Revisiting the Revisionist-Postliberal Debate on Theological Method Katherine Shirk Lucas

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Abstract. — The longevity of the revisionist-postliberal debate suggests that the key methodological issues raised by David Tracy and George Lindbeck have not been resolved. The present study aims to further the collaborative task of renewing theological method by revisiting the revisionist-postliberal discussion of three central questions: the locus of theology, the intelligibility of Christian faith, and the justification of Christian truth claims. The study argues that although the two models do have significant differences, they actually share more methodological common ground than is usually acknowledged. For example, both models agree that Christian tradition and human experience can be theological loci, but neither is able to establish a balanced dialectic between them. Both models furthermore acknowledge the significance of the existential impact of Christian claims to truth. Their main divergence concerns the locality of theology and its critical tasks. Is theology primarily a domestic affair, within and for the Churches, or does its mission include accountability to a broader public?

George Lindbeck’s major work, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, marked the emergence of a distinct “postliberal” model of theology that opposed the “revisionist” approach developed by theologians such as David Tracy.1 Over the more than twenty years since this publication, scholars have observed that divisive friction between the revisionist and postliberal schools has impeded con- structive debate. For example, in a 1987 article, Gary Comstock notes a “nasty tension” in two distinct camps separated by a “schism.”2 William

1. The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1984). Cited hereafter as The Nature of Doctrine. The principal works of David Tracy include Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1975; reprint 1996); The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981; reprint 2002); Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-religious Dialogue (Leuven: Peeters, 1990). 2. “Two Types of Narrative Theology,” Journal of the American Academy of Reli- gion 55 (1987) 687. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 260

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Placher suggests that dividing approaches into two “warring” camps has distorted existing methodological pluralism in theology.3 A more recent exchange between Placher and James Gustafson further illustrates the unsettled nature of discussion between the two schools.4 Moreover, in the foreword to the 1994 German translation of The Nature of Doctrine, Lindbeck recognizes the polemical reactions his work has sparked, much to his own surprise.5 The longevity of the revisionist-postliberal debate indicates that its principal disputed questions are far from being resolved and that renewing method is vital to theology. The present study aims to further this collaborative task by revisiting the revisionist-postliberal debate on three central issues: the locus of theology; the intelligibility of Christian faith; and the justification of Christian truth claims. Although the revisionist and postliberal models do have differences, they actually share more methodological common ground than is usually acknowledged. Both models adopt a polar structure for the loci of theology. They are both concerned about the academic legitimacy of theology and make exten- sive use of literary, anthropological, and philosophical analyses. Neither model, however, elaborates theological criteria for assessing this interdis- ciplinarity. Both models also maintain that religious truth should always be a main theme in theology, and both accord primary significance to the existential impact of Christian truth claims in believers’ lives.

The Loci of Theology: Scripture, Tradition and Experience?

In his review of The Nature of Doctrine, David Tracy describes George Lindbeck’s theological project as follows: Lindbeck’s real problem, I repeat, is theological: like Karl Barth (of the Church Dogmatics rather than Romans) and like some of his colleagues

3. Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989) 155. 4. James M. Gustafson, “Just What Is Postliberal Theology?,” The Christian Century 116 (March 1999) 353-355; “Liberal Questions: A Response to William Placher,” The Christian Century 116 (April 1999) 422-425. William Placher, “Being Postlib- eral: A Response to James Gustafson,” The Christian Century 116 (April 1999) 390- 392. 5. He states, “The reason, it would seem, is that the book’s combination of avant garde conceptualities and commitment to historic doctrine was perceived as a direct attack on liberalism, on the one hand, and as seductively dangerous to conservatism, on the other,” The Church in a Postliberal Age: George A. Lindbeck, ed. James J. Buckley (London: SCM Press, 2002) 198. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 261

