Südosteuropa , 49. Jg., 11-12/2000

Ismije Beshiri*

The 2000 Elections: the First Free and Fair Elections in

Introduction The first free municipal elections in Kosovo exceeded the expectations of both the organisers and the people of Kosovo. On August 12 2000, when the Special Rep- resentative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) Dr. Bemard Kouchner publicly set the election date for October 28, many people were not just curious, but also slightly reserved about what the campaign would bring to Kosovo. Many citizens of Kosovo as well as local and international experts predicted large-scale vio- lence. In the end, this did not happen, thanks largely to the commitment to a peaceful process that Kosovo's people and political parties showed during this pe- riod as well as to all the measures taken by the organisers in co-operation with KFOR and UNMIK police. Election Day itself went smoothly and was tempered only by a few technical Problems, which were easily addressed and solved throughout the course of the day. For instance, the long queues of people, who began waiting already at seven o'clock in the moming, overwhelmed the polling centres and Supervisors, when polling Stations initially opened. The Central Elections Commission (CEC), how- ever, guaranteed that all of those voters who were in line when the polls were scheduled to close at 19.00 would be able to cast a bailot, hence some Polling Sta­ tions stayed open later. Remarkably, the day was virtually free of security incidents. Indeed, the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) announced at a Press Conference rounding up the Situation throughout the province on Election Day, that the 24-hour period had been the first violence-free day since KFOR entered Kosovo. The OSCE Head of Mission referred to the elections the best in the Balkans.*1 The election results were almost equally surprising. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) gained an overwhelming majority, one which the Chairmen of the LDK, Mr. Ibrahim , modestly described as a 'solid majority'. The De­ mocratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), headed by former U£K Political Director Hashim Tha^i and other former U(^K associated parties such as the Ramush Ha- radinaj's Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and Naim Maloku's Central Liberal Party of Kosovo (PQLK) did not capture even 40% of the votes. This suggests that Kosovo's voters have had enough of war and warlords.2 It also sug- gests that the vast majority of Kosovars do want a peaceful future, one which al-

Ismije Beshiri, Dipl.-Pol., OSCE-Mission in Kosovo, Prishtina 1 Koha Ditore, 29 October 2000, p. 1. Reuters, 30 October 2000. The First Free and Fair Elections in Kosovo 589 lows them to join in the positive progress being m ade elsewhere in the region and in as a whole. Another surprise of the election was the poor showing of sm aller parties. In the end, the province-wide results were LDK, 57% ; PDK, 28% and AAK 7.7% of all votes. None of the other parties reached m ore than 3% . Similar results are ex- pected in füture elections. This presents som ething of a challenge to the OSCE, whose aim is to build a solid multi-party society. The few m inorities who registered such as the Turks in , the "Bos- niaks" (slavic speaking M uslim s) in both Prizren and , and the Gorani in Dra- gas did take part in the elections. The Gorani and the Bosniaks m ade a good run- ning in the elections, as opposed to the Turkish Peoples Party (KTHP), which failed to gain a seat in one municipality, falling short by just three votes. Milosevic's govem m ent prevented Kosovo Serbs from taking part in the voter registration; hence they did not participate in the elections. Even President Vojislav Kostunica, expressed his opinion that the m unicipal elections in Kosovo were pre-mature. In order to encom pass the Kosovo Serbs in the new local gov­ em m ent administration, the Special Representative of the Secretary General Ber- nard Kouchner (SRSG) announced on Election Day that UNMIK would do every- thing in its power to m ake the Kosovo Serbs part of a new Kosovo. This m eans to register them and to hold elections in the Kosovo Serb m ajority areas as soon as possible. W hile som e Kosovars were dissatisfied with the election results, unlike in other Balkan States, all of the province's political parties recognised the results. The transitional period of changing the self-appointed administrators with elected m unicipal officials has proven to be unexpectedly sm ooth. W here the results called for it, former KLA (UQK) parties em ptied their seats and handed power over to elected LDK representatives. However, co-operation between the parties has not been unproblematic. Neither the LDK nor the form er U£K have yet es- tablished a record of solid co-operation. Instead, the PDK sees itself in the role of a 'constructive Opposition'. Their strategy is all too fam iliär: To ultimately show that the party in power is unable to perform and then profit from their m istakes and eventually com e to power. W hat began auspiciously on October 28, has started to unravel and a descent into violence threatens to overshadow the upcom ing elections. This will reflect poorly on the achievements of October 28. Kosovo has struggled in the past and, sadly, will continue to do so for som e tim e due to a vicious circle of violence, which no one seem s capable to bring to a halt. 590 Ismije Beshiri

