Christina Ge HIST 1969A

Zionism As Settler ?

When Patrick Wolfe applied the concept of to Israel/Palestine in 2006, he sparked a series of debates about whether Zionism could be described as colonial. The settler colonial tendency revolves around land contests, which in many cases, requires the removal of the native inhabitant to make space for the colonizer. In recent years, scholars have borrowed

European colonial frameworks to understand Israel’s systematic removal and subjugation of

Palestinians historically. Yet, questions arise as to how far the analogy between European colonization and Jewish reaches. Are Zionism’s peculiar characteristics more settler colonial or nationalistic? Can be both natives and settlers? While Zionism’s origins differ drastically from the impetus for European conquests, Israel/Palestine has significant similarities with under . Whereas South Africa’s apartheid system was the rule of law,

Israel’s informal system of separation nonetheless poses insidious effects in its removal of and discrimination against . Israel’s Judaization of land began in its early state planning phases, and the continued spatial exclusion of Palestinians is in line with settler colonial tendencies. Importantly, settler colonialism should be evaluated based on the characteristics that

Wolfe identified, rather than solely by its adherence to the European colonial model.

The defining characteristic of settlers on an occupied territory is that they intend to stay and remove natives who live on the land (Wolfe 1). For settlers, the most important factor is land takeover, which most settler colonial societies execute through the elimination of the indigenous population. Wolfe clarifies that “invasion is a structure not an event,” and the logic of elimination is a structure of organizing the new society rather singular occurrences (Wolfe 2).

Settler colonial societies across the world differ from each other, but some aspects of elimination

Ge 1 include depriving natives of rights, citizenship, land, religious conversion, and forced assimilation to the colonizer’s laws and institutions (Wolfe 2). The overarching idea is rebuilding by destroying native communities (Wolfe 2). Importantly, Wolfe distinguishes between settler colonialism and genocide, which is the deliberate killing of a certain . While settler colonialism is inherently eliminatory, it does not always lead to genocide, which can occur without settler colonialism such as in Dafur or Rwanda (Wolfe 1). In many cases, however, settler colonialism may act as a precursor to genocide and warrants caution (Wolfe 1).

South Africa is a classic example of European settler colonialism. The settlers imposed apartheid, which means state sponsored separateness of races. This system included the subjugation of natives, separation from whites and native labor exploitation. Africans were displaced and subjected to Dutch cultural assimilation that distanced them from their native language and agricultural traditions. Black acquiescence and political exclusion were necessary to achieve capitalist modernity, and slavery of blacks became common practice in South Africa.

In 1948, apartheid became a legal system, formalizing the denial of human rights and towards African people. For example, The Homeland Citizens Act of 1970 created “reserves,” colloquially known as “,” that forced thousands of blacks to move from urban centers.

Many scholars view Israel/Palestine through the prism of apartheid, and examine the extent to which the South African case is applicable to Zionist suppression and elimination of

Palestinians (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2). Some similarities immediately jump to mind. The

Boycott, Divest and Sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel to withdraw from occupied territories is reminiscent of the 20th century boycotts against South Africa to end apartheid. The

Israeli military checkpoints and physical barriers that isolate Palestinian communities are reminiscent of Bantustanization, when blacks were relegated to specific areas in South Africa

Ge 2 (Bakan and Abu-Laban 9). However, the context of Jewish settlements in Israel differs greatly from the motivations of Dutch colonizers. The difficulty lies in distinguishing who is indigenous and who is settler in Israel/Palestine, and whether the two groups could co-exist in the same way that blacks and whites in South Africa have post-apartheid.

Unlike other settler colonial societies, Israel was formed as a safe haven and homeland for displaced Jews. Most of the first settlers were primarily refugees and immigrants who had been persecuted. Historically, Jews were racialized as the “other,” as exemplified by their expulsion from Middle Eastern countries and intense anti-Semitism in Europe that culminated in the Holocaust (Yiftachel 6). As part of a greater national and liberation movement, Zionism’s origins were largely nationalist rather than colonial like in the case of Dutch settlers. Zionism is complex in that it is both inter and intrastate; Jews, on top of being settlers, also have claims to indigeneity since the Biblical times, and some of the most egregious acts in removing

Palestinians stemmed from security concerns. Nationalist motives do not always manifest as colonial takeover, and Zionism stemmed from self-preservation. While nationalism should not excuse human rights violations, and it is futile to convince Palestinians that nationalism absolves occupation, Zionism’s peculiarities complicate classifying Israel as settler colonial (Pappé 3).

