Democracy Think Tanks in Action

DEMOCRACY THINK TANKS IN ACTION

Translating Research into Policy in Young and Emerging Democracies

Argentina

Ecuador

Georgia

Ghana

Lebanon

Romania

Slovakia

South Korea

Turkey

The International Forum for Democratic Studies National Endowment for Democracy JUNE 2013

DEMOCRACY THINK TANKS IN ACTION Translating Research into Policy in Young and Emerging Democracies

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments | vi

About the International Forum for Democratic Studies | viii

About the Network of Democracy Research Institutes | viii

Democracy Think Tanks in Action: Translating Research into Policy in Young and Emerging Democracies Christopher Walker | 1

Strengthening Civil Society Influence on Policy Formulation in Argentina: The Identification of Economic and Institutional Consensus among Policy Makers Gabriel C. Salvia | 9

Translating Evidence into Policies: Two Cases in Ecuador Orazio Bellettini Cedeño and Andrea Ordóñez Llanos | 17

The Role of Democracy Research Organizations in Georgia Ghia Nodia | 31

Translating Research into Policy: Two Cases from CDD-Ghana E. Gyimah-Boadi, Regina Amanfo Tetteh, and Kojo Asante | 41

Turning a Research Idea into a National Movement: How the LCPS’s Advocacy Initiative Led to Municipal Elections Sami Atallah | 55

Enhancing the Policy Impact of Democracy Research: The Case of the Romanian Academic Society Adriana Iordache & Simona Popescu | 67

Promoting Democratic Transformation: The Role of Slovakia’s Think Tanks, Watchdogs, and Human Rights NGOs Martin Bútora | 74

Translating Research Into Policies: The Experience of South Korea’s East Asia Institute Sook Jong Lee | 87

Enhancing the Policy Impact of Democracy Research: The Case of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation’s Democratization Program Özge Genç | 99

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

his project was designed, implemented, and completed under the auspices of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes (NDRI), a global network of Tthink tanks that conduct research and analysis on democracy, democratization, and related topics in comparative government and international affairs. The National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies serves as the think tank Network’s secretariat. All the contributors to this study are members of the NDRI. The idea of examining the ways in which think tanks translate research into policy was initially explored in 2010 during a workshop at the Global Assembly of the World Movement for Democracy (WMD) in Jakarta, when representatives from the East Asia Institute, Grupo Faro, and the Pakistan Institute for Legislative Development and Transparency discussed preliminary thoughts on the topic. The Forum and East Asia Institute then organized a larger workshop in Seoul, South Korea, where representatives from CDD-Ghana, the Romanian Academic Society, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, and the East Asia Institute presented initial drafts of their case studies for discussion and debate. The Centre for Policy Studies in India and Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, both also NDRI members, participated in this workshop as well. In 2012, a final workshop was held at the WMD’s Global Assembly in Peru, where the Institute for Public Affairs, the Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL), and INCITE.Gov made presentations on this subject.

In all, fourteen members of the NDRI contributed analysis to this project and we are grateful to them for the time and expertise they contributed to the reports in this study:

• Ghia Nodia of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development (Georgia); • Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Regina Amanfo Tetteh, and Kojo Asante of the Ghana Center for Democratic Development; • Gabriel Salvia of the Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (Argentina); • Sook Jong-Lee of the East Asia Institute (South Korea); • Orazio Bellettini Cedeño and Andrea Ordóñez Llanos of Grupo FARO (Ecuador); • Sami Atallah of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies; • Simona Popescu and Adriana Iorche of the Romanian Academic Society; • Martin Butora of the Institute for Public Affairs (Slovakia); • Özge Genç of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation

This project could not have been completed without the hard work and dedication of the International Forum for Democratic Studies’ staff, including Jessica Ludwig, Sukanya Banerjee, and Dean Jackson. Diego Abente Brun, who served as deputy director of the Forum, deserves thanks for his role in initiating this project. From its inception, the Forum’s Melissa Aten played an integral role in coordinating the work of this project and ensuring that it was a success. Forum executive director Christopher Walker provided overall guidance toward the completion of the study. Marc Plattner and Larry Diamond, co-chairs of the Forum’s Research Council, deserve special men-

vi D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

tion here for their advice and support over the course of the project. We are grateful to the Korea Foundation, whose generous financial support made this project possible.

The Forum also extends its thanks to Jean Schindler of the National Endowment for Democracy, who was responsible for the design and layout of this publication, and to Brent Kallmer of the Endowment for his insights and advice on the publishing of this study. Suzanne Levine-Gallo, also of the Endowment, assisted with the online publication of this project. Thanks are also owed to Tyler Roylance, who provided valuable editorial support for the reports appearing here.

Finally, we thank the activists, scholars, and other experts whose work is profiled in these pages, and whose efforts this project is meant to advance.

vii D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

ABOUT THE FORUM

he International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy is a leading center for research, discussion, and analysis on the theory Tand practice of democracy around the world. Established in 1994, the Forum strives to bridge the gap between academic research and the practice of democracy through several initiatives:

• Publishing the Journal of Democracy, the leading academic journal on democratization • Hosting Fellowship Programs for international democracy activists, journalists, and scholars • Organizing research initiatives and conferences to explore critical themes for democratic development • Serving as the Secretariat for the American Political Science Association’s Comparative Democratization Section (APSA-CD) • Coordinating the Network of Democracy Research Institutes (NDRI), a global think tank network

ABOUT THE NDRI

The Network of Democracy Research Institutes (NDRI) is a global network of think tanks that conduct research and analysis on democracy, democratization, and related topics in comparative government and international affairs.

A key network of the World Movement for Democracy, NDRI is coordinated by NED’s International Form for Democratic Studies to foster interaction among international think tanks, democracy scholars, and activists in order to:

• Analyze the status and problems of democracy, within individual countries and comparatively • Identify examples of think tank and policy institute innovations • Determine factors that contribute to the emergence and consolidation of democracy • Promote policy discussions among citizens, and between citizens and government • Foster and strengthen democratic values, principles, and ideas • Disseminate major works and scholarship on democracy • Enhance government capacity to address major public policy problems • Identify and stimulate debate about institutional reforms to achieve these goals

Network Activities To achieve the goals outlined above, NDRI conducts the following activities for member institutes to share ideas and information:

• Organizing international workshops on key issues in democracy research • Promoting joint initiatives (conferences, panels, analytical projects) relating to the promotion of democracy and democratic development • Producing Democracy Research News, a quarterly electronic newsletter • Circulating Worth Reading, a semi-monthly email bulletin that recommends important articles, websites, and reports • Meeting at World Movement for Democracy biennial Global Assemblies

For more information about NDRI, visit www.ndri.ned.org.

viii D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

A note about data sources All population data and GDP per capita data contained in the country header pages are 2012 estimates by the International Monetary Fund. Civil and political freedom status and press freedom status are as determined by Freedom House in the Freedom in the World 2013 and Freedom of the Press 2012 reports. Internet penetration data are 2011 figures obtained from the World Bank’s Development Indicators.

ix DEMOCRACY THINK TANKS IN ACTION Translating Research into Policy in Young and Emerging Democracies

Christopher Walker *

chieving meaningful policy reform can be a devilishly difficult task in any political system, COUNTRIES EXAMINED: Abut especially so in countries with weak traditions of democracy. In relatively new democracies ARGENTINA, Center for the and states that can only be regarded as partly demo- Opening and Development cratic, the essential supporting institutions of politi- of Latin America (CADAL) cal accountability, media pluralism, and civil society have not grown deep roots. Decisions are made with- ECUADOR, Grupo FARO out broad consultation, public mobilization to support policy agendas is rare, and the goals of demo- GEORGIA, Caucasus cratic reform are often at odds with the short-term Institute for Peace, interests of political incumbents. Democracy and Development (CIPDD) In established democratic settings, by comparison, the environment for pursuing reforms tends to be GHANA, Ghana Center for more hospitable. No single political or economic Democratic Development power is able to dominate the discussion, and pol- (CDD-Ghana) icy makers must answer to influential civil society groups as well as an informed public if they fail to ad- LEBANON, Lebanese Center dress the country’s pressing problems. This of course for Policy Studies (LCPS) does not mean that achieving reforms in developed ROMANIA, Romanian democracies is easy or seamless. As the difficult ex- Academic Society (SAR) perience of recent years in the United States and Europe vividly demonstrates, even advanced demo- SLOVAKIA, Institute for cracies still wrestle with the challenge of identifying, Public Affairs (IVO) adopting, and implementing sorely needed policy improvements. SOUTH KOREA, East Asia Institute (EAI) Given the hurdles to achieving reform and the importance of ensuring that weaker democracies remain on TURKEY, Turkish Economic a democratic course, it is all the more critical to have and Social Studies instruments capable of promoting change. In this re- Foundation (TESEV) gard, civil society has an important role to play in enhancing the quality of democracy. Think tanks that seek to inform policy through rigorous research and intellectual argument have carved out a unique place in the broader

* Christopher Walker is Executive Director of the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies.

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array of civil society organizations. And Free category. The remaining four— within the think tank universe, those Argentina, Ghana, Romania, and South that specialize in democratic develop- Korea—are classified as Free but exhibit ment are especially relevant to the pur- weaknesses in their systems that cause suit of accountable and responsive gov- them to fall short of the top numerical ernance. ratings.

In order to acquire a better under- While all of the cases possess multiparty standing of the ways in which leading systems with competitive elections, they democracy think tanks are innovating also face challenging obstacles to trans- and finding ways to make an impact in parent and accountable governance. their countries, the International Forum Ghana, for instance, operates within for Democratic Studies at the National a context of checks and balances, but Endowment for Democracy asked nine government accountability suffers from members of its global think tank net- the dominance of the executive branch. work (the Network of Democracy Re- The country is also poised to obtain con- search Institutes) to contribute essays siderable oil wealth and must create that analyze their own efforts to achieve systems that will prevent the onset of influence in young democracies or the “resource curse.” Argentina con- semidemocratic settings. These organ- fronts weak transparency and rule of izations are among the most highly re- law, as well as indirect censorship that garded in the field. arises from the discriminatory allocation of official advertising resources. Roma- It should be noted that there is no iron- nia, one of two EU members included clad definition of “think tank.” Some of in this review, has achieved impressive the organizations classified under this democratic success since the fall of the term tend to focus solely on scholarly totalitarian Ceauşescu regime nearly a policy research, while others also de- quarter century ago. However, it contin- vote considerable resources to public ues to face unstable governments, weak outreach.1 The organizations that have rule of law, and entrenched corruption. contributed essays to this study by and Although South Korea’s democracy is large engage in both rigorous research a relatively strong performer and has and public advocacy. emerged successfully from a legacy of dictatorship, residual restrictions or dis- The Operating Environment for tortions remain. The country contends Reform with various forms of corruption and on- The think tank leaders who contributed line censorship, for example. essays to this project operate in a diverse range of political environments, Slovakia, the other EU member state each with its own distinct challenges to in this study, has achieved a remark- improving democratic governance. Ac- able degree of democracy since the late cording to Freedom House, eight of the 1990s. Indeed, following the collapse of nine countries in the study were elec- Soviet communism, it has successfully toral democracies as of the end of 2012, overcome hurdles including the overhaul signifying that they meet certain mini- of a command economy, the creation of mum standards of electoral competition. a new state after the division of Czecho- Lebanon is the sole exception. slovakia, and the neutralization of dangers posed by the illiberal leadership of Only one of the nine countries, Slovakia, Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar (1993– earned Free status and top ratings (1 98). Martin Bútora notes in his essay on out of 7) on both political rights and civil Slovakia that a “part of the [civil soci- liberties in the latest edition of Freedom ety] sector has taken on the profile of House’s annual Freedom in the World a check on power,” a development that report. Of the other eight, four—Ecua- had its genesis in the quasi-authoritar- dor, Georgia, Lebanon, and Turkey—are ian period under Mečiar. Civil society in ranked in the middle-performing Partly Slovakia has continued to perform this

2 A n O v e rv i e w function since 1998, maturing and com- To one extent or another, the countries ing to represent a “source of alternative in this study have vulnerabilities in their approaches to public policy.” young or partially developed systems— including weak rule of law, inadequate Meanwhile, the countries in this study transparency, and enduring corruption— that have weaker democratic profiles that require dedicated reform efforts in (Partly Free in the Freedom House anal- order to prevent backsliding. ysis) face more complicated challenges. Diverse Obstacles to Overcome In Ecuador, as part of an ongoing cam- The policy environments in these sys- paign to repress independent voices in tems are partially developed and pres- the country, the executive branch has ent challenges to the democracy re- recently placed greater pressure on the search organizations operating within news media and the judiciary in an in- them. One problem lies in the nature of creasingly populist and polemical envir- political parties in young democracies onment. and their often sharply limited capacity to develop reform ideas and platforms. In the decade since Georgia’s Rose Parties in these countries frequently Revolution, the country has enacted im- rely on personalities and do not always portant if partial reforms, but it has also represent clear constituencies or soci- undergone violent domestic upheaval etal interests. Even when they do, they and a military invasion by Russia. While may lack a sense of responsibility to the Georgia has made notable progress in broader public interest. These parties tackling corruption and strengthening therefore tend not to serve as the driv- state institutions, and recently experi- ing force behind reforms, and they may enced a peaceful turnover of power, its not be receptive to external advice. democratic gaps include lagging judicial reforms and a polarized, personality- The uneven quality and diversity of news driven political arena. media present another obstacle, hinder- ing the emergence of an informed public Lebanon’s political system has relied debate about policy options. While the on a rigid power-sharing formula under internet and other digital media plat- which parties representing the coun- forms are affording new opportunities try’s main religious groups divide the to foster these discussions and mobilize top executive and legislative posts and public support, the most popular news hold quotas in the parliament, the civil outlets, especially on television, are still service, and the security forces. The on- dominated by either the government or going violence in neighboring Syria partisan business interests. As a result, threatens to have harmful spillover such media may be seen more as politi- effects on Lebanon’s governance. cal instruments than as neutral forums for civic exchange. As Turkey’s prospects for accession to the EU have dimmed in recent years, its In addition, because many of these domestic governance has become less countries have only recently made the transparent and accountable. Indepen- transition from dictatorship or are still dent or critical journalists have been struggling to address poverty and eco- among the notable victims of this shift. nomic underdevelopment, their civil so- In her essay on Turkey, Özge Genç notes ciety organizations must contend with that civil society in the country faces a such social obstacles as deeply rooted range of risks from an uncertain political skepticism toward public engagement, climate. Turkey’s persistent authoritar- immature private philanthropic tradi- ian tendencies have implications beyond tions or incentives, and difficulty recruit- its borders, as it is often held up as a po- ing and retaining high-quality staff. tential democratic model for the Turkic world and the Arab Middle East. Finally, in systems with weaker democratic institutions, it can be said that the

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nature of the reform challenge differs in think tank figures in Georgia feel that kind, not just in degree. Instead of sim- they stand a much stronger chance of ply modifying existing policies and per- influencing policy through public opinion suading decision makers that one or an- than through a direct approach to deci- other option is the best way to achieve sion makers.” widely accepted goals, democracy think tanks in the more difficult environments Working in conjunction with the Leba- are tasked with introducing fundamental nese Association for Democratic Elec- reforms that may face strong political tions (LADE), the Lebanese Center for resistance. As Ghia Nodia of the Cau- Policy Studies (LCPS) utilized news me- casus Institute for Peace, Democracy, dia and government officials as inter- and Development (CIPDD) shrewdly ob- mediaries in a way that allowed for the serves in his essay, “The task in Georgia spread of information and building of is to help transform a superficially dem- support. The media informed the public ocratic—or predominantly autocratic, about a movement to call for local elect- depending on the opinion of a given an- ions, while allied lawmakers were able alyst—state into a substantively demo- to actively work within the parliament cratic political system. It is about chang- to persuade their colleagues. And in ing the nature of the political regime.” Argentina, in order to make as clear and compelling an impression on audiences All of these factors, and the limitations as possible, the Center for the Open- they present, have not prevented the ing and Development of Latin America think tanks in this study from making (CADAL) enlists a professional journalist an impact. Despite the challenges, they to present the results of each question have displayed a capacity for adaptation in its Legislative Barometer surveys in and innovation, and their experiences an attractive manner. can help inform the efforts of counterparts in other countries. Grupo FARO developed assessments and rankings for government agencies and Lessons on Making an Impact officials that measured their success The following are but a few of the broad at implementing reforms in the social- lessons than can be drawn from the services sector, especially as regards successes and setbacks of the nine de- the transparency of the reforms. This mocracy research organizations in this is a different type of “content” than the study. evidence used in policy making; it is a public information tool and a means of The importance of effective commu- applying pressure. Similarly, as part of nication. Grupo FARO in Ecuador ob- an environmental conservation project, serves that the “gathering of evidence Grupo FARO “had a clear strategy of di- is not enough.” Findings and arguments rect communications with government, need “to be communicated in a way that but it was intertwined with an advoca- speaks to politicians and policy advisors cy coalition that actively promoted the (the top-down view of the policy pro- same ideas among the wider public.” cess) as well as to journalists and ordinary citizens (the bottom-up view).” In Turkey, the Turkish Economic and In other words, “evidence needs to be Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) transformed into stories and narratives launched a campaign to hold govern- that capture the political and social ment officials accountable for their con- imagination.” In Georgia, as Ghia Nodia stitutional reform promises. This effort observes, “to date civil society organiza- included making available online for tions have generally been the primary public review the reports, letters, and instigators of and participants in public- presentations produced by civil society policy debates that deserve the desig- relating to the reform process, despite nation. They are also the main agents government refusals to do the same. for spreading policy ideas and assess- The Turkish parliament had taken the ments through different media. Many step of removing from its own website

4 A n O v e rv i e w the comments from civil society. TESEV’s trol, and reinvigorated grassroots activ- campaign also surveyed public opinion ism in a country with multiple societal on constitutional reform issues and held cleavages.” LCPS credits its success in a press conference on the survey’s re- part to a strategy of enlisting the sup- sults, pressuring the decreasingly transport of civic groups and political parties parent government to keep its promises. from all regions and confessions in the The Institute for Public Affairs (IVO) was country. This helped to spread the peti- a key player in the critical “OK ’98” cam- tion to every community, demonstrate a paign in Slovakia, an effort coordinated broad and nonpartisan public demand, by an eleven-member council of civic and build mutual trust among previously and activist organizations whose widely estranged constituencies. It is a prime and thoroughly disseminated messages example of how civic activism on be- helped to ensure free and fair elections. half of a common cause can knit social This nationwide collaborative effort con- groups together. tributed significantly to the election of a democratic government in Slovakia, and In response to instances of religious the value of the civic activism it engen- violence, CIPDD in Georgia carried out dered there is immense. a program of religious tolerance workshops for schoolteachers, challeng- In South Korea, among its other initia- ing assumptions that societal attitudes tives, the East Asia Institute has used were too ingrained to be changed at the frequent domestic and teacher level. At the cross-national public end of the process, opinion surveys, con- many teachers ad- ducted in cooperation The countries in mitted that a rational with major media com- this study have discussion of religious panies, as a tool for vulnerabilities pluralism helped them reaching wider public see this issue in a very audiences. The rapid in their young or different way. growth of the inter- partially developed net and other inform- The Coalition for a ation and communica- systems…that require Clean Parliament in tion technologies in the dedicated reform Romania, organized country has afforded efforts in order to by the Romanian Aca- think tanks new pos- demic Society (SAR), sibilities for public out- prevent backsliding. offered the public a reach. means to demand the removal of corrupt The power of civic parliamentarians. The education and public awareness. project created public lists of electoral A number of the organizations in the candidates who were suspected of cor- study leveraged civic education and ruption, thus putting pressure on the public awareness to effect change. Sami various political parties to cull them from Atallah of the LCPS observes that his their slates. Citizens were then able to “Center’s experience demonstrates the vote against those who remained. In power of ideas—that ideas relating to essence, SAR effected change by linking democratic representation, local gov- a policy request with a public awareness ernment, or corruption, emerging from tool. Using a similar approach, SAR per- a fairly academic exercise, can provide suaded the Ministry of Finance to make the basis for sociopolitical collective public the debts owed by state-owned action and become forces for change.” companies, revealing the scale of their As noted above, LCPS joined with LADE inefficiency and dependence on state to create a petition demanding that bailouts and increasing pressure on offi- municipal elections be held. The proj- cials to proceed with long-delayed privat- ect “shifted politics to a new playing ization efforts. field that the government did not con-

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Research can provide insight into how to The elusiveness of causal relation- set up these outreach efforts—and pro- ships in policy making. Many organ- vide openings for popular participation izations note that it is often impossible that ordinary citizens may not have the to quantify success or measure their expertise, resources, or creativity to ini- true impact on the policy-making pro- tiate themselves. cess. It is important to remember that public policy is usually formed through The added value of joint initiatives. the work of many hands and the influ- Joint initiatives between organizations, ence of external events, meaning a par- especially between think tanks and ticular think tank may play only an in- more activism-oriented groups, can be direct or facilitating role in the gener- of value in bridging human capital gaps. ation of a given outcome. But the dif- An individual group may have strong re- ficulty of identifying a direct causal research products and lationship does not connections with peer diminish the value institutions or other Democracy think of the contribution. nongovernmental sec- As one author put it, tors (private busi- tanks in the think tanks can serve nesses, for example), more difficult as “idea brokers” or but lack the expertise “conduits” between or capacity to carry environments “policy makers on the out a full-scale public are tasked with one hand and civil so- awareness campaign. introducing ciety, community lead- Networks of nonresi- ers, interest group dent fellows can be fundamental reforms representatives, activ- another useful way to that may face strong ists, academics, and share human capital students on the other.” and pull together dis- political resistance. Through this conduit, parate experts from participants can ex- across organizations change ideas and ex- and sectors. This ap- pertise in a wide public proach requires less financing than a discourse about the policy-making pro- large in-house staff, although it also has cess. Helping to cultivate, sustain, and limits and requires personal ties and influence such a discourse is a public mutual respect among members to suc- service that all think tanks should aspire ceed. to provide.

International connections also proved Meeting a Steep Reform Challenge useful to the organizations in this re- At a time when most societies are deal- port and were in evidence in five of the ing with a rapidly changing governance case studies. Developing partnerships environment, spurred in part by the on- with groups abroad can supplement the going communications revolution, young expertise of an organization, lend cred- or weak democracies must find ways to ibility to its proposals, and allow it to adapt to the new landscape. Political convey international “best practices” fragmentation, information overload, to the government. Such partnerships and the complexity of modern policy may require researchers to give up their making all increase the value of organ- exclusive ownership of ideas and share izations that can bring clarity to difficult credit for any successes, but the fact re- policy problems. Improving the quality mains that success is more likely when of the discussion in the public sphere is many advocates are working toward the a critical need in all democracies, and same goal and the initiative rises above especially so in partial ones. In this re- the particular interests or limitations of spect, think tanks have an important its originator. role to play in addressing issues of civic consequence.

6 A n O v e rv i e w

Effective instruments for encouraging the weaker democratic settings, the reform are in demand in young and as- challenge is steeper. Democracy think piring democracies around the world. tanks in such countries can play a simi- The transitional states of North Africa larly important part in improving specif- are a prime example, as their leaders ic policies, but they have the additional are facing terribly difficult policy deci- challenge of helping to enable more fund- sions and very tight timeframes. But the amental systemic reforms to deepen de- experiences of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya mocracy. will undoubtedly be repeated elsewhere in one way or another, given popular In all of these cases, it is critical to main- pressure for more responsive and effec- tain realistic expectations for civil soci- tive governance in other countries in the ety organizations, which do not operate Arab world and beyond. in isolation. A range of social, economic, political, and others factors influence For this reason, it is important to de- and compete with the efforts of think velop the capacity of democracy think tanks in young or partial democracies. tanks even in political environments Despite this reality, some observers ex- that are currently hostile to their ideas. pect quick results on very specific mat- As Ghia Nodia points out with respect to ters. But as Gabriel Salvia of CADAL in Georgia, it is often the case that “ideas Argentina observes, the work of a think follow people.” When governments tank is intended to bring results in the change, civil society figures migrate to medium to long run, since successful official positions, bringing with them reforms under democratic governments important knowledge about democratic are necessarily gradual and require con- practices. As democracy takes root and sensus. further rotations of power take place through elections, some former govern- While there are no “silver bullets” for ment officials may in turn move to the achieving democratic reforms, the ac- think tank world, enriching civil society counts in this study demonstrate the with their expertise and experience. In value of independent think tanks that the Georgian case, given the 2012 elec- are able either to directly incorporate tion results, there is reason to hope that an advocacy component into their work, this process will become institutional- or otherwise partner with organizations ized. that can help promote their analytical efforts. Given the clear and persist- The environments presented by new de- ent challenges to improving democrat- mocracies and partly democratic states ic governance, protecting and, ideally, offer particular challenges, but real op- institutionalizing the operating space portunities as well. Unlike the patently for organizations that help inform the corrupt and coercive governance that policy discussion, encourage consensus, predominates in consolidated authori- and generally offer a thoughtful frame of tarian systems, the countries included reference for elite and mass audiences in this study to one extent or another is an endeavor that deserves dedicated feature competitive elections, space attention and continued support. for news media, and the ability of civil society to operate with relatively few Endnote constraints. For the countries with more 1. For more on the subject of definitions, developed democratic systems, where see James G. McGann, Think Tanks and the “rules of the game” are settled, Policy Advice in the United States: Acad- democracy think tanks can play an im- emics, Advisors, Advocates (New York: portant role in improving policies. In Routledge, 2007).

STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY INFLUENCE ON POLICY FORMULATION IN ARGENTINA The Identification of Economic and nsI titutional Consensus among Policy Makers

Gabriel C. Salvia*

he Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL) is a private, nonprofit, ARGENTINA Tnonpartisan foundation dedicated to the defense and promotion of democratic values; the monitoring Capital: Buenos Aires and analysis of political, economic, and institutional Population: 41.282 million performance; and the formulation of public policies that contribute to good governance and individual Internet Penetration: well-being. 47.7 percent

CADAL highlights, in both its objectives and pro- Press Freedom Status: grams, the importance of the rule of law and of merit Partly Free and active transparency in the public sector; the role of private initiative in the generation of economic Political Rights and Civil growth; the subsidiary role of the state in guarantee- Liberties Status: Free ing cohesion and social inclusion; and the necessity GDP per capita, PPP of an international commitment to the defense of hu- (Current Int’l Dollars): man rights. $18,202 CADAL was created in February 2003 in the context of the political, economic, and institutional crisis that had recently taken place in Argentina and several other Latin American countries, and the related challenges of upholding democratic freedoms and pursuing economic growth with social inclusion. CADAL sought to promote the different facets of development in the region through initiatives of political, economic, and institutional opening.

In the case of Argentina, almost three decades after the end of military rule, the country has suffered important setbacks in the quality of democracy. These include political fragmentation due to the collapse of the party system in 2001, a federal structure that is not applied in practice, and, crucially, a federal legislative branch that is subordi- nated to the executive.

CADAL has worked to highlight the legislature’s important constitutional role in the formulation and implementation of public policies. In 2008, the Center introduced

*Gabriel C. Salvia is President and General Director of the Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America.

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the Legislative Barometer, a tool de- and considered the tax on checks to be signed to help civil society influence one of the country’s worst. the policy-making process. It is a self- administered, anonymous opinion poll Two years later, the Legislative Barom- that indicates whether or not a given eter entitled Argentine Economic and In- policy measure enjoys sufficient consen- stitutional Agenda 2010–2011 was im- sus among legislators. That is, it casts plemented, surveying lawmakers on the light on the viability of initiatives pro- following committees: budget and trea- posed by civil society. This is important sury, finance, economy, agriculture and because civil society often works on pro- livestock, industry, commerce, energy, posals that do not enjoy a basic politi- and revenue sharing. This time, imple- cal consensus, meaning time is lost and mentation of the barometer required resources wasted. seven months of work, two more than foreseen, due to the difficulty of obtain- CADAL’s team has experience in the use ing responses (especially in the case of of this instrument. In 2008, two surveys ruling party legislators). The major con- were carried out (one in Uruguay and clusions were as follows: the other in Argentina), and in 2010 a further survey of Argentine legislators • More than seven out of ten legisla- was conducted. tors (73.3 percent) who sit on various economic, fiscal, and production- In the first case, which was supported related committees of both chambers by the Swiss embassy, the theme of the of Congress identified inflation as the Legislative Barometer was the reform of main problem the Argentine economy the penal and incarceration system in would face over the next two years. Uruguay. The results of the survey were published in a book, in which several • According to the view of the Argen- specialists underlined the advisability of tine economy espoused by thirty-five introducing the proposed changes. deputies and ten senators of all parties, the second major concern was In the second case, the theme under structural poverty (57.8 percent). A investigation was public spending and slightly lower percentage (55.6 per- taxation in Argentina. Thirty members cent) cited judicial insecurity, while of the budget and treasury committees less than half of those surveyed ex- of both chambers of the Argentine Con- pressed worry about the scarce level gress were interviewed, and a broad of investment present in the economy majority was opposed to a budget deficit (48.9 percent).

About the Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America

The Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL) was founded in 2003 as a non-profit, non-partisan, private foundation with the mission of promoting democratic values; observing political, economic and institutional performance; and formulating public policy proposals that contribute to good government and well-being. Based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, CADAL also operates a satellite office in Montevideo, Uruguay and is supported by an advisory group consisting of academics, analysts, businessmen, and consultants in various Latin American countries.

To achieve its goals, CADAL organizes national and international conferences, conducts analysis, surveys, and research projects concerning public policy, provides educational courses for university students and professionals, and generates publications to spread ideas. In addition, CADAL conducts a number of activities with regional and international reach to promote international solidarity for democracy.

10 P o l i c y F o r m u l at i o n i n A r g e n t i na

• When questioned about the best business has been shown to be defi- way to slow price increases for con- cient, or that state-owned companies sumer goods, 60.5 percent of the should be the rule in key sectors, such legislators supported moves to re- as defense or public services. Never- duce the value-added tax (VAT) on theless, they showed themselves to goods from the basic consumer bas- “generally agree” with the liberaliza- ket, while a little more than half said tion of the commercial airline market they would “control the emission of (59.4 percent). money” (51.2 percent). As a third alternative, the legislators considered it • The politicians consulted also best to “let the market operate freely showed themselves to be in favor and help the poor through direct cash of commercial opening as long as it transfers” (25.6 percent). is reciprocal (54.5 percent), justified nontariff barriers in exceptional • In order to escape the tangle of circumstances (34.9 percent), or re- subsidies on public-service tariffs, the jected them with the argument that majority (54.8 percent) indicated a the imposition of tariffs is more trans- preference to “negotiate a staggered parent (37.2 percent). With regard to increase of tariffs on all users,” while the regulation of local commerce, the 38.1 percent of those surveyed would majority (61.5 percent) of legislators as an additional preference “establish said they agreed with the obligation to adjustment mechanisms for the fu- restrict medicine sales to pharmacies ture.” Meanwhile, the options to “up- and sales of newspapers to kiosks. date tariffs automatically according to inflation” and “offer subsidies so that • The legislators surveyed declared tariffs do not increase” did not receive their principal countries of reference a single affirmative response. in Latin America to be Brazil (83.7 percent), Chile (72.1 percent), and • The deputies and senators were in Uruguay (65.1 percent), while only a favor of balanced budgets (31.8 per- few indicated that Argentina should cent), prioritized health as the most emulate Bolivia (4.7 percent), Ven- relevant option for government spend- ezuela (2.3 percent), or Cuba (2.3 ing (68.2 percent), considered the tax percent). on checks to be the country’s most distortive tax (72.7 percent), and with The Legislative Barometer was well regard to the agricultural sector, pro- received by the media, including the posed the reduction or elimination of Buenos Aires Herald, which published a retentions and other bureaucratic or fairly detailed account of the results on customs obstacles (31.8 percent). At 15 December 2010. Several other media the same time, they valued the role outlets also covered the survey. of Congress in the setting of export tax rates (50 percent) and the autho- The success of this type of survey basi- rization of spending increases (62.8 cally depends on its impact in the media. percent). Good research by think tanks is often wasted due to flaws in the presentation • Regarding the state’s role in the and communication of the final product. economy, 77.8 percent justified the It is consequently very important that liberal reforms of the 1990s, although the survey results are processed in such with certain reservations. Equal num- a way that they can be readily used by bers of legislators (31.8 percent) journalists. CADAL hires an experienced thought either that state-owned com- journalist to present the results of each panies are justified only when private question in an attractive manner. This

**See, among others, “Para los legisladores, la inflación será el principal problema en 2011” [For legislators, inflation will be the main problem in 2011], El Cronista Comercial, 14 December 2010; “Inflación oficial Argentina de 0,7 pct en noviembre” [Argentina’s official inflation rate was 0.7% in November], Reuters, 15 De- cember 2010; “El Congreso sueña con bajar el IVA” [Congress dreams of lowering the VAT], (con’t on next page)

11 D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

work, which bears no signature and is terns, and members of staff assigned presented as an institutional text, in- on a part-time basis. cludes the elaboration of an executive summary that synthesizes the data from CADAL has dealt with these obstacles as the survey.** follows:

Leaving aside the communications strat- • We are dedicating more time to the egy, CADAL has encountered the fol- implementation of the barometer, and lowing obstacles during its five years of as we receive responses we adjust our work on this initiative: priorities for reminder telephone calls. The idea is to focus on the completion • The legislators, with a few excep- of surveys by those legislators who tions, do not respond rapidly to the are necessary to offer the most rep- survey and must be called and re- resentative survey possible, accord- minded week after week. ing to the number of legislators from each political bloc, each chamber of • Regardless of each legislator’s pre- Congress, and each province. disposition to respond, it is necessary to remember that they receive many • A telephone contact is established solicitations of this type. The Legisla- in each legislator’s office, and distinct tive Barometer is competing with nu- methods are used to obtain contacts merous initiatives promoted by con- close to the legislator to facilitate the sultants, investigators, journalists, completion of the survey. At times the and other entities. survey may be completed by an ad- viser and simply approved by the leg- • In the case of the governing bloc the islator, and we seek to identify such a situation is even more complicated, person. In other cases we appeal to whether due to a lack of contacts with mutual acquaintances to deliver and advisers, the fact that CADAL may be follow up on our request. We also take perceived as politically opposed to advantage of any opportunity to es- the government, or the fear that indi- tablish direct contact with the legisla- vidual responses may be made public. tors and obtain their personal e-mail Furthermore, it is important to point addresses, for instance at events in out that in the case of Argentina, the which they participate or social activi- legislative branch does not, in prac- ties they attend, including receptions tice, enjoy independence from the ex- at foreign embassies. ecutive and generally limits itself to considering and approving projects as • We also take advantage of CADAL’s indicated by the presidency. associates and especially members of the Business, Advisory, or Academic • Several of the legislators surveyed Councils who have direct or indirect reported that the Legislative Barom- contact with national legislators. Simi- eter Argentine Economic and Institu- larly, we appeal to friendly journalists, tional Agenda 2010–2011 contained analysts, consultants, or academics. too many questions (twenty). • Because in many cases we are in- • This initiative (in its Argentine ver- formed, upon calling the legislators’ sion) does not have sufficient eco- offices, that the printed survey has nomic resources to hire full-time staff, not been received, the same docu- and is carried out by volunteers, in- ment is available in electronic form:

(con’t from previous page) La Nación, 19 December 2010; “Encuesta hurgó en opinión de legisladores y se notan más coincidencias que las que expresan los discursos” [Survey explores the opinion of legislators and finds more agreement than is expressed in speeches], Agencia Diarios y Noticias, 28 December 2010; “Barómetro legisla- tivo: Los legisladores se parecen más entre sí que lo que ellos creen” [Legislative barometer: Legislators are more alike than they think], Perfil.com, 29 December 2010.

