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1992-Concurrent Actions in the Situation Calculus

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1992-Concurrent Actions in the Situation Calculus From: AAAI-92 Proceedings. Copyright ©1992, AAAI (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. Concurrent Actions in t Fang&en Lin and Uoav Shoharn Department of Computer Science Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 Abstract tions, and In expresses the membership relation be- tween global actions and primitive actions. When a We propose a representation of concurrent actions; global action is performed in a situation, all of the rather than invent a new formalism, we model primitive actions in it are performed simultaneously. them within the standard situation calculus by in- Formally, the extended situation calculus is a multi- troducing the notions of global actions and prim- sorted first-order logic with four domain-independent itive actions, whose relationship is analogous to sorts: situation sort (s), propositional fluent sort (p), that between situations and fluents. The result global action sort (g), and primitive action sort (a). is a framework in which situations and actions We have a binary function Result with the intuitive play quite symmetric roles. The rich structure meaning that ResuZt(g, s) is the resulting situation of of actions gives rise to a new problem, which, performing the global action g in the situation s. We due to this symmetry between actions and situ- have two binary predicates, H and In. Intuitively, ations, is analogous to the traditional frame prob- H(p, s) means that the fluent p is true in the situation lem. In [Lin and Shoham 19911 we provided a so- s, and In(a, g) means that the primitive action a is one lution to the frame problem based on a formal ad- of the actions in g. equacy criterion called “epistemological complete- For any finite set of primitive actions, Al, . An, we ness.” Here we show how to solve the new problem assume that {Al, . An} is a global action satisfying based on the same adequacy criterion, the following properties: Va.(In(a, {Al, . An}) E (a = Al V . V a = An)), Introduction (1) In [Lin and Shoham 19911 we proposed a methodology and for formalizing the effects of actions in the situation Vg(Va.(In(a, g) E (a = A1 V . V a = An)) 3 calculus. In this paper we extend this methodology to a framework which allows concurrent actions. g = {AI, . An}). (2) Recall that traditional situation calculus [McCarthy If A is a primitive action, then we shall write (A} and Hayes 19691 is a many-sorted first-order logic with as A. Most often, whether A is a primitive action the following domain independent sorts: situation sort or the corresponding global action {A} will be clear (s), propositional fluent sort (p), and action sort (a). from the context. For example, A is a global action in There is a domain independent function ResuZt(a, s), ResuZt(A, s), but a primitive action in In(A,g). We which represents the resulting situation when a is shall make it clear whenever there is a possibility of performed in s, and a domain independent predicate confusion. H(p, s), which asserts that p holds in s. To be sure, there are other proposals in the litera- It is clear that there is an asymmetry between ac- ture for extending the situation calculus to allow ex- tions and situations in this picture. While situations pressions for concurrent actions. Most introduce new are ‘rich’ objects, as manifested by the various fluents operators on actions [cf. Gelfond et al. 1991, Shubert that are true and false in them, actions are ‘poor,’ 19901. For example, in [Celfond et al. 19911 a new op- primitive objects. In this paper, we propose to model erator “+” is introduced, with the intuitive meaning concurrent actions in the situation calculus by correct- that a + b is the action of executing a and b simul- ing this asymmetry. We introduce the notions of global taneously. This approach is common also in the pro- actions, primitive actions, and the binary predicate In, gramming languages community. The relationships be- whose roles will be completely analogous to those of tween our formalism and those with new operators for situations, fluents, and the predicate H, respectively. concurrent actions are delicate. It seems that our for- Intuitively, a global action is a set of primitive ac- malism is more convenient in expressing complicated 590 Representation and Reasoning: Action and Change actions such as the global action where every agent if, given a complete description of the initial situation, makes a move. the theory enables us to predict a complete description Another way to extend the situation calculus is to of the