A Brief History of Theory and Research on Impression Formation

CHAPTER A Brief History of Th eory and 4 Research on Impression Formation

James S. Uleman and Laura M. Kressel

Abstract

Why do we view people as we do? What is scientifically tractable, in that view? How did subjective concepts such as traits become legitimate “objects of perception”? Thorndike, Asch, and Cronbach were critical. This chapter traces Asch’s legacy to the present and describes the strange independence of research on accuracy from social cognition. Impressions’ internal organization (not accuracy) became the foundation of research on the Big Two (warmth and competence), facial trait dimensions, and morality’s unique status. Associative memory structures and schemata provided the language. The unique impact of negative information is reviewed, along with behaviors’ diagnosticity and how the morality and competence domains differ. The chapter highlights the importance of goals in shaping impressions, of forming impressions without goals (spontaneously), and of stages in forming spontaneous trait inferences. It also notes the importance of social cognitive transference, perceptions of persons and groups, and conceptions of persons as moral agents and objects. Key Words: accuracy, competence, diagnosticity, goal, impression, morality, spontaneous, subjective, unconscious, warmth

Hindsight is 20/20, they say derisively. It can- Understanding impression formation has prob- not isolate causes or predict the future. Th ere are no ably been a human concern ever since our ancestors control groups, and who’s to say it could not have had the metacognitive realization that impressions been otherwise. We are experimental social psychol- do form and are not simply refl ections of some real- ogists, plagued by counterfactuals and mistrustful ity out there—ever since, putting aside na ï ve real- of post hoc explanations. So take this brief selective ism and assumed similarity, one person gestured history with a large grain of salt. or grunted to another, “How could you possibly Also note that any history of impression forma- believe that about them?” Rossano (2007) argued tion is, in part, a history of how we have viewed our- that as long ago as the Upper Paleolithic (late Stone selves. More than most topics in this handbook, it Age; 45,000 to 10,000 b.c.e. ), our species showed has been aff ected by widespread practices in how we unusual levels of cooperation and social organiza- (the broad culture and/or the scientifi c community) tion, and that the development of religion (ances- describe people. We take the long view and focus tor worship, shamanism, and belief in animal and broadly on early history, rather than exclusively on natural spirits) supported this by providing “perma- the most recent developments. We sketch how the nent social scrutiny.” Inherent in this were theories research community came to believe in the things (stories) about what these spirits were like, and how we study as “impression formation,” and provide a they could be pleased, appeased, or off ended. Such few interesting stories and ideas along the way. theories must have existed about people as well.

004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 5533 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:511:41:51 AAMM Disagreements about impressions, in these egalitar- mind . . . the Baining of Papua New Guinea . . . rarely ian societies, would have raised questions about the comment on reasons for actions, even their own . . . processes of impression formation—the topic of Bimin-Kuskusmin . . . and the Ommura . . . —both of this chapter. Papau New Guinea—and the Kaqchikel Maya . . . are other cultures that are said to view the mind as Diversity of Conceptions of Persons unknowable and unimportant” (p. 13). Lillard People’s descriptions of others are remarkably guesses that members of these cultures have concepts diverse and have changed over time. Th is diversity about mental states, but regard them as so private or arose because, unlike the perception of objectively unknowable that they are absent from conversations, measurable physical properties (e.g., how visible including discussions of fault and justice. light’s wavelengths relate to perception of color), We usually assume that mental events (desires, person “perception” is not about physically objective intentions, beliefs) cause actions, but this view is reality. Modern psychology regards the properties not universal. Cultural diff erences associated with we “see” in others as largely inferred, assumed, felt, individualism and collectivism (including the lat- and/or enacted (e.g., Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, ter’s greater sensitivity to situations) are well known 2008). What we “see” has been wondrously diverse (Kitayama, Duff y, & Uchida, 2007). Many peoples across time, culture, and subculture. credit gods, spirits, dead ancestors, witches, and Lillard (1998) provides an overview and numer- ghosts with causing people’s actions. Th e Salem ous examples, focused on theories of mind. Th e witch trials in North America were only 320 years Quechua people in the Andes believe each person ago (see also LeVine, 2007). consists of two selves: the everyday self and the self of altered states of consciousness as when dream- Natural History of Human Nature ing or drunk (Carpenter, 1992). Despite the con- How did we arrive at the conceptions of per- tentious history of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, it sons that we now “see”—from our prehistoric is now clear that language aff ects multiple cognitive past through the time of Homer’s gods and heroes processes (e.g., Hardin & Banaji, 1993). Th us, the (800–900 b.c.e. ), through Galen’s (about 150 a.d. ) absence in English of an equivalent to the Hindu four temperaments (sanguine, choleric, melan- emotion of lajya (shyness + shame + embarassment) cholic, and phlegmatic) based on bodily humors, or the Japanese behavior of amae (to depend and and ancient Roman and Judeo-Christian concep- presume upon another’s benevolence) aff ects these tions of persons as codifi ed in their contrasting language communities’ impressions of other people. laws and codes of conduct, through the Middle Instead of speaking of the mind, the Philippines’ Ages (fi fth–15th centuries) dominated by Roman Illongot speak of rinawa , which “unites concerns for Catholic beliefs about God and salvation, to the thought and feeling, inner life and social context, European Renaissance (14th–17th centuries) with violent anger, and such desirable consequences as its renewed emphasis on observation, nature, and fertility and health” (Rosaldo, 1980, p. 26, quoted the individual? Th is is largely a Western history in Lillard, 1998). One’s rinawa can depart dur- because modern science only arose in the West. ing sleep, and it gradually leaves one over a life- A detailed description is beyond the scope of this time. Other living things (e.g., plants) also have chapter. But Robinson (1995) provides an account rinawa , so it resembles the force vitale or vitalisme of of the history of thought about human nature in 18th-century Western thought. Rinawa also resem- the West, based on ideas from philosophy, art, reli- bles the ancient Greeks’ concept of psuche (soul), gion, literature, politics, and science, with particular but the ancient Greeks also spoke of thymos (which emphasis on discrepancies between humanistic and produced action) and noos (which produced ideas scientifi c conceptions. Political thought based on and images) as additional parts of the “mind” (from various conceptions of human nature can be traced Snell, 1953, in Lillard, 1998). In Japanese, there is from Plato (about 400 b.c.e. ) through Machiavelli no clear separation between mind and body, and a (1469–1527 a.d ). And Baumeister (1987) pres- variety of terms (kokoro, hara, seishim, and mi ) refer ents an interesting overview of how conceptions of to various aspects of the mind-body (Lebra, 1993). the self have changed from the late Middle Ages to Lillard (1998) describes many peoples who “view the present, with the rise of self-consciousness, the the mind as unknowable and unimportant.” Th e Victorian imposition of repression and resulting “Gusii prefer to discuss overt behavior, and they hypocrisy, and the consequent modern emphasis avoid talking about intentions and other aspects of on unconscious processes.