12 P o l i c y F o r m u l at i o n i n A r g e n t i na both through a hidden link on CADAL’s ment of productive activity. website and as a Word attachment that is repeatedly sent to the legisla- • Currently, the 2012–13 edition of tor’s office by e-mail. Once the survey the Legislative Barometer Argentine has been completed, the legislators Economic and Institutional Agenda is have two options: print and sign the being carried out, and all members of survey (to be picked up by a member Congress (72 senators and 257 depu- of CADAL’s team) or send it directly ties) have been invited to participate. by e-mail. As with any think tank, CADAL’s main • In response to the lack of replies aspiration is to see some of its initiatives from government party legislators, we become public policy. This requires a fa- are considering presenting the results vorable climate of public opinion toward of the latest survey as “The Opposi- the proposed policies, as well as political tion’s Vision.” This will allow us to ex- interest on the part of legislators or the clude the few completed surveys from government. the ruling party legislators, as the bloc makes up the majority of both In adverse political and economic con- chambers and its low participation texts, the second option of any think rate affects the representativeness of tank is to try to place some subjects on the survey. This alternative also takes the public agenda that may influence a into account the fact that it is pos- change among policy makers. With this sible to infer the probable responses second option in mind, the questions of governing party legislators based included in the Legislative Barometer on the policies of the government are selected according to the following and projects previously approved by strategy: Congress. Moreover, we consider that it could be of greater interest to the • Surveys are performed every two public and more attractive to the me- years to show changes in the answers dia to identify the perspectives of the of legislators. For example, regarding opposition, which is often criticized “the vision of the Argentine economy,” for failing to offer alternatives to the legislators are asked to select four an- policies of the government. swers to the following question: Ac- cording to you, which are the main • Meanwhile, a Political Opening problems that the Argentine economy Program at CADAL’s Latin American will face in the next two years? The School of Political and Economic Stud- possible options are: A) Judicial inse- ies will be directed toward young stu- curity, lack of clear and stable rules; B) dents and university graduates. Be- Economic dependence from abroad; ginning in 2013, they will be trained C) External factors (international cri- to participate in the institution’s pro- sis, commodities prices, etc.); D) Low jects, including the Legislative Ba- level of investments; E) High level of rometer and the Monitor of Legisla- state interventionism; F) Structural tors’ Transparency. The goal is to poverty; G) Corruption; H) Political recruit future volunteers and interns uncertainty; I) Tax pressure; J) Labor and increase the human resources at and/or union conflicts; K) High level our disposal for future initiatives. of public debt; L) Protectionism and the lack of economic opening to the • To improve financing, CADAL’s - ob world; M) Unfair wealth distribution; jective is to concentrate any fund- N) Fiscal deficit; and O) Inflation. raising directed toward businesses on this project. The survey generates • Similarly, legislators are asked to considerable interest in the business choose from the following options re- community, as several of the ques- garding the proper role of state com- tions directly or indirectly affect the panies: A) The government must pro- investment climate and the develop- vide a basic regulatory framework for

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certain activities, but is not to man- market labor and favors investment in age companies directly; B) The gov- capital goods over the legal hiring of ernment must not manage compa- workers. nies directly, but subsidize strategic sectors of the economy; C) Govern- • CADAL has modified questions from ment companies are only justified in previous editions of the Legislative Ba- the cases where private management rometer as needed. For instance, one has proven deficient; D) Government that asked lawmakers to identify the companies should be the rule in key country’s worst tax was replaced by economic sectors; or E) The govern- the following question: Which of the ment should be the owner of all the following taxes would you eliminate? means of production. Ten tax categories were listed, along with the option of “None.” According • To encourage debate on the issue of to provisional answers, the so-called meritocracy as a rule “checks tax” (applied in public administra- to bank credits and tion, the legislators Good research by debits) was chosen are asked: Would by the overwhelming you agree that the think tanks is often majority. The results heads of the techni- wasted due to flaws of this question will cal government en- be used by CADAL to tities must be hired in the presentation advocate for the tax’s through a contest and communication repeal. There are cur- of experience and rently a number of expertise, so as to of the final product. different proposals by prevent the post experts for its gradual and its tasks from elimination, but one becoming a political possibility in particu- matter? lar—that the revenue from the tax would be distributed among the prov- • Legislators are offered a variety of inces—would make its elimination choices as to the best mechanisms for nearly impossible. reducing unemployment: A) The establishment of a “flexicurity” system, • Legislators are invited to consider whereby companies pay less for social priorities for public expenditure, es- benefits and it is easier to fire work- pecially in light of questionable poli- ers, but the government provides un- cies like the program “Football for All,” employment insurance to those who through which the federal govern- have lost their jobs and are looking ment subsidizes the broadcasting of for a new one; B) Penalizing compa- soccer matches on television. In this nies that fire employees, for instance case the question was submitted as by establishing a system of double follows: Would you agree to reallocate or triple compensation; C) National- the budget for the program Football izing companies that are about to for All? The possible responses were: close and/or go into bankruptcy; D) A) No, the government should remain Establishing a uniform unemployment in charge of the free transmissions; insurance that does not favor the B) No, the government should remain workers of big companies over those in charge of the free transmissions, working at small and medium-sized but government advertising should firms; E) Creating more jobs in the be regulated to avoid its use as politi- public sector; F) Giving subsidies to cal propaganda; C) Yes, I would use companies that are having difficulties the funds for higher education, sci- and agree not to reduce their staff; ence and technology, and/or culture; and G) Reducing the labor cost to D) Yes, I would allocate the funds for companies, since current legislation defense, internal safety and justice, provides incentives to rely on black- and/or to fight against drug traffick-

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ing; E) Yes, I would allocate the funds menting for two years now on the Argen- for health, social programs, and/or a tine economic and institutional agenda pension system; F) Yes, I would allo- tries to foster debate on macroeconomic cate the funds for public works, infra- and political-institutional matters that structure, and/or housing; G) Other; affect the country’s development. H) I don’t know; I) No answer. The Legislative Barometer provides the • The survey addresses institutional field research, the information analysis, issues with important economic im- and the elaboration of diagnostics that plications, such as the possibility of are indispensable for the generation of extending the legislative discussion constructive ideas. At the same time, period for important projects to allow the survey’s data on the coincidence of more public consultation and the cor- opinions help to identify and prioritize rection of any flaws. Major decisions initiatives that have more solid support like the repeal of the private pension and are therefore worth pursuing with system and the nationalization of the additional resources. Moreover, consen- oil company YPF have been enacted sus is the basis of collective intelligence. after less than a month of legislative It is essential to the decision-making deliberation. By contrast, the creation process and the formulation of state of the private pension system and the policies in the long run. privatization of YPF in the 1990s took place after more than a year of legis- In light of the economic policies that lative discussion. have been implemented in Argentina in recent years, together with setbacks in In comparison with the previous edi- the quality of the country’s institutions, tion of the Legislative Barometer Ar- it could be said that CADAL has failed gentine Economic and Institutional in its mission. However, one should con- Agenda, the new survey for 2012–13 sider the following: includes the following changes: • A civil society organization that pro- • The number of questions was re- motes certain principles and propels duced by half to make it easier for the policy initiatives owes its existence to legislators to answer them. Among those who see value in its task: its the questions that were eliminated members, donors, and those who take was the one related to expenditures in part in its activities; the media outlets the federal budget, since many impor- that use its research for news; and all tant social expenses like health and those who in different ways engage in education are dealt with mostly by the work of the institution by attend- provincial governments, and because ing events, receiving newsletters, and it is difficult for a legislator to openly following its work through social net- prioritize tourism or sports over safe- works. This social representation sug- ty, justice, and national defense. gests that CADAL’s point of view has achieved some resonance within the • Questions about policies for individ- pluralistic democracy, notwithstand- ual economic sectors were cut, since ing the unfavorable political context now we are sending the survey to all or even our own inability to exert a legislators, and many are not famil- more decisive influence. iar with the reality of specific sectors. More general or institutional matters • The work of a think tank is intended were prioritized instead. to bring results in the medium and long run, since successful reforms Conclusions under democratic governments are Although the Legislative Barometer is necessarily gradual and require am- a product that allows questions on any ple consensus. The organization must subject on the public political agenda, therefore not only survive for an ex- the survey that we have been imple- tended period, but also guarantee the

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continuity of its more innovative prod- Although many of the questions included ucts. in the Legislative Barometer Argentine Economic and Institutional Agenda list • There is no doubt that the main answers that are not especially popu- challenge to taking full advantage of lar at present, it is worth noting what the results of this survey is improving John Stuart Mill expressed in his book its communication to the public. We On Liberty: “It is as evident in itself as are considering different alternatives any amount of argument can make it, that include greater diffusion through that ages are no more infallible than in- the internet, inviting the public and dividuals; every age having held many specialists to answer the survey, of- opinions which subsequent ages have fering videos with experts giving their deemed not only false but absurd; and opinions on the results, and involving it is as certain that many opinions, now candidates for the legislative elections general, will be rejected by future ages, of 2013 to state their positions. At the as it is that many, once general, are re- same time, we are evaluating specific jected by the present.” campaigns through social networks and strategic alliances, whether with peer institutions or well-known social referents.

16 TRANSLATING EVIDENCE INTO POLICIES Two Cases in Ecuador

Orazio Bellettini Cedeño and Andrea Ordóñez Llanos*

It has been said that man is a rational animal. All my life I have been searching for evidence which could support this. — Bertrand Russell

hink tanks, international institutions, and even politicians agree that policies grounded in solid ECUADOR Tresearch are superior to those based merely on political interests or ideology, and that such research Capital: Quito can prevent crucial misunderstandings. In this paper, we will describe two cases in which evidence played Population: 15.23 million an important role in the policy process in Ecuador, a Internet Penetration: country where this is still the exception. We analyze 31.4 percent the factors that seem to affect the use of evidence in both cases. At the end of the paper, however, we will Press Freedom Status: argue that the gathering of evidence is not enough. Partly Free It needs to be communicated in a way that speaks to politicians and policy advisers (the top-down view of Political Rights and the policy process) as well as to journalists and ordi- Civil Liberties Status: nary citizens (the bottom-up view). Neither of these Partly Free groups uses facts alone; both politicians and citizens GDP per capita, PPP need arguments to promote the policy changes they seek. Consequently, evidence needs to be trans- (Current Int’l Dollars): formed into stories and narratives that capture the $8,616 political and social imagination.

I. CASES In this paper, we will analyze two cases in which evidence has played an important role in the policy process in Ecuador: 1) Fighting Political Clientelism in Social Programs and 2) the Yasuní-ITT Initiative.

1. Fighting Political Clientelism in Social Programs1 This case describes the efforts that Grupo FARO, a “think-and-do tank” that promotes public policies in Ecuador, carried out to reduce and prevent political clientelism in social programs, which resulted in a concrete agreement signed by nine social programs in 2006. During Lucio Gutiérrez’s presidency (2003–05) there was a general

*Orazio J. Belletini Cedeño is Executive Director of Grupo FARO; Andrea Ordóñez Llanos is Grupo FARO’s Director of Research.

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perception of corruption, especially in ment for the Transparency and Protec- the social sector. Furthermore, many in- tion of Public Funds of Social Programs vestigations by the media exposed the during the Electoral Campaign.” With use of social programs for political gain. the implementation of this agreement, Gutiérrez’s removal from power in April Grupo FARO hoped to place the topic on 2005 opened a window of opportunity, the public agenda and pilot new mecha- as the phenomenon of politicized social nisms to prevent clientelism. Therefore, programs was fresh in the minds of Ec- the agreement included concrete actions uadorians. One month later, with a new to be taken by the social programs, such government in place, Grupo FARO began as rescheduling their delivery dates and researching the topic and cooperating events if they coincided with electoral with two programs—Aliméntate Ecuador, dates, and setting up mechanisms to re- a nutrition program, and Maternidad ceive reports of clientelism, among oth- Gratuita, a health program—to imple- ers. ment concrete measures that would prevent clientelism. The initial research, The agreement stated that on behalf of an index on the opportunities for clien- the signatory CSOs, Grupo FARO would telism, illustrated the programs’ weak- develop an assessment of the results nesses, including lack of compliance of its implementation by the end of the with the Transparency Law, the absence 2006 presidential election. This moni- of a mechanism to receive complaints toring component had two objectives: to of manipulation at the local level, and inform social programs on their perfor- underdeveloped mechanisms for citizen mance and to generate some evidence participation. on the middle-term impact of the initiative. Probably the most innovative tool Grupo FARO considered the presidential was the creation of a ranking system election of 2006 to be an opportune time for compliance by the participating pro- to bring the topic of clientelism back to grams. the public agenda, since clientelistic practices can increase during campaign The signatory CSOs were actively en- periods through the manipulation of gaged during the process, whether in candidates at the national or local lev- promoting the agreement, monitoring it el. On July 14, 2006, after lobbying ef- at the local level, or working closely with forts by Grupo FARO, the coordinators the social programs during implementa- of nine social programs and six civil- tion. Grupo FARO in particular worked society organizations (CSOs), including with the social programs’ management Grupo FARO itself, signed the “Agree- teams to design communications mat-

About Grupo FARO

Grupo FARO was established in 2004 as a “think and do tank” in Quito during a time of significant political instability in Ecuador to create an independent and non-partisan space to support the institutional capacities of the Ecuadorian government, civil society, and the private sector in generating public policy. Since that time, Grupo FARO has become globally recognized as a center that promotes public policies and sustainable development in Ecuador and Latin America.

Today, Grupo FARO’s mission is to influence public policies in order to build a more democratic, innovative, sustainable, and inclusive society in Ecuador through research, informed dialogue, and collective action. Through a variety of projects, Grupo FARO focuses on four thematic areas: environment and society, equity and social opportunities, public governance, and information and knowledge.

18 T w o C a s e s i n E c ua d o r erials that included posters, radio spots, able to recommend improvements in the joint press releases, and conferences. general management of the programs to In this way, Grupo FARO was not only the new government.3 engaged in promoting the idea with public officials, but also in conveying it to a 2. The Yasuní-ITT Initiative wider public. This case summarizes the birth of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, which proposes to One concrete aspect that Grupo FARO leave untapped approximately 944 mil- monitored was compliance with the lion barrels of oil reserves located in the Transparency Law, according to which Yasuní National Park (a 983,000-hectare certain information must be made public area in the Amazon region) in exchange through the social programs’ websites. for monetary compensation.4 The initia- Grupo FARO had elaborated a methodol- tive is currently being debated in Ec- ogy to evaluate compliance with these uador, and the discussion has grown to requirements and informed the pro- include multiple new dimensions. How- grams at baseline, during the political ever, this text focuses on the beginnings campaign, and one year later, in June of the initiative, meaning the govern- 2007. From this monitoring it was evi- ment’s public commitment to leave the dent that the majority (six out of nine) reserves untapped and the development of the programs improved their compli- of a compensation scheme. We will not ance with the law; however, this was not touch on the events that occurred after the case with all aspects of the agree- the proposal by the official committee ment. As the final report concludes, “it was finalized, and will concentrate on is not possible to assure that signing the how evidence affected the adoption of agreement produced structural changes the initiative rather than on the role it within the social programs. However, is currently playing in the public debate. what one can assure is that the main In the 1970s, an oil boom began in Ecua- objective was achieved: setting the top- dor’s Amazon region as major reserves ic on the public agenda.”2 Furthermore, were found by international companies. the implementation of these concrete In the specific area of what is now Yasuní actions to prevent clientelism gave Gru- National Park, the national oil company po FARO insights into the problems that conducted seismic studies to determine social programs face when implement- initial reserves, and additional wells ing reforms, and the organization was drilled during the 1990s further outlined

Figure 1: Political Clientelism Timeline April 2005: Cuio Gutierrez leaves the presidency May 2005: Grup FARO begins working with nine social programs July 2006: Social programs sign agreement for transparency and protection of public funds during elections October 2006: Elections held

February 2007: Grupo FARO presents follow-up report

May 2007 June 2005 April 2006 July 2006 March 2005 January 2006 September 2005 November 2006 February 2007

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the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) In January 2007, Rafael Correa became oilfields. However, the operation pre- the new president, and some of the sup- sents significant technical challenges, porters of the moratorium became part which are among the reasons why it did of his cabinet. Most importantly, Alberto not prosper in those years. Acosta became minister of mines and oil, and promoted the initiative within Meanwhile, Yasuní National Park was the government until it was officially ad- created in 1979 and declared a Bio- opted. He reportedly encountered resis- sphere Reserve by the UN Educational, tance from other ministries, and particu- Scientific, and Cultural Organization larly from the head of Petroecuador, who (UNESCO) in 1989. During the 1990s was negotiating a possible oil concession and 2000s, several studies measured with Brazilian and Chinese companies.6 amphibian, bird, mammal, and plant diversity in the Amazon rainforest. Two The initiative was formally launched in scientific stations are based within the June 2007 by President Correa, who an- park, and have attracted much attention nounced that keeping the national park from the international scientific commu- intact was the first option, but that drill- nity. Yet a significant portion of the area ing was still the second option. In its around the park has been contracted original form, the initiative envisioned with oil companies, generating a con- a financial contribution from the inter- stant threat to park’s boundaries. national community equivalent to 50 percent of the potential government In 2004, about fifty scientists grouped revenues from oil extraction—about under the collective “Scientists Con- $350 million a year.7 cerned for Yasuní” systematized the findings of scientific research that point However, this first proposal was unsuc- to the rich diversity and conservation cessful in attracting funds, and a new significance of the park, as described in political commission—Consejo Adminis- their letter to then president Gutiérrez trativo y Directivo de la Iniciativa Yas- when a plan to build a road into the park uní-ITT—and technical secretariat were was put forward: established in February 2008. The commission made a substantial change to “Our first conclusion is that Yasuní- Na the proposal, creating the concept of tional Park protects a region of extraor- Yasuní Guarantee Certificates (CGYs). dinary value in terms of its biodiversity, They were designed to account for the cultural heritage, and largely intact wil- carbon dioxide emissions that would be derness. . . . Overall, Yasuní has more avoided by not extracting the oil. The than 100,000 species of insects per emission credits could be traded in car- hectare, and 6 trillion individuals per bon markets worldwide, and the result- hectare. That is the highest known bio- ing revenues would be used to generate diversity in the world.”5 a more sustainable energy matrix for Ecuador. Using evidence from all available research, CSOs developed policy propos- II. FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE USE als to protect this area. The first pro- OF EVIDENCE posal was a moratorium on a project envisioned by the national oil company, 1. Political Context Petroecuador, to drill the ITT fields, Research-policy linkages are shaped by meaning a prohibition on any explora- the political context in which decisions tion or extraction in the area. The idea are adopted by policy makers. Both was presented in June 2006 to the gov- cases above illustrate the importance of ernment of President Alfredo Palacio. finding a window of opportunity to intro- Although the drilling project was not duce a proposal into the public debate. carried out, the government failed to is- In the case of political clientelism, Grupo sue an official statement endorsing the FARO pointed to two opportunities as- moratorium. sociated with the political context. First,

20 T w o C a s e s i n E c ua d o r given that the previous government CSOs and scientists had been advocat- had been heavily attacked for clientelis- ing protections for the park, their im- tic practices, the new administration pact on the previous governments had was motivated to show that things had been marginal. But in 2007, the political changed.8 The secretary of the Social context had dramatically changed, and Front (Frente Social), who was in charge in June the government announced for of social programs, later stated: the first time that its preferred option was to preserve the park. Furthermore, “Obviously we came from a given gov- in September, Ecuador was electing ernment, there was a common char- representatives for a Constitutional As- acteristic among those working with sembly summoned by President Correa. Palacio, which was a general rejection The government aimed to change the of clientelistic practices, there was sig- constitution to reflect its new vision for nificant questioning of this topic; around development in the country, which was social programs were many technical based on the concept of sumak causay people that were not looking to work in (“good living” in Kichwa) and aimed to a clientelistic way.”9 prioritize human rights and sustainability. 10 The elections for the Constitutional Second, the election became a unique Assembly took place on September 30, opportunity to pilot concrete actions to four days after Correa had officially fight political clientelism. It was a rela- launched the initiative at the UN General tively short period of time in which ac- Assembly. tions were carried out, systematized, and later evaluated, giving visibility Internationally, the discussion on cli- to the work done by the management mate change had been of particular teams of the social programs. interest at the moment the initiative was launched. One day before the UN In the case of Yasuní-ITT, the political General Assembly, UN secretary general context was also crucial, at both the na- Ban Ki-moon had convened a high-lev- tional and international levels. Although el event on climate change that looked

Figure 2: Yasuni-ITT Initiative Timeline November 2004: SCFY presents a letter to the President with concerns about a road being built in Yasuni. June 2006: Coalition of CSOs and activists present the moratorium proposal on both Yasuni and Block 31 September 2006: SCFY presents a letter to the President with concerns about a drilling project in Block 31 June 2007: President officially launches Yasuni ITT initiative January 2008: Creation of the initiative’s commission and secretariat Mid-2008 on: promotion of market-

based CO2 Proposal

June 2008 April 2007 August 2004 March 2006 February 2005 October 2006 November 2007 December 2008 September 2005

21 D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

forward to the next UN Framework Con- ages between the stakeholders involved vention on Climate Change meeting.11 in the process are equally important. In this context, it was relevant for the As will be analyzed in this section, both government of Ecuador to portray itself cases described above demonstrate the as a new and progressive force with in- key role played by different types of net- novative ideas. In his speech at the UN works in promoting the use of evidence General Assembly, Correa said of the in the policy-making process. Research- Yasuní-ITT proposal: er Harry Jones has identified an array of “policy network” mod- “This extraordinary ini- els,13 of which several tiative should set an Research-policy are featured in the cas- example to be followed es at hand: the policy by the international linkages are shaped communities concept,14 community in order to by the political epistemic communi- reduce global warming ties,15 knowledge bro- on our planet, while at context in which kers,16 and advocacy the same time inaugu- decisions are coalitions.17 rating a new economic logic in the twenty- adopted by policy The clientelism case first century—that is makers. involves a particular to compensate for the policy community, un- generation of value and derstood as a network not only for the genera- of professionals with tion of commodities.”12 experience in a particular domain who are actively engaged in the policy pro- However, both cases also show that cess. As mentioned earlier, Grupo FARO the windows of opportunity can only identified coordinators of social pro- be taken advantage of when the programs who were “champions of reform,” ponents present the evidence to the many of whom had previously been part “right” policy maker. In the case of cli- of CSOs or had backgrounds in social entelism, Grupo FARO had previously policy. However, the initiative to sign a worked with the social programs and the common agreement strengthened the coordinating agency Frente Social. It concept of a policy community among had found that within the current man- the nine signatories, which began shar- agement, one could identify “champions ing a unified discourse on political- cli of reform,” who ultimately played a key entelism. role in adopting and implementing the initiative against political clientelism. In the Yasuní-ITT proposal, both the The nature of the proposal allowed the epistemic communities concept and the management teams, with aid from the idea of advocacy coalitions may be ap- coordinating agency, to carry out the plicable. The Scientists Concerned for initiative. In this sense, Grupo FARO Yasuní is a group of fifty scientists, from selected interlocutors who were both Ecuador and abroad, that actively com- interested and able to implement re- municated with the Ecuadorian govern- forms. In the case of the Yasuní-ITT Ini- ment as new extractive projects and tiative, ideas reached the highest levels roads emerged as threats to the park’s of the government, including the presi- existence. In a letter written in 2004 to dent and the minister of mines and oil, then president Gutiérrez, they present since it required the government to ad- themselves in the following way: here to a plan that would be presented internationally. “We represent leading scientists of Ya- suní National Park, and other tropical 2. Linkages and Networks researchers concerned for the future of Although the political context sets the Yasuní. We come from Ecuador, Pana- scene for the implementation of policy ma, Peru, Denmark, England, Germa- reforms or initiatives, the actual link- ny, Greece, Scotland, Spain, and from

22 T w o C a s e s i n E c ua d o r across the United States including Puer- 3. Characteristics of the Evidence to Rico. Together we have well over 100 Used years of experience conducting research Any discussion on the relationship bet- in the park.”18 ween evidence and policy must address the characteristics of the evidence being They were essential in promoting the rel- used. Specifically, we focus on its- na evance of Yasuní National Park through ture, sources, and presentation. scientific research; they also share common values, since they prioritize conser- 3.1 Nature of the Evidence vation. By joining values and knowledge, Education scholars Fernando Reimers they were able to accumulate significant and Noel McGinn establish four general evidence from a variety of sources and categories of research: academic, plan- greatly strengthen their advocacy. ning, instrumentation, and action.23 The distinction of the types of evidence used The network had a clear strategy of is relevant because the output generat- direct communications with the governed by the different frameworks, designs, ment, but it was intertwined with an ad- and methodologies is applicable at dif- vocacy coalition that actively promoted ferent points in the policy-making cycle. the same ideas among the wider public through campaigns such as “Amazonía Academic research is understood as that por la Vida.”19 This campaign was born which helps us to understand the current in 1989, joining many environmental reality we encounter through the lenses activists who had made concrete pro- of models, conceptual frameworks, and posals based on scientific evidence. In theory. In both the clientelism and Ya- 2006, they presented to the Palacio gov- suní-ITT cases, academic research was ernment a proposal for a moratorium on crucial to the development of the pro- the ITT project, which laid the founda- posals, serving to frame and expose the tions for what would later become the problem and to lay the foundation for a Yasuní-ITT Initiative.20 narrative or discourse. Both cases demonstrate that “scientific knowledge in Furthermore, for the actual implemen- itself does not have intrinsic normative tation of the initiative, the direct link- authority, nor are research-based judg- ages between CSOs, universities, and ments value neutral.”24 In the clientelism the government were crucial. In fact, case, the academic review was biased by according to a review of the relationship a belief that a political system is better between political parties and think tanks when actors are independent and deci- in Ecuador, Alianza País, the governing sions are taken democratically, and that party, was founded in part by “a group social programs are more effective when of intellectuals, researchers, and activ- they are devoted to the most vulner- ists, some of whom participated in the able instead of political supporters. In project Jubilee 2000, while others came the case of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, the from NGOs, universities like FLACSO, bias was in favor of sustainability and and research centers such as ILDIS.”21 social and cultural rights. In this context, some of the members of the advocacy community joined the The second category, planning research, government and were able to promote includes looking forward and identify- their ideas from within its structure. ing the possible results of implement- The coexistence of these multiple actors ing a given policy. A clear example may meant that the proposal was the result include cost-benefit analysis. Both of of a long process with many different the Ecuadorian cases made use of this stakeholders, rather than a single intel- type of evidence to turn the frame- lectual owner.22 works from academic research into more concrete ideas and evidence. In the clientelism case, Grupo FARO carried out research on the weaknesses in the social programs that could contrib-

23 D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

ute to clientelism. More than pointing at as important as the evidence itself. As direct cases of clientelism, it informed policy researcher Enrique Mendizabal program managers about the existing states, “It is very difficult for policymak- safeguards used in certain programs, as ers to check all the evidence available to well as other possible measures to limit them, therefore they often rely on the the chances of clientelism. In the case reputation of its source as a proxy for its of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, the actual accuracy.”25 proposal used several technical reports and data on oil reserves to develop the Reputation, however, is subjective and concept and mechanisms of the certifi- depends on the decision maker. The two cates (CGYs). cases discussed here used research- based evidence from multiple, respected The evidence from academic and plan- sources, increasing their legitimacy. In ning research is translated through in- the political clientelism case, the evi- strumentation research, which focuses dence came from a CSO that was con- on making specific proposals for change. sidered independent and nonpartisan. In the clientelism case, the components Melania Carrión and Orazio Bellettini, of the proposal were designed based on in interviews done after the implement- a variety of evidence, previously dis- ation of the agreement, found that some cussed, as well as the instruments used program coordinators valued Grupo in other countries. The Yasuní-ITT CGYs FARO’s independence and technical ap- were a result of all the previous informa- proach, as opposed to the more activ- tion. The generation of these new ideas ist stances of other CSOs.26 At the same is probably the step that requires the time, Grupo FARO used previous aca- most creativity and ingenuity; it is the demic research on clientelism to develop point at which policy entrepreneurs play its narrative and analytical tools. a distinct role, considering the academic research as well as politics and the cur- The Yasuní-ITT case featured a wider rent context to come up with concrete variety of sources of evidence, ranging and viable proposals. from the purely theoretical to practical research carried out by companies for Finally, only the clientelism case fea- commercial purposes. As stated previ- tured what Reimers and McGinn call ac- ously, the evidence on Yasuní’s conser- tion research, which is used during the vation significance was backed substan- implementation of a policy and seeks to tially by Scientists Concerned for Yasuní. inform its performance primarily in the There was little opposition to its accu- short term. The clientelism case includ- racy in the public domain. Nonetheless, ed a component that monitored imple- the actual economic value of the park’s mentation of the agreement constantly, biological diversity, compared with the and that allowed for the presentation proven value of oil in international mar- of a final report on the initiative. This kets, is still being debated. This contro- action research was particularly useful versy is accentuated by the fact that the for motivating compliance, and to give Yasuní-ITT proposal is based on the lim- early alerts on noncompliance. It was an ited information on oil reserves. While essential part of Grupo FARO’s proposal. such information is always uncertain, This type of research has not been ap- the fact that in this case it was collected plied in the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, as the decades ago, using existing technolo- proposal has yet to be implemented. gies, has opened a discussion on wheth- Nevertheless, both cases used various er the initiative’s numbers are correct or types of research and evidence in their more oil could be extracted from the ITT proposals, each of which had different fields.27 objectives, but which jointly created a stronger argument (Table 1). 3.3 Presentation of the Evidence Mendizabal suggests that the way evi- 3.2 Source of the Evidence dence is communicated can be at least The source of the evidence is sometimes as important as the dimensions anal-

24 T w o C a s e s i n E c ua d o r

Table 1. Research Categories Applied to Case Studies

Research Political Clientelism Case Yasuní-ITT Initiative Case Categories • Scientific research on • Conceptual framework biodiversity Academic of political clientelism, • Conceptual framework for transparency, and citizens’ indigenous social and cultural participation rights • Sustainable development analysis

• Index of opportunities for clientelism • Research on oil reserves and Planning • Grupo FARO’s previous work project viability with the social programs

• Previous experiences in other • Economic proposal for carbon Instrumentalism countries on techniques to dioxide certificates combat clientelism

• Monitoring of compliance with Transparency Law and the Action agreement • Handbook to reduce opportunities for clientelism in social programs

yzed above: “Policy influence is affected portrayed possible ways in which cli- by both topical relevance and, equally entelism can take hold during electoral importantly, the operational usefulness campaigns. Meanwhile, the managers of of an idea; hence it helps if a new ap- social programs were directly informed proach has been piloted and the docu- on their compliance with the Transpar- ment can clearly demonstrate the value ency Law through a letter that detailed of a new option. The other key set of every consideration taken in the analy- issues here concern communication.”28 sis as well as concrete recommendations Both cases show that evidence should for improvement. be communicated in accordance with its main audience, and when possible, tail- Scientists in the Yasuní-ITT case used ored to its context. direct letters to the president that contained, annexed to their statements, de- The clientelism case exemplifies how tailed reports on scientific evidence. In information can be communicated to addition, each letter was context specif- different audiences with different lev- ic, referring to particular decisions that els of detail. When addressing the gen- were being made by the government at eral public, the project aimed to inform the time. people on the “concept” of clientelism. For example, posters and radio spots In an interview, Roque Sevilla, the presi-

25 D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

dent of the initiative’s commission, com- these were not clearly evident in the mented on the promotion of the CGYs public agenda. internationally. He argued that the technical and commercial information was • Connecting research with social crucial for foreign governments to un- or public motivation. Both cases derstand and value the proposal. At the show the relevance of linking research same time, the proposal was linked to with public concerns. The Yasuní re- the direct commitments of various coun- search was associated with concerns tries with respect to climate change. In about the previous Texaco oil spills in this case, the arguments were framed the Amazon region. The political cli- in accordance with those policy makers’ entelism research was connected to particular contexts. specific scandals in the previous government. The two cases here show that there is no single method for communicating Both cases demonstrate the importance or presenting evidence. Instead, they of relationships between stakeholders illustrate that evidence can be contex- in the use of evidence and in convinc- tualized and presented according to the ing policy makers to consider a pro- researchers’ objectives as well as their posal. These networks are complex and audiences. Generally, an initiative to constantly shifting. To get them work- influence policy will not have only one ing to promote a given idea, research- audience, and it will likely be necessary ers should be willing to “give up” their to present evidence differently to each exclusive ownership of the idea. The interlocutor. Yasuní-ITT case shows how the lack of a particular “owner” can turn a proposal IV. CONCLUSIONS AND into a policy that the public in general IMPLICATIONS can relate to. However, this arrange- The two cases analyzed here present ment makes it difficult for researchers some lessons for those who hope to in- to identify the extent to which their own fluence policy through research and the research was influential, and should be use of evidence. Both cases show that taken into account when such endeavors these endeavors take time to conceive, are analyzed. communicate, and implement. Whether ideas are concrete and time-constrained In these examples, it is also clear that or wide and encompassing of various the kind of evidence that is presented policies, researchers should not expect matters significantly, with different to make an impact immediately. Howev- types used for different purposes in the er, some lessons from these cases may political or public debate. Both cases inform those who endure the process. indicate that academic research is fundamental for creating and supporting a 1. The Importance of Windows narrative, while more applied research is of Opportunity influential as the debate becomes more The political context should be analyzed concrete and actual policy options are carefully to identify windows of opportu- weighed. This should be carefully con- nity as well as interested stakeholders. sidered by researchers when analyz- However, windows of opportunity do not ing the context or timing for presenting necessarily occur spontaneously and can their research. be opened with ingenuity. Approaches that can aid researchers in opening a Finally, responding to windows of op- window of opportunity include: portunity requires flexible, innovative, and learning organizations. It requires • Identifying hidden or unexposed the capacity to learn from context and needs among policy makers. In adapt strategies without losing sight of both cases, the ideas presented to one’s core goals and values. Even when policy makers were aligned with their windows of opportunity are found, the needs and objectives, even though process may be long. The Yasuní-ITT

26 T w o C a s e s i n E c ua d o r

Initiative shows that an idea needs time with ideas that politicians could consider to evolve. Therefore, promoters should to be against their own interests. constantly work to increase their capacity to enrich proposals and increase their 3. Evidence or Narrative? political, institutional, and social feasi- The two cases indicate that evidence is bility. not enough to capture the social and political imagination. As Claire Fox of the 2. Policy as a Multiple-Way Process Institute of Ideas states, Evidence-based policy influence is the result of a dialogue between several “Today we are offered the thin gruel of communities, including policy makers ‘evidence-based policy.’ When we are and researchers. In this sense, the dif- told that scientific research demands ferent perspectives of policy makers, re- particular courses of action, ever in- searchers, CSOs, and others are equally creasing areas of politics are ruled out- relevant in the process. Frequently, of-bounds for democratic debate; ideas there is a perceived lack of understand- and morality are sidelined by facts and ing among these communities, leading statistics. Historically, what has moved to stagnation. Sometimes “knowledge millions to act upon the world and brokers” can play an important role in change things for the better has been reducing these “gaps.” Grupo FARO big ideas, such as freedom, progress, ci- served such a function in the political vilisation and democracy.”30 clientelism case, presenting complex arguments regarding the negative con- In the political clientelism and Yasuní-ITT sequences of politicized social programs cases, evidence was just part of a big- for the quality of democracy and the ef- ger narrative. It enabled the policy pro- fectiveness of social policies. It was es- moters to create a story that introduced sential to build close relationships with a hidden issue to the public agenda, or the social programs while retaining supported a new development para- strategies to evaluate and monitor im- digm. Narratives are particularly useful plementation independently. Research- for putting together facts, details, and ers seeking to influence policy must be other information in a sequential form, “close enough to light, not enough to making the dissemination of concepts or burn.” ideas simpler. In both cases, narratives were crucial to engaging a wider audi- However, sometimes the most direct ence in the discussion. way to influence a government is to participate from within, as with the Yasuní- Researchers should develop capacities ITT case, in which a civil society pro- to see evidence in a broader perspec- ponent of the idea became part of the tive, connecting facts and statistics with cabinet. This strategy, although it may a bigger story that can be used by politi- have a strong and direct influence, can cians and policy makers (top-down), as also affect the perception of an organi- well as journalists and ordinary citizens zation’s independence. This should be (bottom-up), to participate in the pro- considered by those seeking to influence cess. In other words, researchers who policy. aim to influence public policy should be willing to get closely involved with the As Lewis Coser points out, “Knowledge public debate and engage in discussions may bring power, but, even so, men of that can reach beyond the theoretical knowledge have only rarely been men of or scientific level and touch on current power.”29 He describes the clear distinc- events, values, and philosophy. tion between the two communities, with researchers usually lacking the power to generate change. But this is not always Endnotes the case. The Yasuní-ITT example shows 1. This case is based on the initiative’s final the power of researchers and knowledge report in 2007, a separate case study, and brokers to influence the public agenda the authors’ participation during the process.

