American Behavioral Scientist

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Democracy, Action, and the Internet After 9/11 Deana A. Rohlinger and Jordan Brown American Behavioral Scientist 2009; 53; 133 DOI: 10.1177/0002764209338791

The online version of this article can be found at: http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/53/1/133

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Citations http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/53/1/133

Downloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com at FLORIDA STATE UNIV LIBRARY on January 25, 2010 American Behavioral Scientist Volume 53 Number 1 September 2009 133-150 © 2009 SAGE Publications 10.1177/0002764209338791 Democracy, Action, and http://abs.sagepub.com hosted at the Internet After 9/11 http://online.sagepub.com Deana A. Rohlinger Jordan Brown Florida State University

This study examines the role of the Internet in challenging the state after 9/11. Drawing on interview data with members of the Internet-based group MoveOn.org and participant observation data collected at MoveOn events, the authors argue that the Internet provides citizens an opportunity to lodge democratic challenges against the state during hostile political climates. There are at least three features of the Internet that make it a useful tool for challengers after political shocks such as 9/11: (a) it provides a free space for challengers to form oppositional points of view away from dominant groups; (b) it allows individuals to participate anonymously and, thus, buffers challengers from the high costs of activism; and (c) it moves challenges from the virtual to the real world by engaging citizens in intermediary forms of activism. In short, the Internet engages individuals in a broader range of activities—and this has important implications for democratic processes.

Keywords: activism; internet; mass media; democracy; MoveOn.org

here is a great deal of debate regarding the role of the Internet in democratic soci- Teties. Scholars on one side of the debate argue that because the Internet is largely a commercial medium (or at least largely under corporate control) the Internet cannot meaningfully contribute to democratic processes. From this perspective, the Internet is comparable to radio and network television, where profit is valued more than public interest and, as such, democratic concerns are rarely considered when determining content (McChesney, 1996, 1999). Scholars on the other side of the debate disagree, arguing that the Internet is an important tool for democracy. Proponents of this view suggest that the Internet engages citizens in everything from challenging dominant discourse to cyberdissent and, therefore, allows individuals to fully engage on a broad range of social and political issues (Ayers, 2003b; Crossley & Roberts, 2004; Dahlberg, 2001; Siapera, 2004). At the crux of this debate is how the Internet is being used by individuals and whether online participation translates into activism in the real world, which generally is regarded as the gold standard of political participation (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995).

Authors’ Note: We thank Audris Solomon and Jessica Kemper for their research assistance on this project and Herbert Gans for comments on an earlier draft of this article.

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We weigh in on the debate, suggesting that the broader political environment affects when and how the Internet is used for democratic purposes. Unlike previous social movement research, which generally focuses on the political opportunities (Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, 1998) and/or political threats (Rohlinger, 2006; Staggenborg, 1986) a particular social movement or activist group faces (except see Meyer, 2009 [this issue]), we examine how individuals use the Internet in the wake of political shocks or after dramatic changes to international and/or national systems that fundamentally alter the processes, relationships, and expectations that drive political interactions (see the introduction to this issue for a more detailed discussion, Rohlinger, 2009 [this issue]). We suggest that the Internet can be an important democratic resource in the wake of political shocks because some segments of the citizenry are likely to disapprove of the policies and practices of state actors but find it difficult to voice their dissent. Specifically, the Internet is an important democratic resource because it provides a free space for citizens to articulate their dissent in a less public way and cultivate oppositional identities, which, in turn, can provide a foundation for activism in the real world. The Internet, in other words, can buffer the risks associated with activism and, as individuals became more comfortable with speaking out in a hostile political climate, move individuals from the armchair to the street.

Challengers and the Internet

Challengers are the heart and soul of social movements. By definition, challengers are outsiders who are united by a common cause and looking to gain access to political structures to affect change (Gamson, 1990). Challengers use a range of institutional venues to achieve their goals, and given the technological advance- ments over the past decades, scholars increasingly have examined the importance of the Internet to coordinated collective action. For example, scholars have illuminated the role of the Internet in everything from strategic voting (Foot & Schneider, 2002; Johnson & Kaye, 2003; Schussman & Earl, 2004) to social movement tactics and dynamics (Dordoy & Mellor, 2001; Earl, 2006; Earl & Schussman, 2006; van de Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht, 2004). There are at least three features of the Internet that make it a useful tool for challengers after political shocks: (a) it provides a free space for challengers to form oppositional points of view away from dominant groups; (b) it allows individuals to participate anonymously and, thus, buffers challengers from the high costs of activism; and (c) it has the potential to move challenges from the virtual to the real world. First, the Internet is an alternative communication network that has not been completely monopolized by corporate voices or regulated by politicians. As such, the Internet provides a free space, or a setting removed from the direct control of dominant groups in which challengers may form an oppositional consciousness

