VERTIC News Archive 2013 24 December 2013 Seminar on The

VERTIC News Archive 2013

24 December 2013 Seminar on the role of intergovernmental organisations in arms control and disarmament On 5 December 2013, VERTIC and the Vienna Centre for Non-proliferation and Disarmament held the first in a series of seminars on the role of intergovernmental organisations in arms control and disarmament verification. The seminar featured former IAEA veteran and UNMOVIC head Dimitry Perricos, VCDNP fellow Nikolai Sokov and VERTIC's Executive Director Andreas Persbo. A workshop summary will be posted on the website of the VCDNP in early 2014. Mr Persbo's presentation can be downloaded here. ------

24 December 2013 VERTIC organises a workshop on the IAEA Additional Protocol in Côte d’Ivoire VERTIC organised a two-day workshop in Abidjan Côte d'Ivoire as part of its Additional Protocol Project. The workshop was titled: ‘Facilitating the adoption and implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol in Côte d'Ivoire' and took place on 16 and 17 of December 2013. The workshop was hosted by the Ivorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and included participants form various national authorities involved in the nuclear field including the Ministries of Petroleum and Energy, Industry and Mines, Justice, Health and Higher education and Scientific Research. The workshop aimed at raising awareness on the Additional Protocol including how it can be effectively and efficiently implemented and the process whereby the Protocol can be brought into force. The workshop included 9 sessions that covered topics including the global non-proliferation regime, detailed implementation requirements and options for the Additional Protocol and interactive sessions investigating paths forward for the adoption of the Protocol. Contributing experts from the US Department of Energy and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Agency provided their national experiences on how the Protocol is implemented in their countries. Côte d'Ivoire is a state party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force. Côte d'Ivoire signed the Additional Protocol on the 8th of September 2008. ------

12 December 2013 VERTIC participates in the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention VERTIC's Senior Legal Officer, Scott Spence, and Legal Officer, Bilqees Esmail, represented VERTIC at this year's Meeting of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention during 9-13 December in Geneva, Switzerland. The week's agenda included discussions of co-operation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under Article X; review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention; strengthening national implementation; how to enable fuller participation in the CBMs; and progress with universalization of the Convention. As part of established practice for several years, NGOs were given the opportunity to speak Monday morning regarding standing agenda items or biennial items. Though VERTIC was unable to fully give its statement due to time constraints, it is available here. VERTIC was also given the opportunity Wednesday morning, on an exceptional basis and without setting precedent for future meetings, to speak from the plenary floor at an informal session to discuss the Standing Agenda Item on National Implementation. That statement is available here. ------

10 December 2013 VERTIC participates in workshops to implement the BWC in Burkina Faso and Benin Burkina Faso and Benin, together with UNREC (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs through the Regional UN Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa) and the BWC Implementation Support Unit, organized two workshops on the national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). These workshops were held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso from 2 to 3 December 2013, and in Cotonou, Benin, from 5 to 6 December 2013. They gathered national agencies and stakeholders as well as regional and international experts in the field. As part of the expert team, VERTIC presented on the national implementation of the BWC in

Page 1 the domestic legal order. The presentation in French can be found here. Both countries identified the need to draft implementing legislation for the BWC as a matter of priority. At the request of both states, VERTIC will participate in two legislative drafting workshops in 2014 to be held in Ouagadougou and Cotonou. The workshops formed part of the BWC Action, a programme of the ‘European Union Council Decision in Support of the BWC', which aims to support the BWC on the international, regional and national levels through three major projects, namely universality and national implementation; confidence in compliance; and strengthening international cooperation and encouraging international discussion on the future of the BWC. The workshop was covered by a daily newspaper for Ougadougou. ------

05 December 2013 VERTIC participates in the 18th Conference of the States Parties to the CWC VERTIC's Senior Legal Officer, Scott Spence, represented VERTIC at the 18th Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention during 2-4 December. High on the agenda of this year's Conference was Syria's accession to the Convention and the status of verification of the destruction of the country's chemical weapons stockpile. The Conference also re-appointed by acclamation Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü for a second term of office as OPCW Director-General. It has been a historic year for the organisation that he oversees with the events in Syria and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize. Other events took place during the Conference including an Open Forum, organised by civil society, which included the following speakers: Scott Spence from VERTIC; Dr Michael Crowley from the University of Bradford; Ms Sharon Dolev from the Israeli Disarmament Movement; Dr Shahriar Khateri from the Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support (SCWVS) and the Tehran Peace Museum; Ambassador Gillane Allam from the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs; Mr Daryl Kimball from the Arms Control Association; and Mr Rana Ather Javed from Pakistan House (Denmark). The audience heard a moving account from a survivor of chemical weapons use in Iran of the suffering that he and others continue to go through, decades after the Iran-Iraq war. NGOs were invited for a second time to give statements from the plenary floor of the Conference (the first opportunity was during the Third Review Conference in April this year). Mr Richard Guthrie, of CBW Events, kindly delivered VERTIC's statement on our behalf. The statement is available here. ------

02 December 2013 New opportunity: Programme Director for National Implementation VERTIC wishes to make an appointment at the Programme Director grade, following a potential internal promotion. Note that this recruitment may be cancelled should either no suitable candidates apply or other conditions change. For more, see our recruitment page. ------

02 December 2013 VERTIC Researcher presents on verification in Kuala Lumpur Last week, VERTIC Researcher David Cliff presented on nuclear disarmament verification in the context of the North Korean nuclear crisis at a conference in Malaysia. The conference was held near Kuala Lumpur and run by the International Network for Emerging Nuclear Specialists. Mr Cliff's presentation, which draws on VERTIC's project investigating the role of intergovernmental organisations, is available in full here. ------

20 November 2013 VERTIC participates in Expert Meeting on National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security in Yogyakarta, Indonesia VERTIC Senior Legal Officer, Scott Spence, and Legal Officer, Sonia Drobysz, participated in the Expert Meeting on the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, during 20-21 November. Mr Spence gave VERTIC's statement to the Expert Meeting, which is available here. The Expert Meeting had the objective of officially introducing the Kit to all Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) participants before

Page 2 its official submission by the Government of Indonesia to the NSS in March 2014 in The Hague, the Netherlands. To build wider ownership of the Kit, all participants, from 35 countries around the world, were invited to give their inputs on the Kit. Experts from international and regional organizations, including the IAEA, UNODC, CTBTO, and ASEAN, also gave their views on the Kit. VERTIC warmly thanks the Government of Indonesia who initiated this gift basket, as well as our funders for their generous financial support towards our work on the Kit: the Global Partnership Program of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada and the Strategic Programme Fund of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom. And VERTIC joins Indonesia in thanking those twenty-six countries around the world who supported Indonesia's proposed gift basket to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. The Kit, which was drafted by VERTIC, covers the following international instruments: the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and 2005 amendment; the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); the 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention); the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation as amended by the 2005 Protocol; the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf as amended by the 2005 Protocol; the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; as well as the non-legally binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct) and Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. The Kit includes five sections: a foreword, which reiterates the two primary objectives of the Kit; an introduction, which explains the background and structure of the Kit; a model law for nuclear security; a description of the process for developing nuclear security legislation; and acknowledgements. The model law in Part III of the Kit contains eight sections: overview of the law; definitions; national regulation of nuclear security; accounting for, securing and physically protecting nuclear and other radioactive material; transfer controls; offences and penalties; jurisdiction; and national criminal enforcement and international co-operation. For more information, please contact VERTIC Senior Legal Officer Scott Spence. ------

13 November 2013 VERTIC leads EU initiative to strengthen South East Asian national CBRN legal frameworks 0 0 1 398 2274 Vertic 18 5 2667 14.0 Normal 0 false false false EN-GB JA X-NONE

24 October 2013 New blog post: Elephants, cyanide and the Chemical Weapons Convention In this week's blog post, Dominic Bright enquires how poisoning of elephants in Zimbabwe has relevance for national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Read the full post here. ------

24 October 2013

Page 3 Elephants, cyanide and the Chemical Weapons Convention Dominic Bright, London News that cyanide was intentionally used in an illegal venture to harvest ivory through poisoning salt pans, where elephants gather to drink in the current dry season, made for melancholy reading indeed, chronicling Zimbabwe's worst case of elephant poaching. What does the use of a toxic substance to poison wildlife in Hwange National Park, including 100 elephants, have to do with domestic legislation implementing Zimbabwe's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (‘CWC')? After all, there are no confirmed instances of cyanide in perhaps its most toxic form being used in chemical warfare; and three individuals have been successfully sentenced under existing legislation. Zimbabwe has signed and ratified the CWC, which entered into force in April 1997. It obliges ‘any activity prohibited to a State Party' to be proscribed to persons at the national level. The ‘use' of a ‘chemical weapon' is one such activity; and ‘chemical weapon' means any toxic chemical, except when it is intended for peaceful purposes and its type and quantity are consistent with that purpose. Following Article II, ‘toxic chemical' means ‘any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.' Fauna are therefore within the scope of this definition. The evidence from officials is that the toxic substance used to poison the salt pans - sodium or calcium cyanide - is used in, destined for, or a product of, the gold mining industry. At the time of writing, we do not know the exact chemical form that was used in Zimbabwe. However, both sodium cyanide and calcium cyanide are used in gold processing and are inorganic cyanides that are toxic to humans and animals. There can be no question that the use made of the toxic substance was not legitimate and so would have fallen foul of any national measure Zimbabwe would have taken to implement the CWC, in accordance with Article VII of the Convention. Implementing legislation for the CWC equips prosecutors in circumstances where current legislation is silent or to reflect the gravity of the harm caused. The former bites in the speculative scenario that a similar toxic chemical is released to harm animals at a future date other than within a national park. One of the (two) provisions successfully prosecuted would be inapplicable if the proscribed act - ‘discharge of hazardous substances, chemicals and materials' as per s.73 of the Environmental Management Act - were commissioned outside of a national park. The second, principled, reason is that from a criminal justice standpoint, the accused should be tried and sentenced for offence(s) that reflect and reasonably convey the harm for which culpability exists. One of those successfully sentenced was jailed for 15 years for an offence related to poaching and possession of ivory - s.128 of the Parks and Wildlife Act, contained in No. 5 of the General Law Amendment Act, 2011 - and only one year to mark that a toxic substance had been willfully released. However, there is a qualitative and quantitative distinction - and one correctly drawn by the Public Relations Manager of the Zimbabwe Parks and Management Authority - between traditional (snare and shot) and the more recent, indiscriminate, modus of poaching. The difference in quality between shot and poison has long been reflected throughout national criminal legal systems worldwide - as well as by the laws and customs of war. Moreover, in the case of poison, the rangers are denied the first visible sign of death. Soaring vultures are often nature's first means by which to indicate animal fatality, and so also killing by illegal modus. In the instant case vultures, too, have been poisoned, thereby depriving park rangers of nature's first indication of death, in this case by proscribed means. The difference of scale, of course, is that of the indiscriminate nature of employing toxic chemicals to harm - and overwhelm - animals. Rather than traditional shot, which can be discriminating if employed surgically, toxic chemicals are inherently indiscriminate, striking down species as diverse as elephants and vultures all too effectively and with cold efficiency. There is, then, a principled reason for the sentence to adequately reflect the gravity of the harm caused by the intentional use of a toxic chemical. ------

18 October 2013 VERTIC Senior Legal Officer participates in BWC seminar and leads legal drafting workshop in Quito, Ecuador VERTIC Senior Legal Officer, Scott Spence, participated in a 'Taller para la Implementación Nacional de la Convención sobre Armas Biológicas' in Quito, Ecuador on 14 October. He then led a three-day workshop (15-17 October) with the objective of drafting amendments to Ecuador's Arms Control Law and revised Penal Code to implement the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in Ecuador, including biological weapons prohibitions and measures for the non-proliferation of particularly dangerous biological agents and toxins.

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BWC Action The four days of activities took place under the auspices of the BWC Action, an initiative of the Council of the European Union under Council Decision 2012/421/CFSP, adopted on 23 July 2012; VERTIC is listed as an expert in this Decision. The BWC Action envisages a number of regional seminars (two have taken place already in Kiev and Kuala Lumpur, while another is scheduled for November in Mexico City). The BWC Action also envisages a number of national assistance activities - including legislative drafting, laboratory and border control capacity building, etc. - for countries that have successfully applied for assistance under the Action, including Ecuador. VERTIC has been and will continue to participate in a number of these regional and national activities. More about the BWC Action can be found here. One-day seminar The one-day seminar on 14 October had an ambitious agenda focusing on objectives, obligations, procedures and enforcement of the BWC; national implementation; regional experiences in national implementation; and the BWC Action assistance programme for Ecuador. The seminar was opened by the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Defense and a representative of the European Union's External Action Service. Participants included officials from several ministries in the Ecuadorean government and the armed forces; regional experts from Argentina, Brazil, Chile; and the BWC Implementation Support Unit and UNLirec. Mr Spence's presentation is available here. The seminar was well-covered by the Ecuadorean press (Spanish only):

Ecuador Inmediato PP El Verdadero El Telégrafo El Comercio

Three-day legislative drafting workshop The one-day seminar was followed by a three-day legislative drafting workshop led by Mr Spence. He was joined by Ms Karina Hinojosa, a Legal Officer with Lima-based UNLirec. Mr Spence worked closely with officials in the Ministry of Defense to draft amendments to Ecuador's revised Penal Code to implement the prohibitions in the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. They also worked on a new chapter to be added to the Ley sobre Armas, Municiones, Explosivos y Accesorios, Fabricación, Importación, Exportación, Comercialización y Tenencia with measures to prevent the proliferation of particularly dangerous biological agents and toxins. ------

12 October 2013 VERTIC Senior Legal Officer participates in regional BWC seminar in Santiago, Chile VERTIC Senior Legal Officer, Scott Spence, participated in a "Seminar on Biological Material and Biosafety in the Framework of the Biological Weapons Convention" during 9-11 October in Santiago, Chile. The seminar was organised by the Dirección General de Movilización Nacional, which is Chile's National Authority for the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. There were participants from across the region and experts from Argentina, Germany the United Kingdom, the United States, the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit and the World Health Organisation. Topics covered included the scope of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), laws and regualtions, and biological material and research. Mr Spence gave a presentation on VERTIC's study on the gaps in Chile's national legislation to implement the BWC. He welcomed the National Authority's openness and transparency in allowing him to share these results with participants from across the region. On the second day, the participants broke into working groups to discuss: implementation of the BWC within each participating country; food defense; legislation; biocontainment and biosecurity; scientific research and biological material; regional matters and education and the BWC. The working groups reported back to the plenary seminar, providing concrete actions for the future with a significant focus on regional co-operation in order to co-ordinate and strenghten implementation of the BWC across Latin America. More about the seminar can be found here. ------

Page 5 11 October 2013 OPCW awarded Nobel Peace Prize Today, the Nobel Peace Prize committee announced that the prize for 2013 is being awarded to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for its 'extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons'. The OPCW, the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), is currently engaged in verifying the chemical disarmament of the convention's newest member, Syria—a country where several alleged, and one confirmed, chemical weapons attacks have taken place this year. 'Recent events in Syria…have underlined the need to enhance the efforts to do away with [chemical weapons],' the Nobel committee said in a statement, noting that the US and Russia are among a number of CWC parties behind schedule in their chemical weapon destruction activities.

Past organisational winners of the Nobel Peace Prize include the International Committee of the Red Cross (in 1917, 1944 and 1963), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (in 1954 and 1981), the UN Children's Fund (in 1965), the UN as a whole (in 2001), the International Atomic Energy Agency (in 2005) and the European Union (in 2012).

Speaking today, the director-general of the OPCW, Ahmet Üzümcü, described the award as a ‘great honour' and said that the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war stands as a ‘tragic reminder that there remains much work to be done.' Since its founding in 1997—the year of the CWC's entry into force—the organisation has done a great deal to embed an international norm against the use of chemical weapons. Today, with Syria having joined the convention it oversees, only six states remain outside. ------

08 October 2013 New blog post: The IAEA safeguards resolution: return to consensus In this week's blog post, Sonia Drobysz and Hassan Elbahtimy discuss the return of consensus over the safeguards resolution during the 2013 General Conference of the IAEA. Read the full post here. ------

08 October 2013 The IAEA safeguards resolution: return to consensus Sonia Drobysz and Hassan Elbahtimy, London This article was published in the 142nd edition of Trust & Verify. It is published here with a few additions. For the first time since 2006, the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has unanimously supported a resolution on the agency's international nuclear safeguards. The resolution was adopted during the last hours of this year's General Conference which took place in September at the agency's headquarters in Vienna and is the largest annual meeting of IAEA member states. Over the years, the resolution has become one of the highlights of the conference and is often the focus of long and protracted negotiations over its drafting and language. Recent episodes of the resolution's journey were chronicled by Andreas Persbo on this blog in 2011 and on the ACW in 2012. The resolution goes back a long way. It was first introduced in 1991 by Australia and 12 other countries to support efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the agency's safeguards. At that time, the resolution enjoyed wide support and was adopted by consensus. This was largely due to the agency's experience of safeguards implementation in Iraq that had highlighted gaps, vulnerabilities but also what many considered as systematic shortcomings in the application of nuclear safeguards. Ever since, however, the resolution has grown both in length and complexity to reflect the main safeguards issues of the day. In the early nineties it echoed growing appreciation of the importance of extending verification to undeclared sites and facilities. In 1997, it started to include references in support of the Additional Protocol. From 2006, it has been linked with various issues related to the Middle East fuelled by Arab states' frustration on lack of progress on a regional nuclear weapons free zone as well as controversies related to the Iranian nuclear issue. The consensus on the resolution eventually broke in 2007 and since then the future of the resolution has been subject to annual speculation. The adoption of the resolution by consensus is particularly significant this year given that the conference did not adopt one in 2011 and was passed last year with a majority vote rather than consensus.

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This year's resolution includes notable changes that potentially mark a departure from the resolutions adopted in previous years. Importantly, the title of the resolution has changed. When first introduced in 1991, the resolution was simply called ‘Strengthening the safeguards system.' After the introduction of the Additional Protocol in 1997, it was replaced with a rather long title but one that reflected the development of the new instrument: ‘ Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol.' This year's resolution went back to a pre-1997 formula and removed the reference to the Additional Protocol from the resolution's title. Also interestingly, the newly adopted resolution seems to have been purged from most references to the ‘State-level' concept, which has been the focus of many discussions in the IAEA recently. As described by IAEA's Director General Amano in the Board of Governors meeting earlier in September, the concept ‘involves giving consideration to a State as a whole, rather than focusing primarily on declared nuclear material and facilities.' The Director General re-emphasised the role of the State-level concept in his address to the General Conference by stating that ‘the State-level approach […] is indispensable to discharge […] safeguards responsibilities under budget constraints,' as it enables the agency to concentrate its efforts on areas that it considers to have greater safeguards significance. Individual state-level approaches are currently being implemented in 53 countries, and the concept itself is supported by the European Union and the United States among others. Nonetheless, other states have been vocal in expressing their concerns about the risk of discriminatory application of safeguards and that political factors could affect or influence safeguards implementation and evaluation. They also raise issues focusing on the agency's use of a wide and expanding spectrum of information These concerns have posed some challenges to wider acceptance of the concept. As part of the on-going discussion in the agency about the State-level concept, the IAEA secretariat reported on the ‘conceptualization and development' of the concept to this year's September meeting of the Board of Governors (as it was requested to do by last year's General Conference). The report, however, did not meet some states' expectations. For example, Russia in its statement to the General Conference, took note of the report but said that the work of the Secretariat was ‘far from complete.' It also pointed out that ‘any changes in the safeguards application methodology shall be subject to discussion among the IAEA member-states, and shall be underpinned by the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors.' Iran further noted that the State-level concept was ‘still vague and that there are several ambiguities in the Secretariat's recent report [which] needs further elaboration and clarification.' This year's safeguards resolution seems to indicate that a cautious attitude toward the state-level concept had the upper hand. For example, last year's preambular paragraph ‘m' in which the General Conference took ‘note of the work being undertaken by the Secretariat in conceptualizing and developing State-level approaches to safeguards'. Also, operative paragraph 20 that urged ‘the Secretariat to continue to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards through the use of a State-level approach in the planning, implementation and evaluation of safeguards activities' was deleted from the new resolution. As these references to the concept were deleted, new text was inserted that reflects the anxieties of some of the states cautious about the State-level concept. In one instance, new language was inserted that stresses that safeguards ‘should remain non-discriminatory and only objective factors should be used to determine safeguards implementation, while political or other extraneous considerations are not included.' (preambular paragraph ‘r'). In another instance, the new resolution calls on the agency to draw ‘independent objective conclusions using only impartial and technically based evaluation methods.' (operative paragraph 7) The new resolution also takes note that the Director General will produce a ‘supplementary document' on State-level approaches providing further clarification and information on the issue. Disarmament and the application of safeguards in nuclear-weapons states have traditionally occupied a prominent place in discussions on the resolution. This year, they featured again as important issues during negotiations. Failure to agree on disarmament language was one of the reasons, if not the main driver, for the failure to adopt the resolution in 2011. This year's resolution, however, sees two new preambular paragraphs that specifically address the issue. The first recalls ‘the IAEA Statute and in particular article III.B.1 which states that, in carrying out its functions, the Agency shall conduct its activities […] in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies.' The second further recalls that ‘the 2010 NPT Review Conference in Action 30 of the Final Document called for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States […] and

Page 7 stressed that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.' This year's resolution also included some noteworthy changes. A preambular paragraph on the use of open source information, which was included in last year's resolution was deleted this year. The Iranian delegation has consistently expressed its reservation about this paragraph in previous years. Also a new paragraph was inserted that notes that Agency has been able to draw ‘broader safeguards conclusions' in 60 countries. It means that for these countries, there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material but also no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities. Significantly, these countries have both comprehensive safeguards agreements and an Additional Protocol in force. The resolution's unanimous adoption is certainly a welcome development in as much as it fosters a spirit of cooperation and harmony on a topic that can trigger heated discussions in the agency's corridors. That said, the resolution is likely to have little bearing on the actual implementation of safeguards since that is governed by international treaties, safeguards agreements and established procedures and practices. The resolution might, however, give some guidance on possible trends for evolution of safeguards practice. Arguably, the resolution's true value is in how much it reflects state positions on safeguards issues but also in providing room for such positions to mature and evolve, and for observers of the process to follow these developments The consensus achieved this year was based on a fine balance between positions but one that has introduced some daring changes to the resolution. How sustainable this new formula is remains to be seen. ------

07 October 2013 VERTIC gives presentation on UNSCR 1540 at the 129th IPU Assembly Scott Spence, VERTIC Senior Legal Officer, gave a presentation today (available here) on the national implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 at the 129th Assembly of the Interparliamentary Union. The session - facilitated by the IPU's Committee on UN Affairs - had the objective of providing an opportunity for participants to deepen their understanding of UNSCR 1540, thus enabling them to contribute to the development of appropriate and effective national legislative and regulatory measures. The Chair of the 1540 Committee, Ambassador Oh Joon, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations in New York, participated in the session. Other panelists included: Mr. Ekwee Ethuro, Speaker of the Senate of Kenya; Ms. Uta Zapf, Chair of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation, German Bundestag; and Dr. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Center on International Cooperation, New York University. ------

02 October 2013 Trust & Verify No. 142 In this issue, David Cliff addresses the practical implementation of the deal to rid Syria of its chemical warfare agents while Yasemin Balci considers legal issues surrounding the possession and use of these weapons in Syria. Plus: Verification Watch, Science & Technology Scan, VERTIC News and a special expanded edition of Verification Quotes. Download the full issue here. ------

24 September 2013 Dual-use technologies addressed in new volume Followers of VERTIC's work and fields of activity may be interested to note that a book addressing 'dual-use' technologies has recently been released, edited by Oliver Meier. The book, 'Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation', is published as part of the Routledge Global Security Studies series. Full information on the book's contents and ordering information can be found here. ------

23 September 2013 VERTIC delegation attends IAEA General Conference Last week, a delegation of VERTIC staff members travelled to Vienna, Austria, to attend the annual IAEA General Conference. The event—full details of which are available from the IAEA website (here)—is the

Page 8 occasion during which various resolutions are debated, national statements heard and matters such as the composition of the IAEA Board of Governors and the organisation's budget agreed upon. During the week-long conference, VERTIC held both a reception and a side-event. The reception, organised to mark the retirement of Laura Rockwood, head of non-proliferation and policy-making in the IAEA's legal department, was held on the evening of Wednesday 18 September. Around 100 people attended in all—ranging from senior IAEA staffers and members of national delegations to interns—and the event was a bustling and very enjoyable occasion. The following day saw VERTIC hold a lunchtime side-event, kindly hosted by the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), where Scott Spence presented on VERTIC's work on nuclear security legislation assistance and Larry MacFaul presented on the organisation's work to facilitate universal uptake of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Mr Spence's presentation is available here; Mr MacFaul's here. The week also saw a contract agreed with the VCDNP for a series of six lectures on verification to be held there over the next 12 months. VERTIC also ran an exhibition stand during the week, showcasing the organisation's work and giving out recent VERTIC publications. These publications proved extremely popular, with almost everything shipped to Vienna being taken up by IAEA staffers and officials from various state delegations. ------

06 September 2013 Andreas Persbo discusses nuclear disarmament in Prague On Friday 6 September the VERTIC executive director, Andreas Persbo, delivered a presentation at the Czech foreign ministry in Prague at a conference on 'Global Zero and Beyond: Theory, Politics and Regional Perspectives'. The two-day event (running from 5-6 September) is being co-organised by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Center for Security Studies at Prague's Metropolitan University, the Institute of International Relations Prague and the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Charles University Prague. The aim of the meeting is to discuss nuclear disarmament—in a city now almost synonymous with that goal. Mr Persbo's address, 'Prague and Berlin: Two Speeches, Same Vision', can be accessed online in full here. In it, he discusses the so-called Prague agenda (to work toward a world without nuclear weapons) set in motion by President Obama in Prague in 2009 and reaffirmed by him in Berlin earlier this year. 'I would say that Mr Obama's vision is intact—and that he remains committed to an abolitionist vision,' Mr Persbo said. 'But I would also say that while the Prague speech was characteristic of the president's first term—enthusiastic and full of ambition—the Berlin speech was coloured by five years experience in international affairs. Some things are easy to achieve, others more difficult. All things come at a price.' In his address, Mr Persbo highlighted a number of accomplishments since the Prague speech four years ago. For one, the nuclear security summit process is now established, with much greater effort invested worldwide into securing radioactive materials and with nuclear security 'here to stay' even after the expected end of the process in 2016. For another, the 'New START agreement was reached between the US and Russia: a verifiable arms reduction treaty, the achievement of which 'cannot be understated' Mr Persbo noted. This optimism, though, was tempered by the many hard realities that continue to dog the Prague vision. In particular, negotiations for a Fissile Material Treaty remain unrealised, caught in diplomatic gridlock, and the US has still to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Looking ahead, Mr Persbo noted that he sees some 'room for manoeuvre' around the issue of tactical nuclear weapon reduction. He noted that he also expects the overall number of US and Russian nuclear weapons to continue to decline through a 'natural pressure' that may slow and stabilise over time but not before warhead numbers have reached an optimal level. ------

06 September 2013 Scott Spence discusses Syria at the Asser Institute's WMD Summer Programme VERTIC Senior Legal Officer, Scott Spence, discussed Syria on 6 September, on a panel at the Fourth Summer Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, held at the T.M.C. Asser Institute for International Law in The Hague, the Netherlands, from 2 to 6 September 2013. The specific objectives of the WMD Programme are: to provide a broad, comparative understanding of the history, purpose and provisions of treaties on WMDs; to provide an understanding of the diplomatic, legal and technical aspects of organisations dealing with WMDs; to illustrate how treaties on WMDs are implemented at the national level;

Page 9 and to provide networking opportunities by bringing the participants in direct contact with officials of the leading organisations in the field of WMDs. Mr Spence joined Dr Alastair Hay, Professor of Environmental Toxicology and Epidemiology at the University of Leeds, for a morning panel on the UN investigative mission to Syria for the alleged use of chemical weapons. Mr Spence discussed, in particular, the procedures and scope of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. He also went into detail into accountability for perpetrators at the international level (e.g. prosecution by the International Criminal Court) and at the national level (national prosecution based on effective legislation to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention), if the UNSG Mechanism confirms that chemical weapons were used. The statement can be found here. Mr Spence also joined an afternoon session with Richard Guthrie from CBW Events and Paul Walker from Global Green/Green Cross to discuss engaging academia and civil society in WMD disarmament and non-proliferation. Mr Spence gave practical examples in his statement of work VERTIC is doing, in co-operation with individual States and international organisations, for national implementation of the CWC, BWC and certain international legal instruments for nuclear security. ------

30 August 2013 VERTIC releases brief on 'Chemical weapons detection: inspecting Syria' ------

16 August 2013 New blog post: UN investigation team to depart soon for Syria In the new VERTIC blog post, Ariane Jugieux looks at the impending visit of the UN chemical weapons investigation team to Syria. Read the full post here. ------

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Page 10 to independently verify whether or not chemical weapons have been used in the country. While their use has been reported by a number of states (several of whom have carried out their own covert information-gathering), a UN judgement on the matter, reached by an international team of experts, will in many ways carry additional weight. That said, evidence found may not be entirely conclusive as the UN team will have to contend with challenges such as time constraints and the need to factor in conflicting reports—from parties to the conflict and from those outside it. The time passed between incidents of alleged attacks and the arrival of the team may also have allowed evidence to degrade, making judgements of use more difficult. In June, a report by the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (which investigated human rights violations committed in Syria since the start of the conflict) highlighted its receipt of allegations of chemical weapons use by both government and anti-government forces. In May, prior to the relase of the report, one of its commissioners, Carla Del Ponte, suggested that the UN had seen strong indications that sarin was used by the opposition, which came as a blow to several governments aligned against Assad. The civil war in Syria is now well into its third year, and allegations of chemical weapons use are just one of its especially troubling aspects. Nonetheless, if proved, their use would raise the obvious issue of attribution—as well as a host of questions addressing what sort of action, or further action, could or should be taken in response. ------

16 August 2013 Briefing paper on the IAEA safeguards function Today, VERTIC has released a briefing paper on the IAEA's safeguards function. In the brief, John Carlson and Andreas Persbo discuss the proper function of IAEA safeguards. The briefing paper emphasizes the safeguards systems role in ‘preventing' the use of nuclear material for proscribed purposes, and goes through what this means for the authority to investigate apparent nuclear weaponization activities, the standard of proof, and the Agency's responsibility to provide early warning. It concludes that ‘safeguards are not an adversarial system, a zero sum game where either the state or the IAEA ‘wins' and the other loses. Rather, for the overwhelming majority of states that have made a non-proliferation commitment, cooperation with the IAEA helps the state to demonstrate that it is meeting this commitment.' Download VERTIC Brief No. 21—‘The IAEA safeguards function'—here. ------

01 August 2013 New blog post: Simulating the Executive Council redux Andreas Persbo had the pleasure of serving his second term as the Director-General of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). He played the role in a simulation set up by the CTBTO's Capacity Development Initiative (CDI). Read his account here. ------

01 August 2013 Simulating the Executive Council redux ------

18 July 2013 New blog post: EU CBRN Centres of Excellence This week's blog post provides an update on the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE). VERTIC's NIM programme is currently leading the implementation of one CoE project and contributing to another. Read the full post here. ------

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/* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Calibri;} NIM Programme, 18 July 2013 The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE) Risk Mitigation Initiative is a European Union initiative jointly implemented by the EU Directorate General (DG) Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid (DEVCO), the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). This innovative Initiative is based on networking, regional and international partnerships. It consolidates and optimises existing capabilities while increasing local ownership, local expertise and long-term sustainability. It addresses regional CBRN needs through tailored projects and aims at strengthening policies, institutional capacity building at both regional and national levels as well as a regional culture of safety and security. It promotes a method of pooling international expertise on CBRN issues, streamlining inputs from multiple assistance providers and developing regional and national expertise which other funders may find interesting to replicate in the future, bearing in mind lessons learned from this process. VERTIC is currently contributing to two EU CBRN CoE projects. We are the leading organisation for Project 8, a project which supports the national implementation of CBRN treaties in five South East Asian countries (Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) and we are a technical body on Project 3, which focuses on delivering training and exchanging best practices on bio-safety, bio-security and bio-risk management across a number of different regions. Funded by the EU Instrument for Stability, the Centres of Excellence are really virtual hubs of expertise. The project implementers consist of key experts who provide dedicated input to the project and other experts who provide ad hoc assistance as required. These experts are based with a range of different government departments, international and non-governmental organisations and research institutes across the world. These entities all work together as a consortium, each bringing their own experience, human capital and information resources to the project. The aim is to create a “network of experts, facilities and training areas” rather than building actual bricks and mortar academic or research centres. This does seem to be the way forward for providing cross-cutting expertise on issues of global relevance. The relative ease of communication, travel and information sharing means that such structures have an enormous potential. From the start, the EU CBRN CoE projects have provided a fascinating opportunity to interact with different assistance providers - both state and non-state actors - from a range of different countries as well as cementing strong relations with the project partner countries. Providing assistance to states at the global level can be a delicate balancing act. VERTIC has a well-established programme of assisting interested States with the national implementation of certain CBRN treaties and related legal instruments. Yet there is no one model for legislative assistance and no specific method for obtaining the optimal results. At the end of the day every country and each set of circumstances are unique. The EU CBRN CoE initiative provides an as yet unparalleled opportunity for assistance providers to exchange best practice and ideas with experts working in similar fields. For example, within Project 8, VERTIC leads a consortium whose other members are the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA), a German federal agency, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The project outcomes will be enriched by the broad and varied experience of the consortium members. A critique of many international assistance activities is that they are often too centred on the priorities of donors rather than the needs of beneficiary countries themselves. The EU CBRN CoE initiative seeks to head off this concern by enhancing partner countries' ownership and national and collective regional capacity to address CBRN risks. Regional Secretariats have been set up in each of the regions where EU CBRN CoE projects are implemented, led by a national of the country where they are located with a deputy from another state in the region. Their stated objective is to assist all partner countries in the region with formulating project proposals and action plans and evaluating projects. At the national level, CBRN teams are formed under the auspices of a national focal point. Made up of all relevant Government departments, these national teams are responsible for identifying their countries specific needs, collecting relevant data as well as contributing to and overseeing project activities. Going forward it will be vitally important to empower these regional and national bodies to drive the process of project implementation and ensure that regional and national interests are central to the design and delivery of EU CBRN CoE projects. A new challenge would be having

Page 12 more donors supporting the development of global expertise and cooperation models. It is an exciting venture to be a part of and a model that is ripe for refinement and replication in the years to come. The views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the European Union ------

12 July 2013 New blog post: Rumours of August talks between Iran and the IAEA In this week's blog post, as the Iranian nuclear crisis rumbles on, Ariane Jugieux looks at rumours of upcoming talks between the country and the IAEA. Read the full post here. ------

12 July 2013 Rumours of August talks between Iran and the IAEA Ariane Jugieux, London As the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security recently reviewed its current and future approaches towards nuclear security, there are rumors of upcoming talks between the Agency and Iran in August. This would be the first time both parties discuss the possibility of pursuing negotiations since the election of Hassan Rouhani, who is expected to take over as Iranian president during the same month. The latest round of talks occurred on 22 May in Vienna, without any improvements being made. Meanwhile, the next IAEA report on the Iranian nuclear programme is also due in late August, with its physical inventory verification (PIV) planned for autumn 2013. While Rouhani's elections is regarded a positive step to resume dialogue, many in the international community remains skeptical his arrival will result in any substantial shift in Iran's nuclear policy. Nonetheless, Rouhani's sixteen years as president of the Supreme National Security Council meant he actively participated in nuclear negotiations in the past, and he is likely to adopt a much softer tone on non-proliferation than his predecessor president Ahmadinejad. Thus, despite critics pointing out the Iranian political system limits his decision-making power in comparison to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, Rouhani holds enough credibility and legitimacy to influence Iran's future foreign policy and negotiations on its nuclear program. As per May 2013, the IAEA remains concerned over Iranian nuclear capabilities, particularly in light of its non-compliance with the Additional Protocol and outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions. It has urged Iran to allow increased access to its facilities for the Agency to verify ongoing nuclear activities and to be able to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of its program. The Agency's latest report emphasizes on recent developments in uranium enrichment, and it appears to believe Iran has yet to reach the capacities to develop a viable nuclear weapon. An additional 639kg of UF6 enriched up to 5 per cent U-235 and 324kg of UF6 enriched up to 20 per cent U-235 have been produced since the previous report in February 2013. Overall, its stockpile of 20 per cent enriched uranium is now at 182kg, which remains far below the amount required to produce a warhead. Its Natanz plant has seen an increase in the number of centrifuges (689 IR-2M, low enrichment, compliance with DIQ), although no change has been reported on the Fordow plant (still 696 centrifuges). Meanwhile Iran maintains it conducts no reprocessing activities, which the Agency has confirmed after two inspections on 7 and 8 May. Specifically, the IAEA monitors the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility, where no uranium targets have been reported. However, the heavy water reactor at under construction at Arak has proved concerning in terms of possible plutonium production. Despite the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor) being under Agency safeguards, Iran still refuses to allow access to its Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP). Finally, Iran is reported as having still failed to provide reassurance over its supposed hydrodynamic experiments in containment vessels at Parchin during the past decade. The IAEA insists that it must verify the site, which has been undergoing major leveling work since early 2012. In June, the Agency expressed concerns that it might already be too late to gather information from the site. The IAEA also continues to urge Iran to start implementing the Additional Protocol. Contention over the Additional Protocol is likely to feature in all upcoming talks between the IAEA and Iran. While the IAEA has no legal authority to compel any state to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol (which is a voluntary instrument), nor to itself enforce compliance over CSAs, Iran's increased political isolation as a regional actor and the changes in its senior leadership means it might seize the opportunity for renewed talks in August. So far, both the IAEA and Iran have denied that talks are underway, and expecting negotiations as early as August might be over-optimistic, despite the need for both parties to

Page 13 resume discussions earlier rather than later. ------

08 July 2013 New blog post: Views from the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security In this week's blog post, Sonia Drobysz highlights the discussions on strengthening the international nuclear security legal framework during the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security. Read the full post here. ------

08 July 2013 Views from the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security Sonia Drobysz, London During 1-5 July, VERTIC Senior Legal Officer Scott Spence and Legal Officer Sonia Drobysz attended the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security. Symposia on nuclear security had previously been convened at the Agency's headquarters, but it was the first time that a conference on this subject was held at ministerial level. As noted by the conference President, Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister János Martonyi, in his concluding summary, this clearly shows ‘recognition of the fact that, while activities relating to nuclear security are the responsibility of individual States, there are regional and global interests in nuclear security matters which could be greatly enhanced through collective actions and international cooperation.' As explained on the conference website, the objective of the event was ‘to review the international community's experience and achievements to date in strengthening nuclear security, to enhance understanding of current approaches to nuclear security worldwide and identify trends, and to provide a global forum for ministers, policymakers and senior officials to formulate views on the future directions and priorities for nuclear security.' State representatives, including government ministers, senior officials and policy makers responsible for nuclear security, as well as experts from regulatory bodies, international governmental and non-governmental organizations gathered to discuss illicit trafficking, physical protection, cyber security, nuclear forensics, nuclear security culture and capacity building. During the ministerial sessions, main substantive sessions and technical sessions, many delegates and experts also addressed the importance of strengthening the international nuclear security legal framework. In his opening statement to the conference, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano stated that bringing the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) 2005 into force was one of the three key areas in which ‘progress could - and should - be made quickly to improve global nuclear security.' The ministerial declaration adopted by consensus during the plenary session on 1 July also invites ‘States that have not yet done so to become party to and fully implement the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and […] encourage[s] the IAEA and States to continue efforts to promote the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM at the earliest possible date.' The declaration further invites ‘States that have not yet done so to make a political commitment to implement the non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.' But the discussions showed that not only should international legal instruments be adopted and universalized; their effective implementation at the national level is also crucial to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear security threats. States legislation should especially include definitions of key terms, criminalization of certain malicious acts, as well as measures for national enforcement and international cooperation. In that respect, many States described in their statements to the ministerial session their efforts to enact legislation on nuclear security. The ministerial declaration encourages ‘the IAEA, in consultation with Member States, to consider ways of further promoting the exchange, on a voluntary basis, of information on the implementation of the legal instruments relevant to nuclear security.' One main session specifically focused on ‘Implementing and Enhancing the International Nuclear Security framework', highlighting the important role that international governmental organisations, such as the IAEA and UNODC, but also non-governmental organizations can play in assisting States to ratify and implement relevant international legal instruments. During the main session on addressing the illicit trafficking threat, panellists further recommended the provision of assistance to States for the harmonization of international law and guidance in an integrated national legislative and regulatory system, implicitly suggesting that there may not currently be a model for doing so. Some States raised the difficulties of

Page 14 having coherent and comprehensive national legislation to address all of the obligations and provisions ‘scattered in different international legal instruments on nuclear security', as Indonesia explained in its statement. Indonesia therefore reminded the participants of its initiative announced at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit to develop, with VERTIC's assistance, a single ‘National Legislation Implementation Kit on nuclear security' to ‘serve as a one-stop illustrative comprehensive legal framework' integrating the various relevant international provisions on nuclear security. The Kit will be offered as a ‘gift' to the next Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague next year. In the run-up to the adoption of the 2014-2017 IAEA nuclear security plan and the Nuclear Security Summits that will take place in the Netherlands in 2014, as well as in the United States in 2016 as announced by President Obama in his Berlin speech on 19 June, coordination and collaboration between the different actors in that domain should be further discussed and promoted. In that respect, the conference President's summary rightly notes that the IAEA, which has a central role to play, ‘should strengthen its collaboration with other international initiatives and organizations to optimize resources, prevent duplication of effort and harmonize approaches to achieving effective nuclear security.' ------

05 July 2013 VERTIC participates in the IAEA Nuclear Security Conference VERTIC Senior Legal Officer, Scott Spence, and Legal Officer, Sonia Drobysz, participated in the IAEA Nuclear Security Conference during 1-5 July. The conference took place at IAEA Headquarters at the Vienna International Centre, with over 1300 registered participants from 125 countries and 21 intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. The Ministerial Session took place all day Monday, 1 July, and during the morning of Tuesday, 2 July. It resulted in a Ministeral Declaration, which can be found here. This was followed for the remainder of the week by six substantive main sessions and 12 parallel technical sessions. The final agenda can be found here as well as the conference president's summary and IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano's closing remarks. VERTIC was honoured to be mentioned by H.E. Mr. Hasan Kleib, Deputy Minister for Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, in his statement to the Ministerial Session on 1 July, in relation to our work on a National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security. Mr Kleib noted that: "Indonesia, at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, proposed to develop a single, user friendly 'National Legislation Implementation Kit on nuclear security'. This Kit is designed to serve as a one-stop illustrative comprehensive legal framework. The Kit could hopefully help countries who wish to have a single and comprehensive legislation that integrates the various relevant international provisions on nuclear security. The initiative is now underway and will be further discussed with interested states and other stakeholders. I wish to thank Member States, the IAEA and other international organizations, as well as VERTIC for their support. We expect that the Kit would be finalized before the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit". VERTIC aims to finalize this Kit by 1 October, in time for a related meeting in Indonesia. In this vein, VERTIC was also encouraged by the sets of recommendations arising out of Main Session 8 on 5 July, "Addressing the Illicit Trafficking Threat", and, in particular, the following recommendation in the second set: “Provide assistance for states in harmonizing international law and guidance in an integrated national legislative and regulatory system”. VERTIC looks forward to engaging with the IAEA and other relevant stakeholders on this particular recommendation and draws attention to our report on this very matter: Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material: The Legislative Response. This report provided the analytical underpinning for our development of the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security noted above. The IAEA press release for the Nuclear Security Conference can be found here. Questions regarding VERTIC's participation in the Nuclear Security Conference should be directed to Scott Spence. ------

02 July 2013 Trust & Verify No. 141 In this issue, Dr Itshak Lederman recalls his experience in setting up the CTBTO on-site inspection training programme, Ambassador Jo Adamson discusses the recently agreed Arms Trade Treaty and prospects for its implementation, and Lord Browne of Ladyton puts forward arguments for multilateral nuclear disarmament. Plus: Verification Watch, Science & Technology Scan, Verification Quotes and VERTIC News. Download the full

Page 15 issue here. ------

28 June 2013 New Blog Post: Fears over climate change monitoring systems not measuring up In this week's blog post Russel Moul discusses climate change monitoring systems and the impact of impending budget cuts. Read the full post here. ------

28 June 2013 Fears over climate change monitoring systems not measuring up Russel Moul, London On Tuesday this week, President Obama delivered an address at Georgetown University where he outlined a comprehensive strategy for addressing climate change. His speech discussed broad range measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to promote the development of renewable energy (especially through nuclear power and controversial use of fracking), to protect the US coastline from sea-level rise and flooding, and to pursue a global climate deal. The President also announced a decision to bypass a deadlocked Congress through issuing an executive memo to the US Environmental Protection Agency, charging them with the responsibility for cutting greenhouse gas emissions from power plants. These emissions amount to a third of America's greenhouse gas production; the move therefore constitutes a particularly significant action against climate change. The overall goal is to bring the US back on track to meet its commitments to cut carbon emissions by 17 per cent by 2015. Tuesday's speech came a week after the President delivered a major address in Berlin following the conclusion of the 2013 G-8 summit. Here, he emphasised the dangers posed by climate change and the potential risks of collective apathy. ‘Climate change', he said ‘is one of the foremost challenges for our future economic growth and well-being.' Together, these statements demonstrate the growing significance of climate change as a political issue, but will it lead to actual change? Furthermore, although Obama plans to cut carbon emissions and to seek alternative energy sources, he has not discussed the provision of funds for scientific observation systems that monitor climate change. For several years, fears have been growing among scientists concerning the future of these systems — which require adequate funding for equipment and personnel. The question is, will such systems now decline in this age of budget cuts? Climate change measuring instruments Understanding the state of the climate is an ever evolving challenge for scientists, engineers and policy makers alike. The conditions of the climate system are constantly changing, and with it the need to maintain an accurate monitoring system to measure both global and regional shifts over long periods of time. Moreover, because climate change is widely thought to be influenced by human activity, there is an added imperative to document what is happening, and to understand those changes by clearly delineating between human contributions and natural processes. In essence, understanding and managing climate change requires firm knowledge of where the climate has been in the past, and where it is now. Global observation can be divided into two categories: 1) space-based observations; and 2) a variety of in situ observations made at the Earth's surface, in the atmosphere or in the ocean. For space-based observation, satellites have — for the last 40 years — been providing some of the most useful and enlightening images and measurements of the entire Earth. These instruments are particularly useful for offsetting the otherwise uneven spatial coverage of in situ observation systems. For example, the JASON systemis said to be the most important satellite system currently operating. Positioned at a vantage point of 1336 kilometres (830 miles) above the Earth, the US/European JASON-1 and OSTM/JASON-2 ocean altimeter satellites measure the height of the ocean surface directly under the satellite with an accuracy of 4-5 centimetres. These satellites travel in excess of 7 kilometres (4 miles) every second as they trace out an orbit; the spacecraft cover the global oceans every 10 days. However, despite their usefulness, satellites like these are not without their weaknesses. They operate in extremely hostile environments — being exposed to cosmic rays and outgassing contaminants (outgassing is the release of a gas that was dissolved, trapped, frozen or absorbed in certain materials), they regularly require on-board remote calibration to correct their measurements. Furthermore, each satellite's mission typically last only 5 years as the satellite's orbit decays and drifts with time. The challenge then is firstly one of continuity - new measurements must be appropriately overlapped with old ones to ensure a smooth transition between different devices — but secondly, of cost. Satellites are not cheap. An important in situ observing system is the Tropical Atmosphere

Page 16 Ocean (TAO) array. This network consists of 55 oceanic moorings that measure temperatures and interactions between ocean and atmosphere in the Pacific. According to scientists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the moorings health is rapidly declining — 17 of the moorings are currently off-line and the amount of recorded data has dropped to about 50 per cent. The system has been compromised, and so its ability to plan for and adapt to natural disasters has been impaired. These are just two examples of the types of systems used to monitor global climate change. In an report by the Global Climate Observation System (GCOS) in 2010, the estimated cost for implementing a fully operational climate observation system would cost an additional US$2.5 billion a year on top of current global expenditure (about US$5-7 billon) for existing global observations systems. Around US$1.4 billion of this additional expenditure is needed for satellites or in situ observation of open oceans alone. Although significant progress has been made in the last decade for raising the profile of climate change issues, it is clear there is a long way to go. Furthermore, the need for climate information has greatly increased, but the effort to achieve it has not. Holes are now appearing within major satellite and in situ observation systems and are set to grow in the future. Consequently, we have in an information deficit that only investment in climatic observation systems will be able to overcome. ------

20 June 2013 New blog post: Prospects for the latest US nuclear security bill In this week's blog post, Sonia Drobysz discusses the latest attempts in the US to implement several international nuclear security instruments into domestic law. Read the full post here. ------

20 June 2013 Prospects for the latest US nuclear security bill By Sonia Drobysz, Paris On 20 May, the United States House of Representatives voted in favour of ‘An act to amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for protection of maritime navigation and prevention of nuclear terrorism, and for other purposes.' Adopted with a 390-3 vote, bill H.R. 1073 was introduced on 12 March by Republican Representative Jim Sensenbrenner. He explained that the legislation had been prepared ‘in full cooperation with' Democratic colleagues. The so-called ‘Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2013' is the implementing legislation for four major nuclear security and terrorism treaties: the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM amendment), and two 2005 protocols to the Convention concerning Safety of Maritime Navigation and to the Protocol concerning Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf. The Senate adopted resolutions of advice and consent for all four treaties' ratification in 2008 (see, for example, Senate Report on Resolution of advice and consent to ICSANT ratification), declaring that certain provisions were self-executing. As noted in the resolutions, however, other provisions obligate the US ‘to criminalize certain offenses, make those offenses punishable by appropriate penalties, and authorize the assertion of jurisdiction over such offenses.' United States Code Title 18 on crimes and criminal procedure should therefore be amended to set up ‘a comprehensive domestic legal framework' indispensable to combatting terrorist threats effectively, as sponsor James Sensenbrenner pointed out . From that perspective, bill H.R. 1073 defines and clarifies key treaty terms such as ‘radioactive material,' ‘nuclear material,' ‘nuclear facility,' and ‘device.' It also provides for new offences and associated penalties, including maritime terrorism acts and the maritime transport of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons (‘‘BCN weapons''), unlawful possession and use of radioactive material with the intent to cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or the environment, as well as attempts, threats, and conspiracies to commit these offenses. Damaging or interfering with the operation of a nuclear facility in a manner that causes the release of or increases the risk of the release of radioactive material, causes radioactive contamination or exposure to radiation is also criminalized. As explained in House report 113-85, U.S criminal jurisdiction is expanded over, for instance, prohibited activities against U.S. ships ‘to include not just those ships flying the flag of the United States, but also “a vessel of the United States or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”' Prohibited activities committed by a United States corporation or legal entity would also fall within US jurisdiction, in addition to those committed by a national of the

Page 17 United States or by a stateless person whose habitual residence is the United States. Furthermore, national enforcement measures are strengthened, updating ‘grounds permitting the master of a ship to deliver an offender to another state, under certain conditions, to include the new offenses.' House report 113-85 rightly emphasizes that the legislation ‘enhances U.S. national security by modernizing and strengthening the international counterterrorism and counter proliferation legal framework and improving multilateral efforts to combat terrorism and nuclear proliferation', and complements ‘important United States priorities such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.' Effective national implementation measures for radiological and nuclear treaties and related instruments are in fact crucial to help combat the illicit trafficking and misuse of nuclear and radioactive materials. Leaders at the 2010 Washington and 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summits encouraged all States ‘to enhance their physical protection of and accounting system for nuclear materials, emergency preparedness and response capabilities and relevant legal and regulatory framework'. The IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013 also affirms the need to enhance the global nuclear security framework, especially through facilitation of implementation of the international legal instruments relevant for nuclear security, including the CPPNM amendment and ICSANT. Adoption of effective implementing legislation in the US would be in line with such objectives and should also, as noted by the House report, ‘reinforce the United States' leading role in promoting these and other counterterrorism treaties and will prompt other States Parties to join.' But as the bill moves to Senate, its future remains uncertain. Previous attempts to adopt similar legislation failed in 2012. Measures on the application of the death penalty for certain nuclear terrorism offences and on extension of federal wiretapping authority to specifically include investigations related to a nuclear incident turned the project into a ‘legislative quagmire'. Removal of such measures allowed the House to pass the bill on 28 June 2012, but pushed Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Charles Grassley to oppose the bill and reintroduce the contentious language. As explained by Republican co-sponsor John Conyers on March 14, the 2013 proposal is ‘free of proposed language that seemed entirely […] outside the scope of underlying treaties.' He explained: ‘the Administration's original proposal expanded the scope of conduct subject to the death penalty, including new wiretap predicates, and authorized the President to conduct similar agreements in the future without congressional approval. These controversial provisions are not necessary in order to implement the underlying treaties, and I am grateful for the spirit of cooperation in which the bill before us has been drafted.' The National Journal and Global Security Newswire reported that Senator Grassley, for his part, would now be willing to consider the bill on the Senate floor with a time agreement and a vote on the death penalty. John Conyers nonetheless noted that the ‘bipartisan proposal has the full backing of the Obama Administration, is virtually identical to a bill that passed by voice vote in this committee and House last Congress', and accordingly ‘urge[d] all the members to support the bill.' Hopefully Senators will hear him, so efforts to effectively implement nuclear security and terrorism conventions can be pursued.

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13 June 2013 New blog post: A role for civil society in oversight of WMD legislation In this week's blog post, Angela Woodward considers the role for civil society in oversight of WMD legislation. Read the full post here. ------

13 June 2013 A role for civil society in oversight of WMD legislation By Angela Woodward, Christchurch Significant technical knowledge and expertise for the effective development and enforcement of WMD-related legislation resides in civil society, such as industry stakeholders, academics and NGO experts. For countries with small administrations, a significant proportion of the nation's expertise in this field may be located outside government. States commonly consult with non-governmental stakeholders when developing legislation in other issue areas, but how common is this in the international security field? Some States regularly liaise informally with civil society on international security topics, updating them on policy developments and changes in their national regulatory framework through meetings, publications and increasingly

Page 18 through social media. In the WMD field, such dialogue is often initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by other government departments with a specific role in biological, chemical or radiological/nuclear security, such as the host agency for a National Authority. Such exchanges help to foster a culture of transparency in the States' activities and, where this outreach occurs with relevant industry groups, can also help to promote a culture of compliance with new national measures by improving awareness and understanding of the legal and political context of the regulatory environment and of the security consequences of breaches. Ideally, of course, such stakeholder groups will also be given a meaningful role in the development of such legislation and other measures, such as through consultation processes. Certain States have gone a step further and legislated for a mandatory, on-going role for civil society in the oversight of WMD regulatory frameworks. For example, membership of the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, established under Section 4 of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, No. 87 of 1993, includes representatives of chemical, biological and space (aerospace) and nuclear industry and, by practice, a civil society representative pursuant to the “such other members as the Minister may deem necessary” clause. The Council's general function is to “protect the interests, carry out the responsibilities and fulfil the obligations of the Republic [of South Africa] with regard to non-proliferation” (Section 6(1)) and it has specific authority concerning the development, monitoring and enforcement of national implementation measures for international conventions concerning WMD non-proliferation, including (redacted list): “control and manage all activities relating to non-proliferation, and provide guidance, instructions and information in connection therewith; supervise and implement matters arising from international conventions, treaties and agreements related to proliferation affairs entered into or ratified by the Government of the Republic; designate knowledgeable persons from other government institutions and the industry as members of committees of the Council”; issue, suspend or revoke permits under section 13 [concerning the designation of controlled goods, and related permits, registration and transfer controls] “ensure that the conditions of permits and end-use requirements are met, and take the necessary regulatory steps in this regard; control the activities and means of transit or re-export, including those relating to goods in transit or in bond; institute and coordinate investigations, carry out and coordinate inspections and verifications”; issue codes of conduct concerning non-proliferation; and publish information concerning the Council's activities. Another example, albeit one with a significantly more limited mandate, is the New Zealand Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC) which was established under Section 16 of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987. Chaired by the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, the committee consists of eight additional members appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, who in practice have all been drawn from civil society. The current membership includes four NGO experts, two academics and a former military officer and senior defence official. PACDAC's functions, as specified in Section 17 of the Act, are more advisory in nature than those of the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and include remits to: Advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade on such aspects of disarmament and arms control matters as it thinks fit; Advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of the 1987 Act; Publish public reports on disarmament, arms control and the implementation of the 1987 Act. The committee is also tasked with making recommendations concerning funding applications for projects and tertiary scholarships submitted to the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust (PADET), whose purpose is to “advance education and thereby promote international peace, arms control and disarmament”. It also decides funding applications from New Zealand NGOs to the New Zealand Disarmament Education United Nations Implementation Fund (DEUNIF), for core and project costs to implement recommendations of the 2002 United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education; possibly the only government fund established to implement the Study's recommendations. See a previous blog post on this United Nations Study. As many other States are only now considering the establishment of national oversight mechanisms for fulfilling their obligations under WMD treaties and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, it is a timely opportunity for them to reflect on whether an how to include a formalized role for civil society experts. Disclaimer: Angela Woodward was appointed to the New Zealand Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control for a three-year term in 2011. ------

10 June 2013

Page 19 New blog post: Discussions continue on a post-CTR future In the new VERTIC blog post, Alberto Muti looks at continuing discussions over what might replace the US Cooperative Threat Reduction programme. Read the full post here. ------

10 June 2013 Discussions continue on a post-CTR era Alberto Muti, London The end of 2012 saw the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) celebrating its 20th anniversary amid widespread praise for the results it has attained. The programme was established in 1991, on the initiative of US Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. Its purpose is to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and related equipment and infrastructures in the former Soviet Union. Over time, it provided crucial assistance in dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems, destroying chemical weapons, and securing stockpiles of fissile material. CTR also oversaw the elimination of former-Soviet nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. At the 20th anniversary symposium, US President Barack Obama called it ‘one of the country's smartest and most successful national security programs'. Yet, with the programme coming to an end in June 2013, and Russia apparently unwilling to extend it, the attention inevitably shifted to what the world was poised to lose with its termination. The VERTIC blog covered the issue on October 25, 2012, highlighting the political challenges the CTR faces, as well as possible ways forward. Russia has opposed renewing the agreement, which was drafted during the Soviet Union collapse—a time in which Russia was in dire need of foreign assistance, especially on the financial side. State officials in Moscow have remarked that the arrangement is not ‘modern' and ‘fails to take into account the changes that took place in the world after its signing in the 1990s'. Claims that Russia can carry on the work started under the CTR through its national budget only are difficult to prove, but there are other, more substantial issues that stand in the way of the programme's renewal. First of all, under CTR, the US Government and its contractors cannot be held liable for accidents, damages or deaths occurred during CTR work. Second, and more importantly, the inspection regime under the Nunn-Lugar initiative is far-reaching, allowing the US in-depth access to sensitive Russian military technologies. While this ensures a high level of confidence on the US part, it has been a source of consternation for some in the Russian national security establishment. In addition, it must be considered that these issues do not represent just practical obstacles, but over time they have become identified within Kremlin circles as evidence of an unequal relationship with the US. Yet while voicing its displeasure over the original agreement, Russia has signalled its willingness to continue the work started with the CTR through a successor arrangement ‘based on the principles of equality and mutual respect'. President Obama responded favourably in its Nunn-Lugar anniversary speech, saying that ‘Russia has said that our current agreement hasn't kept pace with the changing relationship between our countries. To which we say, let's update it. Let's work with Russia as an equal partner.' The two countries have engaged in negotiations over a new arrangement since early 2013, with both sides reporting satisfaction in respect of both the atmosphere and productiveness of the talks. In late May, US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Kennet Handelman stated that the negotiations were approaching a successful conclusion and that all outstanding political issues had been resolved to satisfaction. Handelman even went as far as to say that if the new agreement were not to be signed before 16 June, the day the old one expires, it would be due to bureaucratic reasons only. Even if the renewal deal between the US and Russia were to encounter new obstacles, Nunn-Lugar supporters have an important achievement to celebrate: as the CTR enters its third decade of activity, its legacy is expanding far beyond its original scope (the former Soviet Union) to help secure WMD-related material all over the world. The expansion process started in 2003, when the American Congress adopted the so-called Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, allowing the programme to operate outside the boundaries of the former USSR. In 2004, CTR dealt with chemical weapons in Albania, completing the stockpile destruction in 2007. In 2010, the programme provided assistance to secure biological laboratories in Africa and prevent the theft or accidental release of deadly pathogens such as Ebola, Anthrax and Marburg Haemorrhagic Fever. In a constant effort to expand the initiative, then-senator Richard Lugar used his last months as a state official to promote the expansion of CTR to South-East Asia. After he left office at the end of 2012, his work has been carried on by others, and in May 2013 Senator Jeanne Shaheen proposed a Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Act' to apply the experience and know-how acquired through the Nunn-Lugar initiative to states in the

Page 20 Middle East and North Africa, with a proposed funding of $30 million for, among others, ‘expanded training, professional networking and civil society engagement, […] tighter export and border control rules.' The US is already engaged in the destruction of chemical weapons found in Libya after the fall of the Gadhafi regime, and it has been proposed that the programme might be aimed at the Syrian chemical arsenal. While the situation is Syria doesn't not allow for such an operation at the moment, US-led assistance in dismantling the country's weapons of mass destruction could play an important role in peacebuilding operations in the future. ------

31 May 2013 VERTIC at 5th plenary of African nuclear regulators Larry MacFaul and Hassan Elbahtimy attended the 5th plenary of the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA) in Hammamet, Tunisia, between 21 and 24 May. The meeting included presentations from the IAEA and other partners on safety and security plans and uses of instrumentation. The plenary also discussed membership and other procedural issues, as well as hearing presentations from member states on the state of their regulatory infrastructure. Larry and Hassan presented on VERTIC's IAEA Additional Protocol project. The talk introduced VERTIC, described the project and explained the cooperation and assistance mechanisms we can offer. We also distributed project literature as well as publications in related project areas. VERTIC would like to thank the FNRBA for their kind invitation to participate as observers to the meeting and we look forward to future opportunities for cooperation. ------

31 May 2013 New blog post: Crossing the 'red line' in Syria? In this week's blog post, Russell Moul looks at fresh allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria. Read the full post here. ------

31 May 2013 Crossing the 'red line' in Syria? Russell Moul, London On 29 May it emerged that the British government has given the UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, fresh allegations of three new incidents of chemical weapons use by Syrian government forces in March and April this year. This development once again raises the question: if proven accurate, will this trigger foreign intervention to end the civil conflict that has, over the last two years, consumed an estimated 80,000 lives? To date, Britain and France have been the most active in pushing for intervention in Syria as a response to what they see as wide-scale human rights abuse by the Assad regime—which includes the use of chemical weapons. With reference to Britain's latest letter, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, the British ambassador to the UN, said that: ‘We continue to inform the secretary-general and Mr Sellstrom [the Swedish head of the UN chemical weapons investigation team] of any information as, and when, we get it'. This allegation brings the number of reported cases of chemical attacks to at least six, and applies greater pressure to the international community to take action in response. Earlier this year, the Obama administration threatened President Bashar al-Assad's government with ‘enormous consequences' should chemical weapons be used against opposition forces. However, despite pressure from Britain and France, the US has backtracked until evidence of large scale use of chemical weapons can be confirmed. Furthermore, the US has not indicated how it will respond should verification prove positive, which raises concerns about the stability of the ‘red line'. In a related development this week, Russia has delivered an S-300 air defence system to aid Assad's government, despite objections from the US, France and Israel. The surface-to-air missile system is capable of detecting, tracking and destroying incoming cruise missiles and low-flying aircrafts and would represent a significant upgrade for Assad's air defence systems. The S-300s are being deployed by Russia in an attempt to avoid a Western-imposed no-fly zone like the one put in place by NATO over Libya in 2011. Where do we go from here? Given the maelstrom of events and the inconclusive evidence of chemical weapons use, how can Western nations respond? One means would be to maintain pressure on Assad by closely monitoring any reported incidents of chemical weapons, even if they are anecdotal. Although this will not likely lead the UN investigations team to declare definitively that such weapons

Page 21 have been used, it would demonstrate to Syrian forces that the West is taking the threat seriously. Indeed, some western governments have voiced fears that Assad is testing international resolve and, should he feel it is lacking, he could be tempted to use the weapons on a larger scale. The new allegations released by Britain came 24 hours after fresh claims of chemical weapons use emerged from the Damascene suburb of Harasta. This area, which is largely under rebel control, was apparently hit by a chemical attack during the night, which left large numbers of people suffering from severe respiratory difficulties. Video footage showed multiple individuals lying on the floor with oxygen masks while another revealed two injured fighters being loaded into a van, each exhibiting watering eyes and laboured breathing as medics intubate their throats. Although this footage could not be corroborated, it emerges alongside a publication on the website of the French newspaper Le Monde featuring personal accounts from journalists who had spent two months undercover with Syrian rebels in the capital. During this time, a photographer apparently experienced ‘blurred vision and respiratory difficulties for four days after an attack on April 13 on the Jabar front'. The journalists claim to have witnessed a number of alleged chemical attacks over several days within the district; in extreme cases, fighters would suffer severe coughing, vomiting or even loss of consciousness. The reporters also smuggled samples of suspected chemical weapons elements out of Syria, which were given to the French Intelligence services for analysis. The spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry, Philippe Lalliot, said that the results from these samples will take about three weeks to analyse. In the meantime, investigators are gathering evidence from doctors from within Syria and neighbouring countries, as well as refugees and others. Slowly but surely, this evidence will be drawn together and may well provide a more detailed image of what is taking place in Syria. ------

30 May 2013 Somalia to become the 189th State Party to the CWC Somalia has deposited its instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapon's Convention (CWC) with the UN Secretary General and will become a State Party as of 29 June 2013. This will bring the membership of the CWC to 189 States. Congratulations to Somalia! ------

20 May 2013 Presentation to OEWG Last Friday, Andreas Persbo delivered a presentation to the Open Ended Working Group on Multilateral Disarmament, which is presently convening in Geneva, Switzerland. The group was established by the General Assembly through resolution 56/67. The resolution was adopted in December 2012 through a recorded vote of 147 to 4 with 31 abstentions. Notably, four out of the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty voted against the resolution, while China abstained. So did India, Israel and Pakistan. The mandate of the group is to ‘develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons'. The working group will convene for up to 15 working days in 2013, with the first session being held 14-24 May 2013. The group will report back to the next session of the General Assembly.Mr Persbo was joined on panel by Mr Pavel Podvig and Mr Jean-Pascal Zanders. The other panelist spoke about START verification as well as the relevance of the Chemical Weapons Convention to multilateral nuclear disarmament. Read Mr Persbo's presentation here. ------

17 May 2013 VERTIC releases brief on Iran's nuclear fuel cycle Today, VERTIC has released a briefing paper on Iran's nuclear fuel cycle. In the brief, David Cliff and David Keir present a technical outline of the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle, drawing primarily on the quarterly reporting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The aim of the study has been to provide an overview of what is known about Iran's fuel cycle and how the various parts of it link together, while also commenting on the nature and extent of IAEA safeguards coverage in the country. Download VERTIC Brief No. 20—'Iran's nuclear fuel cycle: a technical outline'—here. ------

Page 22 10 May 2013 New blog post: Egypt shows NPT frustration in PrepCom walkout In this week's blog post, Alberto Muti looks at Egypt's recent walkout from the NPT PrepCom, and the country's historical role in the NPT process. Read the full post here. ------

10 May 2013 Egypt shows NPT frustration in PrepCom walkout Alberto Muti, London Last week, the the Egyptian delegation publicly announced its formal withdrawal from the 2013 NPT ‘PrepCom' meeting in Geneva. The walkout was staged in protest over the failure to set a date for an international conference on the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in Middle East. The conference was originally scheduled for December 2012, as part of a set of actions outlined in the final document adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference. However, in late November it was announced that the conference would be postponed to a non-specified future date due to conditions in the region and disagreements among the proposed participants. Notably, Iran's position was not entirely clear, and Israel had not agreed to participate. In its last statement to the PrepCom, the head of the Egyptian delegation claimed that the lack of progress on the conference constituted a breach of the Action Plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference and defined it as ‘yet another failure to implement a key NPT commitment.' Even though the walkout was unexpected, it is not surprising that Egypt would take a strong position on the matter, as its historical role of leadership, both among the Arab countries and in the Non Aligned Movement, has always made it a crucial protagonist of regional arms control matters. One of the earliest diplomatic initiatives to ban nuclear weapons from the Middle East dates back to 1974. During that year, Egypt and Iran jointly proposed a UN General Assembly resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region. It is worth noting that at the time Iran was still led by a pro-US ruler, while Egypt was in a state of war with Israel, and had just emerged from the 1973 military conflict. Both states would change positions in 1979. While the peace treaty with Israel, following the Camp David agreements, dented Egypt's Arab leadership, it allowed it to establish a strong relation with the US. Egypt proceeded to ratify the NPT in 1981, and in 1990 it formalized the proposal of a regional ban not limited to nuclear weapons, but covering all kinds of weapons of mass destruction.Israel has met the proposal without enthusiasm, stating that a WMD-free zone cannot be achieved without reaching a durable peace in the region. As Israel and its nuclear arsenal are a key element in the regional strategic balance, it is likely that Israeli participation in any WMD-free zone would be necessary to convince the other regional actors to join. Without it, many states might decide that a WMD option, either as a latent capability or as a real arsenal, still represents the best insurance against future uncertainties. Despite Israel's opposition, Egypt has continued advocating for the WMD-free zone proposal in many international fora, and can be credited for some of the most relevant achievements on this front so far. In 1995, during the NPT Review Conference tasked with extending the duration of the treaty, Egypt made it clear that it would not support an indefinite extension unless the Israeli nuclear issue and the creation of a Middle Eastern WMD free zone were addressed. In the end, this pressure resulted in the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. This landmark document called upon all states in the region to take ‘practical steps' towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the region, but did not give any indication as to what kind of steps should be taken. Fifteen years later, in 2010, these practical steps were outlined in the NPT Review Conference final document. At the time, Egypt chaired the Non-Aligned Movement meetings, and would probably have opposed a final document that did not touch on the Middle Eastern issue in a significant way. The 2010 document also openly names Israel (alongside other NPT outliers India and Pakistan), calling for it to accede the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Egypt has often been a proponent of strong international solutions both in arms control and in other areas of international politics, and, as already mentioned, its involvement in the international arena has made it one of the leading states in the region and a prominent member of the Non Aligned Movement since the very beginning. When advocating for the Middle Eastern WMD-free zone, Egypt has insisted that it requires full commitment by all countries, as well as a strong verification system to ensure full compliance. Egypt, of course, lies in the middle of one of the world's most troubled regions. The longstanding differences between many of the Arab states and Israel have been a constant source of instability and latent conflict, and Israel's nuclear and, possibly, chemical arsenals cannot be ignored. Egypt has criticised the preferential treatment Israel has often received by the international community as

Page 23 detrimental to the region's security. On many occasions, Egyptian officials have remarked that Egypt would not take on new international obligations as long as Israel remained outside the NPT regime. Most notably, Egypt has refused to conclude an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and has not signed up to the Chemical Weapons convention, maintaining chemical weapons capabilities, possibly to balance Israel's nuclear weapons. Over the years, these two tendencies have found a point of equilibrium, resulting in an assertive and strongly independent position that focuses on universality and equality as essential foundations of arms control measures. Egypt has been willing to put forward proposals that would subject it to a substantial level of international control and scrutiny, imposing significant limits to its future strategic choices. On the other hand, it has been adamant in demanding that others submit to the same conditions as well, before renouncing parts of its national sovereignty.For the past 25 years, Egypt has been one of the key advocates of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction. The international community, however, has offered little support beyond formal declarations. As the 1995 Review Conference shows, Egypt is not new to forceful positions in negotiations, yet last week's walkout is a strong and highly visible sign of its displeasure. If Egypt's commitment to a multilateral solution remain unreciprocated, it might well decide to re-examine that equilibrium between national and global interests which has guided its foreign policy on the matter so far. ------

03 May 2013 New Blog Post: Moving forward from CISPA In this week's blog post, Katherine Tajer considers CISPA and the future of cybersecurity law. Read the post here . ------

02 May 2013 Moving forward from CISPA Katherine Tajer, London This week, the Cyber Intelligence and Sharing Protection Act (more commonly known as CISPA) is under consideration by the US Senate. Four versions of the bill have been rejected in Congress since 2012, so it seems unlikely that the bill will pass. Just last week, an online petition opposing the bill attracted over 117,000 signatures. The future of cyber security policy may not be with CISPA, but why not? Beyond the media hype in recent months (the New York Times hack in February being the most obvious example), cyber-attacks are definitely on the rise: the Department of Homeland Security reported a 52 per cent increase attacks launched against the US from 2011 to 2012. Similarly, the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) in the UK reported a 50 per cent increase in business related cyber-attacks from last year. While once considered the hobby of embittered adolescent ‘hacktivists', cyber threats have now evolved into a serious international security and commercial threat. International policy-makers have taken note of this threat, and besides making alterations to military doctrine and strategic planning, states are looking to legislation to fight back against undesirable online activity. While some states are adamant about their need to protect freedom of speech and commercial competitiveness online, others are more concerned with the security challenges created by the internet. International laws governing cyber-security would require controversial decision-making in a relatively unfamiliar field and have therefore struggled to gain momentum and credibility. Presently, there is only one international bill in effect the Budapest Convention—to which neither China nor Russia is a signatory. As a result, states have attempted to refine their internal cyber procedures before becoming more heavily involved with international policy. CISPA is one such attempt. The US—as a major political, commercial and tech power—will certainly have a large impact on how other states shape their policies. As a result, the weight of CISPA has already been felt far beyond the Senate chamber's walls. Positives While CISPA has attracted mostly negative media attention, the bill does seek to serve an important purpose. As the title suggests, the bill aims to facilitate information-sharing between the intelligence community and the private sector. Cyber threats are often designed to attack wherever there are vulnerabilities—meaning the same type of attack could be repeated across sectors and across a period of weeks or even months. If American banks and power providers shared information on incoming threats with US intelligence agencies and vice versa, both sides would be better prepared to identify and root out attacks. To be clear, the bill states that all forms of information-sharing on the behalf of either party would be strictly confidential and voluntary on the part of either party. It should also be noted

Page 24 that the various manifestations of CISPA have been promoted by tech leaders, such as Apple and Google, suggesting that this real-time information-sharing would be invaluable to cyber threat detection and private industry interests. Concerns For many Americans concerned with civil liberties (the American Civil Liberties Union has been central to this debate) and of the Senate, the main issue with the bill is that it does not go far enough to protect personal privacy. The logic behind this is that if a bank account is implicated in a cyber-attack, then the account will be under the watch of the CIA, or the Department of Homeland Security, or the FBI. The Senate claims that they are going to review the law, split the provisions up and prepare separate bills to approach the privacy issue in a more robust manner. Alternative and complementary bills are already on the horizon, such as the Cybersecurity and American Cyber Competitiveness Act of 2013, which requires any information that could allow personal identification to be removed before that information is forwarded to government agencies. What's next Despite the pushback against CISPA, global legislative trends nevertheless are heading towards greater information-sharing. In February of this year, Barack Obama signed an executive order to establish a more focused approach to critical infrastructure protection in light of the rising cyber threat, which will certainly increase government participation in this sector. Also in February, the Council of Europe published a set of directives asking for information-sharing between private and public sectors, and to require companies to report any major cyber incidents to their national information security authority. Neither of these provisions has been particularly popular, as many companies see exposing internal vulnerabilities as a possible threat to their stock value. There are a huge range of considerations when establishing reasonable cyber law. As the battle of CISPA demonstrates, the interests of private citizens should be paramount, but are often difficult to protect. Information sharing could best protect important personal and national assets, but at what cost? It is a balancing act to maintain the borderless, competitive and commercial environment but also provide for greater protections. What's more, beyond the political debate, the quickening pace of technology is making threats increasingly difficult to identify and legally guard against. ------

25 April 2013 Angola, UK, OPCW and VERTIC co-organize CWC/BWC universality workshops VERTIC co-organized joint universality workshops in Angola with the British Embassy to Angola and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The workshops, which had the objective of advancing Angola's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), took place on 22 and 23 April in Luanda. Angola is one of eight countries that have yet to join the CWC and one of 26 yet to join the BWC. The OPCW delegation for the CWC workshop included Mr Mark Albon, Director of the International Cooperation and Assistance Division, and Ms Cristina Rodrigues, Head of the Assistance and Protection Branch. The OPCW press release is here. The VERTIC delegation for the BWC workshop was led by Mr Scott Spence, VERTIC's Senior Legal Officer, and included two Portuguese-speaking experts: Ms Renata Dalaqua, Volunteer Consultant to VERTIC, and Mr Francisco Galamas, Researcher at the Ministry of Defence of Portugal/Superior Institute for Security Studies (ISES). Mr Richard Lennane represented the BWC in his capacity as Head of the BWC Implementation Support Unit (UNODA), and gave the keynote speech for the BWC workshop on behalf of the 2013 BWC Chairman, Ms Judit Körömi (Hungary). The workshops are mentioned in UNODA's quarterly publication UNODA Update, which can be read here. H.E. Mr Georges Chikoti, Foreign Affairs Minister of Angola, opened the joint workshops during the morning of 22 April and confirmed his Government's intention to accede to both the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. Coverage about his statement is available here in English and Portuguese. The British, Russian and US ambassadors each gave statements and participated in the workshops along with Angolan officials from the the Humanitarian Demining and Humanitarian Assistance Commission (CNIDAH); National Police; and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Industry, Interior, Defense, Justice, Transport, Commerce, and Finance (Customs). Ambassador Margarida Izata, Director of Multilateral Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIREX) chaired the two workshops. The two workshops shared similar agendas which covered: an overview of each Convention and their main articles, CWC and BWC National Authorities, national implementation, declarations and submission of confidence-building measures, international co-operation and assistance, and the process of acceding to each Convention. A presentation was also given on Portugal's experience with implementation of the BWC. ------

Page 25 25 April 2013 New blog post: Prospects and challenges for the 2nd session of the NPT PrepCom In this week's blog post, Sonia Drobysz looks at the 2nd session of NPT PrepCom, currently underway in Geneva. Read the full post here. ------

25 April 2013 Prospects and challenges for the 2nd session of the NPT PrepCom Sonia Drobysz, Geneva On Monday, 22 April, the Preparatory Committee to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened its second session in Geneva. VERTIC will attend part of the two-week event, the purpose of which is ‘to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference,' as agreed in 1995 by NPT states parties when they decided to indefinitely extend the treaty and strengthen its review process. The PrepCom involves reflections on the state of the NPT's three pillars of disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The summary of the discussions will give a good indicator of the common denominator within states parties as well as of persistent disagreements on the NPT's implementation.Ambassador Cornel Feruta of Romania, who presided over the 55th IAEA General Conference, in 2011, is the chair-designate for this second session. As he explained in his opening statement, he has been consulting intensively with states parties, NGOs and academia to assess the context for the session. The climate surrounding the review process does not, however, seem favourable to smooth discussions. Cases of non-compliance with safeguards and non-proliferation obligations are far from being solved. North Korea's recent nuclear test—its third—and repeated threats by it against the United States and South Korea constitute a serious challenge to the NPT and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global non-proliferation regime, as the UN Security Council noted recently in resolution 2094. Discussions with Iran haven't shown great progress either. After the ‘E3+3' meeting in Almaty at the beginning of April, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton noted ‘it became clear that the positions of the E3+3 and Iran remain far apart on the substance.' What's more, while the sudden resignation of IAEA assistant Director General Rafael Grossi, officially announced on Sunday, 21 April, and the upcoming departure of IAEA Deputy Director General for safeguards Herman Nackaerts will not necessarily have much impact on the Iran talks, it will deprive ‘ the agency of the two officials who have spent the most time in the last two years talking with Iranians at senior levels,' as Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies has noted. More generally, states and NGOs have deplored the lack of progress in implementing the action plan adopted by NPT states parties in 2010—especially in the field of disarmament. The monitoring report published in March by the Geneva-based NGO Reaching Critical Will highlights many yellow and red ‘traffic lights', indicating that additional progress is needed to give full effect to the 64 measures agreed upon in 2010 and ensure that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. Other measures discussed during the last review conference—while not part of the action plan per se—have also lacked support and seen only halting progress. Organising a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction was a key practical step of the 2010 NPT Final document, but that conference has yet to materialise, threatening a successful outcome at the next review conference, set for 2015. Such difficulties will not necessarily lead to complete failure of the Geneva meeting. Threats from the Arab League to boycott the event after failure of the Middle East WMDFZ conference have, for instance, been dropped. Many non-proliferation experts have pointed out that ‘skipping the NPT meetings would mean forgoing an opportunity to use a high-profile gathering to spell out disappointment at the failure thus far to implement the Mideast zone objectives arising out of the 2010 review conference.' In fact, in its opening statement to the PrepCom, the League of Arab States declared that NPT parties who had agreed to take responsibility for convening a conference in 2012 had ‘breached their responsibilities' to do so. The League also explained that ‘despite the resentment of the Arab States of the unjustified delay of the conference [they] have come to the Second Preparatory Committee to call upon the States parties to adopt a clear position demanding the conveners to hold the conference no later than the end of 2013.' More importantly, states parties still value the importance of the NPT and are willing to join the discussions to help strengthen the regime. As Cornel Feruta reminded participants in his opening statement, ‘it is unanimously acknowledged that the NPT is the

Page 26 cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime' and ‘an essential instrument to our collective security.' Furthermore, progresses on certain non-proliferation actions are noticeable. As underlined by the aforementioned monitoring report by Reaching Critical Will, ‘on the 23 action points related to non-proliferation, three are red (relating to the lack of universalization and export controls), nine are yellow, and twelve are green', so ‘there has been more success in implementing in the area of non-proliferation than disarmament.' One perennial challenge is to strengthen implementation of Article III of the treaty, which relates to detection and prevention of the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology through IAEA verification of nuclear material and activities. In that respect, states have yet to agree on a strengthened verification standard including a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. It is worth noting, however, that 119 additional protocols are now in force, an increase of 18 since May 2010, when the last review conference was held. Moreover, many states, including the European Union members as well as Switzerland, encourage implementation of the so-called state-level concept to all states, promoting a safeguards approach that is more objectives-based and that considers all safeguards-relevant information about a state. By so doing the IAEA is able to focus its efforts where the risks of proliferation are greatest. Extension of the IAEA's verification mandate to other non-proliferation and disarmament obligations is also being promoted. The Non-Aligned Movement has, for instance, stressed ‘the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.' In addition, the PrepCom should give NPT states parties an opportunity to emphasise the role of the IAEA not only in the field of safeguards and verification but also in ‘efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework and to promote its implementation,' as noted by the ‘Vienna Group of Ten', which gathers Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. Discussions in Geneva should help further the reflection on the future of the nuclear security summits process and its articulation with IAEA's activities in the field of nuclear security, especially in light of the upcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security that will be held by the Agency this July. Expectations on the success of the PrepCom should not be overly high, but one can reasonably hope that current tensions will not deadlock discussions and that the event will be a good opportunity for states parties to show support to the treaty and the regime and to come together in a constructive fashion. As UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane hoped in her opening remarks, the review process should not only be a ‘diagnosis instrument' but also ‘a means for making prescriptions.' ------

25 April 2013 VERTIC releases new brief on nuclear disarmament verification VERTIC has today released its newest briefing paper, 'Nuclear disarmament verification: the case for multilateralism'. In this brief, the case for multilateral involvement in nuclear disarmament verification is discussed, with reference to VERTIC's ongoing capacity-building effort with non-nuclear-weapon states and intergovernmental organisations. This project has been running since 2011, with the objective of consolidating a role for the IAEA in disarmament verification, as well as reviewing the requirements of verification technology. Download the brief here. ------

19 April 2013 Additional Protocol fact sheet now available in French VERTIC's fact sheet on 'National Implementation Measures for the IAEA Additional Protocol' is now available in French as well as English. Click here for the French version. (Here for English) ------

18 April 2013 New blog post: Scientists find evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria In this week's blog post, David Cliff looks at the finding of apparent proof that chemical weapons have been used in Syria—and at the now stalled UN investigation into the use of chemical weapons in Aleppo province.