54 A Brief History of Theory and Research on Impression Formation

004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 5544 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM Even today there is little consensus on the nature Th urstone’s study was that he borrowed methods of human nature. Anyone who has taught Milgram’s from psychophysics without simultaneously assum- (1974) work on obedience is confronted with the ing the existence of a physical attribute to which to question of whether people are basically morally relate psychological judgments” (Dawes & Smith, good or evil. Pinker (2002) organizes his book 1985, p. 513). Th ese and related developments on human nature around three still-controversial (such as factor analysis) freed empirical psycholo- themes: whether innate traits exist, whether essen- gists from the “brass instruments” approach that so tially good human nature is corrupted by society, dominated the early part of the century, and put the and whether we have souls that allow choice uncon- study of subjective phenomena on a sound scientifi c strained by biology. Behavioral economics has chal- footing. If you can measure it with rigorous quanti- lenged classical economics’ acceptance of homo tative methods, then it must be real. Th e widespread economicus, the view that people are naturally ratio- use of these methods—in government, education, nal and narrowly self-interested (e.g., Henrich et al., and industry—increased acceptance of the reality 2004). Th ere is disagreement about whether or not that they measured, and helped separate it in most people have free will, with Wegner (2005) among people’s minds from supernormal phenomena. others contending that they do not, and Nahmias With the help of logical positivism, what was not (2005) disputing this. Much depends on how “free measured faded into ephemera, or migrated to other will” is defi ned (see Baer, Kaufman, & Baumeister, scholarly fi elds. 2008; Dennett, 2011). It is no accident that conceiving of personality in Given this diversity of viewpoints on human measurable terms preceded research on impression nature, it is remarkable that a science of impression formation. In fact, just as social psychology arose at formation emerged at all. the intersection of sociology and psychology, sus- tained research on impression formation depended Early Research on Impression Formation on developments in both social and personality Social psychology arose within both psychology psychology. Uleman and Saribay (2012) argue that and sociology, each tradition producing their fi rst the study of initial impressions “bring together per- textbooks in 1908 (McDougall and Ross, respec- sonality and social psychology like no other fi eld tively). F. H. Allport’s textbook, Social Psychology of study—‘personality’ because (1) impressions are (1924), focused more on empirical studies than had about personalities, and (2) perceivers’ personalities earlier texts, and included a section on “reactions aff ect these impressions; and ‘social’ because (3) social to persons as stimuli.” Empirical studies in social cognitive processes of impression formation, and psychology had begun appearing in suffi cient num- (4) sociocultural contexts have major eff ects on ber that the following year, the Journal of Abnormal impressions” (p. 337). Th us, the study of impression Psychology changed its title to Journal of Abnormal formation depends on developments in many areas, and Social Psychology . Th e most interesting report some of them surprising at fi rst glance, such as scaling that year was from the $5,000 Award Committee, and factor analysis, and the widespread acceptance of off ering this sum “to any person claiming to produce measures that make concrete the unobservable. supernormal material phenomena . . . under rigid Social psychology was becoming more experi- laboratory conditions and by recognized scientifi c mental. Murphy and Murphy published their methods, in full light . . . ” (Shapley et al., 1925). No Experimental Social Psychology text in 1931, and award was made, and Mr. Houdini’s unusual abilities Newcomb was added as an author in 1937, contrib- were apparently never required. What is remarkable uting sections on measuring both personality and is that less than 100 years ago, American psycholo- attitudes. It was also becoming more applied, with gists gave any credence at all to such supernormal the deepening worldwide Great Depression of the conceptions of persons. If impression formation was 1930s; military adventurism in the Far East, Spain, to be studied, there was still little stable consensus and Ethiopia; and World War II in the early 1940s. on what these impressions were about. American social psychology benefi ted from an infl ux Meanwhile, real progress was being made in the of European immigrants (e.g., Fritz Heider in 1930, measurement of subjective phenomena such as per- and Kurt Lewin in 1932) who were infl uenced less sonality characteristics and attitudes. Likert (1932) by American behaviorism and more by German scaling was introduced, and Th urstone (1928) gestalt psychology. Work on impression formation developed the method of paired comparisons for gained practical importance as government and measuring attitudes. “Th e revolutionary aspect of industry programs expanded in the war eff ort, and

Uleman, Kressel 55

004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 5555 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM better ways were sought to place the right workers strong belief that people (judges) diff er in their in the right jobs. Clinical and actuarial assessment ability to perceive others accurately. Although sub- of skills and personality were among the urgent sequent research largely concluded that it does not problems of the day. And impression formation was exist in any strong form, the intuition persists and central to this. supports contemporary eff orts to isolate the char- Th ere are several good histories of social psy- acteristics of socially sensitive judges (e.g., Mayer, chology, including those by Jones (1985), Zajonc Roberts, & Barsade, 2008). (1999), and Ross, Lepper, and Ward (2009). Jones Th e other two articles with more than 50 citations (1985, pp. 71–72) has an interesting discussion of sidestep the accuracy conundrum by focusing almost the incompatibility of S-R psychology with social entirely on the judge. Heider’s (1944) paper is charac- psychology, particularly social as practiced by Lewin teristically theoretical and lacks data. Under headings and Festinger. Jones frequently mentions impres- such as “persons as origins” and “the relations between sion formation as a moderator or mediator, if not causal units and the properties of their parts,” he the focus of investigation. Th is characterized his uses gestalt principles of perceptual organization to own research as well (e.g., Jones, 1990) and reminds develop some of the central ideas that became attribu- us that the study of impression formation, isolated tion theory. Th e other article was the classic paper by from the urgencies of particular social situations Asch (1946), to which we return below. and goals, can become a pallid and lifeless aff air. Two lines of research with more than 50 cita- Jones (1985) also discusses “the rise of subjectivism tions surfaced in the 1950s. Tajfel’s (1959) paper in the 1930s and 1940s,” particularly its impor- became important for research on social categoriza- tance in legitimizing Lewin’s approach. “W. K. Estes tion and social identity, which remained a distinctly [a student of Skinner’s and pioneer in mathemati- European line of research for several decades. Even cal learning theory] . . . found Lewinian fi eld theory though social identity and ingroup/outgroup status incapable of a priori prediction and lacking in have important eff ects on impression formation (see functional relationship statements that could be Tajfel, 1969, 1970), Tajfel does not appear in the anchored in measureable stimuli and observable name index of Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth’s responses” (p. 84). And so it is. Nevertheless, the (1979) text on person perception. He makes only enterprise prospered. two minor appearances in the fi rst edition of Fiske and Taylor’s (1984) text on social cognition, in Research on Impression Formation discussions of schemata. Th ese were lean years for Before Social Cognition European social psychology. To aid its recovery, To take advantage of the hindsight that the European Association for Social Psychology PsycINFO (now ProQuest) citation counts aff ord, was founded in 1966 with American support, and we examined them for publications through 1980 Henri Tajfel (n é e Hersz Mordche, 1919–1982) was that are retrieved by the key words impression for- central in this eff ort. mation, person perception, social cognition , or social Th e other papers concerned accuracy in person perception . Th ere were only three articles with more perception. Bieri (1955) investigated the role of than 50 citations before 1950, and they refl ect the judges’ cognitive complexity. Taft (1955) reviewed diversity of traditions that contributed to research research on fi ve prominent ways to identify good on impression formation. Th e earliest, by Th orndike judges, discussed several factors that led to incon- and Stein (1937), is in the burgeoning psychomet- sistent research results, and counted “motivation ric tradition noted above. Some 17 years earlier, (to make accurate judgments)” as probably the Th orndike had suggested that there are three types most important of these. Th e number of combina- of intelligence: abstract, mechanical, and social tions of tasks and criteria and judges’ cognitive and (“the ability to understand and manage people”). motivational characteristics was daunting and pre- Th orndike and Stein (1937) reviewed the most cluded any clear conclusions. Two other papers— widely used measures of the day. Th ey found that by Cronbach (1955) and Gage and Cronbach their social intelligence measure correlated poorly (1955)—presented trenchant criticisms of accuracy with other such measures and was hardly distinct research. Th is diverted research away from accuracy from abstract intelligence. Th is raised the questions for decades, encouraged research on attributions of whether such a trait can be measured solely with because they usually sidestepped accuracy, and laid paper-and-pencil tests and of whether it even exists. the foundation for modern accuracy research. We Th is existence question contradicts the recurring pick up this thread below.