27 D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

See Grupo FARO, “Ni regalitos, ni chantajes 7. Ibid. a cambio de tú voto: Acuerdo de uso de los Fondos Públicos en Programas Sociales” 8. Carrión and Bellettini, “Realizando los [Neither gifts nor bribes in exchange for derechos sociales, económicos y culturales your vote: Agreement on the use of public mediante el ataque al clientelismo político en funds in social programs], Llave Ciudadana programas sociales en el Ecuador.” no. 1 (2007); M. Carrión and O. Bellettini, “Realizando los derechos sociales, económicos 9. Ibid. y culturales mediante el ataque al clientelismo político en programas sociales en el Ecuador” 10. Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the [Realizing social, economic, and cultural rights United Nations, “Statement by His Excellency through the attack on political clientelism in Economist Rafael Correa, President of the social programs in Ecuador], in Acercando Republic of Ecuador, at the Sixty-Second la investigacion a las políticas p ublicas en Session of the United Nations General América Latina: repensando los roles y Assembly,” New York, 26 September 2007. desafíos para los institutos de investigaci on de políticas [Bringing research to public 11. Ban Ki-moon, “Addressing the Leadership policies in Latin America: rethinking roles Challenge of Climate Change” (chair’s and challenges for policy research institutes] summary, High-Level Event on Climate (Buenos Aires: Centro de Implementacion Change, New York, 24 September 2007). de Politicas Publicas para la Equidad y el Crecimiento [CIPPEC], Global Development 12. Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the Network, 2009), 217–68. United Nations, “Statement by His Excellency Economist Rafael Correa.” 2. Grupo FARO, “Ni regalitos, ni chantajes a cambio de tú voto.” 13. Harry Jones, Policy-Making as Discourse: A Review of Recent Research-to-Policy 3. Ibid. Literature, IKM Emergent Working Papers no. 5, Overseas Development Institute, 4. Carlos Larrea, Iniciativa Yasuní-ITT: La September 2009. gran propuesta de un país pequeño [Yasuní- ITT Initiative: the grand proposal of a small 14. J. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and country] (Quito: Administrative and Directive Public Policies (Boston/Toronto: Little Brown & Council of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, 2009), Company, 1984). retrieved from http://opsur.files.wordpress. com/2009/07/yasuni-itt.pdf. 15. Peter M. Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (Columbia: 5. Scientists Concerned for Yasuní National University of South Carolina Press, 1992). Park, “Proposed Petrobras Road into Yasuní National Park,” letter to the president, 16. Sandra M. Nutley, Isabel Walter, and Huw November 2004. See also the scientists’ T. O. Davies, Using Evidence: How Research 2006 letter on drilling near the park: Can Inform Public Services (Bristol: Policy Scientists Concerned for Yasuní National Press, University of Bristol, 2007). Park, “Proyecto de Desarrollo y Producción del Bloque 31: Campo Apaika Nenke” [Project 17. Paul Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, for Development and Production of Block 31: eds., Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Apaika Nenke Field,” letter to the president, Coalition Approach (Boulder: Westview Press, September 2006. 1993).

6. C. Imesch, The Case of the Yasuní 18. Scientists Concerned for Yasuní National National Park (thesis submitted in fulfillment Park, “Proposed Petrobras Road into Yasuní of the requirement for a master’s degree in National Park.” development studies, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 19. For more details, visit the campaign’s Geneva, Switzerland, 2009). website at http://www.amazoniaporlavida. org/es/.

28 T w o C a s e s i n E c ua d o r

20. “Carta presentando la propuesta Moratoria 25. Enrique Mendizabal, Good News for al Proyecto ITT y Bloque 31 en el Parque Troubled Contexts: Lessons Learned from Case Nacional Yasuní” [Letter presenting the Studies on How Civil Society Organisations proposed Moratorium on the ITT Project and Influence Policy Processes (London: Overseas Block 31 in Yasuní National Park], 19 June Development Institute, 2006). 2006, retrieved from http://www.llacta.org/ textos/yasuni001.html. 26. Carrión and Bellettini, “Realizando los derechos sociales, económicos y culturales 21. O. Bellettini and M. Carrión, “Partidos mediante el ataque al clientelismo político en Políticos y think tanks en Ecuador” [Political programas sociales en el Ecuador.” parties and think tanks in Ecuador], in Enrique Mendizabal and Kristen Sample, eds., Dime a 27. See “Más petróleo en el Yasuní” quien escuchas . . . Think Tanks y Partidos [More oil in Yasuní], El Commercio, 8 Políticos en América Latina [Tell me to whom March 2008, available at http://www. you listen . . . think tanks and political saveamericasforests.org/Yasuni/News/ parties in Latin America] (Lima: International Articles/2008/01.11.08-MoreOilInYasuni. Institute for Democracy and Electoral htm?story_id=9366138#EnEspanol. Assistance/Overseas Development Institute, 2009), 157–208. 28. Mendizabal, Good News for Troubled Contexts. 22. Imesch, The Case of the Yasuní National Park. 29. Lewis A. Coser, Men of Ideas: A Sociologist’s View (New York: Free Press 23. Fernando Reimers and Noel McGinn, Paperbacks, 1997). Informed Dialogue: Using Research to Shape Education Policy Around the World (Westport: 30. Claire Fox, “Why the Battle of Ideas 2011?” Praeger, 1997). Institute of Ideas, http://www.battleofideas. org.uk/index.php/2011/about/5514/. 24. Ibid.

29 30 THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS IN GEORGIA

Ghia Nodia*

his paper is based on the author’s personal experience as the leader of a democracy think tank GEORGIA in Georgia for about twenty years, but also on T Capital: Tbilisi numerous interviews and discussions with colleagues in the civil society and political communities. Population: 4.44 million

The initial intention was to focus on “democracy re- Internet Penetration: search organizations” or “democracy think tanks.” 35.28 percent However, one has to keep in mind that in Georgia, Press Freedom Status: there are no clear lines dividing such organizations Partly Free from, on the one hand, activist groups that try to influence policy primarily through advocacy campaigns, Political Rights and and on the other, public-policy think tanks that may Civil Liberties Status: concentrate on topics other than development of a Partly Free democratic political system as such. The paper will at times describe this broader pool of organizations, GDP per capita, PPP often referred to as the “third sector,” while at other (Current Int’l Dollars): times it will specifically address organizations dedi- $5,809 cated to democratic development. This issue will be raised again below, but it is useful to make it clear at the outset.

Measuring the Relevance of Public Policy Research Are think tanks, particularly those focused on democracy issues, important for a fledg- ling democracy like Georgia? To be more precise, what is their role in a country that is often described as a “hybrid regime”—neither an autocracy nor a fully developed democracy? The answer largely depends on what one expects from these organizations, or the standards used for measuring their performance.

The United States is often used as a model, because it is the country where think tanks were invented. This model implies that the value of think tanks is measured by their ability to influence public policy. That notion in turn may rest on an assumption that decision makers require some additional intellectual resources to properly design their policies. Even if senior government officials are not prepared to recognize some gaps in their expertise, the fact remains that they do not have the time to concentrate on

*Ghia Nodia is Chairman of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development.

31 D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

careful research and analysis of specific lack the capacity to produce ideas that policy issues. Think tanks, by contrast, would be useful in a real policy process. have the time, resources, and professional staff to carry out such work, and This paper will propose that direct con- it is their central mission to do so. tacts and cooperation between government and public-policy think tanks, and Think tanks do not necessarily need to the influence exerted by the latter on the conduct research commissioned by the former, while valuable in themselves, government or political parties. How- should not be the primary measure- ever, they are supposed to produce ments of the productivity and impact of ideas and projects that are usable in such organizations. Both the Georgian principle, and if they are lucky, their civil-society sector and the donor com- ideas will eventually find decision mak- munity tend to overestimate these fac- ers willing to implement them. For in- tors when discussing the role and impor- stance, the policy ideas underlying Brit- tance of think tanks. ish Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s liberal market reforms, or the “zero tol- The Georgian Context: Local Civil erance” policies carried out by the New Society and the West York City Police Department under May- The role of think tanks is also related to or Rudy Giuliani, were first developed the way in which Georgia positions itself by think tanks. Whether one likes these in the world. They are supposed to be particular policies or not, they are pow- generators of ideas for improving public erful examples of think tanks’ ability to policies. But the grand idea that inspires have a real impact. the country’s policies today is that Geor- gia should be like the West, and this is It is difficult to find similar examples in especially so in the realm of democracy. Georgia. When this problem is raised in Therefore, the West serves as a kind of the country, civil-society organizations collective think tank. It is a reservoir of typically complain that the government models that should be implemented in does not listen to them. They often ar- Georgia and an ultimate source of pub- gue that the administration, at least lic-policy wisdom. that of the United National Movement (2004–2012), is arrogant and has auto- It is not just that Western democracies cratic rather than democratic instincts. are there for Georgians to study and The government headed by President emulate. There are also numerous con- Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003) is sultants who know how Western mod- generally said to have lacked the ca- els were applied in other countries like pacity to implement coherent policies. Georgia. Western consultants may or When one talks to former government may not be listened to, depending on officials, however, they are likely to say their quality and on the readiness of lo- that Georgian think tanks themselves cal policymakers to follow their advice.

About the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD)

The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) is a public policy think-tank, specializing in a broad area of democratic development. CIPDD was founded in 1992 in Tbilisi, Georgia, as a non-governmental and not- for-profit organization. It advocates policy goals such as the development of a vibrant and diverse civil society, effective and accountable public institutions based on the rule of law, and an integrated political community that at the same time respects and preserves the identities of different ethnic and religious communities in Georgia. CIPDD seeks to contribute to the implementation of these goals through producing relevant and high-quality public policy documents and encouraging a pluralistic and informed public policy debate in Georgia.

32 D e m o c r ac y R e s e a r c h O r g a n i z at i o n s I n G e o r g i a

But a given Georgian decision maker is the West, which, incidentally, also funds more likely to accept the recommen- them. Of course, local organizations dations of someone who comes from a have some autonomy from their funders country where the state and democracy in prioritizing specific issues at specific are already known to work properly, or moments, but they work within a pre- at least better than in Georgia. Policy defined framework of transferring global suggestions that come directly from the (in practice, mostly Western) demo- West have greater authority and politi- cratic norms and practices to their home cal clout. countries. This is a legitimate and useful activity, but it is not necessarily about When people from the Georgian “third generating ideas—something think sector” discuss their role and influence tanks are supposed to do. If local NGOs in the country, they tend to complain do generate ideas, they are usually fair- about a lack of political influence and at- ly narrow and technical in character. tention from politicians. This raises the question of how to develop the desired The situation tends to produce skepti- influence. cism about the usefulness of think tanks as opposed to activist organizations. Under the circumstances, the role of lo- Georgians often question the necessity cal think tanks and democracy-promot- of discussing the institutions and ideas ing organizations boils down to properly of democracy, arguing that the problem interpreting what exactly the country is not a lack of knowledge, but a lack of can learn from the West, or even more political will on the part of the govern- narrowly, what the West is actually rec- ment to follow democratic standards. Al- ommending at the moment. Govern- ternatively, they note that despite opin- ments themselves claim that they are ion polls showing widespread support for carrying out reforms aimed at making democracy, Georgian citizens are simply Georgia more like a Western democra- not active enough to force the govern- cy, and that they are following Western ment to conform to democratic rules. recommendations to that end. But civil-society organizations often have two In this environment, few resources are advantages over government officials. available for serious organizations fo- First, they may speak better English and cused on democracy research. Those have a more thorough understanding of that claim to be think tanks are rarely the ways in which Western democracies “pure” research organizations. But re- work. This entitles them to make sug- gardless of their self-identification as gestions and be listened to. More impor- research or activist groups, NGOs are tantly, those involved in power politics considered to be primary carriers of may not actually be interested in making knowledge about democracy as well as the system more democratic, particular- the main support mechanism for the ly because they are more likely to lose implementation of democratic practices. power in a more democratic system. In fact, they can be expected to cheat or Georgian Reforms and the Think drag their feet. Therefore, the main act- Tank Community: Ideas Following ivities of civil-society organizations are People monitoring and advocacy. Their role is to If think tanks have few chances to di- verify whether government performance rectly influence policymakers in Georgia, conforms to democratic standards and how can thinking, research, and debate the government’s own commitments, about democratic development be policy to expose evasions, and to push for the relevant? The first and most effective government to meet democratic norms means is transfer of knowledge through in practice. professional rotation between civil-society organizations and the government. In this effort, local nongovernmental In this case, ideas actually follow people. organizations (NGOs) can be considered junior partners and assistants to President Mikheil Saakashvili’s govern-

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ment, which came to power after the sense of urgency came from a belief that 2003 “Rose Revolution,” was sometimes the political opening for radical reform called an NGO government because it might soon close. Only after the success drew heavily on the human resources of the reforms became obvious did the of the Georgian civil-society community. international entities agree to support Its record on democracy is a matter of the government’s vision. debate among scholars and commentators, both in and outside Georgia, but Georgian officials, despite their civil- most agree that it has quite a strong re- society background, similarly neglected cord of public-policy reforms, especially the advice of the local NGO sector. They but not only in the area of overcoming now explain this by citing several fac- corruption. Therefore, its activities can tors. First, after the new government be used as a positive case study. “creamed” the NGO community of its best talent, the organizations required It is difficult to precisely identify the in- several years to recuperate. Second, be- tellectual sources of the Saakashvili gov- ing dependent on cycles of international ernment’s reforms. However, people who funding, Georgian NGOs were rather may be considered architects of reforms slow in reacting to emerging needs and underline the importance of experience could not keep up with the breakneck brought from past work outside govern- speed of the authorities. Third, reform- ment and politics. Some of these figures ers in government mistrusted most came from private business and interna- leading Georgian NGOs, which they saw tional organizations, but the most typi- as “politically motivated,” meaning tac- cal background was one in the Georgian itly supportive of the opposition. Finally, NGO sector. Its graduates, who largely there were ideological disagreements, defined the direction of the new govern- as most Georgian reforms were inspired ment, carried with them two main as- by a “neoliberal” vision, while many sets. First, they had specific ideas and Georgian NGOs and international con- approaches that they had promoted for sultancies espoused more left-of-center several years while criticizing the pre- beliefs. vious government. Second, but no less important, they brought an organiza- For their part, the government’s crit- tional culture that was oriented toward ics explained its aloofness toward out- change and specific results. One of the side advice by accusing officials of - ar influential reformers in the government, rogance, autocratic instincts, ideological Vakhtang Lezhava (he usually served at narrowness, and being spoiled by power. the deputy minister level), believes that Whatever one makes of these explana- reforms slowed down after 2007 in part tions, they can be summarized as fol- because there was no comparable new lows. A background in civil-society orga- influx of people with NGO backgrounds nizations that combined some research who could bring fresh ideas and a spirit with mostly advocacy-related activities of radical change. ingrained in new members of the government a belief that they already had At the same time, the Saakashvili gov- the best ideas. If they saw talent in the ernment was widely criticized for not lis- NGO sector, their first choice was to tening to outside advice, and today its draw it into government positions rather former members confirm that this was than engage in cumbersome relations largely true. In the first years after the with independent organizations. Rose Revolution, they did not have particularly good relations with internation- The transfer of power that followed the al development organizations because October 2012 parliamentary elections of their approach to reforms: They did set off a new wave of migration from not have the sort of “roadmaps” that civil-society organizations to the gov- the donors tended to favor, inspired in- ernment. It is too early to assess what stead by a general vision and a desire major steps the new government will to achieve results very quickly. Their take in the area of public policy. How-

34 D e m o c r ac y R e s e a r c h O r g a n i z at i o n s I n G e o r g i a ever, it is reasonable to expect that if essarily a medium for influencing policy. there are coherent reforms in any areas, They are rather a way for the govern- the impulse and vision will come from ment to spread its message, get some graduates of Georgian NGOs. Mean- direct feedback, and generally demon- while, with the previous ruling party, strate that it plays by democratic rules. the United National Movement, moving Georgian governments do occasionally to the opposition, some important mem- outsource some implementation tasks to bers of the outgoing government—par- NGOs, for example the training of mid- ticularly those who played key roles in and low-level personnel. International designing and implementing its reform donors tend to assess such projects as policies—have migrated to the think- “successful” because they imply coop- tank scene. There had previously been a eration between the government and few people in the “third sector” with ex- civil society. Government agencies also perience in government, but large-scale invite NGOs to discuss official strategy relocation of successful government offi- documents—the National Security Con- cials to the think-tank community could cept, the Strategic Defense Review, and considerably enhance others—before they its capacity and pro- are adopted, lead- fessionalism. “It is clearly a mistake ing to some minor changes. One may With this change, to primarily measure ask, though, wheth- turnover between the impact and policy er the government think tanks and the relevance of the think compiles these docu- government in Geor- ments to coordinate gia may be becoming tank community by the the actions of its dif- routine. This in itself level of cooperation ferent agencies, or is an important ele- simply to present the ment of a functional between the government international com- democracy. But in and think tanks” munity with the ex- the Georgian context, pected general policy there is an additional statements. reason to welcome the trend. The political party system is extremely weak, and Such activities are useful in many cases, while political opposition may be an ef- but if one focuses on these “success sto- fective tool for mobilizing public discon- ries,” the assessment of the think-tank tent, it rarely produces coherent policy scene in Georgia will be rather narrow ideas. More often, such ideas come from and inadequate. Civil society’s main im- outside the political class. Civil-society pact, save for the occasions when its organizations—especially those that do members actually join the government, public-policy research—are therefore may lie in another area. even more politically relevant. Informing Policy through Public De- Given such a dynamic, it is clearly a bate and Civic Education mistake to primarily measure the impact Shaping public opinion is an important and policy relevance of the think-tank method of influencing the policy envi- community by the level of cooperation ronment, and sometimes also policy de- between the government and think tanks cisions, in Georgia. Even nondemocratic at any given moment. Cooperation does governments tend to be somewhat re- exist, but its impact is limited. Quite a sponsive to public opinion. If a govern- few government agencies have “public ment’s authority is ultimately dependent councils” through which they interact on elections, it has an even greater in- with think-tank representatives; this centive to monitor and rise to the pub- was the case under the previous gov- lic’s expectations. ernment, and the new one is trying to continue and even broaden the practice. It is often said, with good reason, that However, the public councils are not nec- Georgians are passive when it comes to

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participation in civil-society organiza- Movement moved to the opposition, tions. There are very few NGOs that do its leaders pledged to break this pat- not depend on foreign donor support. tern and compete with the government Most of what is called “civil society” in based on a positive policy agenda. It is Georgia consists of professional orga- too early to judge whether the nature nizations created to implement specific of political discussion will really change. projects, rather than citizens’ associa- But to date, civil-society organizations tions that represent and promote the have generally been the primary in- interests and agendas of large segments stigators of and participants in public- of society. However, given this environ- policy debates that deserve the desig- ment, even relatively small groups of nation. They are also the main agents citizens who are able to organize them- for spreading policy ideas and assess- selves around a certain agenda can be- ments though different media. Many come a force that political actors, in- think-tank figures in Georgia feel that cluding the government, must reckon they stand a much stronger chance of with. Georgian politics play out within a influencing policy through public opinion very small circle of people, and it may than through a direct approach to deci- not take much in the way of civic mobi- sion makers. A posting on Facebook may lization to influence that circle. sometimes have a greater impact than a project funded by the U.S. Agency for Public-policy debate in Georgia takes International Development (USAID) or a variety of different forms. There are the European Commission and carried numerous talk shows on television and out in cooperation with a given public radio; many discussion meetings on agency. Of course, it is difficult to track specific topics, sometimes with mixed and prove the policy effects of a specific participation by civil-society experts NGO’s activities in these circumstances, and politicians; and debates on internet which may be a problem for an orga- forums and social networks like Face- nization that depends on donor funding book. All of these may be considered and has to demonstrate that its work did instruments for shaping public opin- have an impact. ion. Although many of these exchanges degenerate into personal attacks and Apart from instigating public debate, bickering, there are substantive discus- think tanks in Georgia—and, presum- sions of policy issues as well. Policymak- ably, in other countries like Georgia— ers from the United National Movement are tasked with broadening the scope government recognized in private inter- and audience of public debate. In other views that they sometimes changed or words, they serve as civic educators. at least modified their political decisions For instance, the Caucasus Institute for if public opinion was clearly hostile to Peace, Democracy, and Development them, contrary to the image of their ad- (CIPDD), led by this paper’s author, de- ministration as immune to outside influ- votes the bulk of its time and resources ences. The Georgian Dream government not to carrying out its research and pro- that came to power in October 2012, at ducing its policy papers—which admit- least on some occasions, has appeared tedly do not have much direct impact rather sensitive to feedback from the on policy—but to civic education broadly public on its policies. understood, which usually means encouraging new groups of citizens to get As noted above, debates between gov- involved in debating public-policy issues. ernment and opposition in Georgia are Other organizations that position them- rarely about policies. Typically, the op- selves as think tanks are also involved position attacks the government for be- in this kind of work. It is a rewarding, ing allegedly corrupt or autocratic, while if not the most rewarding, part of think the government responds by question- tank activity in Georgia, and it is espe- ing the character and integrity of op- cially relevant in terms of the long-term position leaders. No alternative policies development of Georgian democracy. In are proposed. After the United National order to understand why, it is necessary

36 D e m o c r ac y R e s e a r c h O r g a n i z at i o n s I n G e o r g i a to revisit a larger topic: how the Geor- vardnadze included many reasonable gian context defines the role of think people, and there was near consensus at tanks, particularly those focusing on de- the time that Georgia could not have a mocracy issues. A brief history of CIPDD better one. The task was to create prec- and its work on democracy promotion edents for talking about political issues will provide an illustrative example. rationally (and not from the position of fighting for power) and to involve more An Alternative Model: CIPDD and people in the discussion. It was assumed the Development of Georgia’s First that this would gradually change the po- Think Tanks litical culture and, eventually, political The history of CIPDD, created in August behavior. 1992, represents an alternative model to the more common approach of ex- For us, “rational” also meant liberal and changes between think tanks and the democratic. This is not necessarily cor- government. CIPDD was the first inde- rect from the point of view of political pendent organization in Georgia with theory, because political behavior that democracy promotion as its chief objec- does not conform to democratic stan- tive. The few existing NGOs were mainly dards can be perfectly rational as well. environmentalist groups. Even the term But we believed, and still believe, that “civil society” was unusual, appearing for Georgia in the late twentieth and principally in academic lectures. As for early twenty-first centuries, liberal de- the term “think tank,” it was unknown mocracy was the only rational choice, even to the group’s founders. But in and that autocratic temptations were a hindsight it can be said that our vision threat to Georgia’s national goals. for the organization—vague as it was at that time—fit best into the concept of a Since 1992, Georgia has made very im- public-policy think tank. portant steps forward. It has yet to become a fully functional democracy, but it The period in which CIPDD was cre- has developed a state that performs its ated can be considered a “dark age” in basic functions and pursues public poli- Georgia. It was a time of political and cies successfully. Still, CIPDD’s mission economic disaster. Economic output within Georgian society can be described dropped by about three-fourths, the in the same terms: we want to instill a government did not control much terri- greater sense of rationality in Georgian tory beyond central parts of Tbilisi, and political thinking and behavior. there were at least two civil wars run- ning in parallel. The country was a text- The first and most basic task is to take book example of a failed state. stock of the current reality, though that is far from simple. Many external What could a public-policy think tank observers complain that it is often ex- do in a country without a government tremely difficult to understand what is capable of exerting control and imple- actually happening in Georgia, as differ- menting a coherent policy? We thought ent political actors and commentators it could deal with the problems that led give radically different views. Georgian Georgia to the situation of a failed state media are also notorious for serving po- in the first place. The simple diagnosis, litical interests rather than informing the shared by many of our friends, was that public and providing a platform for dif- Georgian political thinking and behavior ferent opinions. It would be extremely was not rational. Therefore a public-pol- arrogant to claim that unlike everyone icy think tank was needed to instill more else, we were beyond bias. But we did rationality into Georgian political life, or try our best to provide the public (Geor- to begin with, into the ways we thought gian and international) with a balanced about and discussed politics. This did analysis of different segments of the not necessarily mean influencing the Georgian reality. specific decisions of politicians. The new Georgian government of Eduard She- Our very first projects, for instance, in-

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cluded producing Georgian Chronicle, these activities are unified by one gen- an English-language monthly summary eral goal: creating a more informed and and analysis of events in Georgia. We competent citizenry and encouraging continued producing it through 1997, a culture of rational debate on public- and quite unusually, we did not have policy issues—something that, as most any donor support for it. At the time this observers would agree, Georgia largely product was unique, because systematic lacks. analysis of Georgian developments was rare. To this day the Chronicle serves as Naturally, specific projects have specific an important source for researchers who objectives. For instance, when Georgia want to make sense of that very com- was shaken by numerous instances of plex period in Georgia’s transformation. religious violence, CIPDD initiated a program of religious tolerance trainings for Over the years, CIPDD has produced schoolteachers. It was widely believed research on different aspects of Geor- that most schoolteachers in Georgia gia’s democratic development. In many spread a message of intolerance toward areas, our research continues to be the minorities, and there were many skep- most authoritative and comprehensive tics who thought that no trainings could of its kind. This can be said, for in- change these attitudes. The assumption stance of a study of Georgian political proved wrong. Many schoolteachers ad- parties that was carried out by CIPDD mitted that the project marked the first staff in cooperation with the Nether- time they had taken part in any rational lands Institute for Multiparty Demo- discussion of religious pluralism in class, cracy. The findings were summarized in and that they saw the issue very differ- a book coauthored by Ghia Nodia and ently as a result. Alvaro Pinto-Scholtbach, The Political Landscape in Georgia—Political Parties: It is extremely difficult to measure how Achievements, Challenges, and Pros- such activities influence the political pects (Delft: Eburon Delft, 2006). A process, though we believe that they somewhat smaller publication written by ultimately have an impact. In some Ghia Nodia, Civil Society Development CIPDD projects, we cooperated directly in Georgia: Achievements and Challeng- with government bodies, trained pub- es (2005), remains the most compre- lic servants, took them on study tours hensive account on that topic produced abroad, gave suggestions on specific is- in Georgia. There were numerous other sues, and submitted feedback on draft publications on the Georgian political government documents. CIPDD has par- system, on the regional media, on the ticipated in numerous advisory councils state of local government, on the prob- set up by the government. However, the lems of ethnic minorities, on the state organization’s indirect influences might of civil-military relations, and the like. ultimately be more important, even if In all these areas, CIPDD continues to they are harder to measure. A number be an authoritative organization that is of people who took part in our events, capable of providing comprehensive and or worked directly for CIPDD, later be- reliable research. came members of parliament, government ministers, or other government Another important component of our officeholders of varying rank. Presum- work—by a rough calculation, some ably the approaches and messages they 70 percent of CIPDD activities fall into picked up from our events and activities this category—is focused on public de- have affected the way they act while in bate and civic education. The events in government. question include conferences, roundtable discussions, public debates, and Lessons from CIPDD: Conducting trainings, among other formats. Partici- Democracy Research in a pants range from government ministers Semi-democratic Environment to high school students, and the topics When discussing the role and relevance are similarly diverse. However, all of of democracy research, it is important

38 D e m o c r ac y R e s e a r c h O r g a n i z at i o n s I n G e o r g i a to distinguish it from other kinds of pub- tankers will say that they produce policy lic-policy research. In the latter case, recommendations because they believe the task is to improve the quality and they are right, even though they do not efficiency of public institutions’ perfor- really believe decision makers will take mance in a specific area, such as health- them up. In that case, the target audi- care or law enforcement. The assump- ence is some kind of ideal decision mak- tion here is that policymakers are really er who does not really exist. Such an interested in achieving the stated objec- approach allows democracy think tanks tives, and there is simply a difference of to keep up their self-esteem—and retain opinion on the best way to do so. Think the esteem of the Western donor com- tanks therefore have a chance to con- munity—without really being useful. vince policymakers that the model they are proposing offers a superior means of This raises the general question of how achieving the established goal. autocratic countries become democratic, or rather how so-called hybrid regimes The role of democracy research in the or competitive authoritarian systems Georgian context is qualitatively differ- turn into full democracies. Despite vo- ent. As noted above, it is still question- luminous literature on democratiza- able whether Georgia’s political system tion, there is no real theory, save the may be called democratic or not. The assumption that it is all unpredictable country is usually considered to be some- and tends to be more dependent on where between democracy and autocra- agency than on structure. (Structural cy; analysts often use the term “com- arguments are most often used to ex- petitive authoritarianism.” This means plain the failure of democratization, not that the public-policy community is not its success.) The belief that removing an simply fine-tuning specific democratic autocratic regime and replacing it with a institutions so that they can adequately new government, preferably one whose confront emerging challenges, as may members have been exposed to West- be the case in “old” established demo- ern democratic ideas and experiences, cracies and in the new but largely consol- will by itself bring democracy seems idated democracies of Eastern Europe. to have been dispelled in the Georgian Instead, the task in Georgia is to help context. Although this method essential- transform a superficially democratic— ly worked in countries like Poland and or predominantly autocratic, depending Czechoslovakia, in Georgia there have on the opinion of a given analyst—state been a number of replacements of real into a substantively democratic political or alleged autocratic regimes with new system. It is about changing the nature governments that promised democracy of the political regime. but failed to deliver a genuinely democratic political system. In particular, the Consequently, one cannot presume that 2003 Rose Revolution brought to power policymakers really want to achieve the a government dominated by graduates objectives that democracy think tanks of Western democracy-promotion pro- have in mind. If a political system is less grams, and a large majority of analysts than fully democratic, it is either because agree that it failed to entrench demo- the ruling elites do not conform to democratic practices in Georgia. It did bring cratic standards and are not interested some progress, becoming the first Geor- in doing so (according to the agency gian government to organize elections in approach), or because they do not con- which the ruling party lost and gave up front strong enough balancing forces, power in a peaceful and orderly manner. such as alternative political and societal But even this may not prove sustain- elites, developed structures of civil soc- able. The first steps of the new Georgian iety, or whatever else may contain them Dream government that came to power (the structural approach). Either way, it in 2012, which really does represent is uncertain who the target audience for the hopes and aspirations of broad seg- a democracy think tank’s recommenda- ments of Georgian society, raised sig- tions should be. Typical Georgian think nificant and justified fears that it could

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actually backtrack on democracy issues. welcome in themselves, but they could not address the root cause of substan- There are probably some deeper struc- tive deficiencies in the Georgian media tural reasons for the failures of Geor- scene, namely the dependence of the gia’s democratization process. One may media on their political patrons and the be that there is a shortage of democracy related ability of the strongest patron to resources, which can mean a lack of “so- dominate the media landscape. cial capital” in general or of intermediate institutions of democracy such as politi- Under these circumstances, the first cal parties, civic associations, and other task of democracy-research organiza- instruments of civic involvement. tions may be to stimulate more honest and adequate debate with regard to the A think tank focused on democracy re- core reasons behind democracy failures, search cannot pretend it is relevant even though such a debate will not bring in this environment if it simply offers about any sizeable changes in the short ideas for institutional reforms that can- run. At the same time, it is an important not bring any substantive change to long-term task to strengthen democracy the system, even assuming policymak- resources by involving more people and ers choose to take them up. It is rather more groups in the democracy debate, obvious that the core problem of demo- encouraging the culture of dialogue at cratic development in Georgia does not different levels of society, and producing lie in the deficiencies of the legal envi- more ideas and concepts that may be ronment, though such deficiencies do unconventional but nevertheless stimu- exist. In a relatively recent example, late thought and activity. This could also the Georgian NGO community success- include scrutinizing the core concepts fully advocated for two changes in me- of democracy, not to weaken commit- dia legislation. One made it illegal for ment to democratic ideals, but to foster media organizations to be registered in a more ample and realistic understand- offshore zones, forcing them to be more ing of them. There are different ob- transparent about ownership structures. stacles to successful democratization in The other obliged owners of cable net- Georgia, one of which may be a deeply works to transmit the signals of all tele- undemocratic notion of democracy as a vision companies, whether they want- preconceived template that can be ap- ed to or not (the so-called Must Carry plied thoughtlessly to any given country. rule). These changes might have been

40 TRANSLATING RESEARCH INTO POLICY Two Cases from CDD-Ghana

E. Gyimah-Boadi, Regina Amanfo Tetteh, and Kojo Asante*

he Center for Democratic Development (CDD- Ghana) was established in 1998 as an indepen- GHANA Tdent nongovernmental institute dedicated to the promotion of democracy, good governance, and eco- Capital: Accra nomic openness in Ghana and Africa through research and advocacy. The Center researches and rigorously Population: 24.96 million analyzes observations and data, drawing on inter- Internet Penetration: national comparisons and best practices. Its find- 14.11 percent ings and recommendations are disseminated through seminars, workshops, publications, and other outlets Press Freedom Status: to bridge the gap between research and the policy- Free making process. Political Rights and The Center has earned a reputation as a source of Civil Liberties Status: high-quality research (such as the Afrobarometer), Free technical analyses, and reports on a broad range of democracy and governance-related issues. Its ser- GDP per capita, PPP vices and outputs are available to, and used by, vari- (Current Int’l Dollars): ous state and nonstate institutions (including govern- $3,257 ment departments, parliaments, anticorruption agencies, election authorities, human rights commissions, and donor agencies) as well as media and civic groups in Ghana and Africa.

I. PROMOTING THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN GHANA

Introduction As in many African countries, persons with disabilities (PWDs) in Ghana are subject to various forms of exclusion, discrimination, and stigmatization. A combination of culture and political economy has ensured that PWDs must contend with barriers that are not faced by the general public. PWDs are also stereotyped and relegated to the fringes of society.1 They experience discrimination in terms of access to education and public services as well as employment, and are more likely to suffer infanticide at birth.

The Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana (1992), particularly the Bill of Rights contained in it, provides the basic framework for the protection of the rights of people with disabilities in the country. Chapter 5 of the constitution guarantees the funda-

* E. Gyimah-Boadi is Executive Director of the Ghana Center for Democratic Development. Regina Amanfo Tetteh is Program Officer at the Center, and Kojo Asante is Senior Research Officer.

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mental rights and freedoms of the indi- scape and challenges. The review, which vidual. Article 12(1) enjoins all organs was timed to coincide with national act- and agencies of government as well as ivities commemorating the tenth year all natural and legal persons in Ghana to of the constitution’s promulgation, con- respect those rights. However, enforce- firmed that Parliament had failed to ment of the specific rights guaranteed in comply with one its constitutional obli- the constitution has been highly uneven. gations—the enactment of a law protect- Relative to civil and political rights, so- ing the rights of the country’s disabled cial and economic rights have often people. The finding provided an entry been deemed nonjusticiable and there- point for the Center to embark on ex- fore tend to lag in implementation. Thus tensive programs, in collaboration with PWDs in Ghana have generally contin- key state and nonstate interest groups ued to face monumental obstacles in as- and stakeholders, to push for the pas- serting and enjoying their fundamental sage of legislation that would promote human rights despite the undeniable lib- the rights of PWDs. eralization of the political system since the early 1990s. b. With funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the What follows is a summary of CDD- Center partnered with the Ghana Fed- Ghana’s research and other activities to eration for the Disabled (GFD), and the help protect the rights of PWDs in Gha- Center for the Development of People na and abate their marginalization. The (CEDEP) to organize a high-profile work- Center’s activities, largely undertaken in shop with Ghana’s print and electronic collaboration with other key stakehold- media. The forum was used to highlight ers, eventually contributed to the pas- the 12-year delay in the adoption of a sage of a law by the Fourth Parliament of disability bill, enhance media and pub- the Fourth Republic of Ghana to protect lic awareness of draft disability legis- the rights and promote the welfare of lation under consideration by law- PWDs in Ghana—Act 715—in 2006, af- makers, and underscore key factors im- ter almost sixteen years of lip service by peding its speedy passage. The exten- successive governments. sive publicity received by the workshop provoked widespread public debate on Research and Advocacy Programs to the plight of the disabled in Ghana in Promote the Rights of Persons with general and promoted awareness of the Disabilities draft law under review. It also generated a. In 2002, CDD-Ghana undertook a ideas for redressing the problems of the review of the 1992 constitution as part disabled. of its regular diagnostic analysis of the country’s democratic governance land- c. Next, the Center commissioned ex-

About the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana)

The Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization based in Accra, Ghana. Established in 1998, CDD-Ghana is dedicated to the promotion of a society and government based on the rule of law, appropriate checks on the power of the state, and integrity in public administration.

CDD-Ghana carries out its mission through policy research, conducting roundtables, workshops, and conferences; providing technical support through consultant services; offering training and capacity-building programs; and collaborating with other organizations and networks on joint initiatives. Its research outputs and other services are available to and used by governmental and non-governmental agencies, African regional bodies, and development partners as well as researchers and the general public.

