Notes 1 Introduction 1. Clinton became chair of the DLC in March 1990 at a time when he was already thinking about his chances of making a presidential bid in 1992. As Shafer notes, ‘The DLC chairmanship would provide him not only with a pre-packaged program but with organizational connections around the country’ (2000, p.13). 2. Al From, president of the Democratic Leadership Council, made the following reflections after a policy seminar in November 1997 which brought together government officials and policy analysts representing the New Democrats and New Labour. ‘The similarities between our movements are striking. Both were born out of frustration with repeated losses in national elections due to our parties’ far-left policies. Both aimed to build a majority coalition composed of those who are in the middle class and struggling to stay there, and those who aspire to get there. Both led our parties out of the political wilderness by offer- ing voters new, progressive ideas that rejected our parties’ recent excesses but remained true to our parties’ first principles’ (1997a, p.35). 3. See Kuttner and Dionne, 2000 for a discussion of the merits of the Clinton presidency. 2 Redefining the Democrats 1. It is important to be aware of potential terminological confusion here. The terms neo-conservative and also neo-liberal were commonly used in US political debate in the late 1970s and early 1980s to describe a breed of politician and political commentator who, for want of a better description, were ‘nearly’ conservative or ‘nearly’ liberal. For a fuller explanation of ‘neo-’ in this sense see Steinfels, 1979; Kondracke, 1982; Rothenberg, 1984; Dolbeare and Medcalf, 1988. What is important is not to confuse the labels when being used in this context with the neo-conservative and neo-liberal wings of New Right thought and ideology. 2. Carter had used the concept of the misery index to attack president Ford in the 1976 election. It was the aggregate of the unemployment rate and the inflation rate. 3. Towards the end of the 1988 presidential campaign in a desperate effort to revitalize his bid for the White House, Michael Dukakis changed his response to the taunt of Vice President Bush that he was a ‘liberal’. Rather than ignor- ing or denying the label, Dukakis protested that he was a liberal, but one in the mold of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy (Toner, 1988). This was an explicit attempt to associate himself with memories of the New Deal and the great names of the Democratic past while dissociating himself from the more recent New Politics tribunes of liberalism. 166 Notes 167 4. The 1984 Democratic primary had seen a clash over the nature of economic policy with Mondale cast as the New Dealer and Gary Hart as the champion of the ‘Atari’ economy. 5. Hale quotes DLC executive director Alvin From as saying of the organiza- tion’s early efforts through to 1988, ‘We were fine until the presidential nominating process got going in earnest, but then that process defines the party’ (Hale, 1995, p.218). 6. The Republicans of course followed the Democrats in introducing a binding primary system and they too have had some bitter campaigns. Notably, in 1992 and 1996, Pat Buchanan ruffled the feathers of Bush and Robert Dole. 7. An editorial in The New Republic commenting after Cuomo finally announced that he would not be running stated, ‘all Democrats – at least those who want to regain the White House – should realize that Cuomo’s non-candi- dacy is the best news they’ve had in years’ (The New Republic, 1992a, p.7). The same piece did reflect, however, that Cuomo might have helped Clinton steer his centrist ship. ironically, a Cuomo candidacy might have helped Clinton define himself against the old dogma of the Democratic party. With Cuomo out of the race, Clinton will be more tempted to usurp the middle ground, and appease the party’s left wing. Luckily, he still has Tom Harkin whose con- stituency is substantially the same as Cuomo’s. Defeating it in 1992, whether a Democrat regains the White House or not, is not just a prerequi- site for the Democratic Party’s renewal, but for the country’s as well (p.8). 8. See Baer, 2000, pp.194–7, on the help the DLC provided to the Clinton campaign. 9. The nomination campaign, of course, was about more than just ideology, as various events from Clinton’s past threatened to derail his bid. For the story of the primary battle and how Clinton survived early scares see Baker, 1993. 10. Party platform reprinted in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 18 July 1992, p.2107. 