Dissident Peace Movements Inside the German Democratic Republic: the Search for Reform, Freedom, and Toleration 1979-1986

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Masters Theses Graduate School

5-2004

Dissident Peace Movements Inside the German Democratic Republic: The Search for Reform, Freedom, and Toleration 1979-1986

Abby DeMaris Thompson University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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Recommended Citation Thompson, Abby DeMaris, "Dissident Peace Movements Inside the German Democratic Republic: The Search for Reform, Freedom, and Toleration 1979-1986. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2004. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/4814

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Abby DeMaris Thompson entitled "Dissident Peace Movements Inside the German Democratic Republic: The Search for Reform, Freedom, and Toleration 1979-1986." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.

Vejas Liulevicius, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

John Bohstedt, Ernest Freeberg

Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) To the GraduateCouncil:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Abby DeMaris Thompson entitled "Dissident Peace Movements Inside the GermanDemocratic Republic: The Search for Reform,Freedom, and Toleration 1979-1986." I have examinedthe final paper copy of this thesis for formand content andrecommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masterof Arts,with a major in History.

We have read this thesis andrecommend its acceptance: ______, __

Dissident Peace Movements Inside the GermanDemocratic Republic:

The Searchfor Reform, Freedom, and Toleration

1979-1986

A Thesis

Presented forthe

Master of Arts

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Abby DeMarisThompson

May2004 ii

DEDICATION

Thisthesis is dedicated to my parentsand to the memory of my grandparentsfor teachingme to alwaysfollow my conscience in addition to their continualsupport and encouragement. It is also dedicated to all those who courageouslyfight for their beliefs andtheir freedom. V ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thankall those who have helpedme complete my Master of Arts degreein History. I thankmy advisor, Dr. Vejas Liulevicius, forhis guidance, patience, and supportthroughout the past two years. His advice and insightshave been invaluable. I thankDr. John Bohstedt andDr. ErnestFreeberg for their helpful suggestions and for servingon my committee. I also thankDr. Michael Kulikowski forhis constructive criticism in matters of teaching andwriting. I want to express my appreciationto Dr. Laura Howes and the Medieval Studies departmentfor their fundingsupport during2003-2004. I must also thankthe Furman University History departmentfor stimulating and cultivating my desire to searchfor new ways to growintellectually in everythingI do. I specificallythank Dr. David Spear andDr. TimothyPehler fortheir teaching, advice, and support. I owe great thanks to Dr. Nancy Lauckner and Melissa Boles forgenerously allowing me to borrow and use importantsource materials. Also, I must thankDr. WernerKratschell forproviding the inspirationto explore the LutheranChurch and its role in the GermanDemocratic Republic. I willforever be indebted to Dr. RonaldJ. Granierifor always having the time to answermy numerous questions, no matter how greator how small,for constantly believing in my abilities even when I doubted their existence, and forbeing a great mentor and friend. Finally, I must thank my parents, Jack andGeneva Thompson, and my fiance, CraigH. Caldwell, III. Their love and support has never wavered throughout this or any of my other endeavors andfor that I have been and always will be extremely grateful. vu

ABSTRACT

This thesis explored the roleof the independent peace movements in the German Democratic Republic in the early 1980s. It specifically examined three leaders of these movements: Rainer Eppelmann,Frank Eigenfeld, and Vera Wollenberger. Their work helpedcreate the much largerdissident actions of 1989 by increasing the level of ''freespace" providedin variousLutheran parishes in East Germany. This expansionoccurred in spite of the formationof the GDR Peace Council, which the state used in anattempt to quell oppositionby politicizingpeace. Their effortswere examinedby looking at English translations of GDR Peace Council works, which oftenexaggerated theirgoals, actions,and the level of participation. The thesis also discussed the roleof Ostpolitikand the early 1980s arms race between the Soviet Unionand the United States. The latter was the initial inspiration forthe independent peace movements, even as it demonstrated that the German Democratic Republic oftendid not strivefor peace, especially when its allieswere a factorin state diplomacy. The role of the early 1980s independent peacemovements has been largely absent fromthe historiographyof the German Democratic Republic. The activities of 1989 have overshadowed theimportant precursors, such as theindependent peace movements. Manyof the leaders of these movements later becameinfluential figures in the actions of 1989. The independent peace movements taught them important skills that they transferred fromleading small groupsin 1979-1983 to larger groups in 1989. The independent peace movements provided East German citizens with a public forumwhere theydiscussed their concernsand wishes. Their main goalswere peace andthe internal reformof the GermanDemocratic Republic. lX TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction...... 1

2. Case Studies of Independent Peace Movements ...... 15

3. Superseding the Independent Peace Movements: the Case of the German Democratic Republic Peace Council ...... 39

4. The Roller Coaster Thatwas Detente: Ostpolitikand the Early 1980s Arms Race ...... 55

5. The Pockets of Resistance Become One MassMovement ...... 67

6. Conclusion ...... 73

Selected Bibliography...... 77

Vita ...... 83 1 Chapter 1

Introduction

In 1989, theGerman Democratic Republic collapsed after widespread

demonstrations. Prior to these protests, small movements had grown in theearly

1980s that laid the groundworkfor the large-scaledemonstrations of 1989.

Throughout the 1980s in East Germany, threeprimary issues or causes, peace, human

rights, andthe environment, had rallied peopletogether in spite of the constantthreat

of Stasiharassment, imprisonment, and possibletorture. The earliestof these crusades

were the anti-nuclearpeace movements of the early 1980s. These set the precedent for

"free space" within many Lutheran churches andestablished that a certain level of

dissidence could exist,especially when the protestors took adequate precautions, such

as alerting theWestern media to their planned activities, though doing so might

undermine their ultimate goals becausethe movements would be going outside the

GDR, andthe media could also put theirown spin on events.

It is necessary to emphasize one crucial detail: the independent peace

movements were plural entities. The majority did not have contact witheach other

and due to the level of statecontrol, only limited networking could be established

among them. In addition to thisfactor, many of the movements startedbecause they

desired reform withinthe system. For this reason, most did not attemptto contact

othergroups because they thoughtmore in termsof local changes. Two new goals,

protection from physical harm and the desire to leave East Germany permanently,

along with one largegovernmental concession allowingmore citizens to emigrate, 2 especiallyin 1984, ultimately led to the demise of the early 1980s peace movements, but they neverthelessended up having significanteffects on East Germancitizens and society.

The firstchanging objective was the importanceof evading torture and imprisonment. From about 1978 until 1982, most of the protestors either did not entirely understand or did not care about the largepossibility for personal harm. As arrests and harassmentincreased, some movements decided to use the publicity affordedby the Westernmedia to protectthemselves fromthe government. While this tactic was quite successful,it also meant that the original goal of most movements, reform fromwithin the country, was lost becauseexternal media involvement often distorted the desires of the protestors. The second changewas the desire of manyto emigrate to West Germany. These people oftenbecame involved in the peace movements because theybelieved that participationin subversive activities could speed along the process. The potentialemigrants were proven correct in their assumptionswhen the governmentchanged its emigration allowancein 1984. 1 The levels were lowered in 1985 and returnedto normalin 1987. The damagethis migrationdid to thepeace movements is a subject of controversy amonghistorians and the formerdissidents themselves. In some areas, the higher numbers of emigrants clearly damaged the movements, whilein other areasthere was little effect. Their

1 Numbers of emigrants fromthe German Democratic Republic in 1983: 11,343; 1984: 40,974; 1985: 24,912; 1986: 26,178; 1987: 18,958. Source: Dirk Philipse� We Were the People: Voices From East Germany'sRevolutionary Autumn of 1989 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke UniversityPress, 1993), 48. 3 strengthin numbersno longer existed, andthe government used this opportunityto create anofficial governmental peacemovement, which began in 1983.

This officialGerman Democratic Peace Movement really took offin 1983 as the government siphonedoff members of the independent peacemovements. The government's peacemovement used manyof the sametactics as theindependent movements, such as peace marches, rallies, andconcerts, but governmentalcontrol was guaranteedby Stasi infiltrationand mobilization of partyfaithful to participate.

By takingover the cause of peaceand calling for the end of nuclearweapons, the government managedto circumvent the independentpeace movements. Anti nuclearization andpeace became linked as issues advocatedby theEast Germanstate, much like workers' rights. For this reason, thecauses could no longer beused to demonstratediscontent with the East Germangovernment's policies and actions.

In spite of their importance,East Gennany's peace movements in the early

1980s arelargely missing in Germanhistoriography. The topic may warranta few lines or perhapsa paragraphin works discussing Germanhistory, German peace movements, andactions leading to the collapse of theGerman Democratic Republic.

Typically, the peace movements in the FederalRepublic of Germany, social movements in thelate 1960s throughoutthe Westernworld, andthe late 1980s protestsin East Germany, have contributed to overshadowingthese importantevents.

In spite of this currentobscurity, East Germanpeace movements were clearly importantin the historyof social movements in the country. If pocketsof protest for peacewere to bebuilt andmaintained, there had to be a meetingplace. Many 4 Lutheranchurches in East Germanyprovided this "freespace. "2 This was because the

Lutheranchurch's relationshipwith the East Germangovernment had been transformedseveral yearspreviously, on March6, 1978.3 On this date, leaders of the

Federationof EvangelicalChurches in theGDR, or theKirchenbund, which contained exclusively Lutheranpreachers, met withErich Honecker, leader of theGerman

Democratic Republic, to discussthe futureof the Lutheranchurch withinEast

Germany. Prior to thismeeting, the Lutheranchurch hadencountered a varietyof moods fromthe state: toleration,sporadic anti-religion campaignsin thelate 1940s, and strongdislike by the governmentunder Ulbricht from 1958 until 1971. When

Honecker cameto power in 1971, church-state relations worsened until 1973 when the state granted limited concessions to Lutheran churches after"its acceptance asa full voting memberof theUnited Nations" possibly due to the role of theLutheran churches "in gaining internationalrecognition for theGDR.',4 Because of increased state support,the Lutheran churchbegan to portrayitself asa "churchwithin socialism."5 Thisgradual returnto toleration slowly led to rapprochementwith

Honecker at the March 1978 summit. RobertGoeckel arguesin TheLutheran Church and the East German State that one of the main areasof concession wasmore freedom

2 JohnP. Burgess, TheEast German Church and the End ofCommunism (NewYork: Oxford UniversityPress, 1997), 40-41. 3 RobertF. Goeckel, TheLutheran Church and the East German State: Political Conflict and Change under Ulbrichtand Honecker(Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1990), 2. 4 MaryFulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR: 1949-1989 (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1995), 107. 5 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 3. 5 of assembly andan emphasis on bettertreatment for East Gennan citizens "regardless of world view and religiousconfession. ,,6

The 1978 accordprovided Lutheranchurches with increased freedom,but this was not entirelywithout a cost to the churches. Whilethe statedid not control the churches externally, the East Gennan government did send Ministryof State Security, or Stasi, agents to attendand check on certainchurch meetings. 7 In addition to this internal review, the state(via the Stasi) used some Lutheranpreachers as unofficial infonners.8 Even with thisnew level of rapprochement, outward dissentand protest were nevertheless not allowed. Infonnaland fonnal meetings were assumed by participantsto always beunder surveillance by the Stasi. In spite of such measures, however, some Lutheranchurches became umbrellas for numerous grassroots organizations.9 Thereare several reasonsfor this. One wasthat the Lutheranchurch had traditionallyspoken out on issues that it viewed as important,especially with a biblical foundation, such as peace, nature, or the environment.1 0 Anotherreason was individual pastors or church members, who had a strong desire to discuss certain issues, such as peaceand the environment. These individuals drove the process of creating small groupsthat met in Lutheranchurches to speakabout such topics. The most likely reasonwas thedebate amongthe Lutheran church hierarchy over what it

6 TheLutheran Church and the EastGerman State, 245; 1-3, 241-246. 7 BarbaraMiller, Narratives of Guilt and Compliancein UnifiedGermany: Stasiinformers and their impact on society(New York: Routledge,1999), 84-85; see also, Anatomyof a Dictatorship,109-1 15. 8 Narrativesof Guiltand Compliance in UnifiedGermany, 15-84; see also, KarenDawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, andReform: The Great Challenge, 2nd ed. (NewYork: CambridgeUniversity Press,1990), 147-148. 9 TheLutheran Church andthe EastGerman State, 253. 10 TheLutheran Church and the EastGerman State, 251-252. 6 meantto be a "church withinsocialism. "11 Manypastors believed that Lutheran churches had a duty to promote Christianideals or causes, such as peace, even in a country with a dictatorial regime in power. Theearly grassrootsmovements focused on the environment in the1970s and anti-nucleardisarmament and peace during the early1980s. 12

The level of participationby church officialsin these movements is still debated. Some, such as Robert Goeckel, believe that the Lutheran church became a tool fornetworking and informationgathering amongthese grassrootsgroups. 13

Others, like FrankEigenfeld, a member of the Halle peace movement, arguethat

14 church leaders did not aid the movements, except by providing meeting spaces. The reality of thesituation appears to be somewhere in between the assertions of these two camps of interpretation. Certain parishes,specifically those in Berlin, appear to have networkedwithin the city and at times also in otherareas. In the same period, other parishes,such as those in Halle, did not know about otherpeace movements untilas late as 1980 and did not begin networking until 1983. 15 Church leaders' acceptanceof thesegroups varied from parish to parish. There was no one cohesive independent peace movement, but insteadnumerous organizationsthroughout East Germany.

