Chapter 1 – The Prelude On the morning of February 28, 1993, seventy-six armed agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) attempted to serve a search warrant using a "dynamic entry" against Vernon Wayne Howell (who legally changed his name to David Koresh in 1990) for suspected weapons violations. The agents arrived under the cover of cattle trailers, and bailed out in force in front of the Mount Carmel Center, the residence and worship facilities of the group that has come to be known as the Branch Davidians. Although accounts of who fired first are conflicting, a gun battle ensued which left four BATF agents dead and twenty wounded, six Branch Davidians dead and four wounded. David Koresh was shot in the arm and stomach. As a result of the gunfight, the BATF was unable to conduct its search, and a protracted siege ensued. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrived on February 29 with its Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and took over the operation, treating it as a "Complex Hostage/Barricade Rescue" situation. The "rescue" lasted for fifty-one days, when at six a.m., on April 19, 1993, FBI agents began inserting CS tear gas into Mt. Carmel through booms protruding from M-60 tanks and with Bradley Fighting Vehicles firing "ferret rounds" through windows. At around twelve noon, smoke was observed coming from windows in the Mt. Carmel center, and by twelve-forty, the structure was completely engulfed in flames. Seventy-four Branch Davidians lost their lives in the fire, including twenty-one children. When the initial February 28 raid occurred, Branch Davidian Wayne Martin, a Harvard educated attorney, called the local sheriff's department using "911." The discussions began with Lieutenant Larry Lynch of the sheriff's department and were continued by Jim Cavanaugh of the BATF. These conversations were recorded on audiotapes and later were transcribed into typed form. When the FBI took control, they set up a negotiation center at the McLennan County Airport, and conversed by telephone with the inhabitants of Mt. Carmel over the next fifty-one days. The FBI also recorded these negotiations and subsequently transcribed them in typed form. According to the FBI in the Justice Department Report on Waco, negotiators spoke by telephone with over fifty individuals in Mt. Carmel, for over 200 hours. The transcripts of these conversations were withheld from the public until August of 1995, when the trial of the surviving Davidians was over and the House of Representatives concluded its second set of hearings on "Operation Trojan Horse" as the siege was called. The transcripts of the negotiations conducted over the fifty-one days of the siege are the primary focus of this study. Importance of the Study There are two primary reasons for pursuing this course of study, one of them of practical and the other of theoretical importance. The basic practical rational is best summarized in the old adage, "Those who forget the mistakes of the past are bound to repeat them." No one has systematically explicated the “negotiations” that occurred over the fifty-one days. The government reports on the incident and the Congressional Hearings provide no detailed analysis of the negotiations or the negotiation process itself. Moreover, no academic exposition of the material has occurred either. However, as the year 2000 or "The Millennium" approaches, the potential for confrontations between alternative religious groups and Federal law enforcement will increase. Many groups are focused on eschatological religious writings, as were the Branch Davidians, and the year 2000 is prophetically important to their belief systems as ushering in a new era and possibly the "end of the world." There is also a rise in more secular anti- government sentiment, leading to the formation of numerous groups built around a variety of value based issues (taxes, guns, property rights, and so forth) that may lead to more confrontations, as the siege with the "Freemen" in Montana illustrated. Additionally, seventy-four people died in a fire while being ostensibly in “government custody,” and in constant contact with "government negotiators" throughout the 51 days. A thorough explication of the negotiations might provide an answer to the question, "What went wrong?" The more U.S. policy makers and law enforcement officials can understand what worked and what did not work in dealing with the people in Waco, the better able they will be to prevent fiery endings in the future. But the Waco incident also provides useful material of theoretical importance for communication scholars. The negotiations with the Branch Davidians created a unique rhetorical problem for the negotiators that at least initially they were ill-equipped to deal with. David Koresh told the negotiators that he was the “Lamb” spoken of in Revelation who was given the knowledge by God to unlock the "mysteries" of the Seven Seals that marked the “end of time” and ushered in God’s final judgment on the world. Koresh had agreed to leave Mt. Carmel with his followers if the FBI would play his one hour declamation of the Seven Seals on the radio. The message was played and 2 preparations were made on both sides for the Davidians to leave. As the Davidians, with coats on, were about to begin exiting the building, Koresh broke down with a "religious experience" in which he claimed to have received an “audible message from God” who told him to “wait.” Koresh and the other Davidians told the negotiators that they feared the wrath of God for disobedience of his "wait" edict more than they feared firepower of the FBI HRT. So the wait began. For the majority of the standoff, the negotiators had to try and talk “a prophet of God” and his followers out of their divinely sanctioned stronghold. On April 14, Koresh claimed to have received another message from God, when he was instructed to write down the interpretation of the Seven Seals and then surrender. However, decisions were made by the FBI to continually increase the pressure on those inside Mt. Carmel (cutting electricity and water, playing loud sounds and shining spot lights all night, having tanks "bump" the buildings, etc.) with the intention of causing the group to fracture and for Koresh to lose “control” over his “followers.” Arguably these pressure tactics not only failed, but had the opposite result of increasing both group cohesion and loyalty to Koresh. The pressure culminated in the tear gas attack, which resulted in the fiery deaths of the inhabitants. Several important theoretical questions are raised by this incident. Were some negotiation strategies more effective than others as measured in concessions on the part of the Davidians? How do those strategies comport with the behavioral science literature and recommendations on crisis negotiations? Which tactics employed stiffened the resolve of those inside to remain for a protracted period of time? Was there a potential solution to the standoff absent a final confrontation? Did ambiguities exist in the narrative scripts adopted by either side that would allow for a peaceful resolution? Is there any evidence that Koresh was serious in his promise to write his interpretation and then surrender, or was this simply a "stalling" tactic as the FBI claimed? Were the Davidians simply a group of "brainwashed" individuals who intended to commit suicide from the beginning? What happens in the "real world" when two worldviews collide into a showdown of faith versus force? What really occurred in negotiations between federal law enforcement and the Branch Davidians? These are some of the questions that this study hopes to provide more documented answers to based upon actual conversations between participants. 3 Review of Literature The relevant literature for this study falls into four categories, which are subdivided by type in the included bibliographies. 1). News stories of the siege that provide contextual material of the rhetorical situation, 2). both academic and popular works that provide information on the history and beliefs of the Mount Carmel Branch Davidians, 3). academic works concerning law enforcement hostage negotiations theory and practice in general, 4). academic works on the rhetoric and beliefs of apocalyptic groups in general. Academic works on the Waco negotiations also would be useful, but they do not exist at present. There was major press coverage of the Waco siege, both in print and on television. Much of the coverage originated with almost daily press briefings by the FBI at the Waco Convention center, and consequently there was extensive duplication in material in most of the newspaper accounts. In order to simplify the research burden, this study draws newspaper material from the New York Times, the paper of record for the United States. In addition, the Waco Tribune Herald also did extensive coverage of the group and the siege, and it is included where appropriate. Interestingly, its initial "Sinful Messiah" series has been charged with warning the Davidians that the BATF raid was imminent. Other press material, such as magazine, television, and popular book coverage, is incorporated where relevant and available. This material is relevant for contextual understanding, but is largely irrelevant for the actual analysis of the negotiation texts. Prior to the raid, there was a general lack of material about the history of the Branch Davidians. Few people even in Central Texas knew of the group’s existence, and only a handful of scholars had written about the group. Since the fire, several works have been written that provide useful material about the historical roots of the group and their doctrinal beliefs. One work of note is Why Waco?, by James Tabor, a professor of New Testament studies at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte.