Combating Islamic Radicalization that Leads to Violent Extremism in and Kosovo

Marios Kefalas S2020181 Master thesis September 2017 Intake

Leiden University Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

1 Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 3 ABSTRACT 3 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 4 CHAPTER 1.1: ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION, VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE 4 CHAPTER 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION/ SUB QUESTIONS 5 CHAPTER 1.3 ACADEMIC RELEVANCE 5 CHAPTER 1.4 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE 6 CHAPTER 2: BODY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 7 CHAPTER 2.1 BACKGROUND 7 2.1.1 ALBANIA 8 2.1.2 KOSOVO 9 2.1.3 IDEOLOGIES: SALAFISM, WAHHABISM, AND TAKFIRISM IN THE BALKANS 10 CHAPTER 2.2 EXISTING LITERATURE 12 CHAPTER 2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE REALIST REVIEW 15 CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 19 CHAPTER 3.1: RESEARCH DESIGN 19 CHAPTER 3.2 METHODOLOGY 21 CHAPTER 3.2.1 DATA 22 CHAPTER 3.3 FEASIBILITY/ LIMITATIONS 23 CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS 25 CHAPTER 4.1: ALBANIA 26 CHAPTER 4.1.1: RESILIENCE 26 CHAPTER 4.1.2: EXIT PROGRAMS 28 CHAPTER 4.1.3: FAMILY & NETWORK SUPPORT 29 CHAPTER 4.1.4: COUNTER-COMMUNICATION 29 CHAPTER 4.2: KOSOVO 30 CHAPTER 4.2.1: RESILIENCE 32 CHAPTER 4.2.2: EXIT PROGRAMS 33 CHAPTER 4.2.3: FAMILY & NETWORK SUPPORT 34 CHAPTER 4.2.4: COUNTER-COMMUNICATION 34 CHAPTER 4.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIES 36 CHAPTER 4.3.1 ALBANIA 37 CHAPTER 4.3.2 KOSOVO 40 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 44 CHAPTER 5.1: FURTHER RESEARCH 47 REFERENCES 48

2 Acknowledgements I would like to begin by expressing my deepest gratitude to all those people who have made this last year possible, and who have supported me in many ways throughout this process. Firstly, my parents, Eugenia and Modestos for supporting me financially, emotionally, and with unconditional love. I would also like to thank my sister Kalliopi for supporting me, as well as my friends and family in the (Kellie, Mike, Emily, Ada), in (Eleni, Kelly, Vasilis), and in The Netherlands (Alex, Sophia, Marios). I would also like to thank Professor Yasemin Irepoglu Carreras from the University of California Riverside for being a mentor to me and helping me during the application process for the Master’s Program at Leiden. I am very grateful to study at the University of Leiden and to be surrounded by a very helpful and experienced staff. This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance, commentary, and support of my supervisor, Professor Liesbeth van der Heide, as well as the helpful feedback from my second reader, Professor Myriam Benraad. To all these people, thank you for everything.

Abstract In this thesis, I examine the phenomenon of Islamic radicalization and extremism, and its impact on the Balkan countries of Albania and Kosovo. Through understanding the nature of the rise and spread of Islamic extremist ideologies in the 1990s, I evaluate what measures both countries have taken to counter the causes of this phenomenon by combating radicalization that can lead to violent extremism. This focus on counter-radicalization by both countries is a change from traditional counter-terrorist strategies that use repressive measures, such as incarceration of extremists, towards soft measures aimed at strengthening society to prevent radicalization. This thesis evaluates the 2015 counter-radicalization strategies or Albania and Kosovo to determine their respective objectives and what intended programs both strategies aim to create. It also evaluates the implementation process up to the year 2017 to determine whether the strategies have been implemented so far successfully, if the objectives have changed, or if Albania or Kosovo have strayed from their counter-radicalization strategies.

3 Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 1.1: Islamic Radicalization, Violent Extremism and the Balkans In recent years, one of the greatest threats to global security was the rise of Islamic extremist ideology indoctrinating young people across the world to take up the call for Jihad (Walraven, 2017). While the threat of Islamic terrorism plagued many countries within the last couple of decades, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) created a new form of extremism which fought for the creation of an Islamic state across the Muslim world (Byman, 2015). Since its first territorial gains, thousands of people from across Europe and the rest of the world traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight for this cause, living openly in a society which was built upon these violent and extreme ideologies (Byman, 2015). To get to Syria and/or Iraq, many of these foreign citizens became members of international terrorist organizations and once in the Islamic State, received training to eventually conduct acts of terrorism in their home countries (Walraven, 2017). While many died on the battlefield, thousands returned to their countries of origin and continued to actively be a part of the networks of terrorists and extremists (Walraven, 2017). Many of these returnees did not disengage and partook in terrorist attacks, while others focused on recruiting young people to join ISIS and assist them to travel to Iraq or Syria (Byman & Shapiro, 2014, pg. 2). The influence of extremist ideologies, which existed for over a decade in the Balkans, was exposed by the rise of ISIS in 2014, which prompted governments to re-examine their counter- terrorist, counter-radicalization, and counter-violent extremist (CVE) strategies to combat this new threat. Countries in the Balkan Peninsula, such as Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo, were similarly plagued by this phenomenon, where religious and ideological belligerency suddenly became an issue in a region where religious communities coexisted peacefully following years of ethnic conflict (Shtuni, 2016, pg. 1). While the overall number of Islamist terrorist attacks in the Balkans was less than that of , Balkan countries fell victim to many deadly attacks and became vital for Islamic terrorist network activities (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016, pg. 30). Recruitment of individuals into terrorist organizations, establishment of terrorist cells, and proliferation of drug and weapons smuggling have all flourished since the late 1990’s due to a lack of strong central governments in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Kagioglidis, 2009, pg. 21). Since the rise of ISIS, Kosovo had the highest number of foreign fighters per capita in Europe (Gall, 2016), and radicalized

4 individuals garnered more attention in media, schools, and mosques, causing fear in this unstable, new country (Gall, 2016). Other Muslim majority countries in the region, such as Bosnia & Herzegovina and Albania had similar problems with high numbers of foreign fighters, prominent extremist organizations, and influential extremist individuals (The Soufan Group, 2015). Similar to their European counterparts, this threat urged Balkan governments to strengthen existing counter measures and create new policy, strategies, and programs to counter new threats of violent radicalization (Gall, 2016). The strengthening and implementation of such strategies, policies, and programs, however, proved difficult for these governments, since the ideologies had been deeply embedded in small pockets of the population through Islamist organizations established in the 1990s (Counter Extremism Project, 2018). While many researchers have recently taken an interest in studying Islamic terrorism and radicalization in the Balkans, the region remains deeply understudied with the majority of research neglecting to focus on strategy formation of state governments. Most research conducted focuses on the phenomenon of Islamic violent extremism, while giving limited insight into the actions of governments. This thesis evaluates the strategies taken and measures enacted to counter the sources of violent radicalization in Albania and Kosovo. The research examines the strategies to combat radicalization leading to violent extremism of two Albanian and Muslim-majority countries in the Balkan Peninsula by evaluating independently the measures against this threat and the progress of their implementation in the years following. Chapter 1.2 Research Question/ Sub Questions

To what extent have Kosovo and Albania been able to properly implement their respective counter- radicalization strategies?

(1) How can we use the Realist Review (Gielen, 2017) to determine the objective(s) of each respective strategy? (2) Has the implementation process been successful in terms of reaching objectives, or has implementation veered from the initial goals?

Chapter 1.3 Academic Relevance The academic relevance of this thesis is to further examine a global phenomenon which has, since the rise of ISIS in 2014, been a large focus for the political and security fields in academia. While

5 the subjects of terrorism, Islamic extremism, and foreign fighters have been thoroughly evaluated by scholars, the subject of Balkan states dealing with radical returnees after the demise of the ISIS lack exhaustive evaluation in current academic literature. Within the Balkans, the rise and influence of extremist ideologies, coupled with the factors causing people turn to these ideologies, remain the greatest focus of scholars who have studied the area (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016; Janková, 2014). Thus, by taking a strategy centered approach of evaluation, this thesis gives a thorough and comprehensive view of the initiatives and programs used to combat radicalization leading to violent extremism in the Balkan region. Chapter 1.4 Societal Relevance Across the world, thousands of people have fallen victim to being indoctrinated by Islamic extremist ideologies that condemn tolerance and peace between faiths and encourage violence as an obligation (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016). As a result of this rise, European societies has fallen victim to many terrorist attacks, which threaten European security and regional stability (Antenore, 2016). The Balkan Peninsula lies in the heart of Europe, with European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states surrounding this region with diverse ethnic and religious populations. It is an area that has seen many deadly wars and genocide in the past, but has made much progress towards cooperation and peace in the last two decades (Tziampiris, 2009). Despite this progress, relations between religious and ethnic communities remain extremely delicate (Venetis, 2015). This fragility of relations between states and communities allows for Islamic extremist ideologies to take root by spreading propaganda to attract battle hardened individuals who were dissatisfied by the peace resolutions and current status of their states (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016). This rise of violent ideologies, the exodus of many individuals to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and the return of many of these foreign fighters, increases the risk for this volatile region of returning to chaos and conflict. Understanding the objectives of the counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo, as well as the changes of the goals during the implementation process can assist in future learning on how strategic aims can change when combating radicalization.

6 Chapter 2: Body of Knowledge and Theoretical Framework Chapter two provides insight into the background of Islamic extremism in both Albania and Kosovo. It begins by outlining the rise of the ideologies in the Balkans, which was introduced first in Bosnia & Herzegovina during and after the in the 1990s. It then describes the establishment of Wahhabi and Salafi charities, initially in Albania and then Kosovo, as well as emphasizing the magnitude of the influence these charities and radical individuals had on Albanian communities in the Balkans. It then describes what exactly these ideologies propagated across the Balkans, making them appealing to specific communities in both Albania and Kosovo. Next, the chapter examines existing literature on the counter measures and tactics put in place by both Albania and Kosovo to counter the influence of these ideologies in the early 2000s. Chapter two then continues by explaining the realist review, describing what it is and how various scholars have now applied it to the field of CVE. Following this description, an explanation on how the realist review will be applied to the context of counter-radicalization in Albania and Kosovo is provided. Chapter 2.1 Background Islamic extremism in the Balkans is a relatively new phenomenon which gained its momentum in the 1990s, following the demise of Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflict that resulted from it (Gibas- Krzak, 2013, pg. 208). Mujahedeen from Afghanistan initially flocked to Bosnia & Herzegovina after rising ethnic tensions between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians in the republic resulted in the outbreak of the Bosnian War (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 209). Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, Hamas, and Hezbollah set up operations throughout the country, infiltrating Bosnian military ranks (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 209). As a result of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 and the cessation of the conflict, many from these groups stayed in the Balkans and created various terrorist networks in all other states with significant Muslim populations such as Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, and FYR Macedonia (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 210). These groups were able to garner attention from marginalized Muslim populations in the Balkans, with being targeted for recruitment as well, due to rising tensions in Albania and Kosovo (Öktem, 2011, pg. 159). Albanians in the Balkans make up the largest percentage of the population of Muslims in the region, accounting for fifty-two percent of the community (Öktem, 2011, pg. 159; Zaimi, 2016, pg. 81). The distribution of Albanians is rather spread out with majority populations in Albania and present-day Kosovo, while significant Albanian minority-majority

7 regions exists in Montenegro, Serbia, and FYR Macedonia (Öktem, 2011, pg. 160). Both Albania and Kosovo were plunged into conflict following the collapse of communist regimes, which was used to the advantage of Islamic extremist organizations in creating a stronghold in the Balkans (Zaimi, 2016, pg. 80). 2.1.1 Albania In 1967, Albania was declared as the world’s first atheist state under the regime of , which resulted in years of harsh measures suppressing the Muslim community in the country until the collapse of the communist government in 1992 (Öktem, 2011, pg. 161). Despite the downfall of the old regime and new relations with the West, Albania remained a severely underdeveloped country with the central government in unable to provide services, education, and infrastructure to the rural areas (Richardson et al., 2017, pg. 89; Zaimi, 2016, pg. 84). The weak central government provided an opportunity for Wahhabi and Salafi Islamist organizations to gain influence in the country by funding the construction of over one hundred and forty mosques and schools primarily in the rural north of the country, filling the role of providers for the local communities (Deliso, 2007, pg. 47). Due to the lack of imams in Albania, conservative imams were brought over from Saudi Arabia and any Albanian individuals wanting to study theology were given grants to study in Saudi Arabia at Wahhabi or Salafi institutions (Richardson et al., 2017, pg. 89; Perry, 2016, pg. 22). This was done to ensure the spread of the ideology for future generations, making Salafi and Wahhabi ideology a part of Albanian Muslim identity (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 16). Mujahedeen from across the Middle East and North Africa came to Albania and were granted citizenship and refuge in these rural areas acting as charity workers for the organizations, thus characterizing Albania as an Islamist safe haven (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 15). This turn back to Islamic roots was welcomed by the government of President , an anti-communist conservative, who saw this establishment of Islamic charities as an opportunity to reinvigorate the economy (Deliso, 2007, pg. 31; Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2). In 1994 the Arab-Albanian Islamic Bank was created to fund many projects across the country, its majority stockholder, however, was Osama bin Laden, who used the Islamic Bank as a way to fund terrorist cells in the country (Deliso, 2007, pg. 31). This however, was ignored by Berisha, and later in 1994, Osama Bin Laden visited Albania after, what scholars argue, an invitation from Berisha was sent to him (Deliso, 2007, pg. 31). Albania, under Berisha, further continued its move towards the Middle East, with the abolishment of Visa’s for citizens of Arabian countries and the joining of the

8 Organizations for Islamic Conferences (OIC) (Deliso, 2007, pg. 30). This move of trying to tie and reconstruction with Islamic rebirth by Berisha was brought to an end, after a erupted in 1997 following mass corruption exposure and Ponzi schemes by government officials (Deliso, 2007, pg. 38). The overthrowing of Berisha was used as an opportunity by the United States, the Albanian-American Lobby, and other western states to establish a new, pro-Euro Atlantic government to eliminate terrorist cells in the country (Deliso, 2007, pg. 39). US government aid to Albania increased dramatically and eventually the new government in power began expelling all known Islamists (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 16). Despite the expelling of known foreign Islamists, many Mujahedeen during the civil war were able to raid military barracks and take weapons and blank passports and flee to neighboring Kosovo and FYR Macedonia (Deliso, 2007, pg. 37). While most of the know foreign Islamists fled after the Islamic organizations were shut down, Albanian radicalized individuals remained and kept open communication with the networks outside Albania allowing for the Salafi and Wahhabi ideology to spread and the Islamist movements to continue (Deliso, 2007, pg. 45). A year after the , Albanian Islamists were present alongside Iranian, Chechen, Bosnian, and Arab foreign fighters in the skirmishes between the (KLA) and the military of Yugoslavia (Deliso, 2007, pg. 45; Shtuni, 2015). 2.1.2 Kosovo The rise of radical Islamist ideologies, such as Wahhabism and Salafism, occurred differently than it did in neighboring Albania. While Islamist organizations entered Kosovo following the Bosnian War, their influence did not start to rise until after the Albanian civil war (Deliso, 2007, pg. 41). Mujahedeen and newly radicalized Albanian individuals joined the ranks of the KLA, providing weapons stolen from Albania during the civil war to attempt to gain influence within the KLA (Deliso, 2007, pg. 41). This rise of Islamic extremism in Kosovo took a militant tactic as opposed to Albania’s initial ‘charity/humanitarian’ one (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 212). Mujahedeen and other Islamist leaders attempted to tie Islamism to Albanian nationalism, relying on the rising tensions between Kosovo Albanians and the Yugoslav army to increase the appeal of their movement (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 212). This tactic aimed to frame the conflict in Kosovo as one over religion instead of ethnicity, with the worldwide Muslim community traveling to Kosovo to help protect the small Muslim enclave from ‘atheist’ or Christian Yugoslav forces (Venetis, 2015).

9 Following the NATO bombings and the cessation of the in 1999, faith based charities from across the Middle East set up shop across Kosovo (Shtuni, 2016, pg. 7). One of the largest charities, the Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC), funded the construction of ninety-eight schools, as well as Mosque reconstruction (Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2). Other organizations such as the Islamic Endowment Foundation built thirty Koranic religious schools and over one hundred mosques, while charities such as the World Assembly for Muslim Youth gave out grants for Kosovo Albanians to attend Salafist Theological Universities in Saudi Arabia (Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2). Many of these charities, such as the SJRC, had ties to Islamic terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda (Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2), which sought to create local terrorist cells in Kosovo, as well as establish an Albanian Salafi and Wahhabi movement through the educating of Kosovo Albanians in the Theological Universities in Saudi Arabia (Centre for Research, Documentation, and Publication, 2016, pg. 2). This new rise of radical terrorist groups put pressure on Western states who, after the war with Yugoslavia, had taken up the duty of rebuilding and governing Kosovo through the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 18). The United States, the EU, and NATO began large scale initiatives towards combating the terrorist cells and Islamist organizations within Kosovo, bolstering Kosovo Force (KFOR) police presence and special operations in the country (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 18). By 2006, the United States increased aid to the UNMIK to $72 million to combat rising Islamism and terrorism, in addition to sending more support to KFOR (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 18). Despite these efforts to combat Islamist influence in Kosovo, less than ten years later in 2014 Kosovo has the highest jihadist recruitment rate per one-hundred thousand people, at sixteen, which was eight times that of and sixty percent more than that of Libya (Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2). The high number of ethnic Albanians in the Balkans who have joined ISIS has alarmed the governments of Kosovo and Albania, prompting both states to re-examine existing counter-terrorism legislation, as well as put an emphasis on new counter- radicalization measures to combat the sources of violent extremism in each country. 2.1.3 Ideologies: Salafism, Wahhabism, and Takfirism in the Balkans Following the demise of Communist regimes in Yugoslavia and Albania, as well as the outbreak of the Albanian Civil War in 1997 and then the Kosovo War from 1998-1999, Islamic extremist ideologies entered and spread roots within each country (Gibas-Krzak, 2013). Mujahedeen from across the Muslim world flocked to the Balkans to fight alongside their suppressed Muslim

10 brothers and Islamic ‘charities’ funded reconstruction and educational grants for individuals wanting to study Islamic theology (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016; Kagioglidis, 2009). The extent of the influence exerted by the Islamist ‘charities’ in the 1990s became evident in both countries with the rise ISIS and the creation of an Islamic State in the Middle East. The high numbers of ethnic Albanians traveling to Syria and Iraq as foreign fighters, becoming entangled in international terrorist networks, and returning to further spread the ideologies or carry out attacks in the Balkans or abroad, showed this phenomenon was heavily underestimated by authorities. Islamic extremist ideologies encourage those who adhere to the ideology to actively partake in various activities deemed necessary to live fully within the guidelines of the ideology. The activities often include giving one’s life to become a martyr through terrorist attacks and another is fighting abroad with other pious individuals in a conflict as foreign fighter (Malet, 2013). A foreign fighter, in this case, refers to a person who has left their country of origin to partake in Jihad in Syria and Iraq, along the side of ISIS (Knudsen, 2017). Similarities between the local population and the fighter are few, often sharing one or two characteristics, which in this case is ideology and religion (Malet, 2013). For these individuals, to partake in Jihad is to become part of something greater, to respond to what they often see as criminal actions against the Muslim community, even if the conflict is not exactly about religion (Malet, 2013). Most Jihadists and radicalized individuals follow the Islamic teachings of Jihadi Salafism and Wahhabism, which are extremely conservative forms of Sunni Islam (Janková, 2014). Both of these ideologies campaign for all Muslims following these doctrines to fight opponents of Islam but at the same time aim to purify the Islamic community (Janková, 2014). Salafism and Wahhabism used to have a great appeal to some in the war-torn Balkans during the 1990s, due to visiting Jihadists’ success in portraying ‘atheist’ dictatorships as trying to destroy Islam in the region (Venetis, 2015). The sub-sect of Salafi-Takfiri1, flourished among these groups in the Balkans where war and poverty made many turn to terrorist groups to ‘liberate’ their countries (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016). It called upon true believers to condemn and take action against fellow apostate Muslims for abandoning Islam (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016). This was an invasion of an unusual

1 According to Shahriyar Rahimi and Abdul Amir Jorfi (2016): The Salafi-Takfiri sub-sect of Salafism was an extremist offshoot of the highly conservative Salafi movement. It refuses to consider itself fully a part of the Muslim community, claiming all other Muslims not adhering to the ideology to be an act of Takfir (apostasy). Despite this, members often partake in international conflict across the Muslim world to spread the ideology and ‘purify’ the Muslim communities. Salafi-Takfiri ideology, unlike Salafism and Wahhabism, allows for the killing of innocent people, rejects the rules of Jihad, and promotes suicide as an act to kill one’s enemies.

11 form of Islam which sought to control aspects of life for Muslims in the Balkans (Qirezi 2017). As mentioned in Chapter One, following the aftermath of the , religious institutions and charities from the Arabian Peninsula funded the reconstruction of mosques (Racimora, 2013) and the establishment of Salafi and Wahhabi schools (Beslin & Igrijatijevic, 2017). Some foreign fighters from the Middle East during the Yugoslav wars also remained in the Balkans to help create a foothold for jihadism (Byman & Shapiro, 2014), which, as some claim, has failed due to the Euro-Atlantic favoring of states (Tziampiris, 2009). Muslim majority countries in the Balkans like Kosovo and Albania remain committed to this move towards the west, with Albania becoming a member of NATO in 2009 and both Kosovo and Albania pursuing membership of the European Union (US Department of State Country Reports, 2016). Both countries have strived to build a diverse society, due to many Albanians and minorities in each country adhering to Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, something that radical Islamists reject as they attempt to make these Islamic extremist ideologies part of Albanian nationalism (Öktem, 2011, pg. 166). Overall the academic sources on Salafi-Jihadi and Wahhabi ideology in the Balkans remain limited as well, with Albania and Kosovo being the least examined cases. Attention on this issue remains concentrated in Bosnia & Herzegovina due to the prominence of Mujahedeen individuals and Wahhabi and Salafi organizations during the Bosnian War from 1992-1995 (Tziampiris, 2009). While the number of Mujahedeen involved in conflicts in Albania or Kosovo dwarfed that of Bosnia & Herzegovina (Tziampiris, 2009), their influence remains just as dangerous for these countries and the region (Venetis, 2015). Chapter 2.2 Existing Literature Following years of combating terrorist cells throughout the region, today, the Balkans remain a great source of jihadist activities and are a major transit center for foreign fighters traveling to and from conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq (Soufan Group, 2015). While many foreign fighters from the Balkans have died in Syria and Iraq (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017), veterans that have returned are feared and pursued by authorities for their newly learned skills (Walraven, 2017). Many have the potential to carry out attacks in Europe or their home countries, or have the ability to promote Jihad to others by acting as recruiters in Mosques, through communities, or in online chatrooms (Byman, 2015). Albanian individuals from both Kosovo and Albania have been involved in terrorist attacks outside the Balkans, including an attack at Frankfurt Airport in 2011 and another previous attempted attack in the United States in 2007 (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 217).