Pastorsled some movements, while othersmerely used churchfacilities as a meeting spot because of governmentaltolerance. In every case, the level of surveillancewas

11 TheLutheran Church andthe EastGerman State, 251. 12 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 253. 13 The Lutheran Church and the EastGerman State, 253. 4 1 We Were the People, 55. 15 We Were thePeople, 43, 46. 7 unknownuntil members were arrestedor tortured. In some cases, while Stasi informerswere present,the agency decided the activities did not warrantintervention.

Opinions also varyabout the numberof churchinformers wh o reported to the

Stasi. Goeckel is veryvague in his assessment of the situation. He states that'1he churchfunctioned to channelrising grassrootsdissent on this [ the independent peace movement] issue, thereby provinguseful to a conservativeregime interested in politicalstability without sacrificingideological purity or loyaltyto the USSR."16

Goeckeldoes not explain how the Church provided informationabout opposition groupsexcept for stating that subcommitteesof the Kirchenbund worked with the state to dealwith such issues. 17 He does not arguethat churchofficials acted as unofficial informantsfor the Stasi. Goeckelalso goes against most in arguingthat the independent peacemovement was a singularentity. Even with such apparent oversights, Goeckel provides a detailed account of the political situation that existed betweenthe Kirchenbund and the East Germangovernment.

Even aside fromthe Lutheranchurch's participatio°' certain other persuasive reasonsexisted for the creation of independentpeace groups that turnedinto social movements in a dictatorial state. This leads to thequestion of what causes a social movement. Theorieson the causes of social movements areextremely varied. As

Alice Holmes Cooper discusses in Paradoxes ofPeace, there arethree primary argumentsthat must beexamined when thinking about peace movements. Thefirst, which is largely connectedto Ronald lnglehart's scholarship, is the ''value change

16 TheLutheran Church andthe EastGerman State, 255. 17 TheLutheran Church andthe EastGerman State, 256. 8 school."18 This school "holds that value shifts takeplace across generations independentlyof theirconscious experience."19 In lnglehart's model, thereare two primarycategories, "materialist" and"postmaterialist." A materialistvalues tangible formsof security while a postmaterialistprizes "social, aesthetic, and intellectual gratification."20 Using West Germanyas anexample for lnglehart's theory, one would supposethat a materialist would have lived through the scarcityof the end of

World WarII and the immediate postwarperiod, whereas a postmaterialistwould have been born or grownup during the economic boom of the 1950s. Inglehart'stheory largelyfits the accountof West Germany'sprotest movements in 1968 and later, as well as otherforms of activism in westerncountries. Youthswho were raised during uncommon economicprosperity did not have to worryabout the existence or availability of basicmaterial goods. For thisreason, theyfocused on non-material ideas andcauses. This argumentstated that thesepostmaterialists had the time and energy to worry abouthigher ideals,and this led to increases in social activism.

A second school waslargely created fromthe theoriesof the Germansocial philosopher JurgenHabermas, who viewed "socialmovements as symptomatic of a crisis of modernity."21 Habermasargued that socialmovements arisein reaction to

18 Alice Holmes Cooper,Paradoxes ofPeace: GermanPeace Movements since 1945 (Ann Arbor: The Universityof MichiganPress, 1996), 6. Thework of Alice Holmes Cooperprovided theinformation about the three primarysocial theories that were extremelyhelpful in analyzingthe independent peace movements of theGerman Democratic Republic. WhileHolmes Cooper's work focuses strictlyon thepeace movements in theFederal Republic of Germanyfrom the 1950s until the 1980s, her explanationof social theories was an invaluable toolin the analysisof the peace movements in the GermanDemocratic Republic. 19 Paradoxes ofPeace, 6. 20 Paradoxes ofPeace, 6. 21 Paradoxes of Peace, 8. 9 new effects on peoples' lives emanating fromadvanced ca pitalism.22 Specifically, such movements arisewhen a new technologicalthreat to societyemerged . 23 This school contended that such a crisis existed in the19 70s, pointingto nuclearweapons andpollution asthreatening "the physicalfoundations of life, while destructionof traditional social settings undermined sources of meaning." 24 According to this school,the inabilityof the current politicalsystem to deal withsuch issues led people to discerna crisis. Those who recognizedthis state of affairscreated or joined social movements in response.25 Thus, Habermas' followersdid not confinesocial activism to a particulargeneration but instead to a groupthat saw a crisis and shiftedtheir values and actions in reaction to it.

While the schools of Inglehartand Habermassought a macro-level explanation of socialmovements in the 1960s and later, othersused micro-level or individual analysisto explainparticipation. Such examinations classifiedcauses "rangingfrom cost-benefitanalyses and the draw of group solidarityto feelings of personalefficacy andbelief in group success."26 Thisthird formof inquiryused individualresponses to reconstruct groupsby combining peoplewho acted for similarreasons. Instead of one generation or "crisis-reacting" group, the individual analysesemphasized numerous theoretical groupswhose only connection could beas limited astheir beliefthat a particularmovement could succeed in its goals, so theydecided to participate in it.

22 Paradoxes of Peace, 8. 23 Paradoxes of Peace, 9. 24 Paradoxes of Peace, 9. 25 Paradoxes ofPeace, 9. 26 Paradoxes of Peace, 281. 10 Numerous reasonsexisted for the creation and participationin social movements. The next chapter will examine a fewof the primaryreasons of those who joined such movements through casestudies.

These case studies, which makeup Chapter2, examinethree important individuals, Rainer Eppelmann,Frank Eigenfeld, and Vera Wollenberger, in the variousindependent peacemovements. Each of thesepeople participated in and helped lead certain peace movements of the early 1980s. They all also encouraged, organized,and influenced the movements forreform that later occurredin 1988 and

1989 in the GermanDemocratic Republic. Their reasons forparticipating varied, thoughthey each believed that the socialist system could be andneeded to be changed.

While the sources concerningtheir activism differed forthe three, much of the informationon Eppelmannand Eigenf eld came frominterviews recordedby historian

Dirk Philipsen. Numerous other secondaryand primary sources were consultedto ensure that the accounts of the events discussed in the interviews were historically accurate. For Eppelmann,a letter he wroteto Erich Honecker, the leaderof East

Germanyfrom 1971 until 1973, also provides specificevidence about his reasons for helping create anindependent peacemovement as well as the goals he hopedto accomplish throughthis group. Vera Wollenberger' s autobiography,which illuminated her participationin oppositionmovements and the eventual discovery that her husband had been a Stasi informer, provided most of the informationfor the third case study. Ag� other primaryand secondary sources were examined to corroborate this material. 11 In addition to examiningand analyzing case studies of the independentpeace movements, the EastGerman governme nt's peacemovement will also be explored in

Chapter 3. The German Democratic Republic created the GDR PeaceCouncil when the countrywas formedin 1949. This Councilwas only activeuntil 1952. While the state's rhetoric at times included the goal of peace, no specificgovernment-sponsored organizationattempted to activelypursue the completion of such a largetask. The emergence of independentpeace movements in the late 1970s andearly 1980s created problems forthe East Germangovernment. While East Germanleaders (at times) claimed to wantpeace, their foreignpolicy did not always reflectsuch a goal. This wasparticularly evident duringthe intermediatenuclear force (INF) controversy, which debated the number of intermediatenuclear weapons the United States could have in WesternEurope and the number that the Soviet Union couldhave withinthe

Eastern Bloc, which lasted from 1979 until 1983. The independent peace movements focusedon such contradictions in the state's rhetoric. In doing so,these groups created active dissent thatcould not easilybe quelled because the government supposedlysupported all activitiesthat led towarda greaterlevel of peacein the world.

For thisreason, the German Democratic Republic revived theGDR Peace

Council in 1983. From 1983 until 1986, theCouncil organizedand sponsored numerous activitiesto get East Germancitizens involved in thepeace campaign. At times, the GDR Peace Council used tactics, such asmarches and rallies, which the independentpeace movements had originallyutilized. The state wantedto replacethe inherent dissent within theindependent peace movements by taking over the issue of 12 peace as a cause that was strongly advocated by the East German government. While numerous Germansources verifythe tactics taken by thestate to accomplish this, thereare alsoseveral English sources thatdemonstrate thatthe GermanDemocratic

Republic wantedto show those in the Western,capitalist world that it was fightingfor peace. Thesesources advertise the activities of the East Germanstate 's peace movement while also pointingout the virtuousactivities of the GermanDemocratic

Republic and the Soviet Union in the struggle for peace.

These two very differenttypes of peace movements demonstratethe creation andquelling of dissent withinthe GermanDemocratic Republic. Prior to the early

1980s (withthe exception of the 1953 Uprising), the East Germanstate had not been actively opposed by such numbersof its own citizens. Their responsecould not be overly harshbecause these independent peace groups were usually contained and often protectedby the Lutheran Church, which had been a largely(but not alwaysrespected) guaranteed "free space" in East Germanysince the mid-1970s. For this reason and the politicalissues, spec'ificallythe Soviet Union placing more intermediaterange nuclear weaponsin East Germanyin 1981 and 1982, involved in the INFdebate, the state could not repress the independentpeace movements, as theywould have done at any previous time. Instead the GermanDemocratic Republic had to wait until the INF controversyhad concluded beforeit could take up the cause of peace as its own, as discussed belowin Chapter 4.

The peace movements from1979 until 1986 have rarely been discussed in the historiographythat seeks to explain why the German Democratic Republic collapsed in 1989. Since theBerlin Wall fell,the episodes of 1988 and 1989 have been 13 thoroughly detailed. While 1989 was a watershed event, there were many prior

actions that led to the success of 1989. The independent peacemovements from 1979

until 1983 created a grassroots level of dissent forthe first time in the state's history.

These movements also taught organizationaland leadership skills to many individuals

who would use them again in 1989. The activities of the independentpeace

movements provided manyof the tools, as well as the realizationthat opposition was possible, that made 1989 such a watershed event forthe late twentiethcentury. 15 Chapter 2

Case Studies of Independent Peace Movements

In We We re the People: Vo ices From East Germany 's RevolutionaryAu tumn of 1989, Dirk Philipsen argues againstthe idea that"the events of 1989 were somehow a product of a 'spontaneous'rising ."27 While 1989 has received the majority of historians'attention in the last decade, the events leading to the German Democratic

Republic's collapse did not happenovernight. Theidea of a spontaneousrevolution is aninteresting theory, but it is incorrect. The followingchapter discusses key leaders and groupsthat representcertain categories withinthe independent peace movements of theearly 1980s prior to theturning pointof 1989. These categories include: a pastor's efforts in Berlin (with almost complete access to Westernmedia broadcasts as well as contactwith Westernjo urnalists), a smallcity group in Hallewith Western media access thatgrew to anunanticipated degree, anda women's peace movement in

Berlin. Thecase of the women's peacemovement is importantbecause it wasthe first women's movement in the GermanDemocratic Republic. These women learnedthat theydid not merely have to listen at groupmeetings but theycould expresstheir opinions andeven become leaders. All three of these case studies are in regions that had access to the Westernmedia, yet in each case, the motivations of the individuals involved were not solely responsesto peace movements in West Germany. Instead, theiraims were to increase peace,provide more openforums where citizens could express theirfears, concerns, and opinions, andto reformthe statefrom the inside out.

21 We Were the People, 16. 16 This information goes against the idea that the East German peace movements were only copycat events and not the true sentiments of East Germancitizens.

In numerous interviews with leaders of the 1989 dissident movements,

Philipsen uncovered animportant correlation: themajority of theseinfluential individuals had participated in, if not in factled, previousprotest groups. One of the best knownof these interviewees is Rainer Eppelmann,a Lutheranpastor in East

Berlin during the early1980s.

Eppelmannrepresents the epitome of a particulartype of East Germanactivist.

He was fairly safe fromserious harmbecause of his position in the church in addition to his intelligent use of Westernmedia to ensure thathe would not just "disappear."

Eppelmannalso preached in East Berlin where knowledge of Westernactivities, such as peace movements, was prevalentbecause Western German television transmitted into East Berlin andmuch of the GDR. While not a typical Lutheran preacher in any other time period (given Lutherantraditional deference to political authorityat earlier times in Germanhistory), Eppelmanndoes fit the profile of manyEast German preachers who joined the professionbecause of theirradical politicaltendencies. The

Lutheran church wasnot entirely protected fromthe government's authority or the

Stasi, but a career asa pastor permitted one to avoid severe penaltiesfor not following the Socialist Unity Party's policies.

Eppelmann's lifedid not begin asthat of a typical East German. He attendeda school in West Berlin until the 1961 erection of theBerlin Wall. 28 Prior to the

28 Wer war wer - DDR: Ein biographischesLexi/con (Berlin: ChristophLinks, 1992), 103. 17 building of the Wall, Eppelmann had not been a pacifist. In fact,he had intended to become a fighter pilot in the West Germanarmy. Because he had attended West

German schools, the government refused to let him take the Abitur, the exam necessaryto attenduniversity. 29 Subsequently, Eppelmannworked as a roofer's apprentice. Then he was draftedinto an East Germanconstruction brigade fora very brief stint because he refusedto take the military oaththat included, "'with a weapon in my hand. "'30 After eight months in jail for thisoff ense, he served his eighteen months required service andthen returnedto a constructionapprenti ceship. After completion of thisapprenticeship, Eppelmannentered a construction-engineering program. After only a brief periodthere, he becamea bricklayer becausehe foundthe

East German university too close-minded after hisliberal, West Germaneducat ion.