Page 27 Read the full post here. ------

18 April 2013 Scientists find evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria David Cliff, London Over recent weeks, rising tensions between the West and North Korea have pushed Syria and its 70,000 dead down the global news agenda, but as the conflict there goes on, British scientists are now reported to have found hard evidence of chemical weapons use in the country. It is a development that, if correct, marks the first proof of its kind amid a sea of accusations and counter-claims. The findings were reported by The Times of London on 12 April. According to the paper, scientists at the Ministry of Defence's chemical and biological research establishment at Porton Down, Wiltshire, found traces of chemicals from a weapon in a soil sample brought out of Syria by Britain's foreign intelligence service, MI6. The extraction of the sample reportedly took place last month, though when exactly, and where the soil came from, is unclear. Notably, the tests at Porton Down seemingly ruled out the possibility that the chemicals in question were from riot control substances used by Syrian security forces. One unnamed, unattributed source was quoted being dismissive of suggestions that what was detected was a riot control agent and pointing instead—while ruling out a definitive identification—to the nerve agent sarin. There are, then, at least three key questions surrounding these tests. First, exactly what kind of chemical was used? Second, where in Syria was the sample taken from? And third, who used the chemical substance that was found? Was it the rebels or the regime? Questions one and two will likely remain unanswerable unless the British government chooses to release more information. Porton Down may have an excellent idea of what chemical they are dealing with (and the source above seemingly indicates sarin as being a good bet), and MI6 will likely have a very good idea where the soil sample came from—even if they didn't send in one of their own operatives to get it. But question three (who used the chemicals?) is more tricky. Indeed, for weeks observers of the Syrian conflict have been asking just that question in relation to one incident in particular: Khan al-Asal. The Khan al-Asal attack Last month the Syrian government and the rebel opposition traded accusations with one another over the alleged use of chemical weapons on 23 March in the Khan al-Asal region of Aleppo province. Confident, presumably, of its innocence, the Syrian government referred the incident to the United Nations, requesting the UN secretary-general to launch an investigation into the matter, which he subsequently did. The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime has for many months been labelled a 'red line' by the United States, although what the crossing of that line would in practice mean for Western involvement in the conflict has never been defined. The rebel side is far from a cohesive bloc and its patchwork of militias contains a number of increasingly entrenched jihadist groups—one of which, the so-called al-Nusra Front, last week pledged its allegiance to the head of al-Qaeda: Ayman al-Zawahiri. And with the rebellion as fractured as it is, Western governments are caught between a desire to hasten the end of the conflict and fears over what certain kinds of support for anti-Assad forces, or even direct intervention, could mean in terms of unintended consequences. If rebel forces were revealed to have used chemical weapons, then the more immediate consequences in terms of what that would mean for Western involvement are even less clear than if the regime was proven to have used them. It is, though, a question that the recent exchange of accusations has brought into sharper focus. As reported in April in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, by the end of March intelligence agencies in the West were apparently beginning to suspect rebels of being behind the Khan al-Asal incident—'having succeeded, by an undetermined method, to fire chlorine gas at a Syrian army checkpoint'. (This suggests that the sample analysed at Porton Down may not have been taken from Khan al-Asal, if the Porton Down tests indicated sarin rather than chlorine.) Meanwhile in the Mediterranean... The UN investigation set in motion by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon may provide more clarity, but only if it manages to get properly underway. Notwithstanding the acute safety concerns of operating inside Syria, at present a 15-strong investigation team is waiting in Cyprus—ready for deployment—while negotiations continue between Syria and the UN over how the investigation should be conducted. Discussions have reportedly reached an impasse over where the UN team can and can't go inside Syria. On 8 April, speaking in The Hague at the Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Mr Ban noted that in addition to Syria's allegations of chemical weapons use near Aleppo, other member states had, he said, brought to his attention 'additional locations where chemical weapons were allegedly used' and requested investigations of

Page 28 those. 'My position is clear,' he went on: 'All serious claims should be examined without delay, without conditions and without exception.' The following day, the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that the Syrian regime was rebuffing efforts by Mr Ban to widen the investigation beyond Khan al-Asal. Such 'additional investigations' served as indications of 'hidden intentions' on the part of other states to violate Syrian sovereignty, a Syrian government source was quoted by SANA as saying. The 'real negative role' played by the UN in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq was also cited by Syria as a further reason for limiting the extent of the investigators' freedom of movement. The additional locations in question refer to Homs, where chemical weapons are alleged to have been used in December 2012, and Damascus, where they were allegedly used this March. Pressure on the UN secretary-general to investigate all three incidents—Aleppo, Homs and Damascus—has reportedly been led by France and the UK. All three incidents are subject to accusations and counter-accusations by the regime and the rebels. Whether any of the three locations will be subject to proper investigation remains uncertain. Without the sort of covert sampling carried out by British intelligence, investigators need access on the ground to be able to do their investigations properly. And no amount of covert sample-gathering can provide the kind of transparency that goes along with proper site access. But even if the diplomatic back-and-forth between Syria and the UN is resolved, the question of safety and security is hardly likely to be. Three years into the conflict, Syria remains as much a warzone as ever. For as long as that remains the case, it is hard to see how investigators can conduct an enquiry that begins to clear up some of the many unanswered questions that this conflict continues to pile up. Click below for VERTIC's past coverage of the war in Syria: 'UN investigation launched into possible chemical weapons use in Syria', David Cliff, 28 March 2013 'Halabja 25 years on: could it happen again?', David Cliff, 7 March 2013 'Wider conflict feared as Syria's war spills into UN-monitored ceasefire zone', David Cliff, 31 January 2013 'Drawing the red line—the case of Syria's chemical weapons stockpile', Russell Moul, 10 January 2013 'Syria revisited—international law and the use of biological weapons', Scott Spence, 5 October 2012 'UN observer mission in Syria ended amidst ongoing violence', David Cliff, 30 August 2012 'Syria: international law and the use of chemical weapons', Scott Spence and Meghan Brown, 8 August 2012 ------

12 April 2013 New blog post: Update from the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference Earlier this week, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrapped up their 15th bi-annual Nuclear Policy Conference. This conference, widely recognised to be one of the highlights on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda, spans two days and attracts some 800 participants from 46 countries. The conference was lively. Printing off all Twitter comments alone would consume at least 100 pages of paper. Read the full blog post here. ------

12 April 2013 Update from the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference Andreas Persbo, Washington D.C. Earlier this week, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrapped up their 15th bi-annual Nuclear Policy Conference. This conference, widely recognised to be one of the highlights on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda, spans two days and attracts some 800 participants from 46 countries. The conference was lively. Printing off all Twitter comments alone would consume at least 100 pages of paper. This year opened with a keynote address by IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and closed with a discussion with Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. Sessions in-between featured speakers such as Rose Gottemoeller, Christopher Ford, Christoph Eichhorn, and Bruno Tertrais. Sessions focussed on topics ranging from ‘Proliferation Implications of New Fuel Cycle Technologies' to ‘Deterring Cyber and Space-Based Threats.' Verification, monitoring or implementation featured only occasionally, and not very prominently. Most of the discussion revolved around the on-going Iranian situation, flaring hostilities between the two Koreas, and the apparent slow-down in talks between the United States and the Russian Federation. Over coffee, one participant characterised the present situation as a “hangover” following several years of optimism and progress. It is difficult to disagree. During breaks, several organisations were highlighting a downturn in funding, and a tendency of states to retreat back into familiar and well-rehearsed positions. And

Page 29 indeed, we heard that in sessions on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and we heard it in the session on ‘What Nuclear Weapons Can the United States Afford?' Increasingly, it would seem, non-governmental organisations are asked to come up with the ‘next big thing' while the sector's funding base is shrinking. Leaving pessimism behind, however, Director General Amano was on good form, and delivered a spirited, balanced and well formulated speech. Of interest to us verification practitioners was his emphasis on the Agency's potential role in nuclear disarmament verification, his remarks on progress of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, and his comments on the ‘State level concept' in safeguards implementation. Mr. Amano correctly noted that, “the IAEA is not a nuclear disarmament negotiation body; it is rather the conference of disarmament in Geneva or the first committee in United Nations that negotiates the nuclear disarmament agreements or bilateral negotiations have taken place.” And indeed, overall conference participants appeared to support the operation of existing, albeit dysfunctional, multilateral fora. According to Mr. Amano, however, the Agency can contribute with technical insights. He held that, “What the IAEA can contribute is to make its expertise, gained through verification, available for the countries, if so requested.” Very helpfully, he pointed out that “the IAEA helped to verify the disposal and dismantlement of nuclear weapons when South Africa abandoned nuclear weapons and joined the IAEA as a nonnuclear weapon state. If there are requests,” he noted, “the IAEA is ready to do more too in the area of verification of nuclear disarmament.” On the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, Mr. Amano, responding to a question from the floor, highlighted that “there are discussions how to deal with the disposal. There are various techniques. Shall we irradiate it in the reactors, or shall we store it or shall we dispose it? These aspects should be addressed. We need to address the financial aspects; we need to define the role of the IAEA. So this is not an easy, simple task, but we have been working on this issue. Rounds of discussions have taken place. And we are continuing these efforts.” Others in the conference that I spoke to, however, were less optimistic about the prospects of getting PMDA verification arrangements agreed. One diplomat, for instance, told me that the agreement had been stalled, and that progress was slow. Finally, in respect to safeguards, it should be recalled that the IAEA General Conference in September 2012 requested that the Secretariat reports “to the Board of Governors on the conceptualization and development of the State-level concept for safeguards.” (see GC(56)/RES/13). This report is still pending. At least one member state oppose the concept of a state level approach, maintaining that the safeguards system should be materials-driven. There are several views of what is driving this sudden interest in an arcane area of safeguards implementation. Opinions are also divided on how the Agency should handle this request, and what the consequences might be if it is done so poorly. Mr. Amano stressed that the Agency treats all its member states in an equitable fashion. He said that they “use the standards that all the countries have to implement fully the comprehensive safeguards and other relevant obligations.” He was also careful to point out that there “is not such a thing that, well, some countries, we - our safeguard approach is generous, or some country's approach is strict. We apply the same rule, that is, the comprehensive safeguard and relevant obligations.” The Director General's full report is expected later this year. ------

12 April 2013 VERTIC at the 3rd Review Conference of the CWC The Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is being held in the World Forum in The Hague, the Netherlands during 8-19 April. States Parties to the CWC have gathered to discuss the operation of the Convention and to take decisions on a number of matters critical to its future. Items on the agenda are the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons, verification of the Convention, achieving its universality, the status of its national implementation, and international cooperation and development. For the first time, NGOs were invited to deliver statements during the plenary meeting. VERTIC, represented by Scott Spence and Yasemin Balci, was one of 14 NGOs to do so. You can find our statement here. A number of side events, organized by both States Parties and NGOs, took place during the first week of the Review Conference. On Monday 8 April, SIPRI, Non-Proliferation Monthly and CBW Events organized a side event outlining resources prepared by NGOs for the Review Conference. The Special Issue of the Non-Proliferation Monthly, to which Yasemin Balci contributed, is available in English and French. On Tuesday, 9 April, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, in conjunction with the Belgian delegation, organized an event to

Page 30 promote the report “The Future of the CWC in the Post-Destruction Phase”, to which Yasemin Balci contributed. Scott Spence delivered a brief statement summarizing the article during this event. On Wednesday, 10 April, Yasemin Balci attended the annual meeting of the CWC Coalition, which counts VERTIC as a member. The Coalition discussed ways in which NGOs can further contribute to the effectiveness of the CWC. On Thursday, 11 April, Yasemin Balci formed part of a panel at the side event ‘ Reinforcing the Global Norm Against Chemical Weapons', organized by the CWC Coalition. The other panelists were Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs, US State Department; Dr Hassan Mashhadi, Independent Consultant; Dr Lech Starostin, International Centre for Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland; and Mr Muhammad Setyabudhi Zuber, National Committee of Responsible Care Indonesia. Yasemin's statement is available here. ------

11 April 2013 VERTIC congratulates Malawi on becoming the 170th BWC State Party Malawi deposited its instrument of ratification in Washington DC on 2 April 2013, becoming a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and bringing the membership of the BWC to 170. Congratulations Malawi!

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05 April 2013 New blog post: Knowns and unknowns in North Korea In this week's blog post, VERTIC Consultant Russell Moul assesses what's known and unknown about North Korea's nuclear activities and capabilities. Read the full post here. ------

05 April 2013 Knowns and unknowns in North Korea Russell Moul, London On Tuesday this week, North Korea announced plans to restart its reactor at Yongbyon—a 30-year-old graphite-moderated five-megawatt reactor (5MWe) capable of producing plutonium. Two days later, the North was observed deploying ‘powerful' ballistic missile to its eastern shore, which it threatened to use against the US and South Korea. These developments have gripped the international community in mass speculation: does North Korea pose a genuine threat or is this simply a case of heavy-handed brinkmanship? With what little is known about nuclear activities in North Korea, the room for speculation is large. Verification of nuclear facilities in North Korea has been absent for a number of years and reliable information on its current and future nuclear capabilities is limited. What's known? The nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon complex were shut down in July 2007, as part of North Korea's commitments to a landmark Joint Statement that emerged from the Six-Party Talks. That statement obliged the North to pursue the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to IAEA safeguards. North Korean workers, alongside US and IAEA technical supervisors, then began to disable the 5MWe reactor a few months later. This was intended to make it more difficult and time-consuming for production of weapons-usable plutonium to resume in the future. However, relations deteriorated sharply in April 2009 when, in response to UN condemnation of a rocket launch, the North announced that it was withdrawing from agreements reached within the Six-Party Talks framework. Alongside that, the North declared its intentions to ‘restore to their original state the nuclear facilities which had been disabled according to the agreement of the Six-Party Talks and bring their operation back on a normal track'. This was shortly followed by the expulsion of IAEA and US monitors from Yongbyon and, in May that year, the North announced the success of its second underground nuclear test. The UN Security Council issued a resolution as a response (no. 1874, 12 June 2009), which prompted the North to retaliate by stating its intentions to weaponise its plutonium supplies and stated also, significantly, that ‘the process of uranium enrichment' would commence. Tension rose further when, in 2010, North Korea revealed a light-water reactor (LWR) in the early stages of construction at Yongbyon. Construction began in late July 2010, and the target date for completion was estimated for 2012. However, satellite images of the site still show an incomplete structure. A visiting US nuclear scientist, Siegfried Hecker, confirmed the LWR's existence during a

Page 31 November 2010 visit to North Korea, but he also reported the completed construction of a hitherto secret uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon. Initially, North Korea had insisted that the plant was making reactor fuel to generate electricity, but this week's announcements from Pyongyang have confirmed Western fears: that the uranium plant is primarily intended to produce enriched material for use in nuclear weapons. The decision to restart the Yongbyon reactor came two days after Mr Kim declared his nuclear weapons to be the ‘nation's life' and part of a ‘new strategic line' to rebuild the economy in the face of international sanctions. On 31 March, during a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ruling Workers' Party of Korea, Mr Kim identified the expansion of his nuclear arsenal as a key priority for this year. The ‘military-first' state has repeatedly emphasised the need to devote its resources to a nuclear programme as the only means to defend the country against an American invasion. Mr Kim affirmed this by stating: ‘It is on the basis of a strong nuclear strength that peace and prosperity can exist and so can the happiness of people's lives'. This current escalation of provocation was sparked in December 2012, when North Korea successfully launched a long-range rocket in defiance of international pressures, and then carried out an underground nuclear test in February this year. The UN Security Council responded by issuing a number of sanctions against the North, which produced increasing hostility and enraged rhetoric as a consequence. Speaking in Washington, US Secretary of State John Kerry condemned the North's plans to restart the reactor as a ‘provocative act' and ‘a direct violation of their international obligations'. He continued to assure South Korea that the US was committed to defending its ally. However, some American officials still regard the North's belligerent activities as brinkmanship in action. Nevertheless, the situation remains volatile. David Cameron, on Thursday, used the North's latest nuclear tests as part-justification for maintaining the UK Trident nuclear weapons programme, while China has demonstrated increasing unease and ‘special concern' over the conflict's potential to spill over their boarder. What's unknown? Since Pyongyang expelled international inspectors from Yongbyon four years ago, there has been no official verification regarding its facilities. Dr Hecker's 2010 report remains the most recent source of information concerning the Yongbyon complex. During his visit, Hecker estimated that the North could resume all plutonium operations within ‘approximately six months and produce one bomb's worth of plutonium per year for some time to come'. However, this estimation is becoming increasingly dated. And there are clear drawbacks to relying too heavily upon a single individual's approximations. Furthermore, since withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks and the NPT, the North is under no obligation to disclose any information concerning its activities. At the same time, the North's enrichment operations gives it a second route to the production of nuclear weapons-usable fissile material. There still exists a great deal of uncertainty over the current state of North Korea's facilities. Dr Hecker could only report on the areas he had access to. The possibility that the North has developed additional facilities capable of producing either plutonium or enriched uranium cannot be ruled out. To give an example, the existence of the Fordow Enrichment Plant in Iran remained a secret until Tehran revealed the facility in a letter to the IAEA in September 2009 (when it was on the verge of exposure by Western powers). Indeed, verification of any suspected nuclear facilities is not straightforward, especially where no on-the-ground access can be had. Satellite photos are the most common means for detecting the build-up of infrastructure and other features of interest in such situations. Clandestine enrichment activities, however, are virtually undetectable and can be hidden in otherwise nondescript warehouse-style buildings. With tension currently running so high on the Korean Peninsula, the need for verifiable information concerning the North's nuclear programme is crucial. However, the existing atmosphere of provocation between Pyongyang and the US threatens to perpetuate the present state of affairs: keeping the West in the dark. ------

05 April 2013 David Keir interviewed about North Korea on BBC Radio 4 On Thursday 4 April, VERTIC Programme Manager David Keir was interviewed on BBC Radio 4's science magazine show, ‘Material World', to discuss recent events in North Korea. The show can be listened to on the BBC website at the link below. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01rlpv2 The discussion with Dr Keir begins at the 8-minute mark. ------

04 April 2013

Page 32 Trust & Verify No. 140 In this issue, Hassan Elbahtimy and David Keir discuss seismic and infrasound detections of the recent North Korean nuclear test and Russian meteor strike. Plus: Verification Watch, Science & Technology Scan, Verification Quotes and VERTIC News. Download the full edition here. ------

28 March 2013 New blog post: UN investigation launched into possible chemical weapons use in Syria In this week's blog post, David Cliff looks at recent claims and counter-claims of chemical weapons use in Syria's ongoing civil war. Read the full post here. ------

28 March 2013 UN investigation launched into possible chemical weapons use in Syria David Cliff, London As remembered recently here on the VERTIC website, 25 years ago—on 16 March 1988—Iraqi planes attacked the Kurdish town of Halabja in northern Iraq with poison gas and nerve agents. The assault, which took place alongside the so-called Anfal campaign of genocide then being waged by Saddam Hussein against Iraq's Kurdish minority, left some 5,000 people dead. Thousands more were injured. Today, 25 years on from Halabja, the use (or alleged use) of chemical weapons is making headlines once again. This time the focus is on Syria, where last week both the Assad government and the rebel opposition accused each other of using chemical weapons in an incident in the north of country, near to the now mostly ruined city of Aleppo. By the time of the attack on Halabja, the use of chemical weapons by Saddam's regime had become more or less routine, both against the Kurds and on the frontier battlefields of its ongoing eight-year war with Iran. In Syria, this at least has not been the case, at least not yet. Even so, the introduction of chemical weapons to a conflict that is now entering its third year has long been a fear among those paying close attention to the vicious civil war for control of the country that rages on, and on. It is a fear that is well-grounded. The Assad regime is known to have sizeable stockpiles of chemical weapons. That, coupled with the brutality shown by the regime toward rebel-held areas and those who reside in them, has centred concerns on the possibility of their use by his forces—a ‘red line' in the view of the United States. Their use would cross a number of legal lines as well. Syria remains a non-party to the Chemical Weapons Convention—which expressly prohibits the development, production and stockpiling and use of chemical weapons—but it nevertheless remains banned from using any such weapons by both the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which it joined in 1968, and by the prohibition of their use under customary international law. Less attention has been paid to the possibility of chemical weapons being used by Syrian rebels, who have not widely been presumed to have access to such weaponry. And who may not—though the Syrian regime is at present claiming very publicly that they do. The forum is the UN. On 21 March the United Nations secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, announced that in response to a request from Syria he was launching an investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons in the country, focusing in particular on Syrian claims that rebels used chemical weapons on 19 March in the Khan al-Asal region of Aleppo province. Rebel commanders, for their part, claim that chemicals were used there on that day, but accuse the regime of doing it—not the first time that Syrian rebels have accused Assad's forces of crossing America's red line. Speaking to reporters in New York, Mr Ban noted that the UN would be operating pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/37 C of 1987—which provides for UN member states to report possible uses of chemical or biological weapons to the secretary-general for investigation—and Security Council resolution 620, of August 1988, which encourages the secretary-general to carry out prompt investigations in response to such allegations by member states. In this case, the investigation has been set in motion at the request of Syria itself, but this so-called Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use could have be triggered by a request from any UN member state. In announcing the investigation Mr Ban noted that UN officials were working with both the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons—which is mandated to cooperate with the secretary-general in cases of alleged use involving non-parties to the CWC, as set out in part XI, paragraph 27 of the convention's annex on verification—and the World Health Organization (cooperation with which in cases of alleged use is provided for under a 2011 memorandum of understanding).