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at Yale he is theologically troubled by the liberal tradition. He wants theology to be done purely from ‘within’ the confessing community. He wants a new ecumenical confessional theology.6 At issue is the locus of theology; in other words, the starting point of theology. Tracy maintains that human experience and Christian “fact” are of equal theological significance and merit equal consideration. He uses the terms “Christian texts,” “Christian tradition,” and “Christian fact” interchangeably, but he prefers “fact” because it does not imply personal adherence to Christian faith. This category includes the events, texts, symbols, rituals, gestures, and witnesses of the Christian tradition. The critical correlation of these two sources permits mutual illumination; it emphasizes both their possible rupture and convergence.7 In a revisionist model, both human experience and Christian fact are therefore com- mensurate theological loci.8 Conversely, Lindbeck asserts that an intratextual hermeneutic, which employs biblical categories to give new meaning to various domains of thought, reality, and action, should inform all theological reflection. Human experience thus acquires explicit theological meaning only insofar as it is viewed through intratextual or scriptural lenses. In a postliberal model, Christian “texts” are therefore the sole theological starting point; they constitute the primary locus of theology. The disagreement over the locus of theology signals underdeveloped aspects of both postliberal and revisionist models. First of all, Lindbeck does not clearly define the concept of “text” operative in an intratextual hermeneutic. He uses the term “intrasemiotic” as a synonym, but seems to attribute textual status only to the relatively fixed canon of Christian scripture. This conceptual vagueness risks reducing the entire Christian belief system to what could be viewed as a sophisticated rendition of the sola scriptura doctrine. In at least some Christian traditions, however, the biblical text alone is not sufficient to establish a semiotic system. Scrip- ture should not be isolated from either the ritual network in which it is proclaimed and lived or the diverse traditions it reflects and continues to

6. “Lindbeck’s New Program for Theology: A Reflection,” The Thomist 49 (1985) 465-466. 7. Tracy adopts the concept of correlation from Paul Tillich, although he finds his articulation of the method inadequate because it ascribes much more importance to the Christian message than the human situation. 8. In The Analogical Imagination, Tracy reasserts a correlational position, but also nuances his perspective with insights which strike an intratextual note, such as the following, “On inner Christian terms, one’s trust and loyalty to the reality of God in Jesus Christ finally determine and judge all other loyalties and all trust in all other realities” (48). Given this ambiguity, it is difficult, even problematic, to state Tracy’s position unequivo- cally. Lindbeck’s portrayal of expressivism does not acknowledge this crucial subtlety of Tracy’ project. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 262

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nourish. Overlooking the lives of the faithful, especially their sacramen- tal practices and prayer, contradicts the inceptive logic of Scripture, which grew in part out of the liturgical, devotional, and ethical practices of nascent Christian communities. Insofar as it is composed of a multi- plicity of documents, creeds, symbols, rituals, devotions, hymns, artwork, websites, practices and forms of expression, Christianity is intrinsically internally plural. It is above all an intertextual tradition. To clarify the concept of intratextuality, it is necessary to account for Christianity’s inherent intertextuality. The postliberal intratextual hermeneutic also does not thoroughly consider the reception of the biblical text. The “hearers of the Word” inhabit diverse “extratextual” worlds and traditions which inevitably condition their means of perceiving the biblical story. The biblical text cannot be detached from its “hearers;” it cannot fully function as the Word of God apart from its actual instantiations in multiple ecclesial, cultural, social, and personal contexts. Critic Miroslav Volf explains how an intratextual construal of the relationship between religious and nonreligious domains is deficient on this point: We can look at our culture through the lenses of religious texts only as we look at these texts through the lenses of our culture. The notion of inhabiting the biblical story is hermeneutically naïve because it presupposes that those who are faced with the biblical story can be completely “dis-lodged” from their extratextual dwelling places and “re-settled” into intratextual homes.9 Systematic theologians who reinterpret Christian symbols, texts, and doctrines can only do so from their particular cultural and ecclesial locations. The postliberal intratextual hermeneutic does not adequately address the empirical reality and theological significance of “extratextual” plurality among the many “hearers of the Word.” Lastly, as presented in The Nature of Doctrine, an intratextual hermeneutic is open to Tracy’s charge of confessionalism because it does not specify the relationship of intratextual to “extratextual” meanings and methods.10 For example, Lindbeck employs various social-scientific and philosophical sciences to construct his theological project, yet he does

9. “Theology, Meaning, and Power,” The Future of Theology: Essays in Honor of Jürgen Moltmann, ed. Carmen Krieg, Thomas Kucharz, and Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996) 103. 10. David Kamitsuka notes an irony of Lindbeck’s method. Due to the lack of specific directives for how to relate nontheological and theological discourses, “extratextual” concepts can be uncritically assimilated, potentially distorting Christian grammar itself. Theology and Contemporary Culture: Liberation, Postliberal and Revisionary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 183. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 263