As for numerous othersin his generation, the 1968 Prague Spring was the turning pointfor Eppelmann. He and his sister legibly signed and provided a complete address in a solidaritydeclaration book at the Czechoslovakian Embassy.31 Shortly thereafter, in 1969, Eppelmann began classes at an East Berlin seminary.32 While he had beenconfirmed previously in his lifeand att ended services, he had not been overly religious.33 His decision to become a pastor hinged more on political convictions thanreligious belief s '"because the churchwas the only placein which one could breathe in this country."' 34 He servedas the pastor of the SamariterParish

29 We We re the People, 58. Interview by Philipsen with RainerEppelmann. 30 We Were the People, 60. 31 We Were the People, 61. 32 We r warwer - DDR: Ein biographischesLexikon, 103. 33 We We re the People, 62. 34 We We re the People, 56. 18 in East Berlin as well as the districtyouth pastor forEast Berlin's Friedrichshain borough.3 5 It is in thesecapacities that his dissident tendencies grew. His most novel actions were the creation of "Blues Masses" in the late 1970s, writing lettersto leaders of the GermanDemocratic Republic, and co-authoring a call fora ''peace without arms" in 1982 with Robert Havemann.

Eppelmannturned into anacknowledged revolutionary within the church almost immediately. He departedfrom the traditional use of a biblical theme as the focus of youth masses. Instead, Eppelmann decided to ask youths in attendance about concernsin their lives. As he remembered,"The topics that came up had to do with hopelessness, feelingincarcerated, fear, fearof the police, fearof the Stasi, fearof superiors-allthese were topics thatwe triedto pick up on, even duringpublic events."36 This formof "outside the boxthinking" epitomized Eppelmann's actions as a pastor. He was one of the firstto provide a public forumfor expressing political opinions. This was extremelyuncommon because "citizens of the GDR only expressed what they really thought among circles of close friends,the family, or at the neighborhood barafter they got drunk-but never publicly. "37 Eppelmanncontinually pushed the envelope.

After being asked by a youngman to allow blues concerts in the church around

1980, Eppelmannsuggested a few improvements to thisidea andin doing so created the "Blues Masses."38 Blues were popularthroughout East Germany as well asWest

5 3 Wer war wer - DDR: Ein biographisches Lexi/con, 103. 36 We We re the People, 63. 37 We Were the People, 63. 38 We Were the People, 63-64. 19 Germany because of the infiltration of Americanmusic afterWorld War II. The view

of blues music that washeld by the GDR state wasthat this type of Americanmusic

was something that only those opposed to the government or degenerates would listen

to. Eppelmanndescribed the "Blues Masses" asstarting

with biblical texts about love, then [the young man] played a fewblues songs, then we read a few texts,and so on, and200 peopleshowed up, forhea ven's sake. For a normalchurch service in downtownBerlin you would never have gotten together 200 people. The next time we chose our owntheme, wrote our own texts while still using some biblical texts, and then 400 people showed up. This kept on growing-growing so much, in factthat people beganto come fromall over the country, with backpackson their shoulders, lining up in front of the church becausethey were worried they wouldn't be able to get in. During peaktimes-that must have beenin the early '80s-10,000 people showed up. We had to repeat some services threeto five times. 39

This description explainsa lot aboutthe independent peace movements in the German

Democratic Republic in the late 1970s and early1980s. Some aspectsjustify detailed

explanation. These movements were oftenheld in churcheswhere the government

tolerated a level of "freespace" as a safety valve. The utilization of church rooms as

meeting places did not meanthat those attending were necessarily Christianbelievers.

This is worth emphasizing. Likewise, Eppelmann's case also demonstrates that not all

. East German Lutheranpastors chose the profession solely because of their religious

convictions. Many actions at this time were driven by political necessity or on an

even more simplisticlevel, the need fora free civic space, a placewhere opinions

against governmentalpolicies could be voiced. The government's tolerance of the

Lutheranchurch, especially after the 1978 agreement, meant that Lutheranchurches

becameforums where dissent could be voiced. It will becomeclear in later examples

39 We Were the People, 64. 20 that the church did not tolerate every group andcertain churches weremore strictly controlledby the Lutheranchurch leadershipthan Eppelmann 's. Also, the levels of

Stasi surveillance and infiltration, not only into groups but also within the church hierarchy,varied from cityto city. Eppelmann's "Blues Masses" should be viewed as atypical, thoughthe level of support he received from the church hierarchy was not.

Thisinstitutional fa ct should be kept in mind: behind each parish that allowed independentpeace groups to meet, there were church leaderswho allowed the incidents andoften protected the participants. In rare cases, church officials were unofficialinformers for the Stasi, but themajority in thehierarchy were well intentioned.

However, the Stasi did have animpact on Eppelmann's life. The "Blues

Masses"were highly controversialand for that reason Eppelmannand the participants were watched and at times punished. As the "Blues Masses" becamelarger events, the Stasi, local police, andthe East Berlin mayor all confrontedEppelmann, ordering that he stop holding these services.40 In spite of these problems, the church hierarchy stood behind himthough theyalso told him, "Eppelmann, you're putting the fate of , the entire church at risk with your activities.' 41 He told Philipsen that these events were difficultfor him, but Eppelmannbelieved that he neverthelesshad to sponsor these services. Throughout his story, Eppelmannemphasized the overriding importanceof a free civic sphere. His actions reinforced this idea. He believed that too many citizens were sufferingnot froma lack of voice (though it was definitely a

40 We We re the People, 64-65. 41 We We re the People, 65. 21 problem), but more importantlycitizens did not know if they were theonly ones who were feeling so much fear andwere detached fromeach other as a consequence.

Eppelmannappears to have truly wantedto help these people. In order to do so, he feltthat he hadto lead them. Eppelmanndid thisnot onlyby backing the "Blues

Masses"but also throughletters (some of which were given in advance to the Western media) to top government officials askingfor change in the GermanDemocratic

Republic.

An exampleof such a letter is one that Rainer Eppelmannwrote to Erich

Honecker on September24, 1981. In thisletter, Eppelmannrequested political changes,especially in relationto issues of peace. He beganthe letter by stating"It is

2 fiveminutes beforenoon. ,,4 Eppelmannstated that the threat of a nuclear war was as highas ever in 1981. He told Honeckerthat many resources, including humanlabor andEast German money, had beenirresponsibly used. Eppelmann argued that increasesin nuclear weapons onlyled to higherlevels of"fear,mistrust, hate, aggression,and resignation" between countries. 43 He told Honecker that peacewas the only solution becauseit buildstrust andconfidence between people andnations, which is impossible to do when thethreat of nuclear destruction looms so close.

Eppelmannbelieved that peacewas the only solution to confronting thepossibility of nucleardestruction. He continued to explain to Honecker why he should make increasingefforts toward peace with Westerncountries. 44

42 Wolfgang Btlscher, Peter Wensierski, and Klaus Wolschner, eds., Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982 (Hattingen: Scandica, 1982), 178. 43 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 178-179. 44 Friedensbewegungin der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 178-179. 22 Eppelmannbelieved that themilitary was beyond the realm of control by East

Germancitizens, even though the civilians would bedestroyed if nuclearwar occurred. Civilianinterests were not beingtaken into account, and citizens wanted them to be, especiallythose who were Christiansand pacifists because they were the primaryleaders of the independent peace movements. Eppelmannwanted Honecker to supportspecific measures that could achieve peace for the numerous EastGerman citizens who desired it. Instead of ordering WesternEuropean countries to disarmand giving NATO rules fordisarmament, Eppelmannbelieved Honecker must firstbuild trustbetween East Germanyand WesternEurope. He even providedHonecker with specificproposals for procedures that would leadto increased trust.45

The letter contained sixteen ideasthat Eppelmann believed must be followed to create peacein Europe. First, he wantedto banthe production,sale, and importation of all war toys. Second, Eppelmannbelieved that soldiers must not beglorified in schoolbooksor in homework materials. Third, he wanted "organized visits of the kindergartengroups and school classes" to the barracks to end.46 Fourth, Eppelmann believed thatstudent and worker militarytraining aswell as studying the history of the armymust beended. Fifth, he deemed it necessaryto teach students methods of peacefulconflict resolution in their fami lies and in their work, and he also asserted that students needed to learnenvironmental conservationtechniques in addition to takingan introduction to psychology class. Eppelmannwanted "financial and occupational preferential treatment" ended for youths who decided to make military

45 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 179. 46 Friedensbewegung in de r DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 179. 23 service their career.47 He also wantedHonecker to stop discriminationagainst youths who decided not to make the militarytheir career. Eppelmannalso believed that alternativesto militaryservice, such as a form of community service, should be created andgiven anequal opportunity. Becauseof hisbackground in the constructiondivision of the army,Eppelmann also asked that "the occupational discrimination for conscriptsallowed to do non-military( esp. building) work" end. 48

The other large changes that Eppelmann believed necessary were ending discrimination of students devoted to pacifism,East Germany publicly declaringthat the countryis leadingthe way "fora nuclear-freezone in CentralEurope," requesting that all European countries followthis example, and a public declaration thatthe

German Democratic Republic would gradually disarm.49 Eppelmannstated that these measures were necessary becauseotherwise, he declared, only "five minutes" remained beforenuclear war would breakout and all of Europewould be destroyed.

Eppelmannconcluded that forthis reason, EastGermany must risk somethingin order to create peace. He even signedthe startlingletter "yours faithfully, Rainer

Eppelmann."50

As this letter demonstrates, Eppelmanndid not want to destroy theGerman

Democratic Republic completely; he wanted to reform it. As he explained, "What we were trying to do was to turnEast Germany into something else, into a society that would seem attractive to us, that would seem humane to us, a society in which it

47 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 180. 48 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 180. 49 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 180. 50 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 180. 24 would befun to live, in which one would be able to fulfill oneself."5 1 In this way,

Eppelmannfits into Inglehart's "value change school" as a "postmaterialist." He did not have to worry about the material goods necessaryfor daily life. For this reason, he had more time to focus on the ideas of change thatEast German citizens had and movements that would attemptto get them to that point. In addition to being a

"postmaterialist," Eppelmannwas also someone affectedby the "crises of modernity."

The causes of his dislike for the currentsociety derived fromwhat it had become as opposed to what it once was or could be. Eppelmann's life did not completely change when he decided to supportthe PragueSpring participants in 1968, but his ideals did begin to come to the forefrontof his mind and they demandedaction. He could have continued to make a good living as a bricklayer, but he would not have been able to speakhis mind. For Eppelmann, the increasing forced militarization in schools and workplaces was somethinghe saw as unnecessaryand harmful. While he was not initially a pacifist, Eppelmann did view increased state control in all areasof lifeas overbearing. There was no public sphere, not even a true private sphere. Even if the

German Democratic Republic did not maintain constant surveillance of every single personthrough the Stasi, each personsuspected and feared thathe or she was being watched in such a way. This fearwas, not only for Eppelmannbut alsomore importantly for those in his congregation, anotherof his perceived crises of modernity.

The finalcrisis was theincreased level of Soviet nuclearweapons in East Germany.

Because Eppelmannwas a leader, he did not really fitinto the micro-level analysisfor

51 We We re the People, 237. 25 group participation. He encouraged others to join because of his belief in the various causes. Each individual who attended the "Blues Masses"and other activities had to decide what hisor her reasons were, but Eppelmanninitiated and perpetuatedthe variouscauses, demandingconfr ontation, but not controlling action.

Other independentpeace movements existed, though most did not knowof the largegatherings in EastBerlin in detail. One such movement formedin Halle in 1978 after a local pastor formed an"open group" calling itself "Open Work." Frank

Eigenfeld, a biologist by trade as well as a foundingmember of the largest oppositional groupin the late 1980s, New Forum, and his wifejoined. At "Open

Work," members discussed variousproblems in their lives andtried to find possible solutions. One area that they continued to returnto was the issue of increasing nuclear weaponsdeployed in East Germany. Eigenfeld andhis wifewere among the few older members of "Open Work." The majority of the members were younger, though all appearto have worked togetherto develop plansof action across generational lines.52

"OpenWork" wantedto draw attention to the problems of larger numbers of nuclearweapons in the GermanDemocratic Republic. To accomplish this, the group decided to conduct smalldemonstra tions. These were largely successfulbecause no one in the government expected such actions. Eigenfeld's description of their first demonstration seems almost surreal. Duringan official EastGerman "peace meeting" in 1981, the group marched alongside the "blueshirts," the party-operated Free

52 We Were the People, 39. This is the source forall but the firstsentence of this paragraph. Interview by Philipsen with FrankEigenf eld. 26 GermanYouth (FDJ). Members of "Open Work" continued to marchin the "Make

Peace AgainstNATO Weapons"state meeting even though they also opposed Soviet nuclear missiles that were to be stationed throughout East Germany. "Open Work" made it all the way to the grandstand,which contained the districtparty leaders. At that point, the independent group of about eighty people began singing songs to gain attention fromthe leaders and the crowd. They brieflyachieved this before being drowned out by the "blueshirts" yelling "' long live the party. "'53 This first event was successfulin gaining attention, even if only briefly, for their cause. Various "forms of repression, summonses, and such" limited futuresuccess. Eigenfeld pointed out that the firstevent was the only one free of oppressive measures. At the 1981 "Make

Peace AgainstNATO Weapons" march,the governmentmerely photographed them.54

In spite of the government's efforts to contain the Halle group, they soon conducted other demonstrations andactivities. This shows that their actions were not for limited goals. They desiredmore thanbrief governmental attention. The group desired real change and social impact. Manyhave suggested thatthe dissident movements of the 1980s desiredthe downfallof thegovernment. Even in these seemingly extreme cases of opposition, the leaders of these groups did not thinkin termsof the destructionof the GermanDemocratic Republic (this perhaps beganto occur closer to 1989). Eigenfelddemonstrated this point when he said that in the early

1980s, his"hopes did not encompassthe idea that theexisting statehad to be

53 We Were the People, 40. 54 We Were the People, 39-40. 27 toppled. "55 This idea runs throughoutalmost every story of East Germandissenters.