56 A Brief History of Theory and Research on Impression Formation

004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 5566 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM During the 1960s, four trends can be seen. First, 1970), they have the virtues of ubiquity and of natu- accuracy disappeared as a prominent research topic. rally linking to the literature on attitudes. Although occasional studies concerned real people, Fourth, Norman Anderson’s work (1965, 1971, research increasingly employed artifi cial stimuli 1974, 1981) on predicting evaluative impressions from for which traditional “accuracy” had no meaning. linear combinations of traits’ valences, and on order Second, attribution theory and other cognitive eff ects, achieved considerable prominence. Linear approaches developed rapidly. Th e cognitive revo- functions certainly provide good fi rst approxima- lution came to social psychology and merged with tions for many things, and are clear and tractable. But its gestalt tradition. Attributions developed as a Anderson’s models assumed that the evaluative mean- separate research tradition. Motivational and func- ings of individual traits are invariant and unaff ected tional approaches receded in importance and were by context—an assumption already contradicted by often at odds with cognitive ones (e.g., Bem, 1967). considerable research. His work was challenged; a “Information” (colloquially, rather than in the sense spirited controversy ensued (e.g., Anderson, 1971; of Shannon & Weaver, 1949) became the coin of Hamilton & Zanna, 1974); and the fi eld lost interest the realm (e.g., Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961). in his models. But the controversy nicely illustrates Interest surged in schemata (or schemas) of all kinds, the diff erence between models that predict outcomes including stereotypes. Kuethe (1962) recast gestalt with some precision and models that also represent unit formation ideas in terms of social schema and the processes involved. In resolving this controversy response sets and biases, and demonstrated again in favor of meaning change, the fi eld moved deeper the strong eff ects of perceivers’ schemata on “per- into analyzing processes, setting the stage for the sov- ception.” Crowne and Marlowe (1960) developed ereignty of social cognition (Ostrom, 1984). their measure of social desirability response bias, to make measures of self-perceptions more accurate. Updating Enduring Research And De Soto, London, and Handel (1965) exam- Traditions from Pre-1970 ined the use of spatial schemata in solving linear Th e papers discussed above are widely cited syllogisms, as when better and worse are placed on because they continue to inspire research and gener- a vertical axis. Th ey made the very gestalt-like sug- ate new insights. We briefl y trace their infl uence, gestion “that the linear ordering is a preeminent and its evolution into the social cognition of impres- cognitive good fi gure” (p. 513). sion formation, by picking up three major threads. Th ird, the fi eld confronted the problem of pro- liferating dependent variables. Th e terms in which Asch and the Focus on Traits one conceives of others are innumerable. Rosenberg, Asch’s (1946) classic paper, although in the Nelson, and Vivekananthan (1968) tackled this gestalt tradition, cut through the many theoretical problem in the most widely cited paper of the decade. complexities of impression formation by off ering Th ey used multidimensional scaling to analyze the a simple experimental paradigm and focusing on co-occurrence of trait terms in participants’ descrip- traits. Asch presented participants with fi ctional tar- tions of 10 acquaintances, and then multiple regres- get people described in lists of traits and asked them sion to interpret the resulting dimensions. (Twenty to form impressions, sometimes in brief sketches and years earlier, without computers to do the calcula- sometimes on bipolar scale ratings. Results enabled tions, this research would have been prohibitively him to identify some traits (warm, cold ) as central laborious.) Th ey identifi ed two dimensions: good– (vs. peripheral) in that they had more eff ect on the bad intellectual (e.g., scientifi c vs. foolish ) and good– overall impression and on the meanings of other bad social (e.g., honest vs. unhappy ), both evaluative traits. He also discussed order eff ects (“primacy,” in but in distinct ways. Evaluation emerged as the pre- which the fi rst items in the list aff ect impressions ferred dependent variable in other work. Parducci more; and “recency,” in which the last items aff ect (1968) found context eff ects for evaluative ratings impressions more) and halo eff ects (in which the of misdeeds, from “not particular bad” to “very evil.” evaluation associated with some traits spreads to oth- Byrne, London, and Reeves (1968) found that a ers). He argued that impressions have structure and stranger’s attractiveness was more aff ected by atti- that the meanings of their elements (traits) depend tudinal similarity than physical attractiveness, sup- on which other elements are present. Anticipating porting his similarity theory of attraction. Although future research, he wondered whether similar prin- evaluations miss much of the meaning of traits and ciples govern impressions of groups (e.g., entitativ- other descriptive terms (see especially Peabody, ity) or relationships. As important as Asch’s ideas

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 5577 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM were, the paradigm pioneered in his paper is just pair such as polite–blunt that is not ordinarily central as important. It initiated the experimental study of can be made central by tapping impressions on impression formation, focused on traits and their scales that correlate highly with it. Th is correlational combinations, and still inspires research. approach to the organization of traits was extended Luchins (1948) soon off ered many criticisms, by Rosenberg et al. (1968). Zanna and Hamilton perhaps best summed up this way: “To begin with (1972) showed that trait descriptions could change discrete traits, to take the processes involved in the impression ratings on one dimension without aff ect- formation and growth of impressions of people out ing the other. Industrious vs. lazy aff ected ratings on of their natural milieu, and to neglect personal and only the intellectual dimension, whereas warm vs. social infl uences may achieve experimental neat- cold aff ected the social dimension. ness, but at the expense of understanding of every- Orehek, Dechesne, Fishbach, Kruglanski, and day judgments of people” (p. 325). Others took Chun (2010) obtained evidence that this structure these criticisms as empirical challenges and began depends on perceivers’ beliefs about traits’ unidirec- building on the paradigm, enriching the stimuli tional implications for other traits. Th ey showed that and focusing on diff erences among perceivers. For implications between traits are unidirectional rather example, Jones (1954) had navy recruits listen to than bidirectional as correlational or co-occurrence mock interviews with a platoon leader, form writ- analyses assume; that individual diff erences in these ten impressions, and then rate him on 30 traits. beliefs mediate such eff ects; that manipulating Th e interviews portrayed either a forceful or pas- these beliefs changes these eff ects; and that they are sive leader. Among other fi ndings, “authoritarians reduced under cognitive load when the stimuli are seem to be more insensitive . . . to the psychological blurry. Th ese results are inconsistent with the bidi- and personality characteristics of others” (p. 126). rectional links in most current associative models of In another dissertation study, Gollin (1954) found impression formation. “that the formation of an impression of the personality of another is a function not only of the charac- recent extensions of asch teristics of the person being observed, but also . . . of Recently the Asch paradigm was employed in the underlying perceptual-cognitive organizing pro- two research programs that Asch (1908–1996) cess in the observer” (p. 76). Students watched fi lm would have enjoyed. Williams and Bargh (2008) clips of a woman behaving promiscuously in two added to the growing evidence that bodily experi- clips and kindly in three clips, so they had to resolve ence can unconsciously aff ect behaviors and cogni- inconsistencies. Th ose who “simplifi ed” rather than tions. Th ey had participants form impressions of a “aggregated” or “related” impressions from the clips target person described by the same list of traits that made more extreme evaluative ratings. Asch (1946) used, but without the traits warm or Decades later, Asch (and Zukier, 1984) returned cold . Participants incidentally held either a warm or to trait stimuli to explore the many ways in which a cold cup of coff ee before making their ratings. Th e inconsistencies are resolved. Th ey characterized warm or cold cup had the same eff ect on impres- targets with pairs of inconsistent traits and asked sions as Asch demonstrated with traits 62 years ear- participants to describe the targets and explain the lier. Participants were completely unaware of these traits’ interrelations. Participants did this easily and eff ects, suggesting that awareness of some stimuli’s exhibited seven “modes of resolution,” including relevance (or irrelevance) for the task at hand is not enabling, means–ends, cause–eff ect, and inner– required for trait centrality eff ects. outer relations. Asch and Zukier noted that more Th e second research program concerns Trope and “elementaristic” approaches to impression forma- Liberman’s (2010) construal level theory (CLT) of tion (e.g., Anderson, 1981) cannot accommodate the eff ects of psychological distance. CLT holds that these fi ndings. Formally describing and predict- more distant stimuli are processed more abstractly. ing the many ways that inconsistent elements can Based on the ideas that schema-driven processing is be combined to form impressions still remains a more abstract than piecemeal processing and that challenge. the primacy eff ect is schema based, Eyal, Hoover, Fujita, and Nussbaum (2011) found primacy eff ects trait centrality for temporally distant targets and among partici- What makes warm–cold central? Wishner (1960) pants primed to think abstractly. When targets were found that central traits are those that correlate temporally near or participants were primed to think highly with the other traits that are assessed. Th us, a concretely, recency eff ects occurred. McCarthy and