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According to Mr Ban, ‘modalities' being discussed included the mandate of the investigation and the composition of the mission, as well as ‘operational conditions including safety and security.' These latter two will be major concerns: the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria was withdrawn last August (after just six months) due to deteriorating security conditions, a number of United Nations personnel monitoring the Syrian-Israeli ceasefire in the Golan Heights were recently captured (and later released) by a Syrian rebel group, and violence from north to south across Syria continues unabated. If the use of chemical weapons is confirmed in Syria, then individuals could in time end up before the International Criminal Court (ICC) as suspected war criminals. According to the Rome Statute—by which the ICC was established—the use of poison or poisoned weapons, as well as ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all other analogous liquids, materials or devices' all constitute war crimes if used in international armed conflicts (see Article 8, part 2). Syria's war is a civil conflict, of course, not an international one, but in 2010 the Rome Statute was amended so that these same provisions now constitute war crimes in the case of ‘non-international armed conflicts' as well. Syria is not a party to the Rome Statute, however, meaning that the ICC has no jurisdiction there unless the Syria case is first referred to it by the UN Security Council. Should that happen, then any use of chemical weapons in Syria could potentially lead to individuals from all sides—government and rebel alike—being brought to the court in The Hague to stand trial for their actions. For past VERTIC coverage of the war in Syria, see the following articles: 'Halabja 25 years on: could it happen again?', David Cliff, 7 March 2013 'Wider conflict feared as Syria's war spills into UN-monitored ceasefire zone', David Cliff, 31 January 2013 'Drawing the red line—the case of Syria's chemical weapons stockpile', Russell Moul, 10 January 2013 'Syria revisited—international law and the use of biological weapons', Scott Spence, 5 October 2012 'UN observer mission in Syria ended amidst ongoing violence', David Cliff, 30 August 2012 'Syria: international law and the use of chemical weapons', Scott Spence and Meghan Brown, 8 August 2012 ------

27 March 2013 VERTIC congratulates Guyana on becoming the 169th BWC State Party Guyana deposited its instrument of ratification in Washington DC on 26 March 2013, becoming a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and bringing the membership of the BWC to 169. Congratulations Guyana! ------

24 March 2013 New blog post: Cyber-attack investigation in South Korea In this week's blog post, Larry MacFaul looks at the recent cyber-attack on South Korea, and the difficulties of attribution that such attacks pose. Read the full post here ------

24 March 2013 Cyber-attack investigation in South Korea Larry MacFaul, London What happened: On Wednesday 20 March, The Guardian reported that several media companies and banks in South Korea were hit by a suspected cyber-attack at around 14:00 local time. The companies' IT systems were disrupted, and ATMs and mobile banking services were also impacted. Lim Jong-in, Dean of the Graduate School of Information Security, Korea University, told the Associated Press ‘It's got to be a hacking attack'…‘Such simultaneous shutdowns cannot be caused by technical glitches.' What was the response: South Korea's communications agency responded by raising its cyber-attack alert level and by increasing staff resources focusing on the situation. An on-site investigation was also started. The following day, it was reported that the incident was being characterized as a co-ordinated cyber-attack that appeared to come from a Chinese internet protocol (IP) address. Difficulties in verification/attribution: However, by Friday, South Korean authorities backtracked from pinpointing China as the origin of the attack. The Korea Communications Commission said that an IP address linked to the incident belonged to a computer at one of the South Korean companies that was attacked. The error apparently arose from the fact that the IP address was

Page 34 used solely on the company's internal network but was identical to a public Chinese address (though, in any case, this in itself may not have immediately provided conclusive evidence on the origin of the attack since IP addresses can be manipulated by hackers). Media reports indicate that it may take weeks, or even longer, to carry out the investigation into the incident. Nevertheless, investigators are reported as saying that their analysis of malware and servers indicates that the attack was probably organised from abroad. And unsurprisingly, suspicions have turned towards the DPRK. It is no secret that verifying or attributing the source of a cyber-attack can be highly challenging. Even if a level of certainty that is satisfactory to those carrying out an investigation has been reached, it can be hard to achieve closure if the accused is simply able to deny involvement, as can be the case in cross-border cyber-attacks. In the meantime, the media, businesses and the public can speculate on the motive and capacity to carry out such an attack. Assuming that the attack was intentional and its effects were generally those that the perpetrator had intended, who would want to disrupt a number of South Korean banks and broadcasters, and who has the capacity to do so? Perpetrators could, perhaps, fall into four categories: the DPRK government; DPRK supporters (but not directly associated with the government); another government; or someone else entirely. Without getting rather more involved in the investigation, it is difficult to systematically assess all the possible motives and actors, other than the DPRK. However, since suspicions have fallen on the state, it is worth a quick look at the events on the Korean peninsula that are currently being highlighted as pertinent to this incident. The DPRK's customarily harsh rhetoric against South Korea and the US continues, though appears to be getting worse. North Korea is certainly very unhappy with sanctions resulting from its recent nuclear test. Furthermore, it was reported that last week, the DPRK accused the US and South Korea of organising cyber-attacks against it. For its part, the South claims that DPRK was responsible for around six attacks between 2009 and 2012. McAfee, the computer security firm, has suggested North Korean involvement in a 2011 cyber-attack against South Korean government and banking sectors. In addition, the North has been accused of jamming GPS signals, impacting flights in South Korean airspace. Does the DPRK have the capacity to carry out sophisticated cyber-attacks? And is it currently strengthening whatever capacity it has? Opinion appears to be divided, at least on the first point. In 2012 Army General James Thurman, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea told a congressional hearing that ‘North Korea employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyber infiltration and cyber-attacks.' Others believe the state's capacity is overestimated. Mandiant, the cyber security company, has provided an interesting list of what it feels it can reliably say about cyber capabilities in the North. One might also ask what the point of a particular attack (of any sort) is, and see if that can help in attributing its source. An attack like that carried out on Wednesday might be a live test of the perpetrator's offensive capabilities, and the victim's defensive capabilities. Or it could be a tentative demonstration of strength or a provocation—though somewhat obscured by the lack of clarity on who the perpetrator is. Of course, difficulties in attribution and verification are not unique to cyber space, though the nature of this realm does present new challenges. With increasing cyber flashes in the world's hot spot issues (China-US relations, Iran's nuclear programme) and the Korean peninsula, it seems a good time to reemphasize the need for three activities: threat and vulnerability assessments for national critical infrastructure as well as prevention and recovery plans; confidence building measures among countries and internationally agreed ways of reacting and responding to various types of attack; and, of course, continued work on methodologies for tracing and verifying attacks. These areas require not only cross-border coordination and development, but also cross-sector cooperation, as much of the capacity and infrastructure in cyber space is privately run. ------

14 March 2013 New blog post: Monitoring the Nuclear Weapons Situation on the Korean Peninsula Shortly before Christmas 2012, I was present at a luncheon hosted by the London embassy of the Republic of Korea. A few hours earlier that day the DPRK had launched, and publicised the launch of, a space rocket apparently capable of delivering a nuclear warhead which, as far as the diners knew at the time, North Korea still did not possess in a developed form. Despite bellicose comments from some around the table, the arguments around the lunch table were evenly divided between ‘this changes nothing' and ‘we are witnessing the birth of a new nuclear weapon-owning state.' Read the full blog post by David Keir with Andreas Persbo here. ------

Page 35 14 March 2013 Monitoring the Nuclear Weapons Situation on the Korean Peninsula David Keir with Andreas Persbo, London Shortly before Christmas 2012, I was present at a luncheon hosted by the London embassy of the Republic of Korea. A few hours earlier that day the DPRK had launched, and publicised the launch of, a space rocket apparently capable of delivering a nuclear warhead which, as far as the diners knew at the time, North Korea still did not possess in a developed form. Despite bellicose comments from some around the table, the arguments around the lunch table were evenly divided between ‘this changes nothing' and ‘we are witnessing the birth of a new nuclear weapon-owning state.' Some three months, and an apparently successful DPRK underground nuclear test later, the arguments have shifted towards the latter position. Although we have yet to see any results of radionuclide detection, the conclusion that the 12 February 2013 event was indeed a nuclear shot seems universal among pundits and politicians alike. Statements from the North about this test claim the device was smaller and lighter than previous ones. This implies that they can build a device small and light enough to be mated to their recently launched rocket. Or put more precisely, the DPRK may now be only a short step away from an inter-continental ballistic missile-deliverable nuclear warhead. There has been no independent verification of these claims. Outside of North Korea itself no-one knows whether this was a plutonium-fuelled device, using the plutonium which has been in the North's possession for some years, or a new, uranium-based nuclear yield device. No significant verification developments Reuters, on 20 February reported that ‘U.S. and allied spy agencies have found no traces of tell-tale nuclear-related particles from North Korea's February 12 nuclear bomb test, leaving unresolved basic questions about the device's design, according to officials in the United States, Europe and South Korea.' The report continues, ‘After the test, the U.S. Air Force Technical Applications Center in Florida dispatched WC-135 "sniffer" airplanes to look for traces of gas residue that could offer clues to the device's design, but those efforts apparently turned up empty.' More recently the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which has a global network of monitoring stations designed to pick up radioactive traces emitted from tests, said it had yet to find any such signs. The CTBTO spokesperson, Ms Annika Thunborg, was quoted by Reuters on 12 March 2013 saying that ‘it is very unlikely that we will register anything at this point ... at this late stage.' Ms Thunborg did not give details, but the failure to detect radioactive traces, even though it can take weeks to pick up radioactive noble gases such as xenon, emerging from an underground test, would indicate that North Korean site managers managed to prevent or mitigate any such release from the recent underground test. Based on the seismic and infrasound signals detected by the CTBTO International Monitoring System (IMS) and other independent systems, the estimated size of the device seems to be around five kilotonnes TNT-equivalent—several times larger than the signals received from the North Korean claimed nuclear tests of 2006 and 2009. Assessments vary, however, as very little is known about the geology of the site itself, and the emplacement of the device. A previous VERTIC assessment, based on the parameters of the Semipalatinsk test site, estimated the yield to be approximately seven kilotonnes. Emerging deterrence discussions in the ROK While the US might not feel that they are yet in reach of such a DPRK weapon, the focus has shifted to South Korea as a possible target. Among the political and military posturing of the North reported in recent weeks have been threats to visit ‘pre-emptive nuclear strikes' and ‘final destruction' on Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea. These statements have apparently shocked the South Korean public, who had assumed the main aim of DPRK's large investment in nuclear weapons development was to shift the nature of their relationship with the United States. An Asan Institute opinion poll now show a clear and unchanged majority (66.5 per cent of the surveyed) in favour of developing a domestic nuclear weapon. Obviously, taking such action would require the country to withdraw from a number of key international instruments, or engage in a strategy of deliberate non-compliance. South Korea was one of the original signatories to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force for Seoul in April 1975. This treaty prohibits the country from developing their own nuclear weapons capabilities. South Korea was stopped from developing its own nuclear weapon in the 1970s by strong pressure from the US, along with firm assurances that the ROK could rely upon the US for its defence against threats from the North. US nuclear tactical weapons were stationed in South Korea until 1991. In recent months the population of ROK at least seems to be losing its confidence in those assurances. So why, with its own modern army, supported by more than 28,00 US troops stationed in South Korea, do the ROK want a nuclear weapon of their own? A South Korean exit-strategy which despite public opinion appears extremely unlikely,

Page 36 would not be driven by the fact that the five nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT has not disarmed, this much is clear. However, it is equally clear that the sentiment is driven by the fact that a state on its border is getting nuclear armed, or expressed differently, has failed to disarm itself. The North has a vastly larger, although technologically inferior, conventional army. The conventional threat appears to be managed by South Korea. The primary driver would be that the DPRK looks set to operationalise its nuclear deterrence. The desire to rely on nuclear weapon to enhance one's security run counter to some of the arguments advanced in the past year or so, that nuclear weapons are obsolete and do not increase military security. As of late, the primary advocate for this position is Mr Ward Wilson, which recently published ‘Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons'. I had the pleasure of hearing him present this book last week in Oslo. Instead, the ROK poll appears to reflect well-established cold war philosophy, still adhered to by most of the current nuclear weapons-owning states. It was put very simply by Josef Stalin in the autumn of 1945, in a request to Kurchatov and Yannikov to provide Russia with a nuclear weapon as soon as possible. On the basis that Hiroshima and Nagasaki had shaken the whole world, the Soviet leader believed that a balance needed to be re-established so as to remove a great immediate danger to the USSR. For South Korea, it must appear that there is no absolute guarantee that the US will protect them under all circumstances. In other words, South Korea would feel ‘the need for a minimum effective nuclear deterrent as the ultimate means to deter the most extreme threats' (to borrow language from the UK's 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review). Finishing thoughts The understandable belief of nuclear abolitionists that the value of nuclear weapons is artificially high due to misconceptions appears to go for nought when, as in the case of the fears of the South Korean population: people believe that they could become the victims of a limited, regional nuclear attack. Whether or not, despite their beliefs, nuclear weapons will actually bring them the security they desire is, however, highly uncertain. The future is of course unclear, and several other factors is likely to come into play to materially reduce the current tension, long before serious decisions are made about nuclear weapons in the ROK. ------

07 March 2013 Morocco legislation added to the BWC Legislation Database ------

07 March 2013 New blog post: Halabja 25 years on: could it happen again? In this week's blog post, David Cliff looks back 25 years to the Halabja poison gas attack—and forward to the possibility that a similar attack could take place in Syria today. Read the full post here. ------

07 March 2013 Halabja 25 years on: could it happen again? David Cliff, London A quarter of a century has nearly gone by since the poison gas attack on the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja on 16 March 1988. The attack—by Iraqi forces, then also in their eighth year of fighting against Iran—left thousands dead: killed by a vicious mix of chemical agents; dead in their homes, in their vehicles, in the streets; dead trying to run, dead trying to hide. Nowadays widely considered an act of genocide, the massacre stands as one of the signature acts of repression against Iraq's Kurdish minority by Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein during the long, brutal years of his dictatorship. Today, of course, Saddam himself is dead and gone, captured and ultimately hanged following the US-led invasion of Iraq, his regime replaced by a shaky democracy. But in a time of ongoing conflict in Syria, another country whose repressive government (such as remains of it) is known to have stockpiles of chemical weapons, the possibility of another Halabja is all too real. Last week, to mark the approaching 25th anniversary of the attack, Chatham House hosted an event to discuss 'Chemical Weapons: Lessons for the Future from Halabja'. Several VERTIC staff members, myself included, went along. (For anyone that didn't, video and audio recordings of it are available online here.) Presentations were given by Richard Beeston, foreign editor of the Times, who was one of the first journalists into Halabja after the attack, as well as Professor Alastair Hay of the University of Leeds—who has conducted a great deal of research into the chemicals used in the town and their effects—and Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, high

Page 37 representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government to the UK, who sought to put the attack on Halabja in its proper, ugly context. For this was not, after all, an attack that took place in isolation. A vicious Iraqi campaign of violence and persecution in the restive Kurdish region was being carried out at the time, while 'Arabization' efforts (i.e. the eviction of Kurds from their homes and land and their replacement with Arabs) had, by the time Halabja was attacked, been underway for several decades. The Anfal campaign and the massacre at Halabja At no point since the founding of the Iraqi state in the years after the first world war have its Kurdish population been enthusiastic participants. In total, around 20 per cent of Iraqis are Kurdish, geographically concentrated in the north of the country, ethnically and culturally distinct from the Iraq's Arab majority and harbouring secessionist sentiments from the outset. By the early 1980s, Kurdish guerrillas belonging to the region's main party, the KDP, were siding with Iran (an old, if not always steadfast, ally) against their common foe: the Iraqi government, led by Saddam Hussein formally since 1979 and effectively for a number of years before that. In the first half of the decade only the KDP opposed Saddam, who managed to drive a wedge between them and Kurdistan's other principal party, the PUK, by opening negotiations with PUK leaders over autonomy. In 1985, after these talks fell apart, the KDP and the PUK forged an alliance against Saddam enabling the Kurds to carry out military operations against Iraqi forces with greater effectiveness than before. As Charles Tripp writes in his book, A History of Iraq (Cambridge University Press, 2007), by this stage of a stalemated war with Iran, Saddam 'saw Kurdistan as a field of opportunity for demonstrating his power and ruthlessness.' To that end, in March 1987 he appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid—who would, in time, become known as 'Chemical Ali' owing to his fondness for the use of chemical weapons—as the official in charge of all affairs in the north, including all military forces and operations. Al-Majid (a man described in one obituary as having been the most cruel of Saddam's henchmen, a man 'without redeeming qualities') lost little time making his presence felt. Almost immediately he set in motion the so-called Anfal campaign to oppress and terrorise the Kurds. Suspected guerrillas were captured and killed; other civilians were forcibly resettled in government-controlled camps; homes and villages and agriculture were destroyed. For its part, the use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces in Kurdistan was recorded for the first time in April 1987—with Iraq having by then been making use of chemical weapons on its other fronts, against Iranian forces, for several years already. In early 1988 the Anfal campaign kicked into high gear. In areas associated with one or other of the Kurdish guerrilla movements the Iraqis showed no mercy: inhabitants were all slain. By this stage the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds had become routine. Halabja—not strictly part of the Anfal campaign but rather an attack prompted by the occupation of the town by Kurdish-led Iranian forces—saw their use reach a fearsome extreme. Up to five thousand people are thought to have died in this single incident, with somewhere between seven and ten thousand others injured. Mustard gas, nerve agents and (it is thought) cyanide were all used, dropped from planes onto those below. Many of the injured still suffer today. Anfal itself was continued for many months after Halabja—up until the late summer of 1988. Altogether, as recorded in Ali Allawi's book, The Occupation of Iraq (Yale University Press, 2007), the campaign led to the deaths of nearly 200,000 Kurdish civilians. Concern over Syria Halabja was recognised as an act of genocide by the Iraqi High Criminal Court in 2010. Much more recently, last Thursday here in London the House of Commons agreed to a parliamentary motion formally recognising 'the genocide against the people of Iraqi Kurdistan' and encouraging other governments, as well as the European Union and the United Nations, to do likewise. This, the motion in question said, would in part 'send out a message of support for international conventions and human rights'—a message, it added, 'made even more pressing by the slaughter in Syria and the possible use of chemical arsenals' by the regime there. Pressing indeed. The possibility that chemical weapons may be used by Syrian government forces—whether against rebel fighters or civilians or indiscriminately against both—remains a matter of serious humanitarian concern. Despite the string of international agreements prohibiting the use of chemical weapons in warfare (added to since Halabja by the Chemical Weapons Convention, in force since 1997) and the fact that their use is also banned by the normative force of customary international law, another Halabja, or something like it, could still be on the cards. Fears of chemical weapons use in Syria is more than just worst-case scenario worrying. The regime of President Bashar al-Assad has already shown time and again that if it is to fall then it will go down fighting to the last, and that it will not give up a moment sooner. The extent to which it might go in its pursuit of survival may, many fear, stretch to the use of chemical weapons in a desperate bid to reverse the tide of rebellion—especially so if Assad and those left with him at the helm of his besieged regime start to feel that they have little left to lose. It certainly has the means to do so. Syria is thought to have sizeable stocks of

Page 38 chemical agents—including mustard gas, VX, sarin and tabun. It may also already have the will. Back in early December, signs that Syria was possibly preparing some chemical agents for use prompted hurried consultations among Western countries anxious to impress upon Assad the line that the introduction of such weapons to the conflict would cross. Though in fact, some allegations indicate that Syria may have already used chemical agents on multiple occasions against the rebel opposition. Whatever the truth of the matter, the Syrian story continues, cities go on crumbling, people on all sides go on dying, the world goes on watching; the tragedy goes on. A once vibrant country reduced, in the memorable description offered by The Economist last week, to 'a new Somalia rotting in the heart of the Levant.' Another quarter of a century from now, were the 50th year after Halabja to also mark the 25th after a similar event somewhere in Syria, history will no doubt have recorded that this was the year in which the conflict there reached a dark new low. ------

06 March 2013 VERTIC wishes to congratulate Nauru on its accession to the BWC Nauru deposited its instrument of accession in Washington DC on 5 March 2013, becoming a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and bringing the membership of the BWC to 168. ------

03 March 2013 New presentation: Verification and Irreversibility when going to zero Andreas Persbo travelled to Berlin, Germany, on 21-22 February 2013 to deliver remarks to the the Berlin Framework Forum: Creating the Conditions and Building the Framework for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World. The conference was sponsored by the Middle Powers Initiative and Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Find a copy of Andreas Persbo's remarks here. ------

