COMMENTARY

after more than 50 years (Goldman 2020). Intrusions and Violation of LAC The terrain where the current tensions have taken place is important for both the in – Border countries for its geostrategic and political reasons, though it is a wasteland situated at a very high altitude and not suitable Sebastian N for human inhabitation as it is covered by snow almost round the year. The current The lack of a clearly defi ned fter a brief interlude of about three crisis gets special attention as it emerged borderline and a mutually years since Doklam crisis in 2017, in a time when almost all countries in yet another round of tensions the world are undergoing through the accepted actual line of control is A started in the India–China border at COVID-19 pandemic, and China is accused the major reason for continuous in May this year. It is “normal” by the Western countries for its laxity that tension and clashes between that tussles occur in usual intervals in caused the global spread of the pandemic. India and China. The political different sectors of the 3,488 km long The border or territorial dispute bet- India–China border. Mostly, such situa- ween India and China has its roots in the leadership of both the countries tions are handled at local levels and rarely colonial construction of states and their should see the present crisis as an lead to human casualty. The current clash- boundaries in the Himalayan region opportunity to fi nd an everlasting es started when around 250 Indian and (Karackattu 2017; Noorani 2011). By the resolution to the border question. Chinese soldiers stood face to face at the end of 19th and early 20th centuries, the banks of Pangong Tso, near the Line of region became a theatre of big power Actual Control (LAC) at Eastern Ladakh. confl icts, popularly known as “The Great The tussle started on 5 May and has spread Game.” The three major global empires/ to adjacent areas of Naku La and Galwan powers at that time, the British India, Valley and turned to bloody clashes, which Chinese Empire and the Russian Tsarist Sebastian N ([email protected]) is at the caused the death of many soldiers from Empire, shared borders in the region Department of International Relations, Sikkim both sides. This type of a clash between the and played in the great power game that Central University, Gangtok. forces leading to human casualty happened was very crucial in setting the cartography

22 AUGUST 8, 2020 vol lV nos 32 & 33 EPW Economic & Political Weekly COMMENTARY of this area. They had made many agree- Pradesh. The issue became much more actions in , the presence of Dalai ments and drawn lines to demarcate the complex as —a territory Lama and his followers in India, and the boundaries in the geostrategically impor- claimed by India as its integral part, but merger of Himalayan Kingdom Sikkim tant locations in the region during the 19th situated in PoK (Pakistan occupied Kash- with Indian Union in 1975 further intensi- century (Mehra 2007). The decline of the mir)—had already gone under Chinese fi ed tensions bet ween the two, even Chinese Empire started when it got de- possession with the support of Pakistan. though none of them turned into a major feated by Japan in the last decade of 19th In the 1,200 km long highway constructed confl ict/war. The 1967 crossfi re between century. This led to the emergence of Tibet by China between Xinjiang and Tibet, about the forces of India and China at Nathu La as a major regional player and it started 179 km is passing through Aksai Chin. and Cho La—two passes in Sikkim–China enjoying great amount of autonomy from India came to know about the construction border—were the only major clash during the central authority in China. It is in this of this highway very late and Nehru made this period, which resulted in the death context, in 1907, the Russian Empire and a public statement claiming Aksai Chin of a few hundred soldiers on the Indian the British Empire had re-emphasised upon part of India. He accused China of construc- side and almost double on the Chinese the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet (Ee- tion of roads in the region by violating side (Dasgupta 2019). kelen 2016). According to this, any border the territorial integrity of India (Bajpai The efforts for reconciliation began by demarcation in the region requires the et al 2020). All these developments have the late 1980s when Rajiv Gandhi, then ratifi cation of the central authority in resulted in mounting tensions between the Prime Minister of India, visited China China or could be valid only after China two