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 5588 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM Skowronski (2011b) examined the eff ect of psy- a close linkage between self- and other-perception. chological distance on the impact of warm–cold on Fourth, . . . people, unlike objects, change when they impressions. Because Asch (1946) argued that this are with diff erent interaction partners” (p. 14). impact depends on abstract confi gurational think- Th ere is more. Kenny’s (2004) PERSON “model ing, they manipulated spatial distance in Study 1a can explain the low level of consensus in person per- and temporal distance in Study 1b. In both studies, ception, the fact that consensus does not increase the eff ect of warm–cold was greater the more dis- with greater acquaintance, the strong stability of tant the target was. Th us, “looking at old paradigms interpersonal judgment, the overconfi dence eff ect, through the lens of new theories and knowledge will and the fact that short-term judgments are some- continue to produce fruitful results” (p. 1306). times as accurate as long-term judgments” (p. 265), among other things. Kenny, West, Malloy, and Cronbach and the Question of Accuracy Albright (2006) discussed the general advantages and Cronbach published his classic paper in 1955 disadvantages of componential analyses of interper- on accuracy in impression formation and how it sonal perception. Kenny and West (2010) presented should be measured, using an elegant ANOVA-like “new measures of assumed similarity and self-other analysis of the multiple processes that contribute to agreement using the Social Relations Model [which, accuracy. For example, it was well known by then based on a meta-analysis,] seem to be relatively inde- that people usually assume that others are similar to pendent of [several potential] moderators” (p. 196). themselves. So if they actually are, their impressions And West and Kenny (2011) described a general will be accurate; otherwise, not. Th e paper decom- model for measuring truth (accuracy) and bias (“any posed both accuracy and assumed similarity scores. systematic factor that judgments are being attracted It showed how accuracy can be decomposed into toward, besides the truth,” p. 360). Meanwhile, the independent contributions from judges’ assump- intuition persists that there exist both good judges tions or knowledge about (1) the general level of (Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Quirk, traits among targets, (2) the diff erences among trait & Burns, 2005; Mayer et al., 2008) and social intel- levels across targets, (3) the diff erences among tar- ligence (Weis & S üß , 2007) that somehow trump gets across traits, and (4) the unique standing of the statistical interactions among perceiver, target, particular targets on particular traits. Apparently, and task and provide simpler answers to this com- “assumed similarity” can be similarly decomposed. plex problem of accuracy in person perception. Cronbach’s analysis might have led to further Models that take accuracy criteria into account studies on accuracy, but it did not. Instead, it are relevant to process questions. Simulation theory seemed to discourage further research on the prob- (Perner & K ü hberger, 2005; Saxe, 2005) holds that lem because of its complexity. Th us, the question perceivers infer characteristics of others by imagin- of accuracy in person perception essentially disap- ing themselves in the same situation, interrogating peared from the research agenda until Kenny and their knowledge of themselves in that situation, Albright (1987) revived it 30 years later. It is beyond and adjusting for known self–other diff erences to the scope of this chapter to describe what followed, derive characterizations of others. Errors in the fi rst except to say that Kenny, his models, his colleagues, step of imagining oneself in another situation arise and the desk-top computer have put the study of from “the empathy gap” (Van Boven & Lowenstein, accuracy in person perception back on solid theo- 2003), and errors occur in perceiving self–other dif- retical and methodological ground. Kenny (1994) ferences (e.g., Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004). presented his basic social relations model, which Oddly, such accuracy research does not fall within disentangles “three fundamentally diff erent types of traditional “social cognition,” which is typically perceptions: other-perception, self-perception, and unconcerned with accuracy or interactions between meta-perception” (p. 15). Th is requires a research real people (see also Funder, 1995; Gill & Swann, design in which many participants act as both per- 2004; and Ickes, 2009). Th e research designs, stim- ceivers and targets so that perceiver, target, and inter- uli, dependent variables, and statistical analyses are action eff ects can be distinguished. He pointed out too diff erent, even though both traditions rely heav- that person perception diff ers from object perception. ily on trait concepts and ratings, and both examine “First, person perception is two-sided: Each person processes (cognitive and interpersonal, respectively). is both perceiver and target. Second, . . . perceivers Although the divergence in these lines of research attempt to read the minds of targets and engage in made advances in each possible, they will have to be what is called ‘meta-perception.’ Th ird, . . . there is reunited in the future.

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 5599 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM Rosenberg and the Organization It was inspired by developments in cognitive psy- of Impressions chology at about this time (e.g., Anderson & Bower, Rosenberg et al. (1968) identifi ed two relatively 1973; Collins & Quillian, 1969). independent evaluative dimensions underlying trait impressions. Do these dimensions refl ect the under- fundamental dimensions lying structure of personality and behavior (realism), of social judgment or merely perceivers’ theories about what things go Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, and Kashima together (idealism)? Such theories are known as (2005) have dubbed the warmth and competence implicit personality theories (Rosenberg & Sedlak, dimensions of Rosenberg et al. (1968) as funda- 1972; Schneider, 1973). Passini and Norman (1966) mental (or the “Big Two,” in homage to the Big had shown that trait ratings of complete strangers Five personality dimensions) because they keep yield the same structure (the “Big Five”) as rating of reappearing in impressions of both individuals well-known others, suggesting that semantic struc- and groups. Th ey form the basis for the stereotype ture, rather than actual co-occurrences, is respon- content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, sible. Sorting this out has not been easy because it 2002) and its more recent elaboration, the Behaviors depends on distinguishing sources of biases from from Intergroup Aff ect and Stereotypes (BIAS) map accuracy, the very issues that Cronbach (1955) and (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). In these models, Kenny (1994) grappled with and that West and impressions of group members vary along the two Kenny (2011) address directly in their truth and dimensions of competence, predicted by social bias model. Th ere is no general answer because in status, and warmth, predicted by low social com- each specifi c circumstance, the infl uences of truth petition with perceivers. Th e low-low quadrant con- and bias depend on relations between behavioral tains such groups as the homeless and poor, toward or self-report criteria and perceivers’ prior theo- whom people feel contempt and resentment; and ries, goals, attention and memory, communications the high-high quadrant contains professionals and among perceivers in acquiring new information, ingroup members, toward whom people feel pride and so forth. For example, Anderson and Shirako and admiration. Th e low-competence, high-warmth (2008) had people negotiate with each other over quadrant describes the elderly, who elicit pity and several weeks to discover how much actual behavior sympathy, whereas the other ambivalent quadrant predicted negotiating reputation. “Individuals’ rep- (high-low) contains the wealthy, the “top 1%,” who utations were only mildly related to their history of elicit envy and jealousy. Th e BIAS map (Cuddy et behavior. However, the link between reputation and al., 2007) relates all this to behaviors toward stereo- behavior was stronger for . . . individuals who were typed groups, with characteristic emotions medi- more well-known and received more social attention ating relations between stereotypes and behaviors. in the community. In contrast, for less well-known Talaska, Fiske, and Chaiken’s (2008) meta-analysis individuals, their behavior had little impact on showed that emotions predict discrimination twice their reputation. Th e fi ndings have implications for as well as stereotypes. Groups in the low-low quad- psychologists’ understanding of reputations, per- rant are less likely to elicit the medial prefrontal son perceptions in larger groups, and the costs and cortex activity that is characteristic of “mentalizing” benefi ts of social visibility” (p. 320) about others, suggesting that dehumanization and Ignoring issues of accuracy, however, as most becoming the target of atrocities is more likely for impression formation research has done, there are such groups (Harris & Fiske, 2009). surprising regularities in the underlying structure In comparative judgments of social groups, these of people’s judgments of others. We note three of two dimensions have a compensatory relationship them here. Th e fi rst follows directly from the think- so that, for example, learning that a group is high on ing behind Rosenberg et al. (1968) and is based on competence lowers estimates of warmth (Yzerbyt, correlations or co-occurrences among rating scales. Provost, & Corneille, 2005). Th ere is a “tendency to Th e second builds on the generic gestalt concept diff erentiate two social targets in a comparative con- of “schemata,” organized structures that aff ect how text on the two fundamental dimensions by con- knowledge is interpreted and remembered (e.g., trasting them in a compensatory direction” (Kervyn, Bartlett, 1932). Th e third derives from British asso- Yzerbyt, Judd, & Nunes, 2009, p. 829). Aaker, Vohs, ciationism and conceives of impression structures in and Mogilner (2010) have extended this to impres- terms of interconnected nodes in associative mem- sions of companies. Th ey showed that fi rms with ory networks and the connections between them. Internet addresses ending in dot-com are seen as