More thananything, these individuals desired real change in the existing environment.

They were tired of the government's hypocrisyand repression.

While they desired peace, the independent peacemovements were also

effectivetools for politicaldissent. The governmenthad a peaceagenda as previously

noted, "MakePeace AgainstNATO Weapons"(Frieden Schaffenund gegen NATO

Waffen). For this reason, the issue of peace was one of the fewrealms where a small

level of freedomexisted for East Germancitizens. Clearlythis was still quite limited

as the crackdownon the "OpenWork" grouprevealed. The cause of peace was also

anarea that the Lutheranchurch supportedstrongly. This allowed those who desired

change to use churches as meeting places. Only when groupsseverely deviated from

the issue of peace, narrowlyconstrued, did some church leaders interveneand refuse

to allow meetingspace. And thiswas oftenonly becauseof increased governmental

controlsagainst various churches. Prior to such suppressio�groups in Halle andother

cities worked to changenot only policies and actions with respect to nuclear weapons

but also to changethe East Germansystem to allow more freedomfor its citizens.

According to Eigenfeld, ''OpenWork" was not an overly theoreticalorganiza tion.

Membersfelt that"the party pretty much determined people's lives, that nobody had

the opportunity to participatefreely in this society, that'th ey' alwaysdecided

everything."56 The groupwanted to changethe GermanDemocratic Republic froma

55 We We re the People, 40. 56 We Were the People, 45. 28 repressively controlled government to one thattolerated expression of opinions against certain policies.

They tried to do thisthrough several methods,specifically targeting the causes of peace andthe environment, topics that had received a fair amount of supportfrom the Lutheranchurch in the mid-l 970s (in the two Germanies). An example of the level of suppression thatEigenf eld andthe others had to endure is exemplifiedby one particularenvironmental demonstration incident ( thoughsimilar ones occurred with peace protests). As Eigenfeld explainedto Philipsen, "each andevery time, [these] resulted in our short-termarrest, such as anenvironmental demonstration in which we wantedto bike to Buna (an extremely polluted industrial center near Halle), with banners,signs, and petitions, andso on. "57

In addition to these arrestsin 1982 and 1983, Eigenfeld andthree others attemptedto drafta "petitionabout the current situationin the GDR," but he and another member were brieflyarrested though not triedfor any crime. 58 Their defense attorneywas Wolfgang Schnur, who often defended dissidents though he was also- unknownto his clients-animportant Stasi informer. Schnurtypically advised his clients andtheir fam ilies not to go to theWestern media. He initially convinced

Eigenfeld of thiswhen Eigenfeld's wifewas arrested on August 31, 1983, forhelping plan a failedpeace demonstration. Two weeks later, Erich Honecker released

57 We Were the People, 45. This is only the source forthe lastsentence of this paragraph. 58 We We re the People, 45. 29 SebastianPflugbeil, an East Berlin dissident, afterthe mayor of West Berlin argued publicly forhis release.59 Clearly,publicity was effective at times.

This event was a turningpoint for Eigenf eld. Previously,he had believed that involving theWestern media would be pointless,but thisevent provedthat publicity was key in protection fromlong-term imprisonment. Prior to 1983, "Open Work" did not network with otherpeace movements. "OpenWork" had heardabout Eppelmann andmembers attended his church in Berlin around 1980. They also triedto establish initial contacts with him thoughthey were not reallysuccessful in doing so in a significantway until 1982. The membersof "Open Work" likely traveled to attend a

"Blues Mass" as so manyothers throughoutEast Germanyhad done. Eigenfeld used his wife'srole in creatinga local "Women forPeace" group in Halle to enlist the supportof the much larger,founding Berlin groupof "Women forPeace." Eigenfeld explained thatby 1983 "everyonehad vague notions aboutother gro ups, but untilthen we had not attemptedto establish anycontacts. "60 The emergency situationand understandingof the importanceof publicity led him to drive to Berlin to findhelp by searchingfor Western contacts. Eigenfeld' s use of the Westernmedia resulted in intervention by the West GermanGreen party who petitionedHonecker forhis wife's release,which occurredthe followingday. 61

From thispoint on Eigenfeld decided, in a fundamental shift,that the Halle group"should try [to] use the Westernmedia asa source of security."62 Eigenfeld

59 We Were the People, 45-46. 60 We Were the People, 46. 1 6 We Were the People, 43-4, 46, 51. 62 We Were the People, 52. 30 finallyunderstood that if activists "continued to work in isolation andengage in actions without letting the Westernmedia know aboutit, no one would findout about them.,,6J Previously,Eigenfeld andothers in theHalle peace movement believedthat they should not tumto the Westernmedia becausethe issues were internalEast

Germanmatters. This demonstratesthat the Halle movement continued to believe in reform from within. They sent petitionsto state andparty officialsand not to the

Westernmedia because they "nurtured the naive hope that some day [they] would receive a positionresponse thr ough officialavenues. " 64 It took the arrestof

Eigenfeld's wifeto force him to realize how ineffective their actions had previously been. The Halle peace group had held numerous marches and events in the center of the city, but very fewpeople knew about them andthose who did refusedto spreadthe word. Eigenfeld believesthis was because of the Stasi's controland people's fearof being labeled as dissidents. In this way, the Stasi maintained boundaries for topics of discussion in East German society. However, informationgained through the Western media was outside of this realm of Stasicontrol. Since the governmenttacitly toleratedEast Germancitizens watching Westerntelevision programs,knowledge gained through such channelscould be discussed with others. This realizationin addition to the need forsecurity against almost certain arrestsand indefinite imprisonment led the Halle peacemovement to add the use of Westernmedia to their

63 We Were the People, 52. 64 We Were the People, 50. 31 operations. Theyachieved this by twice monthlytrips to Berlin to update the media abouttheir activities. 65

For Eigenfeld, the building of theBerlin Wall in 1961 was his crisis. He explained, "All of a sudden it becamestrikingly clearto me that thereare certain peopleout there who have the powerfundamentally to curtail your wishes and your plans. This was somethingI wasn't used to fromhome, andsomething I was never able to accept." 66 He viewed constraints as unjust, thoughhe says he and othershe knew feltpowerless, especiallyafter the failureof the Prague Spring. Eigenfeld's turningpoint came after the 1977-1978 nuclearannaments buildups in East and West

Germany. During this period,he decided that he could no longer watch what happenedbut that he should take action and stop beinga victim. 67

This transformation demonstrates that Eigenfeld had time to thinkand worry about non-material values, which means that he was a "postmaterialist" in terms of lnglehart's theories. Eigenfeld fits Habermas' model almostperf ectly because he believed thatthe environment's destruction and increases in nuclearweapons were killing the GermanDemocratic Republic. Habermas' model statesthat those who believe socialmovements are created because of a crisis of modernityoften use the exampleof nuclear weapons andpollution as threatening "thephysical foundations of life,while destruction of traditional socialsettings undermined sources of meaning." 68

This is exactly what Eigenfeld believed. The only areathat does not completely

5 6 We Were the People, 50, 52. 66 We Were the People, 37. 61 We Were the People, 38. 68 Paradoxes of Peace, 9. 32 accord withHabermas ' model is theidea of advanced capitalism. While East

Germanywas explicitly created with ananti-capitalist system, there was still a crisis of modernityfor Eigenfeld. Thestate continually infringedon his life and undermined what he valued, specificallythe environment and peace. For thesereasons, Eigenfeld decided that he must participate in social movements against thestate. On the micro level, Eigenfeld not only believed in the ideas of the independent peace movement in

Hallebut he also feltthat it was necessaryfor East Germansto be able to voice their opinionseven when theyopposed governmental actions. Eigenfeld' s participation ultimately hinged on his desire to end the GermanDemocratic Republic's repression of its owncitizens.

The experienceof Vera Wollenberger has certainimpor tant similarities to that of Eppelmannand Eigenfeld as well as many striking differences. Just as in the cases of the two men, Wollenberger's participationin theindependent peace movement beganin a church. Like themshe eventuallycame to believethat open, genuine discussions needed to occur in which all citizens could freely voice theiropinions.

Wollenberger also believed that theGerman Democratic Republic should continue to exist but that it had to adapt in order to do so. While her views were comparable to those of Eppelmannand Eigenfeld in these areas,her case differed considerably in termsof her personal life. Unknown to her prior to East Germany's collapse, her husband, Knud ("Donald" to the state), was a Stasi informer. Additionally, her case is significant because Wollenberger providesa female perspective as well as thatof a mother in a peace group. 33 Wollenberger' s participationin the independent peacemovement was a

gradualprocess ( unlike her husband's unhesitating decision to be a Stasi informer).69

She studied historical materialism at theAcademy of Science under Professor

WolfgangEichhom. 70 Around 1975 she formed a small housecircle that met to

discuss science fictionauthors Karl-Heinz andAngela Steinmiiller.71 This group

eventually progressed to examine other issues, andbegan to work throughthe history

7 of modem European philosophy. 2 While Wollenberger did not view theirweekly

meetings as practical,she arguesthat the intellectual exchangethe groupfostered was

very importantto her.73 This appearsto beone of the activities that led Wollenberger

to believethat discussion was necessaryin anycountry. Her house group's meetings

were not direct dissent but they were also not typical.

Beyond this group, Wollenberger, like manyothers her age, had prior

knowledgeof importantdissident events in the EasternBloc. She hadbeen present

when classmates at her school discussed thePrague Spring of 1968. 74 Wollenberger

also knew about a group of students thatexperienced disciplinary action and party

punishmentwhen its activities in 1971 were deemed by the governmentto be anti

Soviet andatte mpting to underminethe strengthof the military.75 She knew the

consequences forsuch actions, yet she still had greatillusions and hopesthat change

69 Vera Wollenberger, Virus der Beuchler: lnnenansichtaus Stasi-Akten (Berlin: Elefanten Press, 1992), 10. 0 7 Virusder Beuchler, 14. 71 Virus der Beuchler, 13. 72 Virus der Beuchler, 13. 13 Virusder Beuchler, 13. 14 Virus der Beuchler, 16. 75 Virusder Beuchler, 16. 34 could occur.7 6 These hopes graduallyfaded the longer she worked at the Academy of

Science.77

Wollenberger's participationin the independent peace movement seems almost accidental, thoughher husband's secret worklikely unintentionallyled to this activity.

It all beganwhen she and her husband attended anevent at the old parishin Berlin

Pankow on October 24, 1981.78 The new youth pastor,Ruth Misselwitz, began a discussion of the theme "AgainstDeath-S ecurityfor Peace."79 At the end of the service, a leafletcame around that explained the creation of a peace circle that those attending could attend.80 Wollenberger writes that she andKnud entered their names, and they later received an invitation fromRuth Misselwitz with details for the first meeting.81 A month later, fiftypeople gatheredin theparish hall on Hadlichstrassein the Pankow district.82 Wollenberger became very anxiouswhen she had to introduce herself to the group thoughshe remembers that Knud was oddly calm.83 It was at this first meeting where she beganto work in anindependent peace movement.

Afterher firstmonth of participationin the group, the peace circle rapidly became the center of their lives for the next year. For the first time, Wollenberger was able to overcome her shyness and voice her own opinions to the Pankowpeace circle.

In this environment, she was able to freelyexpress her ideas in front of a relatively

16 Virusder Beuchler, 16. n Virusder Beuchler, 16. 78 Virus der Beuchler, 17. 19 Virus der Beuchler, 17. 80 Virusder Beuchler, 17. 81 Virus der Beuchler, 17. 82 Virus der Beuchler, 17. 83 Virus der Beuchler, 17. 35 large group, an experience she had never previously had. Wollenberger describes it as a new intellectualfreedom because she couldexpress her views instead of hiding them as she haddone growingup and asan adult. These were not necessarilynew thoughts, but now her ideas developedand evolved forthe firsttime because of the input of the group.84

AfterWollenberger began to participatein the group,she alsoassumed a role as one of the teachers. She andher students oftenhad politicallycritical discussions in which she taught them to be mindfulof the numerous pro-Marxist mottos that existed.

Only later did Wollenbergerparticipate in criticaldiscussion classes in her work at the

Academy of Science. Wollenberger describes her experience in the Pankow peace circle as separate fromher career. In the circle, she could discuss her opinions while in her work,she wasforced to ignorethem. Eventuallythe Pankowpeace circle grew to include more membersof the public, which also increased the risk that sooner or later repressive measuresfrom the state would descend on them all. Wollenberger effectively describesthe possibleactions againstan individual determinedto be a dissident. Theinitial measureswould bediscrimination in the workplace. This could then escalate into loss ofjob, andeven more severe were travel restrictions, detention, andpossibly (as a last resort) forceddeportation out of the GermanDemocratic

Republic. 85

The creation of the Pankowpeace circle thus camewith manyrisks, though the greatestof these wasnot ever knowing if a memberwas a Stasi informer who could

84 Virusder Be uchler, 17-18. 85 Virusder Beuchler, 18. 36 turnthe whole group into criminals by reportingto East German authorities. 86 While church roomswere supposed to have a legally safe status,the meetings the Pankow peacecircle held in the parishwere not purely Christian meetings. 87 In spite of this risk, Wollenberger decided to participateiµ the circle. She even commented thatafter the first meeting without any incidents, thefear of being reported disappears.88 While in retrospectthis may appearincredibly naive, it would be almost impossible to live any kind of lifewhile constantlyfearing that the Stasi wasgoing to arrest you. Instead of focusingon suchconcerns, Wollenbergerand the peace circle grewso much that she even created a private philosophy circle thatstudied the environment and later one that focused exclusively on ecology.89 One perceives here the dynamics of growing personaland group activity.