resulting situation when the action is performed. think of Result as a relation, rather than a function. In order to formalize this intuition, we first introduce For example, we can introduce RES(a, sr, sz) with the notion of states, which are complete descriptions the intuitive meaning that s2 is one of the situations of situations with respect to the set of the fluents we resulted from executing a, along with possibly some are interested in. other actions, in sr. This is essentially the approach In the following, let P be a fixed set of ground fluent taken in [Georgeff 1986, Peleg 1987, and others]. The terms in which we are interested. This fixed set of flu- drawback of this approach is that it does not explic- ents plays a role similar to that of the Frame predicate itly list the additional actions that cause the transition in [Lifschitz 19901. from sr to ~2. Thus Georgeff (1986) had difficulty in Definition 1 A set SS is a state of the situation S formalizing the effect of a single action when performed (with respect to P) ij th ere is a subset P’ of P such exclusively. that A more radically different approach to concurrency is via temporal logic [Allen 1984, McDermott 19821. SS = (H(P, S) 1 P E P’) u (yH(P, S) 1 P E P -7”). For a comparison between the situation calculus ap- proach to reasoning about action and that of temporal Therefore, if SS is a state of S, then for any P E P, logic, see [Pelavin and Allen 1987, Shoham 19891. either H(P, S) E SS or lH(P, S) E SS. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Thus we can say that a first-order theory T is episte- section 2 we introduce a formal criterion, called epis- mologically complete about the global action G (with temological completeness, to evaluate theories of ac- respect to P) if it is consistent, and for any ground tions. This criterion was first introduced in [Lin and situation term S, any state SS of S, and any flu- Shoham 19911 in the context of traditional situation ent P E P, either T U SS b H(P, ResuZt(G, S)) or calculus with respect to primitive actions; the exten- T U SS j= lH(P, ResuZt(G,S)), where b is classical sion to global actions is straightforward. In section 3, first-order entailment. we show that this criterion not only help us clarify However, as is well-known, classical entailment is not the traditional (fluent-oriented) frame problem, as we the only choice, we may also interpret our language have done in [Lin and Shoham 19911, it also clarifies nonmonotonically according to a nonmonotonic entail- the new action-oriented frame problem. In section 4, ment. Indeed, the notion of epistemological complete- we illustrate our solution to these problems using the ness is not limited to monotonic first-order theories. In well-known Stolen Car Problem. The solution is ex- general, for any given monotonic or nonmonotonic en- tended to a class of causal theories in section 5, and tailment j=c, we can define epistemological complete- compared to others in the context of conflicting sub- ness as follows: actions in section 6. Finally, we conclude in section Definition 2 A theory T is epistemologically com- 7. plete about the action G (with respect to P, and ac- cording to kc) if T &tc FaZse, and for any ground Epistemologically complete theories of situation term S, any state SS of S, and any jZu- action end P E Q, there is a finite subset SS’ of SS such In the situation calculus we formalize the effects of ac- that either T /=c /\SS > H(P, ResuZt(G, S)) or tions using first-order logic. However, as is well-known, T /=c ASS’ I lH(P, ResuZt(G, S)). adopting classical semantics leads to problems such as We note that for any sets T, SS, and formula (p, TU the frame problem, the ramification problem, et cetera. SS b cp if there is a finite subset SS’ of SS such that In [Lin and Shoham 19911 we argued that the ultimate T b A SS’ > p. Thus if we replace k= in Definition 2 criterion against which to evaluate theories of (prim- by classical entailment b, we get the same definition itive) actions is what we called epistemological com- we have earlier for monotonic first-order theories. pleteness. The various problems amount to achieving this completeness in a precise and concise fashion. We The frame problems shall see that, when we introduce concurrency, new problems arise. However, the notion of epistemolog- There are a number of well-known problems in formal- ical completeness is relevant also to their definition izing the effects of actions. The most famous one is and solution. This section therefore repeats some key the frame problem [McCarthy and Hayes 19691, which definitions from [Lin and Shoham 19911, appropriately is best illustrated by an example.
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