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not justify his choice of Clifford Geertz’s cultural-linguistic theory or Ludwig Wittgenstein’s private-language argument on intratextual terms. Appropriating theories for theological purposes is never theologically neu- tral, for methodological choices disclose implicit theological options. “Extratextual” concepts should thus be explicitly assimilated through critical analysis and their theological implications should be elucidated.11 What are the possible intratextual criteria for evaluating the “extratextual” tools needed to interpret the biblical narrative? How should theologians discern which methods or theories are best suited for discourse on the liv- ing triune God in varying circumstances? Due to its oversimplified notion of “text,” its uncritical use of extratextual methods, and its inattention to the reception and actualization of Scripture, the intratextual hermeneutic introduced in The Nature of Doctrine is clearly rudimentary. Yet, despite the limitations of Lindbeck’s intratextual hermeneutic, Tracy’s somewhat cursory dismissal of his position as “confessionalist” does not fully engage postliberal objections to the revisionist notion of human experience as a theological locus on equal standing with Christian tradition. Lindbeck claims that one cannot recognize the manifestation of God’s Word through human experience alone; a pre-understanding of Christian (or another religion’s) grammar is required. Without a more explicit theology of creation and redemption, Tracy’s concept of “limit- experience” cannot explain why human experience in and of itself should be a theological locus of the same stature as Christian tradition. Likewise, he does not demonstrate that an experiential vocabulary alone can con- vey the tenets of Christian faith without compromising the singularity of Jesus Christ. Tracy has moreover acknowledged that the move from human experience to knowledge of God is problematic, but has yet to offer a more comprehensive clarification other than emphasizing the relentless presence of ambiguity.12 His response to Lindbeck may therefore simply beg the question of method at stake. What should be the locus of theology? Though not thoroughly elaborated, Lindbeck’s intratextual hermeneutic seeks to recover a distinctively Christian character for Anselm of

11. On this point, Tracy states, “Most forms of theology, including my own, have reflected too little upon the non-theological – in some cases the anti-theological – or the poor theological presuppositions of disciplines one is employing for theological purposes.” “Conversation with David Tracy,” interview by Todd Breyfogle and Thomas Levergood, Cross Currents (Fall 1994) 304. 12. He states, “I have come to doubt that the route from fundamental trust to religion and God can prove as direct and unencumbered as I once thought…” “Defending the Public Character of Theology,” The Christian Century 98 (April 1981) 355. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 264

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Canterbury’s definition of theology as fides quarens intellectum, faith seeking understanding. In accordance with this definition, theology starts with, presupposes, and requires ecclesial faith; that is, faith received and lived within a particular Christian tradition. Lindbeck’s intratextual insight, “Scripture creates its own domain of meaning and the task of interpretation is to extend this over the whole of reality,” is a rather ungainly attempt to retrieve the logic of Anselm’s dictum.13 Stated in a more judicious manner, the thrust of an intratextual hermeneutic is that theological “seeking” should be carried out in harmony with the norms set by its object. Christian tradition, rather than Christian scripture exclusively, continues to create a distinct field of meaning which communi- cates God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ; it should therefore be the locus of Christian theology. Contrary to what Lindbeck’s basic argument could imply, this methodological option could encourage the use of philosophical, social, or other sciences to improve theological understanding, provided that theologians incorporate these tools in accordance with the Christian paradigm. Thus, despite its incompleteness in The Nature of Doctrine, an intratextual hermeneutic could be a useful corrective to those methods which appeal solely to other paradigms, such as a phenomenology of human experience, to set the agenda for theological questioning. The revisionist method of correlation and the postliberal intratextual hermeneutic share, however, a methodological drawback – they both adopt a polar structure for the locus of theology. Although both models postulate that human experience and Christian tradition are significant, neither is able to maintain a dialectical relationship between these inter- twined realities.14 On the one hand, Tracy privileges the pole of human experience, and he thus tends to diminish the impact of a particular religious tradition on how religious believers interpret their experience. On the other, Lindbeck attributes preeminence to the Christian “scriptural world … able to absorb the universe.”15 The postliberal model is thus inclined to undervalue the essential interplay between Christian tradition and Christian persons and communities who continue to build up the Church through the Spirit.

13. The Nature of Doctrine, 117. 14. Stephen Stell develops this similarity in “Hermeneutics in Theology and the Theology of Hermeneutics: Beyond Tracy and Lindbeck,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 56 (1993) 679-702. 15. The Nature of Doctrine, 117. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 265

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The Intelligibility of Christian Faith: Public or Ad Hoc Apologetics?

