic protest. He grants there are difficulties achieved (Marshal Ky is an outcome) the U.S. involved in 'offering political advice " ... with a could ensure its success. higher content of American political idealism in ... through American advisors counseling individ­ it. Some might do the task badly, lacking the ual Vietnamese on how to make the project work required perceptivity and understanding of the · most harmoniously for the good of all, while being political backgrounds of either the· host country alert to curtail intemperate moves towards a coup or our own" (p. 79). However, the experience . or studied disobedience (p. 83 ). Other suggestions for immediate actions fol­ "Another reason that past pacification plans did not low: we should promise eventual free elections in work, officials add, is that the efforts were given lip service by everyone from United States Cabinet South Vietnam, find a role for political leaders members to junior military officers but were never who are not in the government, direct the AID given real priority." Program more toward the villages, encourage Charles Mohr in the N.Y. Times, January 24, 1966 the Vietnamese by a voiding tactless criticism, and press the Vietnamese military to make "The five-family system [lien gia] was established in "civic action" more an integral part of its Khanh Hau in 1956 .... The stated aims of the five­ fighting effort. Whatever else, Lansdale con­ family groups are to promote mutual aid among the cludes, we must always keep in mind the villagers, and develop a spirit of communal soli­ darity .... It also serves as a means of maintaining average Vietn8:mese: security. Each group is given a number, and each family within the group is given a number which He is the key piece in the whole war in Vietnam, must be written on a small plaque on the front of both its subject and its object, the pawn and in an the house. Each , group also selects its own leader ultimate sense the decider. There is still time for who is responsible to the hamlet chief. Periodically Americans to help him determine rightly the fate the leader! of the five-family groups meet with the of his country (p. 86 ). hamlet chief to report on their groups and receive instructions or information that is to be passed on to the families. There are also periodic meetings of all THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT the five-family leaders in the village. All male villagers over 18 years of age are required to attend The National Liberation Front was founded monthly communist denunciation meetings at the in southern South Vietnam in December 1960. [Council House] and their attendance is checked by From the beginning it has been committed first the five-family group leader." to the overthrow of Diem and now of his mili­ - Same survey of 1958-9, The Study of a tary successors. The Front itself is the successor Vietnamese Rural Community: Sociology, by Gerald C. Hickey assisted by Mr. Bui of a number of groups which had been fighting Quang Do, Saigon, 1960, pp. 90-2. the Diem regime for a number of years. These included elements of the religious sects which February 1966 7 I had been broken up but not destroyed by Diem minh, even during its most sectarian days. in 1955, former Vietminh fighters driven into There appears to be little organized Cao Dai the maquis by Diem in defiance of the Geneva support and even less Hoa Hao. Of the Trot­ amnesty (see Devillers ), mountain peoples skyists, so important to the highly political (montagnards) resisting :Saigon's attempts at southern Vietnamese scene prior to World War resettling them, . and various other groups in­ II, there is no information. cluding political refugees from the cities. These There is little hard information on the rela­ groups found support in the rural areas -- driven tionship between the Liberation Front and the to revolt by the policies of the Diem regime-­ Hanoi government. Obviously there is a close and it has been primarily on that rural base 1. relationship between the PRP and the Hanoi that they have been able so successfully to Party, though clearly it is not hierarchical. challenge Saigon. The Front remains to this Chaffard comes closest when he describes it as day the chief instrument of South Vietnamese a federation with headquarters in Hanoi and resistance to the Saigon regime, though it is by branches, among other places, in North and no means the only one. South Vietnam. To this description it should be The Liberation Front attempts to present it­ added that there is considerable local option and self to the world as a vast national coalition some highly visib,le quarreling (see Courier). of political parties, religious sects, mass organi­ zations and ethnic groups opposed to Saigon. II. And to some extent this is true. It includes the People's Revolutionary (communist) Party THE PROGRAM OF THE (PRP) and the Democratic and Radical Socialist NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT Parties. It has some support from the Cao Dai The NLF Program (published below, pp. and Binh Xuyen, from the montagnard and 11-14) has often been described as a hodge­ from other groups such as' the Cambodian and podge of promises to everyone, bearing little Chinese minorities. Noncommunists play impor­ relationship to the reality of South Vietnamese tant roles in the Front. It~ President is Nguyen life, but I think such a description falls very Huu Tho, a former Saigon attorney, and mem­ wide of the mark. Certainly the Program has ber 'Of tlie Democratic Party. Four of its six propaganda functions and should be read in Vice-Presidents are noncommunist, as were its that light. In addition, it is only an outline and first two Secretary Generals, Nguyen Van Rieu not a detailed blueprint for the future. But, with (now heading its Prague office) and Huynh Tan these limitations in mind, it must also be said Phat. (The Secretary General's office is now that the NLF Program is a document which: unoccupied.) . Rieu formerly acted as the Front's • does represent real grievances and proposes "foreign minister," but that role has recently ' realistic solutions to them, been assumed by another noncommunist, Tran •does anticipate genuine problems in South Buu Kiem. Many other noncommunists includ­ Vietnam's future without glossing over them, ing a Catholic priest and a Cao Dai sect leader • does take a national rather than a sectarian are members of its Central Committee. view of things, and Behind the noncommunists, however, is the •does have roots in the continuing political reality of the PRP, which almost surely domi­ history of southern Vietnam. nates the Front. Vo Chi Cong, listed as the , representative of the PRP to the Central Com­ Several examples serve to support the claim. mittee of the Front, is one of its Vice-Presidents. The most important of these has to do with the Tran Nam Trung, also a communist, is a Vice­ land problem in South Vietnam. Though South President and was formerly the representative of Vietnam, in contrast to the North, is very the all-important Liberation Army to the Presid­ sparsely settled, much of the land is concentrated ium of the Front.· Communists appear to control in large holdings with the result that well over the Army and, according to Chaffard, staff most half the agricultural population hovers around of the second line positions within the Front and below the subsistence mark (see Hickey). bureaucracy. Most of the Front's bverseas rep­ In light of this situation, lands owned by the resentatives, as in Peking, Moscow, Havana villages themselyes -- called cong dien -- have and Algiers, are PRP. played an important part in southern life. With In addition, a more careful examination of considerable regional variation, about 12 per­ the groups and persons affiliated with the NLF cent of South Vietnam's rice land is held in this reveals either that they are long-time auxiliaries way (my computation, ' from Hickey). Tradi­ of the communist party, such as the Democratic tionally under the confrol of the village councils, Party (see Viet) and the Radical Socialists or the cong dien served tw'o functions. A small part were formerly members of the southern Viet- of it was rented out to support the village tem- 8 Viet-Report ples, but mostly the land was rented at very too large for South Vietnam's economy. The low rates to the village poor. It is difficult to standard U.S. foreign aid device used to combat estimate how many persons found in this land this problem of too much money chasing too the difference between subsistence and outright few goods is the Import Subsidy Program. starvation,' but I would offer 15-20 percent of That is, Vietnamese nationals are encouraged to the rural population of all of South Vietnam as purchase imported goods by means of artifi­ a conservative estimate. These communal lands cially low prices. The difference between the low wereicontrolled by the village councils, and the sale price and the higher cost price of the im­ fact that the councils were elected by the villagers ports is made up by direct U.S. subsidy. A tended to institutionalize a measure of protection great deal of the heralded South Vietnamese for the landless poor. In 1956 Diem replaced economic miracle of a few years ago is easily the elected village officials with Saigon appoint­ traceable to this artificial device. ees and, under American pressure to improve The subsidy does stem inflation but has still local finances (see Woodruff), ordered the new another effect as well. Money sent out of. Viet­ councils to rent out the land at the highest rates nam for imported goods is money which does possible (N. Y. Times, 9/5/65), thus in a stroke . not flow into the hands of Vietnam's middle creating chaos and untold misery in the life classes -- its traders and small manufacturers. pattern of the poorest 2 million of South Viet­ Worse, the government bureaucra~y, which is namese people. the chief beneficiary of the subsidy, begins to The appearance of the Front's point IV(3)-­ Westernize its tastes, aggravating still further the call for redistribution of communal lands-­ the plight of those who provide Vietnamese­ has further significance, however. There it style goods. Thus cheap imports, whatever the appears only as part of a more comprehensive purpose, do what cheap imports always do to agricultural program which in itself tells us underdeveloped countries -- they destroy the still more about the Front. Contrary to popular "national bourgeosie," they inhibit the growth American notions, Vietnam's rural areas are of domestic manufactures, and as a result turn inhabited not just by "peasants" but by a the importing country into permanent depend­ highly complex rural society, with wide and ence on the exporting power. important differences in education,_ social role, There is' still one further effect. Almost all the . and cultural level. The NLF Program does not benefit of the Import Program goes to urban­ attempt to appeal only to part of this society-­ dwelling persons. But then with the destruction the landless laborer or those with plots too of, local manufacturing enterprise, the urban small to support their families. The appeal of areas cease to provide these services to the the Program is reformist and not revolutionary. countryside. Henceforth city and country are It foresees that South Vietna:m's agricultural no longer related by reciprocal advantage, by situation requires a consideration of many prob­ the mutual provision of goods and ~ervices to lems, of the too poor and the too rich, of acces­ one another. The city takes -- taxes, draftees, sion rights, of the problem of land deserted by rice, etc. -- but it provides nothing in return. It its owners, of the problem of those who have is precisely. this situation to which the Front been forced off the land into "strategic ham­ Program turns its attention. Here again it lets." What the NLF will do in the future is, reveals a knowledge of the real conditions of of course, another question. The Pi-ogram may the Vietnamese people and makes a hesitant be just propaganda--but it is at least propa­ beginning of constructive response. And here ganda which reveals a close and sympathetic again, too, it provides for that large part of knowledge of the agricultural situation and of Vietnamese society left out of the Saigon­ the interests of the various strata of rural American scheme of things. society. Certainly, for example, a clpser and Section VII of the NLF Program deals with m·ore sympathetic knowledge of the situation the problem posed by the montagnards and than that shown by Diem and his American makes several proposals for dealing with it. advisors 10 years ago. The Vietnamese inhabit primarily the low-lying Something analogous to this can be shown in wet-rice lands near the coast. Inland and upland the section dealing with the problems of the are mountain peoples, ethnically distant from middle classes, for eiample III (2). Since Viet­ the Vietnamese proper and living at a very nam ceased to be a French colony and became different ·cultural level, proud, self-subsistent instead an Am~r.ic~n "responsibility," there and stubbornly attached to ancient modes of have been serious and continuing inflationary work. There is a traditio;n of bad feeling between pressures stemming from the fact that Saigon the two groups. The French deliberately aggra­ has been supporting a military establishment far vated this feelin~ ,to consolidate their o~n con- February 1966 9 trol of Vietnam, and Diem's brutal efforts at cause there was no organized South Vietnamese assimilating the montagnard exacerbated the group prepared to insist that the promise be situation. The relationship between the two kept and to exert realistic sanctions to back up groups is so bad that there have been armed that insistence. Thus, when the Front states that clashes, the most recent precipitated this summer it must have "a decisive voice" in any prepara­ by American officials who seemed to encourage tion leading to elections in the South, it is separatist inclinations among certain of the responding to exactly that need. Again its Pro­ montagnard tribes (N. Y. Times, 9/15/65). In gram exhibits a realism and a familiarity with spite of the difficult history of this problem, a concrete issue long important to politically there are compelling reasons why the Viet­ informed South Vietname.se. namese must respond to it in a constructive Section IX of the Front Program, which treats manner. Whoever .controls the Highlands has of the modalities for eventual Vietnamese reuni­ strategic control of Vietnam (hence the presence fication is also worthy of note. As General of American units in the Highlands now). No Lansdale has noted, independence is and has Vietnamese with a national viewpoint can over- been the great issue in Vietnamese politics, and look this. The Highlands offer rich mineral since 1954 Vietnamese concerned with independ­ and agricultural opportunities for t:!1e future of ence have been primarily concerned with reuni­ Vietnam. The Front proposal for an autono­ fication. This is natural. A divided Vietnam is mous zone for the montagnards recognizes the politically weak and economically dependent on historical dimensions of the problem. It attempts others. United, this nation of 32 million would to provide sufficient advantage to both peoples face the future well endowed with the natural to prevent the loss of this important zone--an resources to make that future a fruitful one. As objective, for example; which neither Diem's the Vietnamese are an ancient people with still reliance on forceful assimilation nor American­ lively national traditions, the current division is inspired separatism is likely to achieve. galling to national pride. In the Program, as elsewhere (see Chaffard), the Front's leaders - At the core of the Front's Program is the call have shown a sensitivity to the difficulties im­ for the election of a National Assembly through plicit in restoring national unity. Ther:e are now universal suffrage.· This demand has long been three governments- in Vietnam-Saigon's, Ha­ an important issue in South Vietnam. It was, noi's and the Front's, with three armies and for example, the common property of all parties three bureaucracies, three sets of laws and three during the grim depression days of the early tax systems. There are also three differing thirties. A freely elected National Assembly was social systems. While recognizing the urgency promised by Leon Blum's Popular Front of the problem, ·the Program's espousal of French government of 1936, but nothing came "reunification by stages" is realistic and prac­ of it. After World War II the French were able tical. This proposal, like most of the Program, partially to restore their power in southern does not gloss over difficulties; it takes a na­ Vietnam on the promise, made in the Accords tional and not a sectional or sectarian view­ of March 1946 between France and the Demo­ point and it reflects the long-expressed wishes cratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi), that the of the South Vietnamese people. southern Vietnamese would be allowed to decide their own future through free elections. Again LANSDALE VERSUS THE FRONT nothing came of this promise, as nothing came In contrast to the suggestions put forward by from the series of similar promises made by the General Lansdale, the Front Program shows to Bao Dai government after the French reneged even more advantage. South Vietnam's political on the March Accords and restored the former history did not begin in 1954 nor does it begin emperor to power in the South. The Geneva now in 1966. Frequently issues which concern Agreements also promised self-determination for Vietnamese are issues which have been of con­ the southerners -- but again to no avail, as cern to them since late colonial times. They Diem's police state refused to allow parties have been shaped in the historical political other than the Diemist National Revolutionary struggles since Wilson's 14 Points -- not John­ Movement to compete in the elections. The son's -- seemed to promise independence for Front recognizes that promises of free elections, colonial peoples. I have argued that the Front's such as that contained in point 9 of the U.S. Program reflects this historical continuity of "14 Points," are meaningless in themselves. Vietnamese politics. By contrast, General Lans­ The population of South Vietnam has been dale understands that his program " ... involves promised elections for the last 35 years, but exporting American political principles" (p. 79). four times those who have made the promises He is willing to espouse a proposal which in- have been able to bypass them, precisely be- conunued on Pu.ge 29 10 Viet-Report THE PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