42 T w o C a s e s f ro m CDD-G h a na tensive research to assess the attitude Trades Union Congress, and the Private of the private sector toward the draft Enterprise Foundation); the Commission legislation. The effort focused on gath- on Human Rights and Administrative ering information from a select group of Justice; print and electronic media (in- private-sector entities: an architectural cluding the state-owned Daily Graphic and engineering consultancy, Twum and Ghana Broadcasting Corporation as Boafo and Partners; a construction con- well as many private newspapers and sulting firm, G. Ampofo and Partners; a television and FM radio stations); and large intercity road transporter, King- civic advocacy groups like the GFD and dom Transport Service; a quasi-public the Ghana Association for the Blind. road transport company, Metro Mass The discussions at the workshop placed Transit; a fast-food chain, Papaye Fast emphasis on specific provisions of the Foods; a membership organization for draft bill relevant to the private sec- some private-sector entities, the Private tor, including sections that would oblige Enterprise Foundation; a private univer- owners and occupants of public places sity, Ashesi University; a high-end hot- and service providers to provide access; el, Plaza Hotel; a multinational bank, encourage employers to hire PWDs, pro- Standard Chartered Bank; the Coca- vide appropriate tools, and minimize Cola Company; a private housing-estate impediments to their advancement; development company, and Regimanuel require educational institutions to pro- Gray. Senior managers of each entity mote access to educational facilities for were carefully interviewed to ascertain PWDs and provide necessary learning their awareness of the draft legislation facilities and equipment; improve the and knowledge of its contents, particu- physical mobility of PWDs by reserving larly the provisions imposing obligations parking places at public parking lots and on private-sector service providers. The seats in public vehicles; and promote initiative also sought to enhance the in- PWD participation in national activities volvement of the private sector in the by requiring that organizers provide the redrafting, passage, and implementa- necessary access and facilities. These tion of the bill. provisions were accompanied by an associated regime of incentives—including The findings of the research provided in- benefits for manufacturers of technical formation for a multistakeholder forum aides and appliances for the disabled— organized (again with USAID funding) and sanctions for contravention. to discuss aspects of the draft bill that would impose financial and other -obli d. Following the passage of the Disability gations on private-sector operators. The Act, the Center initiated a series of pro- workshop, chaired by the deputy min- grams to popularize the new law and to ister of manpower, youth, and employ- encourage compliance by the public and ment, The Honorable Frema Osei Opare, private sectors. This included the devel- brought together thirty eight partici- opment, publication, and dissemination pants representing Parliament; govern- of a laypersons’ version of Act 715 in ment departments (such as the Attor- English and five major local languages ney General’s Office, the Department of (Hausa, Ga, Ewe, Twi, and Dagbani). Social Welfare, the Ministry of Health, The Center also commissioned the de- the Ministry of Manpower, Youth, and velopment of a Braille version of the leg- Employment, the Ministry of Trade and islation. These versions of the act were Industry, the Civil Aviation Authority, disseminated widely in several seminars the Investment Promotion Council, the organized to educate PWDs, service pro- National Board for Small Scale Indus- viders, and the general public on the tries, the Non-Formal Education Division provisions of the law. In collaboration of the Ministry of Education, and the In- with the GFD, CDD-Ghana developed a formation Services Department); busi- television kit to publicize the content ness chambers and trade associations of the Disability Act, and launched a (such as the Ghana Employers’ Associa- campaign against the stigmatization of tion, the Ghana Hotels’ Association, the PWDs in Ghana.

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e. Next, CDD-Ghana embarked on a pi- sought to enhance the ability of the GFD lot project to audit the status of PWD and allied apex PWD bodies to fully uti- access to existing transport and recre- lize the guarantees in the constitution, ational facilities in Ghana. The premises Act 715, and other relevant laws in their of a select number of public and private- engagements with officials and agencies sector agencies were inspected for sign- responsible for disability issues. An image such as Braille character buttons portant output of the training program and grab bars for the visually impaired, was the production of a “Disability Mani- ramps to building entrances, elevators festo,” which listed important issues of for multistory buildings, and the like. concern to PWDs to be incorporated into The facilities audited in three regional the programs of government and mani- capitals—Accra (Greater Accra), Kumasi festos of parties and candidates compet- (Ashanti), and Tamale (Northern)—in- ing in the 2008 polls. Next, CDD-Ghana cluded government institutions such as organized interactive meetings between the Parliament House in Accra, the Min- the GFD (and the leaders of other PWD istry of Manpower, Youth, and Employ- organizations) and representatives of ment, the new Presidential Office Com- the “manifesto committees” of various plex, the renovated Peduase Lodge in political parties, at which participants Aburi, and the Kumasi and Tamale city explored possibilities for mainstream- halls; leading state health institutions ing the needs of PWDs in party mani- such as the Military Hospital (Accra), festos and the campaign process during the Accra Psychiatric Hospital, Tamale the 2008 presidential and parliamentary Teaching Hospital, and Komfo Anokye elections. Hospital (Kumasi); and public educational institutions such as the University A program dubbed “Enhancing PWD of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah University Participation in Elections” sought to of Science and Technology (Kumasi), promote the inclusion of PWDs in the the University of Development Studies 2004 and 2008 general elections as (Tamale), and Tamale Polytechnic. The candidates, election observers, and vot- public recreational and transportation ers. A similar program was mounted for facilities assessed included the main PWDs in the local government (district sports stadiums in Kumasi and Tamale, assembly) polls of 2006. It began with the State Transport Corporation Yard in a nationwide awareness campaign. This Accra, Kwame Nkrumah Circle and Over- was followed by the mounting of public head/Pass in Accra (the main vehicular forums as nearly sixty PWDs declared and passenger hub in Ghana), Metro interest in contesting the district as- Mass Transit Depot in Kumasi, and Ta- sembly elections (compared with a little male Airport. The private-sector facili- over twenty in the 2002 elections), and ties assessed included the Catholic Ca- workshops to help train PWD candidates thedral (Kumasi), Fosua Hotel (Kumasi), on how to conduct effective campaigns. Manhyia Palace (Kumasi), Labadi Beach The Center also provided platforms in Hotel (Accra), Busy Internet (Accra), selected constituencies for PWDs to di- Gariba Lodge (Tamale), Mariam Hotel rectly engage parliamentary aspirants (Tamale), Picorna Hotel (Tamale), and on disability issues. CDD-Ghana’s direct SG-SSB (Tamale). negotiations with the Electoral Commis- sion resulted in the provision of Braille f. Another set of interventions to pro- ballot papers, which enabled the visually mote the welfare and rights of PWDs in impaired to cast their votes without as- Ghana focused on elections. The Center sistance in 2008. commissioned a national needs assessment for the GFD and its constituent or- g. The Center has helped to build the ganizations. The findings informed the organizational and technical capacities development of a training program for of leading PWD organizations. In add- the leadership and key officers of the ition to the aforementioned training pro- GFD and other disability organizations grams for the GFD and other disability in the country. The training program groups, it supported the GFD’s develop-

44 T w o C a s e s f ro m CDD-G h a na ment of a database to streamline the ment and its new leadership to address collection, management, and storage the matter. of information on PWDs in Ghana. The database is helping PWDs in the coun- This was preceded by the identifica- try to lobby the government more effec- tion of a number of state and nonstate tively. stakeholders and interest groups for collaboration on multiple, interrelated pro- h. The Center undertook activities to grams aimed at improving the welfare of counter the stigmatization of PWDs. PWDs in Ghana: the GFD; the Parliamen- These included research and analysis, tary Select Committee on Employment, as well as the organization of seminars Social Welfare, and State Enterprises; and dissemination of publications on the the Select Committee on Constitutional, topic. Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs; the Select Committee on Subsidiary Legisla- i. Finally, the Center initiated a research tion; the Attorney General’s Office (re- project aimed at exploring private-sec- sponsible for developing draft legislation tor responses to the Disability Act. A on behalf of the executive branch); the workshop was organized for the private Commission on Human Rights and Ad- sector—comprising transport compa- ministrative Justice (CHRAJ); and the nies, universities, financial institutions, Ministry of Manpower, Youth, and Em- and construction firms, among others— ployment, among others. to provide participants with in-depth knowledge of the act and its legal, fi- Mindful of the overcrowded nature of the nancial, and engineering ramifications. legislative agenda as well as the limited and often overstretched technical ca- Challenges Encountered pacities of Ghana’s legislative agencies, PWD rights and other welfare issues CDD-Ghana facilitated the development in Ghana are in keen competition with of the draft legislation at the Attorney many other pressing social concerns in General’s Office by researching inter- a political and economic context of re- national best practices (including the source scarcity and a genuinely over- Americans with Disabilities Act in the crowded legislative agenda. This partly United States) and collating suggestions accounts for the delay on the part of from independent experts, state and the executive branch and Parliament, nonstate human rights advocacy groups, which share legislative power under the and the public at large. For the same constitution, in passing legislation to purposes, the Center collaborated with promote the rights of PWDs. Moreover, the GFD to organize several workshops the marginal status of PWDs, generally on the subject for the media, religious low levels of education among PWDs in leaders, and other key stakeholders, to Ghana, and the short attention span of educate them and solicit their support the media regarding PWDs make it easy for the draft disability bill and actions to for government and society at large to address disability issues in general. ignore disability issues. The Center and its collaborators also With this in mind, the initial focus of held workshops on the draft disability CDD-Ghana’s programs was to draw the bill for officials involved in developing attention of the media and policy mak- the legislation—the drafting section of ers to the unfulfilled constitutional ob- the Attorney General’s Office and the ligation to PWDs, and to get it placed Parliamentary Committees on Constitu- on the legislative calendar of the At- tional and Legal Affairs and Subsidiary torney General’s Office and Parliament. Legislation. These workshops provided The induction of members of the new a platform for the state representatives, Parliament in early 2005 (following the advocacy groups, and independent ex- December 2004 polls) provided a good perts to jointly deliberate on the draft opportunity for raising public awareness legislation. Strong media participation and securing the commitment of Parlia- in the workshops generated significant

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publicity and garnered public support for tions helped to draw attention to the link the agenda. between PWD marginalization in Ghana and prevailing social practices, and In addition, the teams that conducted hence the need to look beyond legisla- the pilot accessibility audit from October tion for effective inclusion of PWDs. For 23rd to November 6th 2007 were also instance, it found that among the Akan strategically composed. Each team in- ethno-linguistic group, a person born cluded CDD-Ghana (which took care of with a disability or who becomes dis- the research, analysis, and report writ- abled is precluded from holding any tra- ing), the GFD, and other key civic additional political office or occupying any vocacy bodies dedicated to PWD issues, leadership position in the community. such as the Ghana Association for the Religious groups (Christian and Muslim), Blind, the Ghana National Association private companies, and the public at for the Deaf, Action for Disability and large tended to see PWDs as objects of Development, and the Ghana Society pity whose needs were best addressed for the Physically Disabled; members through the giving of alms to begging of the Parliamentary Select Commit- PWDs by the roadside and highly pub- tee on State Enterprise, Social Welfare, licized public-relations events in which and Employment (the body responsible philanthropic individuals and organiza- for overseeing implementation of the tions make donations to PWD institutions legislation); the Ministry for Manpower, (especially during the Christmas and Youth, and Employment and Architec- Easter periods). Research also helped to tural Engineering Services Limited (the highlight the fact very few PWDs have official implementing agencies); the broken the glass ceiling to enter national CHRAJ; the CEDEP (a nongovernmental politics. It showed that there have been organization dedicated to empowering only three PWD parliamentary candi- economic and social minorities); and the dates since 1992, and only one was suc- electronic and print media. The inclusion cessful in winning a seat.2 of individuals with physical disabilities as well as those with visual and hear- The pilot audit assessment findings pro- ing impairment in the teams enabled vided an estimate of the huge gap be- the assessment exercise to test access- tween the aspirations of Act 715 and the ibility in a relatively accurate and practi- reality of PWD accessibility. Even over cal manner, and the inclusion of the par- a year after the passage of the law, the liamentary and ministry representatives study confirmed that levels of accessi- ensured effective policy uptake. bility were low to abysmal. It found, for example, that most facilities lacked des- The research on the attitudes of se- ignated parking spaces for PWDs, with lected private-sector operators toward the notable exception of the Presidential the draft disability legislation helped to Office Complex, then under construc- ascertain the degree of notional sup- tion, which had included these in its de- port for the bill in that sector and the sign, and the Baba Yara Stadium, whose potential material and financial costs main entrance, seating arrangements, of compliance with the bill’s provisions. and washrooms accommodated PWD It found, for instance, that a provision needs. The premises of many new and requiring airlines to reserve a certain old public- and private-sector transpor- number of seats for PWDs on each flight tation and recreational facilities, as well was considered too costly by the indus- as government agencies, were inacces- try. The research and the seminars held sible to one category of PWDs or anoth- with the private industry group provided er. Although most facilities could boast suggestions for refining the draft legis- of ramps, they tended to be designed for lation to address the needs of diverse delivery of goods and were not neces- stakeholders—both service providers sarily suitable for wheelchair use; path- and PWD customers. way width was adequate for wheelchair access in only about half of the 28 public Other research, seminars, and publica- transportation facilities inspected. Most

46 T w o C a s e s f ro m CDD-G h a na multistory buildings lacked lifts, facili- with the Disability Act, and the head of ties lacked Braille character buttons and CDD-Ghana was appointed as chair of grab bars, entrances to washrooms and the new council. It is also worth noting elevators of recreational facilities lacked that the membership of the council in- international disability signage, and cluded leaders of the prominent disabil- none made any provision for sign-lan- ity advocacy bodies that were active in guage interpreters. the CDD-Ghana/GFD “coalition,” such as Bashir Kooray of the Ghana Society for The pilot assessment audit also provid- the Blind. This, of course, provided ad- ed a rough gauge of the levels of elite ditional opportunities for PWD advocacy commitment and resource mobilization from the inside. that would be needed for effective implementation of the legislation. The par- d. The Center succeeded in creating en- ticipatory nature of the exercise actually thusiasm among the Parliamentary Se- helped to stimulate such commitment lect Committee on Employment, Social among PWD advocacy groups, policy Welfare, and State Enterprises as well makers, and the public. as other state stakeholders about joining CDD-Ghana, the GFD, and other PWD advocacy groups to undertake the Policy Successes accessibility audit, a project which also a. The Center was able to get busy pol- established a baseline for monitoring icy makers to place the PWD protection progress. legislation on the legislative calendar in 2005 and keep it there until passage. e. PWD protection and welfare issues have been placed on the election cam- b. The generally good quality and pro- paign agendas of political parties in dis- gressive nature of Act 715 can also be trict and national elections since 2004; considered a success. The law’s main the Center promoted the historic rise features include guaranteed PWD ac- in the number of PWDs contesting the cess to public places, free general and 2006 local assembly elections, with sev- specialist medical care, education, em- en winning seats; CDD-Ghana brought ployment, and transportation. It also representatives of political parties to- regulates the commitments and other gether for a workshop to articulate their responsibilities of public and private programs for addressing PWD issues service providers. Act 715 mandates the ahead of the 2008 elections; and the po- creation of PWD at the various employ- litical parties contesting the 2008 elec- ment centers nationwide, and provides tions included disability welfare issues for the formation of a National Council in their election manifestos and cam- on Persons with Disability. The ten-year paign promises, printed copies of their moratorium on mandatory compliance manifestos in Braille, and provided sign- with the accessibility and mobility provi- language interpretation at major cam- sions of Act 715 substantially addresses paign events. the concerns expressed by private-sector representatives (in the CDD-Ghana f. The new administration headed research on the attitudes of the private by President John Atta Mills and the sector to the draft PWD legislation and National Democratic Congress (NDC) subsequent interactive forums for PWDs party formally inaugurated the National and private-sector operators) over the Council on Persons with Disability within cost implications of making all existing its first hundred days in office, fulfilling infrastructure disability-friendly. a campaign pledge. c. The National Council on Persons with g. CDD-Ghana received sustained fund- Disability was established as mandated ing from USAID over a seven-year by the act, charged with monitoring and period to undertake research and ad- evaluating government policies and pro- vocacy programs to promote the rights grams to ensure that they are in line of PWDs. This can be considered a vote

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of confidence in the effectiveness of the cal parties to pay lip service to the lofty Center’s disability welfare efforts. goals contained in Act 715. The law was passed in 2006, but it took roughly two h. The Center is regularly inundated years for the administration of President with requests to participate in, serve as John Kufuor and the New Patriotic Par- speakers for, or provide resource per- ty (NPP) to take the first concrete step sonnel to PWD welfare projects by local toward implementation. The National PWD organizations, Parliament, govern- Council on Persons with Disability was ment departments, state constitutional formed in early 2008, but by the end of bodies, human rights advocacy groups, the Kufuor government’s tenure in Janu- student groups, researchers, and donor ary 2009, it had not been formally inau- organizations, indicating broad national gurated and still lacked office premises recognition of its expertise and interest. and a secretariat. The Mills government recomposed the coun- i. The GFD has main- cil and inaugurated tained some level of it within its first hun- activity in keeping The bitter disputes dred days in office. PWD welfare issues over the results of But the new body has on the development been far from proac- agenda and in press- presidential polls tive in pressing for ing for the implemen- that nearly derailed compliance with Act tation of Act 715; vari- 715 on the part of ous PWD organizations Ghana’s democratic the government and have threatened to transition in the early its agencies, not to boycott national polls speak of the private as a means of pressing 1990s were perhaps sector. It is true that for shows of commit- a more direct trigger council has worked ment to PWD issues on with the Ministry of the part of the govern- for CDD-Ghana’s Local Government to ment and the national election work. develop guidelines political leadership. for the disbursement of the 2 percent of the District Assembly Outstanding Challenges Common Fund (a form of central gov- a. The implementation of Act 715 has ernment grant to the districts) that is been extremely weak. For instance, the earmarked for PWDs. It has initiated Disability Law provides for nondiscrimi- discussions with the National Youth nation against PWDs in terms of employ- Employment Program for allocation ment and professional development. But to PWDs. Unfortunately, this is temp- very little of this has been achieved five orary employment involving largely years after the passage of the law. Avail- unskilled labor, and the program is rid- able data indicate that the rate of em- dled with partisan politics. It is therefore ployment of PWDs (69 percent) is much a poor substitute for the requirement lower than that of the general population in Act 715 that the government equip (80.2 percent). The situation of women PWDs with the appropriate employ- with disabilities is even worse; about 53 able skills and tools to make them self- percent of them have no formal edu- reliant. Moreover, the levels of coopera- cation, compared with 37.3 percent of tion between the leadership of the new males with disabilities. When PWDs are council and leading disability advocacy employed, there are questions as to the groups such as the GFD appear to be quality and level of employment and the weak. constraints and frustrations faced in the workplace. c. Major gaps persist in the technocratic and advocacy capacities of the GFD and b. There has been a marked tendency on other PWD organizations, despite the the part of government and the politi- Center’s earlier technical capacity build-

48 T w o C a s e s f ro m CDD-G h a na ing and leadership training programs. In II. ENHANCING ELECTION TRANS- addition, factional disputes continue to PARENCY AND FAIRNESS THROUGH dog the PWD community and its lead- CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ership. There has been a recession in activities to push the PWD rights protec- Introduction tion and welfare agenda since the Cen- A number of remote and immediate fac- ter took a back seat on those issues. For tors account for CDD-Ghana’s sustained instance, there has been no disability commitment to electoral fairness, cred- accessibility audit since the pilot audit ibility, and peace in Ghana since 2000. led by the Center in 2007. Thus there They include the following: the emer- are no scientifically objective data for gence of the ballot box rather than mili- ascertaining the status of compliance tary coups as the primary instrument with the law by the government or the for changing governments and selecting private sector. political leaders; the establishment of regularly scheduled elections as an ac- d. Sustained USAID funding was cru- cepted feature of Ghanaian and African cial to the Center’s ability to undertake political life; and the high-stakes nature a number of complementary activities of Ghanaian and African elections, whose directed at promoting the rights of PWDs outcomes are often bitterly disputed by in Ghana. A reduction of USAID funding losing contestants and their supporters and the Center’s inability to secure al- (a reflection of autocratic regimes and ternative or additional funding has sub- leaders trying to cling to power by rig- stantially brought the Center’s PWD re- ging elections, and/or of high-strung op- search and advocacy programs to a halt. position parties that see victory as the sole end of electoral contestation). e. Given that at least some of the problems of Ghana’s PWDs are rooted in The bitter disputes over the results of local cultures, social practices, and re- presidential polls that nearly derailed ligions, addressing them is bound to be Ghana’s democratic transition in the a medium or long-term project. Yet the early 1990s were perhaps a more direct attention span of the government, the trigger for CDD-Ghana’s election work. legislature, the media, and the public The electoral disputes provoked violent remains limited. public protests by opposition supporters, and eventually the boycott of the ensu- f. A unique combination of factors that ing parliamentary elections by the main are not easily replicable may, at least opposition parties. This in turn produced partially, explain the substantial suc- a one-sided Parliament that was practi- cess of CDD-Ghana and its partners in cally devoid of an opposition presence. getting the attention of policy makers Thus politics in the first administration focused on disability issues, culminating of the Fourth Republic were character- in the passage of Act 715: an individual ized by parliamentary rubber-stamping at the helm of the Ministry of Manpower, of presidential initiatives, while opposi- Youth, and Employment, Frema Opare, tion parties continually engaged in vig- with a background in civil society as orous extraparliamentary activities that head of Action Aid–Ghana prior to her generated serious political tension. ministerial appointment; CDD-Ghana’s relatively strong access to the attorney A greater effort was made in the 1996 general and leaders of the relevant par- elections to make the polling process liamentary structures under the previ- more transparent and credible. Some ous administration; and the close focus domestic groups (notably the Institute on poverty reduction in official economic of Economic Affairs, the Ghana Legal policies of the 2000s (the government Literacy Foundation, and Ghana Alert) was happy to report policy progress together with international groups (such on PWD issues as a poverty-reduction as the Commonwealth Secretariat, the achievement). Carter Center, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems) took

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advantage of the relative openness credible independent election-observa- of these elections to mount indepen- tion project for 2000 and beyond. dent poll-watching projects. While they helped to improve transparency and a. It formed a broad-based coalition credibility, the projects were faulted on of secular and religious civic bodies to the following grounds: the confinement independently observe Ghanaian elec- of observation mainly to the day of the tions—the Coalition of Domestic Elec- election and neglect of the preelection tion Observers (CODEO)—comprising period; extremely limited geographi- some of the largest and most influential cal coverage, with a focus on polling civil-society groups in Ghana (currently stations in cities and towns; and inad- 35), such as the Christian Council, the equate professionalism. Catholic Secretariat, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission, the National Association Additional factors significantly informing of Muslims, the Ghana Bar Association, CDD-Ghana’s rationale for developing the Trades Union Congress, the National programs on election transparency, fair- Association of Teachers, the National ness, and peacefulness in Ghana for the Association of Graduate Teachers, and polls of December 2000 and subsequent the Nurses and Midwives Association. presidential and parliamentary elections The coalition was cochaired by Justice include the following: V. C. R. A. C. Crabbe, a retired judge and former electoral commissioner, and a. The Center’s maiden Afrobarometer Miranda Greenstreet, a retired univer- Survey in Ghana in 1999,3 and of the fol- sity professor and administrator. The di- low-up elite survey,4 found widespread verse nature of CODEO (horizontally and support for democracy among Ghana- vertically composed, middle and work- ians and strong identification of demo- ing class, religious and secular) gave it cracy with multiparty elections, along across-the-board legitimacy. Similarly, with deep concerns about the integ- relying on the member organizations to rity of the Electoral Management Body select personnel for training and deploy- (EMB), the absence of a level playing ment as election observers helped to field for all political parties, and other minimize perceptions of partisan politi- electoral irregularities. (We took the cal bias. mixed popular attitudes toward democratic reform in Ghana as something of b. Significant expansion in the number an “early warning” regarding the need of citizens involved in poll observation to enhance election credibility in 2000. under CODEO—from under two thousand in previous domestic election- b. The 2000 elections had a special im- monitoring projects to several thousand portance in that they marked the exit of (5,500 in the 2000 polls, 7,000 in 2004, President J. J. Rawlings, who had been and 4,000 in 2008)—has made it pos- military ruler for the eleven years pre- sible to deploy observers nationwide. ceding the Fourth Republic and whose constitutionally mandated two terms c. The Center introduced more compre- in office were coming to an end.5 They hensive observation projects covering were also the first elections in which the the preelection, election-day, and post- presidential candidates of both the rul- election phases of the electoral cycle. ing and opposition parties had no mili- CODEO observation projects since 2000 tary antecedents. have also addressed issues critical to strengthening Ghana’s electoral demo- c. The 2000 polls were likely to be close- cracy in particular and democratic de- ly fought given the roughly equal levels velopment in general, such as candidate of popular support enjoyed by the main selection processes,6 media coverage of opposition NPP and the ruling NDC. elections,7 electoral boundary demarcation processes,8 election violence early The Center employed several strategies warning systems and peace promo- to mount a politically and technically tion,9 incumbency abuse prevention,10

50 T w o C a s e s f ro m CDD-G h a na issue-based campaign promotion,11 and bency in 2004 has helped to increase state financing of political parties.12 The popular knowledge of the exploitation Center’s active research agenda has of administrative, budgetary, and media produced thirty or more publications, resources. Incumbency abuse has now including research papers, briefing -pa become a routine criterion for measur- pers, critical perspectives, and manuals ing election quality, and both candidates and guidelines. and citizens are able to identify certain types of abuses and speak out against d. The development and use of a more them. To date, the Center appears to be comprehensive and technically profi- the only institution on the African conti- cient checklist of the incidents observ- nent to have elaborated and developed ers must scrutinize and record has sig- indicators for measuring incumbency nificantly reduced reliance on anecdotal abuse. The Center completed its work evidence to back claims of electoral fair- and submitted it to Parliament in 2009. ness or unfairness. The use of Parallel Similar effects have been felt in the Vote Tabulation (PVT) methodology in Center’s pioneering work on monitoring 2008, which involved a nationally repre- election violence in collaboration with sentative sample of polling stations and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeep- SMS text-messaging to independently ing Center. verify the results of the presidential poll, brought CODEO election observation to In recognition of the Center’s exper- a new and unprecedented level of tech- tise and experience, it has been called nical proficiency. upon to provide technical support to a range of election stakeholder groups in CODEO today is the largest citizen ob- Ghana and Africa. It has trained election servation group in Ghana. Its presence observers, prepared election manuals, continues to enhance electoral trans- managed election-observation missions, parency and credibility in Ghana. The deployed technology for election obser- Electoral Commission, political parties, vation, and offered preelection political the media, security agencies, and the analysis. In 2008, CDD-Ghana trained general public have fully embraced local the CHRAJ to observe human rights election observers and respect their pro- compliance and political corruption dur- nouncements on the quality and cred- ing the preelection and election-day ibility of the electoral process and the periods. Similarly, the Center trained EMB. and deployed 300 members of the GFD to observe the elections in 2008. CDD- CDD-Ghana has served as the techni- Ghana has also provided support to citi- cal secretariat of CODEO. The Center zen observation groups in Liberia, Sierra has also been responsible for the initia- Leone, Kenya, Sudan, Malawi, Burundi, tion, implementation, and analysis of all Nigeria, and the Central African Repub- CODEO election credibility enhancement lic. research. The above research-oriented initiatives (such as monitoring the inci- Success at Influencing Policy dence of violence, abuse of incumbency The Center measures the results of its for electoral gain, and balance in media policy-influencing activities at two- lev coverage) have helped to provide em- els: outcomes and impacts. The first pirical evidence for assessing the overall level of measurement is less problem- quality of elections. The data gathered atic, because it is relatively easy for the have also informed the development of Center to attribute the outcomes to its appropriate interventions by Ghana’s intervention. The second level of mea- election authorities and other stake- surement is much more difficult, since holders. Some of these innovative re- there are factors outside CDD-Ghana’s search activities have brought limited control that contribute to the overall im- improvements in policy and practice. For pact of an intervention. instance, the Center’s work on identifying and preventing the abuse of incum- In the specific case of enhancing - elec

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tion transparency, peace, and cred- and popularized domestic election ob- ibility, all the major research and pro- servation grammatic activities are measured. Evaluation forms are often handed over b. Enhanced transparency in the elec- to participants to assess the usefulness toral process and broad-based accep- of an activity to them. The Center con- tance of electoral outcomes since 2000 ducts external and internal evaluations through CODEO interventions of entire programs as well as aspects of the programs to determine the quality of c. Increased knowledge and public delivery and the degree to which proj- awareness of new issues like incumben- ect goals were met. For example, this cy abuse, state financing of parties, and was done for the Center’s 2008 election election violence monitoring program with respect to the PVT component. d. Skill building and knowledge sharing on management of various aspects of For research on as- elections for a num- pects of elections that ber of stakeholders in have been either un- Ghana and Africa derstudied or com- In recognition of the pletely overlooked, the Center’s expertise and Center measures the Challenges to CDD- direct impact of the experience, it has been Ghana Election knowledge generated called upon to provide Support Work and received by elec- A key set of challenges tion stakeholders and technical support to relates to the highly the public, particularly a range of election competitive nature of where CDD-Ghana’s elections in Ghana’s research is cited as a stakeholder groups in Fourth Republic, the basis for discussion. Ghana and Africa. roughly even elec- This is true of the Cen- toral strength of the ter’s work on abuse of two main parties (NDC incumbency and state and NPP), and their financing of political parties. In the case shared conviction that it is possible to of the latter, as indicated earlier, Parlia- clinch victory by out-rigging and out- ment contracted the Center in 2009 to maneuvering the opponent. This sets produce a background paper to guide CDD-Ghana/CODEO and other election- lawmakers in the consideration of draft monitoring projects on a collision course legislation on the matter. with those who seek to manipulate their way to electoral victory. The friction is In some cases, the impact has been in- compounded by the extreme polariza- stant. In the 2008 elections, the Center’s tion and hyperpartisanship of Ghanaian pioneering work on monitoring election politics. Parties, candidates, and their violence directly influenced the behavior supporters are often resentful of CDD/ of political party supporters. The moni- CODEO activities that seek to check di- toring reports were disclosed to election rect and indirect forms of poll rigging. stakeholders, including the police and EMB, and subsequently disseminated The Center has adopted three methods to the public through the media. The for dealing with this set of challenges. naming and shaming of individuals and First, it has sought to assure key elec- groups involved in various threats and tion stakeholders and the public of its acts of violence helped to put a stop to independence, integrity, and profession- such behavior. alism. The creation of a broad and diverse coalition has been critical to this CDD-Ghana Has Achieved the end. Furthermore, CODEO’s advisory Following Impact: board is composed of individuals who a. Institutionalized, professionalized, enjoy widespread public respect and a

52 T w o C a s e s f ro m CDD-G h a na reputation for impartiality. tion in 2000. Subsequently, the Center has relied on the success of its previ- Second, the Center has ensured that the ous interventions and research work on information it collects and disseminates elections to attract support for further is credible and of the highest quality. It activities. has employed personnel with appropriate election-related qualifications, and A third set of challenges has to do with tapped its research skills and experi- the recruitment and retention of exper- ence extensively to undertake electoral tise and experience for work on long- studies. All aspects of its work, including term projects of this nature. The Center media engagement and election obser- has to compete with the international vation and management, are profes- and national public and private sectors sionalized. Election observers are armed for high-quality personnel. Often, it is with a checklist of indicators and under- unable to retain talented and experi- go several days of training and trial runs enced staffers who have been important before being recommended for accredi- in advancing the agenda successfully. In tation by the Electoral Commission and other cases, personnel who have built eventually deployed by CODEO. extensive networks with policy makers and gained the trust of such officials are Lastly, CDD-Ghana/CODEO has dem- recruited by international organizations, onstrated in its public and private en- and the Center is forced to begin anew gagements and statements that it works the process of cultivating relationships. principally to support the EMB and other CDD-Ghana’s approach in dealing with election stakeholders to advance elec- this problem is to provide understudies toral peace, transparency, and credibil- for senior and more experienced staff, ity. For example, CDD-Ghana/CODEO creating the capacity for sustaining ini- has provided information about short- tiatives even in the absence of the lead ages of electoral materials to the EMB, officer. In addition, the Center ensures and shared documented reports with the that it can build its corporate brand as Ghana Police Service regarding threats an independent, nonpartisan, profes- of election violence in parts of the coun- sional think tank, so that the reception try during the 2008 polls. of its products and engagements are defined by its reputation. A second set of obstacles relates to the sustainable financing of these initiatives. Moving Ghana toward democratic Endnotes consolidation through the enhancement 1. UN Development Programme (UNDP), of the quality of electoral processes Ghana Human Development Report 2007: and outcomes is a long-term goal. As a Towards a More Inclusive Society (New York: not-for-profit institution in Africa, CDD- UNDP, 2007), http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/ national/africa/ghana/name,3458,en.html. Ghana has been fully reliant on the gen- erosity of various development partners 2. O. Mensah, J. Williams, R. Atta-Ankomah, to successfully pursue this agenda. In and M. Mjomba, Strengthening the Disability 2000, when it began its substantive Movement in Ghana through Organizational work on elections, the Center had been Capacity and Advocacy: Contextual Analysis around for just two years and needed to of the Disability Situation in Ghana (Accra: persuade donors that it had the capac- JMK Research Consulting, 2008), http://www. ity to deliver. Fortunately, the leaders gfdgh.org/Context%20analysis.pdf. of CDD-Ghana were very experienced 3. CDD-Ghana, Popular Attitudes to people with a track record in managing Democracy and Markets in Ghana, Research these types of programs; they had been Paper No. 2, 1999. influential in bringing a similar group of civil-society organizations together in 4. CDD-Ghana, Elite Attitudes to Democracy the 1996 elections. The Center was able and Markets in Ghana, Research Paper No. 3, to leverage the bona fides of its manag- August 2000. ers to obtain financing for the interven-

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5. Rawlings first came to power in a coup 2004: Issues of Demarcation and Political d’état in 1979 and handed authority to a Representation, Briefing Paper Vol. 5, No. 2, civilian regime, which formed the Third CDD-Ghana. Republic. He staged a second coup in 1981 and ushered Ghana into its longest period 9. E. Gyimah-Boadi, Ensuring Violence Free of military rule, from 1981 to 1992. He then December 2004 Elections in Ghana: Early stood as a presidential candidate in the 1992 Warning Facilities, Briefing Paper, Vol. 6, No. and 1996 elections, winning both times. 4, CDD-Ghana.

6. M. Ohman, “Determining the Contestants: 10. CDD-Ghana, Abuse of Incumbency and Candidate Selection in Ghana’s 2000 Administrative Resources in Ghana’s Election Elections,” Critical Perspectives No. 8, January 2004: Monitors’ Report, Report, 2005. 2002, CDD-Ghana. 11. CDD-Ghana, Aspiring Parliamentary 7. CDD-Ghana, Media Coverage of 2000 Candidate Debates: 2004 General Elections, Elections, Research Paper No. 8, January 2005. 2001. 12. CDD-Ghana, Political Party Financing in 8. E. Dumor, Preparation Towards Election Ghana, Research Paper No. 13, 2004.

54 TURNING A RESEARCH IDEA INTO A NATIONAL MOVEMENT How the LCPS’s Advocacy Initiative Led to Municipal Elections

Sami Atallah*

n April 3rd, 1997, the Lebanese parliament approved the prime minister’s draft law to extend LEBANON the mandate of the country’s municipal coun- O Capital: Beirut cils. Although this was not an unusual decision by the government, which had been regularly postponing Population: 4.01 million local elections since 1969, the response by civil society was different this time. The Lebanese Association Internet Penetration: for Democratic Elections (LADE) joined with a number 52 percent of other civil society organizations to launch a nation- Press Freedom Status: al movement calling for local elections. After thirteen months of work, LADE managed to enlist more than Partly Free a hundred associations along with political party rep- Political Rights and resentatives, activists, and volunteers to collect more Civil Liberties Status: than 60,000 signatures. It also mobilized the media Partly Free and parliament members. By June 14th, 1998, the government had held municipal elections in 600 out GDP per capita, PPP of 708 municipalities, more than 1.2 million Lebanese (Current Int’l Dollars): voters had applied for election cards to exercise their $16,104 constitutional right, and 10,000 municipal council members had joined the political class.

This paper examines how the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), a policy research center that has become the hub of intellectual activity on pertinent public issues including elections and decentralization, established LADE, whose primary goal is to monitor voting and lobby the government for electoral reform. This is a case study in which the founders and members of LCPS found merit in generating activism from research. It is also a story of how LADE, which used the intellectual resources of LCPS, brought over a hundred nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) into a focused campaign and steered the movement through a politically constrained environment and a divided social terrain.

The primary lessons of this experience can be summarized as follows: the founders and members of LCPS realized early on that research ideas, having been studied and debated in workshops and conferences, are best advocated by a separate NGO, since the work, activities, skills, and even the character of researchers are different from those

*Sami Atallah is Executive Director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies.