Another revisionist-postliberal disagreement concerns whether theological method should help render Christian faith more widely credible and intelligible in a pluralist society. In the revisionist understanding, theological discourse should meet a society’s standards for discourse in the public domain. It should therefore be accessible and comprehensible for all intelligent, reasonable, and responsible persons, whether or not they profess faith in the relevant religious tradition. Theological discourse should also demonstrate awareness of contemporary intellectual and public social issues and be oriented towards personal and social transfor- mation. As Tracy explains, public discourse discloses “meanings and truth which in principle can transform all human beings in some recogniz- able, personal, social, political, ethical, cultural, or religious manner.”16 He argues that the public nature and role of religion, the monotheistic doctrine of God, and God’s universal salvific will for the world require this type of publicness in theology. Tracy constructs an analogy between religion and art to illustrate the public role of religion. As art, religion, understood as the expression of a particular faith tradition rather than a general phenomenon, belongs to the realm of culture. Furthermore, like art, religious traditions interpret the meaning of individual and communal existence and can thus contribute in a positive manner to society. Martin Luther King’s appro- priation and use of Christian symbols and teachings to combat racism is paradigmatic of how religion is critical to the public cultural realm. The increasing marginalization of art impoverishes society’s vital resources; likewise, the privatization of religion deprives society of an unequalled spiritual and ethical heritage apt to provide insight for resolving public problems. The gradual relegation of religion to the private realm should impel theologians to assume their responsibility for publicness and make the resources of their religious traditions available for public debate, especially since religions address universal existential questions. The Christian doctrine of God is the most decisive reason for publicness in theology. As Tracy emphasizes, theology, logos on theos, must always remain theocentric, focused on God. “This insight into the universal character of the divine reality that is the always-present object of the Christian’s trust and loyalty is what ultimately impels

16. The Analogical Imagination, 55. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 266

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every theology to attempt publicness.17 In consequence, if Christian theologians believe that God created the world and desires the salvation of all men and women through God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, then they should strive to render this truth intelligible for the largest public possible. The postliberal model takes issue with revisionist public apologetics for several reasons. First, according to Lindbeck, the strategy is rooted in an unacceptable foundationalist position that presupposes universal prin- ciples or structures, such as public language or warrants available to any rational person. He doubts whether discourse comprehensible for all reasonable, responsible persons actually exists. Secondly, the postliberal model postulates that Christian faith cannot be conveyed authentically by means of translation into currently intelligible terms. Attempts to elu- cidate Christianity through recourse to other conceptualities relinquish Christian particularity and endanger Christian identity, for as Lindbeck claims, “Religions, like languages, can be understood only in their own terms, not by transposing them into an alien speech.”18 Lastly, revisionist apologetic strategies appeal mainly to a religiously aware audience, have little measurable influence, and have become more “strained, complex, and obscure to the uninitiated.”19 In order to safeguard the integrity of Christian faith, the postliberal model resists revisionist “translation” and proposes an alternative ad hoc apologetic strategy. The ad hoc apologetic approach stems from antifoundationalism, a philosophical current which posits that norms of reasonableness cannot be specified by a general theory of knowledge. In an antifoundationalist perspective, reasonableness has an aesthetic character that places informal, flexible constraints on religious and theological options. Accordingly, the intelligibility of Christian faith stems from the congruity of Christian teachings and practice rather than public discourse and explanatory philosophical categories. As Lindbeck sums up, “Intelligibility comes from skill, not theory, and credibility comes from good performance, not adherence to independently formulated criteria.”20 Christian witness thus constitutes the primary apologetic activity of the Church. Rather than redescribing the tenets of Christian faith with contemporary idioms, a postliberal model seeks to teach Christian practice and its corresponding grammar with the conviction that Christian witness is the most forceful

17. The Analogical Imagination, 51. 18. The Nature of Doctrine, 129. 19. Ibid., 130. 20. Ibid., 131. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 267