countries by the late 1950s. The Chi- in December 1988. Both the countries had becoming a party/signatory to it. nese military intervention in Tibet in taken some fresh steps to strengthen bi- 1959 followed by the exile and political lateral cooperation, particularly in trade History of Border Dispute refuge of Dalai Lama and his followers and commercial activities. Joint Working The Simla agreement of 1914 is a major in India further deteriorated the bilateral Groups (JWGs) were constituted and bi- source of controversy that appears very relations (Guruswamy and Daulet 2009). lateral talks started to open new avenues often in the border dispute between India The tensions started escalating in the for cooperation (Bajpai and Mattoo 2000; and China. The agreement ratifi ed the border areas with the invasion of Tibet by Panda 2020). This has further expanded much-debated 550-mile long “McMohan China. China accused India for protect- and strengthened through diplomatic ne- Line” passing through the Himalayas as ing Dalai Lama and his supporters who gotiations and high-level political visits/ the border line between British India were involved in anti-China activities. meetings. As a goodwill gesture, both the and China/Tibet (Goldman 2020; Mehra The tensions and clashes soon moved countries decided to maintain status quo 1974; Eekelen 2016). The fi nal agreement to a full-fl edged border war in 1962. in the borders and stopped large-scale was signed between the Bri tish Indian India had faced clear setback in the war, infrastructure development projects in Empire and Tibet, but not ratifi ed or as Chinese forces advanced into the the border areas mainly due to the security endorsed by the central authority in Indian territory and captured about concerns from the other. By then, both China. It is also important to note that 43,000 sq km land (Dalvi 1968; Dutta countries became more realistic on the the Chinese central authority was very 2017). Later, the Chinese withdrew from border/territorial issue. weak due to the outbreak of civil war in the areas that they occupied and an In the 1990s, the changed global situa- 1911. The Peoples’ Republic of China that agreement was signed. The major aspect tion and the big power aspirations forced succeeded the Chinese Empire in 1949 of the agreement was the establishment of India and China to reconcile and expand questioned the sanctity of Simla agree- an LAC between the two countries. This the chances of cooperation. Eventually, ment since the very beginning. To China, LAC has nothing to do with either the two agreements were signed by India and Macartney–MacDonald Line of 1899 was border demarcated by Macartney–Mac- China—in 1993 and 1996—that gave legal the legitimate border, as it was also a Donald Line of 1899 (the base of Chinese status to the LAC of 1962 (Bajpai and party in it (Eekelen 2016; Noorani 2011). claims) or the Shimla agreement of 1914 Mattoo 2000). The Chinese de facto accep- The geopolitical scenario of the region (base of Indian claims). Eventually, this tance of Sikkim’s merger with India and had changed completely by the mid-20th LAC has got the status of a “de facto border the agreement signed by India and China century. The British Indian Empire was line” between India and China. The root for cross-border trade through Nathu La replaced by the Republic of India and the cause of escalation of current tensions in pass in Sikkim were the clear indications Chinese Empire was replaced by the Peo- the border is connected to the disputes on of the changing priorities. Both the coun- ple’s Republic of China. None of these states the status of this LAC, not the McMahon tries have explored the chances of cooper- have raised any serious terri torial claims Line of 1914 or Macartney–MacDonald ation in trade and commerce. The agree- in the early years and, therefore, the status Line of 1899 (Sharma 1965; Noorani 2011). ment signed in 2015 to start trade and of border in the region remained “unde- The 1962 events created a big gap commercial activities through the Lip- marcated” (Smith 2014). By the mid-1950s, bet ween China and India. Diplomatic re- ulekh pass of Uttarakhand is another major a serious discussion started from the Indian lations between these two states were development in this regard (Panda 2020). side on making a proper demarcation of nominal for about a quarter of the century On the other side, the intrusions and mi- border line in Ladakh and Arunachal (Maxwell 2011). The Chinese military nor clashes in the border regions, the