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of activists. The government’s decision good. It was also built on the acknow- to postpone the elections gave LADE ledgement that the country has strong the opportunity to fulfill its mandate, universities and an intelligent and ca- which it did well. The strategy of using pable intellectual class, but that these a petition to convey its demand shifted institutions and individuals have not politics to a new playing field that the focused their capacities sufficiently on government did not control, and reinvig- realistic policy choices. LCPS was con- orated grassroots activism in a country ceived as a bridge between the halls with multiple societal cleavages. LADE of academia and the corridors of policy also managed, through its focus and lev- making—an institution that would both elheadedness, to avoid pitfalls among its channel the unique abilities of academ- own NGO members as well as opportun- ics and intellectuals toward proposing ism on the part of the political elite. practical solutions to policy makers, and convey the constraints and concerns of This paper presents the story in four policy makers to the intellectual class. sections. The first introduces LCPS and relates how it was formed and devel- LCPS was founded in 1989, in the four- oped over the years. Section two de- teenth year of the Lebanese civil war, scribes the political system and actors when the country was divided into two in the postwar period. It provides the governments and several cantons, and reader with the political context in which still under the influence and occupation the municipal elections were postponed of several foreign armies. The Center’s and then held. The third section explains founders were a group of Lebanese how LADE responded to the postpone- academics, civil-society activists, for- ment and led the national campaign. mer government officials, and business It then analyzes the strategies used to leaders who believed that one of the influence decision makers. The fourth main reasons for Lebanon’s collapse— section highlights LCPS’s influence in along with regional tensions, internal the policy sphere beyond the municipal divisions, and international competi- elections campaign. tion—was poor policy. In other words, Lebanese policy makers before the war Section 1: The Making of LCPS1 failed to develop the state’s institutions, LCPS was designed as a public-policy laws, and governance practices in ways think tank that would produce educated that would preserve the country, man- and nonpartisan analysis and guidance age challenges and changes, and avert to inform the Lebanese policy-making catastrophe. Although there was little process. It was born of a conviction that certainty in 1989 that the war would be the minds and methods usually found over within a year, the founders were in academia should be brought to bear focused on postwar Lebanon, and were on issues of public affairs and the public committed to creating a think tank that

About the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS)

Based in Beirut, the Lebanese Center for Policy Stud- ies (LCPS) is a respected voice in national and regional debates on issues pertaining to transparency and government accountability. Established in 1989, LCPS operates as an independently managed, politically neutral non-profit and non-governmental think tank with extensive experience in research, advocacy, and training. LCPS’ mission is to produce independent, high-quality research relevant to policymak- ing and to promote active reform through advocacy and raising public awareness. Over the years, LCPS has started many advocacy initiatives for judicial reform, transparent budget processes, decentralization and local governance, and the enhancement of the role of business associations in policy making.

56 LCPS’ s A dvo c ac y I n i t i at i v e would analyze the country’s interests ter’s many workshops and conferences and examine politics and policy in a pro- and collaborating on research projects. grammatic, intelligent, and nonpartisan This complemented similar interaction manner—an institution committed to the taking place among other NGOs and belief that a state that does not reform institutions in the country, and repre- and develop is doomed to regression sented a significant civil society moment and collapse, and that politics is not only in Lebanon. It created a sense of com- an art, but also a science that requires mon identity and common purpose that dedicated and sustained study. transcended the particular activities at hand. This in turn fostered the potential LCPS was started with a shoestring bud- for common action. Indeed, issues that get, a staff of two, and little conception had been first studied rather academi- of how to run a think tank or an NGO, let cally through the Center’s workshops alone how to do so in the midst of an on- and research projects soon evolved into going civil war. Its first product was the activist causes. Such was the case with Lebanon Report, a monthly examination the issue of elections, as a series of of political developments that tried to workshops and books published through provide sound and nonpartisan analysis the Center indirectly gave birth in 1996 within a polarized environment. In what to LADE, whose aims were to address turned out to be the final months of the the problems unearthed by the research, war, the Center’s offices, in the Sin el- to improve electoral laws and practices, Fil area near Beirut, were often inacces- and to reduce fraud and vote rigging.2 sible or bombed out in ongoing street A similar process unfolded on the issue battles or shelling campaigns. of local government, as a collection of workshops and publications produced by After the war ended in October 1990, LCPS gave rise in 1997 to the National LCPS gradually came into its own and Movement for Local Elections, group- began to grow. It had been established ing more than a hundred NGOs under with support from local business philan- the slogan “My Country, My Town, My thropists, and in the postwar period it Municipality.”3 Research on the issue of applied for and received program fund- corruption also contributed to the estab- ing from international foundations and lishment in 1999 of the Lebanese Trans- institutions. It moved first to establish parency Association. a quarterly journal, the Beirut Review, which supplemented the Lebanon Re- The Center grew steadily to a staff of port with more in-depth analysis of over twenty-five by the late 1990s. It postwar developments and challenges. published sixty-three books in Arabic The Beirut Review pioneered analysis and English and dozens of journal is- of the Taif Agreement and the new set sues; held hundreds of meetings, work- of treaties and pacts binding Lebanon shops, and conferences; and undertook and Syria; it also did important work studies of various kinds. Its main focus on Lebanon’s regional and internation- remained Lebanon, but it developed im- al environment, and in tackling key is- portant partnerships with other research sues of Lebanese political identity and centers in Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Mo- civil society. Soon thereafter, the Cen- rocco, and elsewhere, and became part ter launched an Arabic quarterly journal of a general trend of think tank dyna- called Abaad (meaning “horizons” or mism and civil society activism in the “dimensions”), which published ground- Arab world. Regionally, it played impor- breaking research on Lebanon’s identity, tant roles in promoting issues related to politics, and economics as well as on the civil society freedoms, local government judiciary, the environment, social jus- empowerment, electoral reform, anti- tice, and other key public-policy issues. corruption progress, and the like.

By the mid-1990s, LCPS had become a In addition to thinking and writing on hub of activity, with a pool of academ- public policy, LCPS is now playing a cen- ics, intellectuals, journalists, and civil tral role in advocacy and capacity build- society activists interacting in the Cen- ing for local and regional institutions.

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The Center continues to create and de- with a good idea, basic resources, and a velop civil society movements, the latest small but committed staff. of which is Youth for Electoral Reform, or in Arabic, Chaen. Section 2: Political Actors Flirting with Local Elections in Postwar Overall, the Center’s experience dem- Lebanon onstrates the power of ideas—that On October 22, 1989, Lebanon’s surviv- ideas relating to democratic represen- ing parliament members signed the Taif tation, local government, or corruption, Agreement, which officially brought an emerging from a fairly academic exer- end to the fifteen-year civil war.4 The cise, can provide the bases for socio- Agreement led to the amendment of political collective action and become the constitution and formed the basis forces for change. Many of these ideas of Lebanon’s postwar political system. have permeated the public political dis- Although it left the sectarian system course in Lebanon well beyond their intact, it shifted power from the presi- core constituencies. Some have even dent (who must be a Maronite Christian) made it all the way into government de- to the prime minister (who must be a cision making, as for example with the Sunni Muslim) and Council of Ministers step taken by the government in 2005 (CoM), and to the parliament and its to establish a National Commission for speaker (who must be a Shiite Muslim).5 Electoral Law Reform. This Commission reflected thinking on the need for elec- The Taif Agreement entrusted the CoM toral reform that had been pioneered by with executive authority (Article 17).6 LCPS over the previous ten years, and The president, who had previously en- included individuals who had learned joyed sweeping and solitary executive about electoral law reform through powers, was largely reduced to the the Center’s research and workshops. “head of the state and the symbol of the Scholars and experts who had worked nation’s unity” (Article 49).7 The accord with LCPS on issues including decentral- spelled out the practices of cooperation ization, corruption, economic reform, and power sharing between the presi- and budget issues also went on to serve dent and the prime minister, by which as consultants or experts in the govern- it became a custom for the two to gov- ment, the UN Development Programme, ern jointly, setting policy together, and the World Bank, and other key institu- implementing it through the CoM.8 tions. Article 64 expanded and formalized the The LCPS experience shows that ideas functions of the prime minister.9 Mean- can be the starting point of change, and while, the role of the parliament was en- that change does not only come from in- hanced,10 and the tenure of the speaker terest, money, or power. The experience was extended from one to four years, also shows that an idea whose time has essentially strengthening the position come can attract a large following, well of the Shiite community (Article 44). beyond its original audience. The idea Article 58 weakened the ability of the to promote local government, which executive authority to bypass the par- took its first steps in small workshops, liament in times of crisis. In addition eventually became a national movement to introducing concrete amendments, that gathered 60,000 signatures and the agreement called for, among other was joined by a majority of the political things, the abolition of confessionalism, class. administrative decentralization, and the strengthening of Lebanon’s municipali- Rising from humble beginnings, LCPS ties and large local administrative units. became a significant player in Lebanon’s postwar civil society and policy environ- Despite the constitutional changes, the ment. It spawned a number of civil so- country was in effect governed by a troi- ciety movements and, along with other ka of the president, the parliamentary NGOs, showed that much could be done speaker, and the prime minister. This

58 LCPS’ s A dvo c ac y I n i t i at i v e weakened the role of institutions in the control public opinion, the government policy-making process. More precisely, restricted the role of the media by pass- the CoM’s role as the executive author- ing a new audiovisual law that gave ity was reduced to approving the policies licenses only to stations owned by or decided by the troika members, and the close to political parties and politicians. parliament speaker became a partici- As for electoral laws, districts were pant in intra-executive decisions rather drawn for the benefit of certain politi- than being confined to his legislative cians. The political elites opted for a authority. Within the troika, each mem- majoritarian voting system even though ber came to represent his own sectarian a proportional system would produce community and its interests, often at the better political representation. The ex- expense of the formal institutions over tension of the mandate of the president, which he presided. who is constitutional- The working of this ly permitted to serve system was regulated one term, at Syria’s by the Syrian regime, Overall, the Center’s behest, delivered which exerted signifi- experience demonstrates another blow to the cant influence over the power of ideas— country’s democratic the country’s politics. institutions. At best, it acted as a that ideas relating to mediator among the democratic representation, It is against this three principal lead- background that ers, but most often it local government, or the LCPS research called all the shots. corruption, emerging from agenda on elections a fairly academic exercise, and local govern- Elias Hrawi, who was ments was formed. elected president in can provide the bases for In anticipation of the 1990, proceeded with sociopolitical collective 1996 parliamentary the implementation elections, the Center of the amendments to action and become forces organized workshops Lebanon’s constitu- for change. at which academics, tion as envisaged by policy makers, and the Taif Agreement. journalists discussed To balance Christian different electoral and Muslim representation in the parlia- systems to ensure better represent- ment and replace deputies who had died ation. It also launched two studies that during the war, the government took the examined Lebanon’s first parliamentary unusual step of appointing 40 new de- elections and documented fraud and puties. Though the appointments were vote rigging. These studies produced unconstitutional, the government ar- knowledge and generated ideas for re- gued that holding parliamentary elect- form. Equally important, they evolved ions in the tense postwar political en- into causes that galvanized common vironment would have been inflamma- action. It was at this moment that the tory. The first parliamentary elections founders and research associates at were held in 1992, followed by four sub- LCPS decided that a different organ- sequent polls in 1996, 2000, 2005, and ization had to be set up to lobby for elec- 2009. toral reform. Hence LADE was founded to monitor the electoral process and en- However, beyond these initial amend- sure the enactment of a representative ments, reforms stagnated, and the electoral law. overall situation was becoming politically less free. The government reined in In March 1996, a twelve-member steer- labor unions and students who protested ing committee was established, primar- against its socioeconomic performance, ily made up of activists, civil-society as a September 1993 law against hold- members, lawyers, academics, and ing rallies remained in effect. To further journalists. To be legally recognized, the

59 D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

committee submitted founding docu- would become a pretext for Syria to ments to the Ministry of Interior, which clip his wings, as Damascus was uneasy refused to accept them. A few weeks lat- about his trip to the United States four er, an executive committee was elected, months earlier.11 The prime minister, but because the brother of the secretary without consulting the CoM, withdrew general, Laure Mughayzil, became a the draft law on municipalities. The par- candidate in the upcoming parliament- liament speaker supported the decision, ary elections, she stepped down in ac- as he already saw the municipal elect- cordance with the association’s bylaws, ions as a way to weaken him politically. and LCPS director Paul Salem was elected as LADE’s new secretary general. On April 3rd, 1997, the parliament ap- Several of the new executive committee proved the prime minister’s proposal to members were also LCPS research as- postpone municipal elections.12 This act, sociates. In the summer of 1996, LADE which effectively extended the mandate monitored its first parliamentary elect- of the existing municipal councils, pre- ions. cluded the possibility of reinvigorating democratic life at the local level. It also By the following winter, disagreements delayed the prospect of local develop- among the troika members had reached ment, which could only be launched by new heights. This effectively brought to elected leaders who knew their own con- the fore a host of divisive issues, as each stituents’ needs and wants. leader tried to outmaneuver the others. Against this background, the upcoming By that time, conditions in the munici- municipal elections, which were sched- palities were dismal. More than half of uled for June 1st and June 8th of 1997, the municipal councils had been dis- exacerbated political tensions. Both the solved. The central government had president and the prime minister were effectively taken over the role of the initially in favor of the elections, as their councils by appointing officials from the chances of influencing the outcome muhafaza (governorate) and qada (dis- were good. The parliament speaker, on trict) to manage local affairs.13 This was the other hand, was reluctant, since the unfortunate, since municipalities are local elections seemed likely to favor entrusted by law with a broad range of Hezbullah, the rival party of his Amal responsibilities.14 In fact, any work hav- movement. As for Syria’s position, it ing a public character or utility within was concerned that local elections could the area of the municipality falls under shift the balance of power among the the jurisdiction of the municipal coun- Lebanese political actors and become a cil.15 Furthermore, these responsibilities source of conflict. are accompanied by taxing authority, as municipalities have the power to impose On February 18th, 1997, the govern- and directly collect sixteen taxes and ment submitted three draft laws that fees.16 were concerned with municipalities— two relating to municipal elections and Section 3: Civil Society Responds17 one on administrative decentralization. In response to the postponement of loc- The draft laws would in fact expand the al elections, LADE convened a meeting power of the muhafiz (governor), who on April 16th, 1997 that was attended is appointed by the central government, by fifteen NGOs representing various at the expense of the elected munici- sectors, including environmental, devel- pal council president. As for elections, opmental, cultural, human rights, public the laws would require citizens to vote liberties, civil rights, and persons with where they are registered rather than disabilities.18 After studying several alt- where they reside. ernatives, the participants agreed in principle to launch a national movement In a sudden shift, the prime minister complemented with a call for public free- backtracked on holding the municipal dom and recommendations to amend elections, fearing that endorsing them the election law.19

60 LCPS’ s A dvo c ac y I n i t i at i v e

The meeting concluded by forming a tions in the campaign to keep up its committee whose purpose was to draw momentum and increase the number of up an action plan for the movement volunteers who could help in collecting based on the proposed strategy. Almost signatures. The organizers imposed two two weeks later, on April 29th, 1997, conditions on those who joined the cam- the committee shared with the mem- paign: 1) they could not carry or lift any bers of the “forum” its plan of action.20 banners except those of the campaign, The members decided to primarily focus and 2) they could not use the campaign their campaign on calling for municipal for any other purpose, such as promot- elections through a mass petition, and ing a candidate or their own political to use only peaceful means to avoid con- views. In total, seven political parties frontation with the authorities. Equally participated to various degrees.23 The important, they rejected the idea of dis- third step was identifying key activists tributing pamphlets with the petition or or NGOs in each region of the country, issuing any announcement that dealt as these would become the focal points with public freedom in general. In other for collecting signatures. In order to get words, the group’s demands would be as many signatures as possible, the for- limited to holding local elections. um members sought to approach family, friends, neighbors, and people from In the next four months, the comm- their villages, as well colleagues and ac- ittee held several meetings in different quaintances in political parties. regions of the country to prepare the groundwork for the movement, and to The organizers also engaged the media ensure that the movement attained nat- to cover the campaign. Two television tional reach.21 On August 8th, 1997, stations, two radio stations, and seven as civil society organizations convened newspapers responded positively, and to launch the “National Movement for this had a tremendous impact in terms Local Elections,” they were met by inter- of publicizing the campaign and collect- nal security forces who tried but failed to ing signatures.24 prevent the campaign participants from assembling. Five opposition members Between December 18th and Decem- of parliament who were at the scene to ber 22nd of 1997, the parliament, un- support the cause managed to negot- der public pressure, convened to de- iate with the security personnel and con- bate the municipal election law. The vince them to let the event proceed as campaign organizers mobilized their planned.22 members to hold a peaceful protest demanding municipal elections. Some of In the meantime, fourteen members of the participants found in this occasion parliament who contested the constitu- an opportunity to express their political tionality of the law that extended the views and respond to an earlier sit-in by mandate of the municipal councils drew another party few days earlier. The or- on the national campaign. On Sept- ganizers intervened and requested that ember 12th, the Constitutional Council all members abide by the conditions of ruled in favor of the challenge, dealing a the campaign, namely the rule against major blow to the government. raising any political or sectarian interests. Instead, the organizers held ban- On an operational level, the campaign ners reading “No for appointment, No adopted a three-step strategy. The first for cancellation.” On December 22nd, step was to hold weekly meetings to the parliament voted in favor of holding reflect on the situation on the ground, municipal elections, except in areas that follow up on the work of different com- were under Israeli occupation and in mittees, and take appropriate decisions. mountain areas where those displaced These meetings, which were open, in- by the civil war had not yet returned to volved between twenty and sixty peo- their homes. ple. The second step was to enlist NGOs, political parties, and other organiza- In reaction to the new law, the orga-

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nizers reformulated their slogans: “Yes providing credibility to the organization for ensuring that the municipal elec- when they were enforced. For instance, tions will be held, Yes for protecting the as noted above, when the first secret- people’s decision, Yes for the public inary general’s brother decided to run in terest.” Five months later, there were the 1996 parliamentary elections, which 60,083 signatures on the petition calling were to be monitored by LADE, she re- for municipal elections. signed from her position. The observance of these rules later allowed LADE Finally, between May 24th and June 14th to impose its conditions on other NGOs of 1998, four rounds of municipal elect- participating in the campaign, to ensure ions were held in the governorates of impartiality. Mount Lebanon, North, Beirut, South, and Bekaa—in 600 out of 708 munici- In launching the campaign for local palities overall. Participation rates were elections, LADE managed to narrow the high, as 1.2 million voters applied for goals of its members and the participat- new election cards, and the voting was ing NGOs to a single political demand, considered free and fair, though with which was to hold municipal elections. some irregularities. A total of rough- In the earlier meetings, participants had ly 10,000 municipal council members suggested other aims, such as launch- joined the political class. Once the elec- ing a movement for freedom and demo- tions were over, the National Movement cracy or amending the election law. for Local Elections dissolved itself. These did not necessarily conflict with the first goal, but most likely would have diluted the message and even A Synthesis of How LADE hijacked the campaign. The single de- Successfully Managed the National mand ensured the cohesion of the cam- Movement paign, since it was agreed upon by all Several factors contributed to the suc- the members. In addition, the organiz- cess of the national movement. First, ers resisted the temptation among some the founders and research associates of its members to nominate their own at LCPS, where policy ideas and the call candidates for the municipal elections. for change began, had the foresight to For LADE, the objective was to have the create a legally independent organiza- government hold the elections, and for tion to monitor and lobby for elections. as many voters as possible to partici- This step ensured that LCPS’ research pate, regardless of the party or candi- capability was not compromised by the date they voted for. advocacy that was about to be launched through LADE, and that its mission re- The instrument used to effect change— mained clearly defined. It also implicitly the petition—was appropriate to the acknowledged that the skills and act- general political environment, though it ivities needed in a research center are remained risky. Given the restriction of different from those needed to lead an public freedom through the media law advocacy group. The establishment of and the ban on protests, a petition was LADE therefore fulfilled two goals: it left one of the only options that was consti- LCPS to carry on with its proper work, tutional and required no prior approval and it mobilized activists under the plat- from the government. It also provided form of LADE to call for fair and free a peaceful means of expression and al- elections. lowed participants to interact directly with the public, unlike distributing pamp- LADE’s focused mandate, which is to ad- hlets or publishing a protest announce- vocate for a democratic and represen- ment. In this way, the forum preempted tative electoral law and to ensure that a debate with the government on the elections are fair and free, provided it legality or the legitimacy of the move- with a clear mission. Furthermore, its ment, and avoided any conflict. The bylaws addressed, among other things, petition shifted politics to a new play- how to deal with conflicts of interest, ing field that the government does not

62 LCPS’ s A dvo c ac y I n i t i at i v e control, namely public opinion. However, tralization process did not end with the the effort had to overcome the multiple municipal elections. In fact, the Cen- cleavages—religious and political—that ter launched several municipal projects divide society in Lebanon. with the aim of producing policy knowledge through fieldwork, interviews, and In order to ensure the greatest reach surveys on the topics of local admin- possible, the forum worked on enlisting istration and fiscal decentralization. a large number of NGOs throughout the LCPS also conducted dozens of work- country to maintain momentum and re- shops on decentralization with experts, cruit volunteers who could circulate the decision makers, and activists, which petition. Moreover, the forum identified not only provided a forum for discuss- key players in each region, whether in- ion and debate, but also created mom- dividuals or organizations, to appeal to entum for change. Although these stud- citizens and gather signatures. Once ies, workshops, and books did not auto- these were in place, the forum asked matically lead to concrete reform, it is volunteers to approach their families, through them that we have developed friends, and neighbors, followed by net- and advanced our policy knowledge and works of political-party acquaintances. expertise.

The forum also recruited political parties After years of research and knowledge in all the regions of Lebanon to show accumulation, the first moment for real that the National Movement for Local change came in the summer of 2012, Elections was a general public demand when the parliamentary committee for and did not favor or target one sect over defense and municipalities called upon another. The forum called for meetings the author, who is also a fiscal decent- with political parties, but it also man- ralization expert, to provide a roadmap aged to impose its conditions on their for municipal finance reform. More- re participation. cently, LCPS board member and former minister of interior and municipalities The role of the media in promoting the Ziyad Baroud and the author were both movement and the participation of mem- appointed to the decentralization com- bers of parliament provided major impet- mittee established by Prime Minister us to the campaign. The media spread Najib Mikati, as president and member, word of the effort to the whole country, respectively. A third member of the ele- and the politicians who joined acted as ven-member committee, Karam Karam, intermediaries between the campaign is an LCPS alumnus, having served as on one hand and the parliament on the head of research at the Center between other. They were subsequently able to 2004 and 2009 and worked extensively effect change from within the political on political decentralization. The com- institutions. mittee provides LCPS with the opportunity to advance the policy agenda of Finally, the individuals who ran the cam- local administration and development in paign on a weekly basis—their beliefs, Lebanon after years of striving to reform their background, and how they related municipal governance. Beyond Lebanon, to one another as members—played a the author is now being sought to pro- crucial role in building mutual trust and vide advice on municipal finance to the a sense of common purpose. Their com- Tunisian parliament, which is currently mitment to the objective of the cam- debating a new decentralization law in paign and their willingness to invest light of the Arab Spring. time and resources on a voluntary basis with a very limited budget is a key factor LCPS’s influence in policy making is not that needs to be further explored. confined to decentralization. Since the early 1990s, the Center has been advo- Section 4: LCPS’s Influence beyond cating electoral reform to enhance polit- Municipal Elections ical representation in the country. After LCPS’s effort to strengthen the decen- years of policy research and lobbying for

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change, the government in 2005 estab- a bimonthly newsletter highlighting the lished a seven-member committee to topics we are working on, the workshops draft a new electoral law, and the panel and conferences we are holding, and the included three LCPS board members and publications we are releasing. In add- research associates—Paul Salem, Ziyad ition to its policy agenda, LCPS has also Baroud, and Nawaf Salam. incubated three NGOs: LADE, to lobby for electoral reforms and monitor elec- As indicated above, the Center’s alumni tions; the Lebanese Conflict Resolution have carried its reputation into a variety Network, to disseminate the principles of other positions, and LCPS in turn has and skills of conflict resolution; and the drawn notable individuals into its orbit, Lebanese Transparency Association, to enhancing its place in Lebanese political fight corruption and promote the princi- and economic circles. LCPS’s founding ples of good governance. In a testament director, Paul Salem, is now the direct- to LCPS’s continuous efforts to provide or of the Carnegie Middle East Center, policy knowledge and influence decision which is based in Beirut. He is an ex- makers, the University of Pennsylvania’s pert on Lebanese politics and the Arab 2011 global think tank survey ranked world. Ziyad Baroud, who is currently a LCPS as the top Lebanese think tank and board member and research associate, eleventh out of 210 Arab think tanks. served recently as the minister of interior and municipalities in two successive Endnotes governments. Nawaf Salam, who was a 1. I would like to thank Mahmoud Jaber, who board member and research associate, was an intern at LCPS, for his excellent research is currently Lebanon’s ambassador to assistance. I would also like to thank Paul the United Nations. LCPS alumnus Mi- Salem—director of the Carnegie Middle East chael Young is the opinion editor of the Center, the founder of LCPS, and cofounder of LADE—and Karam Karam—head of research Daily Star, a leading English-language at the Common Space Initiative and former newspaper in the country. Other former head of research at LCPS—for sharing with me LCPS members have joined international their experience in the national campaign for organizations like the World Bank and municipal elections. Paul Salem contributed a the United Nations, and academic insti- large part of this section. tutions like the American University of Beirut. 2. Between 1994 and 2011, the LCPS held five workshops on elections: the first in 1995 Over the last twenty-two years, the on the “Reform of the Electoral Law for the 1996 Parliamentary Elections”; the second in Center has published sixty-three books 1996 on the “Role of the 1992–96 Parliament”; and more than sixty policy papers on the third in 2000 on the “Lebanese Legislative topics like parliamentary and municipal Elections of Summer 2000”; the fourth in elections, political parties, decentraliza- 2001 on “Administrative Costs of Elections”; tion, sectarianism, national budget and and the fifth in 2005 on “The 2005 Legislative fiscal analysis, economic development Elections in Lebanon in Light of Local and and growth, sectoral policies, and la- Regional Transformations.” The center has bor issues, among others. The Center also published the following nine books on has held more than 117 conferences elections: Lebanon’s Postwar Election: Facts, Figures, and Analysis (1992); The Techniques and workshops, including fifty-two -re of Electoral Fraud and Ways to Combat It gional ones, bringing together experts, (1996); The Lebanese Parliament (1997); scholars, decision makers, activists, and LADE Report for Parliamentary Elections media to discuss and debate pertinent (1997); The Legislative Election of 1996: The political, economic, and social matters. Crisis of Democracy (1998); The Lebanese In order to articulate and disseminate Municipal Elections of 1998: The Tribulations its policies, LCPS has created a series of Democracy within Local Communities of policy briefs, each of which offers a (1999); The Legislative Elections 2000: four-to-five page synthesis of key- is Between Reproduction and Change (2002); The Techniques of Electoral Fraud and Ways sues and recommendations for decision to Combat It (2005); and The Legislative makers. To enhance our communication Elections 2005 (2007). strategy, the Center periodically issues

64 LCPS’ s A dvo c ac y I n i t i at i v e

3. The LCPS also has a track record of Muslim communities on more equal footing. research work on local governments. It has organized the following eight workshops: 9. The prime minister “is the head of the “Administration Decentralization” (1993); government” and is responsible for “executing “Local Government and Municipal Reform the general policy that is set by the CoM.” in Lebanon” (1994); “The 1998 Municipal Among other responsibilities, he is entrusted Elections in Lebanon” (1998); “Fiscal with the following: conducting parliamentary Decentralization in the Arab World” (1998); consultation to form a cabinet, countersigning “Development and Institutional Reforms in the all decrees, scheduling the meeting of the MENA Region: Justice and Local Governance” CoM and setting its agenda, supervising (2000); “Municipal Development in Lebanon” the execution of policy, and overseeing the (2001); “Empowering Local Government general course of government administration. Institutions in the MENA Region” (2002); and “Arab States Local Governance Forum” 10. As noted above, the seats in the parliament (2003). The center has published four books are now distributed equally between Christians on local governments and decentralization: and Muslims (Article 24). The seats increased Administrative Decentralization in Lebanon from 99 to 108, and were later expanded to (1996); The State of Municipalities in 128. The new seats were distributed in such Lebanon: Obstacles to Local Participation a way that Shiites and Sunnis are equally and Balanced Development (1998); Municipal represented, followed by the Druze. On the Development in Lebanon: A Survey Research Christian side, the Maronites have the largest and Critical Review (2002); and Challenges share, followed by the Greek Orthodox and of Decentralization and Local Governments in the Greek Catholics (Article 24). the Arab World (2005). 11. After the Friends of Lebanon meeting in 4. The agreement takes the name of Taif, a Washington in December 1996, the Syrians Saudi resort town where the meeting between were concerned that Prime Minister Rafic Lebanese politicians and international actors Hariri, with U.S. support, could potentially took place. weaken their influence over Lebanon.

5. Furthermore, the Taif Agreement distributed 12. Out of 128 members of parliament, the 128 seats in the parliament equally 36 voted against the withdrawal of the between Christians and Muslims. Previously decentralization and local elections draft laws. the seats were apportioned on the basis of six Christians for every five Muslims. 13. Lebanon is a unitary country with four tiers of administration: central, governorate, 6. The responsibilities of the CoM include district, and municipality. There were six the following: setting the general policy of governorates, twenty-six districts, and 708 the government in all fields, preparing bills municipalities in 1998 (as of 2011 there were and organizational decrees, executing laws 968 municipalities). and regulations, and appointing government employees. Furthermore, the CoM has its 14. This is based on the Municipal Law of own special offices, apart from those of the 1977. president and prime minister. 15. According to the Decree-Law 118, the 7. His prerogatives include presiding over elected municipal council has, among others, meetings of the CoM “without participating the following duties: formulating and adopting in voting” (Article 53, Clause 1) and other the municipality’s annual budget; managing procedural functions in issuing decrees and the municipal funds; planning, improving, laws. The president can no longer propose and expanding the streets; and establishing or execute laws (Articles 18 and 51), both of or managing schools, mass transit systems, which are functions of the CoM. All decisions shops, parks, racing places, playgrounds, and decrees must be countersigned by the toilets, museums, hospitals, dispensaries, prime minister (Article 54). shelters, libraries, and the like.

8. To this end, Article 53 requires the president 16. Municipalities can now collect up to 36 to undergo binding consultation with the different taxes and fees. Note that the central speaker of parliament and the deputies as a government determines the nature of the tax, group on the selection of the prime minister. the tax base, and the tax rate for municipalities This essentially terminated the prerogative to collect. As for fees, municipalities have the of the president to freely appoint a prime right to decide the amount to be charged minister of his choosing, and put Christian and within a range set by the central government.

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17. This section is largely based on a 1999 20. The paper uses “forum” and “organizers” paper authored by Karam entitled “The interchangeably, as they both refer to the Role of Civil Associations in Local Elections: LADE-led campaign with other NGOs. The Experience of the Forum for Municipal Elections,” in a book entitled The Quest for 21. In the meantime, members of the forum Democracy in Local Societies, published by met on weekly basis to make decisions as LCPS. events unfolded. The number of participants ranged between twenty and sixty members. 18. Some of the organizations that attended the meeting were as follows: LADE, Human 22. The five members were Mansour al-Bon, Rights Movement, Citizenship Movement, Boutros Harb, Nasib Lahoud, Nayla Mouwad, Association for the Defense of Rights and and Kamil Ziadeh. Freedom, Green Line, Green Platform, SOS Environment, Cultural Council for South 23. The political parties that contributed Lebanon, Caritas Lebanon, and Arab Institute to the campaign were as follows: Aounist Alumni of Bhamdoun. Party, Hezbullah, Lebanese Communist Party, Lebanese Forces, National Movement Party, 19. The agenda for the meeting was as and Phalange Progressive Socialist Party. follows: 1) review the current situation regarding municipal elections and their 24. The two television stations were LBC and postponement; 2) assess options, including MTV, the two radio outlets were People’s Voice the launch of a petition; 3) draft a common and Lebanon Voice, and the seven newspapers announcement that could be published; 4) set were as follows: Al-Nahar, Safir, Nida’ al- up a coordination committee to prepare for a Watan, Daily Star, Al-Anwar, and Kifah al- national day demanding municipal elections Arabi. based on a modern law; and 5) identify the next steps for action. 25. The occupied municipalities remained under Israeli control until 2000.

66 ENHANCING THE POLICY IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY RESEARCH The Case of the Romanian Academic Society (SAR)

Adriana Iordache & Simona Popescu*

he Romanian Academic Society (SAR) was founded in 1995, when there were no other Tthink tanks in Romania. Shortly thereafter, in ROMANIA 1996, the country held a presidential election and Capital: Bucharest experienced its first democratic transfer of power. Emil Constantinescu, the candidate of the Romanian Population: 21.34 million Democratic Convention (CDR), managed to defeat incumbent Ion Iliescu, the candidate of the former Internet Penetration: Communist Party, known then as the Party for Social 44.12 percent Democracy in Romania. SAR played a significant role Press Freedom Status: in the election, conceiving a key marketing concept Partly Free for the democratic candidate. The idea was to have a “Contract with Romania,” inspired by the U.S. Repub- Political Rights and Civil lican Party’s “Contract with America.” The Romanian Liberties Status: Free version incorporated its U.S. model’s “first hundred days” element (a deadline by which to fulfill at least GDP per capita, PPP some of the promises), but of course, not the policy (Current Int’l Dollars): aspects. As SAR President Alina Mungiu-Pippidi ex- $12,952 plained, “The policy plan was unfortunately negotiated within the parties in the democratic coalition, so it was not really achievable.”

Nevertheless, our original contribution was the concept of a contract between citizens and politicians. This was an innovative idea in the Romanian context at that time, because it offered a clear change from the former Communist rhetoric. Although the contract was broken by the politicians immediately after they won, the victory was absolutely momentous for SAR, especially given the resources we then had. Our staff consisted of only three employees, and our offices were barely adequate, yet through this marketing device we managed to have an important impact.

Between 2001 and 2003, SAR implemented the Early Warning Program with the support of our donor, the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The project worked in the following way: The UNDP negotiated with the government and then signed a contract through which the government was to be provided with professional advice. The form of advice was referred to as the Early Warning Report, which was supposed to be

*Adriana Iordache is a Communications Assistant at SAR and a Project Assistant for the “Anticorruption Toolbox for Civil Society.” Simona Popescu is Coordinator for the “Alliance for a Clean Romania.”

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published monthly and advise officials reports were quite influential. In add- on imminent crises and policy threats. ition to the monthly report, we issued This marked the beginning of a golden more frequent news alerts on impor- period for SAR. The aim of our organ- tant events. Because of their timeliness, ization was to reform the public sector, these were actually the more influential which helped us gain knowledge and ex- products. For example, if the European pertise on the country’s general reform Commission released a statement re- topics and challenges. SAR became the lated to Romania’s EU accession re- only professional entity in Romania that quirements, we were able to promptly was objectively reflecting on the exist- formulate recommendations for the gov- ing policy problems and formulating po- ernment on how to comply with the EU tential solutions. As a result, we man- demands. aged to reach the standard set out by the UNDP, which has in turn contributed SAR’s Role during Romania’s significantly to the development of our Accession to NATO and the organization. It has provided additional European Union opportunities for SAR, as our staff mem- By 2002, SAR had become a leader in bers have had the chance to visit many its field, and had gained popular- ac countries and to network with the then ceptance. Armed with this reputation, PDSR government. While the govern- we began to turn our attention to Ro- ment was not always receptive to our mania’s adherence to international gov- advice, we at least managed to estab- ernance standards. This was very im- lish a framework allowing us to have our portant, because public knowledge on statements heard by the government these matters was very weak. Moreover, and the general public. during that year, Romania was applying for NATO membership, and there was a At this time we also had the capacity to strong political conditionality attached produce the Early Warning Report each to the process. One of the conditions month in both English and Romanian, imposed by NATO was for the Romanian covering every notable story from all government to adopt a law granting free policy fields. Our editing skills and- ex access to public information. Since the pertise were strong, and some of the government and opposition were sharp-

About the Romanian Academic Society

The Romanian Academic Society (SAR) is the longest-standing think tank still active in Romania. Established in 1996 in Bucharest as an academic association of well-known figures, SAR has operated as a public policy research institute, a leading force in the promotion of good governance, a consultant for the Romanian Government and other governments, and a long-term partner during transition and state reform processes for the United Nations, the World Bank, and the European Union.

SAR’s mission is to create an evidence-based policy-making framework by:

• providing public policy training for young experts via informed debates, seminars organized in cooperation with international partners, and original research projects; • promoting democratic consultation-based solutions to public policy issues in public forums; • contributing to good governance and development through policy research; • contributing to the European integration of Romania, the Western Balkan countries, and Mol- dova through the transfer of best practices and advocacy; • enhancing the contribution of independent policy institutes to the policy formulation process through advocacy and public debate; • contributing to (re)building applied social sciences and public policy fields in Romania and South-Eastern Europe after fifty years of communism.