Derek Penslar, a historian at Harvard University, argues against Israel as a settler colonial state by identifying some key differences between Zionism and other fin-de-siècle European colonialism. First, European colonialism was defined by a colonizing state that established permanent extensions of the homeland in a classic sense of settler colonialism. The early Zionist stateless movement did not have a mother state, and in fact, there was no established state until the formation of Israel in 1948 (Penslar 8). In this sense, the origins of Zionism’s colonial tendencies were extremely different from those in Europe’s colonial projects. The closest thing

Ge 3 would be Britain operating through the mandate over Palestine after the fall of the Ottoman

Empire, when it developed physical infrastructure, and promoted Jewish institutions, both militarily and politically (Penslar 8). Britain was a stepparent rather than the biological parent of

Zionism, though without Britain’s support, “the Zionist project would have died in the cradle”

(Penslar 8). Unlike other settler colonial societies, Israel did not have a mother state to send resources to or fall back upon.

Exploitative labor was another common reason behind European colonial projects.

Europeans settled indigenous lands rich with natural resources and reaped the labor of native populations by subjecting them to plantation systems (Penslar 6). The exploitation of Arab labor is missing in the Zionist narrative, which makes the conflict seem more like a contentious clash between two groups who both had claims to the land, rather than a clear system of subjugation from the beginning. During the mandate period, Zionist labor exploitation in urban and plantation colonies was very modest and Arab labor made up only about 5 percent of the Jewish sector (Penslar 8). During this phase, both groups owned citrus groves and engaged in agricultural pursuits. Employing Arab labor was not considered a colonial tool but for practical utility reasons (Penslar 8). The Zionist system directly contrasts extensive plantation systems, which prior to European settlement, had been land reserved for small-scale cash crops. While the speed with which the Yishuv indigenized the land resembles Boers in South Africa, Zionism did not aim to displace Palestinians from the very beginning to make space for plantations.

Palestinian migration can also be attributed to moving labor demands all over the territory, rather than to purposeful Zionist labor exploits.

Penslar offers a convincing case but falls into the trap of traditional classifications. While

European colonialism is a helpful comparative, settler colonial tendencies are not contained to

Ge 4 the European model. Labor exploitation and home state support are certainly aspects of colonialist societies, but are not sufficient conditions in defining colonialism. In some sense, it is a mistake to force Zionism, infused with deep biblical justifications to create and maintain the holy land for Jews, into the European context of conquer. The Jewish history of persecution and desire to return to the homeland go beyond European theories of development, civilizing and capitalistic gains. For Jews and Palestinians alike, their claims to land are about belonging and a right to land; no European colonial mission experienced this type of existential question. The refutation against Penslar is not to say that Israel was not a settler colonial state, but to suggest that we should not rely on the European model, and evaluate colonial characteristics in their own context. Since 1948, Israel’s spatial planning has been premised on the exclusion of Palestinians, which was undoubtedly colonial in nature. In the events post-1948, Israel has acted very much in line with the settler by systematically removing Palestinians, who in this context, fit Wolfe’s characterization of the indigenous population.

The Judaization of land has been crucial to maintaining a system that entrenches social, economic and political inferiority of Palestinians in Israel, in occupied territories or as refugees.

Judaization is inherently colonial, as it involves one group taking over a space, displacing its former inhabitants, then utilizing most the land’s resources as its own (Yiftachel 6). Nadim

Rouhana and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury describe Israel’s establishment as a process whereby

“outsiders come to a populated land that they claim as their own, and displace most of its indigenous inhabitants while granting citizenship to those who are not expelled” (Rouhana and

Khoury 1). During the Nakba, more than 700,000 Palestinians were expelled from their homes in the 1948 war. Displaced Palestinians and their descendants make up more than 7 million

Ge 5 refugees today, who demand a right to return to their homeland. Jewish nationalism may have motivated colonial actions, but these two factors are by no means mutually exclusive.