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(Mansbridge & Morris, 2001; Polletta, 1999). There are a number of studies examin- ing the role of the Internet in the formation of oppositional social, political, and collective identities (Ayers, 2003a; Chopra, 2006; Mazzarella, 2005). For example, Nip (2004) illustrates how members of the Queer Sisters, the oldest lesbian organization in Hong Kong, used a bulletin board to create principles, ideas, and feelings that challenged status quo. Likewise, Douglas and her colleagues (2005) outlines the self- enhancement strategies White supremacist groups employ to protect their “superior” but threatened status from racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities. We argue that the Internet also provides an important free space for citizens who oppose the positions and policies of the state in the wake of political shocks. Specifically, the Internet provides an arena in which citizens can express discontent and define the contours of their dissent. Second, the Internet allows citizens to express their dissent anonymously and without retribution. This is not a small point. In fact, anonymous communication has played an important role in American history (Rains & Scott, 2007). Thomas Paine’s pamphlet, Common Sense, which helped spark the American Revolution, was published under the pseudonym “An Englishman,” and “Deep Throat” leaked information that ultimately led to the resignation of President Nixon. In short, anonymity is an important tool for those who are challenging the state and wish to avoid repression. Even if anonymity is only perceived (Scott, 1998, 2004), anonymous participation is important to challengers in the days, months, and years following political shocks.1 Given the political context after 9/11, which prioritized national security over civil liberties, challengers may have regarded publicly opposing the Bush administration as risky or as having personal, professional, legal or other consequences. Whereas risk is implicit in research on the Internet, particularly as it relates to unconventional personal and social identities, social movement scholars rarely discuss risk directly.2 Generally, students of social movement focus their attention on what causes individuals to engage in risky activism. McAdam (1986, 1989), for example, highlights the personal and social characteristics of individuals associated with participation in the Freedom Summer Project. Student activists, were biographically available, meaning they were college students who did not have families, bills, or regular employment and were, therefore, available to participate in the project. Likewise, Klatch (1999) found that the social relations between student activists dramatically altered, or radicalized, identity, thereby increasing commitment and solidarity to movement causes and sustaining activism despite the high costs (including government repression and familial strain). Conceptually, the role of the Internet in risky activism is different. Unlike high- risk activism of the 1960s, which could result in physical injury and imprison- ment, the Internet, and specifically the promise of anonymity, creates a buffer between challengers and the costs of activism. This, as well as the convenience of Internet activism, not only changes how participants conceptualize risk but broadens the pool of citizens likely to engage in challenges.3

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Finally, the Internet has mobilizing potential, meaning it can involve individuals in collective action episodes and social movements more broadly.4 Social science scholarship is replete with empirical examples of how the Internet is used organize and mobilize activists (Carty, 2002; Danitz & Strobel, 1999; Rheingold, 2002; Wong, 2001; Wray, 1999). For instance, there are several studies, spanning disciplines, that examine the role of the Internet in mobilizing transna- tional support for the Zapatista Movement in Chiapas, Mexico, as well as organizing activists before, during, and after the Battle in Seattle (Cleaver, 2007; Johnston & Laxer, 2003; Kahn & Kellner, 2004; Murphy & Pfaff, 2005; Rich, 1997; Russell, 2005; Schulz, 1998). This body of work highlights the potential of online social movement groups to move activism from the computer to the street. Whereas online groups may experience difficulty moving individuals from their armchairs to the streets in the wake of political shocks, there are intermediary forms of political engagement that foster dissent and organize collective challenges outside of public protest that scholars often ignore, including discussion groups, letter-writing campaigns, phone campaigns, and canvassing. We describe these activities as intermediary because they are designed to gain acceptance for challengers’ positions, an important first step to broader political change (Gamson, 1990).