12 These attacks resulted in the strengthening on counter-terrorist measures in both Albania and Kosovo but despite these new policies, these efforts could not dissuade individuals from joining radical Islamic groups or terrorist organizations (Zaimi, 2016, pg. 90). When the Islamic State made significant territorial advances in Syria and Iraq between 2014-2016, a high number of radicalized Albanians from both Kosovo and Albania flocked to join ISIS (Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2). As a result, the governments of Kosovo and Albania re-examined their approaches to combating radicalization in their own specific ways. In 2014, Kosovo reevaluated its existing penal code to categorize people traveling to Syria and Iraq as threat to security and constitutional order, leading to immediate arrests of some forty people who attempted to travel (Center for Research, Documentation, and Publication, 2016). In 2015, the government reinforced once again this strong reactive stance against violent extremism through the passing of the law that prohibited Kosovo citizens from joining armed conflicts outside the country (Center for Research, Documentation, and Publication, 2016). This stance however, created fear among those who left and wanted to return home, due to long prison sentences of some ten years being given to anyone who returned (Speckhard, et al., 2018, pg. 3). The measures, as a result, were adjusted by the government of Kosovo to improve proactive soft measures to deal with the issue of radicalization, and include civil society stakeholders (Shajkovci, 2015, pg. 2). Towards the end of 2015, the Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo drafted the “Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism, 2015-2020.” This strategy was created to be a comprehensive response to radicalization in Kosovo by addressing the many push and pull factors that influence people to turn towards Islamist ideologies (Office of the Prime Minister, 2015, pg. 5). In the strategy, the government of Kosovo first defined what it considers violent extremism and radicalism to clarify what the strategy aims to combat and reduce. Violent extremism is defined as “extremism which involves the use of violence; including but not limited to terrorism” (Id., pg. 8). It then defined radicalism as, “the process of approving extremist religious beliefs and in some cases converting into a violent extremist” (Id., pg. 8). Following the definitions, the strategy then justified its focus on radicalization, since radicalization can lead to violent extremism and eventually terrorism (Id.). The measures in this strategy diverged from the tradition repressive techniques of the counter-terrorist policy, and included soft measures, investments in local communities as well as inclusion of non-governmental actors. The strategy charged the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) with many responsibilities to combat

13 radicalization including giving lectures at mosques and community centers, as well as creating a counter-narrative for those who are at risk of joining (Shajkovci, 2015, pg. 2). Other measures included social media account takedown policies on Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook, as well as Google redirecting specific keywords to counter-narrative pages (Speckhard, et. al., 2018, pg. 6). Albania, similarly to Kosovo, initially reformed existing counter-terrorism policies to include banning travel to Syria and Iraq and reforming the Penal Code, leading to the arrests of returnees (Hide, 2015, pg. 43). Other measures included arresting any individuals linked to the ‘charities’ established in the 1990s, as well as the closure of all the illegal mosques built throughout the country (Richardson, et al., 2017, pg. 100). These measures however did not address the grievances of the Albanian Muslim community, who ever since the rise of the communist regime in the 1940s, felt the government in Tirana was unable to represent them, and could therefore not trust it even in a post-communist era (Hide, 2015, pg. 1; Perry, 2016, pg. 22). Since then there have been many calls by civil society and international organizations for the Albanian government to take a more proactive role in combating Islamic radicalization by addressing the push and pull factors associated with it (Hide, 2015, pg. 11). To address the issue of the hundreds of Albanian students being educated in Salafi and Wahhabi institutions abroad, the government of Albania found it imperative to open an Albanian Islamic Theological University in the country, as a means to control the curriculum and narrative to prevent radicalization (Kagioglidis, 2009, pg. 26). The government has also made much use of the Albanian Islamic Committee to monitor imams and individuals in the community, while also providing psychological assistance and counter-narrative for individuals at risk of radicalization (Richardson, et al., 2017, pg. 101). However, despite the progress being made in a short amount of years, the Albanian government still needed to focus on more preventative measures for all the different stages of radicalization as well as for those who have returned to disengage and possibly de-radicalize (Hide, 2015, pg. 11). In 2015, Albania, like Kosovo, drafted the “Albanian National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism,” with the objective of combating radicalization early on, before turning into violent extremism (Council of Ministers, 2015). In the strategy, the government defined specific terms to clarify what the strategy aims to prevent or counter. The strategy defined radicalization to violence as, “a decision to forgo political processes or nonviolent methods of fostering change in favor of adopting violent methods to bring about change” (Id., pg. 4). This was done to clarify

14 that the strategy aims to identify and counter radicalization to prevent it from turning into violent extremism. It later defined counter-radicalization as, “a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programs specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from resorting to terrorism” (Id., pg. 5). This would be done by focusing on resilience, which it also defined as “factors, ideas, institutions, issues, trends, or values that enable individuals and communities to resist or prevent violence” (Id., pg. 5). Through these measures, the objective of the strategy is to prevent and reduce the number of radicalized individuals by using new “soft” methods not used in Albania’s current counter-terrorism strategy. Within the limited scope of academic sources that have explored the phenomenon in question, scholars have yet to fully evaluate in detail the strategies and counter measures of the Albanian and Kosovar governments towards these extremist ideologies. For example, most academic work focuses on the emergence and diffusion of the ideologies in the Balkans (Venetis, 2015; Racimora, 2013; Beslin & Igrijatijevic, 2017; Shtuni, 2015; Byman & Shapiro, 2014), while others have given significance to the specific teachings of Wahhabism and Salafism in the region (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016; Qirezi, 2017; Janková, 2014), or have taken a general approach on the appeal of these ideologies and Jihad (Malet, 2013). Very few scholars discuss the strategies, their objectives, and implementation process of Albania and Kosovo with non-governmental organization (NGO) and think-tank reports providing most insight into this gap of knowledge. Sources that do provide insight concerning the CVE initiatives of the two states are often limited in detail due to no clear and full descriptions of how the programs are being enacted being provided to scholars by the relevant stakeholders (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015, pg. 4). Thus, the spread of these ideologies and causes of the foreign fighter phenomenon remain in focus, while academic sources fail to fully evaluate government action and to take a policy/strategy centered approach to analyze the relevant measures. Chapter 2.3 Theoretical Framework: The Realist Review To evaluate the CVE policies of Albania and Kosovo, I will be using the theoretical perception of the Realist School of Thought in International Affairs, which is contextualized to combating violent extremism. The realist approach puts emphasis on the importance of context in CVE strategy, claiming that one initiative is not applicable to all cases, and the same exact measures in different situations can have different functions, application, and even results (Velduis, 2012, pg. 4). The success of the objective of each CVE measure is dependent of how well the strategy or

15 programs are tailored to the context (Veldhuis, 2012, pg. 3). Despite this, the realist review is not specifically concerned with if a method works, but rather why it works in each respective case by looking at how it is enacted (Veldhuis, 2012, pg. 2) The theory looks into the specific mechanisms used in strategy application, specifically in the areas of dis-engagement or de-radicalization (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015, pg. 16). The functions of the different methods of intervention in each respective case are individually evaluated in detail (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015, pg. 16). It looks to organize the complexity of the social programs created by strategy and simplify the mechanisms of the programs in the specific context (Veldhuis, 2012, pg. 4). However, one of the greatest gaps of the realist review is that there is no existing systematic outline of techniques used to evaluate counter-radicalization strategy and programs (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015, pg. 4). This lack of a systematic overview of analysis made the evaluation of the programs and strategy difficult. Thankfully in the years following Gielen (2017), provided a method of evaluation to apply the realist review to CVE initiatives and programs. The goal of the realist review is to create a theory to evaluate the functions of policies, initiatives, and programs to understand how they function in respective contexts. It can be used to assist in policy or strategy recommendation, and differs from the traditional question of “what works” in CVE initiatives, to the new question of “what works, for whom, in which context, and how?” (Gielen, 2017, pg. 2; Veldhuis, 2012, pg. 4). Gielen states, “the realist review is specifically meant for those interventions and programs where evaluation is lacking, which is the case for CVE” (Gielen, 2017, pg. 4). While CVE policy is a very broad field, it can be divided into two areas of focus; policy (or strategies in this case) concerned with counter-terrorism or focused on counter-radicalization (Id., pg. 1). This is done to conduct a more specific and thorough evaluation on the respective measures of each subfield. Gielen states that there are no solid methodological rules for the realist review, but more than often, the methods of the Cochrane Reviews, which are used in the medical field, are applicable (Id., pg. 4). The Cochrane Review follows a six-step method: Describing the scope of the review, searching for past studies, judging the data, isolating the data, synthesizing the data, and disseminating the results (Id., pg. 4). Gielen describes in detail the how each step can be conducted, putting emphasis on steps one, three, and four, which I will discuss in my methodology chapter within the context of the case studies of CVE strategies of Albania and Kosovo. In regard to counter-radicalization, Gielen claims most prior reviews found that the CVE policies/initiatives of

16 countries focus primarily on four categories: community resilience, exit programs, family and network support, as well as counter-communication (Id., pg. 10). These programs can then be organized into three levels of initiatives, primary, secondary, and tertiary (Id., pg. 9). Primary CVE initiatives focus on radicalization prevention, safeguarding of communication, CVE program awareness, and assistance with psycho-sociological problems (Id., pg. 9). Secondary CVE initiatives draw attention towards the first noticeable signs of radicalization in individuals, calling for intervention and family involvement, usually combining legal and soft measures such as therapy (Id., pg. 9). Unlike the first two initiatives, the tertiary level of initiatives concentrates on working with extremist individuals on de-radicalization, and focuses on rehabilitation and disengagement for those who have taken part in an armed conflict abroad, usually including involvement of the justice and policing system (Id., pg. 9). (See Figure 1).

Figure 1: (Gielen, 2017, pg. 9) Through the use of the realist review, one can be able to comprehensively evaluate complex CVE programs and strategies to better understand the objectives of a state’s counter-radicalization strategy. The methods provided by Gielen aim to emphasize the relevant mechanisms, context, and sometimes outcomes of existing CVE policies to fully understand and answer the question of “what works, for whom, in which context, and how?” (Gielen, 2017, pg. 14). I will use this theoretical framework to evaluate the CVE strategies of Albania and Kosovo in regard to counter- radicalization leading to violent extremism. Through these methods of reviewing the policies and

17 their implementation, I aim to evaluate the strategies original area(s) of focus as well as their objectives and their implementation to determine if the objectives have changed from the creation of the strategies. In chapter two, the history of extremist ideologies in the Balkans was outlined to give emphasis on how Wahhabi and Salafi ideologies garnered influence in many and Kosovo. Through the establishment of charities and NGOs in the aftermath of the Albanian Civil War (1997) and the Kosovo War (1998-1999), terrorist organizations turned these two countries into safe havens for terrorists and radicals. After pressure from the United States and European countries, both Albania and Kosovo began long counter-terrorist campaigns against these organizations by expelling individuals and arresting others. Despite this, the ideologies had an appeal to some extremely loyal groups, due to the ideologies addressing grievances and organizations providing more to communities than the central governments. To counter the influence of these ideologies and the radicalization of individuals, in 2015 both Albania and Kosovo drafted counter-radicalization strategies. By applying the theoretical framework of realism through the realist review, the objectives of both respective strategies are analyzed to understand if Albania and Kosovo’s strategies focus more on creating programs to bolster resilience, family and network support, exit-programs, or counter-communication. This categorization is done to create a thorough evaluation which will determine if both countries have implemented the strategies to reach their intended objectives, or if their respective objectives have changed during implementation.

