I

ReportNo. 15 July 1992

The StrategicArms Reduction Treatyand Its Verification

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David B. Thomson .

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CNSS Center forNational SecurityStudies Los Alamos National Laboratory

DK3”l_F31f3wKJAJGF rHIS DUX!MENT IS UNLIMITED CNSSREPORTS

The followingis a selectionof thetitlesin theCNSS Reportscric.s

No. 1. A Model of the Deferxe of fund-Bawd Missi!eForces by a MultilayerAntimissile SysrembyRobertH. Kuppcrman,RobertW. Scldcn,andHarveyA. Smith,April 1987.

No.2. MonitoringSpaceWeaponry:DctectionandVerificationissuesbyPatrickJ.Garrity, RaymondA. Gore,RobertE. Pcndlcy,andJosephF.Pilat(LA-11278), April 1988.

No.3. UnitedStatesSpacePo/icy: ReviewandAssessmentbyPatrickJ.Garrity(LA-l 1181), June1988.

No.4. AchievingMutualDeterrencewithAc/iveDefensesby Robett1-1.Kuppcrman,Robert W. Scldcn,andHarveyA. Smith(LA-1 1405),August1988,

No. 6. ChemicalWarfareArtnvControl: Issuesand Challengesby KennethE. Apt (LA- 11451),Novcmber1988.

No. 7. Strategic Defenses and InternationalStability by JohnJ. Wchman, editor (LA- 11587),Novcmbcr1988.

No. 8. TheFutureofNuclearWeapons:FinalStudyReportbyPatrickJ,Gamily(LA- 11751), February1990.

No. 10. A SystemsApproachto ChemicalWeaponsVert~cationby KcmcthE.Apt iindJack T. Markin (LA- I 1846),June1990.

No. 11. ReexaminingNuclear Policy in a Changing World by Leon Sloss(LA-1 1998), Dcccmbcr1990.

No. 12. TheFutureofNuclearWeaponsinEuropeWorkshopSurnmaryby JeffreyA. Larsen andPatrickJ.Garnty (LA-1223&-C), Dcccmbcr1991.

No. 13. CriteriaforiUonitoring a ChemicalArms Treaty: Implicationsfor the Verification Regime by Mark F. Mullen, KennethE. Apt, andWilliam D. Stanbro(LA-12242), Dcccmber1991.

No. 14. SpaceSystermsandtheA#ilitaryGeographyofFutureRegio@Coq/lictsby RobertL. Buttenvorth(LA-12252), January1992.

I . . ReportNo. 15 IJ+-12364 July 1992 LE92 019466

TheStrategicArmsReduction Treatyt. and Its Verification

David B. Thomson

LA-12364 UC-900 CNSS Center forNational SecurityStudies Los Alamos National Laboratory

O/STR18UT10fU OF THIS DOCUMENT IS !JNLIMITED ‘ I DAVID B. THOMSON retired after thirty-seven years as a physicist with the Los Ak.mos National Laborato~. His technical backgroundincludes nuclear and pliismti physics,nuclear weaponstesting,high-explosive-drivensystems,and mngneticfusion, IIc has iisskted k the program offices of magnetic fusion (Departlnent of Energy), weaponsresearchanddevelopment (National Security Programs,Los Alamos), and the ReversedFieldPinchProgmmat LosA1amos,He hasa Ph.D.inphysics. Heis presenlly iI[.abor;;toryAssociate in the Center for NationalSecurity Studies.

The author thanks Steven Maiuanenand ArthurNicholsfor critical readings iindmany substantive and helpful suggestions. Comments from Maurice Bryson were also appreciated. Much appreciationis due Janis Dye for her skilIful word processingand preparationof the final manuscriptand layout.

The authoralsoappreciateshelpfulinsightsduring theSTART negotiationsprovided by IMmitr Bergen and Ed Dowdy, Los Alamos,who have served as technical advisors to the INF and START negotiations,respectively. Recentdiscussions with Major David Kwan,Arms Controland DisarmitmentAgency,concerningverificationproceduresare also appreciated.

THE CENTER FOR NATIONALSECURITYSTUDIES

The Los Alarms National Laboratory’sCenter for National SecurityStudies (CNSS) investigatesthecomplexinteractionbetweennationalsecuritypolicyandtechnologicalissues. The Center providesa broadperspectiveon policyissuesrelatedto nationaldefense,and, specifically,promotesandconductsresearchandanalysison keyproblemsinthe broadareas of defensepolicyand armscontrol. A keyobjectiveof CNSS researchisto assistLaboratory managementandscientificstaffintheirdeeisionmakingabouttechnicalprioritiesandLaboratory directions.The Centeralsoundertakesgovemment-sponsorafresearch,and facilitatesand coordinatesLaboratoryparticipationin publicdiscussionand debate on mattersof national security. Tocarryoutitsprogramsandactivities,theCentetsupportsaninterdisciplinarystaff,drawing onexpertisefromthesocialsciences,includinghistoryandpoliticalscienee,andthephysicaland the biologicalsciences. The Center has an activevisitorand consultantprogram,which encouragesshort-andbrig-termvisitsbyexpertsfromgovernmentandprivateinstitutionsand by universityfacultymembers. CNSS also sponsorsan activepostdoctoralresearchand graduateresearchassistantprogramto advancethe carwrs of promisingstudentsof national securiiystudies. InaekfitiontoresearchconductedbyCNSSstaff,theCerrtersponsorsseminars,workshops, and conferencesdesgned to stimulatebroader discussionof the relationshipsbetween technologyand U.S, defensepolicy. These activitiesenhancecommunicationbetweenLos Alarnosandotherorganizations,suchas collegesanduniversities,thatare studyingissuesof interestto the Laboratory. TheCenterdocumentsitsworkinanumberofpublications.TheBr&flngsareshort,informal paperscornrnentingontimefytopiesthatareappropriatetothe Center’sareasof interest.The maref~al researchp-a~ti~mnfere~e pmeeecfings.A bookseries,Issues in Internstiond Security, presentsthe resutfsof the Center’sresearehon key nationaland internationalseeurityissues. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The StrategicArmsReductionTreaty (START),signedbetweenthe [JnitedSI:Itcsand theformerSovitt Unionin hfoscow,July31, 1991,ifratifiedand implemenusd,willlead tomajorreductionsin thedeploymentsof strategicnucleararmsof thetwo largestnuclear powers. Equallyimportant,it willput in placea comprehensives~stcmof no[i!ications, data exchanges, cooperative measures, and on-site inspections that, combined with national technicalmeans (NTM),are expected to add to the confidence that the parties will have in their abilities to verify the reduceddeploymentscalled for in the treaty. The treaty limits the numberof straiegicnuclear delivery vehicles—intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMS),subrnarke-launched ballisticmissiles (SL13MS),and heavy bombers-of eachpartyto 1,600aftera seven-yearbalancedreductionperiod. The total numberofaccountable,deployednuclearwarheadsis limitedto6,000 foreachparty. The total number of warheads on ballistic missiles is limited to 4,900 for each side. A reduction of deployed, heavy ICBFIS(namely, Soviet S!$-18s) from 308, with 3,080 warheads,!()154,with 1,540warheads,togetherwithother prohibitions,sublimits,and counting rules, was designed to reduce the number of most threatening deployments capable of a first strike. The aggregatemissile throw-weightis limited to 3,600 metric tons, and mobile-missiledeployments am limited to restricted areas, further limiting surprise attack. The treaty and its relr.:edprotocols,annexes, and other agreements are accompanied by a detailedexchangeof data in a memorandumof understanding,and uponentry into force of the treaty there will be periodicand detailed.dataupdates to the memorandum. The treatyestablishes~ighty-twotypumf notiticathmconceming deployments,data updates,moveme ts,dispersal~andmissiletests. Thetreatya}soestablishescooperative measures,i: ;Iudingnotificatiormallingfurspecified opendisp!!ys of mobile (roadand rail) launchers and heavy bomkrs, and promns of interfixence with national technicai means. The treaty and its protocols establish twektypes of on-site inspections (0S1s): b.!selinedata,@t updates,nurnkofrec!rttryveliiclesperrnissile, newfacilities,suspect sit :s(threeforeach side),post-exemisedispersals,.eliminationsandconversions,facility close outs, formerlydeclared facilities,exhibitionsof missile technicalcharacteristics, air-launl.hedcruise tnissilc (ALCM) and non-ALCM heavy bomber exhibitions, and ntlclcaramewnonnticlcar heavybomberbtiselineexhibitions. There may beuptofifteen dataupdate0S1s peryearfor eachparty,tmduptotenreentryvehicleinspectionsforeach side annually. The treaty and protocols also provide for portal perirtwer continuous monitoringof declared mobile-missileproductionfacilitiesto help confirm the number of mobile ICBMSproduced, The treatyand its protocolsandannexesspellout in muchdetailthe proceduresfor the 0S1s, including the number of inspectors, notifications, transit and inspection times, equipment[hatmay be usedbythe inspectors,logistics,actionsrequiredbythe host,and otherdetails. Forexanlple,a typical0S1 suchusa data-updateinspectionat a particular site is conducted by a team of ten persons within twenty-fourhours with provision for an eight-hourextension. Treaty-limiteditemssuchas mobilemissilesare identifiedby theirgeneralappearanc:and specificcharacteristicssuchasdimensionsandsize,andare counted at the site and reported. The treaty establishesproceduresfor the observedelimination or conversion(to non- treaty-limiteduses) of certain treaty-limiteditems and facilities. These include ICBM silos,mobileICBMlaunchersandfacilities,SLBMlaunchers,andheavybomberforces. Verification procedures are provided involving notifications, NTM, and/or on-site inspectionsof these eliminations/conversions. The treaty establishes a Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to promote its objective, implementation, and effectiveness. The JCIC may resolve differencesand agreeon additionalmeasuresto improvethe effectivenessof the treaty. The verification proceduresof the treaty are stifficientlygeneric to enable it to verify additional or speeded up reductions in force deployment inventories, such as those announced or proposed separately by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin in Janmry 1992 and the large reductions agreed jointly at the June 1992 Washington Summit. StIchagreementsfurtherreducingeach side’sstrategicnucleardeployment,by rntikinguse of the START verification procedures,reduce the complications of these negotiations. I Fullimplementationofthetreatydependsinappropriate agreementsamongRussiaand the other three members of the former USSR, , Byelarus,and ,on whose terri:ory START-limiteddeployments are located, and upon ratification by the parties. Since this report was written, two major agreementsaffecting the START treaty have occurred.

Lisbon Protocol

On May 23, 1992, a aforeign ministers conference inLisbon,, the !Jnited States,tht?Republicof Byelarus,theRepublicofKazakhstan,Ukraine,and theRussian Federadonsigru? daprozocolthutreafirmeii the support of allfnw nationsfor the Treaty betweenthe UnitedStutesand the Unionof SovietSocialistRepublicsofJuly31,1991, on theReductionandLimitationof StrategicOffensiveArms. Theprotocolpledges thesefour nationsof theformer USSRto assumetheobligations of theUSSRunderthetreaty. Thesenationsagreedto “makesucharrangementsumong themselves as are required to implement the Treaty’s limits and restrictions and to allow functionin~ of the verification provisions.” Theprotocol providesfor inspectionsand continuousmonitoringactiv~,ieson the territory of thesefour nations t.mdfor their participationintheJointComplianceandlnspectionCommissionwiththeUnitedStates. The protocol states that “Eachparty shall ratifi the Treaty--with this protocol--in accordizncewithitsconstitutionalprocedures,“andthatthetreaty“shallenter-into-force onthedateoffinalexchangeofinstrumentsofratification.” Theprotocolalso statesthat Byelarus,Kazakhstan,~ndUkrainewilladhereto theNonproliferationTreatyofJuly 1, 1968,as nonnuclearweaponsstates, and beginactions cothis end. Justprior to thesigningof theprotocol, thepresidents of Byekzrus,Kazakhstan,and Ukrainesubmittedsignedlet:erstoPresidentGeorgeBushobligatingthemto eliminate ail nuclearweaponsand al! strategic oflensivearmsfrom their territories within the seven-yearperiod provided by the weaty. Withthesedocuments,U.S.Secretaryof StateJamesBakerstated at Lisbonthat the basis is createdfor prompt ratificationof the treaty by all parties. (Excerptedfrom a release by the ~ce of Public A#airs, U.S. Arms Control and DisarmarnentAgency,May29, 1992.)

WashingtonSummitAgreement

PresidentsGeorgeBushandBoris Yeltsin,inaSummitiUeetingin Washington,D.C., June16-17,1992,signeda newagreernentwhichcallsforrnajor reductionsindeployed strategic warheadsto linu”tsmuchbelow the STARTtreaty values. In this new “Joint Un&rstandingon ReductwnsinStrategicOflensiveArms,”the sidescgreed to reduce theirstrategicforces to nomore than . an overall total of warheadsof 4~50 (or less)for e~chparty . 1200 multipleindependentlytargetablereentryvehicle(h41RVed),ICBMwarheads . 650 heavyICBMwarheads .2,160 SLBMwarheads. Thesereductionsare to takeplace withinthe seven-yearpcriodf(dlowing entry into force of the START treuty. By the ycur2003 (or by 2000 if the United States can help jinance eliminationof strategic orrnsin ),thesides will . reduce theoverall total of warheadsto no more than3,500 ● eliminateall MIRVedICBMS . reduceSUM4warheah to n~~more than 1,750. For calculatingtheseoverall warheadtotals in this agreement,

● the numberof warheads countedfor each heavy bomber shall be the numberof nuclearweaponsthey are actuallyequippedto carry . upto IOOnon-ALCMnuclearbombersthatarereorientedtos~rictlynonnuclearroles will not countagainst theovera[l warheadtotals . nonnuclear-equippedheavybomberswillbe basedseparatelyfiomnuclearbombers andfrom nuclearweapons. Thejoint understanding further states that . STARTtreaty verl~cationprocedures will beusedto hdpconjbn thatthe normuclear bombers are as dkciared . reductions required by this agreement will be carried out by eliminating missile launchers and heavy bombers wing STARTtreaty procedures, and by reducing warheaa%on existingmissiles (otherthanSS-18s). Thetwopresi&ntsfurther directedthatthisagreernentbeprompdyrecor&din a brief treaty document which they will sign and submitfor ratificatwn in their respective countries. Because this new agreementis separatefrom, but bu”lakupon,the START treaty,theycontinuetourgerattftcationandimplementationoftheSTARTtrea~ assoon as possible. (Excerptedfromrelease by the ~ce of thePress Secretary,TheWhiteHouse,June 17, 1992.)

Ina separate letter submittedby Secretaryof StateJamesBakwrandalsosignedby Rusian ForeignMinisterAndreiKozyrev,it wasagreedthatthe&wn!oading limits (1,250warhead etc.)establishedin theSTARTtreatymaybe exceedkdas nee&dto reachtheaggregatewarheadlimitsofthejointundkrstandt”ng.Reentryvehicleplatform &structionrequiredby STARTtreaty hwnloading provisionswill be rekuedfor downloadinguna%rthejointunderstanding.Theletterstatesthattheseprovisiortswill beincoqoratedintothenewtreatyproposedby thejointund&sta@ing. (Excerptedfkomthereleaseby theUS. DepartmentofState,June18,1992.) ACRCFWMS

ALCM Air-LaunchedCruiseMissile

EIF Entry into Force GPR GlobalPositionReceiver(alsoknown as SatelliteSystemReceiver,SSR)

ICBM IntercontinentalBallisticMissile

INF Intermediate-RangeNuclearForces

101 Itemof Inspection JCIC Joint Complianceand InspectionCommission

MIRV Multiple independentlyTargetableReentry Vehicle

MOU Memorandumof Understanding

NRRC NuclearRisk ReductionCenter NationalTechnicaIMeans 0s1 On-Site Inspection OSIA On-Site InspectionAgency

POE Point of Entry

PPCM Portal Perimeter ContinuousMonitoring

RV ReentryVehicle

SALT StrategicArms LimitationTalks

SLBM Submarine-LaunchedBallistic Missile

SLCM Sea-LaunchedCruise Missile SNDV StrategicNuclear Delivtxy Vehicle SRAM Short-RangeAttack Missile SSBN Submarine,Ballistic,Nuclear Ss[ Suspect Site Inspection START Strategic Arms Rtiuction Treaty Svc Special VerificationCommission TM Treaty-LimitedItem Warhead CONTENTS

1. Introduction ...... 1

IL Treaty Provisionsfor Force Limitations...... 4

111.Verificationand Inspections...... 7 A. Use of NationalTechnicalMeansand CooperativeMeasures...... 8 B. Data Exchangeand Notifications...... 9 C. On-Site Inspectionsand ContinuousMonitoring...... 11 D. Verificationof Eliminationsand Conversions...... 19

IV. Joint Complianceand InspectionCommission...... 19

V. Discussion...... 21 4. The Role of On-SiteInspections,NationaITechnicalMeans, and Cooperative Measures...... 21 B. Applicationof STARTVerificationProceduresto Subsequtmt Arms Reductions...... 22 C. VerificationResearch...... 23

Notes and Referxmces...... ●...... 24

Illustrations Figures 1. DeployedStrategicNuclearDeliva’yVehicl= ...... 26 2. DeployedWarheads...... 26 3. BaUistic-Missilewa.rhd Sublimits...... 27 4. On-Site InspectionTime Durations...... 28 Charts A. On-SiteInspectionsduring Exhibitions...... 15 B. On-Sitelnspectionsof~lo~n~ ...... 17 C. Conversion,Elimination,and VerificationFKX@ums...... 19 Tables 1. Summary of STARTForce Limitations...... 30

2. U.S.and USSR StrategicNuclearDeployments ...... , .0,,0,00.....,.. 35 3. Summaryof ProvisionsforVerificationof Compliance...... 37 4. Highlights of On-Site InspectionProcedures...... 29-