DECEMBER 1960 Since the French colonialists invaded our coun­ been perpetrated by the U.S .. Diem dictatorial and try, our Vietnamese people .have unremittingly cruel rule terrorizing gun shots have never ceased struggled for national independence and freedom. to resound throughout south Viet ~am; tens of In 1945, our compatriots throughout the country thousands of patriots have been shot down, be­ rose up, overthrew the Japanese and French dpmi­ headed, disembowelled with liver plucked out; hun­ nation and seized power, and afterwards heroically dreds of thousands of people tortured, thrown into carried out a resistance war for nine years, defeated jail where they slowly perished; countless people the French aggressor,t; an~I U.S. interventionists, have been victims of arson, forcible house removal and brought our people's valiant resistance war to and usurpation of land, and drafted for forced glorious victory. labour or pressganged; countless families are dis­ At the Geneva Conference in July 1954, the tressed and disunited as a result of the policy of French imperialists had to undertake to withdraw concentrating people in "prosperity zones" and their troops from Viet Nam. The participating "resettlement centres," of exacting rents and taxes, countries to the Conference solemnly declared their terror, arrest, plunder, ransom, widespread unem­ recognition of the sovereignty, independence, unity ployment and poverty, which are seriously threat­ and territorial integrity of Viet Nam. ening the life of all strata of people. Since then we should have been able to enjoy There must be Peace! must be Independence! peace, and join the people throughout the country There must be Democracy! There must be Enough in building a Viet Nam independent; democranc, Food and ·Clothing! There must be Peaceful Reunifi­ unified, prosperous and strong. cation of The Fatherland! However, the American imperialists,. who had in That is our most earnest and pressing aspira­ the past helped the French colonialists to massacre tion. It has become an U:on will, and a prodigious our people, have now plotted to partition our coun­ strength promoting our people to unite and reso­ try for a long time, to enslave the southern par.t lutely rise up to overthrow the cruel rule of the through a disguised colonial regime and turn it U.S. imperialists and their stooges for national into a military base in preparation for aggressive salvation. · war in South-east Asia. They have brought the In view of the supreme interests of the Father­ Ngo Dinh Diem clique-their stooges-to power land, with the firmness to struggle to the end for under the signboard of a faked independent state, the people's legitimate aspirations and in accord­ and use their "aid" policy and advisers' machine ance with the progressive trend in the world, the to hold in their hands all the 'inilitary, economic, South Viet Nam National Front For Liberatton political and cultural branches in south Viet Nam. comes into being. The aggressors and traitors have set up the The South Viet Nam National Front For Liber­ most dictatorial and cruel rule in Viet Nam's his­ ation undertakes to unite people of all walks of tory. They repress and persecute all democratic life, all soci... : ~lasses, nationalities, political parties, and patriotic movements, abolish all human liber­ organizations, religious communities, and patriotic ties. They monopolize all branches of economy, personalities in south Viet Nam, without distinction strangle industry, agriculture and trade, ruthlessly of their political tendencies, in order to struggle to exploit all strata of people. They use every device overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their of mind poisoning, obscurantism and depravation henchmen in south Viet Nam and realize Inde­ in an attempt to quell the patriotism of our people. pendence, Democracy, Life Improvement, Peace and They feverishly increase their military forces, build Neutrality in south Viet Nam, and advance toward military bases, use the army as a tool for repres­ Peaceful Rt;unification of The Fatherland. sion of the people and war preparation in accord­ The program of The South Viet Nam National ance with the U.S. imperialists' policy. Front ,For Liberation includes the following ten For more than six years, countless crimes have points.

I. To overthrow the disguised colonial re­ disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imperial­ gime of the U.S. imperialists and the ists. The south Viet Nam administration is a dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem administra­ lackey .which has been carrying out the U.S. tion--lackey of the U.S. --and to form a imperialists' political line. This regime and national democratic coalition administra­ administration must be overthrown, and a tion. broad national democratic coalition administra­ tion formed including representatives of all The present regime in south Viet Nam is a strata of, people, nationalities, political parties,

February 1966 11 religious communities, and patriotic personali­ 4. To strictly ban all illegal arrests and im­ ties. We must wrest back the peoples' economic, prisonments, tortures and corporal punishment. political, social and cultural interests, realize To punish ~repenting cruel murderers of the independence and democracy, improve the peo­ people. ' ple's living conditions, carry out a policy of peace and neutrality and advance toward peaceful reunification of the Fatherland.

II. To bring into being a broad and pro­ III. To build an independent and sovereign gressive democracy. economy, improve the people's living 1. To abolis~ the current constitution of the conditions. Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorial administration­ I lackey of the U.S. To elect a n'ew National Assembly through universal suffrage. 1. To abolish the economic mon6poly of the 2. To promulgate all democratic freedoms: U.S. and its henchmen. To build an independent freedom of expression, of the press, of assembly, and so~ereign economy and finance, beneficial of association, of movement. To guarantee to the nation and people. To confiscate and freedom of belief; no discrimination towards any nationalize the property of the U.S. imperialists religion on the part of the State. To grant free­ and the ruling clique, their stooges. dom of action to the patriotic political parties 2. To help industrialists and tradespeople and mass organizations, irrespective of political rehabilitate and develop industry, · both large tendencies. and small, and to encourage industrial develop­ 3. To grant general amnesty to all political ment. To actively protect home made products - detainees, dissolve all concentration camps by abolishing production taxes, restricting or under any form whatsoever. To abolish the ending the import of those goods which can be fascist law 10-59 and other anti-democratic produced in the country and reducing taxes of laws. To permit the return of all those who had import on raw materials and machinery. to flee abroad due to the U.S.-Diem regime. 3. To rehabilitate agriculture, and to mod­ ernize farming, fishing and animal husbandry. To help peasants reclaim waste land and devel­ op pro~uction; to protect crops and ensure the consumption of agricultural products. 4. To encourage and accelerate the economic interflow between the town and the countryside, between plains and mountainous areas. To develop trade with foreign countries without distinction of political regimes, and on the prin­ ciple of equality and mutual benefit. 5. To apply an equitable and rational tax system. To abolish arbitrary fines. 6. To promulgate labour regulations, that is: to prohibit dismissals, wage cuts, fines and ill­ treatment of workers and office employees, to improve the life of workers and public em­ ployees, and to fix wages and guarantees for the health of teen-age apprentices. 7. To organize social relief: •Jobs for unemployed. • Protection of orphans, elders and disabled. •Assistance to -those who have become dis- abled or without support due to the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its stooges. • Relief to localities suffering crop failures, fire and natural calamities. 8. To help displaced persons return to their native places if they so desire, ·and to provide ·jobs for those who decide to remain in the South.

12 Viet-Report _ 9. To strictly prohibit forcible house remov­ als, arson, usurpation of land, and the herding THE FOURTEEN POINTS (USA) of the people into concentration centres. To en­ sure the country-folk and urban working people of the opportunity to earn their living in The following are the 14 points of the United security. States negotiating position on South Vietnam, as outlined in pre~s briefings: IV. To carry out land rent reduction arid advance toward the settlement of the (1) The United States accepts the 1954 and agrarian problem so as \to ensure land 1962 Geneva accords as a good enough to the tillers. basis for negotiation. 1. To carry out land rent reduction. ·To guarantee the peasants' right to till their pres­ (2) It would welcome a ~conference on South­ ent plots of land and ensure the right of owner­ east _Asia or any port of Asia. ship for those who have reclaimed waste land. \ To protect the legitimate right of ownership by (3) H is ready for unconditional negotiations. peasants of the plots of land distributed to them. (4) It is also ready, if Hanoi so prefers, for 2. To abolish the "prosperity zones" anc} the informal unconditional discussions. regime of herding the people into "resettlement centres." To permit those forcibly herded into (5) A cease-fire could be the first order of "prosperity zones" or "resettlement centres" to business at a peace conference, or be return home freely and earn their living on p'reliminary to such a conference. their own plots of land. 3. To confiscate the land usurped by the U.S. 1 (6) It is willing to discuss the North Vietnam imperialists and their agents, and distribute it to four-point program. landless and land-poor peasants. To re-distrib­ , ' ute communal land in an equitable and rational way. (7) It wants no military bases in Southeast 4. Through negotiations, the State will pur­ Asia. chase from landowners at equitable and rational prices. all land held by them in excess of a given (8) It does not want a continuing' American area, fixed in accordance with the concrete military presence in South Vietnam. .situation in each locality, and distribute fr to landless and land-poor peasants. This land will· (9) Free elections will be supported. be distributed free of charge and with no conditions attached. (10) The reunification of the two Vietnams can V. To bu,ild a national and democratic be decided by the free decision of their peoples. ,, education and culiure. 1. To eliminate the enslaving and gangster (11) Southeast Asian countries can be non­ style American culture and education; to build aligned or neutral; the United States wants a national, progressive culture and education no new allies. serving the Fatherland and the people. 2. To wipe out illiteracy. To build sufficient general education schools for the youth and (12) It is prepared to contribute $1 billion too children. To expand universities, vocational regional development program in which and professional schools. To use the Viet­ North Vietnam could take part. namese language in teaching. To reduce school \ fees; to exempt fees of poor pupils and students, (13) The Vietcong would have no difficulty-- in to reform the examination system. ' , having their views represented at a con­ 3. To develop science and technology and ference after hostilities have ceased. national literature and art; to encourage and help intellectuals, cultural and art workers to (14) The bombing will be stopped if it is stated develop their abilities in service of national what would happen next. construction. 4. To develop medical service in order to -- N. Y. Times, January 2, 1966. look after the people's health. To expand the gymnastic and sports movement.