18 Chapter 3 Research Design & Methodology Chapter three describes the research design of the thesis aimed at evaluating the objectives of the counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo, as well as their implementation. It explains how the theoretical framework, described in chapter two, will be applied to the two specific contexts, as well as what methods of research will be conducted. The chapter goes into specific details of methodology used, data collected, and addresses any limitations to this thesis. Chapter 3.1: Research Design Islamic extremism in Albania and Kosovo is a very complex problem, which thrives among small but loyal groups of people located in mainly rural, underdeveloped communities, affected by the wars in the 1990s (Beslin & Igrijatijevic, 2017). Many of these radicalized individuals from both countries have been involved in terrorist attacks abroad and within the Balkans, and have also joined international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. This alarming rise of individuals leaving for Syria and Iraq has forced the governments of both countries to reevaluate their strategies in countering Islamic radicalization and terrorism (Venetis, 2015). Both states have placed a new emphasis on counter radicalization to address the causes of radicalization leading to violent extremism. This emphasis and reevaluation of existing measures follows years of harsh counter-terrorist policies which were unsuccessful in disengaging and de-radicalizing individuals, making it difficult for those wanting to disengage to return from abroad and seek assistance (Hide, 2015; Shtuni, 2015). The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the implementation of the counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo created in 2015. The realist review, presented by Gielen (2017), aims to organize and analyze the strategies to better understand what the areas of focus are, as well as the objectives of the proposed measures. The review will clarify the overall objective of the strategies of Albania and Kosovo, to determine if resilience, family and network support, exit programs, or counter-communication is the main area of focus. Next, reports from international organizations, NGO’s, and think-tanks will be used to evaluate the strategy implementation in the years following. The reports discuss the implementation progress of measures, while also critiquing lack of progress in an area, as well as critiquing moves by each respective government that stray from the strategy (i.e. strengthening of counter-terrorist measures, while neglecting the implementation of the 2015 strategies).

19 The use of qualitative analysis is appropriate due to the nature of the evaluation, which analyzes the original goals and focus of the strategies and then the application process up until 2017. The research conducted is based on document analysis of the national strategies and international organization, think-tank, and NGO reports on the implementation. A multiple holistic case study design is used to analyze the CVE strategies of both states which are then categorized into Gielen’s four categories; community resilience, exit programs, family and network support, and counter-communication. Each state is looked at individually and in depth, using the theoretical framework of the realist review to further explore both cases. Through the use of the realist review I aim to understand “what works, for whom, under what circumstances, and how?” (Gielen, 2017). As mentioned in chapter two, the six steps of the Cochrane Review are used to limit the extent of the CVE policy review of both states, to provide a more thorough evaluation of the strategies. Step one of the Cochrane Review aims to clarify the scope of the review of CVE strategy. According to Gielen, CVE initiatives can be divided into two focus areas, one concentrating on counter-radicalization and the other on counter-terrorism. Gielen states most CVE initiatives of countries focus on resilience, exit programs, family & network support, and counter-communication (Gielen, 2017, pg. 9), thus the strategies of both states will be categorized into these four areas to determine the main focus of the national plans. Counter- radicalization is chosen because it has been the new focus of both Albania and Kosovo in combating the grievances associated with Islamic radicalization. Similar to counter-terrorism, counter-radicalization can be both reactive and proactive in practice, but unlike counter-terrorism it includes more soft measures and delegates responsibility to the community and non-state actors to combat extremism. The phenomenon in question focuses around radicalized individuals who are active members of Islamist groups in Albania or Kosovo or are from these countries but have traveled abroad to join Islamist groups. Counter-terrorism policies were enacted by both governments in the early 2000s, and then again bolstered following the rise of ISIS (Zaimi, 2016). These measures however, did not address the grievances associated with Islamic radicalization, such as marginalized Muslim populations, underdevelopment and poverty in Jihadist ‘hot-spot’ municipalities, de-radicalization, and disengagement. Lastly, the steps of the counter- radicalization plans will be grouped into the three levels of CVE initiatives, the primary, secondary, and tertiary. This provides further insight into all relevant stakeholders in each initiative and what action is necessary by the stakeholders on each level.

20 Step two of the Cochrane Review focuses on looking for existing studies on the specific phenomenon in question. The results of the assessment of existing literature shown in chapter 2 indicate that the realist review has not been applied to analyze the CVE policies of Kosovo and Albania. Steps three and four are grouped together due to the fact that judging and extracting all data applicable to this study can be done together in order to assess its relevance and find any patterns that help answer the research question. The last two steps (five and six) of the Cochrane Review, namely synthesizing data and disseminating the findings, focus on combining and evaluating the results of each case and analyzing the patterns, or lack thereof, to best understand “what works, for whom, in what context, and how?” (Gielen, 2017, pg. 8).

The Cochrane Review Steps Description Step 1: Scope of the To determine the scope of the review, we look into relevant contexts, CVE Review mechanism, and patterns of outcomes which can be related to CVE. In this case, we look into counter-radicalization policies.

Step 2: Searching for To see if a similar review has been carried out, one must look for existing Primary CVE Studies reviews on CVE policies for the relevant case(s).

Step 3: Quality Assessment of the relevance of the CVE review, as well as an assessment of Appraisal the thoroughness in which it can answer the research question.

Step 4: Extracting and Looking for relevant contexts, mechanisms, and patterns in the outcomes of Synthesizing Data the CVE initiatives.

Step 5: Realist Evaluating the results of each respective case analysis, to answer “what Synthesis works, for whom, in what context, and how?”

Step 6: Realist Disseminate recommendations in the policy area. Recommendations Table 1. Steps of the Cochrane Review (Gielen, 2017) Chapter 3.2 Methodology As mentioned above, the research for this thesis will be conducted using a qualitative research design, specifically the multiple holistic case study design. Through this design, I aim to evaluate the objectives and implementation of the counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo, which are the units of analysis for research. The justification behind the selection of these two countries is the variety of common characteristics shared by both states and linked events

21 which saw the rise of Islamic violent extremism. Both Albania and Kosovo are neighboring, independent countries2, with a similar ethnic and religious make-up3, a common history, and similar experiences with Islamic violent extremism and radicalization. Albanians constitute a majority in Albania and Kosovo, as well as fifty-two percent of the total Muslim population in the Balkans (Öktem, 2011, 159). This phenomenon of Islamic radicalization has plagued Albanian majority areas the most, infiltrating ethnic conflicts in the 1990s and creating a jihadist breeding ground in Europe (Öktem, 2011, pg. 159). Chapter 3.2.1 Data The methods used to conduct the research for this thesis is within-case analysis of the CVE strategies of Albania and Kosovo to examine the objectives and implementation of counter radicalization measures in each state. Through document analysis of the national strategies, as well as think-tank, NGO, and international institution reports on the implementation from 2015 to 2017, I examine how each country pursues their respective CVE objectives, and if the implementation has veered from the original objectives. This is done to evaluate how specific initiatives are in practice in each particular case, and what has changed from the original focus of the national strategies. The document analysis was conducted using online scholarly databases such as SAGE Journals, JSTOR, Taylor & Francis Online Database, and Google Scholar, while the strategies were retrieved through the Government of Kosovo Official Website and the Government of Albania Official Website. Reports on the initiatives by think-tanks, NGOs, and international organizations were accessed through Google and the websites of the respective organizations. Key words searched in all the databases included (de)radicalization, counter-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, CVE, violent, extremism, measures, exit programs, counter- communication, resilience, family support, foreign fighter, terrorist, counter-terrorism, Islamism, Salafi, Wahhabi, Takfiri, Jihadi(st), policy, strategy, initiatives, Kosovo, Albania(n), and Balkans.

2 While Kosovo has not been fully recognized as an independent country by all members of the United Nations, the government in Pristina acts independently and separately from that in Belgrade. Laws are passed through an elected legislative body, policy is shaped through this body, and laws are enforced through a judicial and policing system (CIA World Factbook, 2018). 3 According to the CIA World Factbook, the 2011 censuses of Albania and Kosovo claim ethnic Albanians consist of 82.6% and 92.9%, respectively, of the total population, and the majority of citizens identify as Muslim in each country (CIA World Factbook, 2018).

22 The ‘snowballing method’ was also used to find any appropriate literature on this phenomenon or policy mentioned in the bibliography of reports or other scholarly sources. All information, such as population statistics, historical background information, or policy/program descriptions, found during the research phase was cross verified among various sources based on desktop research to increase the internal validity of the research, thus assuring the information mentioned is accurate. While I cannot read Albanian, the policies and reports from both Albania and Kosovo are made available in English on the respective websites. The units of analysis in each case are the CVE strategies concerned with countering radicalization, specifically in the four categories mentioned by Gielen: resilience, exit programs, family and network support, and counter-communication, as well as the reports on the application of the strategies. The units of observation are both the countries of Albania and Kosovo with the purpose of understanding how the implementation process has gone and if the areas of focus have shifted from the formation of the strategies in 2015. Chapter 3.3 Feasibility/ Limitations Overall the feasibility of the research for this thesis was attainable due to all necessary documents analyzed being available online in various databases. While I do not speak, read, or understand Albanian, both the governments of Kosovo and Albania have made their policies and program descriptions available online in English. Similarly, think-tank, NGO, and international governing bodies like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have their reports available online in English. Gielen’s theoretical framework can be used, due to the realist review being a very versatile systematic review of social programs using the principles of realism, which does not in itself have specific steps. The categorization and steps of the Cochrane Review to analyze the initiatives and measures have been contextualized through Gielen’s work to fit the field of CVE, which is then used to analyze counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo. The largest limitation of this research is the result of the methodological approach focused on document analysis; counter-radicalization initiatives, priorities, and application are examined through strategic plans, NGO, and international organization reports, which limit the scope of analysis. The inability to organize interviews with relevant stakeholders and actors of the programs and strategies limited the scope of the research to document and desktop research. Interviews with experts such as government officials, individuals working in the de-radicalization programs, NGO

23 representatives, and the police, could offer a different perspective of the issues of radicalization or bring up less known concerns, difficulties, or other strategies not fully described in the documents. Another limitation of the research can be the differences in the development of each country’s CVE initiatives. Based on this research, it is evident that Albania’s strategy is not as extensive and thorough on its goals and implementation as the strategy of Kosovo. Also, a low number of reports on the country’s de-radicalization and dis-engagement programs can mean that the programs are still not fully operational, that there is a lack of institutional reports on the issue, or that CVE priorities are elsewhere and do not focus on tertiary level programs. As mentioned above, I do not speak or understand Albanian, limiting the ability to verify or further evaluate discussions on the policy plans through media analysis. Furthermore, the research may be bias due to the selection of government, think-tank, NGO, and international organization documents. In chapter three the research design was explained to clarify the objectives of the evaluation. This thesis aims to apply the realist review to the counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo to determine the main objectives of each respective strategy. The review will explain if both countries either focus on strengthening resilience, family and network support, exit programs, or counter-communication, which is reflected in the measures/steps of each strategy. This categorizing of the measures/steps will then be evaluated against the progress reports by international organizations, NGOs, and think-tanks to see to what extend the strategies have been properly implemented. The reports are examined in depth to determine what measures have been implemented from 2015-2017. Reports critiquing the lack of implementation or focus on new objectives will also be examined. Through this research, the question of “what works, for whom, under what circumstances” (Gielen, 2017) can be answered for both Albania and Kosovo, due to both countries implementations of the strategies reflecting their respective capabilities.