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 6600 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM more competent but less warm than dot-org fi rms, (2011) found that when forming global impres- and that perceptions of competence drive purchas- sions, participants preferred morality information ing decisions. In contrast, Abele and Bruckmueller to both sociability and competence information (2011) found that for person perception, warmth about other people, and this preference changed for information is preferentially processed. other goals. Perceivers were also most likely to use Two similar dimensions turn up in inferences of a disconfi rming strategy in verifying morality traits. personality from faces. Todorov, Said, Engel, and Th erefore, these two (or three) fundamental Oosterhof (2008) asked for personality trait impres- dimensions provide one way to describe the relatively sions from a wide range of computer-generated faces stable (and conditionally invoked; Garcia-Marques with neutral expressions. Th ey found that “trait infer- et al., 2010) semantic space within which impres- ences can be represented within a 2D space defi ned sions of persons and groups can be located. But this by valence/trustworthiness and power/dominance kind of structure is relatively static and unrelated to evaluation of faces . . . . based on similarity to expres- the dynamics of information processing. Th is is not sions signaling approach or avoidance behavior and true of the next two approaches. features signaling physical strength, respectively” (p. 455). Stewart et al. (2012) found that partici- associative memory networks pants took longer to consciously see untrustworthy Social psychologists appropriated this idea from and dominant faces and that this delay was longer cognitive psychologists (e.g., Anderson & Bower, for trusting perceivers, pointing to unconscious eval- 1973; Collins & Quillian, 1969), for whom per- uation of faces on these social dimensions. formance on various memory tasks is an essential How ubiquitous is this two-dimensional orga- tool for uncovering the structures and processing nization of person information? Is it specialized of mental representations. (You cannot really talk for and used only for social perception, or is it less about processes separate from structure because conditional? Garcia-Marques et al. (2010) used the they depend on each.) Th ese networks describe Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false recogni- mental structures as nodes (concepts) connected by tion paradigm to study this. Participants heard lists links that transmit activation (and sometimes inhi- of 10 traits from one of the four quadrants, mixed bition) among nodes. Nodes become linked to each with six nontraits, and were asked to either form an other when they are activated together (contiguity), impression of the person or memorize the list. After thereby building up a structure of associated con- a 10-minute distracter, they performed a recogni- cepts. Memory performance (errors, reaction times, tion test of 43 items, including 20 critical lures that etc.) is a function of such structures and how they had not been heard, fi ve from each quadrant. Th e are used. Unlike the Big Two, these structures are DRM paradigm typically fi nds high false recogni- dynamic and built to change. Smith (1998) provides tion for words conceptually related to study words. an excellent overview of ways of thinking about Th is eff ect was higher for those under impression mental representations and memory, including instructions than under memory instructions, sug- associative memory networks; and see Chapters 10 gesting “that diff erent encoding goals can lead to and 11 of this volume for others. the activation of somewhat diff erent semantic struc- Th e notion that concepts activated in semantic tures” (pp. 565–566). memory play a role in person perception has been Two dimensions may be too few because “moral- around at least since Bruner (1957) outlined how ity” is especially important for ingroup perception. activation increases a concept’s accessibility (i.e., Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto (2007) pointed out its likelihood of being used to process incoming that warmth includes both sociability and morality information.) Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) and found morality is more important than com- demonstrated this in their classic study of the fi c- petence or sociability in aff ecting ingroup evalua- tional Donald. Participants for whom “reckless” tions and group-related self-concept. Furthermore, (versus “adventurous”) was unobtrusively activated, “identifi cation with experimentally created . . . and and who then read an ambiguous description preexisting . . . in-groups predicted the ascription of of Donald’s actions to which either concept was morality, but not competence or sociability, to the applicable, were more likely to characterize him in in-group” (p. 234). Th ese two aspects of warmth— terms of the primed trait. Both frequent and recent morality and sociability—seem to play diff erent concept use (activation) increases accessibility for roles in the perception of both individuals and subsequent information processing, with eff ects groups. Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, and Cherubini of recent activation decaying more quickly than

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 6611 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM those of frequent activation (Higgins, Bargh, & Klein and Loftus (1990) provided evidence that Lombardi, 1985). superior recall under impression formation may Concept nodes are linked in associative networks, be due, not to more inter-item links, but rather to and activation (and inhibition) spreads from one more semantic elaboration of the items themselves. node to others. Such structures have been used to And of course other organizational structures are describe many aspects of semantic memory (e.g., possible, depending on the perceiver’s goals and the Anderson & Bower, 1973). Hastie and Kumar information itself. Sedikides and Ostrom (1988) (1979) used such a model to describe how people did a meta-analysis of studies that asked partici- organize information about others in memory. Th eir pants to form impressions of multiple unfamiliar participants formed impressions and remembered targets accompanied by other information (hobbies, information about a small number of targets. Each hometowns, etc.) that might be used to organize this target was described fi rst by eight synonyms of a trait, information in memory. Based on clustering in free setting up an expectation, and then by many behav- recall, they concluded that “person categories are no iors. Most were consistent with the trait, but some more preferred than nonperson categories . . . [and] were inconsistent, and some were neutral. Contrary seem not to hold a privileged position in the organi- to what simple schema (e.g., Bartlett, 1932) and zation of social information” (p. 263). prototype theories (Cantor & Mischel, 1977) would Associative network models are powerful because predict, the proportion of free recall was better for they can make many precise predictions, including inconsistent than consistent behaviors, and this serial-position eff ects (how the order of studied items eff ect was greater for shorter inconsistent lists. aff ects likelihood of recall), recall and recognition To account for these results, Hastie and Kumar times, and clustering in free recall. Even though the (1979) proposed that participants constructed hier- full power of associative network models has seldom archical network structures with the person node been exploited by social psychologists, such gen- (e.g., James Bartlett) at the top, linked to several eral frameworks—with traits connected to targets, “organizing principles” such as traits (honest, deceit- behaviors connected to traits, and spreading activa- ful) below that, each of which is linked in turn to tion among them—remain common in social cog- the several behaviors (returned a lost wallet, cheated nitive theories of impression formation. Hastie and at poker) below that. Th en recall occurs by start- Kumar’s (1979) model was among the fi rst to exem- ing at the top target node, traversing descending plify the ideal of a fully explicit cognitive structure links with probabilities equal to the inverse of the with mechanical (non-anthropomorphic) procedures number of links from that node, and reading out for employing it. However, its precise and explicit behaviors that have not yet been recalled. Th is alone nature limited applications because it only applies cannot account for the superior recall of inconsis- to a circumscribed set of conditions. Furthermore, tent behaviors because there are fewer inconsistent social (vs. cognitive) psychologists are relatively dis- trait–behavior links. But they also proposed that interested in detailed modeling of particular cogni- inter-item links among behaviors occur whenever tive processes and in testing them with parametric the items are surprising or novel and require elabo- studies. Many social psychologists needed a way to ration or explanation. Th is produces more links to talk about knowledge structures and their operation inconsistent items, increasing their likelihood of at a more general level, while avoiding such “prema- recall (see Figure 5.6 in Hastie, 1980). ture” precision. Schemata fi ll the bill. Th is general cognitive structure was invoked by Hamilton, Leirer, and Katz (1980) to explain their schemata fi nding that people recall more behavioral informa- Schemata are organized knowledge structures that tion about target persons if they acquire it under an summarize experience and/or information about impression formation than under a memory goal. particular objects (the self-schema, stereotypes) or Th e information about each target could be orga- events (the restaurant and birthday party scripts). nized around a few traits, and because forming an Th ey are typically richer, more complex, and more impression requires organizing information, this is vaguely specifi ed than associative networks built up what impression formation (as opposed to memory) node by link by node. Th ey’re often referred to as participants did by creating inter-item links. Th is “top-down” rather than “bottom-up” because they aff ected not only the amount of free recall but also infl uence processing of current information rather the degree to which the recalled items were clus- than describe how these structures are built up. Th ey tered by trait. usually operate outside of consciousness and aff ect