February 1966 1 13 ' VI. To build an army to defend the Father- VIII. To carry out a foreign policy of peace 1,and and the people. and neutrality. 1. To cancel all unequal treaties signed with 1. To build a national army to defend the foreign countries by the U.S. henchmen' which Fatherland and the people. To cancel the sys­ violate national sovereignty. tem of U.S. military advisers. 2. To abolish the pressganging regime. To 2. To establish diplomatic relations with all countries irrespective of political regime, in improve the material life of the armymen and accordance with the principles of peaceful ensure their political rights. To prohibit the co-existence as put forth at the Bandung ill-treatment of soldiers. To apply a policy of assistance to families of poor armymen. Conference. 3. To' unite closely with the peace~loving and 3. To award and give worthy jobs to those officers and soldiers who have rendered meri­ neutral countries. To expand friendly relations torious services in the struggle against the with Asian and African countries; first of all, domination of the U.S. imperialists and their with neighbouring Cambodia and Laos. henchmen. To observe leniency toward those 4. To refrain from joining any bloc or mili­ who had before collaborated with the U.S.­ tary alliance or forming a military alliance with Diem clique and committed crimes against the any country. people, buChave now repented and serve the 5. To receive economic aid from . any country ready to assist Viet Nam without conditions people. · 4. To abolish all the military bases of foreign attached. countries in south Viet Nam. · IX. To establish normal relations between the two zones and advance toward peace­ ful reunification of the Father!,and. The urgent demand of our people throughout VII. To guarantee the right of equality be­ the country is to reunify the Fatherland by tween nationalities, and between men and peaceful means. The South Viet Nam National · women; to protect the l.egitimate rights Front for Liberation undertakes the gradual of foreign residents in Viet Nam and reunification of the country by peaceful means, Vietnamese living abroad. on the principle of negotiations and discussions between the two zones on all forms and meas­ / ures beneficial to the Vietnamese people and 1. To ensure the right to autonomy of the Fatherland. ' national minorities. , Pending national retmification, the Govern­ To set up, within the framework of the great ments of the two zones will negotiate and under­ family of the Vietnamese people, autonomous take not to spread propaganda to divide the regions in areas inhabited by minority peoples. peoples or in favour of war, not to use military To ensure equal rights among different na­ forces against each other. To carry , out eco­ tionalities. All nationalities have the right to use nomic and cultural exchanges between the two and develop their , own spoken and 'written zones-. To ensure for the people of both zones language and to preserve or change their freedom of movement and trade, and .the right customs and habits. To abolish the U.S.-Diem of mutual visits and correspondence. clique's present policy of ill-treatment and forced assimilation of the minority nationalities. X. To oppose aggressive war, actively de­ 1 To help the minority peoples to catch up with fend world peace. the common level .of t~e people by developing 1. To oppose aggressive war and all forms of the economy and culture in ~e areas inhabited enslavement by the imperialists. To support the by them, by training sldP , personnel from national liberation struggles of peoples in vari­ people of minority origin. ous countries. 2. To ensure the . right of equalitY between 2. To oppose -war propaganda. To demand men and women. Women to enjoy the same general ·disarmament, prohibition of nuclear rights as men in all fields: political, economic, weapons and 'demand the tise of atomic energy cultural and social. for peaceful purposes. 3. To protect the legitimate rights of foreigners 3. To support the movements for peace, l' . residing in Viet Nam. democracy and social pr.ogress in the world. 4. To defend and take care of the interests of To actively co.ntribute to the safeguarding of Vietnamese living abroad. peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

14 Viet-Report -THE FOURTEEN POINTS (NLF)

1. As a state having sovereignty, independence 8. South Vietnam will carry out a policy of and territorial integrity, South Vietnam will not democratic and independent economy, free itself join any military bloc or treaty, or any bloc or from foreign manipulation and prohibit all forms of treaty of a military character and will not accept monopoly by foreign capitalists. protection by any military bloc or treaty. It will not enter into military alliance or alliance of a 9. Foreign nationals of any citizenship will be military character with any country, and will not allowed to reside and earn their living in South sign with any country treaties contvary and harm­ Vietnam, and will be protected by South Vietnam ful to the neutrality of South Vietnam. laws on condition that they do not harm the inter­ ests of the South Vietnamese people. 2. All foreign troops and military personnel must Foreign capitalists of any citizenship will be al­ . withdraw from South Vietnam. lowed to do business in South Vietnam, and their ' South Vietnam does not accept the presence on its interests will be guaranteed, provided they respect territory of foreign armed forces and military bases. South Vietnam laws. 3. South· Vietnam will carry out an internal and externa,l policy of complete independence and sov­ 10. South Vietnam will carry out cultural ex­ ereignty, not depending upon any bloc or state. All chang~s and broaden cultural cooperation with au blocs and states must neither intervene in the inter­ countries. nal affair nor bring pressure to bear upon South Vietnam under whatever forms and in whatever 11. The Vietnamese nation is one. But, because fields, political or military-, economic or cultural, Vietnam has been divided into two zones with dif­ diplomatic or internal. fering political regimes, due concern must be shown tQ the question of Vietnam's reunification and ade­ 4. South Vietnam will carry out the five princi­ quate consideration given to the characteristics of ples of peaceful coexistence in its relations with all this situation and of the two zones. This question countries, regardless of their ideological system and will be decided upon by the people of the two zones political regime. It will establish friendly and diplo­ on the principle of equality, non-annexation of one matic relations with all countries on condition that zone by the other, negotiations between the authori­ they respect its sovereignty and treat it on an ties of the two zones and step by step reunification. equal footing. South Vietnam will not allow any Priority consideration will be given to the restora­ country to use its territory to threaten other coun­ tion of normal relations between two zones, with tries' security. view to the readjustment and development of the With regard to the Kingdoms of Cambodia and economy and because of the sacred sentimental Laos 'in particular, South Vietnan;i. will maintain urge of the people in both zones. friendly relations with them and fully respect the The future political regime of unified Vietnam sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of will be decided by the people of both zones. these two neighbours. L \ 12. South Vietnam is ready to form with the 5. South Vietnam will build an army with the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos a peace [sicJ and sole aim of safeguarding the Fatherland's sover­ neutral area in South-East Asia, in which each eignty, independence, territorial integrity and secu­ member enjoys full sovereignty. rity. With adequate effectives and equipment, the army of neutral South Vietnam will be a defensive . 13. South Vietnam will actively unite with all and peaceful army. States and organisations working for peace and friendship among the nations. It will contribute the 6. South Vietnam will fully realise democratic ' realization of general disarmament throughout the liberties for the people. Freedom of thought, wor­ world, liquidation of nuclear weapons, cessation of ship, opinion and organisation will be guaranteed A-bomb tests and dissolution of hostile military to all citizens, political parnes, mass organisations, religious bodies, and nationalities. blocs.

7. South Vietnam will accept aid from all coun­ tries . 9-irectly and without any political conditions 14. The independence and neutrality of South attached, and provided such aid aims to help de­ Vietnam must be respected and guai:anteed by the velop the economy, culture· and welfare of the South 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and by all Vietnamese people. countries and parties concerned.

February 1966 15 THE PROFESSOR, THE POLICEMAN . I AN'D THE PEASANT,

''

PART ONE

I Ame.rica brings Democracy to the "backward nations" in increasingly ingenious ways. In Part I of his analysis of the role of the Michigan State University Group in South Vietnam, Martin Nicolaus documents the 1955-1962 efforts at "pacifica­ tion" -- through "research," "technical assistance" and "guidance." In question, the MSUG Division of Police. Out of MSU, too, came a little-koown but ever more influential public servant: the professor as international social worker. Part II (March Viet-Report) will explore this world of the MSUG Division of Public Administration. by Martin Nicolaus On a day fo. April 1960 in a small town in university, --the same university that paid · the South Vietnam, the following evenf took place: professor's salary. The professor, the policeman an American professor interviewed the chief of and the peasant were here assembled in exactly the local secret police in the latter's headquar­ their intended roles, playillg the parts the univer­ ters, while (according to the professor's report) sity had designed for them: the professor . "curled up on a mat in the corner was a researching, the policeman interrogating, the twenty-year-old peasant in tattered clothes. His peasant .silent, bruised. This indeed seems like feet were in manacles, the left side of his face an extraordinary episode in the annals of was _swollen and his eye and cheek were badly American academia. And the fact that the pro­ bruised." The youth was "suspected of Vietcong fessor did not . think the event was worth special membership." 1 He had been interrogated by compient-- that seems ·inexplicable, inexcusable, the secret police chief. The professor, who was scandalous. f doing basic research under contract to the U.S. Nevertheless, it happened, and it happened government and to the Saigon government, regularly. Not that the professors regularly noted these facts but asked no further questions encountered manacled peasants in their inter­ ,about the peasant. Neither the police chief .nor views; that was not a typical event. Still, this the professor indicated that the peasant's pres­ encounter in April 1960 is like a microcosm of ence disturbed them or struck them as strange. the larger drama that had been unfolding since Yet it does seem strange for an American 1950 and ended only in 1962. The peasant professor to have an amiable interview with a lying ma-nacled in a corner of the room sym­ secret police chief in the latter's interrogation bolizes, perhaps in an ei{ag'gerated way, perhaps center, and even more strange that the interview not, the predicament of a great many South took place while a young man who ha,d been Vietnamese peasants: they were all being bound, convicted of no crime lay bruised and manacled beaten or manacled in one way or another, in the corner. A closer examination of the event although not all of them took it as silently as yields even more alien facts: the interrogation this one, as the professors well knew. The secret . room had been paid for, and the police chiePs police chief was also playing a typical role­ equipment, including the manacles that held the getting information out of p~sants was his job.

peasant, had been supplied by an American The professor, too, wa·s doing his jbb:.1asking 16 Viet-Report • .f ,( some questions, not asking other questions, since 1946, and it . was rumored that certain writing down the responses, and not expressing elements of the American government -- the CIA opinions outside his field of professional com­ most frequently mentioned in this regard -- were petence. And the manacles, together with related in fact grooming him for the job of eventually equipment, were supplied to the police by the replacing Bao Dai, the playboy emperor of university on a regular schedule; there was Vietnam.5 Nor is it likely that Wesley Fishel nothing extraordinary about it. This one event was simply another young Ph.D off on a lark expresses Michigan State University's Vietnam in Japan, and just happened to run into Diem Project in a nutshell. .. in a tearoom. In any case, this meeting proved · Nor, for that matter, is the episode an iso­ to be an extraordinarily fortunate coincidence lated instance in American intellectual history. for both men. The two exchanged letters when Certainly the .majority of university projects Fishel returned to the United States, and a bare overseas do not involve such collaboration seven months later their friendship had blos­ with the secret police --American pr foreign - - somed to the point where Fishel had Diem made and they do follow a stricter defimtion of what a "consultant" to Michigan State's "Govern­ is "technical" assistance. But the needs which mental Research Bureau. "6 How a mere assist­ the Michigan State project was · designed to ant professor in his first year at MSU was able serve exist now, or are growing into existence, to pull such strings for his friend is one of the in many parts of the world. The conditions that several little mysteries that surround the MS U made it possible to use American professors as project and the person of Wesley Fishel. Only they were used in Vietnam persist.' The Michigan one and, a half years after their initial meeting State University Group (MSUG) was not an in Tokyo, Diem and Fishel-- both without any unrepeatable event. More and more it appears overt official standing--were engaging in inter­ as the prototype, the pilot model of a growing national diplomacy on behalf of the U.S. gov­ family of overseas . "research projects" of which ernment. In 1952, Diem "asked the French to the controversial Project Camelot in Latin Amer­ permit Michigan State College to furnish tech­ ica was the latest member, but not the last. nical aid to the Vietnamese government, the The ·MS U project reflects not only a few indi­ costs of which would be borne by the United vidual professors, ' not just , one particular States government, but the French refused." 7 university, not merely an especially dark period After that, Diem moved his base of operations of American history-although these things were from MS U's East Lansing campus eastward at work too; its roots go back further and deeper into Cardinal Spellman's territory, and began into the "normal," the established and enduring the series of publicity triumphs (recounted in life of Am~rican professors, universities, and Scheer's booklet) which catapulted him into American,· foreign policy in general. power in Saigon in mid-1954. Less than two months later, his friend Wesley Fishel hurried A STRANGE BEGINNING to Saigon as Diem's , special advisor and as a Credit for being the first to piece together and member of U.S. Special Ambassador Lawton publish the outlines of the MS UG story belongs Collin's personal staff.8 "Not surprisingly," in to Ramparts magazine's staff writer and some­ the words of Professors Scigliano and Fox, time foreign correspondent Robert Scheer. Since both of whom were high-ranking members of the the publication of Scheer's booklet, How the MS U project, Fishel's discussions with Diem led United States Got Involved in Vietnam, 2 in to a request that Michigan State "undertake to which Scheer made several allegations that dis­ help Vietnam in its current difficulties. "9 A team turbed Michigan State University, new evidence of four officials from the East Lansing campus, has come to light3 which makes it possible for headed by Arthur Brandstatter, chief of MSU's the first time to substantiate some of these School of Police Administration, made a whirl­ charges with a solid network of proof. This is wind, two-week tour of Vietna111 and returned in how the Vietnam project began: early October 1954 with a recommendation that 1In Tokyo in July 1950, Ngo Dinh Diem, MS U undertake a huge project of technical then one of many exiled Vietn'a,mese politicians, assistance to the Diem government. 1 o During met Wesley Fishell who had just accepted a subsequent negotiations between Diem, Fishel, position as assistant-· professor of political sci­ , MSU, and the U.S. Foreign Operations Admin­ ence at Michigan State University (then called istration (now called, less candidly, Agency for Michigan State College). 4 The circumstances International Development), the size of the proj­ surrounding the meeting are obscure, but it was ect was somewhat reduced, but its scope remain­ hardly accidental. Diem had been a frequent ed broad. Its purpose was to give the Diem guest at American consulates-general in Asia government assistance in strengthening nearly