24 Chapter 4: Analysis

This chapter presents the results of the evaluation of the CVE strategies of Albania and Kosovo, as well as their implementation from 2015-2017. The first two subchapters (Chapter 4.1 & 4.2) organize the strategy of Albania and Kosovo into the four categories resilience, exit programs, family and network support, and counter-communication, to determine the strategy’s main areas of focus and objectives, as discussed in chapter three. While Gielen does not give a clear definition of what exactly defines a strategy or program under resilience, exit program, family and network support, or counter-communication, she provides factors from previous evaluations on measures that help organize the programs into categories. The category of resilience, according to Gielen, can include any program concerned with preventing radicalization of an individual, group, or a community. It can involve mentoring, assisting youth in work or school, bolstering education, monitoring behavior, and or community engagement (Gielen, 2017, pg. 7). The exit-program category is concerned with programs that help already radicalized individuals to de-radicalize, disengage, rehabilitate, and reintegrate back into society. They often include the involvement of religious and community leaders, psychological professionals, civil society, and family and friends (Id., pg. 12). The classification of measures under network and family support contains any programs focused around the family and peers of someone radicalized or at risk of radicalization (Id., pg. 7). This support revolves around early identification, response, maintaining a positive environment, and how to deal with radicalized individuals, such as returnees, to disengage, deracialize, and reintegrate (Id., pg. 13). Lastly, the category of counter-communication includes measures or programs that produce a counter- narrative to radical ideologies, block radical content online, create information campaigns on radicalism, and bolster communication between authorities and the community (Id., 2017, pg. 14). By organizing the measures into these four categories, we can determine the main areas of focus for each strategy and their respective objectives. The subsequent subchapter (Chapter 4.3) evaluates the implementation progress of the abovementioned measures. The aim of this analysis is to conclude if the strategy was implemented as intended, by working towards its goals or if certain objectives or areas of focus were given priority over the others.

25 Chapter 4.1: Albania In 2015, the Council of Ministers created the Albanian National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism with an aim of reducing the high radicalization numbers in the less developed regions of the country. The ten-point plan outlines the various steps the government intends to take with the help of civil society, local municipalities, and NGOs to address the push and pull factors of Islamic radicalization. In the chart below, each step of the strategy is organized into the four categories described in the realist review. The steps are categorized by the common characteristics of programs in each category. Through this categorizing the area of focus of the Albanian strategy can be determine.

Step Measure/Objective Resilience Exit Network Counter- Programs & Family Communication Support 1. Encourage critical thinking, civic participation, and ü ü promote values of tolerance through education 2. Address socio-economic drivers of radicalization ü ü through vocational education and training (VET) and employment services 3. Build trust and confidence and increase community ü safety through community policing 4. Empower civil society to build community ü resilience 5. Propose a creative and innovative communication ü strategy to complement the Albanian National Strategy 6. Influence attitudes and behaviors towards violent ü extremism through contextualized campaigns and other communication initiatives 7. Develop expertise on CVE through research and ü information sharing 8. Enhance capacities of practitioners and frontline ü ü workers 9. Evaluate policies: apply and share lessons learned ü 10. Develop partnerships at the regional and ü ü ü international levels Table 2. Overview of the Albanian National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (Council of Ministers, 2015) Chapter 4.1.1: Resilience According to the characteristics of programs focusing on resilience (Gielen, 2017, pg. 7), the Albanian National Strategy primarily emphasizes the strengthening and creation of measures to enhance community and individual resilience towards radicalization. These primary initiatives center around raising awareness and preventing radicalization before it begins. While some steps

26 of the strategy can be classified under multiple categories, all the steps of the strategy, with the exception of steps five and six, focus on resilience building. Step one, “encourage critical thinking, civic participation, and promote values of tolerance through education,” aims to develop the resilience of schools throughout the country by expanding the “School as a Community Center” initiative (Council of Ministers, 2015, pg. 9). This initiative includes training staff to monitor and respond to signs of radicalization and expanding curricular and extracurricular activities to incorporate debate teams, religious and civic education, sports and arts teams, and any other activities the Ministry of Education and Sports believes will prevent radicalization in youth (Id., pg. 9). The goal of this step is to include possible at-risk youth in community and school programs, to give them a sense of belonging and limit feelings of alienation which make young individuals susceptible to recruitment. Step two of the plan aims to address the socio-economic causes by expanding vocational training in “hot-spot” areas and create employment opportunities to reduce Albania’s high unemployment rate (Id., pg. 10). This step in the strategy aims to combat the economic factors which affected many people to join Islamist organizations. Step three of the strategy builds upon the prior Seven Year Strategy (2007-2013) that the created to begin a community policing program (Id., 2015, pg. 11). This is a turn from the traditional repressive strategy used in counter-terrorism strategy, which aims to build trust and collaboration with the community to prevent and detect radicalization and violent extremism (Id., pg. 11). Step four includes the assistance of civil society organizations to help in building community resilience by creating programs to encourage civic participation (Id., pg. 11). Other objectives of this step include the creation of information campaigns on preventing violent extremism and radicalization as well as informing the public of the other initiatives such as vocational training and extracurricular activities (Id., pg. 11). Step seven targets long term prevention and resilience through the advancement of expertise and data on combating radicalization and violent extremism. By conducting research on trends throughout the country, and sharing the relevant information among local and national authorities, this step will assist in providing effective response in radicalization prevention as well as helping local authorities to bolster effective resilience initiatives (Id., pg. 14). Similar to step seven, step eight increases support for frontline workers, including teachers, social workers, and police, in assessing and assisting at risk individuals (Id., pg. 15). This includes training classes,

27 creation of guidelines, and providing any necessary materials to ensure these stakeholders can identify and intervene in cases of radicalization or extremism (Id., pg. 15). Step nine of the strategy is concerned with the evaluation of these new initiatives and programs to assess the effect of each individual measure of the national strategy on “hot-spot” communities (Id., pg. 15). This proposed step aims, through the evaluation, to learn from the success and failures of each step in the strategy, apply successful methods to all municipalities, and share the lessons learned to increase effectiveness (Id., pg. 15). Lastly, step ten has the goal of developing regional and global partnerships to share research data on causes of radicalization, as well as train relevant actors in the Western Balkans to combat both radicalization and violent extremism (Id., pg. 16). As mentioned before, significant Albanian populations exists outside of Albania and Kosovo in Serbia, Montenegro, and FYR Macedonia. These populations are heavily interconnected with one another despite being in different countries, and radical ideologies can quickly spread among these Albanian majority areas, making the need for a comprehensive regional strategy based on collective data necessary. This strategy puts an emphasis on proactive localized efforts to strengthen individual and community resilience with a goal to prevent radicalization and violent extremism from emerging and spreading (Id., pg. 3). The steps of the strategy concerned with resilience aim to empower at- risk youth, families, as well as the community since these groups are the forefront of combating radicalization. These measures include action from civil society, religious and cultural institutions, as well as educational networks to address the many causes of radicalization to prevent these extreme ideologies from garnering support in Albania. Chapter 4.1.2: Exit Programs The area of the strategy that receives least attention is exit programs. According to the evaluation of the strategy, only step two of the plan mentions briefly providing assistance to those already radicalized. In a sub-bullet of the objectives of step two, “address socio-economic drivers of radicalization through vocational education and training (VET) and employment services,” it is stated that the strategy aims to create job training programs and provide assistance for violent extremist offenders undergoing rehabilitation and reintegration (Council of Ministers, 2015, pg. 10). Despite this small provision, no substantial strategy or tertiary initiative exists concerned with reintegrating and rehabilitating violent extremist offenders or returned foreign fighters from ISIS territory (Bogdani et. al., 2016, pg. 7).

28 Chapter 4.1.3: Family & Network Support Measures in the Albanian strategy which share similar characteristics with the family and network support category presented by Gielen (2017) include steps one and eight. While these steps have been organized into the resilience category, specific measures within each of the steps can be placed into the family and network support category due to them being primary initiatives which include provisions for early detection of radicalization. For this category, step one of the strategy proposes training programs to recognize potential signs of radicalization or violent extremism and will be trained on how to approach and respond appropriately (Council of Ministers, 2015, pg. 9). It aims to keep a calm, safe, and positive environment to allow for the at-risk person to reach out to his/her teachers. Step eight is similar to step number one, in that the measure aims to develop guidelines for frontline workers, such as teachers, local police, and social workers to identify the signs of radicalization and intervene (Council of Ministers, 2015, pg. 15). While the strategy has two steps concerned with early identification and response to radicalization, it does not propose anything substantial on how to support families and peers of at- risk or radicalized individuals. Thus, it can be concluded that, aside from early recognition, the Albanian strategy does not provide any measures with the objective of supporting families of radicalized individuals, while the individual is abroad nor during the disengagement, de- radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration period. Chapter 4.1.4: Counter-Communication Counter-Communication and counter-narrative remain an integral part of the Albanian national strategy. Despite only three of the ten-step plan being categorized under the counter- communication strategy, these primary initiatives aim to promote tolerance and counter the radical messages before they can garner great influence in communities. While step five is also under the resilience category, it aims to counter the narrative of extremists and radicals by creating a public information campaign. It aims to organize regular meetings in “hot-spot” communities and include religious, community, and local leaders to help counter Islamist messages (Council of Ministers, 2015, pg. 13). Step six, “Influence attitudes and behaviors towards violent extremism through contextualized campaigns and other communication initiatives,” like step five, takes counter- narrative efforts further with an objective to create nationwide campaigns to counter extremist messages (Id., pg. 13). This measure requires participation from civil society, the media, and

29 religious leadership to circulate messages of tolerance, peace, human rights, and democracy through social media, television, radio, newspapers, and other types of media (Id., pg. 14). It will include lectures, debates, and sermons from representatives from academia, religious, and local communities and will focus on discussing different issues related to radicalization and violent extremism (Id., pg. 14). Step ten of the strategy aims to strengthen national and regional resilience through harmonizing its counter-communication methods with regional partners (Id., pg. 16). As mentioned above, Albanians constitute a majority of the Muslim population in the Balkans, with a majority in Albania and Kosovo and significant populations in Montenegro, Serbia, and FYR Macedonia. Albanian television programming, radio, and social media are well connecting in these five countries, meaning any extremist messages in the have an effect on populations in all five countries. The goal of this step in the strategy is to ensure extremist narrative can be countered through regional conferences, discussions, lectures, and on media and social media (Id., pg. 16). The Albanian strategy considers the need for a greater, harmonized, regional strategy on countering extremist narrative as imperative, stating that after evaluating its effects, it aims to share best practices with regional partners (Id., pg. 16). Chapter 4.2: Kosovo Similar to Albania, in 2015 the Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo created the Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism 2015-2020 with an overall objective to tackle the push and pull factors of radicalization, specifically concerning youth (Office of the Prime Minister, 2015). The strategy of Kosovo divides the measures into four target areas, early identification, prevention, intervention, and de-radicalization and reintegration, and fully explains the causing factors, target groups, counter-measures to be executed, as well as relevant stakeholders for the implementation of each measure. In Table two below, the different measures of the Kosovo strategy are classified into the four categories of the realist review to determine the overall focus of the strategy.