68 T h e C a s e o f t h e R o m a n i a n A c a d e m i c S o c i e t y (SAR) ly divided, SAR seized the opportunity to clean Parliament. These criteria were 1) make its voice heard. Shortly before the having repeatedly shifted from one po- law had to be passed to meet the NATO litical party to another in search of per- calendar, SAR managed to convince the sonal profit; 2) having been accused of government and the opposition to col- corruption on the basis of published and laborate on drafting the legislation, and verifiable evidence; 3) having been ex- to accept civil society as a mediator. As posed as an agent of the Securitate, the a basis for discussion, our organization Communist-era security service; 4) be- contacted the NGO Article 19 in Great ing the owner of a private firm with size- Britain, and asked them for recommen- able tax arrears to the state budget; 5) dations regarding best practices in this being unable to account for a discrepan- field, which they provided. The working cy between one’s officially stated assets session on the draft law lasted for nine and one’s income; 6) turning a profit hours, and the resulting text was very from conflicts of interest involving one’s similar to the guidelines offered by Ar- public position. The second step was to ticle 19. The bill was passed and became discuss these criteria with the leader- Law 544/2001 on free access to public ship of the political parties represented information. It is a very strong law, and in Parliament. The most important ones it greatly improved the public adminis- were the ruling Social Democratic Party/ tration. Ten years later, SAR is still using Humanist Party coalition (PSD+PUR), it and winning litigation on the basis of the opposition Justice and Truth Alliance its provisions. (DA), and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians from Romania (UDMR). They In 2004, SAR carried out one of its agreed with the civil-society criteria and most prominent projects: the Coalition process, and publicly announced their for a Clean Parliament (CPC). This was support for the CPC’s campaign. Only an anticorruption campaign that pre- the radical populist Greater Romania vented nearly one hundred controver- Party (PRM) resisted any cooperation. sial members of Parliament from being reelected. Funding was provided by the The third step was to gather information Balkan Trust, the Romanian Soros Foun- about the candidates of these parties. dation, and Freedom House. The CPC The CPC collected material published in was considered original by many ob- the press over the years and searched servers. Yet the problems it addressed the websites of various public authori- are widespread in the post-communist ties in charge of financial and commer- world: political elites who at times look cial matters. Then it double-checked the more like predatory elites, high levels of information. The fourth step was to draw state capture, and constituencies with up lists of those candidates who met one low civic competence and low inter- or more of the agreed-upon criteria for est in politics. This situation sometimes being unfit to hold a seat in the future looks hopeless in the Balkans and for- Parliament. The resulting “blacklists” mer Soviet Union. But it is not. By and were sent to the political parties, with large, what we present here is a success the request that they reexamine each story. On the occasion of the local elec- case and decide whether to withdraw tions in June 2004 and the legislative the candidate in question. and presidential elections in November and December, Romanian civil society The CPC also offered to analyze any cas- organized itself for the first time into a es in which individual candidates con- broad coalition for integrity in politics. tested its findings. Step five consisted of Frustrated by the government’s lack of the withdrawal by the political parties of effectiveness in fighting large-scale cor- significant numbers of their initial can- ruption, civil society took matters into didates. Some candidates appealed to its own hands. the CPC, which approved or rejected their appeals and adjusted its lists ac- The CPC first determined the criteria cordingly. The last step was to release that would make a candidate unfit for a the final CPC blacklists in the form of

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nearly two million flyers. Print media the Financial Times, Frankfurter Allge- readership is low in Romania, which re- meine Zeitung, Die Presse, and count- mains a largely rural country. Although less other European newspapers. With most of Romania’s 21 million people are the help of students and grassroots literate, less than 20 percent regularly organizations such as the Civic Alli- read political reports in newspapers. ance and the Pro Democracy Associa- Moreover, because parliamentary election (APD), the flyers were distributed tions at the time were conducted ac- in nearly all of Romania’s 41 counties. cording to a party-list system, people More than two thousand people, from seldom knew their representatives. students to trade union members, participated as volunteers in the campaign. As the process unfolded, the CPC encountered some difficulties. Smaller As a result of the blacklist campaign, parties proved difficult to track. The the CPC initially documented 143 cases Hungarians tried to claim an exception of unfit PSD candidates, including some by virtue of their being a minority when on the county level. Subsequently, un- they were asked to resign positions that der pressure from civil society, the party represented conflicts of interest. For its withdrew about 30 candidates from its part, the PUR generally recruited from electoral lists. The CPC also dropped other parties, meaning it was structur- from the blacklists some candidates who ally resistant to such monitoring prac- appealed its findings, so that the final tices. (After the elections the PUR sided count of unfit PSD and PUR candidates with the winning DA, although it had was 95. Among the other blacklisted been allied with the PSD.) candidates were 10 from the opposition DA (which had withdrawn some of its After the results of the CPC screening initial 28 unfit candidates), 46 from the showed that far more unfit candidates PRM, and three from the UDMR. A final belonged to the ruling PSD than to the accounting shows that 98 candidates on opposition, that party denounced the the original blacklists lost their seats, whole procedure, encouraging its candi- having been either withdrawn by their dates to sue coalition members and ask parties or defeated at the polls. At the the courts to stop distribution of the fly- same time, 104 blacklisted candidates ers. won reelection. Measured in this way, the CPC’s rate of success was just below In public statements and open letters, 50 percent. On the other hand, the PSD the PUR (and Antena 1, the private tele- fell from power. vision station owned by its leader) accused the CPC of “conspiracy,” calling its In the wake of the campaign, Romanian members “civic terrorists” and criminals. civil society was saddled with the task of The PSD and PUR also asked the Cen- defending itself against eleven lawsuits tral Electoral Bureau, Romania’s high- for defamation, filed by a former head est electoral authority, to ban the CPC of the secret service, a former minister flyers, but judges from both the bureau of justice, a former minister of defense, and the ordinary courts ruled in favor of and other top PSD politicians. However, the campaign. Opponents found a more by the time of Romania’s entry into the effective tactic, however. In many coun- European Union in January 2007, the ties, they circulated fake flyers, using coalition had won all the cases. the CPC format but replacing the names of PSD candidates with those of opp- Making Corruption a Priority Issue osition candidates. A parallel accomplishment of the CPC was its influence on the anticorruption- A large number of domestic and inter- themed governing program of the new national media outlets covered the ac- president, Traian Băsescu, and his new tivity of the coalition, including the Brit- DA-led cabinet. The national context of ish Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Re- that time was a very corrupt one. SAR uters, the Associated Press, Le Monde, had realized that although it was making

70 T h e C a s e o f t h e R o m a n i a n A c a d e m i c S o c i e t y (SAR) progress in the area of evidence-based and interests for the first time. This policy making and gaining expertise in measure amended Law 115/1996 and various policy areas, this did not ad- Law 16/2003 by extending the scope dress what we identified as being the of the required declarations. Within the key problem of the period. Indeed, state category of assets, the 2005 ordinance capture was progressing at alarming stipulated that politicians must declare— speeds. For example, the total amount in addition to real estate and bank ac- of unpaid debts owed by state-owned counts—all investments, loans, and gifts companies was very difficult, if not en- received. They also had to declare their tirely impossible, to document. On the and their spouses’ exact incomes and basis of the newly adopted law on free- any other jobs they held, such as seats dom of information, we eventually per- on the governing boards of trade unions, suaded the Ministry of Finance to post the professional associations, or economic debts of all such companies. As a post- agents. communist country, Romania had only privatized about 10 to 15 percent of Romania now also has an office of gov- its state enterprises at that time. Con- ernment ethics, similar to the one in the sequently, large seg- United States, which ments of the econo- provides an analysis my were simply not The year 2007 was a of various segments of paying taxes, and the assets owned by unprofitable com- very important one public officeholders. panies received re- for Romania, marking This office was creat- peated bailouts from its formal accession ed 10 years after the the government. Add- Contract with Roma- ing to the urgency of to the EU. Yet only nia, and was adopted the corruption prob- two weeks later, the by a totally different lem was the fact that coalition from the one it stood as the only government fired mentioned above. SAR major obstacle to the Macovei, the minister contributed to this signing of Romania’s of justice, who had achievement by work- EU accession treaty. ing to ensure such an done most of the work. office was included as SAR’s efforts during a requirement in Ro- the election period mania’s EU accession made political corruption the number- conditions. one issue of the campaign, and Băsescu and the DA embraced it as a core part Initially the European Council refused to of their platform. Once in office, the sign the accession treaty with Romania new president named one of our col- until an international audit could assess leagues, Monica Macovei, as minister of the country’s anticorruption policies and justice. This was a historic moment, as show that the country was doing some- it marked the first time a completely in- thing to resolve the problems identified. dependent minister of justice had been SAR had only two months to arrange an appointed. The minister then appointed international audit, so we called on our the country’s first chief prosecutors to partners, Freedom House, to provide be selected through a competitive rath- assistance, despite the fact that they er than a political process. The devel- had never audited all the anticorruption opments gained a great deal of inter- policies in any country. We worked in- national and national media coverage tensely, and created an action plan that and consolidated SAR’s reputation. then became part of Romania’s accession conditionality in March 2005. In 2005, as a result of our campaigns, the government passed an ordinance, The year 2007 was a very important O.U.G. 14/2005, which required all poli- one for Romania, marking its formal ac- ticians to provide a statement of assets cession to the EU. Yet only two weeks

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later, the government fired Macovei, the decisively for one of the two alterna- minister of justice, who had done most tive approaches: in-kind restitution and of the work. While the government in financial compensation. This has led to power was the same one elected in 2005 the adoption of successive laws that as a result of SAR’s anticorruption cam- were not based on a coherent long-term paign, its members were now divided strategy, and created confusion and between the party of the president, who overlapping rights. The second feature was still supportive of anticorruption ef- was a series of discretionary court de- forts, and the prime minister’s liberal cisions in cases filed under these laws, free-market party. Our NGO organized a and large-scale abuses at the central rally in response to Macovei’s dismissal. and local levels of the public administra- Despite widespread support online, only tion, causing inexplicable discrepancies about one thousand people joined us—a in the interpretation of the laws. very small number in a city of two million inhabitants. Our organization’s policy brief on the topic has provided the first numerical Current Developments at SAR indicator analysis of the restitution pro- Since Romania’s accession to the EU in cess. The paper describes the context 2007 and the related decline in pressure and identifies the main actors respon- to meet international sible for the current standards, SAR has state of affairs. continued its strategy of influencing the gov- One of SAR’s main The unresolved prop- ernment with the help goals has been to erty issue continues to of the European Com- be extremely relevant mission. However, the create a grassroots for Romania. A large Commission only re- social movement strong number of citizens who tains a certain degree enough to push the were dissatisfied with of leverage, linked to the national courts’ its pending decision government toward treatment of their on Romania’s acces- further reforms. cases have turned to sion to the Schengen the European Court of area. This situation Human Rights, placing will probably contin- Romania among the ue for another year or so, after which three countries with the highest number the commission’s influence on Romania of decisions on violation of Article 1 of will essentially be over. Therefore, one Protocol No. 1 to the European Conven- of SAR’s main goals has been to create tion on Human Rights (right to private a grassroots social movement strong property) and Article 6 of the Conven- enough to push the government toward tion (due process of law). In a decision further reforms. made final on January 12, 2011, the court adopted a pilot judgment (Atana- In September 2008 SAR carried out a siu and others v. Romania) asking the project called Performance, Transpar- government to take the steps necessary ency, and Responsiveness in Local Pub- to address this issue within 18 months. lic Administration, financed by the EU The ruling suspended the examination through its Phare 2005 program. As part of the 644 cases still pending until the of the project, we have drafted a policy problem is addressed by the Romanian brief on the topic of property restitution state. in Romania (SAR Policy Brief No. 34). SAR has been involved in conducting The post-communist property restitution litigation on the basis of Law 544/2001 process in Romania had two main fea- on free access to public information. tures that were not encountered in other For example, in January 2010 we ob- Central and Eastern European countries. tained a court decision ordering the di- The first was the state’s failure to opt rector of Romania’s powerful privatiza-

72 T h e C a s e o f t h e R o m a n i a n A c a d e m i c S o c i e t y (SAR) tion agency, AVAS, to disclose details of of second instance, but to convince the the privatization agreement with Auto- public entity in question to provide the mobile Craiova, which the agency had requested information without spending signed with Ford. Our organization re- further public funds on litigation. The quested this information because we be- letters sent to the relevant officials lieved the contract involved some acts of are made public online, increasing the corruption. Initially, the agency refused pressure on them to comply, which they to comply, arguing that the information generally do. was not public and that the contract included a confidentiality clause. Never- In 2010 SAR launched an online platform theless, the court decided in our favor, called the Alliance for a Clean Romania obliging the director to provide the re- (ARC), which aims to uncover corrupt quested information and charging a fine acts and provide the general public with equivalent to a quarter of his salary for the tools to fight against corruption. The each day of delay. The director complied concept is similar to that behind the with the court decision in a matter of “I Paid a Bribe” website in India, but days. more aggressive. For this project, our organization engages a large number The first case on the basis of the of collaborators who contribute articles information law was filed by SAR in about corruption in Romania, as well as 2002, and it involved the disclosure of volunteers from all over the country. The information related to water pollution. platform also includes other resources, In the court of first instance, the judge such as rankings of public institutions ruled that “such information should based on their degree of transparency, not be public.” However, the court of in accordance with the principles of good second instance reversed that finding governance. This initiative has become and decided that the public has the right quite popular in Romania, as we have to be informed about water pollution counted over seven hundred thousand levels. online visitors since January 2012. The project has received the financial In recent years, our organization has support of the Trust for Civil Society in gained expertise in litigating on the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE Trust) basis of Law 544/2001, and we have and the Balkan Trust for Democracy, a had a very high success rate in court. project of the German Marshall Fund. Our strategy is not to reach the court

73 PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION The Role of Slovakia’s Think Tanks, Watchdogs, and Human Rights NGOs

Martin Bútora*

1. Civil Society’s Contribution to the Democratic Transformation of Slovakia SLOVAKIA ver the last twenty-five years, Slovakia’s “third sector,” meaning nonprofit or nongovernmental Capital: Bratislava organizations (NGOs), has gone through sev- O Population: 5.45 million eral phases of development. Internet Penetration: Shortly after the fall of communism in November 72 percent 1989, new laws on freedom of association and assembly generated a boom in civic mobilization. New Press Freedom Status: political parties, professional or business organiza- Free tions, and independent trade unions were founded; scores of voluntary groups sprang into existence; and Political Rights and free media entered the public scene. Various ad hoc Civil Liberties Status: initiatives, both local and national, also took shape. Free Organizations that had been suppressed by the previ- GDP per capita, PPP ous regime, including church associations, began to reappear, and many entities that had existed under (Current Int’l Dollars): communist rule transformed themselves and contin- $24,284 ued their work.

At the beginning of the 1990s, there were already several thousand associations operating in Slovakia. In 1994, a steering panel called the Committee of the Third Sector was established and gained the status of a partner to the government. The goal of this umbrella entity was to improve legislative and tax conditions for the third sector and inform the general public about NGOs’ activities.

The second half of the 1990s was a more problematic time, as a semiauthoritarian government attempted to limit the sector’s independence. Civil-society organizations joined with other actors in a battle over the democratic character of the state, and the road to victory for democratic forces was difficult and bumpy.

***

Immediately after the end of the communist regime in 1989, three demanding tasks became evident: firstly, to replace one-party rule with a modern, pluralistic- politi

* Martin Bútora is Honorary President of the Institute for Public Affairs.

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cal system; secondly, to transform the Mečiar, leader of the Movement for a state-run economy into an effective Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). market economy; and finally, to find an appropriate political arrangement for Mečiar’s brand of nationalism and popu- the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks in lism was not the only complicating fac- a common state. In June 1990, the first tor. Nation-state building proved an ar- free elections took place. Soviet troops duous challenge. While the Czech lands left the country, and democratic rules had a history of statehood, a working and institutions were gradually imple- state apparatus, democratic traditions, mented. ethnic homogeneity, and a stronger economy, the new Slovak Republic was At the same time, new problems in a less favorable condition. The state emerged. Rising unemployment—three bureaucracy and new institutions had to times higher than in the Czech part of be built, some of them from scratch. A the state—had become a painful reality market economy had to be fostered, a in Slovakia. A decreased standard of liv- task rendered difficult by Slovakia’s his- ing created major social tensions, and tory of delayed modernization and the new inequalities in the previously homo- dominance of heavy industry, includ- geneous society deepened feelings of ing arms manufacturing. Forty years of frustration and discontent. life under the socialist welfare state led many Slovaks to believe that the dras- Two years of negotiations on a new con- tic rise in unemployment was too high a stitutional arrangement had not brought price to pay for freedom. results, and after the 1992 elections, the “Velvet Revolution” was followed by An unscrupulous politician with auto- a “Velvet Divorce.” On January 1, 1993, cratic inclinations, Mečiar built his pop- two sovereign states were created: the ularity and power on promises that he Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. would solve the country’s problems if The nonviolent manner of the separation only he were allowed to rule as uncon- was generally praised as a success, but tested leader. His antidemocratic style of many citizens regarded this develop- governance, soon dubbed “Mečiarism,” ment with disapproval or ambivalence. left its imprint on the political culture. In Slovakia, doubts remained not only A winner-take-all majoritarianism, an over the legitimacy of the dissolution unwillingness to seek consensus, dis- without a referendum, but also over the respect for minority opinions, and the democratic bona fides of the winners of labeling of critics as “enemies,” “anti- the 1992 elections, particularly Vladimír Slovak,” or “anti-state” spread across

About the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO)

The Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), based in Bratislava, Slovakia, is an independent, non-governmental think tank bringing together experts from many different areas of study. IVO was founded in 1997 with the aim of promoting the values of an open society and a democratic political culture in public policy and decision- making.

As an independent center of public policy research and analysis, IVO’s activities strive to nurture the expert intellectual potential of Slovakia. IVO’s research is primarily focused in two areas: democratic institutions and processes, and social problems and public policy. IVO seeks to influence the formulation and implementation of key decisions of public importance by providing expert points of view and offering policy alternatives; formulating recommendations for sustaining reform policies; promoting democratic values; and striving to contribute to positive changes in Slo- vakia’s overall development.

75 T h e R o l e o f S l ova k i a ’ s T h i n k T a n k s the country. Political elites were high- the SDKÚ, also promised to be more ly polarized, and the sharp divisions sensitive to the needs of ethnic minor- reached deep into Slovak families. ities. However, due to internal conflicts, Though Slovakia had a vocal political op- the ruling coalition collapsed, and ear- position, some independent media, rela- ly elections in 2012 enabled Fico and tively autonomous trade unions and uni- Smer–Social Democracy to return to versities, and a vibrant civil society, not power with a one-party government. to mention an independent Constitut- ional Court and president, the country The metaphorical glass can now be fell behind its neighbors in failing to viewed as half full or half empty. Ac- meet the criteria for integration into the cording to the more favorable view, EU and NATO. Slovakia is a successful country that has suffered many defeats, but also However, the government’s authoritar- has managed to pick itself up again, ian behavior also had unintended pos- renewing democratic rules and return- itive outcomes. Citizens began to pay ing to the path of Euro-Atlantic integra- greater attention to the question of de- tion. Because of these successes, shifts mocracy. In 1994, issues of democracy or breaks in political power no longer and the rule of law became increasingly have the same urgency. However, Slo- important. Thanks to massive public vakia still suffers from an ineffective mobilization and civic activities, as well state bureaucracy, widespread corrupt- as cooperation between democrats in ion, and problematic judicial conduct. A different parties, Mečiar was defeated in network of public institutions has been the 1998 parliamentary elections amid put in place, but some of them are not 84 percent voter turnout, and a broad infused with authentically democratic democratic coalition came to power.1 content, and too often they are not run by genuine democrats. Over the next eight years, two con- secutive administrations led by Prime Under these conditions, civil society can Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda of the Slovak play an important role in improving the Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) quality of democracy. implemented a series of extensive structural reforms. They also created positive *** conditions for Slovakia’s EU and NATO integration, and accession to both blocs Slovakia’s third sector has created a rich, took place in 2004. The subsequent co- diverse, and flexible network of forums, alition government, led by Robert Fico of organizational schemes, initiatives, and the Smer–Social Democracy party, ran ideas that have moved society forward. the country from 2006 through 2010. Its It has established an intellectual found- tenure featured signs of deterioration ation for societal reforms; provided in the quality of democracy, including mechanisms for the control of power; numerous incidents of party cronyism, defended the interests of various groups corruption scandals, the undermining of citizens; opened forums for previously of control mechanisms, problems in the unheard voices; offered useful services; judiciary, and the use of anti-Hungarian participated in resolving environmental, rhetoric as a tool of voter mobilization social, and health issues; and reacted to and power legitimation. the needs of villages, towns, communities, and regions. Thousands of small In a reaction to these tendencies, the organizations, initiatives, associat- 2010 elections brought to power a new ions, and volunteer groups have proven center-right government devoted to their usefulness, undertaken work that fighting corruption, opening the state no one else could do, and made unique administration to greater transparency, achievements. Civic actors and volun- improving the judiciary, and cooperat- teers engage and motivate a broader ing with civil-society actors. The gov- public because they offer understand- ernment, headed by Iveta Radičová of able, acceptable concepts of freedom,

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solidarity, and activism that are in line concrete examples of cases in which its with democratic modernization and have work and products have entered into the broken down the previously prevailing public debate, reached policy makers, ethos of civic helplessness. They have and influenced policy. demonstrated an outstanding ability to weave together meaningful activities, IVO is one organization among a constell- engage in social campaigns, find ways ation of effective watchdog organiza- to help socially excluded groups, engage tions in Slovakia, some of which include: local elites in useful activities in many Citizen, Democracy and Accountabil- fields, and find support both at home ity, which focuses on the accountability and abroad. of public authorities to the people and human rights; Alliance Fair-Play strives There are around forty different plat- for ethical, transparent, professional, forms, federations, and ad hoc coalitions and effective public administration and of civic organizations operating in Slo- political representation; Via Iuris— vakia, associated on the basis of com- Center for Public Advocacy helps citizens mon social or regional interests. Among protect their rights and participate in more than 37,000 officially registered public affairs decision-making, partici- NGOs there are some 33,000 civic as- pates in the reform of the Slovak judicial sociations. In recent years, there has system, and draws attention to injust- also been more informal, unregistered ice and legal violations; and Transpar- civic participation—in community and ency International–Slovakia pushes for urban activism, volunteering, the work the introduction and implementation of professional associations, and civic of anti-corruption measures and im- actions organized through online social proved transparency in the public sector. networks.2 The Charter 77 Foundation offers free legal advice and advocacy to citizens and Democracy research institutes, analy- NGOs, reviews the legislative process, tical centers, and think tanks, together and functions as a “judicial watchdog”; with human rights NGOs and watchdogs and the Slovak Governance Institute focused on accountability and good gov- focuses on good governance and the ernance, have become an indispensable allocation of public resources to ensure component of a healthy nongovern- accessible, transparent, and effective mental sector. Even if they comprise a public services. The account of IVO’s relatively small proportion of the whole activities that follows will be comple- nonprofit sector, they have a crucial mented by a description of the work of influence on public life. These NGOs have some other prominent NGOs in Slovakia. advanced democratization, observance of human rights, realization of economic reforms, and good governance, in part 2. The Institute for Public Affairs as by setting the agenda and framing the a Player in the NGO Community public debate on important social prob- IVO was established in 1997 as a civic lems and implementing many social in- association of experts on public policy. novations. However, such groups some- Its founders had long been active in times have difficulty making their ideas Slovakia’s public life. Some had partici- accessible to the public and to policy pated in informal or dissident structures makers, reaching out to different groups before 1989 as well as in the Velvet and constituencies, becoming relevant Revolution; others entered the public and influential, and translating their re- scene after fall of communism. All were search into policies. researchers, public intellectuals, and authors dealing with the topics of democ- Using the experiences of one of these racy, civil society, public opinion, and organizations—the Institute for Public societal transformation. Affairs (Inštitút pre verejné otázky, or IVO), a public-policy think tank located Since its founding, IVO has released in Bratislava—this paper will provide more than 130 publications (includ-

77 T h e ro l e o f S l ova k i a ’ s T h i n k T a n k s ing monographs, studies, conference lar photographic testimony by the win- proceedings, and working papers) and ner of a public competition organized by dozens of research reports. It has also IVO. Thus an academic, scholarly, and conducted dozens of public opinion polls objective report was complemented by a and sociological surveys (quantitative fascinating subjective personal account representative as well as qualitative created by renowned artists. In 2011, ones) and organized a great number of IVO published a CD-ROM compilation of conferences, seminars, workshops, pre- all the annual reports, comprising more sentations, and lectures. IVO experts than 17,000 pages written by more than have been involved in public discourse 200 authors and reviewed by dozens of on many important political topics. experts.3

The Civic Campaign for Free and Fair 3. Examples of IVO’s Outreach, Elections “OK ’98” (1997–1998) Influence, and Impact Through its involvement in OK ’98, a pro- The following examples were selected in ject designed to help ensure free and order to illustrate IVO’s experiences with fair elections, IVO arguably contributed entering into public debate, address- to the victory of democratic political for- ing various groups and constituencies, ces in the 1998 parliamentary elections. reaching policy makers, and influencing OK ’98 was a large-scale effort by num- policies. erous NGOs, volunteers, and donors; IVO was a founding member of its 11- Global Report on the State of Society member coordination council. The acro- (1995–2011) nym, which stood for Občianska kampaň Originally launched as a “white book” ’98 (Civic Campaign ’98), signaled a challenging the semiauthoritarian sense of optimism about the positive political establishment of Vladimír effects of public political engagement. Mečiar, the Global Report on the State Dozens of NGOs organized educational of Society gradually developed into the projects, cultural events, concerts, and most comprehensive annual report on discussion forums and issued publicat- Slovak society. Intended for a wide var- ions, video clips, and films. Hundreds iety of audiences, including experts, of volunteers across the country at- media, policy makers, entrepreneurs, tracted thousands of concerned citizens civic actors, students, diplomats, and to election-related events. Through the interested lay readers alike, each report use of the annual Global Reports, which was divided into four thematic parts: offered reliable arguments to politicians domestic politics, foreign policy, eco- and civic activists in their confrontation nomics, and society. The final product with authoritarian forces, and regular was the result of a collective endeavor public opinion polls conducted by IVO, by an informal nationwide coalition of the campaign was able to convince citi- think tanks and academic institutions zens of the importance of their personal that formed thanks to IVO activities and involvement in the electoral process. remains unparalleled, not only in Central Europe but also among all new EU mem- IVO’s educational and analytical mat- ber states. Typically there were about erials were aimed at journalists, com- a hundred people—authors, reviewers, mentators, public intellectuals, civic editors, proofreaders, and translators— and student leaders, politicians, and the involved in the preparation of the report. general public, including young people The annual presentation was always a and first-time voters. Publications ad- public event; policy makers, experts, dressed the fundamental principles of and media felt obliged to respond and democratic electoral systems, the par- react. liamentary mandate in Slovakia, and the electoral programs of the competing For three years (2001–2003), IVO also political parties and movements. prepared a unique Pictorial Report on the State of the Country, a very popu- The impact of OK ’98 among citizens was

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reinforced by six targeted public opinion Research-Action Project on Slovakia’s polls, which contributed to the ongoing NATO Integration (1998) public discourse about the approaching This project focused on the integration elections. A May 1998 poll conducted by of Slovakia into Euro-Atlantic security IVO showed that the majority of citizens structures, a process that was delayed supported the activities of NGOs in the and almost halted during the Mečiar era. OK ’98 campaign. The findings of other Part of the final publication consisted of extensive surveys and analyses were interviews with leading politicians, both presented regularly at press conferenc- from the ruling coalition and the oppo- es and published in a series of articles sition, focused on security and foreign in the widely read daily SME, as well as policy issues. The book was coauthored in two books aimed at both domestic by thirteen experts. Fifteen students and foreign audiences. The largest and were involved in conducting and elabo- most visible OK ’98 project was “Road rating the interviews, and most of these for Slovakia,” a march organized by the young people later became well-known civic association GEMMA 93. During a public figures. The presentation of the 15-day march, some 350 civic activists book and the following seminar became visited more than 850 towns and vil- a closely watched public event, receiv- lages across Slovakia (almost one-third ing numerous responses in the media of all townships and cities), distribut- and by politicians, and it appeared to ing 500,000 brochures to inform voters help the public better understand the about the elections. Door-to-door cam- dangers of Slovakia’s potential exclusion paigning explained voting procedures, from the Western political and security stressed basic principles of parliamen- community. tary democracy, and emphasized the importance of citizen participation in the The main book was preceded by other elections. Members of IVO took part in publications, such as Facts and Illu- the march and attended public meetings sion on Neutrality: NATO and the Price and gatherings. The atmosphere was for Security (1997), and continued with both tense and hopeful. Pro-government other projects, such as Slovakia after politicians, journalists, and state-owned the Washington Summit (1999–2000). media attacked NGOs and their lead- Since 2004, IVO has also taken part in ers, accusing them of undermining the the annual international research pro- independence of Slovakia, serving Slo- ject Transatlantic Trends; the results vakia’s enemies, and not respecting the of the most recent comparative survey law. However, public mobilization gen- were published in 2012. erated a great deal of enthusiasm, and thanks to the public’s civic activities, as Election Analysis and Studies of Political well as cooperation between democrats Developments between Elections (1998– in different parties, Mečiar was defeated 2013) and a broad democratic coalition came Publications of this type provide not to power. only an assessment of election results, but also an overview of public opinion It was in this period that Slovakia’s think and the value orientations of Slovak tanks began to position themselves as citizens. One of the early examples was independent civic institutions providing the book Democracy and Discontent in an expert review of developments in Slovakia: A Public Opinion Profile of a the country and bringing policy recom- Country in Transition (1998; published mendations. Key themes included the in Slovak under the title Slovakia before defense of democracy, the need for re- the Elections). It examined the extent to forms, and guiding Slovakia in a Euro- which people in Slovakia had embraced Atlantic direction. Thanks to collabora- democratic political culture, how they tion with researchers, journalists, and perceived contemporary political reality, civic activists, the third sector began to how they interpreted Slovakia’s history, build its own knowledge base. what thoughts and values appealed to them, and what foreign policy direction

79 T h e ro l e o f S l ova k i a ’ s T h i n k T a n k s they saw as most desirable. (1999), a critical and forceful testimony from a Romany settlement. Chapters on Several publications have monitored Roma have been a regular part of the developments between elections, in- annual Global Reports on Slovakia as cluding The Country in Motion: Political well as the annual publication IVO Ba- Attitudes and Values in Slovakia (2001), rometer: Trends in Quality of Democ- Intentions and Reality: Evaluation of racy (2009–2013). A critical overview the Fulfillment of the Mikuláš Dzurinda of the situation of the Roma and their Government Program Manifesto (2002), coexistence with the majority populat- Public Administration Reform in Slovakia ion was included in the collective book 1998–2002 (2002), and Intentions and Where We Are? Mental Maps of Slovakia Reality: Evaluation of the Fulfillment of (2010). the Mikuláš Dzurinda Government Pro- gram Manifesto II (2006). In 1996, IVO published She and He in Slovakia: Gender Issues in Public Opin- IVO also released an economic study ion. A decade later, IVO’s experts con- entitled A Survey of the Economic Elite’s ducted a project called “Plus for Women Opinions on Topical Issues Concerning 45+” (2005–2008) that dealt with mod- the Slovak Economy (2001); a study on ern gender issues, resulting in the pub- the political system called Party Govern- lications Women, Men, and Age in Labor ment in Slovakia: Experience and Per- Market Statistics; Here and Now: Probes spectives (2004); two publications on into the Lives of Women 45+; and a proposed reforms, Reforms and Respon- seminal collective work entitled She and sibility: Players, Impact, Communication He in Slovakia: Gender and Age in the (2004) and Slovakia: Ten Years of Inde- Period of Transition (2009). The project pendence and a Year of Reforms (2004); attracted much attention with its imagi- reports on the public mood before and native social campaign “My Mom Wants after elections, Slovakia after the Elec- to Work,” which was carried out in elections: Public Opinion, Political Players, tronic and print media in 2008. In 2001, Media (2003) and Slovakia before the Zora Bútorová, a key IVO expert on gen- 2006 Election (2006); and a report on der and age issues, compiled the pub- the media, Public Service Media in the lication Fragile Strength: Twenty Inter- Digital Age (2009). IVO’s books on elect- views about the Life Stories of Women, ions and related social and political drawing public attention to women lead- developments have attracted regular ers of all generations. In 2005, six ana- attention from the media, experts, civic lysts authored the publication Violence actors, and politicians, and have sub- against Women as a Public Policy Prob- stantially contributed to voters’ ability lem. Another IVO study, Twenty Years of to make informed choices. Maturing: Slovak Women Exploring the Frontiers of Democracy (2009), offered Work on Minority, Age, and Gender an extensive overview of research find- Issues ings. In 2010, IVO published a research IVO has released several foundational report dealing with the topic of Discrimi- works on the Romany population of Slo- nation and Multiple Discrimination. vakia, including Čačipen pal o Roma: A Global Report on Roma in Slovakia, Public Campaigns to Preserve the Rule published in 2003 and coauthored by of Law and Confront Nationalism and 44 scholars as a knowledge reservoir Extremism (2006–2013) for experts, the media, and policy mak- IVO’s experts have been active in re- ers; Sociographic Mapping of Roma sponding to growing tensions between Communities in Slovakia, the first-ever ethnic Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians multifaceted description of all Romany and demonstrations of extremism. Hun- communities in Slovakia; Roma Voices: dreds of prominent figures and many Roma and Their Political Participation in thousands of citizens throughout the Transformation Times (2002); and the country signed IVO’s appeals against documentary film Black Word/Kálo láv ethnic intolerance and racism. This

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civic engagement has been systemati- ation of human and minority rights; and cally equipped with arguments based performance of independent and public- on scholarly findings. IVO’s analysts service media. An additional part of the coauthored National Populism in Slova- IVO Barometer, the European and trans- kia (2008) and National and Right-Wing atlantic dimensions of foreign policy, Radicalism in the New Democracies: was replaced in 2012 with the topic of Slovakia (2009) and have published a civil society and the third sector. plethora of articles and studies on the subject, some of them in cooperation These regular assessments of recent with foreign partners and colleagues developments in particular areas have from academic institutions. IVO has become an issue in the public arena. also organized or participated in many Even if it is sometimes criticized by the roundtables, public forums, town-hall government, the IVO Barometer offers meetings, and media debates. extraordinarily valuable feedback for citizens, the media, and the political est- Public Opinion Surveys and In-Depth ablishment as a whole. Studies on Political and Social Transfor- mation (1990–2013) Contributing to the Research of Civil So- The activities of IVO in this field have ciety, Serving as a Knowledge Hub for three basic dimensions. First, the sur- Civic Organizations veys have collected data on public atti- This aspect of IVO’s performance has tudes toward the hottest political issues, been a natural, intrinsic, and organic such as the role of the state security part of the public presence of its key service in the 1995 kidnapping of the protagonists for more than two decades. son of President Michal Kováč, an opponent of then Prime Minister Mečiar. Sec- The founders of IVO conducted a se- ond, they have raised awareness of the ries of research studies before the cre- public’s perception of issues relevant to ation of the think tank, and their ac- electoral choices. Third, they have built tivities continued in the following years. valuable data collections on perceptions Every annual Global Report has a long of many topics related to social transfor- chapter on NGOs, the nonprofit sector, mation, including trust in political bodies and volunteering. In addition, IVO has and public institutions, civic participa- published books like To See Round the tion, the direction of the country, reform Corner: 21 Politicians on NGOs (2003) efforts, the dissolution of Czechoslova- and Corporate Philanthropy in Slovakia: kia, Slovakia’s neighbors, EU integra- Analyses—Opinions—Case Studies. In tion, the United States, and minorities. 2001, IVO produced a documentary film on volunteerism called Volunteers. IVO scholars have been frequent guests in television and radio debates about a In 2007–2010, IVO became a member wide variety of issues. More important- of the Centre of Excellence for Research ly, the accumulated data and in-depth on Citizenship and Civic Participation: analysis from IVO’s projects have pro- Facing the Challenges of the 21st Cen- vided an indispensable base for the de- tury (COPART), operating under the signing of public policies as well as a tool auspices of the Slovak Academy of Sci- for public mobilization. ences. This collaboration by eight institutions across multiple disciplines IVO Barometer: Trends in the Quality resulted in a monumental monograph, of Democracy as a Mirror for Politicians Citizenship, Participation, and Delib- and the Public (2008–2013) eration in Slovakia: Theory and Reality. The principal objective of the IVO Ba- IVO was the key force behind the col- rometer, a quarterly analytical project, lective book When Indifference Is Not is to reach a broad public audience with an Answer: Civic Associating in Slovakia expert assessments in four areas: demo- after the Fall of Communism (2004). In cratic institutions and the rule of law; 2012, IVO’s experts published the well- legislation; protection and implement- received overview Active Citizenship and