The Case of MoveOn.org

Broadly, we are interested in how 9/11 affected activism in both the “real” and “virtual” worlds as well as the role of the Internet generally and MoveOn specifically in progressive activism. Moveon.org provides an excellent case study because it arguably is the “largest and most forceful voice in digital era politics” (Fouhy, 2004, p.), which is stunningly effective at mobilizing people and money in both the virtual and real world (Bernhard, 2004; Kellner, 2003; Last Chance for the Democrats, 2004; Singer, 2004). MoveOn was founded in 1998 by married couple Wes Boyd and Joan Blades when they sent an e-mail petition to about 100 friends calling on Congress to censure President Clinton for his indiscretion with Monica Lewinsky and “move on” to more pressing political issues. The petition generated more than 400,000 replies and encouraged the couple to form MoveOn.org (http:// moveon.org/about.html). According to Boyd, the goal of the organization is to bring “as much diversity to the power structure as possible. That is, ordinary citizens . . . who can provide the countervailing influence against the notion that some kind of inside-the-beltway elite can make all our decisions” (Bernhard, 2004, p. 6). As such, the organization mobilizes its members around a range of issues including the fund- ing of public television and radio, Internet freedom, voting reform, and of course the Bush administration’s response to 9/11 (www.moveon.org).

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By MoveOn’s own account, it filled a vacuum in the days following 9/11.

The administration was starting to talk about going to war, and no one was saying anything. One of the beauties of MoveOn is that if we see an opportunity to do some- thing helpful, we can do it, and we can do it in short order. The “Vigil Around the World” [which involved thousands of antiwar candlelight demonstrations around the world in protest of the war in Iraq on March 16, 2003] was organized in less than a week. (Bernhard, 2004, p. 2)

MoveOn opponents agree that the group is extraordinarily effective. Republican pollster Allan Hoffenblum notes that in addition to organizing liberals MoveOn is very adept at raising money, applying political pressure, and putting forward a con- sistent message to the public (Bernhard, 2004). More colorful conservative pundits, such as Sean Hannity, argue that the organization is too successful and instead of revitalizing democracy the MoveOn “blog nuts” have taken over the Democratic Party and “control democrats with fear and intimidation.“5 Polemics aside, the organization grew leaps and bounds after 9/11. MoveOn reported that its membership increased from 500,000 in September 2001 to 3 million in December 2005, noting that these figures represent members in the United States alone (MoveOn.org fact sheet is available at http://www.moveon.org/about.html).6 There are several potential explanations for this growth spurt, none of which are mutually exclusive. Journalistic accounts suggest that the strategic hiring of Eli Pariser, a long-time antiwar activist, can be credited for the boom in MoveOn members. Pariser, who was hired a few months after 9/11, brought with him thousands of antiwar activists who were determined to prevent Bush from further military engagement in the Middle East and, when this failed, set on simply stopping Bush (Bernhard, 2004). Liberal Web sites and bloggers attribute MoveOn’s growth to its strategic use of media, which included enlisting celebrities such as Michael Moore, Rob Reiner, Aaron Sorkin, and Moby to create anti-Bush ads that were made available online (Brownstein, 2004; Hazen, 2006). Elsewhere, we argue that MoveOn’s structure, which does not require membership dues and relies heavily on democratic processes to determine the organizational agenda and events, have contributed to its overall growth (Rohlinger, Brown, & Weinberg, n.d.). In short, the growth and prominence of MoveOn.org in the wake of 9/11 make it fertile ground to examine how 9/11 affected activism in both the real and virtual worlds as well as the role of MoveOn in subsequent activism. For this research, we conducted semistructured interviews with MoveOn members in the Tallahassee, Florida, area. Because MoveOn.org would not provide us a list of members or a way to contact members in the Tallahassee area, we used three tactics to recruit respondents. First, we posted flyers regarding the study in local coffee shops, on the Florida State University campus, and in the three local progressive centers. Second, we posted information regarding the study on a popular