30 Focus Measure Resilience Exit Network Counter- Area Program & Family Communication Support

1. Training officials to identify people at ü risk of extremism 2. Create analyst team to collect ü information on radicalization 3. Meetings between institutions, ü schools, & religious communities 4. Regional cooperation in identifying ü Early Identification Early the radicalization factors 1. Development of a plan for ü

communication 2. Train journalists & scholars on ü sensitivity of radicalization 3. Creation of an information campaign ü 4. Cooperation with religious ü communities on counter-narrative 5. Establishment of commission to review ü religious content online 6. Grants for businesses, youth centers, ü NGOs, to create youth programs 7. Establishment of safe environments in ü schools 8. Review of curriculum to emphasize the ü importance of religious tolerance 9. Enhance security of extremist prisoners ü to prevent recruiting 10. Assessment of legislation for the ü Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalism and Extremism Violent of Prevention purpose of preventing extremism and radicalism 1. Establish a rapid response team to work ü with radicalized persons 2. Create a hotline to report ü organizations/individuals supporting extremist ideas

Intervention 3. Cooperation between youth ü organizations and educational institutions 1. Counselling for extremist prisoners and ü ü

support for families -

De 2. Develop new employment programs or ü

Reintegration for reintegration of deracialized Radicalization/ Radicalization/ individuals Table 3. Overview of the Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism 2015-2020. (Office of the Prime Minister, 2015).

31 Chapter 4.2.1: Resilience The Kosovo strategy, like that of Albania, heavily centers around objectives aimed at supporting resilience against radicalization and extremism. Resilience building is found in ten measures that are included in the areas of early identification, prevention, and intervention. In the early identification area, the primary initiatives focus around raising awareness, capacity for prevention, and identification of at-risk individuals (Office of the Prime Minister, 2015, pg. 18), with all four measures in this area focusing on resilience. Measure one has the objective of organizing training programs for local officials, educational staff, and local police to first identify at-risk youth and how to approach them (Id., pg. 19). This measure includes civil society and national institutions to provide the training, with support being provided by international organizations to create the guidelines of necessary action (Id., pg. 19). Measure two emphasizes the need for the creation of a national team to collect data on the trends of radicalization in the country (Id., pg. 19). This information will be used to identify radicalization “hot-spot” areas and like measure one, requires involvement from the national and local government, as well as think-tanks, and international organizations (Id, pg. 19). The information acquired during the research phase will be disseminated in regular meetings, provided by measure three, between schools, religious, public, and educational institutions, to implement the necessary mechanisms (Id., pg. 19). Measure four takes this research to a regional level by support regional and international cooperation in the identification process, which requires the inclusion of schools, security institutions, social services, national intelligence, and governments (Id., pg. 19). In the objective area of prevention of violent extremism and radicalism, four of the ten primary initiatives aim to support resilience building in Kosovo (Id., pg. 20). Measure six intends to provide grants for youth centers, businesses, and NGOs to create inclusion programs for youth through sports and community service, as well as traineeships (Id., pg. 21). Measure seven emphasizes support for frontline workers in educational institutions for preventing radicalization through the creation of safe environments for students. Here, students can raise concerns or sensitive issues with qualified practitioners such as psychologists and therapists who can then approach the issue appropriately (Id., pg. 22). This initiative requires support and involvement from local municipalities, medical associations, school councils, and parent councils to determine what approaches are most appropriate (Id., pg. 22).

32 When concerned with violent extremist offenders, measure nine of the strategy targets resilience building by increasing security and surveillance around the offender to prevent the recruitment of other individuals in prison (Id., pg. 22). This measure aims to address the high radicalization rates in prisons, that can easily spread outside once prisoners are released. Measure ten of prevention is an overall analysis of all existing legislation concerned with the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. In this provision the Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Justice, and experts from the field of counter-radicalization and violent extremism aim to update or create new legislation to push through with the above-mentioned initiatives (Id., pg. 22). In the objective area of intervention for radicalized individuals, one primary initiative out of the three focuses on resilience. Measure three supports increasing collaboration between student councils, youth groups, and schools to discuss the dangers of radicalization and extremism. This initiative tasks these groups with the organization of workshops, seminars, lectures, and conferences, as well as other activities aimed to include at-risk youth (Id., pg. 24). Chapter 4.2.2: Exit Programs Like the strategy of Albania, Kosovo’s strategy on de-radicalization and reintegration of radicalized individuals covers a small section of the national strategy. Exit programs are only mentioned in two measures, and while they provide more details on the programs than Albania, the measures still greatly lack thorough emphasis on how the government aims to help radicalized individuals. Measure one in the objective area of de-radicalization and reintegration has the goal of providing counselling for extremist inmates, as well as providing any necessary social support for their families (Office of the Prime Minister, 2015, pg. 25). This provision includes the participation of psychological professionals and religious leadership who are specialized in offering support and counseling in cases of radicalization and extremism (Id., pg. 25). Once the individuals have been deemed safe for society and have disengaged and been rehabilitated, measure two of the de-radicalization and reintegration strategy intends to create new reintegration programs for these individuals. The employment programs offered, with the cooperation of local businesses, aim to give a sense of meaning and responsibility to the rehabilitated individual. The plan also offers to create other methods of reintegration, but does not specifically state what these planned programs are, rather claims his will be determined by the government and experts (Id., pg. 25).

33 Chapter 4.2.3: Family & Network Support Measures of the strategy that can be organized into the family and network support category can be found only in the intervention and de-radicalization and reintegration plans of the national strategy. In the intervention plan, measure one proposes the establishment of a rapid response team in local municipalities to work with at-risk or radicalized individuals to prevent further radicalization or harm (Office of the Prime Minister, 2015, pg. 24). This measure requires the inclusion of psychologists, religious leaders, police, and social workers to quickly react to signs of radicalization. Measure two of this plan assists the intervention process through the creation of a hotline for family, friends, or peers to report anonymously suspected individuals or organizations of supporting or spreading extremist ideologies (Id., pg. 24). This measure will include the Kosovo Police, local municipalities, security institutions, and the national government to target the financing of extremist organizations, recruitment of individuals, and prevent individuals from becoming radicalized (Id., pg. 24). In the de-radicalization and reintegration of radicalized persons strategy, family and network support greatly lacks, which measure one briefly mentioning social support will be provided for the families of radicalized individuals (Id., pg. 25). Within the national strategy family and network support initiatives along with exit-program initiatives, remain limited due to the strategy placing greater emphasis on resilience and counter-communication. Chapter 4.2.4: Counter-Communication All counter-communication measures in the Kosovo strategy are placed under the prevention of violent extremism and radicalism plan with an objective of developing a thorough counter- narrative and information campaign to counter these issues. Counter-communication is the second largest area of focus of the Kosovo strategy after resilience, to prevent the spread of radicalization in young people. Measure one of the plan aims to create an overall plan on communication. Through the organizing of campaigns, lectures, and use of social media and media, the plan intends to include religious leaders, famous public figures, former radicalized individuals, their families, and civil society representatives to raise awareness on recruitment methods and dissuade individuals from joining extremist groups (Office of the Prime Minister, 2015, pg. 21). Measure two focuses on training journalists and scholars to cover violent extremism with objectivity and with sensitivity but with an overall aim to create a counter-narrative on media and in educational institutions (Id., pg. 21).

34 Measure three promotes the creation of a public information campaign through the development of an information brochure to be handed out in lectures and training sessions (Id., pg. 21). This brochure will lay out the tactics used by recruiters, the causes of radicalization in young people, and these tactics can be countered. Measure four targets the religious communities with the creation of lectures and religious preaching that counters the arguments of radical ideologies and dissuades acts of violence and promotes tolerance and coexistence (Id., pg. 21). Measure five aims to establish a commission to analyze any religious content online with the objective of translating moderate sermons and religious content into Albanian to promote tolerance (Id., pg. 21). The aim of measures four and five is to promote tolerance and critical thinking of individuals who have been exposed to radical messages by providing them with arguments of coexistence that originate from religious text. This overall promotion of tolerance and coexistence in Kosovo is the main objective of the prevention strategy with measure eight taking the same tactics from measure five and applying it to schools. This measure will allow for the reviewing of historical and civic curriculum to display the diverse characteristics of Kosovo as well as Albanian nationality (Id., pg. 22). It will highlight religious coexistence and will train teachers on how to promote these values effectively and be ready to counter any arguments against it. Overall, the main objectives of the strategies of Kosovo and Albania are to strengthen community and individual resilience against radicalization by promoting democratic values and critical thinking in at-risk municipalities. Through working with the community, local municipalities, teachers, civil society, medical professionals, and religious leadership, both strategies aim to establish preventative measures, early identification protocols, as well as rapid response teams to counter and help individuals showing signs of radicalization. While resilience remains the largest area of focus in both strategies, counter-communication was given great emphasis with many programs being proposed to counter the extremist narrative. The extremist narrative had a great appeal to many battle hardened veterans and individuals in communities greatly damaged by the wars in the 1990s. The disillusionment with each respective government, coupled with the establishment of charities and funding of various projects, resulted in a general favoring of the Islamist charities that endured throughout the years. Despite twenty years passing since the expulsion of the Islamist organizations in Kosovo and Albania, the influence of the extremist narrative still appeals to many. While the organizations are physically not as visible in

35 both countries anymore, the narrative is disseminated through the internet and radio making it still as great a threat today as in the 1990s. Both Albania and Kosovo have put great emphasis on their counter-communication measures to combat this emphasis by working with schools, religious communities, and local municipalities to provide arguments against this narrative. While both strategies greatly focus on resilience and counter-communication, measures regarding family and network support, as well as exit programs are heavily neglected. Deradicalization, disengagement, and reintegration programs for extremist offenders, as well as support for their family and peers during the exit process, is not thoroughly address by either strategy. Instead, the Kosovo strategy only makes a provision of counselling for offenders and their families, and Albania offers vocational training for extremist offenders undergoing reintegration, without providing details on their respective deradicalization and disengagement programs. Chapter 4.3 Implementation of Strategies In this subchapter, the implementation of both strategies from 2015-2017 is analyzed. The analysis was conducted by reading various reports written by NGOs, international organizations, and think- tanks that are relevant actors in implementation process of the strategies. Despite the fact that the strategy stated the governments of Albania and Kosovo would be providing annual progress reports on their own respective implementation, no such reports from the government can be found through an online search. This lack of reporting is also discussed in other reports by NGOs and think-tanks, making it safe to assume that either no reports have been written, or that any reports written are not made available to the public. The document analysis, as mentioned, covers reports written by relevant institutions which discuss the implementation progress, critique improper or lack of implementation, and examine any new objectives their respective government has focused on by forgoing specific objectives in the strategy. Reports for Albania are provided by the German Council of Foreign Relations (Lamallari, 2016), Balkan Investigative Network (Bogdani et. al., 2016), the Albanian Institute for International Studies (Hide, 2015), Regional Cooperation Council (Perry, 2016), Terrorism Monitor (Spahiu, 2016), and the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (Vurmo et. al., 2015). Reports for Kosovo are written by the United Nations Development Programme Kosovo (UNDP Kosovo, 2016; Qirezi, 2017), Regional Cooperation Council (Perry, 2016), Balkan Investigative Network (Bogdani et. al., 2016), Terrorism Monitor (Spahiu, 2016), and the Kosovo Center for Security Studies (Kraja, 2017; Muji, 2017). While some reports discuss the measures specifically