For almost all of 1982, the Pankowpeace circle worked without being disturbed. During this time, the "Core Members" developed into fast friends. As

Wollenberger describes the members, most were in their thirties with small children.

For this reason, children played animportant role in theirgroup. While they worked and discussed, theirchildren stayedbusy. At one point,the children even took part in role-playing peacefulactions. In Wollenberger' s min� the amount of participation thattheir children were allowed made it possiblefor the adultsto discuss andtheorize as well as play, sing, and dance. In thisway, the experience was very different from

86 Virus der Beuchler, 19. 81 Virusder Beuchler, 19. 88 Virusder Beuchler, 19. 89 Virus der Beuchler, 19-20. 37 the"fossilized system" of East Germany. The peace circle provided a new way of living, an alternative model.90

Becauseof thesereasons, Wollenbergerfits into Inglehart's model as a postmaterialist becauseshe was able to look beyondthe issue of security. She realized the dangerthat could come with Stasi intervention becauseof her participationin the

Pankowpeace circle, yet she chose to ignorethis. In fact, Wollenbergerfits the postmodernistcategory almost exactly because her desire forintellectual discourse was so gratifyingthat it outweighedthe associated threatof harassmentor detention by the state.

Wollenbergeralso fits the theories of Habermas, though only gradually.

Throughher participationin thepeace circles, she realized what the German

Democratic Republic was missing. While in Habermas' model, those joining social movements do so with the knowledge and intent of reacting against the fai luresof the currentsystem to adapt, it took participationwith others before Wollenbergerrealized how problem-ridden the state had become. Afterthis realization, she worked to solve thiscrisis, which she believedcould be accomplished throughpublic discussion that would lead to changes not only in thegovernment but also in societyat large.

On the micro-level, Wollenberger enjoyed participating in the Pankowpeace circle because of the group's unity and camaraderie. Her desire forgroup success as well asintellectual fulfillmenttrumped her fearsabout reactive measurestaken by the

90 Virus der Beuchler, 20. 38 state. For Wollenberger thecost-benefit analysis always came downon theside of participation in spite of the risks.

This was alsotrue forEppelmann and Eigenfeld. Allthree believed in reforming the GermanDemocratic Republic, and they feltthat this could be done through the work of the independent peacemovements. Most importantly, they valued the ideal that citizens should have a voice in the state, especiallyif the government acted in unjust ways. The independent peace movements provided them as well as manyother citizens with such a voice. 39 Chapter 3

Supersedingthe Independent Peace Movements: the Case of the German Democratic Republic Peace Council

According to literaturewritten andpublished by the GermanDemocratic Peace

Council,East Germany wasalways committed to the cause of peace because of the

lessons learned fromWorld War I andWorld WarII. 91 These statements clearlyfit

the mission of the GDR Peace Councilin the late 1980s but do not seem completely

accurate because theactions of the East German governmentdid not always adhere to

increasing peace. This is particularlyevident in the euromissile debate that occurred

from 1979-1983.

Literaturewritten by the GDR Peace Councildemonstrates the contradictions

that exist between therhetoric andthe reality of the state's actions. The English translationof the GDR Peace Council'swork, Thepeace movement in the GDR, and

its distribution to librariesin theUnited States prior to the collapse of East Germany

also indicates a specifically,carefully targeted audience. 92 Throughoutthe Council's

pronouncements, claimsare made thatall areasof society are welcome andparticipate

in theGDR Peace Council's activities.93 One of themost blatant of these assertions

comes on the firstpage afterthe introductory comments. It states, "By nature,the peacemovement of the GDR is a democratic mass movement which comprises all

classes andstrata of society, people of all ages, different philosophies and religious

91 Intertext Berlin, translate� Thepeace movement in the GDR (Berlin: Zeit im Bil� 1986), 5. 92 Imprint ofUniversity of Wisconsin Librarywith the date clearlymarked as October 17, 1985 in World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR: No Militarisation of Sp ace! Stop the Arms Race! (Dresden: GrafischerGrossbetrieb V0lkerfreu ndschaft, 1985), 1. 93 Thepeace movement in the GDR, 5. 40 beliefs. "94 If the movement was truly democratic, then why were all of the independentpeace movements discussedin the previouschapter excluded and persecuted? It also is highly irregular for a text to mention its broad-based support yet provide no individualexamples of thisthroughout the entirework. Each quoted endorsement comes froma leading memberof thePolitburo, (primarilyErich

Honecker, leader of East Germanyand a senior member of theGDR Peace Council) or writers who stronglysupported the GermanDemocratic Republic. Where were those members with"different philosophies and religious beliefs?"95 Theycould possibly beamong the facelesscrowds picturedat the governmentsponsored peace concerts and peace rallies. But thisis unlikely since most who participatedwere involved in the official Free GermanYouth or were partymembers who were expectedto participate ( as discussed in the Halle example).

Why publish such a work in English unless the East German government was in fact trying to foster a new agenda and possibly cover up abuses against truly independent peace movement leaders in the early 1980s? Thepeace movement in the

GDR has a very propagandisticfeel. The historical traditionand activities of the GDR

Peace Council are spelledout in terms that a middle school student could understand.

The work statesthat fivemonths before the creation of the GermanDemocratic

Republic, ''the 'German Committee of Fighters for Peace' was foundedin Berlin to later become thePeace Council of the GDR."96 If this is the case, then where wasthis

94 The peace movement in the GDR, 5. 95 Thepeace movement in the GDR, 5. 96 Thepeace movement in the GDR, 6. 41 Peace Councilduring the late 1970s, the early 1980s, and before,when Soviet nuclear weaponswere stationedin EastGermany? The GDR PeaceCouncil likely existed only nominally since there is no continuous evidence of its work prior to the early

1980s. The Council was apparently activefrom 1949-1952 since the majorityof picturesand excerpts come fromthis period, but the rest withtwo minor exceptions come from 1983 and later. The authors of the work even appearto have noticedthe gap because they included one sentence to tryto demonstrate that the Council continuouslyfought for peace. Supposedly,"Large campaigns were launched by the

GDR peace movement in the 1960s and 1970s calling for anend to the US interventionin Vietnam, Laos and Kampucheaand advocating a Europeansecurity system which was provided with animportant contractual basis through the signing of theHelsinki FinalAct in 1975."97 This statementcomes on the lastthree pages of the work. Even the chronology provided at the back was extremely sparse from 1951 until 1981.98 If the PeaceCouncil was so active,where is the evidence? There are no picturesor documents for almost thirtyyears, yet there were plenty of photos and excerptsfrom 1949-1952 and the early 1980s. The claims regardingthe GDR Peace

Council asa continuous and activeprese nce are very questionable at best. It appears much more probable that thePeace Council wasnot needed by thegovernment until independent peace movements threatened the tight control of the GermanDemocratic

Republic over its citizens. Increased Westernmedia attention apparentlymade it necessary forthe governmentnot only to revitalize and revamp its dormantPeace

91 Thepeace movement in the GDR, 41-42. 98 The peace movement in the GDR, 44-48. 42 Council but also to writeand translate propagandafor the West that demonstrated a highlevel of commitmentto peacethroughout its history.

The evolution of the GDR peace movement's tactics, however, did not take place overnight. Originally, manytactics fromthe independent peace movements were used or indeed coopted. Such measures included writing letters to the Erich

Honecker ( as Rainer Eppelmannand many others had done over the lastfew years).

However, one major difference in the letters from the GDR peace movement was that they were often writtenby high-ranking political figures, who were in practice

Honecker's hierarchicalinferiors. One exampleis the letter to Honecker, which the

GDR Peace Council composedat one of its meetings.99 Writing to Honecker gave the appearance of requesting changewhile actually only informing him of the measures being takenby thePeace Council. Such actions appear to merely be propagandistic tools since the informationhad probably alreadybeen discussed andapproved by

Honeckerprior to the GDR Peace Council meeting. In spite of thisfa ct, the independent peace movements had established the tactic of writing letters to top officialsappealing for transformations in the current system. By followingsuch methods, the German Democratic Republic could gradually absorb the cause of peace and slowly mufflethe independentpeace moveiµents by takingover some of their characteristic methods.

While writingpublic lettersto leading East Germanofficials was one step in the process of superseding the independent peace movements, severalother devices

99 Entering the third millennium without nuclearweapons (Dresden: Grafischer Grossbetrieb VOlkerfreundschaft, 1986), 4-6. 43 were also used. A fewof these included signatures on resolutions requesting 100 disarmament, small meetings, and largerallies. Gainingthe supportof certain members of theEast GermanLutheran churcheswas anotherimportant tool. This was still a difficultand not entirely successfultask forthe state. The primary obstacle in this endeavor was the level of independence that each parishpastor had. While the pastor should followcertain guidelines, each parish differed in the level of participation in theindependent peace movements. As discussed in the earlier case study of Rainer Eppelmann, each parish pastor had to either have the support of the hierarchy or take the risk of losing his parish ifhe oversteppedthe hierarchy 's wishes.

For theseand otherpersonal reasons, many parish pastors chose not to participate in the independent peace movements. Yet those pastorswho were involved managedto tolerate, andat timeseven foster, enoughdissent that thestate viewed themas a threat.

This led to additional force exerted not only against thediss ident pastors and peace supporters but also pressure on the higher levels of the hierarchy. It becamevery importantto the East Germangovernment to controlas much of the Lutheran church's top hierarchyas possible because the state believed that this would calmdissent.

By 1982, individual arrestshad largelyfailed because of Westernmedia 1 1 attention. 0 It had become too costlyfor well-known dissidents to bearrested by an

East Germangovernment that needed to maintainthe levels of international support it had. Clearly, even the Stasiwas aware of thisconcern and took it into account. In one

100 Entering the third millennium without nuclearweapons, 43; Wo rld Peace Day 1985 in the GDR , 28, 45; Friedensratder Deutschen DemokratischenRepub� Thestruggle for peace, more vital thanever (Berlin: The Council, 1984), 43. 101 JohnSanford, TheSword and the Ploughshare:Autonomous Peace Initiatives in East Germany (London: Merlin Press, 1983), 64. 44 example in 1982, the Stasi arrested Eppelmann and about seventy of his supporters, all of whom had signed the Berlin Appeal, which examinednumerous concerns of the independentpeace movements in East Germany.102 In less thana day, all had been released.103 This cooperationbetween the state andthe Stasi seems to verifythe idea thatthe twoorganizations worked closely together even if many East Germancitizens continued to believethat the Stasi followeda largely separate agenda Given the amountof state pressure upon them,many members of the Lutheranhierarchy acquiescedto the government's demands thoughthey oftendid so withan initial statement of criticism prior to their support of governmentpr oposals. 104

The GermanDemocratic Republic's Politburo used its new Lutheran supporters to argue that the governmenthad always and would continue to assist the cause of peace throughthe one and only official peace movement in East Germany.

Anexample of this is the GDR Peace Council's own description of the cooperative work it undertook with pastorsin the Federationof Evangelical Pastorsof theGDR, foundedin 1958 to "mobilize pro-regime, 'progressive' pastorsand pressurethe church leadership."105 The membersof the Peace Council and the pastors had ''regular exchanges of views and ideas in a climate of trust on increased efforts in the campaign for peace, detente and disarmament." 106 According to thePeace Council, specific cooperativeactivities included "the opening of the exhibition entitled 'Hiroshima and

Nagasaki: Warningand Obligation' on World Peace Day 1983 in Magdeburg" as well

102 TheSword and the Ploughshare, 63-64. 103 64. 04 TheSword and the Ploughshare, 1 TheSword and the Ploughshare, 65. 105 3 7. 106The Lutheran Church and the East German State, Thestruggle fo r peace, more vital than ever,21. 45 as ''the candiddiscussion held in November 1983 in the parishof Berlin-

Oberspree."107 TheHiroshima andNagasaki exhibition wasdescribed by the East

GermanPeace Council,not by individual pastors. If there was so much collaboration betweenthe state andthe pastors( asthe text The strugglefo r peace, more vital than ever claims) then why are more combined activities not listed? In the English publicationsof the GDR examinedfor thispaper, only threespecific events are discussed with referenceto a combined effort by the state anda Protestantchurch.

East Germanpublications stated that, "Theologiansand members of all religious communitieswhich are active in the GDR contributeto the work of the [GDR Peace]

Council guidedby their humanistand Christian belief s."108 Oddly, in the numerous listings of remarksmade by East Germancitizens in GDR Peace Councilpublications, onlya fewProtestant pastors were quoted. One example wasa pastorfrom Oderberg who said,"Every trueChristian must raise his voice againstPresident Reagan's attack missiles in WesternEurope !"109 Another examplecame from a self-professedmember of the largely artificialChristian Democrat Party in East Germany anda Protestant

Synodmember who said,"Christians and non-Christians bear an equal measure of responsibility"in relation to bringing about peace.110 Both statements were clearly politicaland very supportive of the GermanDemocratic Republic 's state. They attempted to persuadethe reader that these two Christianswere representative of all

East GermanChristians in termsof their supportof the state. The numerous

0 1 7 Thestruggle fo r peace, more vital than ever, 21-22. 108 Thepeace movementin the GDR, 10, 12. 109 World Peace Day 1983 in the GDR: TheThreat of War Can Be Banned! Peace Must Triumph! (Dresden:Grafischer Grossbetrieb VOlkerfreundschaft, 1983), 34. 0 11 Thestruggle fo r peace, more vital than ever, 36-37. 46 independent peace movements that were aidedby pastors as well as the need to threatenmany in the Lutheranchurch hierarchy into submission did not accord with the perceived love of the GermanDemocratic Republic's government. The participation of Protestant leaders in the official East German peace movement appearsto have been sporadicat best.