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progressive listserv, which announced the study weekly. Finally, we attended several MoveOn events where we announced and discussed the study with members as well as an Eternal Peace Vigil held in front of the state capital in which MoveOn members were in attendance. This strategy yielded a total of 19 respondents, who were inter- viewed between October 2006 and April 2007. Respondents were asked about their range of political experience (petitions, canvassing, protests, etc.), membership in other organizations, when and why they joined MoveOn, the kinds of MoveOn events in which they have participated, their impressions of how MoveOn changed their participation, and how 9/11 affected their political participation and progressive activism more generally. The interviews ranged in length from 25 minutes and to 1.5 hours. All respondents are identified with pseudonyms. Table 1 provides important demographic and political information about the respondents included in the study and a context for the following analysis. There are four points that are worth highlighting. First, there is a variance in the demographics of the respondents. The respondents represent diversity in terms of their age (ranging from 22 to 68 years old), their marital status (with 9 single, 6 married, and 4 divorced or separated respondents), their gender (with 9 female and 10 male respondents), and even racial and ethnic background (with 16 respondents identifying as White, 1 as East Indian, 1 as Jewish and Arab, 1 one as Asian).7 Second, most of the respondents have children (13 of the 19 respondents). Although most of the children are over the age of 18, familial status may affect how individuals conceptualize risk and engage in activism. Third, all but 2 of the respondents reported that they are members of at least one other political organization operating in the real world, meaning that membership generally is not isolated to online organizations alone. Fourth, all but 6 of the respondents noted that how they approached activism had changed since 9/11. This difference can be attributed, at least in part, to their participation in high-risk activism in the 1960s and 1970s. All 6 of these respondents were involved in civil rights and/or Vietnam War protests that entailed conflict with authorities and, in at least 2 of the cases, multiple arrests. In short, high-risk activism leaves an imprint on individuals, which affects their willingness to engage in risky activism later in life (Klatch, 1999). In the remainder of the article, we examine these trends more closely and specifically analyze why and how activism changed after 9/11.

Risky Activism in the Post-9/11 Era

While scholars and pundits often focus on the tradeoffs between national security and civil liberties that citizens should or should not be willing to make, there has been very little discussion regarding how 9/11 and subsequent policy changes affected progressive activism in the United States (Kellner, 2003; Maney, Woehrle, & Coy, 2005). According to our respondents, the climate of fear created by 9/11, buttressed by national security initiatives such as the Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act,

Downloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com at FLORIDA STATE UNIV LIBRARY on January 25, 2010 Table 1 Overview of Respondent Characteristics

Do You Belong to at Least One Has Your Approach

Downloaded from Marital Number of Educational Other Political to activism Changed Name Gender Age Race Status Children Attainment Job Title Organization? Since 9/11?

Janice Female 29 White Single 0 MA Graduate student Yes Yes John Male 32 White Single 0 MA Graduate student Yes Yes http://abs.sagepub.com Jeff Male 57 White Married 3 HS diploma House husband Yes No Lyndon Male 60 White Separated 1 MA Librarian Yes No Richard Male 53 White Divorced 2 BA Contract analyst Yes No Liam Male 37 White Single 0 PhD Comm. director Yes No Ava Female 41 White Married 2 MA Interior designer Yes Yes atFLORIDA STATE UNIVLIBRARYon January25,2010 Adam Male 22 White Single 0 HS diploma Undergraduate No Yes student Samantha Female 34 East Indian Married 1 BA Researcher/marketer Yes Yes Linda Female 39 White Single 0 BA Masseuse Yes Yes Einat Female 30 Jewish/Israeli Single 0 BA Graduate student Yes Yes Clark Male 68 White Divorced 3 Law degree Lawyer Yes No Brent Male 29 White Single 0 BA Nonprofit Yes Yes coordinator Madeline Female 42 Asian Married 2 MA Independent Yes Yes consultant/parent Marcia Female 60 White Divorced 2 MA Geologist Yes Yes Amanda Female 52 White Married 2 BA Social worker Yes No James Male 56 White Married 1 MD Psychiatrist Yes Yes Kendra Female 29 White Single 0 BA Outreach No Yes coordinator Andrea Female 63 White Single 0 BA Writing consultant Yes Yes

139 Note: All names are pseudonyms. 140 American Behavioral Scientist made public political dissent risky. This, in turn, made online participation more appealing because it allowed anonymous activism, which provided a buffer between the individual and the potential costs of activism. Respondents identified three risks associated with publicly opposing the Bush administration’s war on terror. First, and most fundamentally, respondents feared being labeled as “unpatriotic,” “un-American,” or—worse—a “terrorist sympathizer.” Second, respondents worried about the professional and legal consequences of public activism, particularly in a state where the Governor (Jeb Bush) was related to the President. Finally, respondents were con- cerned about the consequences public activism might have for their families. After political shocks such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and 9/11, issues of national identity come to the fore (Schildkraut, 2002) and citizens are expected to support the state’s efforts to secure the nation even if it means a loss of civil liberties (Maney et al., 2005). In this political climate, dissenting voices often are regarded as a direct challenge against the state and, as such, un-American. Not surprisingly, individuals avoid being associated with stigmatized identities (Baumeister, Dale, & Muraven, 2002; Bernstein, 1997; Britt & Heise, 2000). Thus, respondents regarded these labels as a risk of public activism. Richard, a 53-year old government contract analyst, for example, noted that 9/11