5. Equipment for 0S1s ...... ,00,0...... ,.. 41

6. Equipmentfor PerimeterPortal ContinuousMonitoring ...... 42 7. InspectionStarting Times ...... 43

Appendix: ExpandedTable of Contents,Treaty Document...... 44 The StrategicArms ReductionTrea,tyand Its Verification

DavidB. Thomson

1. INTRODUCTION (SS-18s). The historyand issuesleadingto ticsc summitagreementswcm rwiewcd by Ihc strategicarmsnxhctionstalksbctwtxn PatrickJ. Gacity in a CNSS publicationin theUnitedStatesandtheUSSRbeganin 1982 1988.2 andresultedin theStrategicArmsReduction Subsequentnegotiationswerecarriedon by Treaty(START) signedby PmsidcntsGeorge theReaganandBushadministrations,leading BushandMikhail Gorbachevin Moscowon to additionalagrccmcntsinvolving sublimits July31,1991.1‘l%isrcpor!isasummaryofthe on mobilemissiles,air-iaunchcdcruise-mis- trtaty anditscomplexverificationprovisions, sile(ALCM) sublimitsandcountingrules,and includingprotocols,annexes,andagreedstate- principlesfor verification. A separateagree- ments(theAppendixofthisrcponpresentsthe mentwasreachedforsea-launchedcmisemis- expandedtableof contentsof thetreatydocu- siles(SLCMS). ‘l%estatusof the pqoscd ment).Inadditiontoth csumrnaryofthctrcaty, treatyas of the Bush-GorbachevSummitof thereportako e:xamincsin detailtheventila- June 1990 was reviewedby the authorin a tionprovisionsin thetreatyandsomeof their CNSS publicationin 1990.3 implicationsfor armscontrol. The treatyassignedby thepartiesJuly31, The START negotiations,originally pro- 1991, and submittedby PresidentBush in posedby PresidentRonald Reaganin 1982, November1991totheU.S.Senateforratifica- gaincdimpctuswhenPm.sidentGorbachevand tion,includesthemaintreatytextof nineteen PresidentReaganagreedat theGenevaSum- articles;theAnnexon AgreedStatements;the mitof November1985tothegeneralguideline Annex on Terms and ‘TheirDefinitions;the of a50 percentreductionin strategicoffensive Protocolson proceduresGoverningConver- nuciear arms. This was followed by their sionor Elimination,InspectionsandContinu- agreementat the 1986 Summitin Reykjavik ousMonitoringActivitics,Notifications,ICBM thatthcnumericaldcploymentlimitswouldbe andSLBM ‘IImow-weights,TelemetricInfor- 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles mation,andJointComplianceandInspection (SNDVS) and a total of 6,000 accountable Commission;andtheMemorandumofUnder- warheads(WHS). At theWashingtonSummit standing(MOU)on the Establishmentof the in 1987, Gorbachevand Reagan agreedto DataBase. scveraisublimits: no more than4,900 war- ‘f?tctreatyarticlesandtheirsub~ts arc heads on intercontinentalballistic missiles An.icle1: generalobligationsof theparties. (ICBMS) and submarine-launchedballistic ArticIes 11, 111,and IV: central limits, missiles(SLBMS) combin:d; and no more sublimits, counting rules, limits on than 1,540 warheadson 154 heavy ICBMS nondcployedweapons,andotherrestric- tions. 2

ArticleV: prohibitionsof specificsystems Jointstatements(relatingto interpolations andacti~hies. or activitiesinvolvedin carryingout the Article VI: locationmsiric[ionson mobile treaty), ICBMS. Otherstatcmcnts(unilatcralstatcmcntsmlat- ArticleVII: basicridesfor eliminationor ingtospecificsystemsoractivitiesrelated conversionof strategicoffensivearms. to thetrcaiy). Article VIII: basicrulesfor the inventory Declarations(unilateraldeclarationsmgarrJ- datato be providedin the MOU and for ing SLCMS,andconcerningtheTU-22M notificationstobeprovidedpursuant10the Backjlre mediumbomber). notificationspmtocoi. WhenPresidentBushsubmiiiedthetreatyto ArticIcIX: nationaitechnicalmrans(NTM) the U.S. Senate,the USSR wasstill in cxist- for verification. cnccandGorbachevwasstillitsptvsidcnt.By An.icleX: [clemetryandNTM. Janua~31,1992, theUSSRhaddissolvcdancl ArticleXl: rightsforinspcctions,definesthc the separatestateshad formedthe Common- lwclvetypesof on-siteinspections(0S1s), wealthof IndependentStates.RussianPresi. includingthethreeassociatedwithexhibi- dent Boris Ycltsirihad declaredthat Russia tions,andauthorizesthe portalperimeter wouIdlx thelegalsuccessorto the USSR in continuousmonitoring&pCM) activities. tcnnsofintcmationalobligations,includingits Article XII: cooperativemeasuresto en- arms-controlaccords;that hc would submit hanceNTM. START to theSupremeSovietof theRussian ArticlesXIII andXIV: cxerciscdispersals, Federation;andthatthetreatyshouldalsobc majorstrategicexercises,andoperational ratificdbyUkraine,Byclarus,andKazakhstan. dispersalsinvolvingthedcplo~edstrategic SccretaryofStateJamesBakcrhasbeenwork- nuclearICBM andbomberforces, in; with thesestatesto determineandobtain Article >:V: JointComplianceandinspec- thedocumentsthatwill beneededtobringthe tion Commission(JCIC). treatyintoforce(seeLisbonProtocol,Execu- ArticleXVI: conflictinginternationalobli- tive Summary,thisreport). gations. ‘Iltc treaty,if ratifiedandimplemented,will ArticlesXVII, XVIII, andXIX: entry Into resultin reductionsof about30 percentbelow force(EIF), duration,withdrawal,amend- the 1991 levelsin the deploymentof long- ments,andfinalregistrationandsignature rangc,offensivedciivery systemsand their of thetreaty. nuclearwarheads.‘fhe primarydelivc~ sys- ‘l%epresidentalsosubmittedto the Senate temscoveredby theueatyincludeinterconti- severaldocuments?thatarenotintegralpartsof nentalballisticmissiles;submarine-launched thetreatybut areconsideredimportantto the ballistic missiles;and heavy bomlxm with Senateinitsconsiderat.ionofthetreaty.‘I%CSC gravity bombs, short-rangeattack missiles include: (SRAMS), and air-launchedcruisemissiles. Relatedagnxments,suchastheagrecmcnt The two sidesagreedto limit sea-launched one.adyexhibitionsandtheagreementson cruisemissilesthroughunilateraldeclarations theexchangeof coordmates“ andsitedia- separatefromthetreatylimit... As partof the grams. treaty,thesideshaveagrctxito extensive~and Lettemsignedby theU.S. andSovietrepre- detailedon-siteinspccdmproceduresandcoop- sentatives,suchasthe phasedreductions erativemeasureswhich, combinedwith na- of heavy ICBMS‘utdIettm dating to tionaltechnicalmeans,pmide a verification specificsystemsb: activities. regimeunpmcedcntedfor deployedstrategic (Main corre+omicncemiatedtothctrcatyo nuclearweapons. suchas third-countrybiuing and @oca- me START forcelimitationswerenegoti- tionof heavy!C2) iI!m. ated.uiththeU.S.goalof rvducingthedeploy-

1 3 mcntsofthemostthreateningfirst-strikeweap- VerifieatiortforwtobilelCBh4s,Mobilcmis- ons(suchastheSS-18)andreducingthetotal silcsandtheirIaunchcrxamlimitedin number throw-weight.The limitationscncouragcthe andtheirlocationsnonnatlyrestrictedto geo- dcploymcntofbomber-carriedweaponswhich graphicallyIimitcddeploymentareas Verifi- ambclicvcdappropriaktodchxnmtretaliation cationfor mobileshas been providedi~ the butnotforasuqxiscfirststrike.The rationale treatythroughmovcmcntnotifications,coop- formanyof thevariousnegotiatedsublimitsis erativemeasures,andspcciflcdon-siteinspec- discussedclscwhcrc.2C3CS-7 tions,in additionto nationaltechnicalmeans. A numbcrofissues,unresolvedasoftheJune Distinguishabilityofnu;hwr-armedALCMs 1990Summit,wereaccommodatedor agreed and bombers. The sidesagrcfidto provide in thefinal treaty. ‘IIcsc include: dctailcddimcnsionalcharacteristicsandtocon- ?hrow-weighr. A major U.S. aim was to duct“distinguishabilityexhibitions”asabasis limit theoveralllhrow-wcighlof Sovietmis- for distinguishingnuclear from nonnuclear siles.The sidesultimatelyagreedto a limit of ALCMS and bombers. On-site inspections, 3,600 metrictons,whichis 54 pcrccntof the includinguscofncutrondctcctors,will beused USSR dcclarcdvaiuc at treaty signingand in verifying deploymentsof nuclear-w-rncd marginallyhigherthantheoriginalU.S. pro- ALCMS. posal. Downloading. The issueof downloading ICBMwarheadsublimit. The UnitedStates bccamcimpomntduringthefinalweeksof the wishedto reducethefractionof ICBMS in the ncgot.httions.Both sideshad an interestin totalSovietnuclcarforccstructurcasastabiliz- reducingthenumbcrofwarheadsdeployedon ing mcaswc. However, the Uni[cd States cxistingtypesofmissilesbelowthosenumbers droppedits dcmandfor an ICBM warhead flighttestedandagmcduponin thememoran- sublimitof WOO-3,3(M)WHSin rctumfor the dum of understanding.Such reductionsam Sovietsdroppingtheirdcmandfor an SLBM permissible,but no provisionexistedin the warheadsublimit. t.rcatytoallowthcnumbcrofwarhcadscountcd Modernization. The sidesagreedon lan- againstthesideunderthetreatyto bercduccd guagctodcfirtc’’new-typc’”ICBMs. New-type accordingly. ‘l%em was conccmthat steps heavyICBMS andmissileswithmomthanten takentoreducethenum”wrofwarheadscarried reentryvchiclcsarebanned.Othctise, mod- ona missilecouldeasilybereversedin acrisis ernizationor rcplaccmcntof existingsystems bysimplyrdoadingwarheadsonto theattach- is allowed. mentpointsthathadbeenvacated.‘I%iscould Baseline inspections. ANowanccs,not in- allowa“brcakout”fromthetreatybyasuddcn cludedin theJointSummitRatcmentof June increasei.nthenumberof deployedanddeliv- 1990,wereprovidedin thetreatyassignedto erablewarheads.The issuewasresolvedby enablecxtcnsivcverificationof Utcbaseline limitingto 1,250thenumberofreentryvchiclc datasupplicdbythctwosidcs.inaddition,the (RV) spacesthat can be accountablydown- invcntorjdataistobcupdatedeverysixmonths loaded,limiting the numberof missiletypes and detailedprovisionsam madefor on-site uponwhichdownloadingis permitted,atlow- inspectionsto verifyeachupdatedirlventoty. ing only missileswith the samenumberof Eliminationsorconversious. Detailedveri- warheadsto& deployedat a givenbase,and ficationprovisionswereagreedto confirmthe requiringthedevelopmentandtestingof new eliminationsandconversionsof treaty-limited warhead“platforms”in somecases. items(TLIs). Telemetry.Details of the provisionsfor Sttspectsiteinspectiorrs.Rightswercagreed exchangeof telemetrydata werealsofinally toallowinspectionsofsuspectmobile-missile molved just beforesigning. assemblyfacilities,but only at sites on an agreedlistof relevantsites. 4

U. TREATYPROVISIONSFOR Accountabledeployed FORCE LIMITATIONS nuclearwartmds: 6,000 Ballisdc-missilewarheads TheSTARTtreatywassignedon July 31, (lCBMSandSLBMS): 4,900 1991,andprovidesforthefollowingprincipal Warheadson heavyICBMS: 1,540 forcelimitations: Warheadson mobileICBMS: 1,100 ‘how-weight in metrictons SNDVS: 1,600 (aggregate.deployedICBMS HeavyICBMS: 154 andSLBMS): 3,600

Principal definitionsand countingrulesare:

SNDV ICBM andassociatedIaunchcrSLBM andassociated Iaunchenheavybomber(nucleararmed)

Accountablewathcad Any nuclearwarhcad*dcployedon an ICBM, SLBM, mobileICBM, orALCM of rangegrcatcrthan600km; a heavy bomberanncdonly with gravity bombsor SRAMScountsasonlyoncwarhead.

Heavy ICBM (or SLBM) Any ICBM with throw-weightgreaterthanthatof the SovietSS-19(4350kilograms);thisapplicsortlytothc SovietSS-18andtono U.S. missiles.

Bombercountingrules ‘Ihe first150U.S.(180 forthc USSR)bombersanned withALCMS will countashavingontytenALCMS for theU.S.,oreightALCMS fortheUSSR,mgardlessof the numberon board. Abovethe 150/180bomber Umits,each bomberwill be countedas havingthe actualnumberof ALCMSfor whichit isequipped.

Mqjor prohibitions include: No new-typeheavyICBMS No heavySLBMSor launchers No mobileheavyICBMS or launchers No rapidreloadof ICBM launchers No long-rangeALCMS with multiplewarheads Nonew-typcbaUisticmissikswithmorethantenRVs

Additionat sublimitsinclude:

Fordeployednuclearsystems NomorethantwentyALCMS foranyU.S.bombenno morethansixteenALCMS for anyUSSRbomber no morethantenRVS perICBM or SLBM

For nondeploycdmissUes No morethan2S0ICBMS of a typeflighttestedfrom mobilelatmchers(12Sorfewerofthesemaybeforrail 5

launchers);nomorethanfournondcploycdICBMS at anyoncsilobase

Fornonnuclearheavybanbers Up to seventy-fiveheavybombersmay bc mmovcd fromtheSNDV andWH countsif convcrtcdto carry nonnuclearweaponsonly. Up to twenty testheavy bombersmay alsobe excludedfmm the SNDV and I warheadcounts.

Other f=turesof the treaty include:

Nondeployedwarheads ‘I%crcis, in general,no limit on the total numberof nondeploycdwarheads.There is no overalllimit on nondcploycdsilo-basedICBMS or on nondeploycd SLBMS.

Declaratorylimits(SLCMS) Sea-launched,rmclcar-arrncdctuisemissilesdo not countinthetotalSNDV/WH counts(1,600/6,0(M)),but are limited by separatedeclarationsby eachsideto 880. ‘l?tcnumberactuallydcployedisto bedeclared annually;thedeclarationis not subjeetto inspection. SLCMS arecountedif theirrangeis greaterthan600 km.

Downloading Up to 1,250 RV warheadsmay be removedfrom existingtypesof missiles([heMinuteman111plustwo othertypesfor the U.S.; the SS-N-18 plustwo other typesfor the USSR), therebyreducingthe START reentryvehiclecounton missileswith specifiedmul- tiple independentlytargetedreentryvehicle(MIRV) capabilities. A downloadedMinuteman 111,or any missilereducedmomthantwo RVS,musthaveanew RVplatform. HeavyICBMsmaynotbedowntoaded.

Modernization Modernizationof strategicnuclearforcesmaybe un- detlakenbyeachsideexeeptasspecificallyprohibited.

HeavyICBM mchtctions ‘ltte Sovietswill eliminatetwenty-twoSS-18 heavy ICBMSeaehyearfmthe firstsevenyearsof thetreaty toreducetothe 154limit (separateletters,p. 250,Ref. 1).

Durationandtiming ‘Ihesideswillredueetheirdeploymentsinthreephases over sevenyears(to agreedlevelsat theendof each phase)to teachthe finalSTARTdeploymentlimits. ‘Ilwpartiesmayindividuallyoreollectivelyredueeat a mom rapidrateto lowerdeploymentlevelsif they choose.‘Ihetnxttywillremaininforeeforfifteenyears unlesssuperseded.It may be renewedthtmafler at five-yearintcwals. 6

Reductions Reductionsofsilos,mobileICBMS,mobilelaunchers, SLBMlaunchers,andhcavybomberswillbeachieved byeliminationsand/orconversions,for whichproce- duresamspeeificd.

Restrictedareas Deployedroad-mobilelaunchersandmissilesshallbe (road-mobile missiles) basedonlyin restrictedareasof 5 sqkmorless,which maycontainuptotcnmobilcICBMSandonlyonclype of KBM foreacharea.

Eachrestrictedareamustbeinaspecifieddct)loymem areaof upto 125,000sqkm.me deploymentan> may containonlyoneroad-mobileICBM IUC, oneassoci- atedmaintenancefacility,andoneor more rcstncted areas.

Deployedroad-mobilemissilesway lcaw a reswicted areaordyforoperationalorforcxcreiscdispersalswith speeifiednotifications.

No morethan 15percentof tic NMU-. +ile missiles maybeoutsidetherestrictedareasatot time,cxccpt duringanoperationaldispcrsa!.

Wstrkted rail garrisons Deployedrail-mobilelaunchersandr.issilcsshaIlbe (rtdl-mobilendsidles) basedonlyin rail garrisons.A nil g: risenisanarea in which one or more parkin~’ ~esfor nil-mobile launchertriiinsmay be loeatc~.,ind for which one associatedmaimenaneefacilityma he t, cated. No pintmapfionof~~k lwaicdti: .: arwigamsm

shallbemomthan20 km, mcmurcd. iong the track. fmm anyexwcntranecfor thatra}lgar, M. No two rail garnws mayoverlap. Eactlpartystllll haveno morelhansevenrail galrisorrs.

N0morethan20pcreentofthcdesignated ii-mobile Tdssilesmay be outside the garrisonsat tJI~ the except duringanoperationaldispersal.All d’ !oyed ltimofti-mtic mhQl~ofomt~shdl btofone UandardcOnfiguration, execptforroutinemoveif ma, ,. ~ docations, or dispersals,asnotified. ,, I

-

Exeldsedispeniels ‘Ihe treatyprovidesfor conditionsfw movementsof mobilemissilesoutsideof their restrictedareas,in- cluding(butnot Iimitcdto) suchpuqosesasfuutine movementsfor training,maintenance,or testing,Ex- —. —

7

erciscdispcmalsmustbemmplctcdwithinthittydays of initiation,may h conductedno more thantwice everytwo ycm, andmaynotbgin untilafterW six- month period allottedto baselinedata inspections. Ik[itilcd notificationprevisionsamspecifiedforcxcr- ciscdispcma.ls.Somedispmals may be limited to spceificbases.Dataupdatcandmcnwyvchiclcinspcc- [ionsamsuspmdcdfmn thebaseorbasesinvolvedin ancxctcisedispersalbutmaybccortductcdinlull upon completion.