In spite of this, the rhetoricin the works by the GDR Peace Council continually tried to argue that Christiansreally were very active in the sole East

Germanpeace movement. In a section entitled"In concertwith Christiancitizens" the case for Christianand state cooperation is made. The Christians and the Lutheran churchesof East Germanywere also said to be increasinglyactive in the

cause of peace and disarmament. The Federationof ProtestantChurches has vowed to live up to _its responsibility for peacewith the means and possibilities at its command. It hasdeclared its willingnessto contributeto the efforts of our state towardsa more just and peaceful world. Conscious of theirshared responsibility, manyChristians, pastors and theologianshave takenpart in numerous activities undertakenby the all-embracingpeace movement of our country.111

The dismissal of the independent peace movements is clear with the statement of "the all-embracingpeace movement." Thestate refusedto acknowledgedissent of any kind even though many of those involved in the independent movements oftenbegan by merely wantingan area where ideas of all types (political,economic, cultural,and so forth) could be discussed. Instead of tryingto respond to its citizens' desires, the

East Germangovernment wanted to hide all mention of thisissue by reclaimingthe cause of peace andtrying to makeit exclusively the state's cause. The Peace

111 Thestruggle fo r peace, more vital than evert 21-22. 47 Council'swritings supported the state's planby asserting that"The peace movement of our countryand the policiesof our state drawon peoplefrom all classesand strata." 112

In order to ensure that all levels of societywere active in the peacemovement, the state sponsorednumerous activities in the name of peace. Examplesincluded membersof the FreeGerman Youth (FDJ) pledgingtheir commitmentto peace at the

National YouthFestival held in 1983.113 Other activities for youths, aptly named ''the

FDJ Mobilizationfor Peace campaign,"were also very influentialduring the 1984 celebration of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the creation of the German Democratic

Republic.114 The FDJ demonstratedhow they activelyworked forpeace through their

115 labors as industrialworkers, students, scientists, andartists. The idea of working forpeace through typical occupationsis oftenpresented in the English publicationsof the GDR Peace Council. Underlying thisnotion is the belief that the government supportspeace, so if anEast German citizen wants to work forpeace, he or she can increase their level of production at work. B�cause his or her products strengthen the state economically, eachindividual worker cancontribute to peace. Theoretically this idea is possible, and the East Germanstate could have really believed its own rhetoric.

More probable, however, is theacknowledgment that the issue of peacecould be harnessednot merelyto quell internal dissent or to gain favorable international attentionbut also to help save the weakeconomy of the GermanDemocratic Republic.

112 Thestruggle fo r peace, more vital than ever,21- 22. 113 Thestruggle for peace, more vital than ever,photo caption between 32- 33. 114 Thestruggle for peace, more vital than ever, 43. 115 Thestruggle fo r peace, more vital than ever, 13. 48 EasternBloc countries were always looking for tools to increase workerproduction.

The inherentproblem in aneconomy where everyonewho wantswork has it, is that there are no incentives. Why exert one's energies if job security is a guarantee? Why work harderif thereare no substantialpay increases? SinceEast Germany did not have abundantwealth, incentives oftencame in the formsof being able to shop at limited access stores as well as ideological attempts to increase worker productionby appealingto a particularcause.

Anexample of thistheory in action is �e Open-CastMine worker, Martina

Pfefferkorn, who along with fellowworkers tried to followthe '"Good Work for a

Good World"' motto. 116 Pfefferkornexplained this motto as necessarybecause ''the socialist GDR is our country. We have grown up here, gone to school here, many of us alreadyhave families, we have received new flatsand we experience daily the social achievementsof real socialism."117 This statement did not directly correspond to the cause of peace, especiallyin relation to the themesof ending the arms race on earthand possibly in space. Instead, Pfefferkornappeared to be followingthe socialist partyline by stating how good conditions wereand that the GermanDemocratic

Republic was her home. Given the context of increased emigration permissionin

1984 andcontinued requests to leave East Germanyby manyof its citizens,

Pfefferkom's statementappeared to target that problem more thanthe issue of peace.11 8 She focused on what the GermanDemocratic Republic had done for her and

116 World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR, 13. 117 World Peace Day1985 in the GDR, 13. 118 See fo otnote I forspecific numbers of emigrants from1983-1986. 49 how it waswhere she chose to live (even thoughit is unknown if she would have

chosen to stay if she actually had had theopportunity to freelychoose). As discussed

theoretically earlier,the East GermanPeace Council alleged that"workers areguided by the knowledge that theeconomic stability andprodu ctivityof the GDR lends

internationalweight to its constructive peace policies."119 Even withPfeff erkorn's

statements, this notion continues to appear as a weak attempt formotivating workers

to increase theirproduc tivity. While such motivations occurred asearly as 1984, few questionedthat using peace asan incentive could bea signof economic crisis in the

country.

In addition to changesin certainworkers' behavior,the GermanDemocratic

Republic created various new events when the state chose to renew its professed

interest in peace. GDR peacemovement activitiesran the gamutfrom ''meetings,

discussions, work team gatherings, demonstrations and rallies to public readings,

posterexhibitions, solidarityb87.8al'S and discussions with scientists andcultural

workers, peace services, sporting events and rock concerts."120 While the state did use

certain ideas fromthe independent peace movements, the Berlin Peace Run was an

event invented solely by theEast Germangovernment: "The biggest runningevent so

far was thisye ar's Berlin Peace Run whichtook place on theeve of World Peace Day

with 35,000 peopletaking p art."121 In one source the 1983 Berlin Peace Run was

listed as the second timethe event had beenheld, thoughthe amount of Germanand

119 World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR, 12. 120 Entering the third millennium without nuclearwea pons, 15, 28. 121 World Peace Day1983 in the GDR, 19. 50 English literature on theGerman Democratic Republic's supportof peacewas not 122 widespread until 1983.

While the Berlin Peace Runwas anoriginal idea, the idea of rock concerts was likely borrowedfrom the independentpeace movements, possibly coming fromthe successfulBlues Masses held at Rainer Eppelmann's church. Each year(beginning in

1983) the FDJ sponsoredthe "Political Song Festival"in which participants focused 123 on peaceand friendship. Also, the East Germangovernment funded "Rock for

Peace" concerts where the"most popularrock singers and pop groups"performed and 124 "donate[d]the proceeds to thepeace andsolidarity fund." Otherstate ... approved activities included "Artists,actors, singers, writers andpoets organiz[ing]exhibitions, matinees, readings andperformances to contribute, along with their artistic talents,to the peace struggle andto mobilize peoplefor action."125 The independentpeace movements originallydominated similaractivities, but by 1983 the German

Democratic Republic beganto makevery strong attempts to supersedesuch activities.

In manyareas the state was largelysuccessful for several reasons. First, the GDR

Peace Council could actively advertise its meetings, rallies, and similaractivities in ways theindependent movements could not. Second,the state chose to mobilize all citizens under its controlto compulsoryparticipation in the East Germanpeace movement. Thismeant that all party members, workers in governmentorganizations,

122 Wo rld Peace Day 1983 in the GDR, p.20. 123 Thepeace movement in the GDR, 33; Entering the third millennium without nuclearweapons, 30; Thestruggl e/or peace, more vital than ever, 43 . 124 Thepeace movement in the GDR, 33; Entering the third millennium without nuclear weapons, 30; Thestruggle fo r peace, more vital than ever, photo caption between 32-33. 125 Thepeace movement in the GDR, 33. 51 and youths in the Free GermanYouth could be quickly coerced into involvement in the cause of peace. Clearly,their level of convictionwas a separate issue.

The ability and willingnessof the EastGerman government to draw upon membersof state-sponsored organizations clearlycontributed to the rapid supplanting of the independentpeace movements by the GDR Peace Council. The East German organizations that supportedthe GDR Peace Cmmcil's activities included "the

Confederation of Free GermanTrade Unions as the biggest mass organization of the working people,the Free GermanYouth organization, theWomen 's Democratic

League, the Sportsand Gymnastics Union, the League of Culture of the GDR and numerous professionaland otherassocia tions."126 These organizationswere the most importantfa ctor in the state's abilityto quickly mobilize large masses forra llies, meetings,as well as findingcitizens who would verballydefend the government's stance. According to East Germansour ces, the Free GermanYouth contained "more than2.3 million members."127 Turningout even a tenth of thosemembers would create a huge rally. The independent peacemovements could not even remotely competewith such numbersbecause of theirlack of a centralorganization in addition to their inabilityto spread the word about meetings and rallies because their actions werehindered by the Stasi. While the GDR PeaceCouncil highlighted largeturnouts forra llies, such as 300,000 at one rally, their statements were at times clearly exaggerated.1 28 One exampleof thisembelli shment was theirstatement that "Almost

126 Thepeace movement in the GDR, 10. 127 Thepeace movement in the GDR,31. 128 World Peace Day1985 in the GDR, 45. 52 every citizen of the GDR participates,in one way or another,in thepluriform activities of the GDR's peace movement."129 While thestate did control a number of people, it did not have total power over them. If it had,the rally of 300,000 would have instead been a million or more people. This type of overstatement reinforces the idea thatthe English-translated GDR Peace Council's texts were tools thatthe government used to try to bolster its own image of East Germany.

In spite of such embellishments,the East GermanPeace Council at times seemed to realize that it did not controleveryone. This understanding was madeclear in a statement:

The GDR Peace Council is not a rigid bodywith a strict organization. It offers ampleopportunities to everybody who wishes to cooperate constructively with the Council in thecause of peace. Therefore,there are no 'membership quotas' fixedfor certain populationgroups and there is not even any formal membershiprequired for participationin th� struggleagainst nuclear war and the arms race. In this way, thePeace Council andin general the peace movement providevast opportunities and scope to all membersof society, irrespectiveof their social, politicaland philosophical stance,to work for their one common goal. 130

Theseapparent contradictions that exist onlysixteen pages apart couldhave occurred for many reasons. Multiple authorsmay not have examinedprevious texts. Or one author or one group of authors could have writtenboth statements. Whileone or two authors writing a text withclear contradictions may seem impossible, almost every

East German citizen thoughtin terms of several layers of factsand opinions . An exampleof this is thatonly those people who actually participatedin officialpeace movement activities would know for certainof theirparticipation. Yet even those

129 Thepeace movement in the GDR, 31. 130 Thepeace movement in the GDR, 13. 53 who did not attendthe officiallysponsored events would likely say,if questioned by his employer, members of the government, or identifiedStasi agents, thathe attended.

Even if the state knewthe non-attenderwas lying, theywould probably still include him in the numbers of attendees because he saidthat he was there. These contradictions aside, the GermanDemocratic Republic did actively decide to work toward its own understanding of "peace" with renewed interest from 1983 until 1986.

This desire is succinctly stated in a work aboutthe 19 83 World Peace Day: "Peaceis thesupreme imperativefor us, forthe policies of our Partyand government.

Socialism decreesthis by its very nature. It has already been said here that another warmust never emanate from German soil. That has always been our pledge, ever since the GDR was founded, and we shall standby it, now and forall time."131 As the next chapter explains, EastGerman y's leaders may not have always practiced such peaceful ideas with their actions, but theemphasis on "now" appearsto demonstrate the state's new effort in this area even if it took independent peace movements to spur thegovernment into action.

131 World Peace Day 1983 in the GDR, 12. .------11111111·------�

55 Chapter 4

The Roller Coaster That was Detente: Ostpolitik and the Early 1980s Arms Race

The year 1983 was a turningpoint forthe antinuclear peace movements in East

Germany. There were several reasons for this. Throughout 1983 the German

Democratic Republic's stateworked to gain controlover the independent peace

movements throughoutthe country. The GDR Peace Council was largely successful

in its efforts,though the timing of key decisions in the politics surrounding the nuclear

question also played a role in the Council's accomplishments. By 1984 the

antinuclearmovement had become in effect a non-issue. This was because the

euromissiles debate, which had specific implicationsfor the two Germanies,ended

between NATO andthe WarsawPact in November 1983 when the United States

deployed Pershing II missiles in West Germany. However, the GDR Peace Council

continued to use the issue to ensure that independentpeace movements did not

reemerge. The GDR Peace Council also tried to findcommon groundand lessen

tensions between the Soviet Union andthe Federal Republic of Germanybecause the

GDR was allied with the Soviet Union but the Federal Republic was one of it main

trading partners. East German leaders wanted a new type of detente because West

Germanyprovided economic benefitsthat theGerman Democratic Republic

desperatelyneeded at this time. Additionally, the Soviet Union was East Germany's

diplomaticand ideological ally. Relations between thetwo Germanstates had reached

a formof rapprochement under the previous West GermanChancellor, Willy Brandt. 56 His foreignpolicy in 1972 towardthe GermanDemocratic Republic and the Soviet

Unionwas known as Ostpolitik.