Economic & Political Weekly EPW AUGUST 8, 2020 vol lV nos 32 & 33 23 COMMENTARY claims made by Chinese Ambassador to both the countries from the LAC at Galwan cases as a reason for worldwide spread India on Arunachal Pra desh and the Valley—2 km by Chinese forces and 1 km of the pandemic. In this context, any Indian build-ups across the border areas by Indian forces. It is also decided to avoid serious break-up bet ween China and the remained as cause for tensions. further clashes and maintain a status quo. West may lead to a huge outfl ow of foreign In the discussions, India demanded to capital investment from China. Contemporary Confl icts restore the status quo in the LAC as it was One can link the current tensions in in April 2020. Further, India demands In Conclusion Ladakh with the tensions developed in complete withdrawal of Chinese forces The lack of a clearly defi ned border line Dokhlam, a tri-junction between India, from the areas where Indian military and a mutually accepted LAC is the major China and Bhutan, in June 2017 (Gold- carry out routine patro lling and also reason for continuous tension and clashes man 2020). The clashes started when from the northern part of Pangong Tso, between India and China. Therefore, the the Indian forces started disrupting the a territory for which China had never only perpetual solution of the crisis is an Chinese efforts to construct a road in the made any claims before (TOI 2020; Price amicable settlement of the borders. The border area at Dok La, by raising security 2020). On the other side, China wanted countries are working to resolve this dis- concerns. This incident was the outcome India to stop all constructions, including pute for more than three decades now, of the long-time mutual suspicion of the construction of roads, in the border without any signifi cant progress. The states on the constructions for infra- areas in general and Western Ladakh in current developments show that there are structure development in the border particular. The discussions helped in differences between China and India even areas. The current crisis in the Eastern easing tensions, even though a concrete on the status of LAC. It is a fact that both Ladakh is also related to the construc- solution is yet to be arrived. The negotia- India and China are the two fast growing tions in the border areas. Chinese forces tions at the diplomatic and political levels economies in the world, having the poten- have put up tents in the areas where are still on between the two countries. tial to emerge as leading powers in the Indian forces used to do routine patro- The current developments in the India– world. The resolution of border confl icts lling for a long time. This has intensifi ed China border region at Ladakh can be would certainly strengthen their global tensions that has led to use of force and linked to certain other crucial political aspirations. A close cooperation will re- ended up in violent clashes. China even developments. First, the abolition of main as a distant dream, until the border/ intruded into those places on which they Article 370 from the Constitution of territorial dispute is resolved. While re- have not made any claims in the past. It India that gave special status to the state alising this, the political leadership of both is observed that the military upper hand of Jammu and . Second, the bi- the countries should see the present cri- that India got in the Eastern Ladakh re- furcation of the state into two different sis as an opportunity to fi nd an intermi- gion through large-scale development of union territories—Jammu and Kashmir nable resolution to the border question. military infrastructure is the reason for and Ladakh. These moves had attracted The discussions and negotiations are to Chinese provocations. It is a fact that, in harsh criticism from China, whereas be channelised towards this direction by the recent years, India has strengthened India took a clear position that it is an the leadership of both the countries. its military capabilities substantially on internal matter of India. Indian claims of References the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. It has con- Aksai Chin, a territory originally part of structed a bridge across Shyok River in Ladakh, which later became part of PoK Bajpai, Kanti, Selina Ho and Manjari Chatterjee Miller (eds) (2020): Handbook of China–India October 2019, which facilitates the Mili- and currently under the possession of Relations, New York: Routledge. tary Tanks movement much closer to the China, is another major concern for Bajpai, Kanti P and Amitabh Mattoo (2000): The Peacock