Strategicexereises The treatyalsopmvidc formajorstritcgiccxcrciscs involvingheavybombers.Thesemay be conducted onlyonceannuallywiththesuspensionof inspections, but with appropriatenotificationsand post-exercise in,spwdons.If morethanones~it,.:gicbomberexcr- ciscistobeconductedinanyoncyear,inspectionsand cooperativemeasures‘willm l-csuspended.

operationaldispcrsa@ The partiesrescind the righ! o conductojxrational dispersalsinvolvingallof t.hci,mobile.missilcs,heavy tmnbcm,andotherstrategicarms. ‘l?tescdispersals maybeconductedifcithcr ~ [~yconsidersthesurviv- abilityof ils strategicforcesat risk. The otherpatly mustbenotifiedwilhincightccm!ioursuf theinitiation of thedispersal,andbothpartic~maysuspendinspec- tions,cooperativemeasures,wiu Ilmstnotifications. Operationaldispmalsamtobc uscdonlyrarelyandin a crisis. Uponeomplction,all inspectionsandcoop- crativcrrrmures arc to be alloweflthat could have othcnviscoccurred,plustw-oaddiufmalcooperative measuredisplays.

These force limitations, along with thl 111. VERIFICATION AND sublimits,listsof prohibitions,countingtult.,, INSPECTIONS and generalprovisionsof the treaty(such:! time duration)are listed‘mdetailin Table I To verify compliancewith theUCaty,each Table 2 lists the deploymentsof U.S. and sidemaymonitoiml obamc thedeployment formerUSSR strategicnuclearfonxs aspre- of forcesand the a.wuktctof adwit.iesof the sentedin thememorandumof understandin~at other,usingan extensivesuiteof @ua, pm the time thetreatywassignal. Figure 1 pm- cesscs,and qui~ent providedfor by & scntscurrentlydeployedandSTART limitson mns of dte treaty. Each ~ must tkm SNDVS, andFig. 2 showseurrentiydeployed analyzeandinterpmttheinformatimitcolicus ~ART accountablewarheadsandtreatyihll~ and &tcMtincdle degmcso whichb (n&r its. Figure3 showssomeof thekeyaublimits. sidehas~plit?d withthe ~. -h skie may rise anu icck resolutionof questionsor quiredad aredesignedto furtherenhancethe suspcctcdviolationsby theotherin [heJoint effectivenessof ournalionaiwhnicai means, Complhtnccml InspectionCommissioncs- GcMmdly,k START Imaty makesprovi- htblishcdbythetreaty.Asa lastresort,a party sionsfor ~crifk.ationof ils limits in Article maywithdrawfmmthetreatyuponsix-months VIII, which obligalcsthe pmics 10 provide nolicc if its nalionaisecurilyinlcms[shve dcltiilcddalabases,andnoti!icit[ionsrcgiirdu]g bccfijcopardiml by extraordinaryevents. their s[rtitcgicnucicarforces,faciiitics,and Vcrificalionof compliancewith1)wlrc~[yis aclivilics;in Articic1X,tlcaiinywiththeuscof uncnotmousamtchallcngmgwk. F“ullvcnli- nalionidIcchnicidmeans01’vcriiiculiortand uationwill rcquimdeterminingon ii timely nonconccalmcrttol”trctilyactl~iticsfromNTM; hmisthetivcmorws,bycategory,of deployed inArticicX, dealingwiththebroadcastingand SND$’Sid warheads,Iaunchwsandsuppn nrmcncryptionof tclcmclricinformationdur- cquipmcm,andothertrcalv-1imitcditemscov- ing fiighl Icsmg of missiics;in Articie XJ, crcdby the treaty,and comparingthesedata which cnumcrincsrightsfor (m-si[cinspec- u’ilh the onessuprdicdhy the otherside:ind tions,exhibitionsof cquipmcm,wd continu- with lhc trutty’s llmit~ sublimits,and other ousmoniirningwlivitics; ml in Article XII, prohibitions. That is, inc sideswill needto whichdcscrihcsthecoopermivcmeasuresth:lt confirminform.ltiofisuchM the Ilumbcrsot maybercqucsta(tostnmg[huntheuapahilitics deployedSLBNISand ICb.%1silos,numbers of N-l-Mandon-si[cinspections.‘I”hcscbasic andIoctttioltsofmobileICBMsandthcirhmch- rights;iIKJobiigmionsamcl:dmratcdin prom- msandmobile-missilereloads,nuclear-armed mls to[hcIrcalyoninspectionsandc(mtinuous heavy!i::nbcrs,long-rangeALCM-equipped mmti;oringiictivilics;notifications;lclcmctric bombers(bcxhnucicar-anncdandnonnuclcar- information;md theestablishmentof thedata armwl),iitimkrs oIRVSdeployedonwh type base. of J(_’BMmd SLBM,numberof ALCMSfor Ilc rcmaindcrof thissectiondescribesthe whicheacht}pc of bomberis equipped,and treaty’s\ ~“rificationrightsand proceduresin informationregardingreiatcdfacilities.‘Jltey greaterdetail. Table 3 is an overviewof the willrwcdto watchfordcvciopmcnlof prohib- vcriftcationprovisions. i[cdncwtypesof ICBMS, SLBMS,crui,Cmis- siics,andrno~exoticwciqxmsystems.Fortie Uni[cdStatesit wiil h“ particularlyimportant A. U~#~@onal Technical Means and [o ;onfirm the reductionsin theSovic(invC,l- CooperativeMca~ures loryof deployedheavySS-18K%Ms andthe numbers aid locations of deployed and In Afliclc iX the trcalyslatesthat“for the nondc~)ioycclmobiic ICBMS. The sideswill purposusof cnsufingvcnficalion01’compli- countthe aggregatemissilethrow-weightby ance with this mxty, each party shall usc dctcnniningthcthrow-weightpcrmissiicakmg nationaltechnicalmeansof vcrificutionat its with mi~silcinventories. disposaiin amannercunsistcntwithgenerally To accomplishthisdauntingtask,the Bush recognizedprinciplesof internationaliaw.” administrationnotcs9tha[thetreatycstabIishcs NTM includcsiousc of satetlitcsfor photo- afar-twchinginspectionregime,includingon- graphicrcc(maissanccand detectionof pat- sitcinspections,specialaccessvisils,continu- ticlcsand radiationsin space,aircraft-based ouson-sitetnoni[rwingof ccnainfacilities,and systems(e.g.,radars,opticalsystems,andfall- technicalexhibitions. lltis regimeisdcsigncd outdetection),sea-andground-basedsystems .10complementnationli technicalmeans,the (e.g.,nularsandantennasforcollecdrtgm4em- pti~muufurmonl[oring~pj~u with ctry,andoptiealsystcmsfofobsemingnuclear (heptuvisimsof thetttaty. (!ooperativemea- te%s)andotherobservationsfromoutsidethe SIMCS,suchaS~ display(, mad.mobi]e~ terntmyof the clmntrybeingobsctvcd. Na- rail-mobileIaunchcrsof ICL arcalso re- tional!echnicdmeanswastheprinliwymethod 9

for mtmitonngand verifyingthe early wms- tor cxlcnsivcanddetailednotificationsof MC comroltrca[icswith lhc Soviets,suchasthe dcployrnents,movcmcnts,ICSL\, nxluclions, LimilcdTestBwtTrcalyof 1963,the!Hralcgic andotkr uctiviticsinvolvingthes[ratcgicof- ArmsRctiuctionTalks(SALT) 1Trealy( 1972), fensivearmsand facilitiessubjectto limita- and[h: SALT 11Treatyof 1979(unratitlcdand tionsby themxuy. expired), Aniclc VIII of tic treatystipu)atcsthatthe Artick IX SLUICSthiti ctichparty shall IN)( mcmormlum ol understandingsetsforththe inkrfcrc W;[litheNTM of LJwmhcrpartyand dcuiilcddatabaw pertainingtotheobligations shunnol uscm~ilsurcsth:uresultin concctil- underthetreaty.Thedattiin themcm(mmdum mcnt of IC13MS,SI.BMS, or mobile missile of undcrstimdingwasprovidedbythepanicsat IaunchcmM [Ml sites. dw timeof signingandwasincludedaspiIrtof Article X ot Ihc treaty and the tclcmclry theovcra!ltreatypackitgc.The M(3U listsall promcolprovide for cnharwcmcntof NTM the[ypesofICBMS,SLRMS,andheavybomb- duringmissileflightICSLSbybroaacwinglclc- ers(with andwithoutALCMS). rclalcdfacili- mcu-ictechnicalinformationconccmingthe ties,baselocations,andlotaln~mbcrsof TLIs llighL$andrestricts[hcdenialof access(bythe ofcachtypeUIeachIocalion.Watcgic nuclear other party) to such informationby usc of deploymentsa..statedin thememorandumof encryption,jamming,narrow-beambroadciis[- understandingareprcscrucdin Table 2. ing, or cjccfablcand rccovcrablccapsulesor An updwcof all theda[aIistcdin theMOIJ, rccmryvchiclcs.After eachICBM or SLBM includinginvcn[oncsateachlocation,iscalicd tlighl tcs[,[hc testingpartymustproviderc- for fromeachpartywithinthirtydaysafterthe cordcd tapesof the tclcrnctricinformation. entryintoforceof thetreatyfollowingratifica- Eachpartymayuseencapsulationor encryp- tion by the parties. This cxchangcof data, tionpertainingonl;’to tic RV or front-section fo]lowcdbyrcgularupdatcsof thesedataevery phasesof the flights, and on no mom than six monthsihcrcaftcr,togetherwith detailed clcvcnflight km peryear. dataon changesof statusof individualtreaty- ArticleXII ofthetrea[yprovidesforcoopcra- limitcditcmsastheyoccur,isprovidedfor in tivcmcmurcsthatincludeopendisplaysof (1) theprotocolon notificationsandcsmblishcsa ~oad-mobileIaunchcrsIocatcdwithin the re- continuouscompmhcnsivcbaselineagainst strictedareasspecifiedbythetcqucstingparty; whichtomeasureatidcomparctheresultsof all (2) rail-mobileIaunchcrsIocatcdat specified the observationsand data obtainedthrough parkingsi[cs;and (3) all heavybombersand applicationof thevariousvcrifica[icmmecha- former heavy bomberswithin one air base nisms. specifiedby the requestingpatty. Suchopen The protocolon riotificationssetsforththe displaysmustbe conductedwithoutconceal- requirementsfornotificationsassociatedwith mentmeasuresandmustprovidefortheopen- thedata-exchangeupdatesnotedaboveandfor ing of the roofcoveringthemad-mobilemis- notificationofvariousactivitiesinvolvingstra- siles,andmovingtherail-mobilemissiletrains tegicoffensivearmsandtheirrelatccifacilities toanopenarea,duringthedisplaytimepkwiod. subjectto thetreaty. Bombersmustbe locatedoutsidetheirhang- The detailedprotocolon notific~[ionsil; ers. Eachpartymay rvquestup to sevensuch eludeseighty-twospecifictypesof notifica- dispIaysperyear. tionsthatthe partiesmustprovide. An addi- tional twenty-two typesof notificationsam calledforin theinspectionsprotocol. B. Data Exchangeand Notifications Nearlyallofthenotificationsinvoitiea time constraint,thatis,thenumbcrofhoutxordays me START treat~providesfor extensive lxfore or afteraneventduringwhichthenoti- spcciticdexchangesof datainvolvingall the fication must be given. The Nuclear Risk treaty-!imitcditcms. The treatyalsopmvidcs ReductionCenters(N RRCsj,oncforcachside, establishedby executiveagreementin 1987, four such typesof”notificationsconccming am usedw prwidc, receive,and confirmR- tntuw-weightdctennina[ions.Oncsuchnoti- ceiptof eachof thenotifications. ficationis that each pany mustprovidethe Thenotificationsamgroupedinthetencat- other,noICSSthansevendaysin advance,with egorieslistedbelow, notificationof theeighthtestof eachnew-type 1. Notificationsconcerninginventorydata ballistic-missiicflight test. The notification andchangeofinventoryoftreav-limiteditems, mustincludethe greatestthrow-weightdem- suchaslCBMs, SLBh4s,i .dbombers,accord- onstratedin the firstseventests,dataon the ingto thecategoriesgiveninthememorandum maximumcalcuhttcdthrow-weight,data on of understanding. ‘l%csenotificationsamde- theresidualpmpcllantin eachstage,anddata tailedand are designedto atcrtthe verifying onthcdcsccndingflightpathangle(at Iof)km) partytoincrementalordc[ailcdchangesin the usedm thecalculation, inventoryof deployedTLIs. An exampleis 4. Notiflcationvconcerningconversionsor Ihatwithinthirtydaysof theentryintoforceof elimiwkms oftreaty-limiteditemsand elimi- [hctreaty,eachpartymustprovidecurrcmdata nation oj facilities subject to the treaty. In for eachcittcgoryof datagivenin the MOU. reducingtheirinvcn[oricsof SNDVS andde- Another notificationprovisionrequires[hat ployedwarheads[o conformto treatylimits, within thirty daysof eachsix-mon[hperiod thepartiesmaychoose,subjecttothecategory aftertheEIF, eachpartymustprovidecurrcnl sublimits,thosespecificl’1-lswhichtheywish diua for each categoryof dala given in the to eliminateor convcn to nontrcaty Iimitcd MOU. Thereamcightccnnotificationsin this status.lle protocolon conversionsor elimi- category. nationsincludesprovisionsfortheelimination 2. Notificationsconcerningmovementsof or conversion,at appropriatelocationsor fa- treaty-limited item. Thcsc involvegeneral cilitics,ofthcchoscnitcms,ICBMSformobile movcmcntsof ICBMS and heavy bombers launchcrsandthclaunchcrslhcmsclvcs,SLBM amongdcploymcmlocations,testsites,a..sem- launchcrx,heavybombm, andfonncrheavy blyfaciiitics,andairbascs.Thesenotifications bombersmust be c)iminalcdat elimination maycontributeto an understandingof movc- facilities.FixctllCBM silolaunchctsandfixed mcntsobservedby nationaltechnicalmeans structuresformobileIaunchcrsshallbec!imi- andotherverificationprocedures.A typical natcdin situ. notificationis that no Iatcr than forty-eight The pany conductingeliminationsor con- hoursaftcrcomplction,apartymustnotifythe versionsmustmake seventypesof notifica- othcrofthccompletionoftransitofnondq!oyed tions. “IIcsc allow the verifyingpany to re- ballisticmissiics.mobilelaunchcanistersafter spondwith appropriatemonitoringproccsscs, [csts,nondcployedmobile launchers,and/or suchaswith NTM obscwations,requestsfor mohilc training !mnchcrs. 71tcnotification coopmtivc measures,or olwsitcinspections. shaIlinc!udcthenumberof each!ypcmoved, A typicalsuchnotificationis thateachparty the originsanti tin: “mx, m’ k of mustprovidenotificationat leastthitty days !:.Lilswl,i, dndUI ~I.1..’- 4 7 7-I1. priortotheinitiationofcortvcrsionorclimina- hk iC-Bh~ 01 ,:r ,I[ji.l,. .IIvolveU)c tionproceduresformobilcICBMSandlaunch- txO.tuling, k! ~~mplction,of exercisedis- ers,ICMB silos,SLBM launchers,bombers, wsafs of mobiic ICBM nd strategiccxer- and dated TLIs. The locations,catcgorics, ciscsof heavybombers.‘Ihcre am seventeen dates,etc.mustbe provided. suchnoti;ical: ,involvingmovementofTLIs. 5. Notijlcationsrelatingtocooperativemea- 3. Nofi@alions concerning throw-weight surestoenhanceverificationby nationaltech- datafor ICBMand SLBMf7ighttests. These nical means. Thcm arc five typesof such assista party in verifying the throw-weight notifications.The verifyingpanymayrequest valuesprovidedbytheothcrparty,pitrticular!y adisplayofspecificmobilemissilesor hcavy forncwtypesof missilesundcrtcst.Therearc twmbcrsa[spccificdbmcs,andmayrequesta