81 T h e ro l e o f S l ova k i a ’ s T h i n k T a n k s the Nongovernmental Sector in Slova- The study Social Network Sites in Slo- kia: Trends and Perspectives. vakia (2012), based on a representative survey, offered an overview of the inci- A new dimension in IVO’s involvement dence and usage of these communica- emerged through a research project that tions platforms in Slovakia. explored more efficient means of cooperation between the state and NGOs, Improving the Precarious State of the initiated by the Office of the Plenipoten- Slovak Justice System tiary of the Slovak Government for the In 2011–2012, IVO carried out a re- Development of Civil Society in 2011. search project called The Slovak Judi- For this purpose, IVO created a consort- ciary as Seen by the Public, Experts, ium consisting of two other NGOs: the and Judges, mapping the opinions of a Partners for Democratic Change Slovakia variety of actors on the Slovak justice and the Center for Philanthropy. More system, the causes of its existing defi- than fifty experts and twenty executives ciencies, and potential solutions. While from state institutions prepared studies the representative sample of the popu- on the current situation of civil society lation revealed popular convictions, be- in Slovakia as well as an assessment of liefs, and opinions, two panels unveiled the trends in its development. The out- the opinions and arguments of experts puts of this project, which became pub- and judges. Due to the unsatisfactory licly accessible, were the Study on the situation of the judiciary, as well as the State of Civil Society in Slovakia and the interest shown by the media, the project Study on the Trends in the Development generated considerable public discus- of Civil Society in Slovakia (2011). They sion and controversy. analyzed topics including general state policies toward NGOs and policies developed within ministries and departments, 4. Other Think Tanks, Policy the preparedness of NGOs to cooper- Institutes, Watchdogs, and Human ate with the state, social innovations Rights Organizations created by NGOs, the conditions neces- As indicated above, IVO is part of a sary for partnership between the state broader community of analytical cen- and NGOs, and the economic param- ters, think tanks, watchdogs, human eters of cooperation between the state rights NGOs, and action-oriented civil- and NGOs. They also sought to sum- society organizations participating in the marize economic arguments related to democratic modernization of the coun- possible partnership between the state try. and NGOs. In 2012, questions emerged about the Digital Literacy and E-Governance possible impact of the recent elections The report Digital Literacy in Slova- on the civic sector. The outgoing gov- kia (2005) studied the preparedness of ernment of Iveta Radičová had not only the general public to use modern infor- declared its readiness to take the voice mation and communication technolo- of citizens seriously into account, it had gies (ICTs), including the structure and also implemented practical measures to depth of the “digital divide” in society make this happen, including the creation as a potential source of social problems. of the Office of the Governmental Pleni- Citizens Online (2008) looked at the potentiary for the Development of Civil needs and expectations of citizens Society, tasked with improving com- in the area of public online services. munication between the state, the third E-Governance in Slovakia 2006–2008 sector, and the general public. However, (2008) reported on the deepening abil- after the election of Robert Fico’s one- ity of civil-society actors to use ICTs for party government and its emphasis on the promotion of open-society principles the role of the state, the future of the in public life and the increasing interest existing policy was cast into doubt. In of NGOs and other civil-society actors other words, it was unclear which type in the development of e-governance. of relationship the government would

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have with the third sector (cooperation, been involved in a number of advocacy confrontation, or complementarity), how initiatives, like an initiative to reform receptive the new cabinet would be to the public administration structures outside controls and criticism, and how (“For a Real Reform of Public Adminis- it would communicate with the actors of tration,” 2000), an initiative for improv- civil society. ing waste management (“For a Good Law on Waste Management,” 2001), or From the very beginning, the represent- those focused on raising public aware- atives of the civic sector expressed ness about violence against women their interest in continuing the dia- (“Every Fifth Woman Campaign,” 2002). logue with the government so that Civil-society organizations have regular- the potential of active citizens and ly created broader alliances and carried their organizations could be used to out joint campaigns. Perhaps the most improve quality of life important successful in Slovakia. After some example was the 2000 hesitation, the new nationwide campaign cabinet agreed to such A relatively new for a good freedom of a dialogue. Represen- phenomenon is the information law called tatives of the third growing role of online “What Is Not Secret sector currently oper- Is Public,” which was ate within the Coun- social networks supported by over 120 cil of the Government and new media in NGOs and brought to- for Nongovernmental gether over 100,000 Nonprofit Organiza- mobilizing citizen members. Legal ex- tions, and also within activism. perts played a very the Council of the Gov- important role in this ernment for Human campaign. Rights, National Mi- norities, and Gender Equality. The Office A relatively new phenomenon is the of the Governmental Plenipotentiary for growing role of online social networks the Development of Civil Society contin- and new media in mobilizing citizen act- ues its work. Even if the results of this ivism. During the period from 2004 to cooperation have yet to be seen, it cre- 2011, more than 200 campaigns, calls, ates a framework for more systematic petitions, initiatives, declarations, and communication between the cabinet and public reviews of proposed legislation civil society than existed in 2006–2010, appeared on the website of the inter- under Fico’s first government. net-based civic daily Changenet. They were supported by tens of thousands of In addition to communication with the citizens. The ranks of signatories usu- cabinet, many watchdogs, think tanks, ally included well-known personalities and civic activists have continued their in public life, civic activists, and repre- work as independent voices criticizing sentatives of NGOs; experts from vari- the performance of the government and ous fields and professions; members of public institutions. In September 2012, local governments and other politicians; the conference of the representatives and many ordinary citizens. These cam- of the nonprofit sector agreed on ten paigns, initiatives, and controversies requirements addressed to the govern- have concerned various topics: pub- ment, calling for changes in securing lic policies and issues of democracy, the financial sustainability of the sector, the rule of law and implementation of in legislation, and in improving control justice, social and economic problems, over EU-based structural funds. public administration and local government, the position of minorities and *** human rights, nationalist threats, protection of the environment and cultural Policy institutes, researchers, and ad hoc heritage, conditions for the media, and groups of experts and scholars have also the employment policies of public insti-

83 T h e ro l e o f S l ova k i a ’ s T h i n k T a n k s tutions. They have encouraged review individuals, including through experi- of the problems and often include calls mentation and the testing of innovations. to action as well. Mass reviews strive to They believe that NGOs should serve as achieve changes in proposed legislation a kind of civic control, providing critical and usually have a solid level of expert- feedback to state power. They think it is ise. essential for NGOs to help various dis- advantaged groups and to strengthen The most successful of these campaigns the voices of those who would otherwise was an environmentalist initiative by the not be heard. They see it as necessary Slovak branch of Greenpeace and a co- to achieve mutually beneficial cooperat- alition of allied groups that was able to ion with the public and business sectors combine research activities with action. in serving citizens, while respecting the The campaign demanded that the coun- principles of true partnership. try’s local communities have a say in uranium mining projects in their areas. In In contrast with these beliefs, state rep- Slovakia, any petition obtaining 100,000 resentatives sometimes show a tend- signatures must be discussed by the ency to reduce the nonprofit sector to national parliament. This petition gar- a provider of services and suppress nered 113,000 signatures and was civic participation. But weakened public delivered to the parliament in September rights are at odds with EU norms. For 2009. In March 2010, legislators agreed example, after twenty Slovak environ- on legal changes to geological and min- mentalist NGOs submitted a complaint ing laws that would grant local commu- to the European Commission regarding nities as well as municipal and region- violation of the right of public participat- al authorities more power to limit the ion in decision making that is essential development of uranium deposits. This to environmental protection, the com- was not only a huge achievement for the mission began an inquiry on Slovakia in Slovak environmentalist movement and 2008. Facing the potential loss of sev- an inspiration for similar groups around eral billion euros in EU funds, the Slovak the world, but also a strong example of parliament amended the corresponding effective action for Slovakia’s civil soci- law so that civic initiatives, associations, ety as a whole. and organizations, as well as ordinary citizens, could express their views on The uranium initiative was a textbook the environmental impact of govern- example of the effective concurrence ment policies. of numerous factors: a “strong” theme, qualified preparation and systematic work, knowledge of legal and adminis- 5. Challenges Ahead trative norms and regulations, the ability The fruits of association have raised the to find allies and offer them a meaning- quality of life in Slovakia. NGOs have ful benefit (for the Association of Towns created, disseminated, and reproduced and Villages and the Union of Towns, three specific kinds of wealth in society: this meant the prospect of strengthened cognitive wealth, a wealth of practical local authority); an attractive campaign; experience, and wealth of prosocial pat- the internationalization of the contro- terns of behavior. They have used sev- versy; and intensive cooperation with eral approaches to contribute to cultural the media. change and the democratic modernization of their country. *** A part of the sector has taken on the A research project carried out by the profile of a check on power and became Center for Philanthropy has shown how an important bulwark against authori- third-sector leaders understand the tarian tendencies in 1993–1998. This workings of the civic sphere.4 They con- amounted to a mental revolution for a sider it important for NGOs to “fill the country steeped in fear and civic help- gaps” and meet the needs of society and lessness, with a long history of subju-

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gation to incumbent authorities. Since to electoral participation. It can take 1998, civic organizations have contin- various forms, including public debates; ued to carry out this function. Another demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, or part of the third sector demonstrated its rallies; charitable collections and peti- expert potential by becoming a source of tions; engagement in solving local prob- alternative approaches to public policy. lems; and working for a political party. The creation of proposals, together with One also has to take into account the critical reviews of existing state poli- various spheres of public life in which cies, increases competition in the “mar- citizen participation appears. In 2011 ketplace of ideas” and enables better- and 2012, another type of public pro- informed public debates and political test emerged: public rallies organized by decisions. young people to criticize the corruption of politicians, the intertwining of busi- A further segment of the third sector has ness and politics, and the inadequacy established itself as a service provider. of the institutions of representative de- These activities are not just a supple- mocracy. They called for more transpar- ment to state care, but often offer a ency and probity in politics and public distinct and superior alternative. NGOs life, and for strengthening the elements have brought competition to the field of of direct democracy in the political sys- service provision and served as a well- tem. spring of innovation and experimentat- ion. They work with a certain “social- In some areas, civic activism has shown risk capital” that allows them to test new an upswing. Participation by citizens in approaches on a small scale. Dozens of community development has increased, service innovations have been devel- and various forms of urban activism oped and piloted by Slovak NGOs, and are developing as well. Professional this trend continues. organizations are entering the legislative process and fighting for their rights One of the more controversial topics in and interests. At the same time, mem- the third sector is civic participation. bers of various professions have begun Comparative data from representative to engage more for the benefit of the sociological surveys suggest that the public interest. NGO activities continue ranks of active citizens engaging in pub- to develop in the social sphere, focused lic affairs in Slovakia do not expand. One on care for senior citizens, those with of the underlying reasons might be a long-term illnesses, hospices and crisis mental shift generated by the onset of a centers, and filling societal needs that market economy—a growing individual- are not or cannot be addressed by the ism and weakening interest in the prob- state and private business. Formal and lems of others. In a time of crisis, peo- informal volunteering is expanding, ple struggling with poverty and social most intensively in the social and envi- insecurity concentrate all their energy ronmental spheres, but also in culture. on making ends meet. Another reason Public support for charitable giving and might be an overall decrease in social volunteerism is growing. Internet activ- trust, which is the lubricant of people’s ism has gained momentum, and thanks willingness to associate and cooperate. to social media, more citizens have be- Moreover, some people put off participa- come involved in public affairs. tion because they realize what a major effort is needed to change their con- *** ditions and how rarely this kind of effort is crowned with success. Despite these positive trends, one cannot ignore the many obstacles to more And yet, despite these tendencies, efficient input by analytical centers, several spontaneous civic initiatives think tanks, and watchdogs on improv- have emerged in recent years, espe- ing quality of democracy in Slovakia, but cially among young people. Obviously, perhaps also in other new democracies: civic participation cannot be reduced

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1. Party politics play a role. The politi- sis, which has hampered individual and cal establishment sometimes creates a corporate fundraising as well as state “political class” that operates in closed and EU support for NGOs. Thus far, the circles of mutual support and is unwill- crisis has only rarely been perceived as ing to listen to outside or independent an opportunity, especially for imagina- voices. tive civic initiatives and NGOs to help people adapt to worsened living condi- 2. A frequent change of leaders, admin- tions. Such projects deserve financial istrators, and staff generates a certain support from multiple sources. lack of “institutional memory,” making it difficult to preserve continuity and build 10. The prevailing preoccupation with on previous achievements. economic agendas, indicators, numbers, and “hard facts” indirectly nurtures a 3. Mindful of the electoral cycle, politi- mentality that is less sensitive to con- cians often perceive some topics as un- cepts like solidarity, social cohesion, popular or untimely. A typical response social bonds, and social capital, which to proposals is “This is not the proper could become worthy thematic orientat- time to deal with it.” ions for democracy resource centers in Slovakia and beyond. 4. Cooperation between the state and NGOs is marked by formalism. Public In the face of all these complications, administration representatives invite think tanks are striving to contribute to NGOs to take part in preparing strate- the quality of democracy, and their ef- gies, policies, and legislation, and in forts remain a work in progress. discussions and legislative review, but ultimately their opinions, proposals, and demands are largely ignored. Endnotes 1. For a more detailed description, see M. Bútora, 5. Fragmentation of civic initiatives and “OK ’98: A Campaign of Slovak NGOs for Free NGOs weakens their ability to act as an and Fair Elections,” in J. Forbrig and P. Demeš, organized partner or opponent to incum- eds., Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe bent powers. (Washington: German Marshall Fund of the United States and Erste Stiftung, 2007). 6. Many NGOs lack the capacity to invest in voluntary activities. Civic par- 2. For an overview of Slovakia’s civil society and ticipation is undermined by insufficient the third sector, see M. Bútora, Z. Bútorová, financing from the state and paltry sup- and B. Strečanský, Active Citizenship and port from domestic “social philanthro- Nongovernmental Sector in Slovakia: Trends pists.” The dissipation of foreign funding and Perspectives (Bratislava: Včelí dom, 2012). that occurred mainly in 2004, after EU 3. Slovakia 1996–2010: A Global Report on the and NATO accession, has not been com- State of Society. Nine of the fourteen reports pensated for. Current EU funds remain were published in English as well as Slovak. poorly allocated and managed. This release attracted interest from various audiences and was quickly sold out. 7. Think tanks in new democracies still have to work hard to improve their com- 4. B. Strečanský, “Slovakia,” in T. Nicholson, ed., munication skills and upgrade their abil- “We and They”: NGOs’ Influence on Decision- ity to address different constituencies. Making Processes in the Visegrad Group Countries (Bratislava: The Sasakawa Peace Foundation/The Sasakawa Central Europe Fund 8. In some areas of the nonprofit sec- and Center for Philanthropy, 2008). The Center tor, generational change has not yet oc- for Philanthropy supports the development of curred; new, young leaders are emerg- philanthropy and civil society, participates in ing only gradually. civic campaigns, and together with other NGOs negotiates with the authorities on legislation 9. A significantly negative exogenous related to the third sector. factor has been the global economic cri-

86 TRANSLATING RESEARCH INTO POLICIES The Experience of South Korea’s East Asia Institute (EAI)

Sook Jong Lee*

The World of Think Tanks in South Korea hink tanks have become an integral force in the contemporary policy processes of most coun- SOUTH KOREA Ttries. Public-policy scholar Diane Stone defines Capital: Seoul them as “a vehicle for broader questions about the policy process and the role of ideas and expertise in Population: 49 million decision making.”1 Think tanks serve both government and civil society by generating influential pol- Internet Penetration: icy ideas and ultimately enabling better governance. 81.46 percent These functions are not limited to domestic issues. Press Freedom Status: Aided by a rapid transmission of information, today’s Partly Free think tanks copy and learn from one another as they address similar policy questions. A significant num- Political Rights and Civil ber of think tanks disseminate their research out- Liberties Status: Free put widely, and engage in international networking and exchanges. Political sociologist Inderjeet Parmar GDP per capita, PPP even argues that institutes involved in global affairs (Current Int’l Dollars): engage in unofficial diplomacy through international $33,397 conferences.2

American think tanks in particular have been widely recognized as influential in both domestic and international public affairs. Political scientist David M. Ricci writes that about one hundred think tanks thrive in the met- ropolitan Washington area, and that the ideas circulated there make a commendable contribution to society’s perennial search for political wisdom.3 He finds that today’s Washington think tanks emerged during the 1970s and 1980s to support a nationwide campaign by conservatives against what they saw as the dominant liberal policies and ways of life. Furthermore, he argues, the trends of the new American politics—the rising importance of expertise in campaigning and governing, an increasing dissonance in values, and the need to market political wares—have contributed to the growth of thinks tanks.4 Historian James A. Smith says that the proliferation of U.S. think tanks reflects the distinctive way in which Americans have sought to link knowledge and power.5 The knowledge and analytic techniques of experts are increasingly utilized in public service, as rational planning and scientific methods have come to be widely recognized as practical tools for improving policies. Emerging countries require planning and advisory institutions as much as developed countries, leading to the rising number

*Sook Jong Lee is President of the East Asia Institute.

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of think tanks around the world. Policy tion—is a key force behind the rise of experts R. Kent Weaver and James G. think tanks.8 These organizations help to McGann maintain that officials in both develop and assess policies and mediate information-rich and information-poor between civil society and more formal societies need research that is under- political institutions, such as political standable, reliable, and useful, and such parties, the executive branch, and leg- demands have helped to foster the de- islatures. At the same time, think tanks velopment of independent public-policy operate in a variety of political systems, organizations, or think tanks.6 meaning their organizational forms and roles vis-à-vis political powers can dif- The 2012 Global “Go-To Think Tanks” fer. In this sense, the global presence Index shows the proliferation of think of think tanks in itself does not mean tanks around the globe.7 Although North that most countries have a marketplace America and Western Europe dominate of ideas like the United States. Although with 59 percent of the world’s 6,300 the majority of think tanks aim at pro- think tanks, the report suggests that ducing quality research and ultimately other regions are catching up. Among seek to influence public policy, the ways non-Western regions, Asia has the larg- in which they engage the public and for- est number of think tanks, accounting mal governance institutions vary consid- for 19 percent of the global total. Broken erably. down by country, China has 428 think tanks (the second most in the world), In South Korea, as in many other coun- India has 261 (fourth), and Japan has tries, scientific planning of public poli- 108 (ninth), though all three trail well cies and democratization contributed to behind the top-ranked United States, the rise of think tanks. In fact, South with 1,815. Korea’s major think tanks were only established after the country’s rapid in- The rise of think tanks can be under- dustrialization, with the aim of assist- stood within the larger context of the ing the government’s policy planning. growing number of nonprofit organi- Democratization would likely have con- zations (NPOs) in the world. As policy tributed to the growth of private think researcher Lester Salamon has expres- tanks, but it is difficult to determine sively put it, the “associational revolu- how many were built following the 1987 tion” in the last quarter of the twentieth democratic transition in South Korea. century—aided by the information revolution, democratization, and globaliza- Weaver and McGann divide think tanks

About the East Asia Institute

The East Asia Institute (EAI) was established in 2002 as an independent think- tank dedicated to developing ideas and formulating policy recommendations on the main challenges facing the region. Based in Seoul, South Korea, EAI strives to transform East Asia into a society of nations based on liberal democracy, market economy, open society, and peace. To this end, EAI works to promote liberal values and ideas, including diversity, tolerance, accountability, and transparency, through research, education, and international exchange. EAI was established to pursue and develop innovative and fresh ideas and is rooted in the belief that knowledge and good ideas can change the world.

EAI seeks to achieve its goals by creating influential publications that result from the hosting of scholarly seminars, forums, and education programs. EAI conducts research activities through two main programs: foreign affairs and security and governance research. Working together with recognized scholars and leading policymakers, EAI seeks to lead the way in forming a true knowledge-network community in Northeast Asia by setting up a system of joint research and scholarly exchanges in the U.S., China, and Taiwan, as well as many other countries.

88 T h e E x p e r i e n c e o f S o u t h K o r e a ’ s E a s t A s i a I n s t i t u t e into four types: academic (university) tank that researches economic policy is- think tanks, for-profit contract research- sues concerning Korea in both system- ers, advocacy think tanks related to in- atic and applicable ways, and assists the terest groups, and those that represent government in formulating the ‘Five-Year the research arms of political parties.9 Economic Development Plans’ and relat- In Northeast Asia, advocacy think tanks ed policies.”11 The Institute is funded by dedicated to winning the war of ideas the Economic Ministry and has changed are rare, and party think tanks tend to its official title over the years. Local be relatively new, weak, and not very governments have also established their influential. The Youido Institute was the own think tanks. The Seoul Metropoli- first think tank created by a political tan Government formed the Seoul De- party. It was founded in 1995 to improve velopment Institute in 1992 to respond the policies and strategies of the Grand to various urban challenges facing the National Party, South Korea’s main con- capital. The Gyeonggi Provincial Govern- servative party. The Democratic Party, ment founded a think tank in 1995, and the leading progressive party, reconsti- other local authorities followed suit. tuted its advisory organization as the Institute for Democracy and Policies in In order to cultivate research autonomy 2008. Most political parties established and encourage revenue activities, the think tanks after a 2004 revision of the Korean government passed the Act on Political Party Law required them to do Foundation, Management, and Growth so with government subsidies. The pur- of Government-Financed Research In- pose of the legislation was to encourage stitutes in 1999. Centers dealing with political parties to develop better policy science, technology, economic, social, platforms. and humanities policies were created under the Prime Minister’s Office with As public-policy scholar Makiko Ueno the aim of reducing redundant research observes, the majority of think tanks in and facilitating interministerial policy Northeast Asia (China, Japan, South Ko- research. Currently, there are two cen- rea, and Taiwan) are affiliated with or ters coordinating national think tanks: have strong ties to government minis- the National Research Council for Eco- tries or higher education institutions.10 nomics, Humanities, and Social Sci- I divide think tanks in South Korea into ences (NRCS) for twenty-three related the following three categories based on national think tanks, and the Korea Re- their funding source: public think tanks search Council for Industrial Science and established and funded by the govern- Technology (ISTK) for thirteen national ment, profit-seeking think tanks creat- think tanks. The country’s national think ed by big business, and nonprofit think tanks maintain an arms-length relation- tanks, including those affiliated with ship with each government ministry in universities and civic movements. choosing policy agendas and promoting specific public policies. The Ministry of Public think tanks in South Korea are Knowledge Economy and the Ministry large institutions created and funded of Education, Science, and Technology by the central and local governments. fund a greater number of national think Those formed by the central government tanks than other ministries. In terms will be referred to hereafter as “national of annual expenses and number of ex- thinks tanks.” Most were founded in the perts, Korea’s national think tanks are 1970s and 1980s based on a specific act quite large when compared with those to financially support and monitor them. in the West. Table 1 shows the scale of For example, the Korean Development the major national think tanks’ annual Institute (KDI), the most famous and expenses, with revenues from govern- oldest national think tank, was founded ment funding and other sources, and the in 1971 following the promulgation of main government ministry with which a law to that end in the previous year. they work. KDI’s website states that it was founded “in recognition of the need for a think South Korea’s conglomerates also began

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Table 1: Major National Think Tanks in South Korea

1. Korea Development Institute Ministry of Knowledge Economy $62,452,210 (69%) / KDI 2. Korea Energy Economics Institute Ministry of Knowledge Economy $27,703,486 (31%) / KEEI 3. Korea Environment Institute Ministry of Environment $22,953,897 (50%) / KEI 4. Korea Information Society Ministry of Knowledge Economy $24,448,577 (24%) Development Institute / KISDI 5. Korea Institute for Curriculum Ministry of Education, Science, and $123,632,904 (22%) and Evaluation / KICE Technology 6. Korea Institute for Health and Ministry of Health and Welfare $25,352,478 (54%) Social Affairs / KIHASA 7. Korea Institute for Industrial Ministry of Knowledge Economy $21,451,432 (62%) Economics and Trade / KIET 8. Korea Institute for International Ministry of Strategy and Finance $27,007,179 (72%) Economic Policy / KIEP 9. Korea Institute for National Ministry of Unification $10,418,649 (82%) Unification / KINU 10. Korea Institute of Public Ministry of Public Administration $10,836,433 (75%) Administration / KIPA and Security 11. Korea Institute of Public Finance Ministry of Strategy and Finance $19,285,529 (83%) KIPF 12. Korea Labor Institute / KLI Ministry of Employment and Labor $14,138,050 (78%) 13. Korea Legislation Research Ministry of Justice $9,403,166 (72%) Institute / KLRI 14. Korea Maritime Institute / KMI Ministry of Land Transport and $26,694,923 (42%) Maritime Affairs /Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 15. Korea Research Institute for Ministry of Land Transport and $34,642,332 (45%) Human Settlements / KRIHS Maritime Affairs 16. Korea Research Institute for Ministry of Education, Science, and $30,918,606 (47%) Vocational Education and Technology Training / KRIVET 17. Korea Rural Economic Institute Ministry for Food, Agriculture, $27,270,997 (47%) / KREI Forestry, and Fisheries 18. Korea Transport Institute / KOTI Ministry of Land Transport and $33,798,979 (27%) Maritime Affairs 19. Korean Educational Ministry of Education, Science, and $29,385,866 (42%) Development Institute / KEDI Technology 20. Korean Institute of Criminology Ministry of Justice $7,934,435 (86%) / KIC 21. Korean Women’s Development Ministry of Gender Equality and $13,419,254 (75%) Institute / KWDI Family 22. National Youth Policy Institute Ministry of Gender Equality and $7,881,671 (73%) / NYPI Family 23. Science and Technology Policy Ministry of Education, Science, and $14,864,631 (61%) Institute / STEPI Technology * The numbers in parentheses refer to the share of governmental funding in the organization’s total expenditure. Dollar amounts are based on a 2010 conversion rate of 1,156.1 won per U.S. dollar.12

to establish think tanks. The Samsung POSCO Research Institute (POSRI) was Economic Research Institute (SERI) was established in 1994, nine years after the created in 1986, and the Hyundai Re- Pohang Steel Company built its own tech- search Institute was also founded. The nical research institute. These private

90 T h e E x p e r i e n c e o f S o u t h K o r e a ’ s E a s t A s i a I n s t i t u t e think tanks are funded by their business when it was founded. Some civic move- groups and primarily study economic ment organizations also created think trends and related topics. They dissemi- tanks. The Hope Institute was formed by nate information and engage in consult- civic movement leaders in 2005 with the ing or educating business personnel and mission of providing alternative public ordinary citizens. These major private policies on topics like small businesses think tanks are interested in promoting and the environment, and helping the business interests, and their research is development of rural and local commu- often customized to meet the demands nities. News media, in particular several of their donor conglomerates. Although newspaper companies, have set up in- some programs are dedicated to cor- house think tanks, though their impact porate social responsibility, they rarely is very limited. Many NPO think tanks engage in framing public policy, other are in essence run by an individual with than through the narrow scope of indust- a limited number of staff. They tend to rial or business inquiries. It is difficult to be ephemeral and rarely noticed by the ascertain their revenue sources and ex- Korean public. The biggest challenge for penditures due to lack of transparency NPO think tanks is gathering enough fi- in their finances and nancing to maintain management. SERI’s staff and operate annual budget equals South Korea’s major programs, as they that of the Korea In- think tanks were face a tough and stitute for Curricu- competitive environ- lum and Evaluation only established after ment for fundraising (KICE), the largest the country’s rapid activities. national think tank in terms of expenditure industrialization, with The establishment (see Table 1). the aim of assisting the of more NPO think government’s policy tanks is certainly de- There are only a few sirable as a means independent nongov- planning. of capacity building ernmental and NPO in the civic sector think tanks in South and promoting more Korea. They tend to be fairly small and democratic governance in South Korea.13 are usually connected with higher edu- However, the think tank environment of cation institutions. University-affiliated South Korea makes it difficult for them think tanks are more oriented toward to survive. Unlike their government- and academic research even when conduct- conglomerate-funded counterparts, NPO ing policy studies, and are often isolat- think tanks are in a desperate struggle ed within the academic community and for funding. There are two basic types of lack full-time researchers. Notable think grant-making foundations that can fund tanks in this category are the Asiatic the work of NPO think tanks. Govern- Research Institute at Korea University, ment foundations, such as the National the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Research Foundation, distribute large Kyungnam University, the Institute of grants for research, but to academic East and West Studies at Yonsei Univer- institutions rather than independent sity, and the Center for Social Sciences think tanks. Private foundations tend at Seoul National University. Among non- to be more focused on student scholar- profit think tanks that are not affiliated ships and other philanthropic activities. with universities, the Sejong Institute is Therefore, it is very difficult for NPO the largest and oldest. It has its own en- think tanks outside universities to find dowment and foundation. However, the financial resources. This funding issue is Blue House (South Korea’s presidency) one of the main reasons why there are and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not many NPO think tanks in South Ko- Trade have influence on the selection of rea. its board members and chairman due to the legacy of government intervention

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The East Asia Institute’s Growth summer 2011, 236 students had partici- The East Asia Institute (EAI) was found- pated in this program. ed in 2002 by Korea University professor Kim Byung-kook. While it began with a The rapid growth of EAI relies on four handful of staff members, EAI has grown strategies. The first is proactive exter- rapidly, doubling its expenditures and in- nal project financing. With a small- en creasing its endowment sevenfold. The dowment of US$2 million, EAI has to number of full-time staff with master’s mobilize funding to meet an almost and doctoral degrees has increased to equal amount of annual expenditure. fifteen. EAI has also built a strong repu- In 2011, roughly 70 percent of expend- tation at home and abroad. It has been itures were composed of research fund- ranked either fifth or seventh among ing from outside institutions or individu- foreign-policy think thanks in South Ko- als. With a very competitive funding rea by the daily newspaper Hankyung. It environment for NPO think tanks at was also recognized home, EAI has been as twelfth among looking to overseas Asian think tanks in institutions to raise the 2010 Global “Go- The biggest challenge funds for research and To Think Tanks” In- other programs. Cur- dex.14 EAI’s research for non-profit think rently, the MacArthur programs are carried tanks is gathering Foundation, based out by six centers: in Chicago, sup- the Center for Public enough financing to ports EAI’s Asia Se- Opinion Research, the curity Initiative Pro- Asia Security Initia- maintain staff and gram. Other research tive Center, the Cen- operate programs, funds come from the ter for China Studies, government, news- the Center for Japan as they face a tough paper companies, and Studies, and the Cen- some domestic grant- ter for Values and and competitive making organiza- Ethics. More routine environment for tions. Government or ad hoc research projects have been panels are created to fundraising activities. limited, however. examine specific -is Among programs sues and challenges. other than research, Around one hundred the Luce Found- scholars participate ation in New York has in EAI’s network for supported the Jour- various research projects. EAI’s strength nal of East Asian Studies. The Chang also lies in its capacity to produce and Ching Kuo Foundation and the Japan disseminate public opinion surveys. Foundation are both supporting the EAI Cross-national surveys are carried out in Fellowship program, together with YBM, collaboration with a diverse range of in- a South Korean educational company. ternational partners, such as the British The Samyang Company, another Kore- Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the an firm, supports EAI’s essay competi- Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The tion for students. In order to stabilize Institute hosts conferences and round- individual contributions, a group called tables with experts under the names Deseo was created to bring together Smart Talk, InfraVision, and Global Net prominent business figures to support 21. Its EAI Fellowship program draws EAI. Its members and other individu- scholars based in Asia, Europe, and als contribute about 20 percent of the North America every year. Academically, Institute’s annual expenditure. This pro- the EAI publishes the Journal of East active search for varied funding sources Asian Studies and thematic books and has been quite successful. However, the reports, and offers internships to col- heavy reliance on outside funding results lege students at home and abroad. As of in financial insecurity, and the Institute

92 T h e E x p e r i e n c e o f S o u t h K o r e a ’ s E a s t A s i a I n s t i t u t e is attempting to increase its endowment al scholars is one example of this strat- to facilitate sustainable growth. egy. Engaging in cross-national opinion surveys with overseas think tanks and The second strategy is utilizing research media outlets is another. networks of nonresident scholars. With a limited budget, EAI is unable to host The fourth and final strategy is innova- a large number of experts. Instead, it tive dissemination. Effective dissem- has reached out to external scholars, ination of research products is a re- most of whom are teaching at leading quirement for any think tank that wants universities in South Korea. Indepen- to have major impact. EAI is a front- dent research carried out by EAI’s in- runner among South Korean think tanks house staff has been limited mainly to in electronically disseminating research opinion research. This network-based products. The twenty-first century idea approach is useful, as it allows the market is globalized and moves at a rap- Institute to target a group of distin- id pace. Naturally, an English-language guished experts according to a spec- website with readable content is critical ific research topic. Every year, ten to for interacting with experts around the twelve groups of scholars carry out re- world. EAI has benchmarked the web- search projects. The opportunity to col- sites of renowned global think tanks in laborate with other leading academics in order to follow international standards their field is a major incentive for schol- and qualities. Distribution via e-mail ars to participate. The leadership of a lists and social-networking services like senior scholar who can convene col- Twitter has also been introduced. Creat- leagues and coordinate collaborative ing extensive English-language content research is a key to the success of such is challenging, since much of the origi- projects. Since scholar networks operate nal research output is in Korean. EAI’s voluntarily, personal ties and mutual re- staff translates these Korean texts into spect play an important role in sustain- English to expose them to a wider glob- ing these networks. al audience. A Chinese version of the website was recently developed, with The third strategy is active internation- Chinese translations of several research al networking. Most public think tanks products. in South Korea are government funded and therefore have a principal-agency EAI’s Efforts to Translate Research relationship with a particular ministry. into Policies For NPO think tanks, with no principal Think tanks collect, synthesize, and cre- or official customer for policy research, ate a range of information products, establishing a reputation is a very dif- often directed at a political and academ- ficult challenge. International attention ic audience, but also sometimes for the is often effective in attracting more fo- benefit of the media, interest groups, cus from the policy community within business circles, international civil soci- South Korea. As a latecomer in South ety, and the general public of a nation.15 Korea, EAI has looked out to the larger Producing research for the government world and tried to develop networks with or the legislature is a more direct path international think tanks and institutions for translating policy ideas into public as well as individual scholars and ex- policies, and it can be difficult to - de perts. Rather than competing at home, termine whether think tanks have had where the idea market is very much influence on policy changes when they compartmentalized between agent think take the indirect path of informing the tanks and funding principals, many of general public or interest groups. One EAI’s activities have focused on operat- could argue that merely shaping pub- ing outside of the country and drawing lic opinion with no consequential policy international attention to South Korea. changes should be considered a major Publishing the Social Sciences Citation contribution by think tanks. All think Index–accredited Journal of East Asian tanks are aimed at influencing public Studies through networks of internation- policies directly or indirectly, but they

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are more sensitive to their own influence Translating ideas into public policies is on the government, the media, and civil particularly difficult for NPO think tanks, society. which do not have a principal government office that commissions specific Think tanks in South Korea tend to di- research projects. Accordingly, NPO rect their products to the relevant gov- think tanks are more willing to partici- ernment department. Under the legacy pate in the hot issues of public debate. of the “developmental state,” in which With organizational and financial inde- the government has played a strong role pendence from the government, their in both assisting and regulating busi- output is likely to be bolder and even ness and society, it is natural for South critical of contemporary government Korean think tanks to harmonize their policies. Preserving intellectual auto- policy interests with those of specific nomy from the government and parti- public officials in order to gain policy san politics is desirable for NPO think influence. At the same time, the- phe tanks as they seek to maintain their nomenal development of internet-based credibility and influence in civil society. communication has driven an increase in At the same time, NPO think tanks need the provision of information and policy to have some kind of engagement with ideas to the media and the general pub- government to influence policies. There- lic. Demand for think tank ideas among fore, they try to strike a delicate balance both the public and the private sectors between dependence on government has grown. and total isolation from it.16

The policy-making process has become EAI is a nonpartisan NPO think tank. It increasingly complex to meet external does not receive regular financial con- demand and global standards. Techno- tributions from governments or political logical convergence and market integra- parties. On occasion, the central and tion are driving forces in this process. local governments have commissioned Internally, there is also a greater need research projects related to public- for more customized policy responses policy issues. Although the portion is to satisfy increasingly fragmented and small when compared with the total diverse social groups. With these chang- annual research output, some research es in the policy-making environment, commissioned by the government is the South Korean government has ident- important to have an impact. For ified the need to tap into the expertise of example, a three-year research pro- think tanks for the sake of more effect- ject on South Korea’s mid-term foreign ive and efficient public policies. policy is an effort to help the Foreign Ministry with its overall policy goals and Translating ideas into policies may be strategies over the next five years. In easier for government-funded national this project, public officials participate think tanks, since their research is more regularly in seminars to exchange views readily adopted by the government and discuss ideas suggested by experts. bureaucracy due to their principal- Aside from projects commissioned by agency relations. The policy ideas these the government, EAI seeks to main- think tanks submit are usually instru- tain interaction with government offi- mental to making selected policy goals cials and politicians to influence policy feasible. National think tanks essential- debates. They are frequently invited ly have an automatic path to influence to speak at seminars and conferences. decision makers. One could view this Dialogue between policy implement- relationship from a critical standpoint, ers and experts in the private sector is arguing that the think tanks are em- continuously undertaken, in addition ployed by the government as tools to to unilateral dissemination of EAI’s provide intellectual legitimization for research to officials and politicians. policies. In this sense, they would have little impact on the government. Finding concrete examples of the impact that EAI has made on policy is not