and the Dragon: India–China Relations LAC. Besides, the construction of a 3.5 km China. Third, the Chinese believe that in the 21st Century, New Delhi: Har–Anand long airstrip at Anantnag and the reno- India’s efforts to build close relations Publications. Dalvi, John (1968): Himalayan Blunder: The Angry vation of military airfi eld at Daulat Beg with anti-China axis of Western powers Truth about India’s Most Crushing Military Oldi should have provoked China to vio- like Australia, and United States (US) Disaster, New Delhi: Thacker and Natraj. Dasgupta, Prabal Das (2019): Watershed 1967: late status quo (Gamble and Davis 2020). and also with Japan are a move to push India’s Forgotton Victory Over China, New Delhi: It is a fact that all these developments have its economic and political interests in the Juggernut Books. substantially increased India’s military region. Interestingly, it is the fi rst time Dutta, Prabhash K (2017): This Day in 1962: China– India War Started with Synchronised Attack on capability in the region and the power that India is openly discussing this issue Ladakh, Arunachal, New Delhi, 20 October, equations moved in favour of India, at with the the US and Russia and seeking https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india- china-war-1962-20-october-aksai-chin-nefa- least in the Eastern Ladakh region. The their support to counter Chinese military arunchal-pradesh-1067703–2017-10–20. demand of China—that India should stop at LAC in Ladakh. Fourth, China suspects Eekelen, Willem Frederik Van (2016) (1967): Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China, all its constructions in the Western Ladakh that India may try to grab the economic Second revised edition, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. sector—can be connec ted to this. opportunities that it might lose in the on- Fang, Tien-sze (2014): Asymmetrical Threat Percep- tions in India–China Relations, London: Oxford The discussions at various levels are going tussle with the Western countries University Press. still on to reduce the tensions and resolve on the COVID-19 pandemic issue. Many Gamble, Ruth and Alexander Davis (2020): “The Big Lesson of the India–China Confl ict: Bor- the issue. In the high level military talks, Western countries are accusing China for ders Don’t Work at High Altitude,” Diplomat, it is decided to step back the forces of its irresponsible handling of coronavirus 23 June, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/

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the-big-lesson-of-the-india-china-confl ict-bor- Mehra, Parshotam (1974): McMohan Line and After: Price, Gareth (2020): Has China Sought to Provoke ders-dont-work-at-high-altitude/. A Study of the Triangular Contest on India’s India? 8 June, https://www.chathamhouse. Goldman, Russell (2020): “India–China Border North-eastern Frontier, Delhi: MacMillan. org/expert/comment/has-china-sought-pro- Dispute: A Confl ict Explained,” New York Times, — (2007): Essays in Frontier History: India, China, voke-india?gclid. 17 June, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/ and the Disputed Border, Delhi: Oxford Univer- Sharma, Suriya P (1965): “The India–China Bor- world/asia/india-china-border-clashes.html. sity Press. der Dispute: An Indian Perspective,” American Guruswamy, Mohan and Zorawar Singh Daulet Meredith, Robyn (2007): The Elephant and the Journal of International Law, Vol 59, No 1, (2009): India China Relations: The Border Issues Dragon: The Economic Rise of India and China, pp 16–47. and Beyond, New Delhi: Viva Books. and What It Means for the Rest of Us, London: Smith, Jeff M (2014): Cold Peace: China–India Karackattu, Joe Thomas (2017): “India–China Border Norton. Rivalry in the Twenty-fi rst Century, London: Dispute: Boundary-making and Shaping of Material Realities from the Mid-nineteenth to Noorani, A G (2011): India–China Boundary Problem Lexington Books. Mid-twentieth Century,” Journal of the Royal 1846–1947: History and Diplomacy, New Delhi: ToI (2020): “India–China Standoff at Galwan Valley: Asiatic Society, Vol 28, No 1, pp 1–25. Oxford University Press. Top Developments,” 18 June, Times of India, Maxwell, Neville (2011): India’s China War, New Panda, Jagannath P (ed) (2020): India and China https://timesofi ndia.indiatimes.com/india/ Delhi: Natraj Publishers in Association with in Asia: Between Equilibrium and Equations, india-china-standoff-top-developments-from- Wildlife Protection Society of India. London: Routledge. the-day/articleshow/76428511.cms.

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