Background to the Municipal Elections Registration Organising elections from the bottom-up requires the fulfilment of certain basic conditions applicable in any election. In Kosovo, the organisers started the pro- cess of voter registration at the most basic level: there were no civil registers and countless people had their identity documents violently taken from them during the 1998 to 1999 conflict. As a result, there was no register from which one could begin to draw up a voter's list. In April 2000, UNMIK Civil Administration, in co-operation with OSCE, created the Joint Registration Task Force (JRT) and began registering Kosovo's population. By the time registration ended in July 2000, approximately one mil- lion Kosovars had registered. Of these, 38.000 resided out of Kosovo.3 4The Kosovo Serbs were prevented by the Milosevic regime to take part in this exer- cise. A part of the Turkish minority in Prizren did also not register, because the registration form has not been printed in Turkish. Though the OSCE Head of Mission and SRSG undertook efforts to convince them to register, they boycotted registration. After the registration period, a correction period was launched to cor- rect mistakes that were made. Errors in the final voter list (FVL) were approxi­ mately five percent, a rate generally considered remarkably small given Kosovo's circumstances. Like everything eise in the Balkans, the registration process had been accom- panied by strong criticism. Even three weeks before the elections, the serious Kosovo ncwspapcr published by Veton Suroi, Koha Ditore\ published a lead ar- ticle on registration errors, incorrectly explaining to the public that the registra­ tion process had gone wrong and that thousands of voters were not on the voters lists. The OSCE was forced to counter these Claims through both Public Informa­ tion and its common voter education programmes. The registration period also included the registration of political parties, coa- litions, citizens' initiatives and independent candidates, which were taking part in election. For the elections, 19 political parties, 2 coalitions, 3 civic initiatives and 15 independent candidates registered.5

3 OSCE Press Declaration, 19 June 2000. 4 UNMIK Pillar Two Admits Huge Mistakes During Registration. In: Koha Ditore, 21 September 2000. 5 See Ballot Lottery Results. In August 2000, OSCE organised a lottery to select the Or­ der of the municipal bailot and determine their Order. To prevent any one party from having the possible psychological advantage of number one, numbers started from eleven. The First Free and Fair Elections in Kosovo 5 9 1

Ballot Lottery Results

P o l i t i c a l parties/coalitions/citizen initiatives/independent c a n d i d a t e s 6

1 1 . GRADANSKA INICIATIVA GORE - GIG (GORA'S CITIZEN INITIATIVE)

12. b o Sn ja Ck a STRANKA DEMOKRATSKE AKCIJE KOSOVA - BSDAK

(BOSNIACS PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC ACTION OF KOSOVA)

1 3 . PARTIA DEMOKRATIKE E KOSOVES - PDK (DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KOSOVA)

1 4 . PARTIA REPUBLIKANE E KOSOVES - PRK (REPUBLICAN PARTY OF KOSOVA)

1 5 . DEMOKRATSKA REFORMSKA STRANKA MUSLIM ANA - DRSM

(DEMOCRATIC REFORM PARTY OF MUSLIMS)

1 6 . LEVIZJA NACIONALDEMOKRATIKE SHQIPTARE - LNDSH

(ALBANIAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT)