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displayof a special-purposesubmarine,The ing mobile ICBMS, SLBM Iorccs,or heavy rcccivingpartymayrespondwithnotificatiorus bombers.The partyconductingthedispersal thaithespecificmobileICBM orbombercan- mustnotifytheotherpartyaspmvidcdbyonc notbcdisplaycdatti,ctimcsrcqucstcd.A party or more of the seventypesof notifications mustnotifythetxhcr,withintwcnty-fourhours, spccificdin thisscciion.Atypical notification of ~hcexit of a submmincfrom a covcrcd isthatcitchpatiymuslprovidenotificationno facilityinwhichconvcrsionofitsSLBM launch- laterthancightccnhoumafterthe startof an 0’SW&!carriedOUL operationaldispersal includedshall be the 6. Notificationsconcerningjlight tests of date,time,andreasonfor theoperationaldis- ICBMSand.5LBh4sand concerningtelemetric pmal. information. Five kindsof notificationsarc Additionalnotificationsprovideforthccomplc- specifiedby(hctestingparlytoenhanceNTM tionandotherfeaturesof theoperationaldis- for the vcnfying pmy or to explaincertain persal. detailsof thetclcmctcring.AtypicalnoLfica- Most or all of the notificationsspecifiedin tion is thateachpartymustprovidenoticeof theprotocolsctvcasimpomnttriggersto the any flighttestof an ICBM or SLBM. It must variousmonitoringand verificationmecha- includethe launchdate,launcharea,reentry nisms.Movcmcntsor testsofstratcgicweap- vchiclcimpactarm, tclcmctrybroadcastfre- onsor changesin inventoriesof treaty-limited qucncics,andinformationastobroadcasttapes itcmsmay be specificallyobservedby NTiM andplansforencryptionor encapsulation. satellitesordetectorsin responseto thenotifi- 7. Notifications concerning production, cation. The verifying party will frcqucruly movement,jlight tests, or deploymentof new have the option to requestofxm displaysat typesor newkiruhofstrategicoflensivearms. specificmissileorbomberbasesin rcspnseto Therearcsixteentypcsofnotificationconccm- notifications, Finally,decisionsto conducl ing thedcvclopmcntof newtypesof strategic specificon-siteinspectionsmay be madein offensivearms. Typicalof thesenotifications responsetocertainnotificationsandin coordi- isthateachpartymustprovidenotification,no nationwiththeflow of infwrnationcomingin lessthan fofiy-eight hoursin advance,of a from nationaltechnicatmeansand observa- plartncdexit froma productionfacilityof the tionsfromtheopendisplays.Theymayatsobc fimt prototypeof a ncw type or new kind of usedtoclarifyquestioruaboutpossibleviola- ICBM or SLBM. The notificationmustin- tionsidentifiedbyotherli]onitoringprocesses. cludetheIcngth,diameter,weight,calculated Takentogether,theeighty-twospecificnoti- throw-weight,andthenameandlocationofthe ficationsdetailedin the notificationprotocol productionfacilitythatwill pmducctheproto- arcmeantto be a ccmsidmbleadditionto the type. cffectivcnessofthcverificationof thetreaty.If 8. Notificationsconcerningchangeofnoti- falsedataaregivenin thenotifications,ordata jlcation &ta on movementsand on conver- arcconsistentlywithheld,NTM and the 0S1 sioarleliminations. There are two typesof provisionsof thetreatyshouldenabletheother the.scnotifications. partytoevcntuallydetectit andto takeappro- 9. Notif7cationsconcerninginspectionsand priateaction. continuousmonitoringlisted in SectionIll of theinspectiomprotocol. Tlnx aretwcnty-two typesof suchnotifications.Thescartinvolved C. On-Site Inspectionsand Continuous with [hc on-siteinspectionsand continuous Monitoring monitoringproudurestha[atediscussedinthe nextsectionof thismpott. On-sitcinspectionsofdeployednuclearweap 10. Notijkations concerning operatiortaf ons on Sovietterritoryfirst becamea nxtlity dispersals. Each party may conductopera- withthe Intermediate-RangeNuclearForces tionaldispersalsof itsstrategicforces,includ- (INF)treaty,ratifiedandenteredintoforcein 1988. The negotiationsleading10thatlmaly, cxchangcsof updatedinventorydatacailcdfor and discussionsin the SpcciaiVerificationaftcrcachsix-monthperiodafterthecrttryinto Commission(SVC) cstabiishcdby the INF forceofthc treaty. ‘i%crcmaybe asmanyas [matyto rcsoIvcverificationissuesandcstab- fifteendata-updateinspcctionscachyear,start- Iishmoredetailedinspectionpmccdums,led ing i65 daysafterentryintoforce. Detailsof theSTARTnegotiatorsto spelloutextensive theproccdutrsaregivenin thefollowingtwo 0S1rightsandmechanisms. sectionsof thisreport. NewFacilitylnspection.v.Whenncwfacili- tiesarciistcdin notifications,[heyarcsubject 1. General Types of On-Site Inspections to inspectionsto confirm the numbm and and ContinuousMom-toting Iypesof treaty-iimitcditemsspecified. SuspectSiteinspections(SS1).The inspect- Article XI of the START treaty and the ing party has the right 10 conductOSis to protocoloninspectionsandcontinuousmoni- confirmthatcovcrtassemblyofmobilcICBMS toringspclloutthegcncraicalcgoricsofon-site or firststagesof mobileICBMS is notoccur- inspections,continuousmonitoringactivities, ringatasuspectsitenotspecified by [hcother andcxhibitionsthatallowforinspcctions.The sideas producingmobile ICBMS. Thesein- on-silcinspectionproceduresarcsummarized spectionsmay ttakcplace oniy at facilities inTable4. designatedforsuchinspectionsin the .MOU. The.scgcncraicategoriesarc describedbc- Time suchsiteswcmdesignatedbyeachside. IOw. EachSS1countsagainslthe quotaof fifteen BaselineData lnrpections. Inspectionsarc dataupdateinspectionsperyear. ailowcd at facilitiesdesignatedin the treaty ReentryVehicleinspections.On-sitcinspcc- mcmorandumofundcrstanding.Theyarcmcant tionsof RVSampennittcdtoconfhmthatthe 10validatetheinitialinventorydalaexchange numbcrofmcnt~vchiclcs(wadmchs)dcployed and make baselinemeasurementsof Wcaty- on ballisticmissilesarc as statedby the in- Iimitcd items. Tim facilitieswhere baseline spcctcdparty.‘iltisisaccornplis hcdbyremo- inspectionsmaybe madeincludeICBM and vingtheshroud(RV eovcr)andmakingobser- SLBM bases,ioadingfacilities,andrepairfa- vationsof the front end of the missileusing cilitics.Alsoinciudcdarcstozagefacilitiesfor proccdunxtopreventtheinspectorsfromsee- iCBMs,SLBMS,mobilelaunchersof ICBMs, ing thedetailsof the warheador bus. There andheavybombersor formerheavybombers; may be up to ten RV inspectionsper year, training facilities for ICBMS,SLBMS,and startingi65 daysaftertheentryinto fotcc. heavybomixrs;conversionor eliminationfa- Post-ExerciseDispersal Inspections. %- cilitiesfor SLBM iaunchers,mobile ICBMS site inspection may be conductedaftct an andtheir iaunchem,andheavybombcts;test allowedandnotifieddispersalexerciseof mo I ranges;andspecifiedair bases.Theseinitial bile ICBMS to determinethatthe numbersof I basciincinspectionsarcconductedfrom45 to deployedmobileICBMS andtheirlaunchers, 165 daysafter entry into forceof the treaty. attributedtothatbase,havereturnedtothcbase Theremay be anynumberof inspections,but orarvaccountedfor,andthatthistotaldoesnot thenumberwili be iimitedby the logisticsof exceedthcnumbcrspecificdforthatbaseinthe time constraintsof notificationsand procz- MOU or subsequentnotifications.The 0S1s dunx, andtheremaybe nomorethantensuch are conductedby proceduressimilarto data OSisconductedatonetime. updateinspectionsfor mobile-missiicbases. Data Update Inspections. On-siteinspec- Conversion or Elimination Inspections. tionsmay&conductedatfaciiitiesdcsignated Conversionsor eliminationsfor mobile mis- intheMOUandlistedaboveor in subsequent silesandlaunchets,heavybombers,or SLBM notifications.‘Theinspectionsareto confitm launchersarcearnedoutat specifiedeiimina- the accuracyof data providedin the mguiar tion/conversionfacilities.Fo]iowingadvance

— — -. 13

noti!icationofaschcdulcdconvcrsionorclimi- numberof ALCMS for whicheach type of nation,NTM orOSlsmaybeconductedbythe heavybombr is actuallyequipped. rnhcrpartytoconfirmtheclimina[ionor con- BaselineExhibitionsfor NonnuclearHeavy versionto allowed usesw providedby the Bombers. Eachpartymustconductbaseline treaty.ElimirmtionofICBM silolaunchcrsatv exhibitionsof all heavybombersquipped for lobe conduclcdon-site,withadvancenotifica- nonnucleararmarncnw,trainingheavybomb- tion given. Thesemay be obscmcdonly by cm,andformerheavybombersspecifiedinthe NTM. initial datacxchangc(notificationsprotocol). Ciose-outImpactions. inspectionsmaybe The other party may conductinspectionsof conducted10dctcnnincthiiltreaty-limitedac- the.scbombersto confirmthat suchbombers tivi[ics have ccascdat a site dcclarcdto be Sati!dytherqttimmcnL$forconversiontonon- c!iminatcdor convertedto allowedUSCS.‘I%c nuclearuses,as given in the convctsionor 0S1 will confertheappropriatechangeof sta- eliminationprwtocol. tus. Perimeter Portal ContinuousMonitoring. Formerly Declared Facility Inspections. Each party may conductPPCM at mobilc- Facilitiesmaybecliminalcdundertreatypr- missilc productionfacilities to confirm the evisionsthat allow for a periodof clo.sc-out numbcrofmobilcICBMs produced.UsingTV inspections.Afterthisperiod,theotherparty cameras,infrmd .scnsors,and other equip may conductup to thnx fonncrly dcclamd mcnt,thcinspcctomcstablishcontinuousmoni- facilityinspectionsperyear. toringoftheperimctcrofthcfacilityorsitc,and Technical ChuracterisricsExhibitionsfor obswveallcandidateTLls enteringor leaving /CBh4sandSLBMs.Eachsidcrnustconductan the facility. PPCMof productionfacilities cxhibibonof the technicalcharacteristicsof maycontinueas long asthe facility is active oncICBM, oncSLBM, andoncmobileICBM andthetreatyis in effect. IaunchcrofcachtypeandvariantIimitedbythe ‘I?Icdcgtvcanddepthwith whicheachtype treaty.TIYCothcrpartyhastherighttoconduct of inspectionis madewill dependon the in- 0S1sduringthecxhibi[ionstoconfirmthatthe spctors’ obsemationrightsasspecifiedin the characteristicsfor eachexhibitedTLI arc as treaty,theefficiencywithwhichtheinspection statedin the MOUor subsqucnt declaration issnack,andtheabilityof thehostto dcmon- notifications.Charac[cristicstha[maybcmea- slratcto the inspectionteamthatthe number surcd include the length, diameter,shape, and characteristicsof tr~atylimited itemsat weight,and otherobswablc featuresa..de- anysitebeinginvestigatedamasstatedby the finedin theverificationpromcolandIistcdin host. For the UnitedStates21CSCinspections thememorandumof understanding. will beconductedby theU.S. On-SiteInspec- Distinguishability Exhibitionsfor Heavy tion Agency(OSIA). Bornhersand ALCMS. Eachpartymustcon- duct exhibitionsfor heavy bombcts,fotmcr hcavybombers,andlong-range,nuclear-anmxl 2. Administrativeandtigistical ALCMS. ‘Ilc othcrpartyhastherightduring Proceduresfor On-SfteInspections theexhibitionsto conducton-siteinspections thatconfirmthe datagivenin the MOU and ‘ile treatyprovidesfor theestablishmentof subsequentnotificationsasto thedistinguish- inspectionorganizationsfor each patty, in- ing teaturesof heavy bomlxmsequippd for cludinginspectots,monitom,andairctewmem- Iong-range, nuclear-armedALCMS, heavy bcrs.Inspcctionandmonitonngteamswill be bombetsequippcdonlyfornuclcararmaments madeupfromlisLs(submittedandapprovedby otherthanlong-range,nuclear-armedALCMS, eachparty)of 400 inspectors,3(X)monitom, andlong-range,nuclcmanrtedALCMs.‘Ike andunlimitedaircrewmembers. inspectionsalsoareto cmntitmthemaximum Advancenotice of up to sixteenhoursof intenttoconductan0S1 isrequiredforinspec- 14

tionsof baselinedata,dataupdates,suspect complctionofthe0S1. Anyinfomtation(asto sites, reentryvehicles,new facilities,post- the hostcountry’sfacilitiesor weaponssys- cxcrciscdispersals,and fmmcrlydeclaredfa- tcms)gainedthroughtheinspectionsrequires cilities. Notificationsarc giventhroughthe permissionofthehostbcfomitcanbereleased nuclearriskreductionccntcrforeachcountry. to a thirdpanyor madepublic. For a giveninspection,theinspectionteam Forsettingupaperimeterportalcontinuous mustfile a flightplanforcntryattheappropri- monitorat a specifiedfacility,the inspection ate pointof entry(POE). Eachcountrywill teammay uscup to thirtypetsons.Monitors haveestablishedtwo or threepreviouslyap- maybercplaccdasneededandwill uscequip- provedpermanentPOES.Allequipmentand mentspecifiedin thetreatyandprotocols(see suppliesbroughtwiththeinspectionteamam Table6). subjectto inspectionby the host(in-country Baselineon-siteinspectionsmaystartforty- escort). Specificin..pcctionand monitoring fivcdays afterentryinto forceof the treaty, equipmentthatmaybe usedby theinspectors which will occurshortlyaflcr ratification:by is listedin Table 5. Equipmentnot relatedto bothsidesandofficialdepositandexchangeof thctrcatyinspectionmaybcinpundcd. Equip- documents.Dataupdateinspectionsmtdothcr ment and suppliesmay be stored,underthe 0S1smaystafi165daysafterentryinto force. inspector’slockandkey,atthePOEofthehost Figure 4 illustratesthe time .sequcnccof country.Thetreatyprovidesthatthehostmake in!!pcctioncvcnLsfor specific on-site inspec- provisionforfood,lodging,andtransportation tions. of theinspectionteamwhile in thehostcoun- Table7 liststhestartingtimesforapplicabil- ty. ity foreachof thetypesof inspections. The treaty and prcmcolspmvidc (ictailcd rulesfor the activitiesandconductof the in- spectionteam. Upon arrival at the poim of 3. Proceduresfor ConductingOn-Site cr!try,theteamnamesthesiteto beinspec[cd. inspectionsandMonitorl”ng Thehostmustensurethattheinspectorsarrive atthesitewithinninehours(forthcinspections This sectiondcscribcstypesof inspection.s Iistcdabove)of the namingof the site. The (Iistcdin .scc.111.C.1.dxwc) astheyapplyto equipmentavailablefor theinspectorsduring eachclassof strategicweaponlimited in the citchtyp of in..pcctionis specified.The host treaty(fixcd ICBMS, mobileICBMS, SLBMS, mustprovidea sccurctclcphoncline bctwccn andheavybombers).For eachof theinspec- the inspectionsite and the cmbassyof the tionsor monitoringproceduresdcsctibcdin inspectionteam. this section,wc note that the administrative The 0S1 team may consistof as many as procedures(rtotification,transpomttion,and twentypcmonsfor conversionor elimination otherlogistics)will havebeencariicdout as 0S1s,asmany as fifteeninspectorsforcxhibi- dcscribcdin theprccding section. l;oninspections,andasmanyastcnpersonsfor Forbaselineinspections,datatqxlatcinspec- all otheron-siteinspections.Two inspectors tion.., suspectsite inspections,new facility mustspcakthchostlanguage.Instantdcvclop- inspections,and other inspections,the 0S1 mcntcamerasmaybeusedbutoperatedforthe team carriesout the following six specific inspcctorsontybythcttosts.Thetimcduration steps: of an inspectionshallbetwenty-fourhoursor 1. ‘Ihc 0S1 team arnvcs at the sclcctcd ICSS(exceptfor warheadexhibitions,conver- declaredsitcandverifiesiLslocation(atICBM sions,orcliminations)andmaybecx!cndcdup silo sites)usingglobal positioningrcccivers toeighthoumby mutualagreement. (GPR)basedonorbitirtgsatellites.‘llc GPRs Post-inspectionprocedures,including the arcprovidedby thehost. completionof ths on-siteinspectionreport, 2. Thehostprovidcsasitcbricfing(lcssthan mnst be complctcdwithin four hours after onchour)andpmvidcsasitedrawingthatlists 15

aiidshowsthe locationof all dcclarcdtmaty- cmbassy and to the OSIA (for the United limimditcmsat thesite. Teammcmbcrsarc States). taken by the hos! to each TLI locationas To wsist with the subsequentinspections, rcqucstcdbythctcarnIcadcr.Atcamsubgroup each party must providenotificationof and maypatrolthepcrimctcrofthesi!candmonitor conductanexhibitionof eachtypeof SNDV, exitingvchiclcsduringtheinspection. andvariantthereof,to demonstratethetcchni- 3. Duringtheinspectionthcteamcompams ca!charactcristicsIistcdinthemcmorantiumof theobscmcdandthecandidateTLIs with the understanding.Ncw typesof SNDVS devel- dcclarcdinvcntoncs,andthctlcclarcdTLlchar- oped afterJuly 1, 1991,arc listedin the rc- actcristicswiththosegivenintheMOUand/or quirvdnotifications.ChmtApresentsspecific dcclarcdby the host. Discrcpancicsarc dis- on-siteinspectionsthat may be madeby the cussedwith thehost,who is askedto explain other patiy during theseexhibitionsto help any ambiguitiesor disagrccmcntsin thedata. verifythedeterminationof thetechnicalchar- A candidatetreaty-limiteditcmisanydevice, acteristicsto be used in the other typesof unopenedbox,orcontainerlargeenoughtobe inspectionsdescribedin ChartsB andC. or conlaina TL1 of a typebeingmuntcdand In makingtheinspectionsIistcdin ChartA, thathasnotbeensatisfactorilyexplained. the0S1 teamsmay uscinspectionequipment 4. The teammakesadditionalobservations listedin Table 5. andmcasurcmcntsasprovidedby thetreatyor A separateagrccmcnt’iprovidesfor con- agreedby the hostin ancffofi to resolveany ducting tcchrticalcharacteristicsexhibitions dkagrCCItICIIL% I%c 0S1 mustbe complctcd and distinguishabilityexhibitionsbeforethe within twenty-fourto thitly-two hours (see stanof basclincinspections.Theseearlyexhi- Fig. 4). bitionsarc to be complctcdwithin 240 days 5. Within four houmaftercompletingthe after the date (July 31, 1991) the treatywas 0S1, the team leader wntcs the inspection signed. Tltcscearly exhibitionsand inspec- report,with a copyforthehost,andIcavcsthe tionsarcto be carriedout in accordancewith site,returningto thepointof entry. The team the inspectionsprotocolcxccptfor modifica- leadermay requesta sequentialinspectionat tionof theprovisionsforlistsof inspectorsand thattime. aircrewmembers.Theinspectionprocahms 6. The teamleaderreportspromptlyto the indicatedin Chiul A apply. Any itcm or characteristicnot exhibitedprior to theentry

Chart A. On-Site Inspectionsduring Exhibitions

WeaponsSystem Typeof Inspection” CharacteristicsObserved

!CBMS,silo launchers Technicalcharacteristics Exhibitedappearance(obtain photographs);specifieddis- tinguishingfeatures;length anddiameterof eachstage; weightbof ICBM; typeof dispensingmechanism;etc.