Two individuals, Arieh Sharon and Ariel Sharon, were integral in Israeli spatial organization. Arieh Sharon was an Israeli architect who made major contributions to early state planning, and Ariel Sharon was the Prime Minister of Israel from 2001-2006. While the two

Sharons have different backgrounds, they promoted a separation strategy based on the acronym

SEEC, which stands for Settlement/Security, Expansion, Ethnicization,

Control/Commercialization (Yiftachel 3) that have defined the past sixty years. The aims of

SEEC were to maximize Jewish settlements and attain security of those spaces, expand into new frontiers, transfer territory to Jews but contain previous Palestinian inhabitants to specified areas, and lastly, control all spaces in the hands of the Jewish elite (Yiftachel 7). Oren Yiftachel argues that SEEC built the critical foundation of a new regime revolving around the Judaization of

Israel/Palestine, and as a result, legitimized the deliberate “geography of separate and unequal” that has severe implications for citizenship, power and mobility (Yiftachel 3). The SEEC rules are so entrenched today that they manifest as a “creeping apartheid” (Yiftachel 4).

Arieh Sharon headed the first era of building the state master plan from 1948 to the

1970s, at which point Ariel Sharon continued the legacy into the current day; I argue that both periods are colonial. Until the early 1990s, Israel’s settlement strategy was largely "horizontal," which was defined by Israel expansionism from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea to achieve legitimacy for the new state (Yiftachel 6). After the 1990s, Israel’s approach transformed to "vertical" ethnocracy to amplify control over settled areas (Yiftachel 6).

Publicized in 1951, Arieh Sharon’s “Sharon plan” concerned Zionist nation-building goals (Yiftachel 9). The plan prompted a drastic transformation of Israel’s resource allocation

Ge 6 that eased its transition towards becoming a modern state. The plan embraced the model of an urbanized society, creating 400 Israeli settlements and 30 or so new cities (Yiftachel 10). Sharon employed a “scattering” spatial strategy, calling for “the most settlements on the most space”

(Yiftachel 10). At the cost of Palestinians, Sharon strengthened Jewish sovereignty through land control, which is a classic settler colonial tactic. It is worthwhile to note that the Sharon Plan was implemented at a time when 82% of the population lived along the coast, primarily because thousands of Palestinians had been expelled during the Nakba and hundreds of Arab villages inland had been destroyed (Yiftachel 10). While Israel created this geographic distortion, the

Sharon plan ignored its historical context and corrected it with accelerated Jewish settlement to fill Palestinian vacancies. This act suggests a settler-colonial view of dismissing past histories, and aggressively replacing the land with settlers after removing the natives.

Before 1948, during the early years of Zionist settlement, Palestinians resisted the settler- colonial project to take over their land, but there was little they could do facing the extent of

Zionist plans and expulsion that occurred during the war. After the 1948 war, about 156,000

Palestinians, or almost 20% of the new Jewish state’s population, remained while the vast majority of Palestinians had been expelled and entire Arab cities such as Bisan or Tiberias were emptied (Rouhana and Khoury 2). Under military rule, Palestinians expected the expulsion to be temporary, and eventually reversed. They did not feel like part of the state, and were in fact obstacles to Zionist ideology in creating an exclusively Jewish state. To achieve its settler- colonial goals, Israel barred expelled Palestinians from entering its , which were only open to Jewish immigrants, while instituting a Jewish state that dominated Palestinian land, culture and history on the grounds of national security (Rouhana and Khoury 4). Currently in

Jerusalem, Palestinians live in various ghettos and receive only partial "resident" benefits, while

Ge 7 in Beer Sheva, Palestinians live without basic services, hidden from the Israeli planners

(Yiftachel 7).