dealt the left a real serious blow because . . . it made dissent unpatriotic in the minds of most Americans. . . . I think it was Emerson who said that “nationalism is a way to avoid meaningful political debate” and I think that is what 9/11 did. It made it a lot harder to be a progressive.

Brent agreed:

People didn’t really want to rock the boat. . . . I think after a tragedy we all kind of come together and circle the wagons. So many people didn’t really want to criticize Bush or anything else. They just wave their flag. . . . [Those that did criticize Bush] were attacked by the right for not being patriotic. You can’t criticize the President after 9/11 [and] we’re not supposed to criticize the President in a time of war. So, this makes [public] activism a bit tougher.

Linda added,

I’m making a sweeping generalization here, but I think that I am correct [in saying] that people who were more left-leaning or more pacifist . . . were attacked in a brutal way by a the majority in the nation who were not pacifist . . . [and wanted] retaliation. I mean, hell, if you think about it, anybody who wasn’t of that opinion was being labeled unpatriotic. . . . If you’re unpatriotic, then you’re an enemy of the nation. If you’re unpatriotic, you’re a terrorist or a terrorist sympathizer. . . . I’m not unpatriotic just because I don’t think this is the way to go. It has nothing to do with whether or not I believe in America. . . . But, I don’t know that the people on the left had an effective way of fighting back against that type of labeling.

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In other words, definitions of what constitutes patriotic behavior in the wake of political shocks is relatively inflexible and citizens must either embrace a narrowly defined nationalist identity or shoulder a stigmatized identity that places them at odds with broader society. Many respondents noted that being labeled unpatriotic in the post-9/11 era may have professional and legal consequences, particularly in a Republican-dominated state run by the President’s younger brother. Several respondents noted that working in a city where the state of Florida is a primary employer made public opposition risky—a perception some respondents argued was intentionally cultivated by officials and law enforcement. For example, Liam noted,

Right here in Tallahassee when we had our vigils at the Capital Building, law enforcement would drive by slowly with a Web cam taking a picture of everyone [at the vigil] as they drove by. That scared the heck out of people. A lot of folks are state workers and their ultimate boss is Jeb Bush. It just scared the hell out of people!

This risk was discussed a great deal at MoveOn events and was best exemplified when the first author was approached by a member who inquired how her identity would be kept confidential if she were to participate. At the conclusion of the discussion, she shook her head and said she “couldn’t risk it.” She explained that her Republican boss had made it clear that “loyalty” was paramount if employees wanted to keep their jobs. As such, she was careful to “keep her activism in the closet.” Respondents also pointed to the political climate more broadly, noting that the policy changes in the wake of 9/11 made progressive activists publicly opposing the Bush administration vulnerable to government surveillance and legal complications. For example, Kendra noted,

I still think it’s [public activism after 9/11] risky. I think that with the Patriot Act and with the wiretapping and all the secret scandals that arose it [opposing the administration] is a risk. As you learn more about what the administration is doing to track people and follow people and crack down on the demonstrations, I think it’s very risky. . . . When I worked with the children’s museum in XXX [Reference to the city deleted], we had a director . . . [who was named on] a national terrorism watch list. His name was on the list because of his political connections and liberal viewpoints. This kinda thing makes political activism risky.

It is important to note that by in large these risks were perceived, meaning activists felt that public opposition to the Bush administration’s response to 9/11 may have personal, legal, and professional consequences, rather than experienced. However, it is also worth noting that those four respondents who did engage in public protests experienced some of these costs. Labeling was the most common cost reported by activists—a risk that the second author witnessed first hand at the Eternal Peace Vigil in which activists were called “unpatriotic,” “commies,” “terrorist sympathizers,” and

Downloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com at FLORIDA STATE UNIV LIBRARY on January 25, 2010 142 American Behavioral Scientist a number of profanities by individuals passing the vigil in their cars. Whereas none of the respondents were fired for their public activism, Amanda’s car (which sports a number of antiwar bumper stickers) was keyed and Kent suddenly found that he had difficulty traveling:

I ended up on the No-Fly list. Clearly, this was a result of my organizational affiliation and because I spoke out against the administration. There was no other reason for it. I don’t have any kind of criminal record. . . . I’ve had some arrests [in the 1960s and 1970s] for civil disobedience, but all those were thrown out as issues of free speech a long time ago.