ICBM, mohilelaunchers Technicalcharacteristics Exhibitedappcamnce(obtain (roadandrail) photographs);specifieddis- tinguishingfeatures;length anddiameuxof eachstage; weight’of ICBM: sizeof mcbilelaunchcanisters:type I 16

ofdispsing mechanism;etc. Exhibit“newtype”closeto “existingtype”

SLBMS Technicalcharacteristics Exhibitedappearance(obtain photographs);specitiaidis- tinguishingfeatures;length anddiameterofcashstage; numberof launchtubespa” submarine;insidediametetof launchtubes;weightbof 1 SLBM;typeof dispensing mechanism

Heavybomberswith nuclear Distinguishabilityexhibitions Exhibited appearance(obtain armamentsandlong-range, photographs);specifieddMn- nuclear-arrnedALCMS guishingfeatures;linear distancesbetweendesignated pointson bomberor ALCM as designatedby ho?tasdistin- ~ishing; (mayobserve ALCM for absenceof nett- uonsif declarednonnucktr)

Nonnulear-annedheavy Baselineexhibitionsto Exhibited appeamnce (obtain bombers demonstratenonnuclear -W@@; spcikd distinguishingfeatures,lima I distancesbetweendesignated pointson bomberor ALCM; (mayObsmc declared nonnutccarALCMS for absenceof neutrons)

ah L51~in SCC.m.C. 1.of thisreport. %kightmeasuredfa dctamm. ationof“newtype.”

intoforceof thetreatymustbeexhibitedafter InvefifyingthedeclamdinventoriesofTLIs theEIF. listedin the MOU and subsequentnotifica- Aprincipalgoalofeachverifyingpartywill tions, the sidesmay also inspectfor missile be to determinethat the inventoriesof de- launchersandothersuppmtequipmentlisted ployedSNDVSandtheirwarheadsm asde- in theinspectionprotocolas itemsof inspec- claredbytheotherpartyinthememorandumof tion. undmtmhg asmodifiedinsubsequentnoti- Eachsidemayconductsuspectsiteinspx- fications.ChartBpresentstypicalspecificorl- tionstoeonfinnthatcovertassemblyofmobile siteimpactionsthatthetreatyprovidestohelp ICBMSis not ocxuning at a site listed as verify the inventoriesof deployeddelivery eligibleforsuspeusiteinspectionsintheM(XJ. I systemsandwarheadslimitedby START.In SW may aIsobe conductedat a facilitythat mSkingeaChtjqxWfinapedonshowninChart startsproductionofanICBMorSLBMaslarge B, the 0S1 teamsmay use inspedionequip orkger thana mobileICBMoftheinspected mentlistedin Table5. partyat tk timeof entryinto fomeand not

I Chart B. On-Site Inspectionsof Deployments

WeaponsSite Typeof hsptwona OSIObservations/Techniques

ICBMsiloWC Baselinedata;dataupdale; ObscrveICBMlocationsatsite; ncwfacility;close-out observesckctedsilosand 1Ci3Ms;measuredimensions asneeded;observeinside containersasnmkd; obtain photographs;comparedata with referencedafac

ICBM mobik-missik sits Baselinedafa;dataupdate; Hosthasmovedmobikmissiles (road-mobile,rail-mobile) ncw facility;cl-out to bewitiin restrictedareas; for 0S1, teamposfsPe3imetcr monitoqU2unobserves,reads t2gS,andcountsdeclared ICBMS;observessekctcd missilesandIaunchasand measuresdimensionsas needed;observesinside CQlltit%S asneeded;obtains Pho-hsb; comparesdata with referencedatac?d

SLBMSUbMSSinCbase Basclinedata;dataupdate; Hostdisplaysrequestedsubma- newfacility;closwu! rinesby type;teamcounts submarinesby type;hOSt opensspecifictubesonrc- q~ ~ measuresSLBM dimcmsions;teamobfainspho- tographs asnccdcd;team comparesdatawith mfcr- enccsc

ICBM andSLBMbasew RV inqm%kns Tam selectsICBM/SLBMat mobik-missikbases site;mi.x3ikmovedfm obser- vationby hostandfrontst!c- tionprepared(asteamOb serves);hostopensshroud; teamaunts RVS

Heavy-bomberkm (in- Basctirlcda@dataupttatc;- Hostexhibitsbombersatbasc dudcsWaponstorageareas) ncw facitity:clmwut bycypc;teaminspcdsonc bomberof -h type:teamOb- Hcs distinguishingfeatures of bombersandALCMS, can- paleswith rcfcmmtX?da@ ~b tskcn;in W- on storageareasteammayusc ~ detectorifmlckar ALcMsdcclsrcd llomluc-. mm countsinvcntorksof I eachtypeof nuclear-armed I bomberandALCM I Mobile-missilebases Post

Any of abovebasesafter Formerlydeclaredfacilities Teamconducts0S1s forTL1s completionof close-out using proceduresfor data inspections update0S1 for theappropriate categories

a~ lis~ in sec.111.C. 1.of thisreport. bMay rqW1 @otogmphsif therean2~biguitics. cRefemnce&~ includesMOU ~d &~ gjv~ in subsqucnl notificationsad (kc]~tioflS. ‘ dMust~cl~e~j d~loy~ r~d missiles~Sign~~~ifi~ [email protected] WC restrictedto rail garrisonsandinspectedin a similarway.

subjectto portalperimetercontinuousmoni- 4. Proceduresfor PorfalPerimefer toring. Also includedis any site for which ContinuousMonitoring continuousmonitoringhas ceased. Itemsof inspectionfor suspectsite inspectionsare an Each side may establish a portalperimeter ICBMfora mobilelauncher,thefirststageof continuousmonitoraroundmobileICBMpm- a mobileICBM,anda solidrocketmotorfora duction facilitiesof the other side. These mobileICBM. ‘IheSS1proceduresam: facilities,as dcclanxiin the memorandumof Within one hourof notificationof thedesig- understanding, are at Votkinsk (SS-2S), natedsuspectsitetobeinspected,thehostshall Pavlograd(SS-24), and Promontory,Utah imptemcntpreinspectionmovementrestric- (MX). ‘Ihe proceduresare summarizedas tionsofall TLIs. All vehicles,containers,and follows: launchcanisterslarge enoughto comainan — Hostsuppliesmapsof area;teamdeploysat itemof inspectionarenottoberemovedfrom facility and postsmonitorsat agreedpoints thesite. Team membersare takento siteas (allowedquipmentis listedinTables5and6); rquested.Perimeterobsenersarecsablished. teamestablishessecuretelephoiwlinetotheir Rodures similartodalaupdateinspections embassyandinstallsbackupradiolink. formobile-missilesitesarethenfollowed to — Teamoccupiesbuildingssuppliedby hostfor searchfor suspectitemsof inspection. The monitoringactivitt‘s;teaminstallsfiber-optic inspectorsmay usetic inspectionequipment perimetczfencemonitorsystem;teamchecks indicatedin Table 5 for SS1s. outmonitoringsystem:teamreportstohostas Each suspectsite inspectionusesup oneof tomaintmance,modifiutions,etc.necdedfor the quota of fifteendata updateinspections monitoringoperations;theperimetershallbe allowedeach year. Only ~ SS1may be secureandallvehictesandmateriatspassingin conductedat a time,andrmmomthantwoat andout shattbesubjectto monitoringby the thesamefacility. inspectionteam. Team establishesagreedportal monitorsta- tions (1 or 2) forenwancekxitthroughthe perimeterfence. 19

-. ‘I%cteammonitorsail vchiclcscntcnngor carryout a processof climinitlion,or twwcr- exitingtheportals;theLcamasksfor andthe sion,of certain ;rtw[y-limited itcms and facili- hostsuppliesinformationonthccontcntsofall ties. ‘IWsc pruccdures will involve scvcrid vehiclesand containersexiting throughthe typesof ICBM silos;mobileICBMS, litunh- I portalsthatmightcontainitcmsof inspection crs,andfitcililics;SLBMIaunchcrs;andhcitvy (101s)or TLIs. Hostmayweigh vehicleto bomberforces. confirmno101s. TheIma[ypmvidcsforcliminationandcon- — If appropriate,the[caminspcdssuchvchiclcs orcontaincrs;if thehostdocsnotopcncontain- vctxionproccsscsandverificationthittcnaldc crsfor furtherinspection,thetam measures or cnhanccconfidencethai thesesystcmsarc Icngthsand diamclcrsfor comparisonwith indeedbeingcliminithxlor convcflcd to non- MOU and otherdit!a;if ncccssary,thetciim nucfcarUSCS.Suchvcriftcationis intendedm requestsmoredetailedinspectionof content.. addto thecffcctivcncssof eachside’sovcrill of the vchiclcor container,and/or requests abilitiesto mtmilorstrategicnuclearwcitpons need to make dimcnsimtmcasurcmcntsof invcmoricsandcapabilities, itcmsinsidethe vchiclcor container;photo- Chart C is a summaryof the climin~tion graphsmaybcrcqucstcdforinspcctcdilcmsas proccdums relit[ctl pmccdurcs lwcdcd. IJniqucIdentifiers(tags)arcread. iind vctification — Theteamcountsall 101sandTLIsthatexitthe foreachof theca[cgoricsof weaponssystcms portals,compareswithhost-suppiicdinforma- thatmaybeeliminatedorconvcrtcd. In some tion,anddctcnnincsthenumberof ICBMs for cases,the vcriftcationinvolvesNTM andco- mobile launchersthat cxil the facili[y each operativemeasuresonly, andin othcmit itlso year;thelearnandhosldiscussantdiscrepan- involveson-siteinspectionsduringtheelimi- cies. nationor conversion The U.S.teamreportsregularlylothc U.S. EmbassyandthcOSI. \. Da~ fromthePPCM monitoringstationsarc combinedwith the IV.JOINT COMPLIANCEAND otherinspectionandNTM databy theverify- INSPECTIONCOMMISSION irtgpartyto helpdeterminethe accuracywith which the other party has s[aycdwithin the The START treaty cstabtishcs,in Atliclc inventoriesallowedby thetreaty. XV, a Joint ComplianceandInspectionCom- mission“topmmotctheobjectivesandimplc- mcnlalionof theprovisionsof thetreaty.”The D. Verification of Eliminationsand treatystatesthat,if eitherpartyso requested, Conver90ns theywouldmeetwithinthe frameworkof the JCICto In reducingtheir inventoriesof deployed 1. resolvequestionstvlatingtocomplianee SNDVS and watttcads,the sideswillhaveto

Chart C. Conversion,Elimination, and Verification Procedures

WeaponsSystem ConversionalElimination VerifKation Procedures

Silo-baaedICBMS Missilesandotherquipment notto NTM andcooperativemeasures beeliminatedareremovedmorethan only;observewith saLcllitcphotos l,fXK)m from silo;eliminatesilo by etc.;othersideprovidesnotitica- excavatiortto S m or explosionto tionsof eachstep;siloma must depthof 6 m bevisiblefor entireprocessplus 90 days 20

SLBM Imtnchcrs .Ibmarmcmwd 10ciilllinallon l;witity;allSLBAf\ rcmo~cd,in qh”n; rcmovccomlk”lc missduscc- li{msor all launchtulwsid super- Structurc;all rcrnnvcdI:lunchIubcs cUI In hidl”;thcrc~f[cr,suhnminc may h“usedonly for uscsO!!I ‘I th:m‘VW carriers iMobilcICBMS and RCrlloVCRVs, gui[!:lmx!ill)ll conlrnl 0S1 (camu:rivcshy standardpro- ktunchcanisters ~yslcms;n) IVrcmo~(”prnpellcnl, cedures,con!irrnstypcsof rnissifcs Pcncualxm,,.,!s,clc priorm 0S1, m hceliminated:obwvcs entire Iuunchcrs,cilll,,l~:r~. WgCS, WI(I climiniuionprnccss;~.lm Icadcr IImlorsdestroyedhydcmolilimror andhostwrite rcponconfirming crushing;RV plut(onii,rueticinoz- elimination / 1(’s,Clc.cut infoJ)lL!CC\

Mobile Iaunchcrsand Rw:.I crccmr!uunchcrsid r:!il-car 0S1 learnarrivesas4X.MW;*- relatedstructures kwnchcrsCU[Imn Ixw pIcccs;other servesentireClifl”)h[lofl proms; hiidwrrc andslrucmrcssimilar]y rcporlwriltcn climinalcd

Hciwybombers; Prior100S1, enginesandequipment NTM, with notification,okcrvcs fonncrheavybombers nol partof airframercmovcd;elim- cn~ircprocess;maymake0S1 by (elimination) ination: tail severed,wingsrcmovcd, request;proecdurcssimifarto fuselagecut in two picccs. above

Hciivybomhcrs Bomberswith long-rangenuclear Priornotifications.spccificd;WM (conversion) ALCMS mayhcconvcrtcdto used;mayrequest0S! at a parlku- nuclur non~ALCMbombers. Iar site;produrcs simik to Nuclear-armedbombersmaybe above convertedto nonnuclear.Details ~pecificdin climinationjconvcrsion protocol(SCCRef. 1).

2. agreeuponsuchadditionalmeasuresas mcagcndaforase..sionmayinchtdcqucstions maybenecessary[oimprovetheviabilityand submittedby thepartiesin advamx,asWCIIas cffcctivcncssof thetreaty questionsthat arisejust beforeor duringthe 3. resdvc questionsrrlal~ I tu thedcvclop- session.The workof thecommissionisto be mcntofa’’ncwkindofs[ratc~Icoffcnsivcarm” conftdcntial,execptasothcrwiscagreed.Com- afterthercquimdnotificationof thefirstflight municationspursuantto meetingsof theJCIC testof sucha device. arcprovidedthroughtheNRRCS. The JCJCpromeolspellsout the make-up ‘Ilwprovisionsfor callinga specialsession and proceduresfor meetingsof the commis- arcpan.icularlysignificant.Jfcithcrpartyhas sion. Eachpartyistoappointa commissioner anurgentconeemrelatingto comp]ianeevvith and deputy commissionerto representit at the treaty, that party may requesta special JCICmcctings.Eachpartyalsohastherightto sessionof the JCICto addressthat coneem. be representedby al[emates,mcmbcrs,advis- The requeststatesthe type of strategicarm ers,andexperts,astheysodesignate. related to the concernand may proposea A regularor specialsessionof thecommis- specificmethodfortcsolvingthcconcem.Such sionmaybecalledatthereques!ofcilhcrparty. methodsmayincludea visitwithspecial right 21