Brandtbelieved thatgreater cooperation could exist between the two

Germanies if diplomatic coexistence became the establishedpolicy. This course of action "belatedly recognized Soviet hegemony in EasternEurope" and propelled West

· Germanyinto a higher statusin international affairs.132 Brandtbelieved that detente was possible, andhe led the Federal Republic's efforts toward this goal.

In the early 1970s, Brandt created the primaryarguments in favor of

Ostpolitik. He believed th�t realism and communication should be the basis for all politics between the Eastand West. Brandt argued that ''the realities of thepostwar settlement should be accepted."133 He also favored increased communicationbetween

Easternand Western powers because he believed that this could lead to the saturation of Westernideas into the communistEast, which would lead to gradualchanges.

Brandtalso believed that the West's securityinterests must beacknowledged in relation to the East's interests if ''the realities of power politics" were going to change.

Brandtbelieved that recognizingthe currentstate of affairswas the firststep to transformingEast-West relations. Partof acknowledging the status quo was to reassure the Soviet Union that it was the predominantforce in Eastern Europe. Brandt thought that Moscow would be more willing to communicatewith the West if Soviet leaders were not constantlyfearful about being forcedout of East Germanyand then

2 13 GottfriedNiedhart, "Ost politik: The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Process of Detente," in 1968: The World Transformed, eds. Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker(New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1999),173. 133 "Ostpolitik:The Role of the Federal Republic ofGennany in the Process ofDetente," 175. 57 out of EasternEurop e. Ostpolitikalso led to the acknowledgementthat ''the division of Germanywould last aslong as the division ofEurope."134 Finally, Brandtbelieved that the Federal Republic should be treated asan adult within the Westerncommunity because it had been integrated into theWest and it should now be able to "' look after its [own] interests withrespect to the East in a more vigorous way."'135

It is withinthis context of Ostpolitikthat relations betweenthe Federal

Republic of Germany and the GermanDemocratic Republic progressedfrom the early

1970s untilthe late 1970s when the question of intermediate-rangemissiles cameto the forefront in East-West relations. This issue arose in earnest in October 1979 when

Brezhnev, at a meeting in East Berlin, "made a much-publicized offerto reduce the nwnber of his country's intermediate-rangemissiles provided that the West abandoned

1 6 all consideration of its ownINF deployments." � The German Democratic Republic also supported this proposal. This is evident froma letter written by Erich Honecker, theleader of EastGermany, on October 12, 1979, to Helmut Schmidt, the current

Social Democrat Chancellorof West Germany. In the letter Honecker "emphasized thatany NATO decision to stationthe INF forceson Germansoil would 'necessarily

7 have negative consequences forrelations between the GDR andthe FRG. "'13

Honecker's supportmay have beenan act of conformingto expectedbehavior for a

134 "Ostpolitik:The Role of the Federal Republic of Germanyin the Process ofDetente," 175. 135 Dokumentezur Deutsch/andpolitik, 4th series(Frankfurt amMain, 1978), 9:565-75, quoted in GottfriedNiedhart, ''Ostpolitik: TheRole of the Federal Republic of Germanyin the Processof Detente," in 1968: The World Transformed, eds.Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert,and Detlef Junker (New York:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1999), 175-176. 136 A. JamesMcAdams, Germany Divid ed: From the Wall to Reunification(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UniversityPress, 1993), 141. 137 GermanyDivid ed, 141-142. 58 country in the Soviet Bloc. But it is more likely that Honecker also worried about having additional Soviet nuclear missiles deployed in East Germanybecause more missiles would make the GDR aneven greater target if the West decided upon a nuclearatt ack. The Soviet Union's leadership told Honecker thatif NATO chose to deploy missiles, the exact number deployed in West Germanywould be stationed by 1 8 the Soviet Union in East Germany. 3 Leaders in the GermanDemocratic Republic

"chose to underscore theirregret at the extent to which the 'so hopeful' developments 1 9 between the German[ies] had been threatened by international tensions." 3 This tame language was very different fromthe harsh words that Moscow had forthe West 14 Germangovernmen t's role in the intermediate nuclearmissiles debate. 0 In spite of 141 this, Schmidttried to stave offthe end of detente. President Jimmy Carter of the

United States knewthat the issue of nuclearmissiles in West Germanycould be a divisive issue, not only between the two superpowers but also between the Federal

142 Republic andthe United States. This awareness did not help to defusethe issue.

By theearly 1980s there was a clear riftbetween the United States and the Soviet

Union over the number of missiles thatcould remaindeployed in thetwo Germanies.

The issue of nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic and in the German

Democratic Republic became even more importantwhen President Ronald Reagan

138 GermanyDiv ided, 142; EasternEurope, Gorbachev, and Reform, 145. 139 GermanyDiv ided, 142. 14 0 GermanyDivided, 142. 141 Thomas Banchoff, TheGerman Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and ForeignPolicy, 1945-1995 (AnnArbor: The Universityof Michigan Press, 1999), 95. 142 WilliamE. Griffith, TheOstpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1978), 233. 59 14 proposedthe "zero option" on November 18, 1981. 3 The "zero option" stated that

"If the Soviet Union would agree to dismantleits SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s, NATO

144 would canceldeployment of the Pershing II andcruise missiles." The Soviet Union flatlyre jected the planarguing that it was ''purepropaganda" based on "absolutely fantasticfacts." 145 The primaryproblem was over the definitionof what constituted anequal numberof intermediaterange missiles in Europe andthe boundariesof

Europe. The Soviet Union believed that British and French weapons should be included in the total numberallowed in Europefor the West.146 The United States disagreedwith this definition because nuclear missiles inside the Soviet Union itself were excluded since leadersin Moscow saidthey were not technically in Europe. In

1978, the Soviet Union had deployed fiftySS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe. By the end of 1981, two hundred fifty SS-20s were present in countries belonging to the

Soviet Bloc.147 The West had not sent any new missiles duringthis time period. 148

Given these new additions in the East,the two superpowersdid not have equal numbers of missiles in Europe. Afterthe Soviet Union had fortifiedits East European arsenal, Brezhnev decided on March 16, 1982, to declare a moratorium on stationing

149 new intermediate· missiles in Europe. In response to Brezhnev's action, "In

Washington, President Reagansaid that the moratoriumproposal did not go far

143 JeffreyHerf, War byOther Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissi/es (New York: The Free Press,1991), 140. 144 War byOther Means,140. 145 War byOther Means, 141. 146 War byOther Means, 157. 147 War byOther Means, 141, 151. 148 War byOther Means, 141. 149 War byOther Means, 151, 152. 60 enough and that it would leave a large Soviet arsenal intact."150 Prior to these negotiations, many other options had been exploredand dismissed, primarilyby the

Soviets.

One well-publicizedexample was the so-called "walk in thewoods agreement," which occurred in the summer of 1982. 151 Thisparticular arrangement occurredbetween the United States Ambassador Paul Nitze and the Soviet Union's negotiator, JuriKvitsinsky. 152 The two men decided to present to their respective governments a package which stated that"the United States and theUSSR wouldeach have 225 long-rangeintermediate nuclear force (LRINF) missile launchers and aircraft in Europe; each would belimited to a ceiling of 75 LRINFmissile launchers in

Europe."153 Further conditions were that theUnited States could only deploy cruise missiles while the Soviet Union could simply send ballistic missiles. 154 There were additional limitations on the numbers of missile launchers that the Soviet Union could have in its eastern regions aswell as limits on numbers of American andSoviet aircraftthat could be present at a given time. 155 The Soviet Union rejected the agreement. Instead Moscow demanded"no U.S. deployments, no constraints on

Soviet deployments in the EasternUSSR, radical reductions in dual-capabilityaircraft, andfull adherence to the principle of equality and parity."156 These were demands thatthe United States could not agree to follow.

150 152. 151 War byOther Me ans, byOther Means, 151. 152 War War byOther Me ans, 156. 153 156. 54 War byOther Me ans, 1 War byOther Me ans, 156-157. 155 157. 156 War byOther Me ans, War byOther Me ans, 151. 61 The unacceptable proposalscontinued back and forth fromboth sides, as each

157 saidthat the other was tryingto gainsu periorityover the world. Meanwhile, a political changeoccurred in the Federal Republic of Germanyin the 1983 election.

Accordingto JeffreyHerf , "The election of March6 was a turningpoint in postwar history and a continuation of the reversal in the regional balance of forces in Europe 158 that Helmut Schmidt had set inmotion inOctober 1977." Helmut Kohl, leader of the Christian Democrat Union, or CDU, became the new Chancellorof the Federal

Republic. Kohl had campaignedin support of the United States deploymentsand a 159 strongeralliance between the UnitedStates andWest Germany. By contrast, the 160 Social Democratswere clearin their desire to stop the planned missile deployment.

West Germanvoters had decided in favorof the leader andthe partywho urged forthe acceptance of themissiles.

While new leadership took over in the Federal Republic of Germany,the

Soviet Union tookadvantage of the situation and "By March 1983, the Soviets had deployed 351 SS-20s, with 1053 warheads, and no new American missiles had 161 arrived." Another series of proposalsensued, were rej ectedby either side, andthe

Soviet Union continued to insist that equal numbers of missiles must include those of

162 Great Britainand France . At thesame time thatthe n egotiations continued, the

151 War byOther Means, 167, 181. 158 War byOther Means, 174. 159 TheGerman Problem Transformed, 91; Edwina Moreton, "The Germanquestion in the 1980s," in Germany between East and West, ed. Edwina Moreton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 5. 160 War byOther Me ans, 174. 161 War byOther Means, 181. 162 War byOther Means, 175. 62 Social Democrats debated how they would vote on the euromissile question at a meeting in Cologne. While former Chancellor Schmidt wanted to blame the Soviet

Union for the East-West conflict, the overwhelming majority of the other delegates decided to vote against the deployment of new Americanmissiles in theFederal

64 Republic.163 The finalvote was held in the Bundestag on November 22, 1983.1 In this vote, "All 286 members of theCDU/CSU-FDP coalition voted in favor of the resolution, while 226 Social Democrats and Green members voted against it."165

Arrivals of the Pershing Ils beganthe next weekend.166

Once this occurred amidst the crisis, the German Democratic Republic started activelyseeking to preserveits ties, especially foreconomic reasons, to the Federal

67 Republic of Germany. 1 East Germanytried to "downplaythe significance of the deployment" while the Soviet Union tried to penalize West Germany. 168 At other times the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union had not been on the same page even during the euromissiles controversy. While both countries believed that thelevel of securityneeded to increase along the East Europeanborder, their 1 reasons forthis varied. 69 The Soviets desiredgreater security in thisarea because it

"worried in particularabout both Chinese militarismand the potentialthat the FRO would gain nuclearcapabilities of its own."170 East Germanleaders wanteda more

163 War by 197-198, 204. 164 Other Me ans, by 214. 165 War Other Means, War byOther Me ans, 214. 166 War by 214. 167 Other Me ans, Fred S. Oldenburg, "EastGerman foreign and security interests," in Germanybetween East and West, ed. Edwina Moreton (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1987), 116. 168 "East German foreignand security interests," 116. 69 1 M. E. Sarotte, East Germany, Detente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973 (Chapel Hill: The University of North CarolinaPress, 2001), 169. 70 1 EastGermany, Detente, andOstpo/itik, 1969-1973, 169. 63 secure andstatic region becausethey were concernedabout "protection against the

flowof humanbeings -eithera flowof West Germans into the GDR, thanksto

improved transitand visitation rights; or a flowof East Germanout of the GDR, via 1 cooperationwith all thosenew capitalist visitors." 71 While both had thesame goal,

theirju stificationswere quite different. This exampledemonstrates the existence of a

divergence of ideas over how theGerman Democratic Republic should be run between

the leaders of the Soviet Union andthose of EastGermany. These divisions increased

fora brief periodin 1983 and 1984 beforethe Soviet Union ended such blatantly

independent foreignpolicy gestures by the GDR towardthe Federal Republic.

While theseactions were wildly outside the normfor a countrywithin the

Soviet Bloc, the German Democratic Republic likely feltan attempt to salvage ties to

West Germanywas vitally necessaryand jus tifiedgiven the GDR's declining

economy. Surprisingly,"Economic links between both Germanstates flourished

duringthe early 1980s, most dramaticallywith Bonn's two DM 1 billion credits to

1 East Berlin in 1983-1984." 72 Political anddiplomatic issues, such as a combined

Germanyor a renewal of Germannational unity,were pragmaticallydismissed by

West Gennanyand East Germany.17 3 Instead,the two countries focusedon "their joint commitmentto the preservationof peaceand cooperation in Europe."174 While

the Soviet Union initially tolerated this type of behavior by the German Democratic

Republic, its patience finally ended when Honecker plannedto visit the Federal

171 East Germany, Detente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973, 169. 172 TheGerman Problem Transformed, 189. 173 TheGerman Problem Transformed, 189. 174 TheGerman Problem Transformed, 189. 64 1 Republic in September 1984. 75 Honecker's trip was "postponed"with no further

1 explanation. 76 The visit' s goal was to have been ''to signal mutual German determination to construct an island of detente in Central Europe, a 'coalition of reason' in an implied sea of irrationality."177 Instead, in October 1984, Gromyko, then the foreignminister of the Soviet Union, rebuked the East German leadership's separatepolicies. In the keynote address forthe October Revolution'sanniversary,

Gromyko ''warned 'revanchists'(the West Germans) and 'semi-revanchists' (the East

Germans) 'of all stripes,wherever they are' (in eitherBonn or East Berlin) that 'the

GermanReich (not just Hitler's Third Reich, but anyhope for a unified Germanstate) burned to theground in thefire of the Second World War. There is no return to it, nor will there be."'178 Such languageleft nothing to theimagination. The Soviet Union had clearlyhad enoughof even mildly independentEast Germanforeign policies. The euromissiles controversybrought to the surface some budding issues of conflict betweenthe leaders in East Berlin and Moscow, but by theend of 1984, these had died.179

Beforethe October 1984 speech by Gromyko,the German Democratic

Republic had tried to accommodate its Soviet allies while also tryingto maintain economic supportfrom the Federal Republic. East Germany'ssupport for the Soviet

Union took variousforms. One exampleis that in 1983 andafter, the German

7 1 5 Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, andRe form, 145-146. 76 1 EasternEuro pe, Gorbachev, and Reform, 146; TheGerman Problem Transformed, 100. 77 1 EasternEuro pe, Gorbachev, and Reform, 145-146. 178 Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, andRe form, 146. Material in parentheses was added by Karen Dawisha, the author of EasternEuro pe, Gorbachev, andRe form. 179 GermanyDiv ided, 159. 65 Democratic Republic's governmentbegan to praise peace andthe actions taken by the

Soviet Union to create peace. While thesestatements might technicallyhave been true if they were published in December 1983, they would not have been valid prior to that time. The GDR Peace Council literature discussed in theprevious chapter continually blamed Western powersfor the lack of peace. Yet from 1979 untilNovember 1983, theWest triedto reach peacefulsolutions. Only afterall theseattempts had failed,the

United States deployed Pershing II missiles with authorization from the Federal

Republic of Germany.