01 March 2013 New blog post: The Mandiant Report: explanation and implications ------

01 March 2013 The Mandiant Report: explanation and implications Katherine Tajer, London The Mandiant Report, released last week, has given celebrity status to a previously unknown computer security firm. Detailing the tactics and organisation of the supposed Chinese military cyber defence wing—entitled Unit 61398 or referred to by Mandiant as APT 1 (standing for Advanced Persistent Threat 1)—Mandiant's in-depth report grew to prominence due to its reporting on the recent major attacks on the New York Times, Washington Post, Bloomberg News, and the Wall Street Journal. What makes Mandiant's report so salient—and controversial—is the assertion that the Chinese military is behind a wide range of targeted hacking efforts. Although the Chinese government has already been accused in some press outlets and other forums of being the source of specific cyber attacks, never before has such a large number been attributed to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Specifically, Mandiant claims that one military unit of the PLA was responsible for 141 planned security breaches, lasting an average of 365 days. Mandiant believes the purpose of these attacks is to harm “English-speaking” commercial rivals and advance Chinese dominance in five fields identified by China's 12th Five Year Plan Accordingly, the main industries affected in the 141 attacks were: Information Technology, Aerospace, Satellites and Telecommunications, Scientific Research and Consulting, and Energy. The attacks reported by Mandiant seem to target sectors of growing concern amongst the cybersecurity community, namely critical infrastructure, government, and large corporations. The New York Times was therefore perhaps an atypical victim and suggests that the perpetrator may have had non-commercial motivations for such an attack. The newspaper itself reported on the issue in attempt to expose the growing risk of these kinds of attacks. The Times traced the attacks back to

Page 39 September 2012, when staff were completing a major story involving the Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao. With the help of Mandiant, the Times was able to uncover a complex and extensive cyber-espionage effort, originating from China. The paper reported that no customer information or any information outside of the Wen Jiabao story had been infiltrated. How this genre of attacks will be used going forward presents some interesting questions about government power and cyber-warfare. China's tight governmental control over civilian internet use has been in and out of the press: for example, China's move to block Twitter in 2009 made headlines. Some suspicious activity targeting political groups within China has raised questions about the possibility of internal attacks. In February of this year, an attack targeting the Uighur minority in China—a group of Turkic Muslims living predominantly in Xinjiang province—was discovered by Infosecurity. In 2012, an attack with similar results against Tibetan activists was located: both attacks targeted politically motivated organizations with an initial spear-phishing attack - an attack that masquerades as a legitimate form of communication with a relevant attachment. The reports describe how these attachments then went on to steal documents and activate computer microphones. Notably, spear-phishing is the same method of infiltration indentified by Mandiant as the primary tactic of APT 1. If, as asserted by Mandiant, the New York Times hack was condoned or authorized by the Chinese government, which its officials deny it would indicate a move towards extending censorship beyond state borders. Whether these particular accusations are accurate or not, to think that China might be alone in conducting militarized hacking efforts would be naïve. Last year, the US Army Joint Staff released a publication stating that all efforts will be used to establish US information superiority and cyber activities will have an offensive angle as well as a defensive component. While there is no conclusive evidence that the US is planning attacks similar to those Mandiant has attributed to the PLA, attacks like Stuxnet, in 2011may be a better indication of what kind of attacks we can expect from US sources. Currently, the United States is attempting to provide both strong cybersecurity measures to protect its main commercial and infrastructure assets against major hacks, while maintaining the internet as an open and innovative personal and commercial environment. Two recent bills have raised concern regarding the internal aims of the US government's cyber-security strategy. Earlier this month, President Obama signed an executive order facilitating greater government knowledge regarding cybersecurity breaches within critical infrastructure. Currently, the Cyber Information Sharing and Protection Act, more popularly known as CISPA, is once again under consideration by congress. If passed, this bill would encourage the private sector to share information with government, which could include personal details about their customers. Right now, policymakers are negotiating the space between secure internet and a free one. As we see a growing capability for and a higher frequency of cyber-based attacks, policy makers and citizens will have to decide the price paid for secure web-based infrastructure. ------

21 February 2013 New blog post: Son et Lumiere over Russia In this week's blog post David Keir reflects on the infrasound detection capability of the CTBT monitoring system and the meteor which entered the Earth's atmosphere over Russia on 15 February 2013. Read the full post here. ------

21 February 2013 Son et Lumiere over Russia David Keir, London There can be few people who have not by now seen the spectacular video images of the meteor blazing across the Russian sky in daylight on 15 February this year. The light output was startling in its brilliance, casting intense shadows of buildings and vehicles. Some of the footage also captured the sound of the event. But how many realise that this provided a further proof of the capability of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty international monitoring system? In fact, a lot of the sound produced by this object as it entered the earth's atmosphere could not be heard by human ears, as it was of a lower frequency than we can detect. This, so-called infrasound, with a frequency of less than 20 Hertz, is one of the signatures of a nuclear explosion too and is a phenomenon that the CTBT International Monitoring System network has been set up to detect. Infrasound detection is one of the four key monitoring systems of the CTBT; the others being seismic signal detection, hydro-acoustic sensing and radionuclide detection in the atmosphere. In an excellent piece on

Page 40 the CTBTO website (www.ctbto.org), released from Vienna on 18 February, the organisation reports that the CTBT infrasound network did indeed detect the signals from the Russian meteor event. The infrasound signal was detected by 17 infrasound stations in the CTBTO's network and the furthest station from the meteor path to record the sub-audible sound was some 15,000 kilometers away in Antarctica. Actual data from the station in Kazakhstan is also shown in the article. Sound is, of course, a sequence of pressure waves propagated in air (and other materials too) and is just one component of the impact that this type of meteor has as it burns up rapidly in the atmosphere. This type of object spends its life in space —as a so-called meteoroid— in an environment free of oxygen and essentially friction-free. It is only when it enters the earth's atmosphere and heats rapidly, due to friction with the air, and ignites due to the oxygen present. This rapid oxidation of the material in the meteoroid means that it burns with the bright light seen in the videos and emits the accompanying sound waves. As well as the pressure wave caused by the meteor breaking the sound barrier in air (which caused the damage to windows and other structures), judging by the data recorded, there was a longer period of infrasound output as the object travelled across the sky. Pierrick Mialle, an acoustic scientist at CTBTO, is quoted as saying that the 15 February meteor signal picked up by the detectors was not from a single explosion, but from the object burning in air, traveling faster than the speed of sound. He further stated that this was one of the ways it could be distinguished from mining explosions or volcanic eruptions. Mialle also indicated that scientists around the world will be using the CTBTO's data, (some of the strongest signals the infrasound network has ever detected) to better gauge the object's breakup and discern more about the object's final altitude, energy released and how the meteor disintegrated. The particular property of infrasound waves, that they are attenuated less than higher-frequency (audible) sound, is a fortuitous feature that the CTBTO detector network makes good use of. Once again this shows the value of such a network, in operation around the clock, for the detection of events, expected or otherwise, and provides confidence in the overall International Monitoring System for detecting nuclear tests, anywhere in the world. ------

20 February 2013 New Employment Opportunities at VERTIC VERTIC seeks a multi-skilled Office Manager or Administrator who is enthusiastic about the challenge of working in a dynamic and expanding non-governmental organisation. In the last few years, the organisation has experienced growth in activities and staffing mostly associated with start-up ventures. For more information see here. ------

18 February 2013 VERTIC participates in BWC seminar in Bogota VERTIC's Senior Legal Officer, Scott Spence, participated in a Biological Weapons Convention seminar in Bogota during 14-15 February. The workshop, co-organized and hosted by the Colombian Ministry of External Relations, VERTIC and UNLirec addressed implementation of the BWC into national law, the establishment of a National Authority, and submission of annual confidence-building measures to the BWC Implementation Support Unit. The seminar included the participation of experts from Chile and the EU Action for the BWC. Scott Spence's opening statement and closing statement. The Ministry of External Relations press release. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs Update. ------

15 February 2013 Updated information on DPRK's test The Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation released an updated estimate on the seismic activity detected in North Korea on the 12th of February. The organisation's earlier estimate was informed by data collected from at least 25 stations that initially detected the tremor. The new analysis incorporates data from 96 international monitoring stations and slightly changes the estimated magnitude of the seismic activity from 5.0 to 4.9. The new estimate will lead to a re-assessment of the likely yield of the explosion whose value partly depends on the detected magnitude of the tremor. New analysis also confirms earlier

Page 41 information about location which corresponds to the location earlier identified for DPRK's tests in 2006 and 2009. The new estimate, however, decreased the margin of error for the current location estimate to +/- 8.1 km. Absent on-site access to the testing site, detection of radionuclide particulates or certain noble gases can possibly confirm the nuclear nature of the explosion. New information released by the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation did not refer to any findings of that sort. Detection of these materials depends in part on the effectiveness of measures taken to contain the underground explosion but also on meteorological conditions that influence how long it takes for these materials to reach remote monitoring stations. ------

14 February 2013 New blog post: DPRK nuclear test On 12 February 2013, the DPRK announced that it had conducted its third nuclear test. Hours before the announcement, however, data started to flow from various monitoring stations indicating seismic activity in North Korea. This gave considerable credibility to the assertion that the DPRK conducted an explosive test possibly of a nuclear nature. Read the full post here. ------

14 February 2013 DPRK nuclear test By Hassan Elbahtimy with Andreas Persbo On 12 February 2013, the DPRK announced that it had conducted its third nuclear test. Hours before the announcement, however, data started to flow from various monitoring stations indicating seismic activity in North Korea. This gave considerable credibility to the assertion that the DPRK conducted an explosive test possibly of a nuclear nature. Testing of nuclear weapons was a salient feature of the nuclear age until the 1990s. The North Korean tests bring doubts to confident assertions that nuclear testing can be comfortably written off as something of the past. Testing is, strictly speaking, not necessary for the construction of a nuclear weapon. Indeed, the first weapon ever used (‘Little Boy') was an untested gun-assembled design. There are many more examples. It is assumed that Israel has developed nuclear weapons. The Israeli government has never denied this allegation. Yet, Israel has probably never conducted a nuclear weapons test. Also, Sweden, while drawing up final plans for its weapons programme, decided in 1962 that nuclear testing was desired, but not necessary, to develop an independent nuclear arsenal. A study by the US National Academy of Sciences explains that, “without testing, South Africa produced six modernized lighter U-235 gun-type weapons.” In other words, the test ban is not a major constraint on states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. However, countries can conduct tests for various other reasons. States wanting to develop high-yield, reliable, economical and lightweight nuclear weapons for missile delivery need to conduct both assessment trials and safety trials. Thus, while a state may be able to develop a functional design without testing, they may face challenges should they want a safe missile-delivered weapon. Naturally, military planners would need to have some assurance that the weapon will work when deployed, that it won't go off by accident or rough handling, and would want to have a rather precise idea of the destructive capability of the device. Nuclear tests leave behind several footprints that can be studied, analysed and therefore used for verification purposes. One of these footprints is the seismic impact of the test. Nuclear tests are ultimately explosions caused by man-induced nuclear reaction either by fission, fusion or some combination of both. Nuclear explosions are followed by the rapid release of vast amount of energy. Depending on the environment or the medium in which the nuclear detonation took place, shockwaves produced by the sudden release of energy can be detected, collected and analysed. Seismic stations are particularly equipped to detect underground tests and it was through these stations that early data about the DPRK started to flow. National seismic stations run by the US, South Korea and Japan among in addition to international networks part of a global CTBT verification regime also detected the North Korean activity. Analysis of seismic waves can provide indicators for the nature of the explosion, its strength and its location. For example, It can indicate whether the seismic activity due to a natural phenomenon or the result of man-made explosion. Most of the time, just glancing at the waveform data is enough. An explosion has an instant impact on the surrounding environment, a sharp initial wave, that then subsides. An earthquake, on the other hand, builds up in intensity and then subsides. Signal strength depends on many factors: the yield, the depth of

Page 42 emplacement, and the nature of the geological structure surrounding the device. The strength of the tremor provides indications to the possible yield of the explosion. Calculating yield can be a challenging endeavour and depends on converting data reflecting shockwave activity into an equivalent of explosive charge calculated in tonnes of TNT. As shockwaves travel through various geological formations to reach sensors, geological factors need to be taken into consideration to arrive at an accurate calculation of yield. This is particularly challenging in the North Korean case due to lack of sufficient information about the geology of the site. Information available on the North Korean activity show a seismic activity with an estimated magnitude five. Various sites have put the yield estimate as low as seven kiloton, and as high as 20. The explosion could have been more, but is not likely to have been less, powerful than that. However seismic date cannot on its own establish whether that explosion is the result of a conventional ordinance or one that involved a nuclear reaction. Additional means are needed to reach such a conclusion. Analysis of this seismic data traces back the shockwaves to the location where DPRK's two previous tests in 2006 and 2009 took place. It should also be noted that it would be extremely challenging to detonate a very large conventional explosion instantly. The explosives would need to be transported to the site, requiring hundreds, possibly thousands, of truckloads, all channeled into an often rather narrow tunnel. That kind of activity would be difficult to hide from watching surveillance satellites. Then the explosives would need to be wired in a way that ensures that it goes off at exactly the same moment. While not beyond the realm of possibility, that in itself would be an exceptionally challenging task. Finally, why would anyone having joined the CTBT want to fake non-compliance? While the seismic footprint provides important indicators, it is radionuclide analysis that can provide more conclusive evidence about the nature of a detected explosion and particularly whether it is of a nuclear nature. This can be established through detecting certain isotopes that result from the nuclear reaction. If conducted in the atmosphere certain fission products can be detected but this is not the case when the test or explosion is buried and contained underground. In this case however, certain noble gases that are also produced during the reaction can seep through and leak into the airspace. Because of their nature as noble materials they don't readily react with the environment. Of these Xenon is of particular importance given its relatively longer half life than Krypton, another material produced in the reaction, for example. Air currents, wind and meteorological conditions more generally play a big role in the direction and rate of Xenon's dispersal. Different Xenon isotopes are also produced from nuclear related activities including reactor and accelerator operations and therefore form background noise that needs to be factored in to correctly establish its source. As radionucleides drift with the wind, the collection and analysis of this data takes more time than seismic detection: days, or possibly weeks. Information on the radionuclide footprint of the North Korean activity is yet to appear. The verification regime of the CTBT involves radionuclide stations and labs dispersed around the world half of which are equipped with noble gas detection and analysis capabilities that are needed to verify the nuclear nature of any underground explosion. The United States also has its own national technical means and previously released information from its air sampling systems in the region that were particularly relevant to 2006 North Korean test. What added value could this test bring to the DPRK? The test may well have domestic or international political reasons. What is more important perhaps, a third nuclear test can be helpful to further advance the DPRK's bomb making capabilities. The previous two tests seem to have left considerable room for design improvement considering their relatively low explosive yield. A DPRK test can therefore test design enhancements that could increase bomb yield. It is also possible that the DPRK might need to experiment with lighter or smaller nuclear devices that can be successfully mated with a delivery vehicle and particularly a ballistic missile. The official DPRK statement explicitly highlighted these factors by stating that the new test used a ‘smaller and light' device compared to those used in previous tests. The DPRK is not sitting on unlimited reserves of bomb grade fissile materials. On the contrary, the production of nuclear fuel suitable for bomb making is a challenging task. Particularly so for a country like the DPRK which has been under the crunch of international sanctions for many years. Moreover, North Korea's main plutonium producing reactor was shut down in 2007. With an estimated plutonium inventory in the range of 24-42 Kg, enough for about ten charges, one would expect this stock to be used with due diligence and economy unless the DPRK has other sources for fissile materials. Plutonium is widely considered to be the source of fissile material for the previously tested devices in 2006 and 2009. However, the DPRK has also taken steps toward mastering uranium enrichment. The scale and efficiency of uranium production capabilities available to the DPRK can only be guessed. A visit by Siegfried Hecker in 2010 to North Korea's enrichment plant provides evidence that the DPRK started to achieve considerable progress in uranium enrichment technology. However, absent full IAEA inspections, no credible estimates exit on whether the DPRK is capable of producing enriched

Page 43 uranium with sufficient purity and quantities for bomb making. Can the recent test help us identify whether uranium was used rather plutonium? Ultimately, one way to differentiate can be through analysis of radioactive materials leaking from the explosion and mainly isotopes of radioactive Xenon. While some argue that plutonium based and uranium based designs produce different isotopic compositions of Xenon, others doubt that this can be accurately detected to differentiate between plutonium and uranium designs. Either way, it might be too early to put this to the test now. Without access to the test site, materials used for any such analysis has to be collected by air samplers, taking into consideration various meteorological factors, in a process that takes longer than the collection and analysis of seismic data. ------

12 February 2013 North Korean Test The Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted a nuclear test at noon local time today, according to an official announcement by its state-run news agency. The test is the third following previous tests in October 2006 and in May 2009. The Vienna-based Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation organised a press conference today that included initial analysis on what was described as a ‘seismic event with explosion like characteristics' in North Korea. The organization also produced a press release including its initial technical assessment informed by preliminary data obtained through its verification regime. Information released indicate that the location of today's event is ‘largely identical' to the location of the previous tests. The tremor measured 5.0 in magnitude and was initially detected by up to 25 seismic monitoring stations. Some initial assessments of the event interpret this as a nuclear explosion with estimations of yield (see for example the report by the Norwegian organisation NORSAR). ------

07 February 2013 New blog post: Bond v United States towards the US Supreme Court again In this week's blog post, Yasemin Balci looks at the chemical weapons case of Bond v United States, which will be heard by the US Supreme Court on appeal. Read the full post here. ------

07 February 2013 Bond v. United States: towards the US Supreme Court again Yasemin Balci, London The case of Ms Bond, a woman convicted in the United States under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Implementation Act for putting highly toxic chemicals on the car door handles, doorknob and mailbox of a former friend, will be considered by the US Supreme Court again. Due to its focus on the balance of power in a federalist system, this case is particular to the US domestic legal order. However, as the Court will address the application of the CWC Implementation Act to Ms Bond's criminal acts, it is also of interest to other CWC States Parties that have adopted or are in the process of adopting implementing legislation for the CWC. The US Supreme Court previously heard Ms Bond's case in 2011 to decide whether she had standing (that is, the legal ability to bring her case) to challenge her conviction under the CWC Implementation Act (see Trust & Verify No. 134 on this decision). Deciding that she did, her case was then remanded to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which upheld her conviction under the CWC Implementation Act in 2012, although not without some criticism (see the VERTIC Blog of 28 June 2012 for an analysis of this judgment). This would have been the end of the case, had the Supreme Court not accepted last month to hear it on appeal (the Court only hears 75 to 80 cases out of 10,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari per year). Ms Bond's new appeal has raised two questions for the Court. The first one asks how treaties such as the CWC should be implemented by the Federal government in the domestic legal order without encroaching on the power of states. The second one asks whether “the provisions of the CWC Implementation Act [can] be interpreted not to reach ordinary poisoning cases, which have been adequately handled by state and local authorities […]?” Ironically, state and local authorities failed to adequately handle Ms Bond's case, at least in terms of enforcement. When the victim notified the local police about the white powder on her car door handles, doorknob and mailbox (something that occurred over 24 times over a course of three months), she was told it might be cocaine and was advised to

Page 44 clean it. Only when she contacted the postal service, a Federal entity, was an investigation started that led to Ms Bond's arrest. The white powder was 10-chlorophenoxarsine, half a teaspoon of which could have been lethal if swallowed by the victim or her child. This instance highlights the importance of training enforcement officers at all levels to be aware of the possible non-peaceful uses of toxic chemicals (as well biological agents, toxins and nuclear and radioactive material). It is true that Ms Bond's criminal acts could have been prosecuted under penal provisions other than those in the CWC Implementation Act. Many states have provisions criminalizing the use of poison. These are often archaic provisions, however, which usually do not clarify what is meant by the word ‘poison'. For example, international instruments such as the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 separate poison from gases. Nor do these provisions include related activities such as acquiring poison for malicious purposes. In the CWC Implementation Act, which ‘faithfully tracks the language of the CWC' according to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, chemical weapons and toxic chemicals are clearly defined. While these definitions are broad, this is necessary to ensure that these legal terms will remain relevant as the field of chemistry advances. Ms Bond could have also been prosecuted for the crime of assault or battery. These charges would not have satisfactorily reflected her criminal behavior, however, especially as her intent was to cause physiological damage to her victim through covert means. As a microbiologist working for a chemicals manufacturing company, she knew which chemicals she should choose for this purpose. She was correctly prosecuted under the CWC Implementation Act, which criminalizes chemical weapons use, i.e. the non-peaceful use of toxic chemicals, which can cause permanent harm to humans by the way they affect bodily functions. It is common knowledge that chemical weapons can be used as weapons of mass destruction or for terrorist purposes. However, it is also important to understand that the use of toxic chemicals as a weapon by one individual on another can qualify as chemical weapons use. Whether this will feature in the Court's decision will become clearer in June this year. ------

01 February 2013 Lebanon legislation added to the BWC Legislation Database ------

31 January 2013 New blog post: Syria's war spills into UN-monitored ceasefire zone In this week's blog post, David Cliff looks at fears that the Syrian civil war could spark a wider conflict as it spills into the UN-monitored ceasefire zone in the Golan Heights. Read the full post here. ------

31 January 2013 Wider conflict feared as Syria’s war spills into UN-monitored ceasefire zone David Cliff, London Last month, the routine six-monthly extension of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights was issued alongside expressions of serious concern at escalating violence in its area of operations and repeated, increasingly brazen violations of the 1974 Israeli-Syrian ceasefire pact that led to its formation. The violations in question have taken several forms. Syrian military forces have been observed conducting operations inside the UNDOF-monitored ‘area of separation', where no military forces from either side are allowed, and both Israeli and Syrian forces have fired across the north-south ceasefire line known as the ‘Alpha' line, which divides the area of separation from Israeli-occupied Golan. (See here for a map of the UNDOF deployment area.) An attack on a UN convoy on 29 November, which left a number of UNDOF personnel wounded, has raised the level of concern still further. These concerns, set out in UN Security Council resolution 2084 (of 19 December 2012), reflect mounting fears that the ongoing civil war in Syria could seriously destabilise the Golan Heights region and possibly lead to the breakdown of the Israeli-Syrian ceasefire agreement altogether. According to the most recent report of the UN secretary-general on the activities of UNDOF (issued on 27 November 2012), since mid-2012 Syrian armed forces had ‘expanded their deployment and carried out military activities, including security operations, in the UNDOF area of operations, ostensibly to contain domestic unrest and the activities of armed elements.' The report lists a number of specific incidents where Syrian military fire had impacted on the western (i.e.