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public apologetic statement the Church can provide.21 Privileging learn- ing their “native tongue” will also help Christians sustain the Church in the current context of dechristianization. The postliberal position thus emphasizes praxis-oriented catechesis as the primary tool for helping Christians live a faith that is both credible and intelligible in a pluralist society. Lindbeck does not preclude apologetic efforts; he simply insists that apologetic argumentation must be a secondary, non-systematic, ad hoc element of theological method. This postliberal alternative to public apologetics nevertheless pre- sents several drawbacks. First, the claim that a Christian way of life is exclusively self-defining and therefore only properly understood on its own terms risks reifying Christian particularity at the expense of its relational character. The postliberal argument that Christian faith is comprehensible only on Christian terms could imply an originary autonomy which contradicts both the nature of the New Testament and the history of the Church, marked from their inception by their relation to various Jewish and Greco-Roman traditions.22 Lindbeck himself points out how the practices of Teuton and Japanese warriors reshaped highly developed Buddhist and Christian traditions.23 The postliberal strategy of understanding Christianity strictly “on its own terms” does not fully recognize relationality as a fundamental axiom of Christian grammar. Moreover, Lindbeck’s objections to revisionist apologetics are mis- construed in two areas. First, Tracy’ revisionist model offers an explanation of the Christian’s encounter with Scripture rather than a descrip- tion of Christian grammar. Because they are inherently reductionistic, explanatory hypotheses do not serve the same purposes as identifying- descriptions. Lindbeck, however, does not distinguish between concep- tually explaining a faithful reception of Scripture and describing the whole of Christian faith and life. In light of this confusion of genres, Lindbeck’s criticism of Tracy’s explanatory account as reductionistic and indebted to alien philosophical notions is thus partly unjustified.24 Fur- thermore, labeling Tracy’s argument as foundationalist is a somewhat hasty move. Although Tracy’s insistence on publicness could suggest a

21. William Placher defends this argument in “Revisionist and Postliberal Theolo- gies and the Public Character of Theology,” The Thomist 49 (1985) 393-416. 22. Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997) 111-112. 23. The Nature of Doctrine, 33. 24. Gary L. Comstock, “Two Types of Narrative Theology,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55 (1987) 698-699. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 268

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foundationalist penchant, he clearly disavows this tendency when he states, “The Enlightenment ‘prejudice against prejudgments’ is discoun- tenanced by systematic theologians … because it is implausible.”25 Finally, Lindbeck’s categorical refusal of all explanations independent of strictly Christian terms envelops the postliberal position in a suspicious “epistemological flak-jacket” that obstructs further debate.26 It may well be true that the only consequential apologetic method is to live the Gospel, but the postliberal approach has not definitively shown this to be the case, as Lindbeck himself notes.27 Although these objections challenge postliberal ad hoc apologetics, they do not completely undermine Lindbeck’s position. The revisionist alternative similarly leaves several key questions unanswered. For example, Tracy does not establish his preference for hermeneutic phenomenology on theological grounds. Why not turn to feminist, deconstructionist, or other categories for an explanatory paradigm? In addition, discursive explanation of faith without reference to Christian witness cannot account for the existential demands of the Gospel, nor for the apologetic value of the lives of authentic Christians. The revisionist emphasis on explanation thus risks severing the vital root link between hearing and practicing the Word of God. In brief, neither position on the intelligibility and credibility of Chris- tian faith is satisfactory in and of itself. The postliberal concept of intelligibility as skill is an indispensable complement to revisionist explanatory efforts, which, without reference to the lived faith experience, border on speciousness. Revisionist explanations of faith, when addressed to a specific cultural audience rather than a vast anonymous “public,” serve as a reminder that Christianity has always been a relational tradition, ready to engage and learn from other worldviews. A central question remains, as Lindbeck puts it, “How does one preach the Gospel in a dechristianized world?” The postliberal model assumes that Christian community and forms of life will attract “potential adherents;” a sort of Christian allure is thus the principal means of evangelization. On the other hand, the revisionist model suggests that explaining faith in terms comprehensible for contemporary people is an essential component of the Christian mission. A realistic approach to the apologetic labor of the Church would judi- ciously take both perspectives into account.

25. The Analogical Imagination, 100. 26. Comstock, “Two Types of Narrative Theology,” 702. 27. The Nature of Doctrine, 134-135. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 269

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The Justification of Christian Truth Claims: Relative Adequacy and/or Coherency?

