Osama bin Laden’s trail went cold right as al Qaeda’s leadership, being pummeled by airpower, appeared to be trapped in a mountain fortress. By Rebecca Grant

he battle of Tora Bora in December 2001 may have airpower and special operations forces teamed with various North- been a lost opportunity to catch . ern Alliance factions to topple control of ’s But it was definitely the moment when Operation northern cities. The fall of on Nov. 13 collapsed Taliban Enduring Freedom shifted from a fast-moving, control across Afghanistan, but al Qaeda and Taliban elements TUS-led rout of Taliban forces to a tricky counterinsurgency war. spread throughout the country as the government crumbled. The consensus view of Tora Bora’s outcome was captured by Dispersed Taliban and al Qaeda elements presented the coali- a November 2009 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report: tion with a new challenge. “Our interest,” said then-Secretary “On or around Dec. 16, [2001] two days after writing his will, of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, “is to capture or kill all the [Osama] bin Laden and an entourage of bodyguards walked al Qaeda and prevent them from escaping into other countries unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into ’s or other locations in Afghanistan where they can continue their unregulated tribal area,” read the report, overseen by Sen. John terrorist activities.” Kerry (D-Mass.), a longtime critic of the Tora Bora operation. Of course, it was no surprise OEF had the potential to turn Exactly how bin Laden got into Pakistan is a mystery even into a guerilla war. “When you go back and take a look at the after his death. The intelligence reports from the time were history of how they have fought tactically, it’s been predomi- constantly shifting and often contradictory. The US has never nantly a guerrilla-style war done from hidden positions,” Rear definitively determined whether bin Laden was actually at Tora Adm. John D. Stufflebeem explained to reporters that Nov. 14. Bora during the now-famous battle, and even top US military However, the rapidly evolving situation in Afghanistan left US commanders feel he was probably—but not definitively—there. Central Command with very little sense of how many al Qaeda Bin Laden and Taliban forces had planned for some time to and Taliban remained. Afghan fighters had the option of simply make a stand at Tora Bora. Beginning on Oct. 7, 2001, US-led going home—or taking up new fighting positions.

A US Army Chinook helicopter offloads coalition forces high in the mountains of Afghanistan during a hunt for Osama bin Laden. Caves honeycombed the Tora Bora complex, and al Qaeda’s leader knew them well.

DOD photo

52 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2011 AIR FORCE Magazine Magazine FORCE AIR by bodyguards. He then headed out of of out headed then He bodyguards. by surrounded mosque, a at appearance an make Laden bin saw Others broadcast. nightly BBC the radio of -language news beginning the before just p.m.,” at 9 of guesthouse our in front “standing Later, a resident reportedgifts. cash seeing out bin handing Laden audience, the in years. 10 nearly for whereabouts his of confirmation certain dress in person by bin Laden—and the last flee. or hide, surrender, to had now and places such as Saudi Arabia and Chechnya from to come Afghanistan ever,had and hundreds of fighters during his speech. his during fighters of hundreds told Laden bin Russians,” the taught we one same the lesson, a them teach we’ll invade, but if we and are believe united in to Allah, plan a had Americans “The . in center Islamic an at crowd stronghold.” military a as use for caves personal fortune to enlarge and equip these ian the Senate report. A report in said figures,” Qaeda al senior other and himself, his wives, and for numerous elevations higher children at camps base ing expanding the fortress at Tora Bora, build leaving Sudan for after Afghanistan hideout in 1996. Bora He Tora “began the to caves. the within system tunnel connecting the of excavation ing from Jalalabad to Tora Bora and supervis road rough the building as such projects had assisted with many of Laden the bin 1980s, construction late the in that tended con report Senate US himself. A Laden 2001. December in Bora Tora it redesignated others CENTCOM and reasons unknown for but originally designated the area Tora Gora, Maps for fighters. resistance by Afghan use Bora Tora at complex cave the up build helped money CIA Union, Soviet less than 10 miles from the Pakistan next move,border. and it led straight to Tora Bora, Laden. bin with sticking terrorists of group sizeable for any choice preferred a Pakistan—as to access sheltered their mountains—with were roads subject to attack and from the air. hands, This left the Taliban of out left him few options. Cities were slipping Bin Laden’s Options On that night, bin Laden circulated circulated Laden bin night, that On It was to become the last public ad public last the become to was It On Nov.a rallied bin Laden 10, 2001, improvements more made Laden Bin Few knew