36 and in order, most of the reports examine the strategy as a whole and make references to specific measures. Some of the reports discuss divergence from the original strategies by addressing new measures enacted or actions carried out by Albania or Kosovo. Chapter 4.3.1 Albania Before the drafting and implementation of the Albanian National Strategy to combat violent extremism, Albania committed to the 2014 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 which aimed at preventing individuals from joining ISIS. This however led to years of harsh counter-terrorist measures including the closure of illegal mosques and suspected terrorist cells (Lamallari, 2016, pg. 3). Despite these measures and the arrests of individuals responsible for the radicalization of others, an estimated one hundred to one hundred and fifty Albanian citizens left for Syria and Iraq (Lamallari, 2016, pg. 3). Radicalization on Albanian citizens, it became evident, was not reduced, and cooperation between authorities and the family and peers of Albanian foreign fighters was non-existent (Lamallari, 2016, pg. 5). A survey in 2015 showed twenty eight percent of respondents were tolerant of the illegal religious institutions set up during the 1990s, and an alarming number viewed the “charities” more favorably than the Albanian government (Vurmo et. al., 2015, pg. 113). This rising radicalization demonstrated that the current strategy of Albania was not working to fix the causes of radicalization. The need to research and implement a comprehensive counter-radicalization and violent extremist strategy was then realized with the drafting of the 2015 strategy. The plan consists of ten soft measures with the objective of preventing and reducing radicalization in Albania, especially among young populations through primarily building resilience. After the drafting phase, the government of Albania promised a swift, thorough, and transparent implementation of the various steps of the strategy, with annual progress reports being produced by all stakeholders. During the Balkans Regional Summit of 2015 in Tirana, the Minister of Interior stated that the strategy was already composed and stressed the need for immediate regional cooperation on counter-radicalization, based on the success of the Albanian strategy (Ministry of Interior, 2015). The strategy however, was not yet implemented in Albania, and while the strategy itself was drafted by the government, civil society, religious leaders, and educational institutions were left out of the drafting phase (Spahiu, 2016). Due to the lack of judicial reform, the creation of soft measures concerned with de-radicalization, disengagement, and reintegration of extremist persons, did not occur (Perry, 2016, pg. 26). This lack of exit programs in the strategy

37 had already left a wide gap in the strategy, making the measure of step two concerned with vocational training for reintegrating offenders, impossible. The strategy also originally intended to follow a bottom up approach involving grassroots organizations, local communities, religious leadership, and police, but since its slow implementation has taken a top down approach. The central government in Tirana has not allowed for thorough involvement from civil society, religious, and local communities, leaving many roles which are necessary for proper implementation of the strategy, vacant. National authorities have not drawn out a plan on how to incorporate each respective actor, and within what time frame each measure will be taken, resulting in the vast majority of measures not being implemented (Spahiu, 2016). A lack of cooperation from the Albanian police on the implementation of step number three of the strategy (establishment of community policing), is due to the police force’s preference of using counter-terrorism initiatives, which it sees as responsible for the drop in the number of foreign fighters (Perry, 2016, pg. 26; Spahiu, 2016). The overall implementation process of the Albanian strategy remains slow due to the lack of foundation established to allow for the transition to counter-radicalization from counter- terrorism, before the drafting of the strategy. As mandated by step number seven of the strategy, Albania was first responsible to conduct research on the drivers of extremism and radicalization and share the data to enhance CVE policy as well as assist in the implementation of the 2015 strategy (Council of Ministers, 2015, pg. 14). However, no research or assessment on the causes of radicalization to determine best practices has been carried out by specialists due to lack of funds (Lamallari, 2016, pg. 5). Albania lacks the necessary resources to carry out its own counter- radicalization strategies, thus making a counter-terrorist approach more appealing due to its strong cooperation with the United States and European partners (Bogdani, et. al, 2016). Out of the total ten steps of the 2015 strategy, none have been implemented fully to date with limited training workshops being organized by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM). Parts of step one and step eight, concerned with training teachers and frontline workers to detect and respond to signs of radicalization or recruitment, have been established, but overall the lack of reporting makes evaluating progress difficult (Bogdani et. al., 2016). The measures involving building resilience by addressing socio-economic drivers, as well empowering civil society, communities, youth groups, educational, and religious institutions (steps one, two, and four) have all been

38 lacking implementation as well due to insufficient funds and lack of division of responsibilities among stakeholders (Perry, 2016, pg. 26). Implementation of the counter-narrative/communication measures, which was the second largest objective area, has not occurred as it was originally outlined in the strategy according to reports from the Balkan Investigative Network. To fight radical and extremist narrative, the government of Albania has supported granting the Albanian Islamic Community (AIC) oversight of all mosques in the country, to supervise imams (Bogdani et. al., 2016). This tactic is seen as necessary to remove any radical imams from these influential positions, but implementing this new strategy has been difficult due to communities and imams refusing to have oversight from the AIC (Spahiu, 2016). As of 2016, ten mosques in Albania were not under the control of the AIC, with the forced takeover of one resulting in the arrest and sentencing of nine radicalized individuals to fourteen years in prison by the Tirana Serious Crimes Court, for recruiting people to terrorist organizations (Lamallari, 2016, pg. 5). Despite having oversight of almost all mosques in Albania, the AIC lacks control and influence due to their lack of unification on a counter-narrative strategy, as well as their relationship with the government (Bodgani et. al, 2016). Aside from delegating oversight of all mosques to the AIC, the government still lacks on implementing steps five and six to strengthen the country’s counter-communication efforts. While takedown efforts exist to remove extremist content on the internet, the government has yet to influence attitudes through campaigns to promote tolerance and raise awareness of radicalization on social media, television, and radio (Bodgani et. al., 2016). It has yet to form a national counter-narrative strategy among all relevant stakeholders, giving it little leverage on countering extremist messages and propaganda. As mentioned before, the Albanian strategy made no provisions for dealing with radicalized individuals or those who have left for Syria and Iraq. Due to the fact that there is no knowledge of how many people have returned from the Middle East, following the demise of ISIS, the Albanian government has made it imperative to track the individuals who left (Lamallari, 2016, pg. 5). Fifteen returnees have been arrested before 2014, and none have been provided with enrollment in a rehabilitation, disengagement, or deradicalization program (Lamallari, 2016, pg. 5) To track further returnees and extremist individuals, Albania entered an agreement with the United States to set up a Bureau of Investigation similar to the American Federal Bureau of Investigation, with support from the United States (Spahiu, 2016). The government has

39 backtracked to its previous counter-terrorism methods, due to resources being made available to them from the United States and Europe (Spahiu, 2016). Overall, the implementation of the 2015 Albanian national strategy on countering violent extremism has to an extent been abandoned with the government and security institutions turning to their traditional counter-terrorism tactics. Because of improper planning and lack of thorough implementation, the Albanian government, hindered the success of its own plan (Spahiu, 2016). The strategy failed to address all issues related to countering radicalization and violent extremism, and mainly focused on resilience and counter-communication, which the government did not have the knowledge or resources to reach on its own. This move of foregoing the objectives of the 2015 strategy to continue the repressive and reactive counter-terrorist tactics, will unfortunately not reduce the issue of radicalization and extremism in Albania. Chapter 4.3.2 Kosovo Unlike Albania, Kosovo has been more successful in implementing its preventative strategy on countering extremism and radicalization through better communication and inclusion of civil society, international institutions, police, and local municipalities during the phases of application (Perry, 2016, pg. 36). While it is still in the early stages of implementation, the United Nations Development Programme in Kosovo states surveys were conducted through poll taking to research the causes and grievances associated with radicalization to better adapt the strategy in different contexts (UNDP Kosovo, 2016). Research showed corruption, high unemployment, community underdevelopment, and lack of educational institutions and other necessary infrastructure were the greatest grievances of “hot-spot” communities where radicalization was at its highest in Kosovo (UNDP Kosovo, 2016). Originally, the implementation process was lacking for all measures concerned with prevention, but in late 2016 a new emphasis was placed on socioeconomic development and transparency in these municipalities (Perry, 2016, pg. 39). The central government worked closely with local businesses and municipalities to implement the measures on prevention to boost community resilience. In 2016, over two hundred enterprises were established, five thousand cases of corruption were reported to authorities4, and socioeconomic conditions improved for almost fourteen thousand people (UNDP Kosovo, 2016). The relevant stakeholders held five town hall meetings to discuss counter-radicalization efforts,

4 Reporting Corruption Online through www.kallxo.com or by phone 044 22 44 98

40 local narratives were established in fifteen municipalities, and over one thousand young people were involved in the discussion and decision-making processes (UNDP Kosovo, 2016). These meetings later led to the training of sixteen municipal representatives on early identification of radicalization and later civil society, the government, and local municipalities established a rapid response team (referring mechanism) in three municipalities in Kosovo (UNDP Kosovo, 2016; Kraja, 2017, pg. 20). In the municipality of Gjilan/Gnjilane, the referral mechanism has been described as the most successful, with municipality officials, civil society, teachers, and police cooperating effectively, which resulted in the detection of radicalization in three individuals and the appropriate response by all participants following (Qirezi, 2017, pg. 21). This success if also seen in local polls which were conducted after the episodes, which showed a favorable view of the strategy in the Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality (Qirezi, 2017, pg. 21). This success in implementing early detection, prevention, and intervention measures, however, has not occurred in all municipalities to bolster resilience. Civil society and local municipalities still complain that the strategy does not include them enough (Qirzei, 2017, pg. 21). Other concerns in reports state that not all relevant stakeholders are reporting the implementation progress nor how the budget was spent (Qirezi, 2017, pg. 21). These critiques on transparency and inclusion, coupled with the fact that the de-radicalization, disengagement, and reintegration programs have still not implemented, have been the largest concerns of NGOs (Qirezi, 2017, pg. 21). Since 2015, Kosovo has had one hundred and twenty-seven returnees from Syria and Iraq, of whom one hundred and twenty were arrested immediately upon arrival (Muji, 2017, pg. 13). No effective exit programs have been enacted to deal with the disengagement and deradicalziation of returnees, and this tendency by Kosovo police and authorities to enforce repressive counter- terrorist measures has resulted in fifty-nine Kosovar foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq refusing to cooperate with Kosovo authorities (Muji, 2017, pg. 13). Due to fear of persecution from the current counter-terrorist measures, Imams and families also are not reaching out to returnees and known individuals abroad, hurting any hopes for those individuals to return (Qirezi, 2017, pg. 21). The need to insert protections and support for returnees, their families, and those reaching out to them is vital for the proper implementation of the strategy (Muji, 2017, pg. 9). In its current state, the strategy does not offer any tertiary soft measures for returnees nor does it provide deradicalization programs for radicalized individuals who did not leave for Syria and Iraq (Muji, 2017, pg. 9).