1 7 . PARTIA LIBERALE E KOSOVES - PLK (LIBERAL PARTY OF KOSOVA)

1 8 . ALEANCA PER ARDHMERINE E KOSOVES - A A K (ALLIANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF KOSOVA)

1 9 . MITROVICE/MITROVICA TÜRK TOPLUMU - MTT (MITROVICA TURK COMMUNITY)

2 0 . PARTIA SOCIALDEMOKRATE E KOSOVES - PSDK (SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC P A R T Y OF KOSOVA)

2 1 . PARTIA BALLI KOMBETAR-DEMOKRAT I KOSOVES - PBKD

(NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT OF KOSOVA)

2 2 . KOSOVA TÜRK HALK PARTISI - KTHP (TURKISH PEOPLE ’ S PARTY OF KOSOVA)

2 3 . INICIATIVA QYTETARE TE PAVARURIT E MITROVICES - IQPM

(CITIZEN INITIATIVE - THE INDEPENDENTS OF MITROVICA)

2 4 . PARTIA E TE GJELBERVE E KOSOVES - P G J K (GREEN PARTY OF KOSOVA)

2 5 . UNIONI SOCIALDEMOKRAT - USD (SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC UNION)

2 6 . PARTIA DEMOKRATIKE ASHKALI SHQIPTARE E KOSOVES - PDASHK

(ASHKALI ALBANIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KOSOVA)

2 7 . KOALICIONI PER P A V A R E S I - KP (COALITION FOR INDEPENDENCE)

2 8 . PARTIA SHQIPTARE DEMOKRISTIANE E KOSOVES - PSHDK

(ALBANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KOSOVA)

2 9 . STRANKA DEMOKRATSKE AKCIJE KOSOVA - SDA

(PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC ACTION OF KOSOVA)

3 0 . PARTIA LIBERAL-DEMOKRATIKE E KOSOVES - PLDK

(LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KOSOVA)

3 1 . PARTIA NACIONALE DEMOKRATIKE SHQIPTARE - PNDSH

(ALBANIAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY)

3 2 . PARTIA QENDRA LIBERALE E KOSOVES - PQLK (LIBERAL CENTRE PARTY OF KOSOVA)

3 3 . PARTIA REPUBLIKANE SHQIPTARE - PRSH (ALBANIAN REPUBLICAN PARTY)

3 4 . LIDHJA DEMOKRATIKE E KOSOVES - LDK (DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE OF KOSOVA)

6 N u m b e r s 1 8 a n d 2 7 a r e coalitions, n u m b e r s 1 1 , 1 9 a n d 2 3 a r e C i t i z e n initiatives, n u m -

b e r s 3 5 - 4 9 a r e independent candidates, a n d t h e r e s t o f t h e n u m b e r s a r e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . 592 Ismije Beshiri

35. HASAN SADR1U - GJAKOVE / DAKOVICA

36. SAKIP MAKASQI -PRIZREN / PR1ZREN

37. AGIM HYSENI - PODUJEVE / PODUJEVO

38. GANI SELMAN KRASNIQI - MALISHEVE / MALlSEVO

39. SEVDIJE HYSENAJ-SADIKU - SUHAREKE / SUVA REKA

40. SELAMI LATIFI - GJILAN / GNJ1LANE

41. AVDYL H. MAZREKU - MALISHEVfi / MALlSEVO

42. AVDULLAH QAFANI - GJAKOVE / DAKOVICA

43. HALIT BISLIMI - GJILAN / GNJILANE

44. NYSRET HAXHIU - PRISHTINE / PRlSTINA

45. RAMADAN GASHI - KAMENICE / KAMENICA

46. EJUP QERIMI - GJILAN / GNJILANE

47. KIMETE BERISHA - SUHAREKE / SUVA REKA

48. SKENDER KORENICA - GJAKOVE / DAKOVICA

49. BISLIM HOTI - GJAKOVE / DAKOVICA

Following a recommendation by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) on August 12, SRSG announced the election date in Kosovo as October 28. The de- cision was made on an extremely tight timeline, which barely allowed for unex- pected problems - a hazardous assumption under Kosovo circumstances.