the complex better than bin During Afghanistan’s long war with the The 9/11 mastermind began to plan his For the end of bin Laden, Taliban rule Many al Qaeda were not natives, how stated bin Laden “used much of his his of much “used Laden bin stated / December 2011 December / The The Guard ------he figured out what to do next. next. do to what out figured he while stopgap a but martyrdom toward him. with entourage security and family solo player. Bin Laden hid out but kept a he was nor his ideals, his of pursuit in kin his of that or life own his risk to willing his intensity, he was not the kind of leader characteristic of al Qaeda’s leader. For all safety.”own their for village sent the women and children into another Wein village. our as they stopped Arabs cause we thought the planes would hit the be in were terrified, “Our people Garikhil. elder village a was who Khan, man Os Malik eyewitness caves,”recounted different to them assigning and fighters the up dividing stoop, a on there sat and him. with lowers with several the fol mountains, hundred for convoybound vehicle a in Jalalabad 1996 with taking over taking 1996 with Kabul and install Taliban the in and Afghanistan in founding September with credited native area Kandahar a Omar, Mohammed Mullah was for several reasons. important especially Kandahar 2001. 7, Dec. until ued Nov. on 30. said armed,” Rumsfeld they’re still and there they’reand still mountains the and lages Taliban, ended up just fading into the vil other the of number a and left, then and who surrendered and turned in their arms ing “Asouth. good many of these people mov then and city the into fleeing were Qaeda al and Taliban some that gested sug Reports time. the at hands Taliban Qaeda. al Taliban of and full chock locations several monitoring full Hands Full personnel. ground of handfuls just involve would though intense, forBora, fight Tora the end, the In targets. sight forces operations Special The move The to Tora was a not Bora step was ToraBora to retreat Laden’s Bin hurry, a in and scornful were “They Operations to take Kandahar contin Kandahar take to Operations in still Kandahar, was list the of Top Meanwhile, CENTCOM had its hands ------aa, n eetootcl esr al sensors lowed at coverage night and bad through electro-optical and radar, infrared, Its record. combat impressive an up time—racked the aircraft at existence in four just system—with UAV The aircraft. reconnaissance unmanned included the zone Jalalabad area This and Khyber. Tora and Bora. Kabul between two areas closely: Kandahar and the area R. Franks confirmedthe US was watching as Oct. 9 and air strikes had hit the caves. had surveyed the Tora Bora area as early Predators surveillance-reconnaissance. bear. to airpower bring to time under the name Jawbreaker. Now, it was Tora Bora, as was a CIA-led team working Forces teams were already operating near evaluated its options for Tora Bora. Special Qaeda. al Taliban and the for Kandahar combing work to went As a result, approximately 1,000 marines the whole perimeter of the ship guarded.” to leave a sinking ship. But we at didn’t rats, like have deciding, “people to endgame Kandahar the compared Wolfowitz team. the of Afghan-US members three the face from an off-target bomb that iban. killed Karzai was so close he was injured the Tal with in battle two-day a for strikes Kandahar. from mid- November. in By KowtDec. 1, Tarin they were of 30 miles town the taken had forces his and state, of head interim over as take to slated was Karzai Hamid to emerge. waiting figure political major area. Kandahar the left had Omar that indications no had Pentagon the 10 thought to be there. Stufflebeemsaid Dec. was country, the across rule Taliban ing CENTCOM tasked a Global Hawk Hawk Global a tasked CENTCOM CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy intelligence- for was call first The CENTCOM as large loomed this All D. Paul Defense of Secretary Deputy air directed forces operations Special On the outskirts of the city was another 53 - -

DOD photo Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said Dec. 9. Specifically, senior DOD photo US leadership believed bin Laden to be holed up in Tora Bora. As the air strikes intensified, a 15,000-pound “Daisy Cutter” bomb, so large it had to be delivered by C-130, hit a target in the complex and reportedly shook the terrain for miles. “The al Qaeda forces are still holed up in caves in the Tora Bora area. There still has been fierce fighting to defend their cave entrances, and we have still been providing strikes, as requested by the opposition groups and coordinated by our forces that are with them,” said Stufflebeem Dec. 10. DOD photo weather. The Global Hawk’s 30-hour- plus mission endurance made it perfect for Tora Bora and the evolving situation in Afghanistan. “Around the end of November we started looking at the Tora Bora mountain region because we had indications there from a variety of sources that said Tora Bora was where the bad guys were,” said then-Maj. David Hambleton, who was a Global Hawk liaison officer at the combined air and space operations center.