As this chapter has discussed, this event provided a short-lived turningpoint forthe German Democratic Republic . For much of 1984, EastGerman leaders followedtheir own foreignpolicy, diverging fromthe Soviet line in some areas. After

Gromyko's speechstopped this type of action immediately, it took theappointment of a new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1985 beforethe two countriesbegan to closely plan their foreigntrade again.180 Shortly afterGorbachev took thetop office, he decided to reopen the intermediatenuclear force (INF) negotiations between the

United States andthe Soviet Union.181 In spite of theEast German leadership's 1984 rebukeby the Soviet Union, "policymakers in the GDR andthe FRG were already preparedto enter into a qualitativelynew stage in theirrelations" beforethe new INF meetings began.182 To maintain theeconomic benefitsof the relationship, leaders of theGerman Democratic Republic understood thatcertain accommodations had to be

1 0 8 "East Germanforeign and security interests," 116-117. 1 1 8 GermanyDivid ed, 165. 1 2 8 GermanyDivid ed, 165. 66 made to ensureBon n's goodwill.183 At the sametime, East German leadership worked to remainwithin the lines of acceptable foreignpolicy that were drawn so firmlyby the Soviet Union. Concurrently, changes within East Germany, andthe ongoing development of the actors of the independentpeace movements, would now become a factor.

183 GermanyDivided, 165. 67 Chapter 5

The Pockets of Resistance Become One Mass Movement

The appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as theleader of the Soviet Union in

1985 ushered in a new era of changes,the significanceof which can still be seen today, thoughother transformationswere tal

77 movement in Czechoslovakia,the Polish Solidarnosc (Solidarity)union, and the

German peace movement[ s] fought not just for the recovery of civil rights but also for the constructionof a new formof civic self-organization."184 Prior to these events, the constructionof the Berlin Wall in 1961 led many East Germans to feel trapped while thePrague Spring of 1968 provided a brief flicker of hope thatthe system could changebefore Soviet tanksrolled in to snuffit out. This long series of events on the internationalstage, in addition to a stagnatingeconomy, loss of faith in thestate 's ability to effectively govern, and gradualerosion of control by theSoviet Union led to thecollapse of theGerman Democratic Republic in 1989.

However, one thingis clear:the events of 1989 would have been impossible if theframework for dissent in theGerman Democratic Republic had not been previously established. The leaders of the independentpeace movements were the groundbreakerswho accomplishedthis great feat. Leaders such as Eppelmann,

Eigenfeld, and Wollenbergerwrote letters, organizedmarches, led small meetings and largerrallies, andlearned how to utilize the Westernmedia to furthertheir causes. In

184 Konrad H. Jarausc� "1968 and19 89: Caesuras, Comparisons, andConnectio ns," in 1968: The World Transformed, eds. CaroleFink, Philipp Gassert, andDetlef Junker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 469. 68 doing so, theylearned how to mobilize people,build coalitions, allthe basics of leadership, and the political strategies fortargeting the concerns and ideas of their fellowcitizens. They also discovered thatit was possible to opposethe state and survive,though arrests and torture were likely to be the penalty forsuch behavior. In spite of this, theyrefused to let such obstacles standin theirway.

Eppelmannand Eigenf eld, already discussed in detail above, were chosen for case studies because each had different motivations forparticipation in the independent peace movements. Also, each becamea leader or co-founderof groups thatmade 1989 a historicalturning point. Eppelmannwas a foundingmember of

Democratic Awakening, which was "the only large opposition group that made initial referencesto a 'reform of socialism."'185 For his part,Eige nfeld helped to create New

Forum,formed by people fromvarious cities who wroteand disseminated copies of theNew Forum appeal, which stated thatthey ''wanted to address allthose who wanted to stay, all thosewho wanted to fight fora transformation of the existing society," rather thansimply emigrating to West Germany. 186 Thiscall forreform was typical amongleaders of the independent peace movements of the early 1980s. While some of the members wantedto leave East Germany, these leaders chose to stay to fightfor reform.

By contrast,the case of Vera Wollenberger, "one of the founders of the antiestablishment 'church frombelow ,"' is significantlydiff erent.187 She andmany

185 We Were the People, 55, 236. 186 We Were the People, 35, 227. 187 GermanyDivided, 185. 69 other well-knowncritics were expelledfrom the GermanDemocratic Republic at the beginningof 1988. 188 Such measures were takenby the state in order to "quell discontent amongits artistic community and churches. "189 Prior to her expulsion to the Federal Republic of Germany, Wollenbergerp articipated in the independentpeace movements of the early 1980s as well as being involved in a nongovernmental women's group, whichformed out of a largerindependent peace movement group, demonstrating "growing opposition to the ruling power structures" in the early

1980s.190 She continued to work in and lead similarorganizati ons until 1988. The work of Wollenbergerand other women like her increasinglypr ovided East German women with theirown voice regarding their fearsand concerns as well as the hopes forchange that they sharedwith the other members of the group.

Beyond each of these brief case studies of leadership figures, there are hundreds of others who also led the oppositional movements as well as the thousands who participated in these activities. Any of them could have beenchosen as a case study and though their stories would bediff erent, the overarchingtheme of civic participationto create changewould bepervasive. Eppelmann, Eigenfeld, and

Wollenberger were chosen because of theirearly and later leadershiproles as well as the availability of resources thatprovided for a more in-depth analysis of theirreasons forp articipation and the methods theyused. While each of these leaders was

188 Germa,ryDiv ided, 185. 189 Germa,ryDivid ed, 185. 190Eva Maleck-Lewy and BernhardMaleck, "The Women's Movement in East and West Germany," in 1968: TheWorld Transformed, eds.Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, andDetlef Junker(New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1999), 392. 70 important in the creation of opposition to the state, one event was a necessary precursorto the independentpeace movements: the INFdebate.

The role of the intermediate nuclearforce controversy was animportant and yet unlikely link in the chainof events leading to a mass movement frombelow in the

German Democratic Republic. Without the INF debate of 1979 until 1983, the independentpeace movements would not have had a single issue to rally behind. The desire for peace and anend to nuclear weapons in East Germany led a variety of different individuals to join anoppositional groupand become involved. The agendas of these groupsspread beyondthe urgent cause of peace. They becameplaces in which theatte ndees had a voice. Their remarks did not followthe party line, and for many this was the first time they had shared such ideas with anyone outside of their immediate family. The psychological effectsof such acts were significant. While the independentpeace movements existed in many forms, the most common was a small groupwhere such personal contact and empowerment was maximized. Examplesof the small groups were the women's groups that Vera Wollenberger participatedin as well as the slightly largerthough still relatively small group originally organized and led by Ruth Misselwitz which Wollenberger also attended. Another example was the small group, which first focusedon peace and later on theenvironment, that Frank

Eigenfeldorganized, participated in, and led. Togetherthe groups provided small pocketsof dissent throughout East Germany.

Afterthe INFcontroversy had been settled, the state took over the issue of peaceand formed theGDR Peace Councilin aneffort to calm dissent. While thestate was largely successful in making the cause of peace its own on a rhetorical level, other ------1-,------......

71 concerns, such as human rights and the environment, took the place of peace for

dissenting groups. Smallgroups formed around these causes, andopposition from

below continued throughout the 1980s. Unfortunately this time period has been

largely ignored in the historiography. Manyhistorians have chosen to focus on the

larger, denser oppositionac tivities in 1988 and 1989. These events are also very

important, but it is unlikelythat they would have beenso effective in such a short

periodof time if the tools learnedand applied to later movements by the leaders of the

independentpeace movements, had only beentaken up in 1988 and 1989. 73 Chapter 6

Conclusion

The independent peace movements thatappeared from 1979-1983 in the

GermanDemocratic Republic provided the necessaryskills andmindset for the later successfulopposition movements of 1989. In particular, the case studies of

Eppelmannand Eigenfeld demonstratedthat the movements taughtthem how to organizeand mobilize peopletoward a specificcause. Meanwhile, the case study of

Wollenbergershowed that manyEast German citizens even in the early 1980s did not know how to lead small groupsor how to voice their opinions in public, but

Wollenbergeralso provedthat these skills could belearned. All threecase studies established that citizens did not always agree with the state's actions, but untilthe independentpeace movements provided a foundationor possibilityfor doing so, many had no idea how they could effectively voice their dissent.

The creation of the independentpeace movements, whilefurnishing a forum for discussion about political andsocial issues, also slowly created a greaterlevel of

"free space" within the Lutheran churches. Thiswas not universallytrue, but many more churches opened their doors to oppositiongroups from 1979 on. There are numerous levels on which this was animpo rtantdevelopment. Lutheranchurches oftenhad to defendthe independent peace movements against the government. By doing this,certain Lutheranchurches, intentionally in some cases andunintentionally in others, became sites where dissent against the governmentwas tolerated, at least in relative terms. The independentpeace movements pushed this"free space" at times, 74 but theyalso made manychurches aware thatcitizens had numerous ideas that could not be voiced anywhereelse. Thisnew consciousness because of the actions of the independentpeace movements meantthat when issues about the environment, human rights,and other problems were raisedin the mid-to-late 1980s, more and more

Lutheranchurches contributed space for oppositionists. This became very important in 1988 and1989 because without these locations, which were relativelyprotected fromthe Stasi, it is unlikely that the "revolution" of 1989 would have been cohesive enoughto succeed. The independent peace movements forced Lutheranchurches' hands,and some of the churchesresponded with meeting space, which set a new precedent.

While the independent peace movements were importantin this way, they were not entirely protectedfrom harassment and arrests, as previously discussed. The movements were also just that: plural entities and not one united effort. For this reason, the GermanDemocratic Republic was able to supersedethe independent groups andcreate the official, government-sanctionedEast Germanpeace movement.

This movement did not have to worry about the Stasi because it was state sponsored and organized. The East Germanpeace movement was successfulbecause members of the socialist party andtrade unions all participated in marches, rallies, andletter writing. The united movement spoke often about peace and linked it to the German

Democratic Republic and its public relations initiatives, yet verylittle was really done to create peace. Instead, the East Germanpeace movement was aneffective tool for quicklyquieting true dissent over a debatable topic. 75 The issue of peace was quite controversial in the early 1980s because of the

INFdebate, in which the United States andthe Soviet Union arguedover the number

of intermediate nuclearweapons that could be deployed in the two Germanies. Aftera

decision had beenreached in 1983, the anti-nuclearargument, which was inherently

linked to theindependent peace movements, temporarilybecame a non-issue. Most of

those involved in these movements moved to the issues of greater human rightsand a

cleanerenvironment. In spite of this,the official East Germanpeace movement

ensured that peace would not continue as a focalpoint for dissent. This was an

importantdevelopment forthe governmentbecause while the state oftensaid it

believed in creating peace,it did very little to achieve this. In fact,the positioningof

intermediate range nuclear weapons fromthe Soviet Union was contraryto the idea of

peace anddemonstrated a blatant contradictionin the GDR's policies, which strongly

advocated world-wide peace.

While the officialEast Germanpeace movement was successfulin turning

peace into a state-controlled cause, the governmentwas less effective in actually

ending dissent by its citizens, which demonstratedthe increasingspace fordissent

which the independentpeace movements had created. The independent peace movements demonstratedthat oppositionexisted, that some Lutheranchurches would provide meeting space forthese dissenters, andthat manybelieved changemight

actuallycome if the citizens were able to convince the government of other ideas. The

independent groupsalso gave manya voice as well as leadership andorganizational

skills that they would not have acquired otherwise. Most of these participantswere unwillingto give up their new voice, andthose who foundthe courage to lead also 76 refusedto let go of thisnew, importanttool in their fightto changethe system. The

"bloodless revolution" would probablyhave taken place without the independent peace movements, but it is likely that the year would not have been 1989 but much later. 77

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Abby DeMarisThompson was bornand raised in Aileen, SouthCar olina. She graduatedsumma cum laude fromAiken High School in 1998. From there, she attended FurmanUniversity in Greenville,South Carolina and graduated cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts in history in 2002. Abby received a Master of Arts in history from the University of Tennessee in 2004. 592949 66('J 06/23/04 flll '