The Electoral Campaign The OSCE launched the electoral campaign officially on September 13. Several parties, keen to be part of the first, free and democratic elections in Kosovo, be- gan their campaign hours before the official opening, by holding rallies to intro- duce the main candidates. Most parties hit the ground running with their electoral campaign. Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), as a glaring exception, was barely visible in the first week of the campaign. Notwithstanding their low-key strategy and the slow Start to the electoral campaign, the LDK soon realised the imperative to join the electoral fray. Düring the campaign period an average of 10-15 properly notified rallies we- re daily held throughout Kosovo with an additional number of un-notified events. By the end of the campaign, more than a thousand events had taken place. SRSG Dr. Kouchner and OSCE Head of Mission Daan Everts attended the majority of rallies in Prishtina to underline the need to run a clean election campaign, free of both violence and intimidation. A common denominator linking the campaign was that every political entity, both in the party programmes and the rallies, at least initially, focused on the loft- ier rhetoric of independence and general economic development rather than con- centrating on municipal issues. Anticipating that "central themes" would most The First Free and Fair Elections in Kosovo 593 probably pre-dominate the local vote, OSCE conceived the Voters Voices: Com­ munity Concerns project, which was officially published on 3 October.7 This was designed to encourage the political parties and candidates to focus on concrete and specific issues to the Kosovo voters, and to give the electorate a tool with which to engage political candidates in discussions and debates that are informa- tion focused and constructive.

Voters' Priorities Ranked In Order Of Urgency And Importance x Rank Issue Score (1-3 scale)

1 Health Care 2.67 2 Education 2.62 3 Economic Development/Employment 2.50 4 Water 2.35 5 Social Services 2.31 6 Electricity 2.30 7 Housing 2.21 8 Roads 2.02 9 Environmental Protection 1.81 10 Garbage Collection 1.67 11 Sewage 1.55 12 Minority Protection 1.52 13 Telecommunications and Post 1.50 14 Cultural Activities 1.38 15 Public Transport 1.24

Speciflcs of the Electoral Campaign Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) The PDK launched its campaign in Prishtina on 13 September, addressing a crowd of approximately ten thousand people, at which PDK President, Tha?i , formally announced the candidates for each of the municipalities the PDK was contesting. The official closure of their campaign on 26 October was held in the Prishtina Stadium, again, in front of thousands of supporters, mostly coming from rural areas. The PDK candidates' list, particularly in Prishtina municipality, was very strong with a large number of intellectuals and university professors. Also in other municipalities, key figures from society were included to strengthen the lists. A highly visible poster campaign with the candidates' photographs, frequent