Battle Joined The real fight for Tora Bora would be intense but involve just handfuls US air strikes hit the caves repeatedly for more than two weeks. In one strike, a 15,000-pound “Daisy Cutter” bomb—delivered by a C-130—struck a target at the of US personnel on the ground. The cave complex and the earth shook for miles around. special operators of Task Force Dagger had forces committed to other locations Ali and Haji Zaman. This loose “Eastern Warlord Ali was ready to move into around Afghanistan. The most they could Alliance” was to move into Tora Bora Tora Bora. For a brief time it looked like offer was to augment the Jawbreaker under US direction. success was imminent. That afternoon, team that had been tracking bin Laden “We moved up with this Eastern Alli- Afghan fighters reported they had sur- around Jalalabad. ance army with large embedded Special rounded bin Laden. Ali plucked two Nor were regular forces available. Forces and CIA, and they called in air SOF operators from the coordinating Any decision to pull marines from to support our positions [and] closed team to accompany him and rushed his Kandahar and deploy them around Tora tunnel openings,” Marine Corps Lt. Gen. forces forward. Bora would have sacrificed the hunt for Michael P. DeLong, Franks’ deputy at Another 33 special operators prepared Mullah Omar—the Taliban leader—and CENTCOM, later told National Review. to move up to support Ali, but to no the task of dealing with the large fight- The idea was that Ali and his people avail. Ali’s forces took fire as soon as ing concentrations around Kandahar. would lead the way. “These were high they probed al Qaeda’s positions. The The only immediately feasible option mountains,” said DeLong. “The [Af- Afghans immediately retreated, leaving was Rumsfeld’s preferred template of ghans] knew how to get there without the first two US commandos to wind having small SOF teams and airpower being seen from some positions, so their way back to friendly positions support allied Afghan fighters. The deci- going with them was by far the best during the course of the night. sion not to employ a larger US force is way to go.” As a US Special Operations Command controversial to this day. For the next six days, Cobra 25 sur- history later put it, Ali’s soldiers’ “fight- On Dec. 2, more than 100 strike veyed positions and called in air strikes. ing qualities proved remarkably poor.” aircraft hit targets near Kandahar and Afghan security elements provided pro- The only good outcome was that the Jalalabad. tection. On Dec. 8, CENTCOM added two SOF operators abandoned by Ali That same day, CENTCOM began its another special operations task force, now had detailed reconnaissance of al move. A SOF team of about 13 person- with 50 more special operators, and a Qaeda mortar and gun positions. Once nel codenamed Cobra 25 traveled to small British element linked up as well. back to relative safety, they used this Jalalabad to recruit Afghan forces under “To the best of our knowledge, he information to work alongside the Co- the command of two warlords, Hazarat has not left the country,” Air Force Gen. bra 25 combat controller and call in 17 54 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2011 straight hours of air strikes. They were as intense as the US and allies could muster. Global Hawk planners at the CAOC DOD photo got new orders to “go VFR [visual flight rules] direct straight up to Tora Bora and start taking pictures,” recounted Hamble- ton. Strike aircraft and AC-130 gunships honed in as well. What if enemy fighters tried to escape, as had already happened just days before at Kandahar? Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had forces on the border to at- tempt to block escapes from Afghanistan to Pakistan. But the task was exceedingly difficult. “It’s a very complicated area to try to seal, and there’s just simply no way you can put a perfect cork in the bottle,” Rumsfeld conceded Dec. 11. The plan was to prompt the Afghan forces to destroy bin Laden’s hard-core fighters in the caves. The only way to get Ali to hold terrain Special Forces personnel surround future Afghan President (middle was to commit more SOF personnel, row, third from left). Karzai was wounded in a two-day battle with the Taliban near however, so special operators drove in Kandahar. trucks as far as they could then continued on donkeys to carry their gear. The Afghan man in the area, and he had funded these “We deliberately did not plan an op- forces pulled back from their positions people for years.” eration in Afghanistan based on putting every night. It was , and the Ali declared Tora Bora a “victory” on in 100,000 or 150,000 American troops troops were fasting by day and feasting Dec. 17 and the last SOF operators de- along the model of the Soviets,” Wolfowitz after sundown. parted the area on Dec. 19. They estimated said in June 2002. Fortunately for US forces, al Qaeda they had killed about 250 terrorists, but it A big US-led ground attack at Tora Bora opposition kept lighting campfires to keep was obvious that many had slipped away. was never a serious option. For one, Franks warm at night. SOF teams used optics and Pakistani soldiers said they captured as only had about 1,300 soldiers, marines, thermal imaging to bring in even more many as 300 fighters who fled Tora Bora, and Special Forces in Afghanistan at the air-delivered firepower. Franks testified later. time of Tora Bora. They were spread Air strikes chipped away at the com- across 17 locations. “We didn’t have the plex, but the US still had only about 50 Ground Action Post Mortem lift” to get them to the fight, DeLong later men committed. The teams controlling Almost immediately, critics used Tora told lawmakers. air strikes were finding thermal imaging Bora to make a case that the battle was a Policy considerations mattered, too. so effective they could pull back from missed opportunity where ground forces According to DeLong, it was Franks’ forward positions. The two Cobra 25 should have been used. objective to ensure Afghanistan was peace- teams withdrew by Dec. 14. That night, The controversy simmered for years ful in the run-up to elections expected to Ali’s forces at last held the terrain they’d and reached full flower with scholarly bring in Karzai as leader. taken during the day. articles asserting a force of as little as Mop-up efforts continued for some Then the assault paused. 1,000 troops could have been placed in time. Rumsfeld told the Baltimore Sun The Taliban “had clearly changed their the 14,000-foot mountains to envelop at the end of December searches of the strategy to one of survival,” Lt. Gen. Tora Bora. now-empty cave complex could go on Maxwell C. Bailey, commander of Air Few thought so at the time, however, through much of January 2002. Force Special Operations Command, later and Rumsfeld’s policy for OEF was firmly One thing was certain though. When explained. “They had ceased resistance. set on using US airpower with very light bin Laden vanished in December 2001, The bad thing was that once they ceased ground forces. it ensured that the hunt for him and the armed resistance,” Ali’s and Zaman’s The Bush Administration had for many mission to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan anti-Taliban forces also ceased attacking. reasons been loath to put US ground forces would drag on. The Afghan forces insisted on a quiet into Afghanistan. Logistics, the risk of But the next time allied forces engaged battlefield for several hours, with the alienating Afghanistan’s population, and a significant concentration of al Qaeda explanation that al Qaeda had decided to even the long shadows of Soviet mistakes terrorists, in , CENT- surrender and needed an opportunity to in the 1980s all made for reluctance to COM was determined that US ground come down from the mountains and turn commit ground forces. forces would lead the way. n in their weapons. In reality, the pause gave the hard-core Rebecca Grant is president of IRIS Independent Research. She has written ex- fighters still holed up time to run. “This tensively on airpower and serves as director, Mitchell Institute, for AFA. Her most tribal area was sympathetic to bin Laden,” recent article for Air Force Magazine was “Enduring Freedom’s New Approach” in DeLong later wrote. “He was the richest the October issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2011 55