ojaccessto the I“uctlityor lncatinnwhcmthe and for checkingon the distinguishabilityof” rc@cs[ingpwly hclicvcslhc activityof con- nuclear-arnml bomberscompurcdLOmm CCrnt~k plil~c. Il]c rcqucskdpwly musl nuclear-anncdbombers. respondwithinseventitiys,eitherwxcptingtic of particularimportancehasken thedown- praposcdmc[hodw’d./orsi!cvisit or proposing loadingissue, Byconductingon-siteinspec- WI al[cmalivc Ioctilion and diill! forthespecial tionstocountthenumber0! it Vspermissile, sessionand/oriin al[cmalivcmethodfor re- thcmcan bc a measureof assurancethtilLIIU solving the conccm. The partieshave the dcclarcddownloadinghassotnubasisin fact. optionIOtigrccM usi[cvisilwithspcciairight Wccannotmeasurethenumberof RV~.,mcud] of access,conduc[cdtmdcrprovisionsof the andeverySovietICBM, butbyu ingamson- inspcciionspromcol,andnotconvcncthespe- ablc numtx- of short-noticeRV inspections. cial session, wc shouldgainsomestatisticalcon[idcnccus The JCIC protocolallowsthepartiesto cs- to the actualdownloading. “Ilc rcquinvncnl mblish;Witional prowlurcsforconductof the forinstallingncwplatformsrcduccsthelikdi- commission.The protocolallowstheJCICto hoodof rapiduploading. convcncprovisionaly forup10lwclvcmonths If a significantnumberof criticaiviolatiom undcrthcrulesoftheprotocol,startingwiththe by theotherpartyareobscwcdby the [Initcd dateof trciuy signature(July 31, 1991). Itwill States,in say twelve monthslime (wilhout convcncunderthetreatyuponratification(the rvasonablcexplanation),theothcrpartywould JCIChasindeedbeenmeetingprovisionallyin putthestatusof thetreatyatrisk-a [rctity that GenevasinceOcMcr 1991). Thc JCIC pro- their politicalleadershiphas viewed M ,crv videsa functionsimilar10thespeciaiverifica- importantto theiroveraIlnationalinlcrcsts. tioncommissionusedwith theINF treaty. Bysystematicallycomparingthetotalinvent- ories obsemedby NTM and continually spm chcckcd by 0S1s, the UnitedSta[csshould v. DISCUSSION havea fairmeasureof thedcgrccto whichthe otherpartyis stayingwithintheoveralltreal, A. The Role of on-Site Inspections, limits. In thecaseof thedangerousheavySS- National Twhnical Means, and 18s,we shouldhavesomecordidcnccin our Cooperative!Measures NTM observationsalonebecausethesemis- silesarcin large,fixedsiteswhosecharactcris- Nationallcchnicalmcansaloncwouldnotbe ticshavebeenobsewcdformanyycam.U.scof sufficiclittoguimmtccthat STARTlimitations shor moticedataupdateinspections(everysix were being adhered10by the nationsof the months)shouldaddto theconfidencethatthe fonncrUSSR. Cooperativemeasures,suchas SS-18sarebeingreducedat theagreedspeci- banningof datadenialof tclcmctricinforma- fied annualrate. tionduringmissiletestflightsanddisplaying Suspectsiteinspectionsof suspectmobiJc- mobilemissilesat spccificdtimesforsatellite missileassemblyfacilities(not declaredas observation,cnhanccthe vaiue of NTM but such)maybemadcin responsetoanyinforma- stillmaynotpmvidcsufticicntaccuracytothe tiongleanedfromnationaltechnicalmeansby overall vcritication. The com~mhcnsiveort- satelliteobservationsand/orby intelligcncx- sitc inspectionsadd greatlyto this accuracy gatheringtechniques.Carefulcoordinationof sincetheycnabica mechanismforspotcheek- sbort-noticeSSIswithotherverificationshould ing thenumbersof deployedSNDVSat speci- eontributetoourknowledgeoftheotherparty’s fied sites,and for determiningthe numberof capabilities. warheadson particularSNDVS. This is par- It seemsclearthat the effectivenessof the ticularlytntcfordetermirtingnumbersofreen- verificationof theSTART treatybytheUnited tryvehiclesperICBM orSLBM, fordetermin- Stateswill be dependenton theeffectiveness ingthenumbersof ALCMs perheavybomber, with which we arc able to utilize national tcchnicatmeansobservationsandrwrabilityto hlorercucnt]j ‘residentBushin hisSW.ICof c(xmlinatcNTM with lhc coqxmlivc mea- the Union Ad11ws~i4to Congressin January suresand with theon-si[cinspections,Con- 1992anluwnccd..,~lionalufilatcrdSTART- tinuousanalysisof the inpu[data from NTM rel.dcdf(m.(:reductite~s.Theseincludtxlthat andcarty 0S1swill beconductedandwill lcud the L‘!i[cdSIMC.Swil!. [odccisionsastohowbesttousethefollow-up 1. slopB-2production:if!vato[:dof twenty 0S1s. The efficiencywith which we do this planesill:. canceltheMidg.?man program analysisandmakethesedecisionswill beim- 2 +toppr{uhlctionof SLBIki rhtxls, new portantto theoverailaccuracyof ourverifica- production01 i.hcMX, ilnd purchaseof d- tion and krtowlcdgcof the numbersof de- vanccd~\LCMs. ployed (and nondeploycd) strategic nuclear In addl!ion,on conditio~lof an agreement wctiponswithin the formerSovietUnion. withthcCoI~lmonwcalthoflndcpcndcntSlates, Prcsidcn[Bushoffered [{I 1. eliminate ali MX ICBMS B. Application of START Verification 2. reduce all Minulcmen to one warhead Proceduresto SubsequentArms each Reductions 3. reduceSLBM warheadsby one-third 4. convert a substantialnumber of nuclcar- Since [hc START treaty was signed,IIIC armcdheavy bombersto primarily conven- lciidctxof bothpanicshiivc announcedplans tionaluse. wd proposalsfor additionalstrii[cgicnuclear Thesefourrcductiomswouldbeconditioned forcereductions,bothunilateralandbilalcral. on Russianandcommonwealthagrccmcntto W’c list here thoseplans and proposalsfor nx!uccall land-basedICBMS (fwrncr Soviet) whichthe notification, verification, and other to oncwarheadeach. provisionsof theSTART treatyarcmostappli- OnJanuary29,1992,RussianPresidentBoris cablc, Yeltsin, in a comprchcnsivcstatmncnt15on On September27, 1991, PresidentBush disarmament, announced the following annound ‘ thatthe UnitedStateswould: START-relatedunilatemlforcereductions(cat- 1. climinatr iCBMsat a faster rate than firming or going beyond those listed by requiredby STAR~”(afterratification) Gorbachevon October5, 1991): 2. hahdcvcIopmentoftheMX railgarrison 1. 600 ballisticmissiIes,alongwith 1,250 andmobileelementsof Midgetman warheads,have been removedfrom opera- 3. cancelSRAM-H development tionalreadiness 4. seekagreementwith theUSSRtobanall 2. 130 ICBM siloshavebeendestroyedor MIRVcdICBMS,underSTARTprovisions. arcbeingprcpamdfordestruction On October 5, 1991, former Presidenl 3, deployedstrategicweaponslocatedin Gorbachevannounced*3thattheUSSRwould: UktinetiUktismmtidmner~mpl- 1. haltbuildupofrail-mobile ICBM forces 4. productionof TU-160 and TU-95MS 2. discontinuedevelopmentof a smailm~ heavybombersandof long-rangeALCMS is bile ICBM andof a SovietSRAM beingstopped 3. reduceto5,CNX)START-accountablewar- 5. Russiawill reduu thenumberofstrategic heads(belowthe6,000 limit) weaponsonoperationalreadincsstotheagtted 4. after START ratificationseekto begin numbcrinthrecyeaminsteadofthesevenycats talkson reducingforcesa fitrther50 percent. providedin START. Hc notedthattheUSSRhadalreadyremoved PnxidentYeltsinproposedthatthestrategic threeSSBNswithforty-fourlaunchersandwas weaponsretainedby the UnitedStates and removingthnx morewith forty-eightlaunch- Russiaafterthe reductionsnot be targetedat ers. eachother. Yeltsinaisosta:edthatproposats havebeenprepared(by Russia)to CUIstra[cgic exactlyhowthcirnuclearwcaponswereindeed forcelevelsto 2,000-2,5(N)warheadson each tobe administered.U.S. ofticiidshavebeen side, Hc addedthat“In doingso,wchopethat encouragingsuchfigrccmcntsin the hopeoJ” China, Bnmin, and Francewill join the real expeditingtheratificationandimplementation disimriiirmmtprocess.” pmccss, Presentand fumm stralcgicnuclearforce (On Muy 2.?,1992, inLisbon,i’ortugul,the reductionsthatgo bcyon(Jthosegivenin the fi~reignministersofRussia,Byelar~r,Ukraine, STARTlrcatyassigned,suchasmanyof those andKazakhstanandtheU.S.Secretaryof.state discussedabovebyPrcsidcn[sBushandYchsin, sigrteda protocol that houndtheseparties to andformerPresidentGortwchcv,will invnNc theSTARTtre@ andwhichSecretaryof.ftute rcductmnsin theinvcntorwsof thepi~rtics,and iluker stuttd ~rcuwd the basis for prompt AUSwill becovcrcdbytheitppropriatcbaseline ratificationof theSTARTtreutyby thepartie.r. datanotificationsonceSTART isratified,and At thejust concluded WashingtonSummitof bysubsequentdamupdatenotificationsspcci- June16-!7, 1992,PresidentsBushand Yeltsin ficdbythetrciity.llws theverificationprovi- signed ajointunderstandingwhichcalledfor sions(NTM, coogxraiivc mcawres,and on- reducingthenumberofstrategicnuclearwar- silc iiispcctions)proviticdby the treaty will heaaktolimitsmuchtxdowthoseprovided for i3U[OM~dCd[y bCCOMCapp]icdb]cfOrmonitor- intheSTARTtreuty,undfor utilizingthetreaty ing eachside’sinventoriesa..additionittforw forverificationof thcseaddedreductions. The reductionstakeplace.Wc alsonotcthatPresi- WashingtonSummitagreementandtheLisbon dent Bush’s initiative ca!lcdfor utilizingthe protocol are reported in more detail in the eliminationproceduresin the STARTagrcc- ExecutiveSummaryofthis report.) mcntif thesidesagreeto eliminateMIRVS. Puttingin placeancffcctivcverificationm- gimcasprovidedforinSTARThasthepolcn- C. Verification Research tial forcnsunngtheverificationof fu[urearms reductionsgoingbeyondihoscagreedtoin the The STARTtrcatv was ncgotialcdon the treaty,whethertheybe unilateralor by future basisof existingverificationtcchnologics,and mutualagrccmcnt. for a variety of nn.sonsdid not incorporate Asthisiswritten,theratificationandimplc- much“high-technology”equipmentforuscby mcntalionof [hc treaty are still in pmccss. the on-siteinspectors. In many cases,size Prcsidcn[BushsubmittedtheSTART tttaty to criteria,weightand dimensions,andobvious the U.S. senatefor ratificationon Novcmbcr apparanccmprcscntthcticyobservationaltcch- 25, 1991,andtheForeignRelationsCommit- niqucs. In Tables5 and6 x c listthetypesof [cchasconductedsomehearingson thetreaty equipmentaltowcdbythe[rcat)foruscby lhc duringthccarlymonthsof1992.I-iowcvcr,the in..pcction[cams. Ale note such itcms as si[uationin the statescomprisingthe former saltuiitcsysmmrcccive~ (for aocuratcglobal USSR hasbeenuncertain.Earlyon, the four posititi\),neutrondeteuxs, prograrnmablccal- formcrSovictRepublicswherestrategicwcap cdatorsand HaMs computcr~,infraredsen- onsam deployed[Russia,Ukraine,Byelams, sor systcms,sumeijlam”.+ystcms,PC:. with andKazakhsmn]cxpressedsupponforSTART hard disks.etc. ti” ~xamplcsof someof the and pledgedto fulfill iLsobligations. And more Sophisuca[edtypes of equipmentthat though the Commonwealthof Independent may be used. Ihc treaty,ils protocols,and S[atcs,comprisingmostof the formerSoviet annexeslay out the @fic instWlcnts and Republics,createda single unified military equipmentthatthepartieshate a‘“righi”“wU.SC commandformaintainingcmtrol of theirstra- forcachtypeofinspcction.Additionalverif- tegicnuclearweapons,by the end of March icationinstrumentationmaybeagteedtointhe 1992thcfournuclcarrepublicshadnotachievedJointComplianceandInspectionCommission wri[tsn agreementsamongthemselvesas to if mutuallybeneficial, Coiltinucd m.Search and impmvcmcnls in inspection.Fornewtypesof ICBMSand vcrificaiion[cchnologics,irnprovcmenlsinthe SLBMS, the numberof warheadsis the types and usc of inswumcnls such as those largerof(I) themaximumnumberllight- t lislcdabove,dcvclopmcntof ncwinstruments Icstctlor(2) thenumbcrdctcnnhwdbythe that might be agreedfor use by LhcJCIC, “40pcrccnt”mlc. ‘lltcnumberissubjcctto dcvclopmcntof computer-biiscdmudysistech- in.pcction.‘l%crcwa..concernthatancw- 1 niquestha( c(uIldaid lhc overall verification typc missilemight not be testedwith as coordination,cw., could make it possible10 manywiirhcadsasit wascapableof carry- I“urthcrcnhanccthe veriti~ii[iortaccuracyof ing. At a minimum,a ncw type wili be this lrcit[y and futurr Igrccmcnts. amibutcdwith the numberof warheads tictcrmincdby dividing40 pcrccniof the missile’sthrow-weightby the weight of NOTES AND RtI:K”flRF:N(;l\S lhc IighlcstRV flighl tested. 9. “MessagefromthePrcsidcnloftheUnited 1. “Trcii[y Bctwccn ttw Unilcd Sta[cs of States mmsmittingThc STARTTreaty Americaandtic Unionof Soviet Socialist signedat Moscowon July 31, 1991, in- Republics on the Reductions and cluding AMCXCSon AgreedStatcmcnts Limlationsof StrutcgicOffensiveArms,” andDefinitions,Protocolson Conversion signedin Moscow,July 31, 1991. Com- orElimination,Inspections,Notifications, pleteSTART Tmaly Documentincluding ‘Ilwow-weight,I“clemelry,and the Joint !cxtofTrcaty,Prutocols,Annexes,Memo- ComplianceandinspectionCommission; randum of Unacrsmnding,and related Memorandumof Understanding;atl intc. Agrccmcnts,Ixttcrs, SupportingDocu- gral pans of the START “f%eaty.”102d mcrus,and Declarations(280 pp.), U.S. Congress.lstScssion,U.S.Scnatc,Treaty ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency, Dec. 102-20. Nov. 25, 1991. U.S. Govt. Washington,D.C., 1991. PrintingOffice, Washington,D.C,, ]991. 2. Palrick J. Garrity, “The U.S.-Soviet l%isdocumcntincludes:TransmittalLet- STARTNcgotiations:StatusandImplica- IcrfromPresidentBushtotheU.S.Senate, tions;’CNSS Papcrno.7, LA- 11280-MS, Nov. 25, 1991;SubmittalLetterfromSec- April 1988. retaryofStateBakertothePresident,Nov. 3. David B. Thomson,“START: A Sta[us 20, 1991;thecomplctctextof the treaty, Report,Septcmbcr1990,’’CNSSBriefing, protocols,and otherdocumentslistedin vol. 1, no. 6, Scptcmbcr28, 1990. thcmcssage;andanarticlc-by-articleanaly- 4. The related agrccmcntsincludedin the sis (by the administration)of the tnmty, ‘ ‘ART Trcaly Documcmsas signedin protocols,andothersTART documents. Moscow, July 31, 1991, arc inchtdcdin 10. William C. Potter,VerificationandArms KCf 1. Controltixington, Massachusetts:D.C. 5. L;.S. Arms Control and Disarmamcn[ Heath,1985). Agency, “Annual Report to Congress, 11. AgrecmcntonEarlyExhibitionsof Strate- 1988,”March 14, 1989. gic OffensiveArms,pp. 24647. Ref. 1. 6. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 12. PresidentGeorgeBush,nationwidetele- Agency, “Annual Report to Congress, vised address,September27, 1991, The 1989,”March 13, 1990. Arms Control Reporler (611.B695,6), 7. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmamcnl IDDS 10-91; 675 MassachusettsAve., A&cncy,“Amual Reportto theCongress, Cambridge,MA02139. 1990,”March 20, 1991. 13, PnxidentMikhailGorbachcv,nationaltele- I 8. For currenttypesof KBMs andSLBMS, visedaddress,October5,1991,TheAm I thenumbersofwarheadspcrmissi!eamas Control Reporter (611.B699,7(N)),IDDS declaredin the MOU and ~umfirmcdby 25

10-91; 675 MassachusettsAve., Cam- 15.PresidentBoris Yeltsin,Russiantt4evi- bridge,MA 02139. sion address,January29, 1992 (English 14. PresidentGcorgc Bush,Statcofthc Union versionby TASS, AMCISCOW),JPRS-TAC- Addmss,January28,1992(foreignpolicy 92-006,February14,1992,pp. 11-13. cxccqm),U.S.Departmentof StateDis- patch,vol.3, no. 5, Fcbma~ 3, 1992.

.. . 26 2,500

2,246

1,600

■❞ SNDV: ICBM, SLBMOor kavy bomberequippedfor nuclearwvlvxls (bombs,SRAMS,or ALCMS).

Fig. 1. STARTLimits: DeployedStrategicNuclear Delivery Vehicles(SNDVs). .—-

10,563 10,271

,, 6,000

L ———— d Fig.2. DeployedWarheads (STARTAccountable). 4,900

RV“hWdOKhl~” 1,540 (EJllplyspaceS) 1,250 1,100

250 ‘Deployedwarheads‘ L ————,——.J

Fig.3. Bailistic-MissileWarhead Sublimiw NRRC DepartHost Notification Coimtry

Post-hts tion 0S1 Complete ReportFomplcte Arrive Announce POE )S1Site 1an toK)E

Arrive0S1 I Site HostBriefing Complete

9 hrs- I 1hr 4- 24-32hrs + 4hrs+ 4-4+ (-[4+ +4+ 4-16+ +$+

sequential Inspections 0S1 Trztiel Activities

Inspectionteamflies(overseas)fromhometo hostPOE(includestimefmrn notification). Time for teamto rest,prepareforinspection;hostinspectscquipmentetc.; teamdesignatessite;~ = 4-24hrsfor Ma update,suspectsite,andRV0SSs. Hostfliesteamto specifiedsite(expeditiously). Hostbficfs0S1 teamuponarrivalat inspectionsite. Actualspecified0S1 takesplace(teammay requestextension). Team leaderwrites,completesreportof 0S1 findings. Teamreturnsto POE;announcessequentialinspectionby thistime. Teampreparesto leave,leavesPOE forhome,or conductssequentialinspection. Teamumductssequentialinspection.

Fig 4. On-Site InspectionTimeDurations(doesnotincludePPCM; time durations shownare forbawline+dataupdatGandother“short-notice”inspections). 29

InspectionTimes (t) in Hours for Fig.4

Type 0S1 t, tl t,. t, t~ t6 $ t,

BaselineData ~]6 448 <9 1 24’ S4 %’ 24

NcwFacility z16 448 59 1 24’ S4 ;’ 24

Data Update z]6 4.24 <9 1 24+8d S4 $’ 24

RV Count ~1: 4-24 <9 1 t$(RV) S1 ~’ 24

>\6 SuspecLSite 4-24 S9 1 24+84 9 $’ 2’$

Conversionor Elimination z72 # # 1 t$C,E) a # 24 -

Post-ExerciseDispersal 216 48 S9 1 24+8~ S4 4’ 24

Ctose-Out - z72 # ti8 1 24+8d a # 24

FormerlyDeclaredFacility z16 4-24 <9 1 24+8d S4 4’ 24

Exhibitions:RVTechnical z72 # # 1 24b S4 # 24 Characteristics Exhibitions:HB, ALCM; 272 # # 1 24’ S4 # 24 distinguishability Exhibitions:nonnuclear 272 # # 1 24’ S4 # w HII; baseline

‘Seeexceptionsformobile-missilesitesete.(Ref. 1). b~y & cx~nd~ by mu;ualagreementasneededto completeinsption. ‘Thesetimesarcdependenton sequentialinspections(seeinspectionsprotocol,Ref. 1). %-hourextensionbyagreement. ~ (RW Uponcompktionof proceduresinannex3 of inspectionsprotocol,Ref. 1. $ (C&) dependentonconversion/eliminationactivities. # Thesetimedurationsfor the“scheduled”inspectionswill bedependenton thehost exhibitionactivitiesfor thesecases. 30 —- lable 1. Summaryof STARTForo@Llmttattons

CATEGORY PROVtSIONSANDNUMERtCALLIMITATIONS

GsnamlPrdalons U.S. andUSSRwillreducmtheiraccountabledeployed strategicnucleararmsbyabcut30Y0toequalaccount- ablelevels.