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 6622 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM the direction of attention at encoding, the interpre- contributions by Ostrom, Pryor, and Simpson; tation of ambiguous events, inferences about things Hastie; Taylor, and Crocker; Hamilton; Wyer, not directly observed including causality, and retrieval and Srull; McArthur (né e Zebrowitz); Ebbesen; cues and processing strategy. Th ey vary in accessi- M. Snyder; M. Ross; R. M. Krauss; and Higgins, bility, depending on their frequency and recency of Kuiper, and Olsen. Th e fi rst issue of Social Cognition use (Higgins, 1996). Schemata may be primed, pro- hit the stands in 1982, under Dave Schneider’s edi- vided, directly assessed, or simply assumed. Much torship. So 1980 was a watershed year. Th e distinc- social cognition research on impression formation is tive social cognition emphases on understanding conceptualized in terms of schemata. processes rather than merely outcomes, and on the For example, in a study designed to show that use of memory and response time measures to do traits function as prototypes, Cantor and Mischel so, had been established. (1977) developed four stimulus targets based on pre- It is beyond the scope of this chapter to trace testing trait adjectives for their perceived likelihood all the important lines of research addressing of describing an introvert or extravert (prototypes). impression formation; and some have already been Th en participants read descriptions of an introvert, sketched. Furthermore, many of other the chapters an extravert, and two unrelated targets under mem- of this handbook address topics that include sec- ory instructions, each containing about 40 traits. tions on impression formation, including at least Th eir recognition memory for traits was tested, Chapters 6 (on, attribution theory), 7 (on attitudes, and their confi dence in recognizing each item was for implicit and explicit evaluations of others), 9 rated. Even though participants showed consider- (on facial processing, for how faces provide infor- able accurate recognition memory, their confi dence mation on traits, group membership, and aff ect), 10 in “recognizing” introvert- or extravert-related but (on mental representation, for the variety of ways in nonpresented trait foils was elevated when the trait which person information can be represented), 11 list suggested (or explicitly mentioned) introversion (on implicit representation), and 13 (on behavior or extraversion. Th at is, the lists primed introvert, productions, for interpreting others’ behaviors, as extravert, or neither, and these schemata guided well as Chapters 5 and 27 (on prejudice and stereo- subsequent recognition performance, leading to typing, for an aspect of impression formation that schema-consistent errors. Andersen and Klatzky has burgeoned into its own extensive literature). In (1987) examined whether introverted and extra- fact, we often contend that impression formation is verted “social stereotypes” (i.e., types, such as brain, “about everything” in social psychology, so also see politician, and comedian ) are associatively richer and Chapters 29 (on relational cognition), 34 (on social more distinctive than trait prototypes. Th ey found cognitive neuroscience), 36 (on social cognitive support for this idea in cluster analyses of trait sort- development), 37 (on cross-cultural psychology), ing data, number of features generated to traits 38 (on personality), 39 (on behavioral economics), versus types, and the structure of their associations. and 41 (on political psychology). Instead of trying to be encyclopedic, we sketch Some Major Topics in Social Cognitive major developments since 1980 on several topics Studies of Impression Formation not likely to be treated elsewhere in this volume: the By 1980, social cognition had emerged as a dis- dominance of negative information in impression tinctive approach to issues in social psychology, and formation; eff ects of goals on forming impressions, impression formation was at its center. Some of including forming impressions without impression this was presaged by Wegner and Vallacher’s (1977) formation goals (spontaneous trait inferences); and Implicit Psychology , but neither of them had the posi- then briefl y, eff ects of signifi cant others on per- tion or the students at the time to power a move- ceiving strangers (social cognitive transference); ment. In 1980, Person Memory (Hastie, Ostrom, forming impressions of people and groups; and Ebbesen, Wyer, Hamilton, & Carlston, 1980) was the perception of people as moral agents and as published by the group of scholars who were central human beings. in shaping the social cognition approach. It was the year after Wyer and Carlston’s (1979) groundbreak- Negativity Eff ects ing book and theory, focused largely on impression negative items have more weight formation. Th e following year, the fi rst Ontario In early work on Anderson’s (1965, 1974) infor- Symposium (Higgins, Herman, & Zanna, 1981) mation integration, weighted averaging model, appeared, devoted to social cognition and with the meanings of traits on some (usually evaluative)

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 6633 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM dimension that described a target were averaged than poor performance (which is negative) is of low to predict the overall impression. One fi nding was ability because anyone can have a bad day, whereas that negative (and extreme) traits were given greater immoral behavior (negative) is more diagnostic of weight in the average, so that a –5 (dishonest) and a morality than is moral behavior (positive) because +1 (polite) produced a –3 rather than a –2. Several even evil people can act good. Th us, behavior diag- models attempted to explain this, in terms of stimu- nosticity is not independent of domain or valence. lus values. Skowronski and Carlston (1989) outline all these models clearly, along with their failings. personality domain effects Expectancy-contrast theories assume that stimuli Wojciszke, Brycz, and Borkenau (1993) docu- for impressions are evaluated relative to a standard mented diff erences between positivity and negativity that is moderate and positive, and that this produces biases in the ability and morality domains, by vary- contrast eff ects (more extreme evaluations) for the ing behavioral extremity. Participants read about stimuli. Such standards (e.g., adaptation levels) do targets who performed four behaviors, all either exist, but they should already be incorporated into in the ability or morality domain, and all either the original evaluations of the individual stimulus moderate or extreme. Th ey found that in terms of items (traits). Frequency-weight theories assume trait inferences and global evaluations, “extremely that more costly (Jones & McGillis, 1976) or more evaluative information results in negativity eff ects novel (Fiske, 1980) behaviors are more informative whereas moderately evaluative information results and hence weighted more heavily. Although there is in positivity eff ects” (p. 332). Th ere were two main some support for these theories, there is also research eff ects and no interaction. And ratings were posi- indicating that cost and novelty do not completely tive for ability but negative for morality. Th eir fi nd- account for the greater weight of negative (and ings link to Skowronski and Carlston (1989) in that extreme) behaviors. Finally, range theories (e.g., more extreme behaviors were more prototypical for Wyer, 1973) predict impressions from the overlap relevant traits. But their larger claim is that these in the range of (usually evaluative) implications of two main eff ects “refl ect the goals and interests the behaviors or traits. Unfortunately, these theories of perceivers. . . . If they [others] are not compe- break down when there are three or more cues. tent . . . they [perceivers] can usually turn to someone Skowronski and Carlston (1989) off ered their else. . . . In contrast, perceivers are more aff ected by own “category diagnosticity approach,” which states the immoral than moral behavior of other persons that cues (traits, behaviors, etc.) have more weight because immoral behavior may threaten perceivers’ if they are more diagnostic of the dimension or well-being . . . ” (p. 333). Th erefore, domain and per- category of judgment. Diagnosticity is defi ned in ceivers’ potential outcomes are crucial. Immorality terms of reducing uncertainty in choosing among in others is more harmful than competence is ben- responses or categories, consistent with Shannon efi cial, so the result is a bias toward negativity. Th is and Weaver (1949) defi nition of information. Th is focus on the consequences of behaviors for perceiv- defi nition, coupled with the observation that nega- ers, as a determinant of target ratings, is supported tive (and extreme) behaviors are generally more and elaborated by Vonk (1996, 1998). diagnostic, produces negativity eff ects. Note that diagnosticity refl ects perceivers’ implicit theories of processing differences relations between cues and judgments, which may Th ere are also important valence diff erences or may not be captured by cue properties alone, in early stages of information processing. Pratto such as how novel or ambiguous or counternorma- and John (1991) found that negative information tive the cues are. Critically, the diagnosticity of cues automatically attracts attention more than positive depends on their meaning in the context of particu- information and leads to higher incidental memory lar judgment tasks and is not inherent in any invari- (free recall). Th ey measured the capture of atten- ant property of the cues in isolation. Skowronski tion by asking subjects to name the colors in which and Carlston (1989) cite considerable evidence trait words were printed. Subjects were signifi cantly supporting this formulation, including Reeder and slower to name colors for negative traits (23 milli- Brewer’s (1979) work on how schemata for judg- seconds across three studies) because negative traits ing ability and morality diff er, with a positivity captured more of their attention. Th is was unrelated bias more common for ability and a negativity bias to traits’ extremity or base rates. Although not tested more common for morality. Superior performance here, these automatic eff ects might well contrib- (which is positive) is more diagnostic of high ability ute to negativity eff ects in impression formation,