Finally, respondents were worried about the risks public activism posed to their families. Given that the vast majority of our respondents have participated in public activism at some point in their lives, this concern was surprising. However, several respondents explained that Tallahassee (with a population of approximately 150,000) is relatively small and, as such, the consequences of activism “ripple beyond” the individual activist. Janice, for instance, noted,

I feel far more on the spot with local activism, just because these people are going to see me in the supermarket. I’m going to run into them at school. . . . I’ve done state and federal activism. In fact, I feel a lot more anonymity and safety in a hundred thousand person march in DC . . . than in Tallahassee where I’m going to see my boss on the side of the road while I’m sitting there protesting Iraq.

Linda agreed, adding,

It’s less risky to participate on a national level because you’re a much smaller part of it. When you’re in your local community, depending on the issue and depending on your local community, it could either be okay or not so okay to be an activist. There can be consequences for you and your family.

Not surprisingly, this concern was somewhat heightened among parents of school- age children, who worried that their vocal opposition to President Bush would affect how their children were treated by community members and even teachers. When we probed Samantha about her concern with participating in public protests and vigils after 9/11, she paused and answered,

You know, although it shouldn’t matter, I don’t necessarily want my child’s band teacher driving by. I want my Congressman to know about it [my activism], but I don’t necessarily need my whole community to know. If my son’s teacher knows, I guess that’s okay, but what’s he going to do about it?

The Internet enabled respondents to voice dissent but in a much less public way. Specifically, challenging the Bush administration’s policies online offered

Downloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com at FLORIDA STATE UNIV LIBRARY on January 25, 2010 Rohlinger, Brown / Democracy, Action, and the Internet 143 respondents anonymity and, thus, buffered the risks of activism. It is important to note that respondents were aware that anonymity was not guaranteed. Almost all of the respondents discussed how policy changes designed to protect national security made their e-mails, and ultimately them, vulnerable to detection. Ava noted that on more than one occasion she had wondered about her online participation with MoveOn.

I’ll sign a petition for MoveOn or give money and I’ll wonder—is this being tracked by someone? Am I going to have Homeland Security knocking on my door now? Before 9/11 I would have dismissed such thoughts as complete paranoia.

Linda joked,

I don’t think that anything I do is particularly dangerous, however, it was on the Internet and if someone wanted to monitor my actions at the government level then they could have. . . . I certainly have made jokes about it all. When I was e-mailing people saying colorful things about the President, I would include a little line in there [saying] ‘Hello, Mr. Ashcroft. Hope you’re enjoying this’.”

That said, the Internet provided a critical free space for respondents to articulate their dissent and, for many, to connect this challenge to intermediary action.

9/11, MoveOn, and Democratic Participation

Whereas Internet participation provided some anonymity to activists and, as such, buffered some of the risks associated with activism, its role was more far reaching. Specifically, MoveOn provided members a free space away from the direct control of dominant groups in which they could articulate an oppositional point of view. Almost all of the respondents noted that MoveOn specifically, and the Internet more generally, provided a space where they could challenge the status quo and reconnect with the political processes. Einat noted that MoveOn filled an important gap: “I think MoveOn has been helpful. . . . I think people felt like they wanted to be patriotic and liberal and they didn’t know how. So, they subscribe to MoveOn and they feel less alone.” Marcia agreed,

Pretty much every single thing I’ve ever gotten from them [MoveOn], I’ve agreed with. So, I just felt like, whoa! They are right on. So, they [MoveOn] didn’t influence me. I felt like they were speaking what I was thinking.

Brent added,

I would like to think that, in general, people recognize [that] criticism of the government is as American as apple pie. We wouldn’t be here if Thomas Jefferson and George

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Washington weren’t critical [of the existing government.] I think that some people real- ize this. But, I also feel like MoveOn was one of the first groups that critiqued Bush beyond the “We didn’t need a war to fight 9/11.” They [MoveOn] made it [activism] easier because they were one of the first ones [groups] to challenge [status quo]. They [MoveOn] said, “Hey, we’re tired of being called names, like unpatriotic. We’re going to say what we feel.” I think it made it okay for other people to feel that way too.