February 1966 17 all aspects of its · functioning, with particular is a question that should be suspended for the emphasis on the economy, the civil service, and moment, waiting until more of the evidence the police. 11 is in. However, in early 1955, the Diem govern­ In May 1955, the Michigan State University ment was so near collapse that the MS U project almost died stillborn. The majority of Diem's Group was officially born with the signing of two contracts, one between MS U and the Diem cabinet deserted him, the army was in near revolt, and the city was under virtual siege by government, - the other between MS U and the one of the armed sects, the Binh Xuyen. Even U.S. government. The contracts were for two Speci:al Ambassador Collins sent a pessimistic years,_ and were renewed with modifications in report to Eisenhower, suggesting that a new 1957 and 1959.8 The first MSUG advisors under the contract arrived at the end of May, man be found to replace Diem. However, firm 1 support for Diem came from the CIA's ubiqui­ 1955. 9 For a. project of its size, it was pre­ tous Colonel Lansdale, and (via CIA chief pared in a remarkably short time. Actually "the team of MS U professors," as one is tempted to Allen Dulles to his brother, John Foster, to call the group, were neither predominantly from Eisenhower) Collins was overruled, and Diem's MS U nor were most of them professors. It was future was assured. 12 The persons in Saigon an academic program neither in numbers nor who did the most to keep Diem in power during in purpose, only in publicity. From 1955 to this crisis, according to the French journalist Georges Chaffard, ·were certain American mili­ 1962, the term of the project, MS UG had 104 tary counsellors antl unnamed "activists" from American staff members altogether, who served Michigan State University.13 Their efforts were · various lengths of time. Of these 104, 32 were successful; Diem rode out the crisis, and in the clerical or administrative personnel. Only 72 spring of 1955 1Jie U.S. National Security were full-fledged MS UG advisors. Of these 72 Council formally endorsed Diem. Accordi:p.g to advisors, 33 were in the police division, 34 in Scheer, who says he got it from Fishel, at this the Public Administration Division, and 5 were time "no less a personage than Vice-President short-term consultants. Of the 33 police advisors, Nixon called John Hannah, the president of only 4 came from the MS U campus, the Michigan State, to elicit his support." 14 Han­ remainder being recruited from law enforce­ nah, an important figure in the GOP and a" ment and other agencies. Of the 34 non-police former Assistant Secretary of Defense, was told advisors, only 11 were from the MSU campus·. Only 25 of all 72 advisors were actually pro­ (according to Scheer quotin.g Fish~l) that it was fessors, and almost all of these were in the non­ "in the national interest for his university to become involved."15 According to Hannah, police division. The only reason to call the group the "MSU professors" is that all five of however, there was no request from Nixon. the Chief Advisors were political· science pro­ Hannah claims that the request came from "authority even higher than Nixon's."16 How­ fessors at Michigan State, and Michigan State ever that may be, ·Michigan State's interests, faculty held all other controlling positions in the project. But professors from Yale, Pittsburgh, Diem's interests, and the national interest were 0 other universities also took part. already thoroughly intertwined before this phone UCLA~ and While Michigan State lent its name and its call to Hannah took place. respectability to the project and acted as coor­ According to Scheer, the MSU project filled dinating agency, the real direction of the pro­ a special need of American foreign policy at gram came from the U.S. government and-from this time. "The Geneva Accords had prohibited the Saigon government. In doing its utmost to increases in the strength of either side through ~ooperate with these powers, MS U did no more the intr:oduction of 'all types of arms' or build­ than many other American universities would ups in troop strength. The presence of the have done, and are doing. International Control Commission ... offered the prospect of unfavorable publicity to the United Compared to the cost of a jet fighter-bomber, States if its Military Assistance and Advisory MS UG was a trivial operation, but compared Group, United States Operations Mission, or to the cost of most "research" projects even in CIA agents operated openly. The Michigan the physical sciences, MS UG was a behemoth. group would serve as 'cover'." 17 It is true The cost of salaries, transportation, and over­ that the Geneva accords (Article 17a) forbad head for the American staff alone was $5.3 arms increases, and it is a fact that the Inter­ million, and the equivalent of an additional national Control Commission could have $5.1 million in Vietnamese piastres was spent created heavily damaging publicity. But whether on the staff of about 200 Vietnamese scholars or not the Michigan group served as "cover" translators, typists, chauffeurs, and securit; 18 Viet-Report

I guards. To this tidy subtotal of $10.4 •million quest. The first real professors who arrived must be added another $15 million more, ac­ were assigned to the refugees. cording to the estimate of Scigliano and Fox. The Vietnamese secret police was nothing This amount approximately represents equip­ more nor less \han a branch of the French ment and material aid funds controlled and Surete, a name that means to Vietnamese ap­ disbursed by MSUG. 2l Nearly all of this proximately what Okhrana meant to the Bol­ amount was spent by the Police Division, but sheviks and Gestapo meant to German Jew~. there is no way of knowing by .how much the When the French abandoned Vietnam in 1954- estimate is too low, since certain activities of 1955, the Saigon government inherited the the Police Division were never formally reported organization lock, stock and barrel, and set to MS UG's Chief Advisors. 22 But if the esti­ about patching its war wounds. The first step mate is anywhere near accuracy, it means that was to abolish the dreaded name Surete and MS UG spent the neat sum of about $25 million, replace it with something more suited to a or about two dollars for every man, woman brave new nation. The MSUG advisors had and child in the country. The entire cost, of the answer: the secret police was henceforth course, was borne by ,the U.S. government. called the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation, Wesley Fishel became MSUG Chief Advisor or VBI. , ~7 They then devoted a great part of in early 1956. Scheer quotes Fishel as having their energies to increasing the organization's said " ... I surfaced-to use a CIA term-to efficiency. Its scattered facilities and records become head of the MS UG program," 23 but were consolidated and expanded in a former Fishel denies that he ever used such language. 24 French army camp which was renovated for In any case, it was not a bad job for a man the purpose. Here, under ·MSUG guidance , who had begun academic life as an assistant and with MS UG-supplied funds, the VBI built professor only six years before. an interrogation center, detention center, labor­ All these factors are worth keeping in mind atory, records and identification center, and when asking the question whether MS UG a_cted communications headquarters. 28 They under­ as "cover" for the CIA. took to modernize the Surete's fingerprint files by reclassifying them from the French to the AN URGENT REQUEST American system. After a year of work, they had reclassified 600,000 files in th~ "criminal The first ·MSUG advisors to arrive in Saigon and subversive" section, and expected the job were police experts, and the first task under­ to take another two years, which gives an idea taken by MSUG was a police project, so it of how many people. the Surete had its eyes seem.s fair to begin to describe the behemoth on-perhaps from ten to twenty per cent of the here. MS UG was divided into two Divisions: population; not bad for an antiquated outfit, Police and Public Administration, with the Chief but not good enough by American standards. 29 Advisor responsible for both. As the project In order i 9rove on this percentage, the became organized the two Divisi9ns worked University Group in 1959 took charge of the quite separately from one another and the national identity card program, designed to Chief Advisor acted as the only channel of information between them, at least formally; but in the first few months the two groups worked together. Throughout 1955 much of Saigon. was in ruins from the pitched street battles; frequent plastic bomb explosions rocked the residential districts, and some MS UG mem­ bers happened to be living in a hotel that was raided during a riot, and suffered considerable property damage. 25 In the midst of this at­ mosphere of crisis and chaos came an "urgent request" from the American Embassy in Saigon that ·MS UG devote all its energies to strengthen­ ing the police and security organizations, par­ ticularly the Surete and the Civil Guard, and to reorganizing the refygee commissariat. 26 Since the first advisors on the scene happened to be a secret police specialist and a civil guard I'm not very keen for doves or hawks. I think we specialist, MS UG readily acce·ded to the re- nJed more owls. -- Senator George Aiken (Rep., Vt.) 1 l /29/66. February 1966 19 furnish every South Vietnamese over 21, for a paled in importance compared to what Scigliano small fee, with an obligatory, nearly indestruct­ and Fox call "the core of the police program," ible plastic-laminated ID card bearing his the provision of "material aid." 37 From 1955 photograph and thumbprint. MS UG imported to 1959, accOTding to Scigliano and Fox, the specially-designed laminating machines and University Group was for all practical purposes portable photography studios, and it trained, the sole supplier of weapons, ammunition, vehi­ equipped, and advised the heavily-armed iden­ cles, and equipment to the entire South Viet­ tification teams which sought, unsuccessfully, to namese secret polic~ municipal police, Civil dog-tag every peasant in the country. After a Guard, and palace guard. 38 Scigliano and number of identification teams were ambushed, Fox state that "the major items, some of which the program was abandoned. 30 came· from local stocks of American material MS UG established a special training school that had been given to the French Expedition­ under the jurisdiction of the VBI high com­ ary Corps, were revolvers, riot guns, ammuni­ mand, in which the Americans gave instruction tion, tear gas, jeeps and other vehicles, hand­ in subjects ranging from jeep driving to the use cuffs, office equipment, traffic lights, and com-. of different types of tear gas. They wrote or had munications equipment." 39 Even MSUG's translated manuals on weapons maintenance, Final Report, available on request from MSU, riot control, ,and related subjects. 31 They gave admits these facts: "The Division arranged to advice on all aspects of the VBI's operations, supply, wherever possible, motor vehicles, small including the location of trainhg camps and the arms weapons and tear gas ... Schedules of so-called detention centers 32 However, despite distribution of weapons to patrolmen and main­ the advisors' best efforts, when the project tenance of training was also established." 40 ended in 1962, the VBI (in the words of But "patrolmen" is a characteristic euphemism. MSUG's Final Report) "still fell far sqort of The most substantial portion of these supplies the revised set-up which had been recom­ and funds went to the secret police directly; and mended." 33 even more, indirectly, in the name of Michigan The U.S. Embassy's urge~t request for help State University. 41 with the Civil Guard was a matter of special The weapons supply program was the biggest importance, but ·MS UG was less helpful here. and most. successful part of the entire MS U The Civil Guard, an ill-equipped body of about project. It received the lion's share of the 50,000 men staffed with military officers, quar­ project's costs, and the greatest number of tered in army encampments and under control man-hours were devoted to it. Most of all of of the province chiefs, played a key role in the Police Division's training program's centered Diem's strategy for seizing power in a largely around the weapons and equipment supplied hostile countryside. Regular units of the Civil by MSUG; Scigliano and Fox note that the Guard would sweep through an area to soften Vietnamese were eager to be instructed in the it up and to overcome whatever resistence was handling of riot guns but turned a deaf ear to encountered, and then remaine(, ~.!S in g the old attempts to instruct them in the rules of evidence French forts to keep the area pacified. The or the rights of priso11ers. Americans refrained MS UG advisors wanted to reduce the organi­ from trying to impose their cultural values in zation in size and to convert it into a rural these matters on the Vietnamese, although some police force, to take it out of military control instructors were "guilty" of the attempt. 42 Even and base it in the villages, somewhat on the when the training programs had been largely model of Franco's Guardia- Civil. USOI\.;1. and completed in 1958, the Police Division still MAAG, on the other hand, wanted the Guard found it necessary to maintain a staff of more to be " organized into company, battalion, and than 20 advisors to handle the distribution regimental groups, and armed with rifles, auto­ schedules. 43 During the peak period of MS UG's matic rifles, and machine guns." 34 As a result operations, mid-1957 to mid-1959, the Police of this conflict, which was won by USOM and Division staff outnumbered the Public Admin­ MAAG in 1959, MSUG's role in the Civil istration staff-- despite the latter's much wider Guard was confined to some trainin1:, and some range of tasks - by a ratio of about 5 to 3, and supply activities. 35 the Public Administration Division never had as MS UG advisors also trained and supplied the many as 20 advl_sors in it at any time. 44 If municipal police; reorganized traffic patterns in one did not know that the program was spon­ Saigon; gave training in pistol marksmanship sored by a respectable American university, one to the palace guard and to other "special could ·easily ,come to the conclusion that MSUG groups"; and advised the government on was primarily a para-military aid program counter-insurgency. :36 with a research bureau thinly spread over it, But all these training and advisory activities like icing on the cake. :.:!() Viet-Report Finally, the accusation that MSUG acted as conceal tended to bring the whole MSU en­ a cover for the CIA ca:n now be regarded as deavor under suspicion." 49 What the rather definitively proven. Although both MS U and vague phrase "somewhat forced hospitality" Wesley Fishel have denied Robert Scheer's refers to is not clear; but what is clear is that allegations to this effect, 45 - Scheer lacked deci­ MSUG's function as a cover for the CIA unit sive evidence, after all- recent testimony by ,was written into MS UG's original contract. In three top-ranking MSUG members makes these mid-1959, after reviewing its progress, the group denials extremely dubious. Ralph Smuckler, "refused to provide cover for this unit in the MS UG Chief Advisor from April 1958 to De­ new contract period." 50 At that tilpe the CIA cember 1959 (immediately after Fishel's tenure), unit moved from MS UG to under the wings of stated in a newspaper interview that "a few" of USOM, which also absorbed the weapons dis­ the Police Division's "borrowed helpers were tribution program. 51 As soon as these transfers from the CIA." But, he continued, "these were had been accomplished, the Police Division staff . cloak and dagger operations, and the use of dwindled rapidly to the vanishing point; its CIA agents was a drop in the bucket compared mission had been successfully accomplished. 52 to the overall project." 46 Smuckler is presently In the light of these circumstances, MSU's pro­ Acting Dean of International Programs at MS U. testations of innocence and ignorance are simply MS U political science profess-Ors Robert Sci­ not credible. gliano (Assistant to Chief Advisor, July 1957 to September 1959--covering most of Fishel's It is a fact that article 1 7 (a) of the Geneva term) and Guy Fox (Chief Advisor, May Agreements prohibits the introduction into Viet­ 1961 to June 1962), both colleagues of Fishel, nam of all types of arms and munitions, and have this to say in their_recently-published it is another fact that from 1954 to 1957 the book: "The non-professorial advisors in the United States maintained an official posture of police program were overwhelmingly from state strict respect for the Agreements, even while and municipal law enforcement agencies, al­ supporting the Diem government's refusal to though there was also a group of CIA honor them by holding the 1956 national re­ agents." 47 Further: "Lack of adequate infor­ unification elections. · During Eisenhower's sec­ mation makes it impossible to assess the work ond term the official line changed to open that several persons conducted with a special disregard for the Agreements, and about a year internal security unit of the Surete between 1955 later the International Control Commission and 1959. Although attached to MSUG, these began growing increasingly ineffectual because persons were members of the CIA and reported of an irreconcilable split between the Canadian and were responsible only to the American and the Polish delegations, so that the Com­ Embassy in Saigon."48 Scigliano and Fox also mission no longer represented a publicity threat. complain that MS UG's intimate inv:olvement Could these facts be related to the fact that the with police work "blurred for too many persons, CIA and USOM-MAAG shed their professorial including its own staff, its primary mission as cloaks and began to distribute d8;ggers openly an educational institution. The last point appli~s at about the same time? Then, too, by 1957, with even greater force to M8'UG's somewhat the manacled peasant had begun his flight from forced hospitality as an organizational cover Diem's repression into the maquYs 53 ; for the for certain intelligence functions f;f the American peasant, his urban sympathizers, together with government until mid-1959. Not only was the the sects and certain ethnic minorities, and for cover quite transparent, but what it did not the Diem regime, the gloves were off.