7 Voters' Voices: Community Concerns in Kosovo, 4 October 2000, OSCE publication. Voters' Voices, p. 8. 5 9 4 Ismije Beshiri r a llie s h e ld th r o u g h o u t th e p r o v in c e in b o th u r b a n a n d r u r a l a r e a s , a s w e ll a s th e PDK g r a ff iti p la s te r e d th ro u g h o u t P r is h tin a a n d o th e r to w n s , m a d e th e PDK c a m - p a ig n a h ig h ly v is ib le o n e . T h e f a c t th a t H a s h im T h a 9 i a ls o p e rs o n a lly a tte n d e d r a llie s in th e b ig u r b a n c e n tr e s , in c lu d in g M itr o v ic a , 9 P r iz r e n , P e ja , G jila n , a s w e ll a s in s m a lle r to w n s s u c h a s G lo g o v c , k n o w n a s a PDK stronghold, a s s u m e d ly h e lp e d to g a in recognition. T h e PDK c a m p a ig n b u ilt o n th e p a r ty 's f o rm e r U £ K foundations. I ts m a in C la rio n c a ll, a lo n g s id e th e v a s t m a jo rity o f o th e r p a r tie s , w a s f o r independence. T h is w a s th e centrepiece o f S p e e c h e s m a d e b y a ll high-ranking PDK o f f ic ia ls a t r a llie s . A lth o u g h n o t e x p lic itly s ta te d , th e PDK f o c u s w a s o n f in d in g a p o litic a l s o lu tio n f o r K o s o v o 's f u tu r e , a n is s u e a llu d e d to in th e p a rty P r o g r a m m e s u m - m a r y , 1 0 w h ic h S ta te s th a t "the PDK is engaged in Clearing the path to freedom". A g a in s t th is b a c k d r o p o f independence, th e PDK m a d e a f e w r e m a r k s a b o u t is - s u e s th a t w e r e c lo s e to v o te r s ' h e a r ts , s u c h a s th e PDK commitments to im p r o v e infrastructure, healthcare, e d u c a tio n , c a re f o r th e e ld e rly , a n d e m p lo y m e n t o p p o r - tu n itie s . T h e S lo g a n s th e PDK d e v is e d in c lu d e d 'Remember the Glory - Build the Future' a n d ’Vote for the PDK, Life will be Better'.

Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)

T h e e n e r g e tic S ta rt o f th e e le c to r a l c a m p a ig n b y th e m a jo r i ty o f th e la rg e r p a r tie s s to o d in c o n tr a s t to th e a b s e n c e o f a n y LDK a c tiv ity . LDK o f f ic ia ls in itia lly s ta te d th a t th e p a r ty 's c a m p a ig n s tra te g y w o u ld b e r e la tiv e ly lo w p r o f ile . T h e p a r ty , r a th e r th a n h o ld in g p u b lic m e e tin g s , m e t in p r iv a te r e s id e n c e s o r in s m a lle r s c h o o ls . T h e y h a d a c tiv is ts responsible f o r disseminating p a rty p la tf o rm in f o r m a - tio n . D ü rin g th e e le c tio n c a m p a ig n p e r io d , th e LDK h a d o r g a n is e d m o r e th a n 4 0 0 m e e tin g s . T h e r e a r e s e v e ra l o th e r p o s s ib le r e a s o n s f o r th e in itia l lo w p r o file m a in - ta in e d b y th e LDK. F ir s t o f a ll, th e a b s e n c e o f a s tro n g c a m p a ig n w a s a reflection o f R u g o v a 's g e n e ra l te n d e n c y o f b e in g m o r e r e s e r v e d v is -ä - v is e v e ry d a y p o litic s . A ls o , th e LDK b e lie v e d th a t it c o u ld r e ly o n its s tro n g s u p p o r t a n d h is to ric r o le . W ith th e LDK s till s h o w in g s tro n g ly in th e p o lls , a n y p r o p e r campaigning m a y h a v e le a d to th e realisation th a t its p la tfo r m w a s n o b e tte r th a n w h a t th e o th e r s o f - f e re d . A c c o r d in g to th e e le c tio n r e s u lts , th is s tr a te g y p r o v e d r ig h t. I n s o m e a r e a s , th e lo w - k e y s tr a te g y m a y a ls o h a v e b e e n in f lu e n c e d b y th e f e a r o f intim idation o r o f p r o v o k in g n o n - L D K supporters. H o w e v e r , R u g o v a e x p r e s s e d g e n e ra l s a tis f a c - tio n a b o u t th e r e la tiv e ly c a lm e le c to r a l c lim a te a n d o r d e r ly r a llie s . H e e v e n d e - s c r ib e d s o m e o f th e in c id e n ts d ir e c te d a g a in s t h is p a rty a n d its candidates, a s " d e ­ m o c ra tic incidents". D e s p ite th e n a tu r e o f th e lo w p r o file c a m p a ig n a n d its s lo w S ta rt, th e L D K 's f ir s t la r g e r a lly o n 2 7 S e p te m b e r in P r is h tin a w a s e x tr e m e ly w e ll a tte n d e d . T h e