94 T h e E x p e r i e n c e o f S o u t h K o r e a ’ s E a s t A s i a I n s t i t u t e easy, since such causality is rarely clear. public officials. Tapping wisdom from For instance, many experts from EAI’s these experienced policy elites made research networks are advising the gov- the suggestions in the book more ernment as policy council members. persuasive. Whether some of the rec- They are also frequent contributors to ommendations were adopted by the new the media through columns on policy government is difficult to determine. issues. Therefore it is difficult to dis- However, Kim Byung-kook, who planned cern whether these “idea brokers” are this research project, was nominated as influencing public policies through EAI’s senior secretary on foreign affairs and research output or through their other security in the President’s Office, though activities. he himself was not a member of the transition team. Nevertheless, there are cases in which EAI’s influence is demonstrable, includ- A New Foreign-Policy Paradigm for ing the following: “Complex Diplomacy” Scholars belonging to EAI’s National Research on Presidential Transitions Security Panel, chaired by respected EAI has engaged in a great deal of senior scholar Ha Young-sun of Seoul research on democracy and good gov- National University, have coined the ernance in South Korea. Amid the pre- concept of a “complex diplomacy” as a sidential election campaign in late 2007, new paradigm for South Korea’s foreign the Institute launched a special research policy. International-relations literature project on a successful presidency in has emphasized the increasing role of South Korea. By delineating what a NGOs, multinational corporations, and president should and should not do dur- intergovernmental organizations in ing a transition, EAI tried to assist the international affairs, which have tradi- new administration that would be inaug- tionally been dominated by the world’s urated in late February 2008. Taking a governments. With increasing market bipartisan approach, EAI consulted key integration and institutional network- advisers who had participated in the ing across national boundaries, foreign- presidential transition teams of three policy issues are now addressed across past administrations. The study inte- bilateral, regional, and global levels of grated some theoretical concepts from interaction. In addition, the realm of political science literature with the foreign policy has been diversified from voices of experienced high-level govern- conventional security and trade poli- ment officials, and the results were pub- cies to nonconventional challenges such lished in December 2007 in the form of as development assistance, climate a book entitled Presidential Transitions change, energy security, science and in Korea. The new presidential transi- technology, and human rights. Multiple tion team set up after Lee Myung-bak’s actors, multilayered spaces, and the victory then requested the book and issues encompassed by foreign poli- debated its policy recommendations. cies increasingly require policy makers to view international affairs in a much There are two reasons why this book more complex way. EAI’s foreign-policy had an impact. First, there had been scholars argue that South Korea must very little research focused on the role adopt this way of thinking, as its future and tasks of a presidential transition success lies in proactive networking team. While many suggestions had been with the rest of the world, in addition to made on a successful presidency in the major powers such as the United States, past, they had not paid due attention to China, and Japan. the transition period, since it would not last longer than two months. Second, After several years of advocating a the book included vivid recollections and “complex diplomacy,” EAI has seen advice from participants in past trans- this notion become incorporated into ition teams. Many of them had served the thinking of the Foreign Ministry. new governments as high-ranking At his inaugural speech on 8 October

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2010, Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan results to a wide audience. described new foreign-policy strategies including “total diplomacy” for multiple It is difficult to analyze the causal actors and “complex diplomacy” for relationship between EAI’s opinion sur- issue contents, as well as “digital- veys and any policy changes. Still, the network diplomacy” and “soft-power main purpose of opinion surveys is to diplomacy.” Several EAI scholars also diagnose what the public wants regard- participated in a workshop with the ing contentious ideas and concerns. In Foreign Ministry to discuss new visions doing so, opinion surveys can also help and goals. And as noted above, EAI raise citizens’ awareness of public issues has been commissioned to carry out a and encourage their participation in the project on the government’s mid-term debate. For decision makers, opinion foreign policy. surveys can serve as reference points, so that politicians and government offi- In this case, the translation of EAI ideas cials are able to deliberate legal or policy into actual policy strategies can be said matters in the context of public prefer- to have occurred. There were many ences. In addition to these broader con- factors behind this success. Inviting key tributions, the distribution of opinion public officials to EAI and engaging in surveys via the media has the benefit of dialogue with them was very effect- promoting awareness of EAI itself. The ive. Another factor was the individual Institute is one of the most searched- involvement of scholars from EAI net- for think tanks on major internet por- works in advisory councils. Both individ- tals, and its survey results, such as the ual and organizational ties and institu- approval ratings of presidents and other tional research output can be important politicians, are often quoted. in creating policy impact. Lessons from EAI’s Experiences Opinion Survey Research EAI’s growth and performance have Both domestic and cross-national opin- been widely recognized at home and ion surveys are areas in which EAI has abroad. In an environment where gov- enjoyed a competitive edge over other ernment-funded think tanks dominate, think tanks in South Korea. Designing EAI has provided an alternative model opinion surveys on public issues and for NPO think tanks that have to oper- offering good analysis serve both deci- ate with limited resources. This model sion makers and civil society. EAI en- is based on active projective funding, gages in six or seven polling projects a network-based research, and proactive year, and in every election year an elect- international contacts. It is difficult to ion study panel is chaired by Profes- follow this example without a group of sor Lee Nae-young of Korea University. policy-minded scholars who are commit- Its accumulated data set is open to the ted to building an innovative institution public and contributes to both academic independent of both the government and policy studies of election and vot- and the universities to which they may ing behaviors. Other leading data sets individually belong. In order to man- include polling on institutional trust, na- age the nonresident scholar networks, tional identity, and national security. EAI has relied on able program officers and staff who conduct their work After polling, EAI has published opinion autonomously. The leadership of EAI briefings and sent them to politicians delegates most routine tasks to its staff, and public officials, in addition to post- focusing instead on strategic decisions ing them on the website. For the gen- such as funding and research planning. eral public, survey analyses are usually disseminated through newspapers. As a In order to translate research into poli- majority of polling is carried out in part- cies, EAI has tried to directly engage nership with major media companies, in dialogue with public officials and it is relatively easy to diffuse polling politicians, and reached out to decision

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makers and opinion leaders through the American Politics: The New Washington and active dissemination of research prod- the Rise of Think Tanks (New Haven: Yale ucts. EAI also places a high priority on University Press, 1993), viii, 1. providing information to civil society as 4. Ricci, The Transformation of American a way of educating and engaging citi- Politics, 22–25. zens on major public issues. Despite these efforts, it is still difficult to clearly 5. James A. Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think establish where research has had a poli- Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite cy impact. This is largely due to the fact (New York: The Free Press, 1991), xv. that the policy-making process is often a black box, with little public informa- 6. R. Kent Weaver and James G. McGann. tion on which individual or institution is “Think Tanks and Civil Societies in a Time of responsible for specific policy choices. In Change,” in James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver, eds., Think Tanks and Civil Societies: addition, it is impossible to separate the Catalysts for Ideas and Action (New Brunswick: contributions of EAI’s scholars from their Transaction Publishers, 2002), 2. other channels of influence. Neverthe- less, in several cases it is quite obvious 7. James G. McGann, The 2009 Global that the policy influence of individual “Go-To Think Tanks” Index (Philadelphia: experts would not have been possible Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, without EAI’s collaboration with the gov- University of Pennsylvania, 2010), http:// ernment and media. repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1001&context=think_tanks. Although EAI experiment has so far been 8. Lester M. Salamon, “The Rise of the very successful, it faces several chal- Nonprofit,”Foreign Affairs (July/August 1994). lenges in organizational sustainability. Financial dependence on external pro- 9. Weaver and McGann, “Think Tanks and Civil ject funding is one of the main concerns. Societies in a Time of Change,” 10–11. In order to stabilize an internal source of financing, EAI is searching for more 10. Makiko Ueno, “Northeast Asian Think philanthropic donations from individu- Tanks: Toward Building Capacity for More als. Moreover, most of EAI’s staff spends Democratic Societies,” in McGann and Weaver, eds., Think Tanks and Civil Societies, 221–41. much of their time on administrative tasks rather than direct production of 11. “About KDI: History, the 1970’s,” Korea research output. For the Institute to Development Institute, http://www.kdi.re.kr/ grow further, it will need to develop a kdi_eng/about/history70.jsp. research capacity made up of resident experts. This matter is of course related 12. “Field Listing: Exchange Rates,” CIA World to the need for stable funding. Fact Book, 2013. https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2076. html Endnotes 13. Won-taek Kang, In-hwi Park, and Hoon 1. Diane Stone, “Introduction: Think Tanks, Jiang, Possibilities of Korean Think Tanks [in Policy Advice and Governance,” in Diane Korean] (Seoul: Samsung Economic Research Stone and Andrew Denham, eds., Think Tank Institute, 2006). Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas (Manchester: Manchester University 14. James G. McGann, The 2010 Global Press, 2004), 2. “Go-To Think Tanks” Index (Philadelphia: Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, 2. Inderjeet Parmar, “Institutes of International University of Pennsylvania, 2011), http:// Affairs: Their Roles in Foreign Policy-Making, repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent. Opinion Mobilization and Unofficial Diplomacy,” cgi?article=1004&context=think_tanks. in Stone and Denham, eds., Think Tank Traditions, 29–30. 15. Stone, “Introduction,” 3. 3. David M. Ricci, The Transformation of 16. Stone, “Introduction,” 4.

ENHANCING THE POLICY IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY RESEARCH The Case of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Democratization Program

Özge Genç*

Part I: Civil Society and Research in the Turkish Political and Social Sphere TURKEY espite its ups and downs, Turkey is on a path of democratization from which there is no return. Capital: Ankara DCivil society is stronger, more vocal, more ac- Population: 74.89 million tive, and more demanding than it has ever been in the country’s history. It has become the engine of change Internet Penetration: behind political and social reforms, notwithstanding 42 percent certain limitations on its policy impact. And while there are still obstacles to freedom of expression, is- Press Freedom Status: sues that were until recently considered to be politi- Partly Free cally taboo are now discussed openly and critically. Political Rights and The quantity and quality of civil society work has in- Civil Liberties Status: creased substantially over the past decade. As Turkey Partly Free proceeds toward European Union (EU) membership, GDP per capita, PPP EU governance mechanisms that involve civil society (Current Int’l Dollars): in policy making have been introduced, and more EU $15,029 funds have become available for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Turkey.

Meanwhile, the number and variety of research-based policy organizations have also increased. While the majority of these institutions have focused on foreign policy, more are now working in the field of domestic politics and producing research and opinion on political reforms that Turkey must undertake for democratic institutionalization. The quest for reform in Turkey remains alive due to (a) the EU accession process, the related transposition of acquis communautaire into the national legislation, and its implementation; (b) Turkey’s commitments to the Council of Europe and its obligation to address the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), as it is the country with the highest number of violations under the European Convention on Human Rights; and (c) the inevitability of compliance with the universal criteria of democracy and the rule of law as part of Turkey’s pursuit of regional and international recognition and influence. In addition to these factors, as Turkish society inte- grates with the world, a growing portion of the population expects conformity with the normative values of democracy, respect for individuals, and a better quality of life.1

* Özge Genç is the Program Director of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation’s Democ- ratization Program.

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At the same time, there is restlessness at the policy level. In providing grants to and mistrust within society, as Turkey NGOs, external donors such as the EU, is unable to solve one of its most fund- the United Nations, and the World Bank amental problems—the Kurdish ques- have made involvement in policy mak- tion, which arises from the authoritar- ing a criterion for funding. Similarly, do- ian, nationalist, and monocultural ap- nor funding for public institutions made proach of the Turkish state. it compulsory for them to include civil society. This has resulted in a certain Some of Turkey’s research-based policy degree of interaction and exchange of organizations are sponsored by politi- knowledge and expertise between policy cal parties and their circles, attached to circles and NGOs. universities, or operated as branches of foreign think tanks. Others, such as The democratization process has also the Turkish Economic and Social Stud- provided more tools for realizing civil- ies Foundation (TESEV), are more de- society aims at a supranational level. pendent on external funding and receive These tools include petitions to the funding from a variety of sources, hav- European Court of Human Rights and ing been founded by business groups, engaging in advocacy efforts at the EU, academics, politicians, journalists or especially during the preparation of the retired bureaucrats.2 Institutions af- European Commission’s annual prog- filiated with political parties may- suf ress reports. Civil-society organizations fer from a lack of independence, while started to use international benchmarks university research institutes may have (such as the Copenhagen criteria, the to operate under the legal, institutional, European Convention on Human Rights, and ideological restrictions of the higher and other Council of Europe standards) education system in Turkey. However, in their advocacy work. The EU came to independent research institutes with the civil-society sphere with its own de- a variety of financial resources, espe- mocracy and human rights agenda that cially from international donors, enjoy provided a roadmap for NGOs in Turkey. more liberty, working according to pre- The union provided an invaluable incen- set foundational missions and visions. In tive and an “excuse” for certain reforms, TESEV’s case, a core mission is to sup- especially from 2002 through 2003, port reform movements based on the when the Turkish military was forced principles of democracy, equal citizen- out of the political scene and key steps ship, and human rights. were taken toward full civilian control. At the same time, the European hu- Democratization in Turkey has provided man rights framework, first utilized by a larger space for civil society to operate the Kurdish movement, has provided

About the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)

The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) is an independent nongovernmental think tank, analyzing social, political, and economic policy issues facing Turkey. Based in Istanbul, TESEV was founded in 1994 to serve as a bridge between academic research and the policy-making process in Turkey. TESEV’s programs focus on three key areas of policy research: democratization, foreign policy, and good governance.

By opening new channels for policy-oriented dialogue and research, TESEV aims to promote the role of civil society in the democratic process and seeks to share its research findings with the widest possible audience. To carry out this mission, TESEV organizes regular seminars and conferences, bringing together specialists and policymakers from Turkey and abroad to discuss issues of current concern. TESEV publications include project reports, books, pamphlets, policy watch briefings, and seminar proceedings aimed at a general readership.

100 T h e C a s e o f TESEV’ s D e m o c r at i z at i o n P ro g r a m a valuable arena for rights-based liti- solve these problems, and laying out the gation. Kurdish lawyers were able to international examples and benchmarks bring cases, especially those related to in a comparative way. the abuses and rights violations under the state of emergency in the 1990s, to As Turkey becomes more pluralistic, the the ECHR. Later, non-Muslim minorities public sphere is becoming more lively (the Armenian and Greek communities) and crowded with opinion leaders, ac- brought their own cases, especially on tivists, researchers, and journalists, as property issues, and Alevis filed free- well as print, visual, and social media dom of religion cases with the court. The and NGOs. However, in this enlarging judgments of the ECHR against Turkey “open society,” there is a tendency to have affected laws and practices in the produce opinion and ideas based solely country to some extent, as they are in- on impressions and political, socioeco- corporated into the national laws to pre- nomic, and ideological positioning, in- vent similar violations in the future. The stead of on neutral and analytical data. court therefore has been instrumental in Academic production in Turkey also has the reform of the Turkish legal system, its problems due to the authoritarian leading to changes on pretrial detention, and extremely bureaucratic structure trial procedures, freedom of expression, of the universities, as well as the domi- and freedoms of assembly and associa- nant nationalist and statist ideology of tion. Some of the court’s recent deci- the university administrations, which is sions are expected to lead to changes reflected in the work of likeminded re- in “propaganda for terrorism and terror- searchers and in self-censorship by the ist organization” charges, as well as the rest. Therefore, one can argue that the elimination of the statute of limitations political liberalization in Turkey runs the on crimes relating to torture. risk of backsliding as far as the quality and content of information is concerned. There is no doubt that the European Moreover, the new “public” does not framework plays an extremely critical necessarily represent minorities and dis- role in facilitating political reform and sidents—groups and individuals on the democratization in Turkey. However, one margins of political and civil society—as could say that the EU is less of an en- it is still dominated by socioeconomically gine for democratization in the country and culturally advantaged groups. at present. Turkish society has created its own internal dynamic for reform and The civil society sphere in which TESEV democratization. One can even argue operates has many problems, internal that the internal motivation of civil soci- and external. One cannot overlook these ety and its pressure on the Turkish gov- problems when assessing an organiza- ernment to continue with reforms have tion’s impact on public debate and policy almost rendered the EU benchmarks and making. First of all, not all civil-society incentives obsolete. Civil society and groups have equal access to the policy- minority groups in Turkey developed making process, and the communica- and went beyond the EU agenda, and tion channels (especially mainstream in some instances even started to criti- print and television media) are still not cize the EU framework (especially on the wide open to civil society groups. Sec- headscarf issue). ond, public institutions, governments, and opposition parties have very little The democracy research organizations contact with civil society at large and stand at the core of this active civil utilize its expertise at minimum levels. sphere by providing information, As stated in the 2012 EU progress re- reference tools, and platforms for port, the parliament’s efforts to achieve reaching democracy and reform goals. systematic consultation with civil society In the field of activism and advocacy and other stakeholders are very limited. for rights and liberties, there is a need Most of the policy actors have their own for data and research outlining the favored and closely allied civil society problems, formulating roadmaps to organizations, including research insti-

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tutions. gestions coming from civil society, it is apparent that many groups that stand One exception to this pattern has been out for their activism lack the necessary the latest constitutional drafting effort. skills when it comes to intervening with Turkey is now in the process of adopting politicians and decision makers.5 a new constitution, which is expected to imply a restructuring of its institutions Not all civil-society organizations play a and the reformulation of the relation- constructive role on the path to demo- ship between the state and citizens. The cratization. Turkey has a long history outdated 1982 constitution, which was of statist civil-society groups that nur- prepared by a military junta, is expected ture political conservatism and promote to be replaced with a document draft- the status quo, and even engage in allied by the Constitutional Reconciliation ances with antidemocratic forces. These Commission convened under Turkey’s organizations have at times been man- parliament, comprising representatives ipulated as a counterforce to elected from each of the political parties rep- parties. During military interventions in resented in the parliament. The Com- the democratization process, a number mission opened its doors to civil society of Turkish universities and civil-society organizations and enabled them to offer organizations have joined media outlets proposals based on their past and on- and the judiciary as key partners to the going work. This has been a unique op- military. Even in ordinary circumstanc- portunity for civil society organizations es, some civil-society groups—including in Turkey, especially those involved in those which are developing research and democracy research. The Commission, advocacy on critical issues like minority which started its work on October 19th, rights and the Kurdish question—can 2011, had met with forty-two political take nationalism, authoritarianism, and parties, universities, and various insti- “conditions specific to Turkey” as their tutions; thirty-nine professional asso- standards instead of universally accept- ciations and unions; and seventy-nine ed norms and benchmarks. civil society groups under three separate “subcommissions” as of the beginning However, one can say that there is a of May 2012.3 During the same period, certain degree of maturity in Turkey through its official website, e-mail, and with regard to civil-society actors. The postal mail, the Commission has re- state has historically silenced minorities, ceived input from about 64,000 people. journalists, and activists through insti- Of these, 440 were from civil society tutional, legal, and social mechanisms organizations. Some of the consultation that rely on broad definitions of (a) ter- on the new constitution has consisted rorism, in an infamous antiterrorism law of initiatives conveying the opinions of dating back to 1991; (b) the indivisibil- wide segments of society.4 However, the ity of the state, in the 1982 constitution; parliament has not engaged in an ana- and (c) criminal offenses, in the penal lytical evaluation of these contributions code.6 Collective and individual disem- to date. As of May 2012, the political powerment and suppression of minori- party representatives were still discuss- ties have created a deep distrust among ing the most contentious issues of the dissidents toward state institutions such new constitution. But as it is described as the judiciary, the military, and the in the media, the debate is most often police. For these groups, the only option shaped by the “red lines” and habitual was to unite under and collaborate with- limitations of the political parties, in- in a civil society framework, as forming stead of the data collected from civil so- a political party and securing repre- ciety organizations. It is apparent that sentation in the parliament by passing the views of citizens are not reflected in the 10 percent electoral threshold has the Commission’s work. This may lead proven difficult. Civil society was their to a lack of public confidence in the pro- only means for access to citizenship. cess, which could render it a failure. On Consequently, Turkey has been home the other hand, upon review of the sug- to a fairly advanced feminist movement

102 T h e C a s e o f TESEV’ s D e m o c r at i z at i o n P ro g r a m since the 1970s, a Kurdish movement Part II: TESEV’s Democratization since the late 1980s, and a variety of Program as a Democratic Research other groups representing gay men and Institute lesbians, headscarved women, Alevis, TESEV’s Democratization Program (DP) and politically active trade unions and offers research-based analysis and pol- professional associations. icy suggestions in order to assist the strengthening of a civil, pluralist politi- These organizations operate within cal system and counteract the effects of a highly polarized political and social a hierarchical type of modernization, a sphere. The long-standing ideological history of coups d’état, and an authori- polarization in Turkey hampers demo- tarian administrative structure.7 In ad- cratization in general, and more spe- dition to defending the growing author- cifically the production of dispassion- ity of the parliament on the basis of ate and constructive knowledge that democratic elections, TESEV DP aims to could eventually have a policy impact. develop the organs and channels neces- It prevents a holistic approach to human sary to increase the participation of citi- rights, instead promoting a hierarchy zens, organized social movements, and among rights-seeking civil society organiza- groups. Each group tends tions in decision-making to place its own goals at Turkey has a long processes. the center of the debate and ignore or oppose history of statist In recent years, the similar campaigns by civil-society groups program has con- other groups. Polariza- that nurture political tributed to the de- tion also creates closed velopment of demo- communities (secular- conservatism and cratic politics by plac- ist, religious, progovern- promote the status ing taboo topics on the ment, antigovernment, public agenda, such as promilitary, and the like) quo, and even engage judicial reform; security- that position themselves in alliances with sector reform; the Kurd- and produce knowledge antidemocratic forces. ish question; minority according to their ideo- rights and constitutional logical affiliations. citizenship; the relationship between religion, In such an environment, democratic state, and society; and media and de- research institutes like TESEV play a mocracy. The studies on these topics vital role in producing information on the have been designed to support one an- basis of academic and analytical work, other, creating the possibility of a holis- and by engaging actors with different tic approach to political and social prob- positions on a given issue in the course lems that need to be solved as part of of the research. The information is ulti- Turkey’s democratization. mately translated into policy suggestions and advocated in policy circles. TESEV’s One of the primary aims of TESEV’s DP clearly defined mission is not to function activities is to involve and influence like an opposition political party or activ- the policy-making process in Turkey. ist organization, but to support the pol- The program is widely perceived as an icy-making process and put pressure on independent, nonpartisan, and impar- decision makers through research and tial organization that produces reliable advocacy. While the research often con- research with strong academic creden- tributes to the academic literature, the tials. As a result, the publications of TE- foremost goal is to advance democratic SEV’s DP are regularly followed by policy reforms by providing the relevant actors makers, and its events and conferences in the government and bureaucracy with are attended by government represen- specific and technical information and by tatives, members of parliament, and bu- bringing them together with civil society reaucrats. members from across a broad spectrum.

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Because the formal mechanisms for share the outputs of its monitoring pro- accessing policy makers—such as ad- ject. vising them through consultancy or participating in parliamentary committees— On some occasions, TESEV’s DP has a remain weak, think tanks and NGOs are more formal involvement in the policy- left with more modest means of influ- making process by contributing to leg- encing the policy-making process. The islation. TESEV’s DP has been asked on most common and effective strategy several occasions since 2004 to com- employed by TESEV’s DP is to release ment on the various drafts concerning reports aimed at a broader public-policy the Law on Foundations, with a view audience. The publications of TESEV’s to addressing the specific property and DP are utilized by state bodies such self-management issues of non-Muslim as the offices of the president and the communities. A similar advisory role prime minister; the Ministry of Foreign was requested in the context of the Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the government’s “Democratic Opening” ini- Ministry of Interior; the parliamentary tiative, aimed at addressing the Kurd- committees for the constitution, justice, ish question. A former interior minister, and human rights inquiry; and the Con- who was tasked with coordinating the stitutional Reconciliation Commission. project, organized consultations with think-tank representatives, and TESEV’s Another effective strategy used by DP made acknowledged contributions in TESEV’s DP is to enter into direct re- the form of policy reports that provided lationships with policy actors. TESEV’s political and social guidelines for a solu- DP staff can easily access state bodies tion.8 TESEV and its different programs and bureaucrats for advocacy or re- have more recently undertaken several search purposes. For example, in pre- studies linked to the new constitutional paring a report on the headscarf ban in drafting process. First, TESEV’s 2011 2011, TESEV’s DP researchers conducted study Towards Turkey’s New Constitu- bilateral meetings with the minister of tion includes recommendations to the state for women and family issues; the parliament and policy makers on crucial heads of the parliamentary committees issues such as the preamble and prelim- on human rights, justice, the constitu- inary articles, fundamental aims and du- tion, and equal opportunity for women ties of the state, citizenship and cultural and men; and lawmakers from the Peace rights, rule of law, separation of powers, and Democracy Party (BDP), the Demo- freedom of conscience and religion, and cratic Left Party (DSP), and the ruling decentralization and local government.9 Justice and Development Party (AKP). The recommendations were uploaded to In a similar vein, in 2010 TESEV repre- and shortly after removed from a parlia- sentatives had the opportunity to meet mentary webpage on the new constitu- with the justice minister and his subor- tion that collects the views and demands dinates to discuss the ministry’s Judicial of organized initiatives and the public at Reform Strategy and the overall prob- large.10 TESEV’s DP also prepared mon- lems regarding the judiciary in Turkey. itoring reports on the new constitutional At a workshop organized in Ankara in process. June 2010, TESEV’s DP brought together bureaucrats from the ministry, members Two important issues currently being of the high courts, representatives of a tackled by TESEV are of utmost impor- professional organization of judges and tance to democratization and the EU prosecutors (Demokrat Yargı, or Demo- accession process in Turkey: judicial re- cratic Judiciary), and academics to dis- form and constitutional reform. A closer cuss the findings and policy proposals examination of these study areas will contained in its report on constitutional help illustrate TESEV’s policy impact and amendments. TESEV’s DP has also had opportunities for future influence. several meetings with the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission to gather in- Judicial Reform formation on the drafting process and The current judicial apparatus in Turkey

103 T h e C a s e o f TESEV’ s D e m o c r at i z at i o n P ro g r a m does not provide citizens with funda- These proposals were channeled into mental rights, and its structural gover- the concluding remarks of the report. nance does not conform to democratic The roundtable meeting helped to ad- principles. TESEV’s DP analyzes the dress the lack of adequate dialogue be- reform policies carried out by judicial tween legal and political communities in officials as part of the EU integration Turkey, which is necessary for the sus- process, and it aims to intervene and tainability of the judicial reform process. reshape such processes by opening up The report was distributed widely in the issue to public discussion. Accord- Ankara and opened to discussion at a ingly, workshops and conferences are press conference. being organized by TESEV’s DP, and its research products are being submitted As part of the judiciary study area, to the interested parties in the form of TESEV’s DP has also been working on policy reports and bulletins. human rights litigation in Turkey. It has monitored and raised public awareness The program takes the issues in the of critical court cases, brought together Justice Ministry’s 2009 Judicial Reform human rights lawyers and defenders to Strategy and Judicial Reform Strategy develop common strategies for litiga- Action Plan as a reference in its work, tion, and liaised with the parliament to and seeks to push for the fulfillment of advocate legal reforms that would end Turkey’s commitment to align its judi- impunity by, for example, removing the cial mechanisms with EU norms.11 To statute of limitations for crimes against date, the effort has focused on the ar- humanity. TESEV’s DP closely scrutinizes eas of access to justice and fair trial pro- the conduct of public security officials cedures. TESEV’s DP also monitors who served under the state of emer- implementation of the constitutional gency in the Kurdish-majority regions amendments related to the judicial sys- in the 1990s and are now being tried in tem that were accepted in a referendum key cases. Since 2011, for example, it on September 12th, 2012. The program has followed the hearings of the Tem- edited opinions and recommendations izöz case, which concerns the alleged on the amendments by different law pro- actions—such as extrajudicial killings fessors, thereby supporting the changes of Kurdish civilians—of an illegal group and demanding further reforms. One of led by Colonel Cemal Temizöz and com- the changes adopted in the referendum posed of former Kurdish militants, vil- increased pluralism in the membership lage guards, and state informants. and structure of the High Council of Judges and Executives. To monitor the The ultimate aim of these activities is effects of this restructuring, TESEV’s DP not only to increase the capacity of the brought together different stakehold- human rights movement in Turkey, but ers—the president of the new council, also to help create a bottom-up move- members of the judicial professional or- ment for judicial reform through litiga- ganizations, and academics—in a round- tion. table and published the discussion min- utes as well as the points of consensus Constitutional Reform on further reforms at the council. The The AKP is now in its third term as the participants debated the extent to which ruling party, having committed to un- the new council had succeeded during dertake EU accession reforms a little the nearly eighteen months since the over a decade ago. The new government referendum in achieving the anticipated formed after the 12 June 2011 gener- results. A major accomplishment of the al elections is expected to replace the meeting was the fact that, despite their 1982 constitution, which was instituted political differences, the participants by a military junta. Meanwhile, EU inte- were able to pinpoint similar problems gration will still be on the agenda, and and develop common solutions for the the government has been in the process council in particular and the judiciary’s of harmonizing laws and regulations structure and functioning in general. with the EU acquis. There will now be

104 D e m o c r ac y T h i n k T a n k s i n A c t i o n

added urgency to revise laws and regu- actions are being recorded. lations in the spirit of the new constitution. Within this overarching reform The project includes a website that al- agenda, political parties as well as the lows the general public to follow the media, interest groups, and civil-society drafting process.13 Currently, the only organizations have a crucial role to play. other such resource is the website initiated by the parliament, and the informa- During the constitutional drafting pro- tion available there is not updated regu- cess, a variety of actors have flexed larly or prepared to give a day-to-day their muscles to exert civil society influ- account of the constitutional commis- ence on the new parliament and gov- sion’s agenda and progress. Moreover, ernment’s policy agenda. The wealth of the parliament removed the civil soci- information and ideas produced by civil ety views and recommendations sent or society organizations across Turkey, in- presented to the commission from its cluding TESEV’s own study,12 and the cit- website, citing “confidentiality.” TESEV’s izen sentiments already voiced at the lo- DP makes all of these reports, letters, cal level and in the periphery, need to be and presentations available to the public carefully scrutinized and communicated on its websites.14 to the parliament, the government, and the public at large. TESEV decided to The project expects to have built, clari- help meet these needs through intensive fied, and advocated policy positions on monitoring of policy makers, civil society the themes of the constitution debate in actors, and the media; stronger ties to order to feed the agenda of the govern- lawmakers who are in a position to draft ment and parliament. TESEV regularly and ratify the new constitution; and bet- reaches out to policy makers in Ankara ter engagement with mechanisms such and attempts to establish working re- as Constitutional Reconciliation Com- lations with lawmakers, parliamentary mission. committee members, staffers, consultants, ministers, ministerial cadres, With the opening of the new parliament journalists, and fellow civil society mem- in October 2011, TESEV’s DP started bers. It also seeks to act as a conduit to monitor the policies, behaviors, and between policy makers on the one hand performance of the key political and and civil society, community leaders, in- civil actors in the constitutional drafting terest group representatives, activists, process. These include political parties, academics, and students on the other. NGOs, social groups that are not necessarily assembled around NGOs (religious TESEV’s first monitoring report covered and ethnic minorities in particular), and the period from October 2011 to January media outlets. In the resulting monitor- 2012, and the second covered February ing reports (two have been published to June 2012. The latter period includes to date), TESEV’s DP pinpoints the ob- the establishment of the Constitutional stacles and opportunities posed by these Reconciliation Commission under the actors and regularly informs Turkish and parliament, which gathered contribu- foreign public opinion. The ultimate goal tions from citizens and social groups is to hold the political parties repre- and convened in May 2012 to begin sented in the parliament, the parliament drafting the articles of the new charter. itself, and the government accountable As a result of the decreasing public vis- for their preelection promises regarding ibility of the drafting process, TESEV’s a new constitution and other reforms. In DP also conducted a public survey to the meantime, the monitoring effort as- illuminate society’s expectations from a sesses the performance of civil society new constitution. The survey drew the and the extent to which it can influence attention of policy makers back to the the draft constitution. The project is ex- will of the people, and invited them to be pected to put pressure on all actors to responsive to society’s real needs and do their best throughout the process, demands. The results have attracted and maintain their awareness that their considerable media attention. The press

105 T h e C a s e o f TESEV’ s D e m o c r at i z at i o n P ro g r a m launch in Ankara brought together com- 3. All of the contributions are compiled mission members from each party, civil at Tesev’s Constitution Watch blog at society representatives, journalists, and http://anayasaizleme.org/index.php/ academics for a debate on the process.15 yenianayasaonerileri/

4. For details see Mehmet Uçum, Özge Genç, Future Challenges for TESEV’s and others, Making of a New Constitution in Democratization Program Turkey: Monitoring Report 2: February–June The problems facing civil society in Tur- 2012 (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2012). key, most of which are outlined in the first section above, are also the chal- 5. TESEV compiled civil society organizations’ lenges facing TESEV’s DP in particular. contributions and recommendations to the The most difficult problems are the ex- commission and made a critical analysis of the ternal risks related to the overall politi- points that are reconcilable and irreconcilable. cal climate, such as failures in Turkey’s 6. Dilek Kurban and Ceren Sözeri, Caught in EU accession process, a lack of politi- the Wheels of Power: The Political, Legal and cal will on the part of the government Economic Constraints on the Independent Media for undertaking reform, and the inabil- and Freedom of Speech in Turkey (Istanbul: ity of political parties to come to terms TESEV Publications, June 2012), 39–40. with the political, legal, and social steps that are necessary for reform. Project- 7. See the program’s page on the TESEV related challenges can include a lack of website at http://www.tesev.org.tr/en/ cooperation between NGOs and other program/democratization-program. stakeholders (especially politicians, 8. The outputs on the Kurdish question are media actors, and researchers) due to available on the TESEV website at http://www. political and ideological differences. tesev.org.tr/en/working-area/kurdish-question. In order to minimize this obstacle, TE- SEV’s DP seeks to establish good rela- 9. The study can be accessed on the TESEV tionships with the reformist members of website at http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/ the political parties and within the state Publication/341774d7-7e6f-4078-9149- bureaucracy. More internal challenges 445ede629d51/TESEV%20Report%20on%20 involve the functioning of TESEV itself, TR%20Constitution.pdf. and most importantly the availability of 10. The webpage is located at http:// funding for research activity. Like other yenianayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/. organizations, TESEV has been dealing with these challenges on a daily basis. 11. The Judicial Reform Strategy is available at The ever-changing strategies and tools http://www.sgb.adalet.gov.tr/yrs/Judicial%20 employed to overcome such obstacles Reform%20Strategy.pdf. The action plan is make civil society a dynamic and indis- available at http://www.sgb.adalet.gov.tr/yrs/ pensable actor in the process of political Reform%20Strategy%20Action%20Plan.pdf. and social change toward the ultimate 12. Mustafa Erdoğan and Serap Yazıcı, Towards goal of democratization. Turkey’s New Constitution (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, June 2011), available at www. Endnotes tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/341774d7- 7e6f-4078-9149-445ede629d51/TESEV%20 1. The results of a recent public survey Report%20on%20TR%20Constitution.pdf. offer critical analysis on the extent to which society is transforming and adapting itself to 13. The website can be found at universal norms and principles. See Anayasaya http://anayasaizleme.org and http:// Dair Tanım ve Beklentiler—Saha Araştırması turkeyconstitutionwatch.org. [Definitions and Expectations from a New Constitution—Public Survey] (Istanbul: TESEV 14. See http://anayasaizleme.org/ Publications, November 2012). yenianayasaonerileri/.

2. Şule Toktaş and Bülent Aras, “National 15. The survey report is available in Turkish Security Culture in Turkey: A Qualitative Study here: httpp://anayasaizleme.org/anket/. In on Think Tanks,” Bilig no. 61 (Spring 2012). English: http://turkeyconstitutionwatch.org/.

106 The Network of Democracy Research Institutes National Endowment for Democracy 1025 F Street NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20004 www.ndri.ned.org | www.NED.org