3 Clintonomics I 1. One problem was that $500 billion was too easily an identifiable figure to back away from without losing credibility especially after a public interven- tion by Alan Greenspan who reflected, ‘If the markets perceive that we are backing off the size of the commitment … I think that they will react appro- priately negatively … The $500 billion program is probably about the right size’ (quoted in Hager and Cloud, 1993c, p.1939). 2. Clinton had in fact asked that 85 percent of benefits be taxed, rather than 50 percent, for recipients with an income of over $25,000 for individuals and $32,000 for couples. Congress raised these income levels to $34,000 for individuals and $44,000 for couples. 3. Times–Mirror and Gallup polls featured in ‘Opinion Outlook’ in National Journal, 21 August 1993, p.2102. 4. This dispute over whether to use budget projections from the CBO or the OMB was something of an absurdity. In truth neither could be relied upon. 168 Notes For example, the final deficit for fiscal 1996, which ended on 30 September 1996, was $107 billion; yet in March the OMB projected a deficit of $154 bil- lion and in May the CBO one of $144 billion. Even in July and August when revised estimates were issued both still missed the figure by over 10 percent (Hager, 1997a). 5. 20 percent of respondents blamed both President and Congress. Polls in ‘Opinion Outlook’ in National Journal, 20 January 1996, p.142. 6. In exasperation Bush at one point during the campaign said that Clinton must be developing ‘straddle sores’ (Cloud, 1992, p.3711). 7. A Gallup poll in September 1993 showed respondents opposed to NAFTA by 41 percent to 35 percent. Asked whether they thought it would lead to more or less jobs in the US respondents overwhelmingly replied that it would result in job losses, by 67 to 22 percent (‘Opinion Outlook’ in National Jour- nal, 25 September 1993, p.2334). Another Gallup poll showed that while 59 percent thought that NAFTA would be good for US corporations and 55 percent for US consumers, 57 percent felt that it would damaging to US workers (‘Opinion Outlook’ in National Journal, 23 October 1993, p.2560). 8. According to Bob Woodward’s account, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen was worried for a short while that Clinton was going to abandon the NAFTA ship because of labor’s opposition. Thus in ‘a table-pounding’ speech Bentsen insisted that ‘it was absolutely imperative that [Clinton] show he was a strong leader, willing to fight. … to take on an interest group in his own party.’ Howard Paster, the White House’s congressional liaison officer is also reputed to have told the President, ‘If you abandon NAFTA, Mr. President, there goes New Democrat’ (Woodward, 1994, p.318). 9. This would in fact have been difficult on NAFTA where Clinton effectively inherited a done deal. 4 Clintonomics II 1. The $16 billion figure stayed within the overall budget cap for discretionary spending in fiscal year 1993 imposed by the 1990 balanced budget act. The shortfall in appropriations was actually in defence and foreign aid spending, and in order to transfer the money to a domestic area, without having to get a supermajority in congress, Clinton declared the matter an economic emergency. 2. In May 1993 a U.S. News and World Report poll found that 36 percent of respondents thought that the job creation proposals were the most impor- tant part of Clinton’s plan against 34 percent who thought that deficit reduction was (poll cited in ‘Opinion Outlook’ in National Journal, 26th June 1993, p.1670). In April an NBC–Wall Street Journal poll found that 44 per- cent believed unemployment to be the most important economic issue fac- ing the country compared with 28 percent who nominated the deficit. By September these numbers read 40 percent and 26 percent (polls in ‘Opinion Outlook’ in National Journal, 25th September 1993, p.2334). More specifi- cally, a Yankelovich poll for CNN–Time magazine asked, ‘Which do you think is more important – cutting the federal budget deficit, even if that does not improve the economy in the next year or two, or creating jobs and Notes 169 improving the economy, even if the budget deficit is not cut?’ In response 25 percent called for deficit reduction, while 68 percent favored an immediate boost for jobs and the economy (in ‘Opinion Outlook’ in National Journal, 24th July 1993, p.1891). For details of Gallup polls reinforcing this data see Weatherford and McDonnell, 1996, p.424. 3. Reich recounts how Stanley Greenberg had assembled a focus group to mon- itor reactions to Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union address. After the speech Greenberg told Reich of the highly favorable reaction to the sections about investment in education and training, ‘In fact, when the President said he wanted to move from an unemployment insurance system to a re-employ- ment system, the meter went ballistic’ (1998, p.150).