The third point of contention in the revisionist-postliberal debate regards the justification of Christian truth claims. Tracy and Lindbeck agree that theological method should assess the claims religions hold to be true and address their justification. The postliberal model endorses a performative-propositional theory that postulates categorial and intrasystematic truth as the conditions of ontological truth. Categorial truth sig- nifies that a religion possesses adequate categories for designating correspondence to reality, in Lindbeck’s terms, the “Ultimately Real.” Religious utterances are intrasystematically true if they cohere with the total relevant context of a religion, which includes both its teachings and its cor- relative forms of worship and life. Lindbeck summarizes this theory as follows, “A religious utterance, one might say, acquires the propositional truth of ontological correspondence only insofar as it is a performance, an act or deed, which helps create that correspondence.”28 To justify the truth of a particular Christian claim, Christus est Dominus for example, one would ask the following questions. Can the categories Christus and Dominus be made to apply to the Ultimately Real? Is this affirmation used in the activities of “adoration, proclamation, obedience, promise- hearing, and promise-keeping which shape individuals and communities into conformity to the mind of Christ?”29 Is this affirmation used in a manner coherent with the ensemble of teachings on Christ? Is this affirmation used to encourage or support behavior in conformity with Christ’s way of lordship? Positive responses to all of these questions would indi- cate that it is justified to hold a particular Christian claim as true. Tracy approaches the question of truth by first clarifying the hermeneutical concept of truth as manifestation, then by determining how a claim to manifestation coheres or not with what is otherwise con- sidered reasonable. He theorizes that the truth of a religion, like the truth of its closest analogue, art, is a truth of manifestation and recognition on the part of the subject.30 This notion stems from Tracy’s concept of the classic, which maintains that every culture produces “texts, events, images, persons, rituals, and symbols” that manifest truth. A classic transcends its particular context of origin, is thus accessible in the public sphere, and

28. The Nature of Doctrine, 65. 29. Ibid., 68. 30. “The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method and Post- modernity,” Theological Studies 50 (1989) 561, 564. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 270

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can wield transformative power over individuals and communities who risk interpretation. Religious classics have the specificity of originating from the “power of the whole” and speaking of the sum of reality. The normative classic of the Christian tradition is the event and person of Jesus Christ, the lens for understanding “God, self, others, society, history, nature, and the whole Christianity.” From this perspective, to justify the truth of a particular Christian claim, such as Christus est Dominus, the following questions would be asked. Does the claim Christus est Dominus speak to the whole of reality? Does this claim call its hearers to a change of life? Do believers actually live in conformity with this claim? At this first stage, Tracy’s position on the justification of Christian truth claims converges somewhat with Lindbeck’s. Both agree that an initial step involves evaluating the existential impact of truth claims, whether they exist in the form of religious utterances or religious classics. Both affirm that truth claims expressed in different forms invite a reaction from their audience and that the response of the faithful to a truth claim is constitutive of truth itself. Both furthermore maintain that Christian truth claims should first be verified within the context of Christian praxis – are the lives of believers coherent with what they profess to believe as true? This pragmatic standard of evaluation raises questions concerning normative judgment in the Church, the relation of divine and creaturely agency, and the conceptualization of Christian truth claims in ecumenical and interreligious matrixes. In the case of intrasystematic truth, how can an individual or a community assess whether particular utterances or acts in a given cir- cumstance are coherent with Christian teachings and practice? How do factors such as the sensus fidelium or, especially in the Roman Catholic tradition, the magisterium of the Church come into play? In the case of a classic, if an image, person, ritual, or symbol attains this implicit status through community consensus or recognition, how is this consensus defined, measured, and represented? Neither author clearly addresses how ecclesial teaching and governing structures should contribute to the assessment of the coherentist and pragmatic aspects of Christian truth claims. It is also problematic to analyze the pragmatic aspect of Christian truth claims without discussing the relation of divine and human agency. To return to the claim Christus est Dominus, neither theory measures the weight of Paul’s affirmation, “No one can say Jesus is Lord except by the Holy Spirit” (1 Co 12:3). To examine Christian existential responses apart from the divine grace which inspires them risks promoting an implicit brand of Pelagianism. Neither theory sufficiently addresses the 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 271

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action of the Spirit and the participation of human volition. This constitutes a serious conceptual shortcoming. Furthermore, in an ecumenical matrix, theories on truth should be able to conceptualize conflicting responses to Christian truth claims. For example, both the Mennonite community and the Roman Catholic Church agree that Jesus’ command “Love your enemies” is a fundamental truth of Christian faith. The Mennonites respond to this claim by adopting a pacifist attitude in all situations because, according to their tradition, authentic love of one’s enemies always excludes taking up arms. In the Roman Catholic tradition, however, love of enemies does not rule out armed combat under certain conditions specified in what is called the “just war” doctrine.31 These contradictory responses to a shared truth claim are perhaps both true within their respective Mennonite and Roman Catholic contexts; however, in an ecumenical matrix, a theory of truth that accentuates the existential impact of truth claims should be able to account for such discrepancies. How can disparate practices be construed as equally legitimate and coherent responses to the same truth claim? Neither Tracy’s theory of truth as manifestation nor Lindbeck’s propositional-performative theory can adequately justify the plurality of legitimate faithful responses to the same truth claim. Despite similar emphases on the existential coherence of truth claims, a second element of each theory illustrates their epistemological divide. As stated above, Tracy maintains that theological method should also investigate how truth-as-manifestation coheres with what we otherwise know reasonably from science and all other uses of reason. Theolo- gians should therefore demonstrate the reasonableness of inquiry into the nature of ultimate reality and provide reasonable, “relatively adequate” answers to this transcendental question. He explains: For theology at its best is not an exercise in the quest for certainty at all, but includes the difficult, necessary exercise in the quest for some understanding of how all claims to meaning and truth in the revela- tory and salvific manifestations of faith cohere with the character of self-correcting, unrestricted nature of inquiry itself.32 In other words, to justify a Christian truth claim it is necessary not only to determine its pragmatic impact upon the faithful, but also to explore how this same claim about the nature of ultimate reality speaks to the rational search for meaning and truth inherent in human experience.