Reductionswillbeachievedbyeliminationsorconver- sions.

Eliminationsorconversionswillbecarriedouttnthree phasesoversevenyearstoagreedtevelsattheendof eachphase.Thesetevelsare: 3 yrs:SNDVSS2,1OO; WHS59,150.5 yrs: SNDVS51,900;WHS57,950. 7 ym: Limitsareasdescribedbelow.

Modernizationandreplacementmaybecarriedout exceptasspacitkallyprohibited.

Thetreaty’sdurationwillbefifteenyearsuntasssuper- seded.Thetreatymayberenewedatfitie-parintervak

Notransferofstrategknucfaararmstothirdcountries, butexistingpatternsofcooperation(Le..U.SAJK)may continue.

OvemllLfmtts

WDVS Nomorethan1,600dsptoysd!CBMSandtheirassoci- atedlaunchers,SLBMSandtheirassociatedlaunchers, andheavybontwmwillbeallowedeithersideaftera sever-yearreductionperiod.

Nomorethan6,000accountablewarheadsmaybe daploysdonfC8Ms,SLBMS,andheavybonbersafter theseven-yearreductionperiod.Aborrrbarwithonfy gravityborbs andSRAMswillcountasonetowardthe 6,000limit.

Thfow-weghtfYotd) Nomorethan3.600metrictons

OverseasBasirg Notpermanentlypermitted.TenqmraIY~- Ofbombsrsparmiftedwitha@cable notmoatbns.Mt cattsforSSSNsparnitfad.

SuMfmftsandRatrlotfons

Bamfk-M&sBeWarheab Nomomthan4,900~ WSlhSd onlC6hk and SLmfs. Nomra man10Rvsperbalfistkmissile. 31

Tablo1.(wntlnuad)

LYownbating Nomomthan1,250‘emptyspaces-reducingtheSTART countofRV6onballisticmissileswithdemonstrated MIRVcapabiiities.HeavyICBMS(SS-18s)maynotbe downloaded.DownloadingrestrktionsforSS-N-18, MMIII,etc.(seetreatyArt.Ill,Par.5).

H8avy/CBMs Nomorethan154heavyICBMS(appliesonlytoSS-18). Nonew-typeheavyICBMS.Nomorethan 154silosfor heavyICBMS.Sovietswiileliminate22 SS-18launchers peryearforsevenyearstoreduceto 154limit.

Heavy/CBMWarheads Nomorethan1,540warheadsonheavyICBMS.

IA?avySLBMS NoheavySLBMSandnoheavySLBMlaunchers.

MobiieiC6Ms Nomorethan1,100warheadsonmobileICBMS.No mobilelaunchersofheavyICBMS.SS-24,SS-25,and MXtreatedasmobiles.

HaavyBonhws Eachnuclear-armedheavybombercountsasoneSNDV. Eachbombermaycarrymorethanonebomb(and/or SRAM)andwillstillcountasoneagainstthewarhead Mt.

U.S.agreesnottocountBackfire(lupolev22-m). Sovietswill,bydeclaration,iimitBackfirestos300air forceandQOOnaval,andnotgivethemintercontinental capability.

H8ayyBonXw WMALCMS Nucfear-armadALCMborrbersmustbedistinguishable fromnonnuclearbombers.EachALCMquipped bombercountsas 10ALCMSforU.S.and8 ALCMSfor USSR.

TheU.S.maycountnomorethan150borrkmraas carrying10ALCMS,andthe(former)USSRnomorethan 180bombersascarrying8 ALCMS.Iftheaavaluesare excaaded,eachbomberinex-ss willbemuntedas -W theactualnumberofALCMSforwhkhitis equtpped.

FortheU.S.,anALCMheavybonbermayactuaffybe equippedfornomorethan20 nuclear-armedALCMSper bomber.FortheUSSR,anALCMheavybombermay actuallybaequippedfornomorethan16suchALCMS parbomber.

BonberamayberemovedfromSNDVandwarhead countsifconvertedtocanynonnuclearweaponsonfy. 32

Tablo1.(contlnuad)

Nonnuclear&?avyBo,-rs 575(excludedfromSNDVandWHcounts).

TestHeavyBOdMrS s20(excludedfromSNDVandWHcounts],

ALCM’S Eachnuclear-armedALCMcountsas onewarheadunder ~hocounlhr~rulesforbombersIisfadabove.Nuclear ALCMSarecounted(long-range)iftheirrangeisgreater than600km. Nonnuclear-armed,long-rangeALCMSare notcountediftheyaredistinguishablefromnuclear- armedALCMS,

SLCMa SLCMSarenotdirectlyconstrainedinthetreaty,buteach yeareachsidemusldeclareitspoiicyforplanned deploymentsofnuclearSLCMS(ofrangegreaterthan 600km)forthenextfiveyears,andthesedeclarations arebinding.Theseplanneddepfoymenfsmustprovide fornomorethan880SLCMSforeachside.Therewillbe nonuclearmultiplewarheadSLCMS.Nuclear-armed SLCM,300s ranges600km,subjecttoconfidential annualdataexchanges.Thedeclarationswntainlng theseagreementswereincludedwiththeJuly31, 1991, treatydocuments.

SpaciflcProhMtlonc TheseprohibitionsapplytobothIheU.S.andtheUSSR: . NoheavySLBMSorlaunchers . NomobilelaunchersofheavyICBMS . NorapidreloadofICBMlaunchers . Nolong-rangenuclearALCMSwithmultlplewar- heads . Nonew-typeheavyICBMS . Nonew-typeballisticmissileswithmorethan10 FWs (Newtypedefinedasanymissilewhosethrow- weightwasincreasedby221Y0 orwhosestage- Iengtnchangedby25%.). . No increaseinnumberofICBMorSLBMwarheads fromthoselistedinMOU . Nomorethantwonew-typeICBMSorSIBMswith frontsectionoffundamentallynewdesign . Noincreaseinlaunch-weightorthrow-walghtof existingheavyICBMSorSLBMS . ICBMSmaybedepbyedonlyinsibsorroadlrail mobilelaunchers . NoundergroundfacilityaxassibfetoSSBNS . NoconversionofSLBMtoIand-mobileICBM . Noballisticmissileswitha rangeover600kmfor waterbornevehicles,exce@submarines . Noballlstic-missjlalaunchersonsaabed . Nosystemsforplacingnuclearweapons{norbit I

,I Tablo1.(contlnuad)

. Noalr40wrfacaballisticmissiles . NobasingofTL!soutsidethenationalterritoriesof theparties . Nonuclearweaponsonanaircraftwitha range greaterthan8,000kmthatisnotanalrplano NonucleararmedALCMSonairplanesotherthan bombers.

TheU,S.unilaterallystatesthatitdoesnotplanto placenuclear-armedALCMSonthe&2 bombor unlessflighttestedandexhibited.

NomhployadWorqxma

Mobk ICBMS Theremaybe no morethan250nondeployedICBMSOf typespreviouslyfighttestedfr~mmobilelaunchers,5125 ofthesemaybeforrail-mobiles.Nondeployedmobile IaurtchersotICBMSwillbelimitedto 110. Nomorethan 18 Ofthesemayberail-mobilalaunchers.Ata mahrte- nancefacility,nondeployedICBMSshallbestored separatelyfromnondeployedmobi!elaunchers.There rnsybenomorethantwonondeployedICBMSofeach types~cifktdata maintenancefacilityformobile launchers.Additionalrestrictionsgivenh’ttreatyArt.IV.

/CBMsandSLBMS NondeployedsilotCBMsandSLBMSarenotsubjectto . aggregatenumericallimitsbutaresubjecttorequire- mentsfordataexchange[specifictypesmMOU)and notification.Example:transitofnondeployedICBMSand SLBMsmustbestatedina notification.

TestRanges ICBMSandSLBMSlocatedattestrangesarelimitedto 435atonetime;<25after7 yrs.

Otherf?estdcfbns TherearefurtherdetailedreMctionsastofocationsof (ICBMSandSLBMs) specificnondeployedICBMSandSLBMS(seetreatyArt. Iv).

hrbers4ALCMs Thetreatyprovidesnonumberlimitonnondeployed bombersandALCMS.

Thetreatyprovidesnolimitonthetotalnumberof nondeployednuctearwarheads.

TheU,S.andUSSRhaveagreedtoaffoweachsideone bonWrexen”seperyear,withagreednotification procedures. 34 , Table1.(contlnuad)

Convardonof TU Provisionsspaclhd. (saaconverslotiellmlnatlon protocol)

Ellmlnatlonof TU Provisionsspecified.(saaconverslonhliminatlon I protocol) I 1 fCBU FacllttyLocations Eachsuchfacllltymustbalocated>100kmfromany (produotlon,mpalr,stom~, ICBMbaseforthattypa(SIIO,mobl!e,testrange).See I Ioadlnq●ndconvoralon) treatyArt.IV. 1<

Tablo2. U.S.andUSSRStmtaglcNucfoarDaploytnonts(STARTcountingrulasusedforwarhaads -r SNDV)

IalnGhm” IQwwMda’

UnltocStato8

ICBM MlrmtemanII 450 1 450 MinutemanIll 500 3 1,500 MX 50 10 500 Subtotal(ICBM) 1,000 2,450

SLBM Poseidon 192 10 1,920 TridantI 384 8 5,072 TridentII 90 0 768 Subtotal(SLBM) 672 5,760

Bombers B-lB 95 lb 95 B-52(non-ALCM) 290 lb 290 B-52(ALCM) 189 10(39@ 12)b 1968b Subtotal(Bombars) 574 2353

TotalSNDVS 2,248 TotalWarheads 10,563

ICBM 33-II 326 1 326 SS-13 40 1 40 33-17 47 4 186 33-18 308 10 3,080 33-19 300 8 1,800 SS-24 89 10 890 SS-25 288 1 288 Subtotal(ICBM) 1,398 6#12 36

Table2.(contlnuod)

SLBM SS-N-6 192 1 192 SS-N-8 280 1 280 SS-N-17 12 1 12 SS-N-18 224 3 672 SS-N-20 120 10 1,200 SS-N-23 112 4 44s Subtotal(SLBM) 940 2,804

Bombers Blackjack(ALCM) 15 120 Bear(ALCM) 04 672 Baar(non-ALCM) 63 63 Blackjack(non-ALCM) 0 0 Subtotal(Bombers) 162 855

Total(SNDV) 2,500 TotalWarheads 10,271

Waluesgivenin MOLJ,signedJuly31, 1991. bAttributadbySTARTBombar/ALCMcountingrulas. 37

Tabla3. Summa~of ProvlolonaforVerlflcatlonof Compliance

CATEGORY PROVISIONS

DataExchanga Bothsidesprovidedinventorydata(MOU)atsigningof the. “eaty.Thedatawillbeupdatedeverysixmonths duringtheIheoftheIraaty.Thesedataincludethe numberof‘iLls,sitelocations,andcharacteristics.

NationalTachnicalMaana EachsidewilluseNTM. Thesidesagreednotto interferewithNTM. Encryptionoftelemetricdatais bannedduringflighttests.Thetreatyprovidesfor cooperativemeasures,includingnotifiedopendisplaysof deployedmobileICBMSandbombers.

On-SftoInspections Eachsidewillconducttwelvekindsof0S1s.

On-SiteInspectbnRegimes Inspectionsmaybeconductedofbaselinedata,data updates,newfacilities,reentryvehiclespermissile,post- exercisedispersals,facilityclose-outs,andformerfy declaredfacilities.

Exhibitionsoflechnicalcharacteristics[forICBMS, SLBMS,bombers,andALCMS(nuclearvs.nonnuclear)] willbeinspectedbytheotherpartyusing0S1proce- dures.

TrfalExhibitionsof Counting Therehavebeen[fiatinspectionsofselectedSNDV RulesandW Denwnstration systemstodemonstratecountingrules.’

VerifyEliminationand Notifkationsofeliminationsorconversionsareissuedby Convers~onof TLI eachparty.TheotherpartyobservesbyNTMand cooperativemeasures,orobservesby0S1.

SuspectSttes Short-noticeinspectionsmaybeconductedofsuspect mobile-missileassemblyatsalesIistsdintheMOU(for USSR:Ziatoust,Bershet.andPetropavlovsk;forU.S.: Ogden,Sacramento,andMagna.)

lnspecflonQuotas Fifteen0S1s(dataupdate+SS1)~r year.TenRV0S1s peryear.OfherOSfsareinresponsetospecificnotifica- tions.

‘Pa Therewillbea portalpeffmetercontinuousmonitor (PPCM)ofthedeclaredmobire!CBMassartbfyfacilities (Vofkinsk,.SS-25;Pavlograd,SS-24;Promontory,Utah, MX), Tabfe3. (continued)

SpeclflcSyatems

MobibBallisticMissiles Mobile-missiledeploymentsarerestrictedtospecific areastoassistverification,movementnotifkationsand proceduresforNTM,cooperativerneasums,and0S1s arespelledout.

&avy Bombers/Al.CMs Bothsideshavecompletedtrialexhibitsofheavybomb- erswithALCMStodistinguishthemfromnon-ALCM bombers.bProcedureswerespecifiedforadditional exhibitions(seeS6C.111.C,ofthisreport).

SLCMS SeparatedeclaratorySLCMlimitswfllbeverifiedbyNTM only.

NondsployedWeepona

NoadephyedSNDVS Nondeployedmobile-missilelocationrestridonsmaybe verifieddurfrtgdalaupdate0S1sofICBMbases.

Nontiployed warheads Noverifkationregimesproposed.

‘Demonstrationofprocedurestoron-siteinspectionofRVSfor U.S.Peacekeeper(MX) April25-26,1990 SovietSS-18 hfay11, 1990 U.S.SLBM May29-30,1990 I SovietSLE3M June12,1990 I bAnexhibitionofheavybomberswithALCMStoobservethedemonstrationofprwedumsfordistin- guishingfromnon-ALCM-equippedbombers,byeachside.Exhibitiono? SovietTupolevheavybomberApril18,1990 U.S.B-1heavytir May11,1990 39

I TabI@4. Highlightsof On=SttaInspaotlonProcodutss

GENERAL0S1RULES

impactionOrganlzatlon Inspectors,monitors,andaircrewprovidedinverification protocol.Allows400namesoninspectorslist,300 monitors,andunlimitedaircrew.

Notlflcatlons Inspectingpartymustnotifyhost,216hrspriortoarrival of0S1teamat POE,ofintenttoconductbaselinedata, dataupdatooranyotherlype0S1exceptthosefor exhibitions,conversionleiimination,orclose-out.They require>72hrsadvancenotice. See Fig.4 forsubse- quent0S1timedurations.Appropriatenotificationsmust begivenateachstageofthe0S1.

AirTmnsportatlon U.S.AJSSReachhave2 pointsofentry.Mustfileflight planwithinlistedtimeconstraints.

0S1TeamLoglatfoa MustemerthruPOEclosesttositetobevisited.All equipmentandsuppiiessubjecttohostinspection. Equipmentnotrelatedtotreatymaybeimpounded. Equipmentandsuppliesmaybestoredat POE und? inspectorslockandkey. Accesstoequipmentrequires presenceofbothparties.Provisionmadebyhostfor food,lodging,transportation,etc.,ofinspectors.

0S1TeamRules HostmustprovidetelephoneiinefromembassytoPOE andinspectionsite. Hostmustassureinspectorsanive atsite<9hrsafternamingofsite. Inspectorsmayuse specifiedequipment(seeTable5). instantdevelopment camerasoperatedonlybyhosts,forinspectors.

[email protected] sionorelimination.0S1teammayuseS1Oparsonsfor otherinspections(>twoinspectorsmustspeakhost language).

Inspectiondurationshallbes24hrsexapt forexhibk tions,conversions,ore~minationa.Mayextendfors8hra byrequest.Post-inspactkmprocedures,includingreport, mustbecumpletedbyS4hrs.

Inforrrtatbngair.adthru0S1mquireahostparrnbsbnfor third-partydfaofosure. Table4. (continued)

PPCMTeamRules Teamusedforportalperimetercontinuousmonitorof mobile-missileproductionfacilities.Teammayuse$3(I persons.Monitorsmaybe replacedas needed. Moni- torsmayusespecifiedequlpmenl(seeTable6). Team establishescontinuousperimetermonlforofthefacility withportalsforexitlentranceandmonitoringofvehicles. Team InspectsforTLIs.

SPECIFICTYPESOFOSfs

InsqwtlonaforBaaelinaData, GeneralRules(asabove), DataUpdataa,NewFacilftbs

SaaellneData 0S1sstarl45 daysafterandend165daysafterentry intoforce(EIF) of STARTtreaty. Teamswillinspect largenumberofsitesto helpverifyinventotydatagiven inMOU.

DataUpdate 0S1sstarl 165daysafterEIF. Certainmovement restrictionsapplyonehourafternotificationofsite.Each partymayconductfifteendataupdate0S1speryear.

suspectSite EachpartymayrequestSS1ofoneofthreefaciiifles listedinMOUthatsatisfkscrleriaformobile-mksile assemblycapabiiii. Challengedpartymaydenyrequest forSS1.butstepsmustbetakentoresolveissue. Formertydecla.wdfacilitiesmayalsomeetrequirements forSS1.

Treatypermitsteninspectionsperyearat ICBMand SLBMbases.Tearnfollc#sgerteralprowduressimilar todataupdateinspectionsbutspecificprocedure requiredforviewingfronlsectionofselectedmissileto determinenumberofRVS.TLImovermt restrictions applytohostatbaseduringRVinspection.