NOTES: 9. ibid. 23. Scheer, p. 249. 39. ibid. , p. 16. 24 The Detroit News, Loe. cit. 40. Final Report, p. 47. 1. J oseph Zasloff, A Study of 10. Scigliano & Fox, pp. 2, 75. 11. Scigliano & Fox, p. 3. 25.· Final Report, p. 2: Scigliano & 41. Scigliano & Fox, pp. 16, 21; Administration in Binh Minh Final Report, p. 47. District, MS UG, Saigon, October 12. See, for example, Wise & Ros!f, Fox, p. 5. / 1961 (mlmeo), p. 25. The Invisible Government, Ran­ 26. Scigliano & Fox, pp. 6, 66. 42. Scigliano & Fox, p. 19. 2. Available from the Center for dom House, 1964, pp. 157-158. 27. Scheer, p. 251; also Final Re- 43. Scigliano & Fox, p. 18; Final Report, p. 66. the Study of Democratic Institu­ 13. Cbaffard, pp. 75, 8~·- port, p. 61. tions, Santa Barbara, California. 14. Scheer, quoted in Viet Nam, 28. Final Report, p. 48. 44. Fin.al Report, pp. 65-67. 3. Robert Scigliano and Guy H. ed. Marvin Gettleman, Fawcett, 29. ibid., my projections. 45. The Detroit News, ibid. Fox, Technical Assislance in Viet­ 1965, p. 249. 30. ibid., p. 49. 46. ibid. nam, The Michigan State Univer­ 15. ibid. 31. ibid., p. 45. 47. Scigliano & Fox, p. 41. sity Experience, Prager Special 16. Quoted irt "Deny MSU Fr~ted 32. Scigliano & Fox, p. 6. 48. ibid., p. 21. Studies, 1965. for CIA in Vietnam," The Detroit 33. Flnal Report, p. 47. 49. ibid., p. 60. 4. Scigliano & Fox, p. 1. News, Sunday, Nov. 28, 1965. 34. Scigliano & Fox, pp. 17, 23. 50. ibid., p. 11. 5. Georges Chaffard, L'Indochine 17. Scheer, p. 249. 35. Scigliano & Fox, pp. 17, 19. 51. ibid. --dix ans d'independnnce, Cal­ 18. Final Report, MSUG, Saigon, Final Report, p. 48. 52. Final Report, pp. 65-67. mann-Levy, Paris, 1964, pp. 24, June 1962 (mimeo), p. 1. 36. Final Report, 45-51. On the 53. See Philippe Devillers, "The 27, 53. 19. Final Report, pp. 61, 62. palace guard, Scigliano & Fox, Struggle for Unification," China 6. Scigliano & Fox, p. 1. 20. Scigliano & Fox, pp. 40-41. p. 18. Quarter/v, January-March 1962. ' 7. ibid. 21. ibid., p. 4. 37. Scigliano & Fox, p. 15. 8. ibid; also Scheer. 22. ibid., p. 21. 38. ibid.

February 1966 21 LYND/HAYDEN/APTHEKER

I

INTERVIEW the DRV, the NLF, the U.S.S.R.

On January 9 Stoughton Lynd, Thomas Hayden and Herbert Aptheker returned from a three-week fact-finding mission to Prague, Moscow, Peking and Hanoi. Professor Lynd traveled as a corS'.espondent for Viet Report. The following is the fourth in a series of interviews with NLF and ORV officials held during the trip. Subsequent issues of Viet­ Report will publish their interviews from Prague and Peking.

Moscow, December 23. - We spoke with mem­ coalition government, the ambassador said it bers of the Soviet Peace Committee, with an did not mean either. True, the 1960 NLF pro­ official of the DRV embassy iri Moscow, and gram invoked by point four calls for a coalition with a r~presentative of the NLF stationed in government. But how to form a coalition gov­ Moscow. ernment should not be decided by international agreement. The people of South Vietnam must Soviet Peace Committee members: One me,m­ have the right to determine their, own affairs. ber of the Committee said that the main Russian As to troop withdrawal, the ambassador said grievance against China over Vietnam was that negotiations could begin when the U.S. solemnly China has not allowed the coordination of aid recognized the DRV Four Points and the NLF from the socialist countries. He did not think Five Points. The Five Points include the state­ Chinese pressure was decisive in preventing the ment that the NLF is the sole representative of DRV from negotiating. Another member of the the South Vietnamese people, which means that Committee questioned whether China gave much they must be included in negotiations. aid to Vietnam. All members of the committee stressed that the Vietnamese must say for them­ The DRV Embassy official responded to a selves what help they need and how peace question about supervision of a peace agree­ should be made. Russia has given military aid ment by the ICC [International Control Com­ and also, through the Peace Committee, medical mission; established by the Geneva Agreements supplies, canned food and clothing. Two mem­ to supervise their execution] or some other international body by saying that the DRV has bers of the Committee estimated that one to two always recognized the ICC and reported viola­ million Russian men would volunteer to fight in Vietnam if such· help were asked. tions to it. As for the future role and composi­ tion of the ICC, that ' would be determined by DRV official: U.S. so-called unconditional an international conference composed of the negotiations in fact make two conditions: ( 1) same parties. as at Geneva. The U.S. is not ready to withdraw; (2) It will Herbert Aptheker suggested that the NLF not negotiate with the NLF. The four points present its case to the U.N. The answer was of the DRV amount to independence and reuni­ that the U.N. has no authority in Vietnam fication. This proposal represents a compromise because it was not involved in the Geneva as compared with the Geneva Agreements: it Agreements. Generally speaking the people of envisions two provisional governments for a Vietnam lack confidence in the U.N., as in the considerable period, during which South Viet­ instances of Cuba, the Congo and the Domini­ nam would be neutral. President Johnson wants can Republic. The DRV would appreciate' help Vietnam divided forever. in gaining access for its representatives to coun­ He referred to · Ho's interview with Felix tries from which they have been excluded, such Greene and his own interview with an Asahi as England and Italy, but they would prefer to correspondent printed in Vietnam Courier, De­ present their case outside the U.N. The DRV cember 16, 1965, as authoritative. welcomed the November 27 March on Wash­ Questioned as to whether point four in the ington, but it disagreed with those slogans of D RV program meant a negotiated or elected the March which called on the U.N. The slogans 22 Viet-Report