31. For brief overview of the just war doctrine, see the Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2309. 32. “The Uneasy Alliance,” 568-569. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 272

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In Tracy’s estimation, Bernard Lonergan’s work Insight remains the most persuasive attempt to defend this reality of reason without capitu- lating to foundationalist notions of rationality.33 He reformulates Loner- gan’s concept of “virtually unconditioned judgments” under the rubric “judgments of relative adequacy.” A reasonable act of judgment is adequate to the question at hand because the inquirer takes all usable evidence and modes of inquiry into account. A reasonable act of judgment is also dependent on or relative to the community of inquiry’s presently available modes and results of investigation. Every judgment is thus by definition open to further revision as further questions and modes of inquiry emerge. In Tracy’s theory, the understanding of the reasoning process as relatively adequate serves as an implicit universal shared by all rational people. He concludes that seeking how Christian truth claims cohere with the nature of reasonable inquiry is a necessary step in justifying the Christian claim of universality and cultivating the public nature of theology. The postliberal model maintains, however, that universal norms cannot be used as criteria to evaluate truth claims of comprehensive belief systems.34 As other religions or worldviews, Christianity shapes norms in its own manner and therefore has specific notions for what constitutes adequate and appropriate standards of reasonableness. According to Lind- beck, it follows from the comprehensive character of Christian belief that there is no external standard of truth, no independent vantage point from which the truth or falsity of the Christian scheme as a whole could be decisively assessed. Lindbeck does not exclude examining how Christian belief coheres with rational inquiry; he simply asserts that this exercise cannot justify Christian truth claims. He explains: Christians, to be sure, affirm by faith that what is naturally knowable does not contradict faith, and they may spend much time, as Aquinas did, in showing by means of reason that this is the case; but this coherence with natural knowledge … is at most supplementary and non-necessary.35 Contrary to Tracy, Lindbeck argues that the truth of Christian faith cannot be justified through recourse to “extra-Christian” standards of assessment. He states, “The necessary and sufficient publicly accessible criteria for what is true in the realm of faith are entirely what we would

33. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London/New York: Longmans, Green and Co./Philosophical Library, 1957top). 34. Lindbeck does not, however, deny the existence of universals. In The Nature of Doctrine, he claims that religions share the universal attributes of assimilative power and their concern in some way with “that which is Most Important.” 35. “Response to Bruce Marshall,” The Thomist 53 (1989) 405. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 273

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now call coherentist and pragmatic.”36 In a postliberal model, the ultimate criteria of truth are thus intratextual, or internal to the Christian scheme. Such supposedly “pure” criteria of truth presume that Christianity is a static framework independent of its actual instantiations in multiple cultural contexts. As an ad hoc apologetic strategy, this view risks over- stating Christian particularity. The means for assessing the coherence and pragmatic efficacy of Christian truth claims will inevitably vary according to the cultural locations of interpreters. In addition, to argue that the ultimate criteria of truth are internal to the Christian system implies that any potential dialogue partner must first accept that a Christian belief scheme is valid. For theistic traditions, the legitimacy of Christian belief in one God is a common ground for conversation. This position on truth is not, however, propitious towards conversation with those who do not accept theistic frameworks of belief. Lastly, pragmatic coherence or “good performance” may justify hold- ing certain Christian beliefs as true, but meeting these criteria does not necessarily signify that beliefs are indeed true. For example, committed members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints may lead exemplary lives coherent with the Book of Mormon, but it is not therefore legitimate to conclude that Mormon truth claims, such as post-resurrec- tion appearances of Jesus in North America, actually conform to reality. Lindbeck does not intend to defend a simplistic view of truth, but since he only introduces the “categorial” dimension of truth, his position is often interpreted as such. Why are Christian categories, as opposed to Marxist, Mormon, or other categories, adequate for speaking about the Ultimately Real? Lindbeck’s performative-propositional theory cannot deal with this most complex question in a satisfactory manner. While the respective revisionist and postliberal approaches each emphasize an indispensable aspect of the justification of Christian truth claims, each theory also tends to fall victim to its own set of excesses. By investigating how a Christian truth claim coheres with the nature of inquiry itself, Tracy correctly stresses the universality or catholicity of these claims. Yet his strategy involves more criteria for the “nature of inquiry” than can be established and thus risks cultural exclusivity. Given that even the nature of rational inquiry is conditioned by cultural partic- ularities, especially language, it is problematic to use this notion as a standard for the universality of Christian truth claims. Lindbeck rightly affirms the need of a contextual theory to justify Christian truth claims,