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 6644 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM especially when subjects do not have an impression in that negativity increases more rapidly with formation goal and when impressions are memory approach in space or time; they dominate equally based. Such eff ects diff er from those based on diag- positive events when information is integrated (seen nosticity because they are insensitive to extremity, clearly in impression formation); and they are more which usually correlates with diagnosticity. diff erentiated and complex. Th is last feature is seen Processing diff erences were also found by Abele in the 20 languages Rozin, Berman, and Royzman and Bruckmueller (2011), but based on domain (2010) surveyed, in that negative events are more rather than valence. After Wojciszke et al.’s (1993) likely to be lexicalized and are described by marked emphasis on perceivers’ outcomes, they pos- rather than unmarked adjectives. ited that of the Big Two domains noted above— Compelling as this generality is, it is unclear agency (competence) and communion (including how much these negativity eff ects are based on morality)—communal traits would be processed the same processes. After all—as with assimilation more readily. Th ey used a pool of 112 traits rated and contrast eff ects—dividing phenomena into on valence, agency, and communion, and balanced dichotomous categories such as positive and nega- for frequency in German. Communal traits were tive is almost guaranteed to combine outcomes with recognized faster than agency traits in a lexical deci- diverse origins. Yet negativity in all its varieties is sion task, and were categorized faster by valence widespread. Th e search for unifying processes, more than agency words, independent of valence. Forty specifi c than general appeals to evolutionary sur- behaviors implying helpful and friendly (for com- vival, will continue. munal) and competent and determined (for agency) were probed for their trait implications; responses Goals: Conscious and Nonconscious, were faster for communal behaviors, and this was Present and Absent also unaff ected by counterbalanced valence. Finally, Goals have top-down eff ects on a wide variety of participants freely described a fellow student. psychological processes (see Chapter 23) and impres- Communal traits were used more frequently than sion formation is no exception. Th ey create expec- agency traits and occurred earlier in the descrip- tancies, make relevant concepts selectively active or tions. Th is “preferential processing” of communal inactive, shape interpretations and memories, entail information is functional because communal traits standards of comparison, and so forth. In an early have greater potential to help or harm perceivers symposium at Harvard University on person per- and to signal approach or avoidance. It is also conception, Jones and Th ibaut (1958) emphasized the sistent with De Bruin and Van Lange’s (2000) dem- importance of situations, roles, and goals for impres- onstration that people select communal over agency sion formation. Th ey described value maintenance, information to fi nd out about a future interaction causal-genetic, and situation-matching goals as partner, and spend more time reading the commu- each producing its unique “inferential set.” Cohen nal information. (1961) looked at goals’ eff ects on the resolution of inconsistent trait information. Th ose presented generality of negativity with trait lists and given the goal of conveying their Negativity eff ects are quite general. Klein (1996) impressions to others were more likely to ignore showed that negative personality traits were more inconsistent information and form extreme impres- predictive of overall evaluations and voting behavior sions. Hoff man and colleagues examined eff ects of than positive traits. And negativity eff ects go beyond goals on how others are construed from behaviors. impression formation. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Hoff man, Mischel, and Mazze (1981) showed that Finkenauer, and Vohs (2001) and Rozin and memory and empathy goals favored construal in Royzman (2001) off ered wide-ranging surveys of goal terms, whereas impression formation and pre- the ways in which negative information dominates diction goals favored trait terms. Hoff man, Mischel, positive. Baumeister et al. (2001) reviewed research and Baer (1984) showed that verbal (vs. nonverbal) on relationships, emotions, learning and memory, communication goals make perceivers more likely neuroscience, the self, health, and so forth. Rozin to use trait constructs. et al. (2001) were even broader, drawing on liter- Hilton and Darley (1991) summarized the eff ects ary, historical, religious, and cultural material. of a variety of interpersonal goals on impression Th ey note four ways in which negative events have formation. Th ey distinguish between action and more weight. Negative events are more potent than assessment “sets,” and within assessment, they dis- equally positive events; they have steeper gradients, tinguish between eff ects of global and circumscribed

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 6655 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM sets. Not surprisingly, diff erent sets have diff erent not among those with such goals. Th us, chronic egal- eff ects. One infl uential example concerns power, itarian “goals are activated and used preconsciously defi ned and manipulated in various ways. Fiske to prevent stereotype activation, demonstrating both initially looked at eff ects of powerlessness, that is, the controllability of stereotype activation and the being dependent on others for desirable outcomes implicit role of goals in cognitive control” (p. 167). (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987), Moskowitz, Li, and Kirk (2004) demonstrated and followed up with studies of eff ects of power how nonchronic goals that one temporarily adopts, and dominance in producing biased perception and but then from which one consciously disengages, inequality (Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998). can continue to operate preconsciously. Th ey call Since then, studies of eff ects of power, powerless- this “implicit volition,” and it represents another ness, and diff erential status on impression forma- instance of nonconscious goals. Although most of tion have multiplied, adding to a still-developing the work on conscious and nonconscious control of and complex picture (e.g., Overbeck & Park, 2006; the eff ects of beliefs and expectancies on impression Vescio & Guinote, 2010; see also Chapter 28). formation has occurred in the context of stereotyping (because controlling stereotypes is both desir- nonconscious goals able and problematic), the nonconscious activation Much of the early work manipulated goals and control processes it delineates are more broadly explicitly, or put participants into situations in applicable to impression formation. (For much more which they were presumed to have various goals. on inhibiting or counteracting the eff ects of beliefs But the number of possible goals is innumerable, and expectations, especially stereotypes, on impres- and simply describing eff ects of various classes of sion formation; see Chapter 5). goals—from Jones and Th ibaut’s (1958) through Hilton and Darley’s (1991) to Fiske’s (2004) clas- impressions without goals; sifi cations, to say nothing of McDougall’s (1908) spontaneous trait inferences teleological instincts—can be tedious and arbitrary, Srull and Wyer (1979) were interested in the con- unless one is interested in particular goals. However, ditions under which traits are inferred from behav- the study of goals’ eff ects on impression formation iors. Th ey posited that such inferences required, took a whole new turn with the advent of modern among other things, the goal of forming an impres- approaches to unconscious goals (see Chapter 23; sion. Winter and Uleman (1984) doubted this. Th ey see also Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). presented a set of trait-implying sentences to par- Using priming methods, Bargh (1990) and his ticipants who were merely asked to memorize them. colleagues showed how to activate specifi c goals Cued recall results indicated that trait inferences did without participants’ awareness, thereby avoiding occur, and other tests showed that participants were eff ects of demand characteristics and participants’ unaware of inferring them. Th ese unintended and theories of goals’ eff ects. In contrast to primed unconscious inferences were dubbed spontaneous semantic concepts, primed goal eff ects persist over trait inferences (STIs). Subsequent studies showed time unless and until the goal is satisfi ed, and also that they occur under other goal instructions, such diff er in other ways. In a now-classic demonstration, as identifying the gender of each pronoun in the Chartrand and Bargh (1996) showed that impres- sentences, or judging whether you would do the sion formation and memorization goals could be behaviors described. Th ese and other goals aff ect the primed unconsciously and that these unconscious likelihood of STIs, even as they remain unintended goals had the same eff ects on memory for person and unconscious (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994). information—in both amount and clustering in Although most STI research has used verbal descrip- free recall—that Hamilton et al. (1980) showed for tions of behavior, visual presentations also support conscious goals. them (Fiedler, Schenck, Watling, & Menges, 2005). Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, and Schaal (1999) And not surprisingly, individual diff erences play a were interested in the ways that chronic egalitarian role. Participants who diff er in authoritarianism goals may inhibit the activation of stereotypes. Th ey also diff er in their inferences (Uleman, Winborne, fi rst established that those with and without chronic Winter, & Shechter, 1986), and those high on the egalitarian goals had the same knowledge of stereo- personal need for cognition are more likely to make types. Th en they showed that priming these stereo- STIs (Moskowitz, 1993). types reduced response times to stereotype features Other inferences occur spontaneously, including among those without chronic egalitarian goals, but causes, goals, beliefs, counterfactuals, and values (see