'' considered correct were: ( 1) Recognize the NLF; ment in 1954, the American antiwar movement (2) Bring the troops home; (3) Stop bombing; is broader, as the French movement was based ( 4) Cease military activity in South Vietnam; only on the workers. Never in U.S. history has (5) Problems of Vietnam should be settled by a government been so isolated from the people. the Vietnamese. Also, the march slogan "even­ Never before have the contradictions among tual withdrawal" was in violation of the Geneva U.S1 ruling circles been so strong. Many Ameri­ Agreements, which prohibited the presence of cans oppose U.S. policy who do not support foreign troops. the NLF struggle. In the current war the U.S. is supported by fewer countries than in Korea. NLF representative: LThis 56-year-old man France wants to take advantage of. an American was first imprisoned in 1930. Of the persons we defeat. England has not contributed effectively. have thus far :rp.et, he is the most soft-spoken A worldwide front against the war is taking · and the most militant.] shape. Thus, the revolution is stronger than in The American people form · the rear of one 1954 at the same time that its demands are less. battle in which the people of Vietnam are the An instance of the compromise by the NLF front line, he said. Both peoples suffer from the with regard to the Geneva Agreements was that war. they said nothing about South Vietnam, but the The strategic aim of the United States is NLF concedes the possibility of a neutral South permanently to occupy South Vietnam and turn Vietnam. The NLF has not put forward a it into a "new-type colony." The South Viet­ method for reunification, preferring to let that namese people could never agree to any troops, question be settled by the people. Also the NLF or any U.S. military base, remaining in South program provides for a coalition government in Vietnam. Even a small base wollld mean that South Vietnam, as the Geneva Agreements did the U.S. was preparing for another attack. If not. the U.S. were to succeed in colonizing South Because these' demands are lower than Gene­ Vietnam, the people ' would have to undergo va, we will not concede more. even more suffering than they have since 1956. The South Vietnamese people cherish peace A South Vietnamese base could also be used to more than any other people in the world. The attack North Vietnam. de~ire for peace may be seen in the fact that in Face-saving? The U.S. has unmasked its face, the intervals of_fighting we continue to build. lost its face. Withdrawal may mean failure but The free zone represents four fifths of the terri­ the U.S. will have to withdraw in the future tory of South Vietnam. The war cannot prevent from other places as well. "Special War" was an the people from building a new life. experiment in South Vietnam directed against We are educating those who collaborated to the national liberation movements of the whole come back with the people, he said. In the past world. If after 20 years of struggle, with the five years we have helped fourteen authorities widest support from world public opinion, South to create written alphabets. Life in liberated Vietnam were to allow American troops to stay South Vietnam is at a higher level than during it would open no prospects for other countries. the resistance war against the French. In long If troops stayed the war could drag on indefi­ term resistance we can at the same time fight nitely. and build a new life. No matter how many The problem is that the Americans still hope troops it sends, America could never reoccupy an occupation is possible. They recognize the the liberated zone. We compel them to fight failure of special wa:r recognize the failure of hand to hand. American modern weapons can­ escalated war, but are still not hopeless because not be fully used. In a colonial and agricultural they have not understood the strength of peo­ country there are limits to the effectiveness of ple's war. They still hope to improvise a such weapons. The U.S. has two alternatives: victory. withdraw or lose. American conditions for negotiation amount Because the day for ne~otiations has notcome to surrender and permitting the Americans to yet we cannot talk about conqrete conditions. remain. However, in general a coalition government Generally speaking, the aims of the NLF are should include all patriotic mass organizations lower than their strength: they could win ten and also individual collaborators who reject points, so to speak, but put forward as a pro­ American aggression. As to the NLF's future gram only seven or eight. To some extent this economic and social program, it has already permits face-saving for the United States. begun to apply it. Two million hectares have The revolutionary forces in South Vietnam · been distributed to individual farmers. The re­ are much stronger than in 1954, at Dienbien­ education of collaborators goes on in every phu. Compared to the French antiwar move- village. February 1966 23 S.O.S. FOR VIETNAM 1

In the summer of 1965 Dr. Vo that separately we might be able to ex~ctly what he says. He seeks Thanh Minh, a Vietnamese self­ make the contacts that together we people like himself, people like the expatriated intellectual, Professor failed to do. This attempt proved civil rights sit-in'ers in the South, Edith Guild, a Romance Language equally abortive. Professor Guild to place their bodies, their physical Professor from York University in returned to Toronto, and I made bodies in ' front of the war effort Toronto and I, a Unitarian Uni­ an inspection trip to Laos and being mounted by the Uriited States . versalist minister from Long South Vietnam en route home. Department of Defense in coopera­ Island, embarked upon an inde­ When Dr._ Vo's visa to Cambodia tion with the President and the State pendent mission to Southeast Asia expired , he was escorted to the Department. to try to determine the conditions South Vietnamese frontier. Immedi­ Dr. Vo Thanh Minh is a very necessary to conclude the war in ately upon setting foot in South simple human being. He sees sim­ Viet Nam. Vietnam we understand he was ple solutions to complex problems. Our qualifications were minimal, arrested. Appeals to Ambassador And very likely he is correct. The as were our goals. "Our mission is Lodge on behalf of Dr. Vo's safety solution to the Vietnamese war may non-political, non-violent, and non­ have perhaps forestalled the ex­ well be simple. It may involve a partisan. It is devoted exclusively treme penalty which Marshal Ky's massive demonstration against the to helping all sides in the tragic regime reserves for "neutralism." atrocity to humanity not in Wash­ Vietnam war to agree to a cease Only now have we had word from ington, not in the United Nations fire that anticipates negotiation, Dr. Vo from a house arrest in Plaza, not in front of missile fac­ eventual withdrawal of foreign Pleiku, northern South Vietnam. He tories but in Vietnam itself. I join troops and war material, and the has transmitted this SOS for Viet­ Dr. Vo Thanh Minh in a call for. self-determination of the peoples of nam published below. a movement of concerned people to Vietnam .to choose their own form My . friend Professor Stanley. mount yet another mission to Viet­ of government." So ran an official Millet asked me what Dr. Vo means nam. Here in Vietnam, North and statement we released to the press when he impassionedly writes: South, may be the logical places to in Hong Kong. "Peace-loving men and women of protest the escalation of a war so We first went to Phnompenh, the entire world! Fly quickly to graphically and movingly de- Cambodia, in the hopes of contact­ Saigon, to Hanoi, to Hue, to scribed below. · ing representatives of the DRV. Pleiku . . . to help your martyred • Farley W. Wheelwright, Minis- Professor Guild and I dissociated Vietnamese brothers and sisters." ter, Unitarian Universalist ourselves from Dr. Vo in the hope What does he mean? He means Church of Central Nassau by Dr. Vo Thanh Minh Pleiku, Christmas 19..65-- The war in this tor­ London, Paris ... and their diplomacy is so tor­ tured country has attained a degree of barbarity tuous, their bargaining so slow, that a cease­ never before experienced in human history. All fire will certainly not come tomorrow. Yet, the modern devices for slaughter are being Vietnamese people and all peoples of the world laboratory ~ tested on the flesh of innocent people, demand peace with a loud voice, immediate while awaiting the opportunity to use nuclear pea ce, peace at all costs. The brief Christmas weapons which would threaten to exterminate truce has merely spared 51 few thousand human the human species. Such unfortunate cities as lives and there is very little hope that the second Danang, Chulai and Pleime in the South--to truce proposed by the Vatican. for the New Year mention only those more severely hit and where will take place. In any case, it is not ,with thousands of victims fall - have become univer­ truces of 12 or 30 hours accepted for propa­ sally known. The same is tr ue of Vinh , Ronco ganda purposes or for the sake of holiday and Xongbi where tons of explosives are un­ merrimt11t, that one can reswre peace to this loaded at each bombing. The fauna and the country. We need something far more serious, flora are not spared in the disaster. Innumer­ more sincere, more logical, more practical. able traces of horror left by napalm bombs Though international contacts and initiatives and toxic gases in· the Vietnamese jungle give taken abroad on behalf of Vietnam are neces­ those flying over it the impression of an enor­ sary and desirable, what is more nec.essary and mous human body suffering third degree burns. desirable is that the Vietnamese people them­ Death and destruction are so atrocious that selves be allowed to participate in their own ~ven those responsible for the war began some rescue. Nothing is more disheartening to this time ago to talk of negotiations. However, they people than to perceive that its own fate is speak of them in Moscow, Peking, Washington, being decided by foreign powers, hostile to one 24 ' Viet-Report

f- \ I another and which manipulate Vietnam as a brothers and sisters. It is in Vietnam itself that mere pawn in a chess game in pursuit of their the Vietnamese problem must be treated; and the own interests. Not all Vietnamese are simply participation of Buddhist, Christian, Neutralist pawns or political minors. They are tired of and other patriots is indispensable. A truly hearing continua1 references to such remote and popular delegation could be formed quickly and dubious rescuers, whereas all their own efforts sent to engage in prelijminary talks with the to remedy the situation at great peril to them­ belligerent parties. Better than anyone they selves, lead to arrest, impri~onment, exile or know how to find the precise words and con­ execution as great criminals. vincing arguments to force the belligerents to sit Peace-loving men and women of the entire at the negotiation table: Let those who insist on world! Fly quickly to Saigon, to Hanoi, to Hue, pursuing a war so long abhorred by all of to Pleiku . . . to help your martyred Vietnamese humani~y , beware. J / (continued from p. 2) that "the internal affairs of South Vietnam ... be set­ to bases like Camranh Bay where the Seventh Fleet tled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in could triple its grip on Asia for years to come. An accordance with the program of the National Libera­ indefinite U.S. military and "political" occupation of tion Front" -- but it would be unfortunate if it should South Vietnam was happily confessed by Saigon with remain uninformed of just what this "program" the·'"blessing of Secretary Rusk. And now, of course, entails. Altogether too little is known of the NLF-­ almost the entire administration has gbne to Honolulu and the Front itself has Iyudly tried to remedy the to convince Premier Ky of U.S. sincerity in promoting situation. anticommunism in South Vietnam. Who are they? What do they want? How do they "Now that we have passed the point of no return," intend to get it? To begin to answer these questions, said Senator Aiken just before the resumption of the Viet-Report introduces with this issue an intensive bombing, "we ought to take a hard look at where examination of both the official and unofficial record we're going." Judging from the alacrity with which of the NLF and their fighters, the "Vietcong." the bombing was turned back on, the "look" that Opposed to program of the Front, the United States Aiken and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has devised its own "revolution," a truly "pro-people" had finally begun to direct toward Vietnam, was revolution. The internal "pacification" program which "harder" than the credibility of the peace offensive is- now unfolding in South Vietnam (not for the first could afford. Members of the Committee, Senators time) is the brainchild of Major-General Edward G. like Church and McGovern and Fulbright had Lansdale, Assistant to Ambassador Lodge and polit­ begun to ask the crucial question: Would the United ical advisor to the Ky government. So that our States allow the National Liberation Front to par­ readers could compare the NLF program with a ticipate in a settlement of the war? It is tragic that statement of the American alternative, we sought per­ the renewal of the bombing cut this question off in its mrss1on from General Lansdale to reprint his infancy. Ambassador Goldberg's appeal to the UN influential article "Vietnam: Do We Understand Revo­ may be useful if only because it seems to be lution?" from the October 1964 Foreign , Affairs. driving the question out into the open again. Lansdale has failed to respond to our cable, and in In the meantime, what about the National Libera­ accordance with the decision of his publishers --that tion Front? If there is to be any realism in Washing­ he enjoys too "sensitive" a post today to publish his ton's future flirtations with a settlement, it must grapple views at-large without his personal agreemertt--we with the situation of the nine million South Vietnamese are witholding it. Instead, in "The Two Programs", who for better or worse are with the "Vietcong." Jt is John McDermott has quoted liberally from the arti­ significant that Washington has recently confessed its cle. We hope that General Lansdale's views are confusion over Point 3 of Hanoi's "Four Points" -- adequately represented. VIETNAMESE CATHOLICS CALL FOR PEACE

When Washington's policy in Vietnam of neutralism" are crimes punishable by the fir­ appears inscrutable, it may be wise to look to ing squad (N. Y. Times, 7 /23/66), we have much Saigon for the hard evidence. Saigon shares to learn about ourselves, about what we see fit one feature with the Vietcong: it cannot afford to offer the needy, and about what sanctions we to worry about "face." Its survival is at stake. are prepared to level should our "commitments" not be honored by them. That is a concern of In this Asian capital of the free world where Martin Nicolaus and John McDer;mott elsewhere offenses ranging from "hooliganism to support in this issue. Here, we have the occasion to February 1966 25 /

learn something about South Vietnam itself as Browne (Viet-Report advisory editor) from experienced by South Vietnamese. The authors Bangkok-- to which it had been carded by of the statement below .are not ordinary South hand from South Vietnam - it expresses the full Vietnamese -- "ordinary" in the sense the- war horrar of the war as it is visited upon those, has forced us to use the term, for either "Viet­ who like Dr. Vo 'fhanh Minh (page 24), find cong" or Saigonese. They are Vietnamese Ca­ themselves isolated from all centers of power tholic priests who, balking at a traditional in the dispute. Their appeal begs many prac­ allegiance with the capital powers -- whether tical questions; its passion is clear. They would mandarin, French or American -- have organ­ accept -- even welcome -- "diversity of ideologies ized for perhaps the first time in recent history and beliefs"; that is what peace means. What around a platform of peace, at any price. the war has meant, and continues to mean for Theirs is not a revolutionary statement. What them, is not the possible triumph of one ideology is extraordinary about it are the conditions out over another, but the triumph of death over of which it rises. Mailed to Professor Robert man. CALL FOR PEACE