One of the most devastating acts of settler colonialism is denying Palestinians their own name and their relationship to their land, which epitomizes Wolfe’s description of eliminating the native. Soon after 1948, continuous efforts were made to “Judaize” the appropriated space of

Palestinians, starting with the homes, stores, and land that expelled Palestinians were forced to abandon. Official efforts transferred Palestinian land to the Jewish National Fund, under ownership of Jews; owners can be Jews who are non-citizens of Israel, but the law excludes

Palestinian citizens who are not Jewish (Rouhana and Khoury 4). Once Palestinian land had gone fallow for some years, it was automatically transferred to Israel’s ownership as space for Jewish settlements. The erasure of space took place in transforming mosques into public restaurants and bars, renaming Palestinian streets, mountains, and landscapes to Jewish names, and calling the

Palestinians who remained “Israeli ” (Rouhana and Khoury 4). Even now, the process of erasure continues as general policies remove Palestinian narratives from media, maps, education curricula and public discourse. Israeli elites label Palestinians as Arab refugees, foreigners, and infiltrators to remove any authentic and meaningful ties with the land (Rouhana and Khoury 6).

Instead, the settlers recast themselves as rightful owners of occupied land.

Returning to the 1950s, Israel further eliminated the number of Palestinians in its borders.

For example, Palestinians who tried to enter after the ceasefire were killed and only under stringent rules of family unification were expelled Palestinians allowed to return (Rouhana and

Khoury 7). On the other hand, to maintain the conception that Israel was a haven for all Jews,

Israel implemented the Law of Return in 1950, which allows Jews from all over the world to immigrate to Israel and preserve a Jewish majority. By maintaining low numbers of Palestinians,

Ge 8 Israel achieved its goal of large-scale demographic elimination, which is a highly effective way to preserve power imbalances and limit Palestinian movement. Settlers must ensure that expulsion stays permanent to prevent a return of the indigenous group.

Around the 1980s, settlement planning began to look racialized, and a legal hierarchy that placed Jews above Arabs began to form. Jews cited religious reasons for segregation, and claimed rights to biblical sites in the West Bank and all of Israel as a holy land (Yiftachel 14).

The Palestinian religious discourse took on a similar tone, claiming Jerusalem as a holy Muslim center that was wrongly occupied by Jews. The two narratives undermine each other, and concession on either side would cause the loss of respective legitimacy. This tension prompted

Israel’s government to further weaken Palestinian land claims by intensifying control over existing settlements.

Under Ariel Sharon in the 2000s, Israeli settlements represented a “vertical” colonial ideology that intensified control, furthered segregation, and embodied what Yiftachel described as “creeping apartheid” (Yiftachel 15). Ariel Sharon pushed Jewish settlements into populated

Palestinian territories such that Jews were settled “above” Arabs (Yiftachel 14). By the 2000s,

Israel was already a settled nation by Jews, who controlled various occupied Palestinian areas

(Yiftachel 9). Sharon’s plans also created Israeli mitzpims, or hilltop settlements, in the Galilee where most residents are Palestinian (Yiftachel 9). By increasing Jewish presence in a densely populated Arab area, Israel embodies Wolfe’s settler colonial analysis by closing the demographic gap between Arabs and Jews, but also by creating a block to further fragment the

Arab population.

Current Israeli settlements in the West Bank leverage the topography of the region and are mostly built on hills that overlook Palestinian villages. Gordon and Ram believe this to be as

Ge 9 an act of civilian surveillance (Gordon and Ram 5). While the settlements themselves only take up less than two percent of the West Bank, their boundaries encompass almost 42 percent of the land. Palestinians are not allowed to enter most of the settlement areas, and are greatly limited from practicing agriculture and free movement in the West Bank. This allows Jews to establish dominance over Arabs on both sides of the Green Line, and in these spaces, scattered Jews promote the "separate and unequal" existence of Arabs. The numbers are striking; within the

Green Line, Palestinians make up 18% of the population but control less than 3% and cannot settle in about 80% of the land (Yiftachel 14). Prior to 1948, Jews owned only 7% of the land.

The complete reversal of land ownership from the Mandatory period is evidence of settler colonial tactics.