O n 1 4 S e p te m b e r , ju s t p r io r to th e r a lly b y DOS C a n d id a te V o jis la v K o s tu n ic a in th e n o r th e m p a r t o f th e c ity T h a s i to o k p a rt in a r a lly w ith B a jra m R e x h e p i, A lb a n ia n ‘ M a y o r ’ to a to ta l o f m o r e th a n 8 .0 0 0 in th e M itr o v ic a S ta d iu m . 1 0 Voter Information Handbook, S e p te m b e r 2 0 0 0 . OSCE publication, w h ic h s u m m a r is e s th e p a rty p r o g r a m m e s a n d w a s disseminated th r o u g h o u t th e p r o v in c e . The First Free and Fair Elections in Kosovo 595 opening and closing meeting in Prishtina focused on a speech by Ibrahim Rugova and the slogan 'You and Us Together, with the LDK to the Future.' The LDK poster campaigns focused mainly on the picture of Ibrahim Rugova, (though not a candidate himself), similar to posters of AAK, PQLK and others.

Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) The AAK11 conducted an intensive public information campaign and was the only party, which emphasised the need for a coalition to consolidate its input at the lo­ cal level and to come up with projects within each of the different municipalities. With the establishment of women and youth branches, grass-roots work formed the basis of the AAK campaign, and the coalition could formulate relatively strong local govemment programmes in those municipalities in which they con- tested the elections. The AAK ran a very well organised campaign, centred on Ramush Haradinaj, the strong and articulate party leader, who attended most of the rallies in person. AAK's most frequent slogan was 'Initiative, Courage, Com- mitment, Guaranteed Success.'

Other Parties The Liberal Centre of Kosovo (PQLK) party of Naim Maloku, The Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (PShDK) party headed by Mark Krasniqi, the United Democratic Movement (LBD) party headed by Rexhep Qosja and other parties launched their campaign with only a few supporters attending. Some of the parties such as the PQLK focused on the needs of municipalities and issues such as reconciliation. Others did not have a specific focus except the independ- ence issue and the future Status of Kosovo. The final result of the elections showed that even though some of the parties did come up with specific local projects, most of the voters did not vote for issues but for party leaders or other key figures. The electorate voted, for the most part, for Ibrahim Rugova, Hashim Tha9i and Ramush Haradinaj and not for their local municipal leader. The Kosovar electorate feil back to allegiances and leaders they had known throughout the 1990s, in the period when the Milosevic regime fired the Kosovo Albanian administration and closed schools. They voted for people which helped them during their refugee time, through peaceful ways and not with arms. Another explanation of the election results is that many of the problems, which Kosovo is facing today, are attributed to the former KLA (UQK). People wanted to distance themselves from these problems, and vote with the hope that the newly elected officials could crack down on corruption. In this context the Kosovo electorate is not different from other voters in other countries.

11 The AAK Coalition is made up of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LK£K), the Parliamentary Party (PPK), Peoples Movement of Kosovo (LPK), Alba­ nian Unification Party (UNIKOMBI), Alliance of the Citizens of Kosovo (AQK) and Movement of the Christ Democratic party of Kosovo (LKDK). 596 Ismije Beshiri