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 6666 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008, pp. 335–336, interdependent self-concepts. Using stimulus mate- for a review), all with clear implications for impres- rial aff ording both trait and situation inferences, they sion formation. Furthermore, Ham and Vonk (2003) found that priming had no eff ect on spontaneous have shown that traits and situations can be inferred activation or binding of traits or situations. But it simultaneously, as when “John gets an A on the test” did aff ect explicit inferences. Priming independence implies both smart and easy . Th ese inferences are likely increased explicit trait relative to situation inferences, inputs to conscious attributional and impression for- whereas priming interdependence did not. mation processes. Trait inferences from behaviors can In a series of studies of the eff ects of unconscious also become erroneously associated with informants goals on STI, Rim, Min, Uleman, Chartrand, and rather than actors (Skowronski, Carlston, Mae, & Carlston (2012) primed an affi liation goal, with- Crawford, 1998), in which case they are called spon- out participants being aware of the prime’s eff ects. taneous trait transferences (STTs). Th at is, if I tell you Using a lexical decision STI task, they found that that John is smart, I am more likely to be judged as primed participants took longer to recognize non- smart later. An interesting research literature explores trait concepts, relative to participants not so primed. the processing diff erences between STIs and STTs Th is “goal shielding” thereby focused attention (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005). on affi liation relevant concepts, namely traits, and Are STIs about actors or merely their behaviors? left other concepts relatively inaccessible. In a sec- Some of the paradigms used to detect STIs (e.g., ond study, they used the false recognition STI task lexical decision, and probe reaction time) merely and found that affi liation priming bound positive detect concept activation, and results from the traits to actors more than negative traits. Th us, the cued recall paradigm were ambiguous with regard unconscious affi liation goal produced goal shielding to reference. Th ese paradigms were not developed (which was insensitive to trait valence) at the activa- to detect relations between actors and trait con- tion stage, and trait binding that was sensitive to cepts. Th is changed with Carlston and Skowronski’s trait valence at the binding stage. Th is suggests that savings-in-relearning paradigm (Carlston & the well-known positivity bias in affi liation is due to Skowronski, 1994). In it, participants “familiarlized selective binding of positive inferences to actors and themselves” with photo–behavior pairs. Th en after not to selective activation of positive traits. some intervening tasks, they studied pairs of photos Th e “stages” approach to STI and impression and traits, some of which refl ected the STIs presum- formation in general can become quite complex. In ably made earlier and some of which were novel. the Rim et al. (2012) work referred to above, there When tested on these paired associates, learning was are three stages: unconscious goal activation, selec- better for the pairs refl ecting initial STIs than for tive focusing on traits (vs. nontraits), and selective the other pairs. Th is “savings” shows that STIs are binding of positive traits. If these feed into subse- about actors because the savings is specifi c to trait– quent explicit inferences, a fourth stage is added. actor pairs. Todorov and Uleman (2002) used a Recent work by Ferreira et al. (2012) throws light false recognition paradigm to make the same point. on the transition to this last stage by identifying an Th ey had participants study photo–behavior pairs “inference monitoring process” that is engaged by for a subsequent memory test, and after some delay, conscious impression formation goals. Th is process presented photo–trait pairs and asked whether the produces “awareness and monitoring of otherwise traits had appeared in the sentences with the pho- unconscious inferences “ . . . so they can be “used tos. (Some of the sentences contained traits, and toward attaining conscious goals” (p. 2). Evidence others did not.) False recognition rates were higher for this process came to light in a series of studies when implied traits were presented with the photos that addressed the following paradox. Hamilton et about whom the traits were implied than with other al. (1980) found clustering in free recall when target familiar photos. behaviors were learned under impression forma- Recently, researchers have recognized that para- tion but not memory instructions, suggesting that digms tapping trait activation and trait binding to trait-based clusters only formed under impression actors tap separable stages of the impression formation formation. But Winter and Uleman (1984) found process. First, trait concepts are activated by behav- that people infer traits even under memory instruc- iors, and then they are bound to the actor. Finally, tions. So why was there no such clustering by traits explicit trait inferences may (or may not) occur. Th is in Hamilton et al. (1980) under memory instruc- is illustrated in two lines of research. Saribay, Rim, tions? Th e inference monitoring process provides a and Uleman (2012) primed either independent or tentative answer.

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004_Carlston_Ch04.indd4_Carlston_Ch04.indd 6677 44/12/2013/12/2013 111:41:531:41:53 AAMM Finally, consider automatic processes, their role and the other usual features of impressions, but also in STI, and their defi nition. Much of the initial for a wide range of the perceivers’ other responses work on STI in the mid-1980s sought to examine to strangers, including emotions, aspects of the per- whether or not it is automatic, according to the ceivers’ self-concepts (relational selves) when with criteria delineated by Bargh (1994) 10 years later: the signifi cant other, and perceivers’ behaviors. awareness, intention, effi ciency, and control. STI Th us, social cognitive transference engages a wider is clearly unconscious, unintended, and relatively range of dependent variables and extends the usual (but not completely) effi cient. But it is subject to defi nition of an “impression” (see Andersen, Reznik, at least indirect control, as noted above (e.g., Rim & Glassman, 2005). et al., 2012; Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994). Part of the problem is that Bargh’s four criteria do not impressions of persons and groups always covary; thus, “automatic” in this sense in How is impression formation of persons similar not a unitary concept (see Chapter 12). It also has to and diff erent from impressions of groups, and the disadvantage that any task shown to be auto- how are these related? Th is is an old set of ques- matic, even in part, becomes viewed as beyond tions related to stereotyping (e.g., Rothbart, 1978) conscious control. Th is has been particularly true that has acquired new life in research by Hamilton, of research on stereotyping (e.g., Bargh, 1999), but Sherman, and colleagues on group entitativity, that it occurs elsewhere too. Th e solution is to abandon is, group cohesion, longevity, impermeability of the dichotomous and mutually exclusive defi ni- boundaries, and so forth (e.g., Lickel, Hamilton, & tions of automatic and controlled processes and to Sherman, 2001). In an interesting connection with adopt a model and procedures that recognize that STIs, Crawford, Sherman, and Hamilton (2002) both automatic and controlled processes operate showed that spontaneously inferred traits about one in almost any task of suffi cient complexity to be of member of a group are generalized to other group interest to social psychologists. Jacoby’s (1991) pro- members if the group is high in entitativity, but not cess dissociation procedure (PDP) does this. It was otherwise. used to examine STI fi rst by Uleman, Blader, and Todorov (2005), and most recently by McCarthy people as moral agents and objects and Skowronski (2011a). Th ese results show that Judging people on a moral dimension has long STI involves both automatic and controlled pro- been recognized as a high priority of perceivers. cesses, operating together. Th inking of automatic What is less clear is how targets’ morality is judged, and controlled as a dichotomy is less useful than that is, what constitutes morally good and bad conceiving of them as independent processes that behavior, and when judgments based on behaviors both contribute to social cognition. (or group membership, etc.) aff ect perceptions of Th ere is much more to STIs (as well as the other targets’ temporary states of mind or enduring traits. topics we have touched on). A more complete ver- To what degree are these judgments cognitive versus sion of the STI story was recently published by aff ective or emotional? To what extent are the infer- Uleman, Rim, Saribay, and Kressel (2012). ence processes conscious or nonconscious, deliber- ate or spontaneous, automatic and controlled, or Other Topics post hoc justifi cations? And who is accorded the Th ese are only a few topics illustrating the social status of a moral agent, rather than being dehu- cognitive approach to impression formation. Here manized? Th e social cognitive approach to impres- are three others that we might have covered more sion formation (along with, e.g., experimental fully, had there been more space. philosophy, social neuroscience, and developmen- tal psychology) are contributing much to address- social cognitive transference ing and refi ning such questions. A quick overview Rather than conceiving of impressions as formed of some recent viewpoints in this area is provided from observations of behavior and inferences of by Gray, Young, and Waytz’s (2012) target article traits, this work takes existing conceptions of sig- and reactions to it. nifi cant others as the starting point for forming impressions of strangers. If a stranger shares some Th e Future of Social Cognition and features with a signifi cant other, additional features Impression Formation of the signifi cant other are assumed or extrapolated Social cognition is an experimental approach to onto the stranger. Th is holds for traits, evaluations, understanding our thoughts (conscious and not)

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