Jeff, and other respondents, also added that MoveOn provided an alternative media space for those that disagreed with the Bush policies. “It [MoveOn] challenges the power structure. . . . The way that information gets out is largely controlled by main- stream media, which is controlled by established power structures. . . . The media is owned by money and money controls the media.” Matthew agreed that MoveOn enables progressive activists to talk to one another and challenge corporate power:

The most important issue [that MoveOn addresses] is the influence of corporate lobby- ists, and corporate interests generally, have on the political process. . . . I think that the whole political system has been co-opted by corporate powers. . . . They are basically stifling the debate and that’s completely counter to the principles of democracy. . . . [MoveOn] provides the best option to get democratic leadership to be responsive.

As the previous quotes illustrate, the vast majority of respondents believed that MoveOn provided them and others a particular kind of free space, one where they could exercise their democratic rights and responsibilities. More specifically, respondents framed their dissent and subsequent participation in MoveOn as an important way to contribute to a democratic process that sought to shut them out. Often times, respondents would specifically couch this in historical terms noting that dissent is what made America great in the first place. John argued that MoveOn helped remind Americans that dissent and debate in politics were important.

[MoveOn] is reminding [us] what [principles] this country was founded on. It’s [Moveon] saying, “Just because we don’t like things they way they are, doesn’t mean we don’t like our country.” It’s [MoveOn] saying that dissent is good, dissent is what this country was founded on so that is what we’re going to have at times.

Most importantly, MoveOn did not simply provide progressives a free space to articulate opposition to the Bush administration but also linked its members to intermediary forms of activism such as gathering in the real world to watch films, engage in discussions, and write personalized letters to state and national officials, canvassing local neighborhoods, and even rallying outside of polling places for candidates on election day. John noted,

MoveOn made me more interested in getting out there, like when John Edwards came to town. I actually made the effort to go to FAMU’s [Florida Agricultural and

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Mechanical University’s] campus, tracked up the hill and all around just to listen to this guy talk. It [MoveOn] made me what to go and help out on Election Day 2004. I sat out in front of the polls and passed out little John Kerry stickers to people. . . . I’m pretty convinced it [MoveOn] prodded me to go and participate on election day when I could have just sat at home and not done anything. But, I wanted to see a change and [MoveOn] showed how I could do it. Honestly, I’ve never ever gone to volunteer for a democratic campaign in my life. [But there] I was, walking in [to headquarters] the day before the election asking, “What can I do?”

Additionally, respondents noted that MoveOn encouraged them to engage in new and unfamiliar forms of intermediary activism. Amanda described how MoveOn encouraged her to be a precinct captain.

I said “no” when they asked me [to be precinct captain]. I mean, I had absolutely no idea what I was doing. I had never done any kind of door-to-door thing before. But they kept asking. They said they needed another one, so I finally did it. So, I was going in blind, but they were helpful. I might do it again depending on what the issue was and how important I thought it was.

When asked to describe her experience as precinct captain in more detail, Amanda added,

My job was to keep all the paperwork—all the reports. When you went out knocking on people’s doors, you’d ask them questions and then report what their response was such as “Yes, I’m going to vote.” If they told you how they were going to vote, you could document that. We were supposed to ask them that [how they were going to vote]. We weren’t there to tell them how to vote. . . . It was interesting [the experience]. I didn’t know what the response was going to be [like]. It was just so new. It was foreign to me and so it was a little scary. But, actually it [the experience] was mostly positive.

Even the seasoned activists agreed that an important function of MoveOn is con- necting dissent to democratic participation. Richard noted,

Groups like MoveOn tell people, “For everyone of us there are probably 100 more people who feel the same way. So, it’s okay to get off the sofa. It’s okay to participate at whatever level you’re comfortable with. . . .” I think MoveOn gives a platform to those people.