36. “Response to Bruce Marshall,” 405. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 274

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as these cannot be analyzed apart from their pragmatic impact. Never- theless, his stress on “lived performance” slights the propositional signi- fication of truth claims, and his theory slides too easily into relativism. Thus, although they present useful concepts for speaking about truth, neither model completes the task of justification. This analysis has shown that the revisionist and postliberal models of theology do have some common traits in their approaches to the loci of theology, the intelligibility of faith, and Christian claims to truth. Both models agree that Christian tradition and human experience are loci, but neither is able to establish a balanced dialectic between them. Both models also acknowledge the significance of the existential impact of Christian claims to truth. A shared limitation of the two models is their somewhat deficient attention to responsible social action. This is partly because Tracy and Lindbeck both adopt a primarily theoretical, rather than practical, approach to the demands of theology, and they both address a mainly academic public. Both authors do connect the Chris- tian concept of salvation to liberating action. Tracy, for example, states, “Christian salvation, rightly understood, cannot be divorced from the struggle for total human liberation – individual, social, political and religious.”37 He does not, however, develop a concrete social ethic that would explain why and under which conditions this struggle would be salvific. Lindbeck suggests that Christians be involved in action for social justice as long as this commitment does not bring about ambition for undue social power. He also maintains that sometimes a prior Christian cultural influence is necessary for action on behalf of the poor to be effective.38 On this critical point, both revisionist and postliberal models are insuf- ficient; they stand to benefit from the insights of liberation and political theologies. The main divergence between the two models involves the locality of theology and its critical tasks. Lindbeck is most concerned with the anomalies encountered in ecumenical dialogue that “have to do especially with the interrelationship of doctrinal permanence and change, conflict and compatibility, unity and disunity, and variety and uniformity among, but especially within, religions.”39 For Lindbeck, therefore, the initial challenge for theology is internal, within the Christian faith, within the Churches. Accordingly, the postliberal methodological framework reflects

37. Plurality and Ambiguity, 104. 38. “The Church’s Mission to a Postmodern Culture,” Postmodern Theology: Christian Faith in a Pluralist World, ed. Frederic Burnham (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1989) 54. 39. The Nature of Doctrine, 9. Emphasis mine. 0893-08_Louv_Stud_06/3-4_05 14-02-2008 10:36 Pagina 275

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an interpretation of theology as a primarily domestic affair. In contrast, for Tracy, the challenge for theology extends beyond the Church and involves the very legitimacy of theological discourse in society. The methodological options of the revisionist model, especially the concept of “public theology,” correspond to this interest in wider credibility. The fundamental issue at stake involves the Church, its identity, and its mission. As the ecumenical movement has emphasized, the unity of the Triune God is the source, model, and end of the unity of the Church. Unity is both an external/material and an internal/spiritual reality to be expressed in faith, sacraments, and charitable service. Most importantly, the unity of the Church does not simply have an intra-ecclesial end. As part of the divine plan of salvation, the Church is called to signify and serve the unfolding unity of the human family. It follows that theology must also consider the Church as in and for the world. In this perspective, postliberal concern for intratextual coherency and revisionist attention to public apologetics are both essential components of theological method.

Katherine Shirk is a doctoral student at the Institut Catholique de Paris (I.C.P.) and the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. She teaches ecumenical theology at the I.C.P. She was awarded the Louvain Studies Theological Research Competition in 2006 for this article. Address: Institut Catholique de Paris, 21 rue d’Assas, 75006 Paris, France.