41 After resilience building, counter-communication is the objective area with the second greatest focus in the Kosovo strategy. It includes six measures, which dominate the majority of the initiatives concerned with prevention. Through the execution process, aside from a local counter- narrative analysis in fifteen local municipalities (UNDP Kosovo, 2016), little has occurred to bolster Kosovo’s counter-communication strategy. This failure of thorough enactment is due to the lack of a specific counter-narrative for all the different target audiences in Kosovo (Kraja, 2017, pg. 19). The propaganda of ISIS and its narrative addresses the concerns, anger, and fears of Kosovo’s neglected Muslim community, who view state institutions as corrupt and lacking credibility (Spahiu, 2016). This narrative by extremist groups has also garnered the attention of some youth and has created a central narrative for Kosovo, as well as local narratives for specific regions through radical imams, online propaganda, and recruiters (Kraja, 2017, pg. 22). The narratives garner attention by focusing on the various grievances mentioned before such as development, and portray the secular government in Pristina as committing genocide against Albanian Muslims, just as they claim the Yugoslav army did in the 1990s (Kraja, 2017, pg. 22). To combat this, the current implementation of the prevention measures, strayed from the original strategy, which focuses on educational institutions and local communities, by putting emphasis on countering narrative through controlling mosques. The Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) has been working with the government to gain oversight of all mosques in Kosovo with a goal to control narratives, thus blocking any radical messages from being spread in religious institutions (Spahiu, 2016). This plan however remains ineffective due to the lack of influence the ICK has on mosques, the lack of plans/goals on countering radical narrative, and the fact that seventy percent of Kosovar foreign fighters were not from religious families (Bogdani et. al., 2016). All reports covering the counter-communication measures stated the current measures of Kosovo are severely lacking due to having little provision on combating online radicalization and no plan for the funding of exit-programs and family and network support measures (Qirezi, 2017, Bodgani et. al., 2016; Kraja, 2017). The implementation process of the 2015 strategy in Kosovo has also suffered from Kosovo’s lack of international recognition to partake in broader regional cooperation initiatives (Perry, 2016, pg. 36). While cooperation with Albania and FYR Macedonia on counter-terrorist strategy remains high, collaboration remains limited with Montenegro and non-existent with Serbia (Perry, 2016, pg. 36). Reports claim the inability to partake in region wide initiatives

42 hampers Kosovo’s ability to harmonize its counter radicalization strategy with other states to combat extremism amongst Albanian speaking populations (Perry, 2016, pg. 36). Regardless of the lack of recognition, Kosovo, like Albania has not changed it current counter-terrorist strategy to allow for the success of the primary, secondary, and tertiary initiatives of the 2015 strategy. Instead of collaborating and consulting more with international organizations, civil society, local municipalities, and religious and youth leadership, to fix the strategy and address all factors of the phenomenon, the central government strayed and took a top-down approach in the realization without a clear plan and necessary resources (Qirezi, 2017; Perry, 2016). These steps by the governments of Albania and Kosovo have weakened the potential of their respective strategies and both countries have shifted from the original objectives of building resilience and counter-communication through a bottom-up approach to a top-down approach of acquiring control of religious institutions and reverting to traditional counter-terrorist tactics. This return to previous counter-terrorist tactics shows that both countries cannot pursue their own thorough counter-radicalization initiatives due to a lack of political will and resources. Both Albania and Kosovo are heavily reliant on foreign assistance in combating terrorism, and receive aid for their counter-terrorist cooperation. The pursuing of counter-radicalization measures would mean a complete overhaul of their already in place counter-terrorist tactics and foregoing international cooperation and aid to prevent terrorist attacks. Counter-radicalization initiatives require many resources, clear planning, involvement of many actors, and take many years to by fully implemented and functioning. It is not always guaranteed all programs will be successful and given the current economic and political status of Albania and Kosovo, realization of these counter-terrorist strategies is not feasible.

43 Chapter 5: Conclusion The main research question of this thesis is, “to what extent have Kosovo and Albania been able to properly implement their respective counter-radicalization strategies? To answer this question, it was necessary to first identify the respective objectives of each strategy. To identify the objectives, the sub question, “How can we use the Realist Review (Gielen, 2017) to determine the objective(s) of each respective strategy?” needed to be answered. The realist review was chosen due to its lack of specific rules, rather it being a flexible method to categorize and clarify CVE initiatives, strategy, and policy. In the analysis section of the strategies (Chapter 4.1 & 4.2), the realist review was applied to categorize the measures of each strategy and determine if they can be categorized under resilience, counter-communication, exit programs, or family and network support. The analysis determined that both Albania and Kosovo’s respective objectives focus mainly on resilience building and then counter-communication, with little focus on exit programs and family and network support. This move towards creating counter-radicalization measures by both Albania and Kosovo was due to the inability of their respective counter-terrorist strategies to reduce the high numbers of radicalization by addressing the causes of radicalism. The main findings of this research show that before the drafting of both strategies, both the governments of Albania and Kosovo heavily underestimated the influence of extremist Wahhabi and Salafi ‘charities’ established in the 1990s. These organizations and individuals replaced the government across many municipalities in both countries, which granted them with high popularity and influence. To respond to this in the early 2000s, Albania and the UNMIK, initially responded by targeting terrorist cells, closing illegal mosques, and jailing many extremist individuals. This counter-terrorism approach however, did not solve the issue of radicalization, which following the rise of ISIS and the mass exodus of Albanian foreign fighters prompted both governments to reevaluate their strategies. As mentioned above, the realist review, helped organize the complex strategies of Albania and Kosovo to determine what main objective(s) each respective strategy had. For Albania, the vast majority or eight of the ten steps in the strategy focused establishing on primary initiatives to build individual and community resilience. Its second area of focus was counter-communication, with measures concerning family and network support and exit programs being barely mentioned and not thorough. Similar to Albania, Kosovo’s strategy primarily focused on resilience, with nine out of the nineteen measures proposing the creation of a series of tasks to do so. Counter-

44 communication was the second greatest objective area, with family and network support, and exit programs garnering the least focus in the strategy. To evaluate the implementation process of the strategies, this thesis presents a second sub- question; “has the implementation process been successful in terms of reaching objectives, or has implementation veered from the initial goals? To fully evaluate the implementation, reports from NGOs, think-tanks, and international organizations were analyzed. The reports covered progress, critiqued any improper or lack of implementation, and discussed any changes to measures or objectives. Up to the year 2017, both countries have so far been unsuccessful in properly implementing the measures of their strategies due to many factors. Albania’s implementation process of the strategy was doomed to fail from its initial drafting phase. Its inability to reform the judicial system and counter-terrorist policy to allow for the establishment of soft measures to deal with extremists made the realization unfeasible. The strategy in itself is unable to address all the issues surrounding radicalization such as deradicalization or disengagement of extremist individuals, which is due to the absence of civil society, religious organizations, and experts during the drafting phase. The lack proper reporting, resources, and distribution of responsibilities among relevant stakeholders resulted in no measure of the strategy being fully implemented, with counter- terrorist initiatives being priorities due to deep collaboration and funding from the United States and European partners. Kosovo’s application of its counter-radicalization strategy can be described through reports as successful, but still severely deficient in implementation. During its drafting phase, limited representation from civil society, international organization, and local municipalities was present but responsibility, powers, and resources were not distributed evenly and would change sporadically. Kosovo has implemented specific resilience building measures, such as rapid response teams in some municipalities, but overall socioeconomic measures in the strategy are still behind. Measures aimed at bolstering counter-communication have not been enacted and the government has taken a new focus on supporting the ICK to acquire oversight of all mosques in the country. Any measures with the objective of providing family and network support and exit programs has largely failed so far due to leadership in Kosovo not having the political will, plans, and resources to carry out these lengthy and expensive programs. Kosovo still, in practice, has a tendency to prefer counter-terrorist measures due to their ability to show results, such as perpetrators being taken to prison. This however, does not solve the urgent pandemic of

45 radicalization in the country and while counter-radicalization measures show slower results, the long-term effect can be to the benefit of Kosovo. The implementation process of the strategies in Kosovo and Albania has not been presented by reports as successful and keeping track with its original goals. While both country’s strategies put principal emphasis on building resilience through the creation of primary and secondary initiatives, this emphasis has been diluted against a general favoring of counter-terrorist strategies. Programs to build resilience in schools and local municipalities have been stagnation due to insufficient funds and slow action by the central government, which has spearheaded the application of the strategy in both cases. Tertiary initiatives, concerning exit programs, failed to be included sufficiently in both strategies leaving prosecution and prison as the only options for radicalized individuals. The overall return to counter-terrorist strategies has made further implementation of the strategy in Albania unattainable, turning away completely from its original goals. In Kosovo however, efforts to implement the strategy have gained traction and resilience building initiatives have still remained the main objective of the strategy, despite the difficulties surrounding the application. The need to ensure the realization of comprehensive counter- radicalization strategies in Kosovo and Albania guarantees a long-term solution for combating the influence of these extremist ideologies which have been embedded in parts of Albanian majority areas since the 1990s. Failure to do so by turning to repressive counter-terrorist strategies, do not solve the causes and are not viable for the future of this volatile region. Overall, the research of this thesis sought to add insight into a subject area that lacks thorough evaluation. Analysis of CVE initiatives in the Balkans, specifically Albania and Kosovo, remains a generally unexplored topic. Most academic literature focuses on analyzing the drivers and causes of radicalization and extremism, the effect of extremist ideologies on the population, and the history of these ideologies in the region. Little research has been conducted to thoroughly evaluate the counter measures taken by Albania and Kosovo due to the implementation not being carried out thoroughly. The lack of reports and transparency by government institutions on their respective counter radicalization strategies and measures is the largest limitation to this research. Further research can be conducted beyond this thesis, but this would require time, access to key figures and institutions for interviews, and time spent in Kosovo and Albania to witness firsthand the programs created and implemented by each strategy. While the Albanian strategy did not set out a specific time period to be fully implemented, Kosovo expects to fully implement the proposed

46 measures by 2020. Within a two-year period since the drafting of the measures, implementation has been lacking due to factors such as insufficient resources and lack of organization. Interviews with relevant actors of the strategies would benefit future research to clarify how the government, local authorities, civil society, and other stakeholders plan to overcome these obstacles within the next years. This research would give insight into the implementation process, and any new changes to objectives can therefore be identified. Chapter 5.1: Further Research Future research concerning the evaluation of CVE initiatives in Kosovo and Albania can focus on broadening the scope of research as well as enhancing guidelines for applying the realist review to the field of CVE. As mentioned in chapter two, the scope of CVE initiatives can be divided into two focus areas, counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism. While this thesis focuses on counter- radicalization strategies and the unsuccessful implementation of the measures, future research can expand the scope to include counter-terrorist strategies in both countries. Various reports analyzing the implementation of the counter-radicalization strategies stated that both countries had, to a degree, abandoned their respective strategies in favor of already existing counter-terrorist initiatives. Future research can focus on evaluating the counter-terrorist strategies of both countries to give a greater understanding of why this was the case, using the principles of the realist review to fully determine “what works, for whom, under what circumstances, and how?” The application of the realist review in the field of CVE is relatively new. It is a loose theory which applies the principles of realism to CVE policy, initiatives, and strategy, in order to organize the complex programs to better evaluate them. While the realist review has to an extent been applied to CVE strategy, it lacks structure and guidelines, which can hamper the depth of the evaluation. Gielen attempts to add structure to applying the realist review to CVE, but it still lacks a clear method of execution and definitions. It categorizes initiatives into four categories, resilience, exit programs, counter-communication, and family and network support, but without a clear definition of what fully classifies an initiative into each respective category. Future research can aim to strengthen the structure of the realist review by creating clear guidelines, definitions, and possibly more categories to allow for more thorough analysis of measures, policy, or strategy.

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