Conclusion

Clearly, the Internet has played an important, and underappreciated, role in progressive activism since 9/11. The Internet creates a buffer between activists and the

Downloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com at FLORIDA STATE UNIV LIBRARY on January 25, 2010 146 American Behavioral Scientist high costs of activism by providing activists anonymity. This, in turn, creates a free space in which activists can develop oppositional points of view away from the view of a broader, and dominant, political culture. Although scholars recognize the value of free spaces created on the Internet to identity politics, they rarely recognize its democratic potential. Stated differently, the Internet provides a unique mediated space, and social movement groups that understand how to meaningfully organize a citizen’s experience in this space have the potential to effect social change. In other words, online organizations can (and do) move people out of their armchairs and engage citizens in active dissent and democratic participation. However, the kinds of activism in which online organizations engage its members might be far less contentious than scholars expect. This may be particularly true during a political moment that is being compared to the Vietnam War era, in which citizens protested widely. To be sure, vocal opponents do exist and there is not a shortage of protestors. We are merely suggesting that the Internet engages individuals in a broader range of activities—ones that have important implications for democratic processes. Gatherings in which members come together to watch a film, for instance, helps foster a local progressive community that extends beyond the virtual world and provides a touchstone for participation. This is not unlike the feminist consciousness-raising groups or Christian prayer groups that provide both the foundation and the tools to challenge status quo (Buechler, 1990; Rohlinger, 2002). Whereas activities such as canvassing, letter-writing campaigns, and actively supporting a candidate outside a polling location on Election Day might not be con- frontational, they do help pave the way for broader acceptance that opposing views exist even during trying times and, eventually, political change. Of course, the relative importance of the Internet may vary across space. In states, cities and towns where state actors and employers are hostile to challengers, the role of the Internet in people’s lives and democratic processes may be far more important. Likewise, in geographic locations that are relatively isolated, the Internet may provide important connections for individuals exploring and articulating dissent in the absence of a local political community. Once these connections exist, they may provide the foundation for building the kinds of social and political capital that tran- scend local and national boundaries. These issues require further investigation; it is clear that the Internet affects democratic participation and activism in ways that people are only beginning to understand.

Notes

1. In the contemporary age, communication (particularly Internet communication) is rarely truly anonymous (Scott, 2004). As such, scholars often refer to perceived anonymity. Within this framework, anonymity is regarded as a construct with a range of possibilities that include completely anonymous, partially anonymous, and identified (Scott, 1998, p. 387). 2. Issues of risk are explicitly discussed in the literature on Internet dating (Henderson & Gilding, 2004; Lawson & Leck, 2006) and commerce (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2003; Hsieh & Walkling, 2006).

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3. The Internet, of course, is not a panacea. Not all citizens have equal access to computers or the Internet, which means that such activism still largely represents the relatively well-to-do in the United States. 4. There is a great deal of contention among scholars regarding the mobilizing and transformative power of the Internet. For opposing perspectives on this issue, see Tarrow (1998) and Nisbet and Scheufele (2004). 5. The complete segment of “Hannity’s America,” which addresses the role of the Internet in progressive politics, aired on April 29, 2007, and is available via You Tube at http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=ROBDpaxYxT0. 6. It is important to remember that membership in online groups is different from other kinds of social movement organizations. Members are not required to pay dues or attend meetings, group activities, or events (online or off). In short, like professional social movement organizations, membership may be on paper alone and individuals may have little if any contact with leaders or other members. Unlike professional social movement organizations, MoveOn does not require a membership fee but often requests small donations for advertising campaigns, candidates, and bumper stickers. 7. The racial and ethnic demographics are not completely representative of the Tallahassee area in which 60.42% of the population is White, 34.24% is African American, 4.19% is Hispanic, and 2.4% is Asian. In short, we would need more African American and Hispanic respondents in order to be representative of the broader community. Although it was our intent to make a special effort to recruit ethnic and racial minorities at MoveOn events, there was little visible diversity at the events we attended. This may be a reality of the group, a function of the events we attended, or a result of how MoveOn assigns individuals to particular “house parties” based on participant locations.

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Deana A. Rohlinger is assistant professor of Sociology at Florida State University. She works on mass media, social movements and the abortion issue and is author of recently published pieces in Social Problems, Sociological Theory, The Sociological Quarterly, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change as well as several book chapters. Her current research projects include an examination of media outcomes in the abortion debate, an investigation of the role of the Internet in social movement strategy and an analysis of how contemporary senior organizations affect cultural change.

Jordan Brown is a doctoral candidate in Sociology at Florida State University. His research interests include social movements, sociology of emotions, and historical/comparative sociology. His dissertation focuses on the emotional resonance of elite framing of foreign policy initiatives, and the how the use of emotions in frames affects media coverage and public opinion.

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