The Municipal Elections The electorate in Kosovo is different from other voters in one way. Since this has been the first free and democratic elections in Kosovo, many people visited the campaign rallies and other public meetings of the different political parties. On election day, itself, 79% out of a total of 901,000 Kosovars eligible to vote, in- cluding some 21,000 Out-of-Kosovo voters, voted for 5,500 candidates running for 920 seats in 30 different Municipal Assemblies. This is a high final tumout compared to some other countries, but within the expectations. Despite a slow Start due to some technical and logistical problems, everybody who intended to vote had a chance to cast his ballot by end of the day. Another problem within all polling stations had been illiteracy, particularly amongst elderly women. This was a larger problem than had been anticipated. Many women did not have anybody with them who could help, and finding assistance for these voters was difficult and problematic. To ensure that international Standards were met, international observers from the Council of Europe,12 4.886 domestic observers from Kosovo political parties as well as 1.305 national observers from local NGOs monitored the elections. The Election Day Complaints Working Group received few complaints of a minor na- ture, many of which were corrected immediately. The parties also had the oppor- tunity to file Complaints regarding polling violations with the Elections Com­ plaints and Appeals Sub-Commission (ECAC) until 30 October. No major com­ plaints were received, although the PDK made allegations of misconduct and fraud. All the criteria for credible elections, particularly in a transitional area such as Kosovo were met e. g. no injuries to voters, observers or media, minimal oppor- tunities for electoral fraud and manipulation of the vote, transparency of electoral activities, adequate opportunity to cast bailots. Therefore, the IC and local ob­ servers applauded the organisers and the Kosovo public for these elections. To ensure that this criteria be met, the OSCE and the Central Elections Commission (CEC) had put different mechanisms in place. On the one hand, KFOR, UNMIK Police and OSCE co-operated to share their information and to help keep the Se­ curity Situation under control. On the other hand, the ECAC established in May 2000, issued their first decisions regarding political party electoral violations by September. This showed the parties that they were not just being monitored, but also would be sanctioned. This was done through fines or by striking candidates off the list. At the same time, the OSCE launched the biggest media-monitoring Programme ever. This made media, with exception of some print media, comply with the electoral rules and give equal opportunity to all parties. A public cam­ paign, and the voter education Programme, both launched by the OSCE, helped convince voters that their vote would be free and secret, and that they would be able to cast their ballot without any fear on Election Day.

12 Council of Europe Elections Observation Mission: 2nd Statement on Municipal Elec­ tions in Kosovo, 30 October 2000. The First Free and Fair Elecdons in Kosovo 597

To encourage gender balance, political groupings were required to have 30% of their candidates be women. However, with an Open List there was always the possibility, given the traditional nature of Kosovar society, that voters, both men and women, would choose male candidates. In fact, though Kosovo-wide only 8.26% of candidates elected were women, this proportion is considered as a rela­ tive success. In Prishtina, their share rose to 15.7%. LDK won the elections in 21 out of the 27 municipalities that were certified by the SRSG. The three northem municipalities with a Kosovo Serb majority population were not certified and the members of the Municipal Assembly were appointed by the SRSG. In central Kosovo the PDK won in six municipalities and the AAK with a 7.7% did not win in any municipality, despite their stated aim of winning in five to ten municipalities in the Dukajini area, where the influence of the chairmen of the AAK and former U£K Commander of Dukagjini13 seemed indisputable. Lösses of the AAK in Dukajini seemed to have come as a surprise in the election. The implementation of the election result are slow but gradually coming into place. According to the Airlie House agreement, reached in July 2000, between Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian representatives, SRSG had to appoint minor- ity representatives. In co-operation with the International Municipal Administra­ tors and other organisations in the field, the SRSG has appointed these representa­ tives and most minority appointees have already taken their seats. UNMIK and OSCE are working together to plan the registration of the Ko­ sovo Serbs, which will probably begin by early next year. By-elections for the Kosovo Serb municipalities are also currently being discussed. There is the possi­ bility of holding central level elections in Kosovo next year. The Contact Group is already discussing at the expert level the framework for such elections. How­ ever, for the fiiture of Kosovo, and for the sake of the security Situation, which must remain calm, a timeline for the elections is needed. This would give the Kosovar people and the political parties a goal to work towards.

13 Dukagjin, Western Kosovo.