Saigon, January 1, 1966 tions of all those who in the depths • That the great powers re~pect We the under.signed, Vietnamese of suffering have almost lost their the rights of people to autonomy Roman Cathqlic priests, free from voice... . and to self:determination, and that all religious and political partisan­ • We cannot countenence this ab­ they not contribute to the increas-. ship, considering the present situa­ surd drama in which brothers of ing murderousness of the Vietnam­ tion of the country and following the same nationality, sharing the ese war, which is leading to an the increasingly pressing appeals same sincere love of their country impasse whose only resolution can of His Holiness Pope Paul VI, wish and its ..-people, the same devotion be global conflict. to express the deep anguish of the to a great cause, the same thirst • Since under the present condi­ men who refuse to betray mankind, for peace, must fight and kill each tions of war the North and South of those Vietnamese who share the other in hatred. as well as the great powers who sufferings of their compatriots, and support them have effectively shown also of the servants of Christ Jesus • We cannot accept the fact that the desire to unify the country or that they cannot by themselves end who died to brihg love and salva­ the war by an illusory wait for the tion to all men. to construct some better future should serve as a pretext for con­ victory of one side and the surren­ Too much human blood has al­ der of the other, it follows that ready flowed in Vietnam; the fratri­ tinuing this fratricidal war. That is why we request that the a uthorities almost the only way to end the cidal war is at its pinnacle of hostilities, to negotiation, and to cruelty. North and South immediately take all appropriate steps to end the war. peace (with a minimum of blood­ In their struggle for military vic­ shed) is to recognize both the tory, both North and South are • That there be no waiting for any guarantee whatever before de­ mediation and arbitration ot the progressively eroding the country's United Nations, to turn to it for aid autonomy; the Vietnamese prqblem ciding sincerely to respect the lives and liberty ·of the Vietnamese of and to collaborate sincerely with is moving further and further that organization. towards an impasse, since its solu­ North and South and the brother­ tion no longer depends on the free hood which unites them. With all our hearts we ask men decision of the Vietnamese people. • To renounce the pretension of of good will in both the North and The disorders of war and the seeking by force of arms a guar­ the · South to rise above all forms presence of foreign troops are plac­ antee of negotiations and the end of oppression; to courageously ing the mass of people in economic, of hostilities, and to renounce the and frankly express the will for social and moral conditions de­ ambition of implanting or sup­ peace of the Vietnamese people, meaning to human beings. pressing any ideology by subver­ so that the responsible authorities Along with all men of good will, sion or bombardment, since such will not longer be able to pretend we wish to consider the sacred acts can only lead to genocide and ignorance or enjoy a tranquil con- destiny of the human species, the the prolongation of the present , science while refusing to engage dignity of Man, the right to free­ underdevelopment and alienation in negotiations for peace. dom, the brotherhood of all men, of the country. But peace can come to stay only and to remember each of our • That the authorities on both if and when the Vietnamese realize brothers who today, in the North sides engage in a dialogue in jus­ the dangers which threaten the peo­ as well as in the South, are prey to tice and loyalty, toward a peace ple and the land, so that the good the ravages of bombing, to the whose effective realization is the of the commuD-ity and the survival oppression of ideology, to misery, only way in which both sides will of the people may take precedence to suffering, to the degrading seduc­ be able to commit themselves en­ over individual or group interests. tion of money, and who are divided tirely to the creation of material The people's survival, its inter­ and torn by prejudice, vested inter­ and moral conditions necessary to ests, peace - all of these have ests and politics. any free and democratic choice of nothing to fear from the diversity In ·the name of these men, we the Vietnamese people about their of ideologies and beliefs, but, on wish to express aloud the aspira- future. the other hand, do have something 26 Viet-Report to fear from those who, in their 'hearts, all our families, all groups Up to now, in the name of names, go so far as to prevent the bonds which already now per­ humanity, we have echoed the voi­ free choice and freely-held beliefs mit us to build the structure. of a ces of those· who have almost lost among their compatriots. Also to new society with truth, justiCi!e, their own. To conclude, we speak be feared are those whose only liberty and love as the foundations again in the name of humanity for religion and ideology are them­ of an authentic world of peace and those who have decided not to let selves, their money, their own pas­ happiness. In this world, man shall themselves be subjugated in unhap­ sions and their private interests. no longer have to fight man for piness, for those who do not accept The time has come to mobilize the right to live and to think. defeatism, for those who seek vic­ all the faith and spiritual energy Ra~er, all men shall cooperate to tory- but not the victory of arms, that are left in man and in the exploit natural resources, equally exploitation, and hatred,.,. We people, not , for the purpose of sharing the conditions and means seek the victory of truth, justice, spreading hatred, but rather to of material and spiritual prbgress liberty, and love, the only victory extinguish all traces of discord and necessary to personal and com­ which can bring peace with true jealousy, to tighten with all our munal accomplishment. honor for mankind. If History :Behaved

by W{lliam Ross

OUR VIETNAM NIGHTMARE. Marguerite trips to Vietnam." Some of her visits coincided Higgins. Harper & Row: 1965. 314 pp. with the stays of David Halberstam and $5.95. Malcom Brown, who themselves won Pulitzer THE LOST REVOLUTION. Robert Shaplen. Prizes for their exposure of the Diem regime Harper & Row: 1965 .. 404 pp. $6. 95. and coverage of the Buddhist crisis which led to his overthrow. In her "minority report" Miss Higgins ( rparried to General William Hall Even the conscientious American reporter, until her recent death) makes it clear that her trying to cover the war from every angle in view of the war and world politics is that "the Vietnam, finds a crucial part of the circle cut only good Communist is a dead Communist." off from him. Restricted to areas occupied by Therefore, she finds little use for a discusion the U.S. and Saigon, everything he knows of the background of the war or an analysis about the National Liberation Front and the of the social and economic factors which have forces against the government comes to him played a role in its development. Disagreeing by hearsay or through the means of official with the Halberstam analysis which pointed intelligence reports -- hardly known for their to the growing authoritarianism of the Diem reliability in South Vietnam. The. effect is that regime and a continuous persecution of the the Vietcong are not real except as enemy Buddhist population as a source of great weak­ soldiers in battle. The Vietcong among the ness in Saigon, she claims that the Buddhist people or as the leaders of a nationalist revo­ crisis was a hoax and that Diem's strongarm lution are never seen. They are the enemy, tactics were the only way to control a country tools of Hanoi and China, and instruments of that was 'fighting a war. In the Buddhist crisis . a worldwide program of "national liberation." she claims to find much evidence showing that The sophisticated observer may sense that this the whole affair was plann(/d and put into picture is not quite true, but he has little way of effect by the Vietcong and self-seeking monks getting a complete picture and in the end is with the aim of overthrowing the government forced to use the cliches himself. The two books and preparing a Vietcong victory. She claims under review, while as different as black .and that demonstrators were paid; that some of the white in the quality of analysis they offer about monks who burned themselves were mistakenly the events in South Vietnam, . both suffer from persuaded that there was religious persecution this one-sided view. and were drugged before going to their "bar- '­ Marguerite Higgins, who won a Pulitzer prize becue"; that the Buddhist leaders burned tem­ for her coverage of the Korean War, wrote ples themselves and invited the press to their Our Vietnam ·Nightmare after making "ten demonstrations with the aim of gaining a February 1966 27 sympathetic American ear; and that Thich Tri dence is given for the supposed early ro~e of Quang, the Buddhist leader, was a demagogue, the communists in the war. a Vietc<:mg_- agent, and "un-religious." The evidence she presents for all these assertion~ is Shaplen returned to Vietnam near the end of scanty and emotion~!, dominated by a rage the Diem regime and found himself in a position against anyone who was opposing those who to view close hand the plots and counterplots were fighting the Communists. For example: that led to the overthrow and assassination of / Piem and his brother. This story, and the No Vietnamese or American could prove that he subsequent rise · and fall of Khanh, are given [ Thich Tri Quang] was a Communist or that his motives were pro-Communist. Proof, in the Occi lavish treatment--some of the information is dental sense, presumably would require a plaintiff reporteq here for the first time. The sequence to produce an authenticated Communist-party card of crises in American and Vietnamese strategy of membership, complete with photographs and are given in detail: the failure of the original fingerprints. But that Communist ends were being agrarian reform, the failure of the "agrovilles," served by Buddhist-instigated street mobs a:nd the failure of the "strategic hamlets," the mis­ Buddhist-abetted intrigues among the military was evaluation of . the political forces in South undeniable. . . . Is a Vietnamese government of integrity and capability to be brought down once Vietnam, the 'weakening of the military ~ffort again by a numerically tiny minority of knife­ and the increasing desertions from the army-­ wielding, rock-throwing hoodlums manip~lated by all leading to the collapse of first the political, Buddhist political pr_iests of dubious purposes who . then the military strategies in 1964 and the mass use the privileged sanctuary of a few pagodas for intervention of American forces. The evidence instigating chaos? Is this the way to run a war­ is here, but the conclusion which would seem to or even a capital city (p. 259)? follow is not entertained. Patriotism se~ms to In contrast to the often incoherent account of have triumphed over honesty, or at least over Marguerite Higgins, The Lost Revolution is the sometime logic of unhappy endings. intelligent, well-informed, and analytical. It may But even this history is from one perspective: be the best book available on the early role of Diem fell because he was authoritarian and the United States in Vietnam. Robert Shaplen couldn't control the Nhu's; ,the agricultural· was head of the Far East Bureau of Newsweek programs failed because of some planning after the end of World War II, and in contrast mistakes and corruption of village officials; to many other books by reporters on Vietnam, American plans were bad because of poor he begins ~is chronicle with this period. Accord­ contact with the Vietnamese and a lack of ing to Shaplen, it was Ho Chi Minh's hope, experienced personnel in Southeast Asian during this time when the Vietminh were fighting 'affairs -- or, as'. Schlesinger implies, they were the French and the Japanese, that the' United too busy to bother with the Vietnam of the States would support him. Many of Roosevelt's Vietnamese. · Certainly these are all indications speeches during the war, advocating freedom of the cracks in the dam. The pressure is what from colonialism for Asia, are cited as offering is missing. Ho support in this view. The failare of the Shaplen gives no consideration to the actions Truman administration to pursue this line, of the NLF or Hanoi during this period. What _, Shaplen concludes, ended our chances of sup- was the source of the rural revolt before the -porting a really nationalist regime in Indochina, NLF even existed? Were the peasants attracted , and constitute in his mind an important element by the programs of the NLF, or were they in­ in the "lost revolution." This chapter, and the different? Was the Vietcong "terror" really a succeeding one on the French reoccupation, war, terror or did the villagers consider them "justi­ and eventual defeat contain some of the best fied" assassinations? ·Was Diem really consid­ writing I have seen on -this period in Vietnam. ered a nationalist leader in the South? How did The next peFiod, induding Diem's early his­ the southerners view Ho · Chi Minh? What were tory and the origins of the war receive poorer the military and political strategies of the NLF, treatment. Diem's background and early role and what mistakes did they make? Who were as a nationalist leader are covered adequately, the personalities who shaped these policies? but his involvement with tbe "Vietnam Lobby" These subjects are barely touched on in the in the United States is barely noted. For a war book, and while some lack .of information is in which early American involvement has played understandable, it is unforgiveable that the such a misunderstood role, the few pages de­ author does not recognize the lack. He turns voted to its origins is inexcusable. Too little - his microscope on Saigon politics but the wrong attention is paid to the fate of the Vietminh end of the telescope on the people. No wonder and to the rebellion of the peasants, and too Americans cannot understand why we are much to Diem's battles with the sects. No evi- "losing -the war." 28 Viet-Report TWO PROGRAMS - Continued from Page 10