Peat-ExercleeDlsparsal Treatypermits0S1sofdeployedmobilemissilesafteran (mobile missiles) exercisedispersaitoconfirminventoryspecifiedforthat base.

ConversiorVEllmlnationof T1.fs OSLSsimiiartoiNFtreaty,butaddressbothmissilesand akcraft.

Cbaa-OutInapeotlons OSisto confirmtreaty-limitedaothritleahaveceasedat sitesodeclaredandtoconferchangeofstatus. . 41 . iabto5. E@wnent forOSfsa

EquipmentCharacterfstlcs 2-1o P6 Pll 12,13

Measuringtapes(3Gm) x x x Measufingtapes(3 m),M.stick(3 m) x x x x Plumbbobs,etc.,50yds x x x

Cameras(wfllash,Polaroids,tripod,andfllti*@) x x x

Flashlight,compass,andpocketcalculator x x x x Tamperindicatingtape x x x Dosimeters(ionizingandTLD)andchargers x x x x Satellitesystemreceivers(providedbyhost) x x Neutrondetectorsw/electron&counterse x x Y Neutroncalibrationsource x Y Programmablecalculator(HP2?) x x

Handtools x x x x Magnifyingglasses x Calipers(20cm) x x Combinationsquare x x Handlevels x Weghingdevices(tobeagreedbyJCIC) x

Engineeringsitesurveyequipmentandtopographicalmaps x Portablecorrq,wters,printers,andcopier x PortableFax x Videocameras(w/portablerecorders,TVmonitor) x list includesprincipalequipmentprovidedforU.S.teams.Thereisa similarlistforUSSRteams. Theheadingsfortheright-handcolumnsdefinethetypesofInspectionsforwhichthechecked(X) equipmentisprovided(annex80inspectionsprotocol,Ref.1). Thenumbersrefertothedefining paragraphsinArt.Xl ofthetreaty.Theseare: 2-10 baselinedata,da!aupdate,newfacility,suspectsite,post~xetcisadispersal,converalon/ elimination,close-out,andformerfydeolaredfacility. 6 reentryvehicle(RV). 11 technicalcharacteristicsexhibitions(ICBMS,SLBMS). 12,13distinguishabilityexhibitions(heavybomber,ALCM);baselineexhibitionsfornonnuclear bombers. PPCMperimeterportalcontinuousmonitoring(l&tedinannex8, inspectionsprotocol). Typeschecked(V)indicate‘right-toradiationmeasurementsestablishedinannex4, lrrspectbns protocol. B=k~re~ bywrtieS.= ‘Right-10useneutrondetectorsspacifkfonlyforALCMdbflnguishablfhyOSls. Allaqulprnantmay beInspsctadbyhostatPOE. I 42 I Tabs 6. EquipmentforPedmetarPortalContlnuouaMonltorfn@

I EquipmentforPPCM(annex9, inspectionsprotocol)

Vehicledimensionalscreening Ir,frarectbreakbeamsystem(metalbase,irdraredsensors) Weghlsensors(prov”* byhost)

~u~edf!nce system Charactergenerators TVcameras(monochrome,adjustablemountingheads,towers,etc.) TVmonitors Fiberopticcables,othercabling Exteriorlightingpoles,Ights Dataauthenticationdevices

Vehiclesensorsandcontrolequipment IRtreakbeamsystem Induclion-loopsensors Gate-openingsensors TrafficsgnalIghts Semaphoregates Communicationsequipment Telephone,handradios,andintercom Environmentalshetter Forusealongperimeter Videomotion-detectionequipment Dataauthenticationdevices Cablingasrequired Surveillancesystemasabove Operationscenterbuilding Backuppowergenerator Powersupplyequipment,elc. Operationscenterequipment Programmablelogiccontrollermemorymodule Controlpanel PrintersforPCs PCs(hard&floppydisks,monitors,etc.) TV andPCequipmant .SoftwareforPCs Photocopyingequipment Communications LaserFax,telephonesystem,andintercom Basestationradioreceiver,hand-heldradio,andantennas Fiberopticcabling GPRs(byhost)

%t incfudespffncipafequipnwntprovidedforUoS.taama.Shnlt6fflatforUSSR. AflPPCMequipmentmaybainspectedbyhostatPOE. 43

Tabk 7. ImpactionStartingThea

Typeof Ost StartingTlmo

BaselineData ~+45 day8to 165

NewFaciltty 10+45

DataUpdate 10+165

Rv count 10+165

Convers!m/Elimination 10+45

Post-ExerciseDispetsal 10+notifioatbn

Close-Out 10+notifkation(wlthln60daysofnotification)

FormerlyDeclaredFacility 10+165

RVTechnicalCharactenslicsExhibitions Within240daysafteetreatysignature(July31, 1991) forICBMSandSLBMS

HB/ALCMDistinguishability Within240daysaftertreatysignature(Juty31, 1991)

suspectStte 10+165

PPCM 10+30

L=EIF (eti~hmfomtitn~;MwrMMbn) 44 .-. APPENDIX’

EXPANDED TABLE OF CONTENTS2

TreatyBetweentic UnitedStatesof AmericaandtheUnionof Soviet~disl Republicsonthc ReductionandLimitationsof StmtcgicArms

Article1: GeneralObligations A.rticlc11: CentralLimits ArticleIII: Cc*mtingRules Atticlc IV: NondcploycdLimiLsandRestrictions ArticleV: Prohibitions Article VI: Mobile ICBMS Aniclc VII: Conversionor Elimination ArticleVIII: Memorandumof UndcrstmiirtgandNotification.. Article 1X: NationalTechnical.McarMof Vcrifica[ion ArticleX: Tclcmctry Artic!cXI: lnqxctims andContinuousMonitoring Aticic Xll: CooperativeMeasures ArticleX111: ExcrciscDispersalsandMajor StrategicExemiscs ArticleXIV: operationalDispersals ArticleXV: JointComplianceandInspectionCommission ARiclc XVI: ConflictingIntcmaticrtalObligations ArticleXVII: Entryinto Force,Duration,andWithdrawal Attic& XVH1: Amendments ArticleXIX: RegistrationandSignature

Annexon AgreedStatctncnts

1. Nontransfcrof StrategicOffensiveAmts 2. Ncw Kindsof StrategicOffensiveArms 3. SS-11ReentryVchiclcAttribution 4. ASBMIkfinition 5. Replacementof HeavyICBM Silos 6. BisonAirplanes 7. purposeof operationalDispersals 8. StrategicOffensiveArmsoperationsoutsideNatioralTmitoty 9. Lighter-rhan-airAircraft 10. HeavyBomberInspectionsat Davis-MonthanAir ForecBase 11. Eliminationof LiquidMobilesandHeavyBmnbcrswithoutTail- Sclcctions 12. Exclusionof Cenain BearAircraftFrmnSTART 13. EngineeringSilosat Hill AirForceBase 14. SovietStorageFacilitiesExemptfromLocationalRcstlMals 15. SovietTrainingFacilitiesExemptfromLocationalRcstricti(ms 16. LauncherCapabilityforExistingLatmchs 17. “Not Equipped”for HeavyBombcts

‘Takenkm Ref. 1. %C 19Aniclcs ink TrcaIy Text and k Agreed !hcmcnts do not have Mea. bu tides )UW k added to this hble of conknts 10assisI “tjcreader. Whcr [ides in this table have hem shorIcnu! slightty. only k ti[lcs m lhcy appear ‘mIhc acmal IwY.; lcxl arc official. 18. AndcrscnAir ForceBase,Guam Mobiic SpaceLaunchers % RCUSCof LaunchCanisters 21. ch~gcs to the M(XJ 22. Rckuionship Bc[wccnSTART andtheINF Treaty 23, ‘llc Term “AcccssiblcO’wi[hRCSpCCI10UndergroundFacilities 24, FrontSectionof FundamcnlallyNew Design 25. Definitionof “Varianl”for ICBMS and SLBMS 26. Dcclaralion of SpaceLaunch Facilities at Eliminalcd-ICBM Bases 27. Excmpdon for Soft-SiteLaunchcmat Cap Canaveral 28. Rcslnctionson ICBM andSLBM FirstStages 29. STARSBoosterExemptfromSTART 30. Spaec Launch Vchiclcs from ShipsotherthanSubmarinesand from Ai@ncs otherthanHeavy Bombers 3t. Tclcmctryl%otocolApplicabilityto Objectsin Orbit 32. ‘llmw-wcighl of Ncw Typesof MissilesDeployedbeforetheEighth FlightTest 33. SpecialpurposeSubmarines 34. VerifyingLengthand‘llmw-weight for Ncw Types 35. Reimbursementof CostsforTclcmctryTape Exchange 36. Banon Multiple Inspectionsof CertainU.S. Airba..cs 37. Managementof RetiredandFormerTypesof ICBMS andSLBMS 38. RefcmnceCylindersfor ICBMS for Mobile Launchersof ICBMS with Liquid-PropellantRocketEngines

AnnexonTermsandTheir Dcfimitions Definitionsof 124termsaresetfon.h,in alphabeticalorder. I Protocolon ProceduresGoverningConvcmionor Elimination SectionI: ICBMSfor Mobile Launchemof ICBMS andtheirLaunchCanisteIS Section11: SiIo Launchers,SiIoTrainingLaunchers,andSilo TestLaunchem Section111: Mobile Launchemof KBMs, Mobilc TtainingLaunchemandfixed Structuresfor Mobile LauncheIsof ICBMs SectionIV: SLBM Launchers SectionV: Soft-SiteLaunchers sectionVI: HeavyBombersandFormerHeavybombers .SectionVI!: RemovalfmmAccountabilityof ICBMSfor Mobile Launchemof ICBMs asa resultof FlightTestsor StaticTesting sectionVIII: OtherProccdunsfor Removalfmrnor Changesin Accountability SectionIX: Facilities

I%otocolon InspectionsandContinuousMonitoringActivities

SectionI: GeneralObligations Section11: LegalStatusof Inspcctom,Monitors.andAircrewMemMs SectionIII: Notificationsof InspectionsandContinuousMonitoringActivities SectionIV: Arrangementsfor Air Tnutsportation sectionv: ActivitiesBeginningat thePointof EnQ &xtionVI: GeneralRuh2S SectionVII: BaselineData,DataUpdate,andNew Facilityinspections sectionWI: SuspectSiteInspections SectionIX: ReentryVehicleInspections sectionx: Post-Dispersal?nspcctiom

— 46

SectionXI: Convcmion or Elimination Inspections Scuion XII: Close-oul Inspections SectionX111: FormcrtyDeclaredFacilityinspections ScclionXIV: TcchnicatCharactcnsticsExhibitionsandinspections ScclionXV: Distin~uishtibilityandBaselineExhibitionsandInspections ScclionXVI: ContinuousMonilonng Activities SectionXVII: Cancclhuionof Inspections Section XVIII: Ins,pcctionReportandContinuousMonitoring Report Annex 1: Inspection of Covered Objects, Containers,LaunchCanisters,Vehicles, andSlmchrts Annex 2: Inspectionof Silo Launchersof ICBMS, Mobile Launchem of ICBMS, and SL13MLaunchers Annex3: ReentryVchiclcInspections Annex4: Inspectionsof HeavyBombers,FormerHeavyBombem,Long-Range ALCMS,and their Facilities Annex5: Continuous Monitoring Annex6: Unique l&ntificm Annex7: Ddivcnng andExaminingEquipmcmandSuppliesTransportedby InspectionAi@mcs Annex8: Equipmentfor InspcciionsandContinuousMonitoring Amex 9: Equipmentfor thePerimeterandPortalContinuousMonitoringSystem Annex !0: Types of Inspection AirpIancs Annex 11: Conlinning the Dimensions of ICBMS andSLBMS Annex 12: SizeCrhcriato be UsedDuring InspectionsandContinuousIWmitonng Protocolon Notifications

section 1: DataContainedin theMemorandumof Understanding sectionII: Movcmcntof ItemsSubjectto Limitationsin theTreaty Section111: ICBM andSLBM 7?trow-weight ScclionIV: Conversionor Elimination sectionv: CooperativeMeasures sectionVI: FlightTestsof ICBMS andSLBMS sectionVII: Ncw TypesandNcw Kindsof StrategicOffensiveArms section VIII: changes in InformationProvidedPursuantto ArticleVIII of theTreaty SectionIX: InspectionsandContinuousMonitoring sectionX: OperationalDispctsals protocolon ICBM andSLBM Throw-weight

section1: KktcnninationandAccountabilityof ‘Ilmw-weight section11: Verification

Protocolon TclemetncInformation

Section1: Provisionof Tapes section11: DataAssociatedwith Analysisof TelemetricInformation Sc:tion111: EncapsulationandEncryptionof TelemetricInformation SectionIV: provisionalApplication ProtocolontheJointComplianceandInqxctioncommission Section1: composition Section11: Convening SectionIII: SpecialSession ScciionIV: Agenda Section V: Workof SectionVI: Costs sectionWI: Communications sectionVI1l: AdditionalRocedutvs

Memorandumof Understanding on theEshtblishmentof the DataBase

sectionI: Warheadandl%mw weightAttributions section11: AggregateNumbers section111: Auributkmwith Rcdu@ Num&r of Warheads sectionIV: Additional Aggregate Numbcm

AnnexA: ICBMSandICBMLaunchers AnnexB: SLBMS and SLBM Launchers Annexc: HeavyBombersandFonncrHeavyBombers Amex D: SpaceLaunchFacilities AnnexE: EliminatedFaci}itics AnnexF: ICBM andSLBM TechnicalData AnnexG: HeavyBomberTechnicalData AnnexH: Long-RangeNuclearALCM TechnicalData Annex1: other DataRquircd by theTreaty AnnexJ: OtherRequirements

Rclatm+Agreements

AgrvcmcntonEarly Exhibitionsof StrategicOffensiveArms

Agmcmenton Early Exchangeof Lists of Inspectors,Monitors,andAircrewMcmbcrs Proposedfor InspectionsandContinuousMonitoringActivities

Agrccmcn[on Exchangeof CoordinatesandSiteDiagrams(NolReleasedto thePublic)

Agrecmcnto)~ReciprocalAdvanceNotificationof Major StraICgicExercises

LettersSignedby U.S, andSovietRepresentatives

PhasedReductionsof HeavyICBMS BearD B-1 SiloLaunchControlCenters LaunchCanisters

Engineering:WeSu.wcys

RovidingPhotographs (Main CorrespondenceRelatedto theTreaty 48

Third-Couni~~Ba..ing

ALCMS with Muhiplc Weapons

Tacit Rainbow

Relocation of HeavyICBMSilos JointStitlcmcnls !ltatcmcnton NcwMissileProductionTechnologyProcmses StatcmcntRegardingDataUpdateswithRespectto Categoriesof DataContainedin the Memorandumof Understanding Statcmcmon CostsRelatedto theConveningof a Sessionof theJCICon theTerritory of OnCof thePanics

Slatcmcnton theBanon SupportEquipmentat EliminatedFacilities Statcmcnton NarrowDirectionBeaming Statcmcnton theTerm‘“M”

Statcmcn\on ChancrFlights

StatcmcntConcerningCurrencyof PaymentforCostsRelatingto Implementationof the START Treaty

StatcmcntConccmingIntcrprctativcData

Statcmenton WeaponStorageAreas

Statcmcnton Exchangeof SiteDiagrams Statcmcntin ConnectionwithProceduresforConfirmingLaunchWeight other S1atcmcnts U.S.StatcmentConcerningtheB-2HeavyBomber U.S.Statementof PolicyConcerningEncryptionand!Iatnming SovietStatcmcntof Policytincetning EncryptionandJamming

U.S. Statementon ConsultationsRelatingto theReleaseto thePublicof DataandOther Information

SovietS“-ment onConsultationsRelatingto theReleaseto thePublicof Dataand OtherInfomlation ;i,!l Statementon Launch-asdated SupportVehiclesandDriverTrainingVehicles 49

Sovic~Slatementon Ltiunch-amciatedSuppottVchiclcsandDriverTrainingVchiclcs

U.S. Sta:cmcnton Non-circumventionoi’theSTAR’t”Treaty

Sovic[StatcmenlcoNon-circumvcntitmoftheSTART Treaty

SovietStatcmcntConccmingExistingPaucmsof Cooperation

U.S.Statcmcnton theSS-N-23

Sovic[Statcmcnton theSLBM SS-N-23

U.S. Stalcmcnton AttachmentJoints

Sovic[StatcmcntConccmingthePutposcsof Inclusionin theMemorandumof Under- standingof Dataon theDistanceIxtwccnJointsfor AttachingLong-RangeNuclear ALCMS

U.S. Statcmcnton UndcrgmundStmcturcs

.SovictSta[cmcnton UndergroundSwuc[ures

U.S.StatcmcntConccmingtheSTART-ABM Relationship

SovietStaIcmentConcerningthehttcrmla[ionshipBctwccntheReductionsin Strategic OffensiveArmsandCompliancewiththeABMTreaty

U.S. StatcmcntConcerningtheStatementof theSovietSidecntheTSSAMCtuisc MissiIe

SovietStatementConcxwningtheInformationof theU.S.Sideon theTSSAMCruise Missile

Mhrations Declwationof the U.S.RegardingNuclearSLCMS

Declarationof the U.S.S.R.RegardingNuclearSLCMS

DeclarationBytheU.S,S.RConcerningtheTu-22MMediumBomber

*U.S. Go.● rnment Pr1nt IfI!JOff ic.: 1992-67 3-036/67020 ABSTRACT

An overviewoftheStrawglcArmsReducfionTreaty(START)andtfsassociatedprotocols, mnexes,and~readstatementsIspraaanfed.AlsoexaminadindetaifareUrevarificabon provisionsInthetreatyand8wtrimpfkatbnaforarmscmbd. ThaexpmdadfabfeofmrrMts offhafraatydocumantiskKhJdada anAppendix.manegomonssince19821earfingupto?re W* of* treatyarewmrnarizad.

DfSCLAfMER

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