Existing West Bank settlements are designed to have strategic military functions, while creating a “network of observation” that render Palestinians “visible and docile” (Gordon and

Ram 6). In a complex realization of social control, the settlements resemble a type of constant yet spread out surveillance that ensure Palestinian fragmentation (Gordon and Ram 6).

Physically, there are checkpoints located everywhere in the West Bank, as it often is the case in settler colonial societies. Blockades, dirt mounds and a 617-kilometer wall separate the colonized territory and pre-1967 Israel to protect Israeli Jews from the “indigenous other.” (Gordon and

Ram 6). While serving as a symbolic statement of physical separation, the wall also functionally appropriates Palestinian land, and aggressive checkpoint tactics make it very difficult for

Palestinians to access their fields, work and schools (Gordon and Ram 6). Ethnic cleansing through these physical barriers also supersedes place, becoming a type of violence that determines the “re(creation) of space over an extended period of time” (Gordon and Ram 6).

Ge 10 The danger in the two Sharons’ system lies in what Yiftachel calls “creeping apartheid”

(Yiftachel 17). There are clear similarities between Israel/Palestine’s spatial segregation based on race and South Africa’s apartheid system. However, whereas apartheid was a legal system, Israel does not formally state the separate and unequal system. Unlike in South Africa, where Dutch conquest was explicit, Palestinians had expected their expulsion to be temporary after the Nakba, but instead, have been confined to a state of "permanent temporariness" for the past several decades (Yiftachel 19). This limbo situation raises unique issues to the settler colonial question, but it is still clear that Palestinians are treated as inferior and as colonized subjects. The key difference, however, is that Jewish denial of creeping apartheid denies any permanent solution or legal recourse for Palestinians. In other words, if “apartheid” does not exist, it is difficult for

Palestinians to demand that it be ended.

From a different perspective, one could question if Israel/Palestine’s spatial segregation is at all similar in nature to apartheid. Segregation in Israel/Palestine is a unique way to preserve ethnic identity. For example, the Jewish settlements in predominantly Arab areas are a way to break up segregation and to fragment existing Palestinians, which is opposite of South Africa’s apartheid system that sought to keep the two groups completely separate citing racial inferiority.

Establishing Jewish settlements in the Galilee, for example, was meant to address negative immigration balances and account for the rapid Palestinian population increase. It is difficult to envision that the Dutch or white-Americans, for example, would settle “above” existing black enclaves to fragment the community, as identity preservation and nationalism are not issues at play in the same way as in Israel/Palestine. While the treatment of Palestinians and blacks are similar as disenfranchised peoples, the intention behind separation matters. Apartheid in South

Ge 11 Africa propagated racial segregation, but separation in Israel/Palestine is used to cement or break up identity enclaves.

Palestinian fragmentation is another complication that differentiates the Israel/Palestine situation from other settler colonial societies. Israeli Palestinians and Palestinians in the occupied territories receive very different treatment, and Israeli Palestinians are citizens of Israel and have more explicit rights than blacks did under apartheid. Toward the end of apartheid in South

Africa, powerful slogans like “one man, one vote,” or “South Africa for all” gave rise to a unified nationalism that both whites and blacks could identify with. Yet, not only is the

Palestinian reality fragmented compared to the South African blacks, there is no unifying nationalism for Jews and Palestinians, who in fact have oppositional nationalist narratives. The fact that Israel granted citizenship to Palestinians who stayed complicates the traditional concept of settler-colonialism. While the United Nations required that remaining Palestinians be granted Israeli citizenship, they are treated as second-class citizens with curtailed rights and freedoms. In what’s known as a “settler-colonial citizenship,” Palestinians experienced complete domination and military rule, lacking control, access to land and economic opportunities

(Rouhana and Khoury 2). One striking statistic is that the per capita income of Jews living in

Israel/Palestine in the last decade was double what an Israeli Palestinian made, and 12 times what a Palestinian in the occupied territories would make (Yiftachel 19).