volves providing South Vietnam " ... with a BEFORE THE 1"NEW" -PACIFICATION PROGRAM dynamic political answer with which to meet and overcome the foreign ideas introduced by the "The hamlets are dividul into 'lien gia' or inter­ communists as the political base of their attack" family groups. In Com A.1, as in other villages in (p. 79). But whose ideas are foreign? The Quang Nam [Province) the size of the 'lien gia' Front's? Or Lansdale's? The General himself varies from 12 to 40 households .. .. The primary acknowledges that the saving ideas must come functions of the 'lien gia' are to disseminate news and information and provide security" (pp. l 1-12). from the United States -- and, of course, there is ... "The police councillor on the village council is the rub. For Lansdale and for many Americans, responsible for law enforcement and security in the ideas which come from the United States are village. He holds all police power and judicial nowhere foreign: the American experience is authority .... He issues authorization for villagers to universally relevant. That is why one could run travel outside the Province (suspected subversives are barred from that privilege) . ... He makes month­ through the Lansdale article and replace the ly reports to the district chief on the number of name "Vietnam" with the name -of any other villagers who have joined the Vietcong since the country--say "Nigeria" or "Peru"--and it Geneva Agreement.... He is responsible for the would make little difference. The article does surveillance of the 'cou luu' or 'offenders under not deal with history; it deals only with "prin­ investigation.' These people, 51 in all, are suspected of being Vietcong sympathizers, either because some ciples." Yet those same principles, when applied relatives have joined the Vietcong or because they by Lansdale through Diem ten years ago, were denounced as suspects by other Cam An brought about the cong dien tragedy. I think inhabitants during public meetings in 1955" (p. 14). that that is a clue to precisely how relevant "During the week of observation, four declarations they are to the Vietnamese scene today. of loss of identity cards were made, accompanied by requests for new ones. Usually the village council But more. The Front's Program is concrete. made the applicants wait for several days before It discusses problems and it proposes solutions. their cases were reviewed. The deliberate delay was Does Lansdale? On the contrary, it would be imposed by the village chief to point up the serious­ I.' hard to write a more abstract program. He ness of losing these important papers" (p. 20). does not suggest what it is which will motivate - Survey in February, 196 l. Cam An: A Fishing Village in Central Vietnam, by the Vietnamese to fight the communists; no, he John Donoghue, Saigon, 1962 (Mirneo). argues only that a way must be found to make the Vietnamese find a way to do the job (p. 77). . .. in October, 1956 the [Diem) Government abro­ Does he have concrete roles for Vietnamese gated the traditional autonomy df the village by political leaders kept out of the ' government by appointing village chiefs and councils. This was in itself a return to the French system and was much Ky? No, a way must be found to make them resented, but Diem went yet further. Within the useful (p. 83). Does he have suggestions for villages the central government appointed chiefs for achieving cooperation among the Vietnamese each hamlet. Within the hamlet 'khom'. were organ­ governing factions? No,. a way must be found ized--groups of 25 to 35 families, whose chiefs were to make them cooperate (p. 84 ). also appointed. Within the khom, lien-gia which con­ sisted of about five families each were organized into What actually happens when General Lans­ cells, again with appointed chiefs. Chiefs were dale's 1964 Foreign Affairs 1 abstractions meet responsible for the loyalty of their people, and to the 1966 Vietnamese realities is even more this end an extensive mutual spying system wa!; instructive. His new "pacification plan" received instituted. All were to be fingerprinted, and identity only recently (N. Y. Times, January 21, 23 cardc were issued. Permission to leave the village had to be obtained in writing, and countersignatures and 24, 1966) a good deal of publicity. There were required before a man could leave the prov­ it is indicated that plans already are far ad­ ince·. In short, a totalitarian regime was imposed vanced t6 train 42,000 Vietnamese--in 80 man upon the countryside."

teams -- for pacification of . the rura'l areas. The PROFILE OF VIETNAMESE HISTORY training is being carried out by the CTA. Each\ August/Sept. Viet-Report copies a va ilable team includes an "armed propaganda platoon" which will provide security in the hamlet in their grievances and then to tell all they know question and then undertake "agitation and about the Vietcong. Some of the villagers will propaganda." "Meantime, the census grievance be pro-Vietcong and these will be "asked" to team -- described by one source as the 'key to the renounce their allegiance or even to become whole idea and the major vehicle to achieve double agents, spying on the Front for Saigon. control of the population'--will go into action" "Or, if the man in question is an important (N. Y. Times, 1/21/66). "The same news story cog in the Vietcong machine and stubborn, goes on to relate that the. team will " ... under­ another source said 'he might just have an take a systematic interrogation of everyone in accident -- you could assassinate him.'" (N. Y. the hamlet." The villagers will be asked to list Times, 1/21/66). February 1966 29 Interrogations will continue, reaching "each we then be faced with Americans returning from peasant in the hamlet once every 10 days. The Vietnam, filled with an enthusiasm to improve project will work something like a dental clinic; our political health? It happened this way in the peasant will be givr•·1 his next interrogation France within the last decade. Indeed, that would appointment as he : 1ds his first session" . be grim irony. Or, should we rest easy, assured (1/24/66). T,he proje-~. , which is "advised" by that General Lansdale is on the side of freedom General Lansdale ( 1/24/66) plans to issue because he cites so readily "the spirit. of the identity cards and set up family registers British Magna Carta, the French 'Liberte, Ega­ (1/23/66). "A map of each hamlet will be pre-.· lite, Fraternite,' and our own Declaration of pared, with red ·markings to show the houses of Independence" (p. 76)? ' known Vietcong sympathizers or of citizens with There are two more important contrasts be­ relatives in the guerrilla movement" ( 1/23/66). tween the Front Program and that of General In addition there will be an attempt "to orga­ Lansdale. By demanding Vietnamese independ­ nize every group of four to eight houses into ·ence from the Americans and eventual reunifi­ an 'inter-family group.' One family head in cation, the NLF offers a nationalist program. each neighborhood grouping will be appointed It specifically counters those who, like General as the group head" (1/23/66). There is some Lansdale, are prepared to interfere in Vietnam's public relations talk of building "democracy"; interna! life in order to guarantee that the we should take it with a grain of salt. For the "average Vietnamese" will "determine rightly project "will also organize a system of inter­ the fate of his country" (p. 86). Secondly, it is locking organizations -- one for youths, one for - the NLF Program which is "pro-people," not women, one for farmers -- to try to make every General Lansdale's. member of th~ hamlet a member of some kind I cannot speak for the future. The comrµunists of Government-sponsored organiza"tion with who dominate the Front may only be waiting some discipline and <::ontrol over him. 'It'~ a lit­ for lis to leave in order to erect their own police tle bit totalitarian,' a source remarked, 'but the state. But for the present and fGr the past the idea is to tie each person to some kind of con- foregoing analysis is true. · trolled organization.'" (1/21/66). Paradoxically enough, to consider the charge The source is not named. Could it be this leveled most often against the Front--that it familiar voice which summed up the pacification practices terror and murder in the villages -­ will show this most clearly. program thusly: "The Vietcong have an ideo­ I logical doctrine and discipline and you have to As I have mentioned above (and documented try to match them. . . . You cannot expect to elsewhere, see boxes), the Diem regime tried to defeat a political idea by giving someon,e al). establish precisely the same control apparatus in icebox" (1/23/66)? We have heard it before. the villages ten years ago when the same Gen­ Clearly we are giving the Vietnamese '" ... po­ eral Lansdale was advisor to Diem on "pacifi­ litical advice with a higher content of American cation." Diem moved his administration into the idealism in it" (Lansdale, p. 79), but will it villages in late 1956 and early 1957 and one work? It is not new. Almost exactly the same can trace from this date on the gradually rising program ,was pursued by the Diem Administra­ arc not only of rural insurgency but also of tion (see boxes) when the same General Lans­ assassinations of government officials. Within dale--along with Wesley Fishel's Michigan State every village the battle was fought out-- between Advisory Group--was advising Diem on "pacifi­ the communist-led Vietminh which had led the cation" ten years ago. And they were only resistance against the French and the new ad­ copying some devices pioneered by the French. ministration which so often included Vietnamese The present program differs from these earlier officials who had collaborated with the Frencli; efforts only in that it_will be pursued behind a between the heroe$ of the War of Independence military shield of U.S. troops and will include and the newcomers from Saigon, with the latter the "census grievance teams." I don't think it trying to erect a police state. The thousands of will work. dead village officials -- and the thousands of But it would be far worse if it did. The Lans­ dead Vietminh cadres -- are the casualties of that dale program goes far ,beyond any political grim face-to-face war. To call the latter mur­ contro.l program known to this century, the derers and the formei: victims is to falslfy his­ century of the totalitarians. Interviews with the tory. Generally it was the other way around. _ political police every ten days, the next appoint­ The strengfu of the Front rests in the fact ment automatic--as simple as going to the den­ that its leaders were the leaders of this resist­ tist. Not even Stalin ever envisioned such a ance to Diem's "pacification plan~" Other system. This is worse than Stalinism; it is meta­ leaders could have led this resistance. But some Stalinism. Suppose the scheme did work. Would went into exile, some conspired in Saigon, some, 30 Viet-Report other means, it can act to influence the behavior of the Front. It can drive the Front into total dependence on Hanoi, Peking, Moscow--as Mr...... z w <: Truman appears to have driven the infant t:r::l w Vietminh to Peking in the late 1940's by auto­ ~ -tiiJ ~ ';'3 matically including it in the "international com­ -< t:r::l ,, 0 (J) tiiJ munist conspiracy." Or it can act both positively ::0 ""'3 .,, 0 and negatively to bring a peace of reconciliation ~ ...i ,, ~ ...., ::i and a society of internal peace to the Vietnam- ' ;z: 0. ese as it has already done in both eastern ~ (J) ...... ""'3 Europe and Algeria. It would be a measure of 0 ::0 0 t:r::l Washington's realism to explore more fully ~ c.:i t:r::l than it has done so far the opportunities for ""'3 such a solution in Vietnam. ' A measure of realism is also required of the Front. Hanoi responded to President Johnson's April 7 speech by offering a set of proposals -­ the "FoU,r Points" --within 12 hours; the Front only spat defiance (see Courier). They must learn that there are elements in the American government which might wish to work out agreements fully respecting Vietnamese sover­ eignty and bringing to an end the American intervention, provided they were able more clearly 1to see -- and rely on -- the Front's future international and domestic policies. Of course, the greater burden for this kind of realism must rest on Washington rather than on Nguyen Huu Tho and his colleagues. After all, Washington is fighting mostly for its pres­ tige while the Front is fighting for its very life.

Chaffard, Georges. "Inside Vietcong Territory," Viel-Report. July- 1965. Devillers, Philippe. "The Struggle for the Uni­ fication of Vietnam," China Quarterly. Janu­ ary-March. 1962 (reprinted in Gettleman, Viet Nam. Fawcett, 1965 ). Fall, Bernard B. "The Year of the Hawks" New York Times Magazine. December 12, 1965. Geneva Agreements, reproduced in Viet-Report, •••••••••••••••••••••• August/September 1965. VIET-REPORT • Hammer, Ellen. "Genesis of the First Indo­ An Emergency News Bulletin on Southeost Asian Affairs • chinese War," reprinted in Gettleman, op. cit. 133 WEST 72nd STREET e NEW YORK, N.Y. l 0023 • Hickey, Gerald. Village in Vietnam. Yale Uni­ versity Press, 1964. Please enter my subscription for: • International Control Commission, Reports of, 0 6 months, $2.50 • excerpted in Viel-Report, October 1965. 0 1 year, $5.00 Lancaster, Donald. The Emancipation of French Indochina. Oxford University Press, 1961. 0 1 year gift, $5.00 • Maps, cf. that of Vietnam Courier, December 0 1 year as Charter Subscriber, $10.00 • 2, 196 and that of New York Times, 0 1 year as Sponsor, $50.00 • January 30, 1966 (section 4). 0 I wish to help dist;ibute Viet-Report. • Sacks, Milton. HMarxism in Vietnam," in Frank 0 Enclosed is my contribution of $ • S .. Trager (Ed.) Marxism in Southeast Asia. to your Publication Fund. Stanford University Press, 195r. Statement of March 22 by the NLF, in Ber­ Nome ...... ,,, ...... • nard Fall and Marcus Raskin (Ed.), The Vietnam Reader. Random House, 1965. Note Street ...... • changes made by Hanoi. •• Tanham, George. Conununist Revolutionary City ...... State ...... Zip ...... Wa1fare. Praeger, 1961. • Viet, Hoang Quoc. A Heroic People (Mem- Nome ...... • oirs of the Revolution). Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1960. Street ...... Vietnam Courier, an English language bi-weekly • City ...... : ...... State .. published by the DRV. The Front's response .. Zip ...... •. in April 29, 196 issue. Please make check or money order payable to Viet-Report . • Woodruff, Lloyd. Local Administratio11 i11 Viet­ nam: Its Future Deuelopme11l. Michigan State University, The National Institute of Admin­ •••••••••••••••••••••• istration, Saigon, 1961 (Mimeo). 32 Viet-Report