Page 45 Israeli-controlled) side of the Alpha line, as well as incidents of eastward fire from Israeli forces. Some of these were witnessed by UNDOF directly. On 25 September, for instance, UNDOF personnel observed four Syrian mortar rounds detonate in Israeli-occupied Golan. On 12 November, in response to a Syrian mortar round that landed near an Israeli observation post to the east of the ceasefire line, UNDOF witnessed two Israeli tank shells fired across the Alpha line. On other occasions UNDOF personnel observed evidence of across-the-line firing, including being shown craters and unexploded ordnance on the Alpha side by Israeli personnel. As stressed by the UN, firing by either side across the line represents a ‘serious violation' of the ceasefire deal between the two countries. But in a region as volatile as this corner of the Levant is at present, with armed elements from all sides in the mix, verifying claims and assigning responsibility can sometimes be far from a matter of letting appearances speak for themselves. The UN report records an accusation by Syrian authorities on 18 November that Israeli fire across the ceasefire line had killed two Syrian soldiers and injured two more. Israel, for its part, said it was targeting a Syrian armed forces position within the area of separation after Syrian forces there had fired on an Israeli patrol vehicle. But the Syrian armed forces denied having done so, claiming rebel fighters were responsible for the shooting, intending to provoke a response from the Israelis. UNDOF was able to verify that the Israeli vehicle in question had sustained six bullet impacts, but not able to say who held the gun that fired them. Clashes between Syrian regime forces and Syrian rebels within UNDOF's area of operations are perhaps even more serious. The 27 November report by the UN notes that recent months had seen ‘numerous clashes' between pro- and anti-regime forces in the eastern ‘area of limitation' (one of which lies on each side of the separation zone), and also that ‘sporadic, often intense, firefights between the Syrian security forces and armed members of the opposition' had taken place within the area of separation itself. These include serious incidents between 18-23 July and 25-26 September involving an influx of Syrian military personnel into the area of separation. On 31 October, the UN said, Syrian armed forces launched a ‘massive offensive' in part of the area of separation, ‘reportedly to neutralize up to 400 armed members of the opposition' who had gathered there. Then, on 3 November, ‘they launched a renewed ground offensive...employing at least four main battle tanks, mortar fire and two armoured personnel carriers...in the vicinity of Baraika and Bir Ajam inside the area of separation.' UNDOF's security is itself under threat. The UN secretary-general's November report detailed incidents of Syrian armed forces fire impacting close to UNDOF personnel and facilities. On occasion, personnel from the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO, observers from which are attached to UNDOF) have also reportedly come under fire while in clearly-marked UN vehicles. ‘There have also been instances when Syrian armed forces personnel pointed their guns in a threatening manner at UNDOF personnel,' the report notes, including on 25 September when the UNDOF Force Commander was stopped by four Syrian soldiers at a checkpoint and on 21 November when two UNTSO personnel were ‘detained and threatened at gunpoint by Syrian soldiers during a planned inspection of a Syrian position in the area of limitation on the Bravo [Syrian] side.' More seriously, on 29 November an UNDOF vehicle came under fire close to Damascus airport, leaving five UNDOF personnel who were rotating out of the mission wounded. Shortly after that incident, the UN's head peacekeeping official, Hervé Ladsous, told the press that UNDOF would be reinforcing its security, ‘most notably with armoured vehicles', and that more political advisors would be sent ‘to analyse the situation on the ground.' There were no plans to alter the size of the force (currently numbering just over 1,000 troops) he said, though resolution 2084 has changed the secretary-general's reporting requirements to every 90 days, so closer attention is now set to be paid to the mission—and by extension, it can be surmised, to whether the ongoing deployment of that many troops in the Golan Heights is more or less correct, or inadequate, or perhaps reckless. There are, though, no signs of reducing the mission's size in the face of the deteriorating security situation—much less withdrawing entirely. Indeed, as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon put it in his 27 November report: ‘Under the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential.' As with the short-lived UN Supervision Mission in Syria, however, UNDOF is not mandated (nor, accordingly, is it sufficiently equipped) to reverse the current trend in hostilities, which may yet grow in seriousness. In Mr Ban's reckoning, the incidents of firing across the ceasefire line demonstrate ‘the potential for escalation of tensions between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, and jeoparadize the ceasefire between the two countries

Page 46 and the stability of the region.' There is, it seems, a sense within UN headquarters that the ceasefire is more fragile now than at any time in the recent past. As the secretary-general went on: ‘I am concerned that the presence of armed members of the opposition and the ongoing military activities of the Syrian security forces have the potential to ignite a larger conflict between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, with grave consequences.' All that is to say nothing of the situation in Syria itself. There, civil war continues to rage, talk of the potential use of chemical weapons rumbles on (prompting Israel to this week move at least one of its ‘Iron Dome' missile batteries to the north, and to strike Syrian targets), and if—or when—Assad falls then UN officials, and possibly even UN troops, may yet become key actors in a transition that is almost sure to be long, ugly and uncertain.

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30 January 2013 VERTIC releases factsheet on IAEA Additional Protocol Today, VERTIC has released a factsheet on national implementation measures for the IAEA Additional Protocol. The document outlines the origins and evolution of the Additional Protocol, what its key features are, and how states can bring the instrument into force. Download the factsheet here. ------

25 January 2013 New blog post: Cyber space's international friends Cyber security is now a key priority in many countries' national policy agendas and its importance to states will continue to grow into the foreseeable future. The fundamentally transboundary nature of cyber space means that a considerable portion of government, and other stakeholders', efforts needs to be put into identifying and agreeing to rules of the road that enable the opportunities cyber space has to offer to be fully realised and its potential for disruption to be minimised. Read the full post here. ------

24 January 2013 Cyber space’s international friends Larry MacFaul and Katherine Tajer, London Cyber security is now a key priority in many countries' national policy agendas and its importance to states will continue to grow into the foreseeable future. The fundamentally transboundary nature of cyber space means that a considerable portion of government, and other stakeholders', efforts needs to be put into identifying and agreeing to rules of the road that enable the opportunities cyber space has to offer to be fully realised and its potential for disruption to be minimised. Cyber space pervades nearly all aspects of modern society and increasingly underpins government activities, military planning and operations, industrial and civil infrastructure, as well as business growth and transactions. It is already a dominant mode of social communication and interaction. And in addition, much of the infrastructure that cyber space is based on is owned and run by the private sector. This means that there are a lot of players in the field with significant interests and clout. It also means that there are a numerous challenges ranging from cyber attacks on critical civil and military infrastructure, disruption of financial services, and theft of intellectual property as well as the potential for stifling freedom of expression, association and innovation. Each country's policies, ideologies and culture can profoundly affect the way they view cyber space, and how they believe it should be used. These differences in position affect governments' positions in discussions on how to manage the cross-border characteristics of the internet. Two other features of cyber space require the international community to get innovative, and quickly: its ability to convey attacks across borders at speed—and for the perpetrators to hide their identity—challenges conventional defence planning, and, at a more general level, the sheer pace of change in the cyber field can make it hard for governments to formulate and implement appropriate policies in an useful timescale. If we are to generate practical and actionable ideas on how to move forward, it is going to be important to break down the various issues into their constituent parts—without, however, ignoring the links, dependencies and relationships that necessarily

Page 47 make up cyber space. For facilitating international discussions on these issues, it will be important for countries to have good mechanisms and forums to enable them to reach common understandings and agreed approaches. Several regional and international processes are already underway, and their work continues in 2013 and beyond. Below is an outline of some of the main processes supporting international talks and generating ideas for how to move forward. At the UN level, two Groups of Governmental Experts have been in action. The first group convened in 2004-2005, and in 2010 a new group met to revise several resolutions. This group has been ordered to reconvene in 2012 and to report to the 68th General Assembly in 2013. This is likely to be an influential forum. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, first written in 2001, remains the only operational international agreement on cybercrime. This convention asks its signatories to adopt national legislation that criminalizes cybercrime, and attempts to harmonize international legislation in order to prosecute cross-border crime. However, US ratification of the convention was controversial in the US Senate and among the media, and the membership as a whole remains fairly limited at only 32 parties. This number does however include many of the counties with higher levels of digital take-up but lacks participation from key players Russia and China. At the regional level, NATO has developed a ‘New Strategic Concept', in 2010, as part of the Lisbon summit. The paper contains measures for strengthening cyber-defence capabilities. It includes information on operational requirements and new NATO bodies established to coordinate cyber defence within NATO and to liaise with the other regional and international bodies. A ‘Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence' in Estonia was accredited as a NATO CoE in 2008 and conducts research and training on cyber defence. The OSCE is also active in the field. It established a working group focused on developing a set of confidence building measures (CBMs) for states with a focus on transparency instruments such as exchanges of contact information for key bodies and exchanges of data. It also recently hosted a conference (in 2012) on Internet Freedoms and Governance. For its part, the EU External Action Service is working on a cyber-security strategy for the region. And in the east, the Asia Regional Forum (ARF) has hosted a series of cyber-related seminars, and has sought to draft CBMs too. In July 2012, the ARF ministers made a statement on cybercrime that included calls to promote dialogue on cooperation, confidence-building, stability, and risk reduction measures in the use of ICTs and cyber security. London and Budapest have hosted a large international conference on cyber space. The 2011 London conference, which was inaugural meeting, had over 700 delegates representing 60 countries in attendance. The UK Foreign Secretary William Hague spoke at the event saying ‘The spread of connectivity between individuals, governments and organisations is bringing benefits and opportunities on a vast scale.' But he added the following caution and call for action: ‘As all our societies become more wired-up and technologies converge, the scope for malignant activity will widen alongside the many advantages, whether it is the theft of intellectual property or the spread of malware and viruses. It will become harder to protect our users or to prevent our defences from being swamped. Furthermore it is increasingly clear that countries with weak cyber defences and capabilities will find themselves exposed over the long term; at a serious strategic disadvantage given the apparent rise in state-sponsored attacks. So if we want a future in which the benefits of the digital age are expanded to all peoples and economies of the world, and the risks minimised as much as possible, then we need to act to achieve that. I believe we must aspire to a future for cyberspace which is not stifled by government control or censorship, but where innovation and competition flourish and investment and enterprise are rewarded.' Independent bodies are also contributing to the debate. Last year, VERTIC collaborated with UNIDIR and Chatham House in hosting a conference on cyber security at the UN in Geneva. The meeting addressed ‘Confidence Building Measures in Assuring Cyber Stability'. It gathered over 100 participants from governments, intergovernmental bodies, NGOs and the private sector. The agenda examined technical and political challenges to cyber stability and heard countries' perspectives on what a stable cyber environment might look like. And, at the operational level, it's important to consider the ongoing work of the International Telecommunication Union (which has over 193 member countries and 700 private and academic members) and ICANN - the Internet Cooperation for Assigned Names and Numbers who carry out key activities in maintenance of communication technologies. The above forums and bodies do not constitute an exhaustive list of the processes working towardseffecting an open and stable cyberspace in which countries and their citizens can interact and innovate. But they do provide a picture some of the key mechanisms in use by governments and other stakeholders at the moment. We are likely to see even more activity and, hopefully, outcomes in 2013 and beyond.

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24 January 2013 VERTIC wishes to congratulate Cameroon for its accession to the BWC Cameroon deposited its instrument of accession in Washington DC on 18 January 2013, becoming a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and bringing the membership of the BWC to 167. ------

16 January 2013 Notes from the 1540 Civil Society Forum Scott Spence, VERTIC's Senior Legal Officer, attended the ‘UNSCR 1540 Civil Society Forum - Opportunities for Engagement', which took place in the Vienna International Centre (the VIC) during 8-10 January. He reflects on this important event in this week's blog post. The Civil Society Forum (Forum) on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) was organized with the objective of bringing together members of civil society, with varying levels of engagement with UNSCR 1540, to share experiences and ideas to broaden participation, and to broaden support for and build upon previous efforts to engage civil society in support of full implementation of the resolution. More than 50 NGOs from Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East - including representatives from academia, think tanks, and industry - participated in the Forum. VERTIC had the honour of serving on the Steering Committee, which has since been tasked to continue building on the outcomes and success of the Forum. The Forum was addressed in a video message by Angela Kane, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, who stated that she “…looked forward to our strengthened cooperation and interaction in moving forward, together, towards the objectives of resolution 1540”. Ms Kane also shared a message from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon who recognized that “Civil society has contributed significantly to the activities of the United Nations, including in disarmament, human rights, development and many other critical areas. I have no doubt that the positive impact of civil society will move the world closer to meeting the objectives of resolution 1540 and a world without weapons of mass destruction”. These two statements got the Forum off to a good start with clear support from the highest levels of the United Nations and its disarmament and non-proliferation office. The Forum took place over three days with a rich agenda, which of course included discussions on the resolution (and subsequent related resolutions) and its objectives, mandate, status of implementation and challenges; an overview of civil society and UNSCR 1540 and the contributions civil society has made; the role of civil society in raising awareness about the resolution; civil society's experience gained and lessons learned in implementing the resolution; and the WMD threat posed by non-State actors. I presented on VERTIC's activities in the area including the expanded NIM Programme on CBRN legislative assistance and the production of our 'Guide to National Implementation of UNSCR 1540'. On the second day, there was a dynamic three-hour roundtable where most of the NGOs present at the Forum had the opportunity to provide some ideas on how they could contribute to the implementation of UNSCR 1540. It was reassuring as a co-chair of this roundtable to see that there are many initiatives underway around the world, even though many of them may not necessarily be labelled as 1540 activities. For example, some institutions are actively engaged in raising awareness among life scientists about the dual-use nature of their work with dangerous pathogens or toxins, even though they may not make an explicit link between their work and UNSCR 1540. The roundtable was largely successful in getting a lively discussion going on how to interact with national governments in the implementation of the resolution; how to foster cooperation between national, regional and international stakeholders; and how to promote a culture of non-proliferation. The third day was marked by several presentations by international and regional organisations, including the IAEA, OPCW, UNODC, CARICOM and the EU. They discussed how they viewed collaboration with civil society partners on the implementation of UNSCR 1540. The speaker from UNODC, for example, described their participation as a partner in an EU Centres of Excellence project - on CBRN legislation in certain Southeast Asian countries - along with the German export control agency, BAFA, and VERTIC as the lead partner. She noted how this was an excellent example of NGO-government-international organisation collaboration on a project that contributes towards the implementation of UNSCR 1540. We agree and look forward to working with our partners under the auspices of this and other EU Centres of Excellence projects. An invaluable opportunity has opened up for civil society actors to greatly enhance our work with international and regional organisations and

Page 49 the UNSCR 1540 Committee. Ideally, the momentum that we achieved at the Forum in Vienna will continue to grow and our collaboration will tie in more firmly with the increasing maturity and institutionalization of the 1540 process. More information about the event can be found here. Scott Spence is the Senior Legal Officer at VERTIC, where he co-ordinates the strategic vision and technical delivery of the National Implementation Measures (NIM) Programme. ------

16 January 2013 New blog post: Notes from the 1540 Civil Society Forum Scott Spence, VERTIC's Senior Legal Officer, attended the ‘UNSCR 1540 Civil Society Forum - Opportunities for Engagement', which took place in the Vienna International Centre (the VIC) during 8-10 January. He reflects on this important event in this week's blog post. ------

10 January 2013 New blog post: Drawing the red line – the case of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile In this week's blog post, Russell Moul revisits the question of Syria's chemical weapons and muses on verification options. Read the full post here. ------

10 January 2013 Drawing the red line – The case of Syria’s Chemical Weapons stockpile Russell Moul, London Recent weeks have seen mounting fears that the Syrian government may resort to the use of chemical weapons against rebel forces seeking its overthrow - a move that could mark a tipping point towards international military engagement. In a related development, as the civil conflict continues to rage, recent reports from the Netherlands indicate that military vehicles carrying Patriot air-defence missiles are now heading towards Turkey. This follows last week's announcement from the US European Command that initial equipment and staff are already in Turkey as part of NATO's pledge to protect the Turkish border from feared chemical weapons strikes, and other offensive threats from Syria. Patriot (Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target) missiles are surface-to-air guided missile defence systems notable for their short response time, their ability to intercept multiple targets simultaneously, and their resistance to electronic jamming. Ankara, Turkey's capital, requested air-defence support from NATO late November last year - after several Syrian shells landed in Turkish territory, killing several people. As a result, NATO foreign ministers declared their determination to deter the possibility of a Syrian attack on Turkish territory. They welcomed the intention of Germany, the Netherlands and the U.S. to each provide two Patriot batteries - each launcher is capable of firing four missiles or sixteen if they are the ‘Pac-3' version - and hundreds of personnel to aid Turkey's defence. NATO has stated that these batteries are purely a defensive measure and will not constitute a no-fly zone. Throughout 2012, Syria's civil war was a persistent cause of both regional and international anxiety. Fears over chemical weapons use mounted in July when Syria's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Jihad Makdissi, acknowledged the existence of an extensive chemical weapons stockpile which could be used against ‘external aggression'. Then, in late November last year, troubling satellite intelligence emerged from Israel: Syrian forces appeared to be preparing chemical mixtures, most likely the deadly sarin nerve agent, for potential attacks against rebel forces. Syria is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and is also obliged by customary international law not to use chemical weapons under any circumstances. However, it has not signed the 188-member strong Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and is so free to produce and stockpile - see Scott Spence's recent blog post Syria: international law and the use of chemical weapons. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the implementing body of the CWC, and is responsible for the treaty's verification regime. Since Syria is not a party to the treaty, the organisation lacks a direct legal mandate to conduct inspections in the country. However, such a mandate could be given through the United Nations. The Secretary-General may, if there is an alleged violation of the 1925 Geneva protocol, deploy a fact-finding team to the site of the alleged violation. This team would be tasked to ascertain the facts in an ‘objective and scientific' way. Part XI, paragraph 27, of the CWC Verification Annex reads, ‘In the case of alleged use of chemical weapons involving a State not Party to this

Page 50 Convention or in territory not controlled by a State Party, the Organization shall closely cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If so requested, the Organization shall put its resources at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.' The Secretary-General's team may also be supplemented by staff from the World Health Organization (WHO), according to the terms of a 2011 UN-WHO Memorandum of Understanding. In other words, the OPCW has a stake in the matter. In response to the news that Syrian government forces were preparing chemical agents, the OPCW Director-General, Ahmet Üzümcü, contacted the Syrian Foreign Minister to urge the Syrian Government to ‘accede to the Convention without delay'. By signing the CWC, Syria would assure the international community of its intentions and would enable the OPCW to conduct detailed verification activities, including verifying the destruction of the chemical weapons that already exist. Concerns remain that Syrian government forces now have chemical weapons ready for use on short notice. Moreover, as the fighting continues in the Syrian capital Damascus, government forces have reportedly moved towards more sophisticated forms of conventional weapons. Facing growing rebel antiaircraft capabilities, Syria's military is recently thought to have launched several short range ballistic missiles. The missile are believed to be Fateh-110s, which are short-range, road-mobile missiles capable of carrying chemical-tipped warheads. No chemical munitions have been used so far. This week, the political counsellor of the Syrian rebel group The Free Syrian Army, Bassam al-Dada, claimed to have possession of precursor substances and technical knowledge for manufacturing chemical agents. He stated that such weapons would only be used in retaliation against chemical attacks from President Assad's forces, adding that: ‘If we ever use them, we will only hit the regime's bases and centres'. ------

10 January 2013 New employment opportunities at VERTIC VERTIC wishes to make up to two appointments to its National Implementation Measures (NIM) Programme at either the Associate Legal Officer, Legal Officer or Senior Legal Officer grade, depending on the post-holder's qualifications, skills and experience.

For more information click here. ------

09 January 2013 VERTIC's Senior Legal Officer presents at UNSCR 1540 Civil Society Forum Scott Spence, VERTIC's Senior Legal Officer, presented today at the UNSCR 1540 Civil Society Forum - Opportunities for Engagement. The Forum is taking place during 8-10 January in the Vienna International Centre (VIC). Scott discussed two examples of how VERTIC is working as a civil society actor on activities directly related to implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). These include the Verification and Monitoring Programme's Additional Protocol project and the National Implementation Measures Programme's assistance on adherence to and/or national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, certain international instruments to secure nuclear and other radioactive material and UNSCR 1540. The presentation is available here. ------

08 January 2013 Nigeria legislation added to the BWC Legislation Database ------

04 January 2013 Trust & Verify No. 139 In this issue, Jesus S. Domingo discusses the impact of the BWC 'Superweek' on cooperation and coordination in the East Asia & Pacific region and beyond. Plus, Verification Watch, Science & Technology Scan, Verification Quotes, Publications and Events, and VERTIC News. Download the full issue here. ------

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