While Palestinians in the occupied territories have few avenues for redress, Palestinians who are citizens of Israel are not treated equally by the law, as exemplified by the limitation of space, restrictive immigration or marriage laws, and the refusal of Israel to recognize their settlements (Yiftachel 19). In addition, Palestinians are treated as inferior citizens in Israeli courts. One particular example emphasizes the meaninglessness of Israeli citizenship for

Ge 12 Palestinians. After the Camp David negotiations failed in 2000, Palestinians in Gaza and the

West Bank protested and hundreds were killed by Israeli forces (Rouhana and Khoury 15).

However, when Israeli Palestinians protested in solidarity as citizens, they were also killed, wounded and arrested (Rouhana and Khoury 15). While the numbers of Israeli Palestinians killed were far fewer and a major debate occurred about their deaths, Israeli courts ultimately ruled against the Palestinians citing insufficient evidence, and this decision was momentous in establishing the inferiority of Palestinian citizenship in Israel.

It is worth noting that Palestinians have not responded passively, and actively defy

Israel’s subjugation through both violent and civil opposition (Yiftachel 20). Sometimes, opposition escalates to extremism, and Palestinians have a long history of involvement in suicide bombings, and escalated violence against Israel such as the Passover Massacre during the Second

Intifada. Palestinian extremism motivated by nationalism fuels the Israeli narrative that land segregation is necessary due to security reasons. In 2011, Benjamin Netanyahu declared that for

Palestinians to prove their commitment to achieving peace, they must recognize Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, which is supposedly central to Israel’s security needs (Khalidi

1). Palestinians' recognition of Israel as a Jewish state would raise major existential issues. It not only legitimizes Palestinian citizens’ second-class status in Israel, but completely undermines the

Palestinian right to return to a Jewish state. As such, Arab presence becomes presented as that of a trespasser and Palestinian displacement from the Jewish homeland would be justified.

Importantly, this also places the burden of the conflict upon Palestinians, and as transgressors, they should not be entitled to any redress for displacement or land concessions (Khalidi 4).

Khalidi’s argument is crucial in highlighting the importance of acknowledging past wrongs,

Ge 13 which paves the path towards reconciliation and any prospects of future peace. The question cannot be addressed in the ‘now’ without addressing the past wrongs of both sides.

To address history, intent must be evaluated. Israel’s desire for a Jewish homeland necessitated the removal of any existing groups who lived on the land, and it is tricky to grant that desiring a homeland is legitimate while condemning the actions to achieve that goal. A thought experiment would be that if historical events were reversed, and Palestinians gained the upper hand in the 1948 war and removed Jews systematically, it seems equally unacceptable and settler colonial. Thus, when are mutually exclusive and closely tied to the right to exist, the setup of the issue seems to be an inescapable quagmire regardless of who is on which side. Having said this, there are various arguments on both sides about whether Zionism included colonial intent early on, but despite different contexts and motivations, Israel’s establishment of a national Jewish state did remove and subjugate Palestinians. The ensuing actions, as Wolfe correctly identifies, are aspects of settler colonialism in the form of rights limitations, land takeover, and forced assimilation.

As for the future of the conflict, we must take Wolfe’s cautions against settler colonialism seriously. The objectives of settler colonialism are never met unless the indigenous population is near elimination, and there are few efforts in Israel currently to recognize past injustices or discrimination against Palestinians. Judaization, an inherently colonial project, continues to erase Palestinian history and control of land whenever possible. While the comparison to South Africa’s history of apartheid sheds light on the Israel/Palestine situation, it does not fully address the unique aspects of Zionism. Longing for a homeland is very different from conquering a colony, but spatial segregation of groups in Israel is reminiscent of South

Africa’s apartheid. Regardless of motivations, Israel’s policies following independence involve

Ge 14 high levels of spatial sequestration of Palestinian land and removal of Palestinians, which are the defining aspects of Wolfe’s settler-colonialism framework. Despite stemming from nationalistic reasons, Zionism’s aggressive tactics perpetuate a denial of existence for Palestinians and should not be excused. In a perverse way, the Israeli government has reversed a history of Jewish oppression and imposed upon Palestinians a particular form of settler colonialism that continues as a pervasive structure, rather than a one-off event.

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