Information about the Conference: http://eng.iph.ras.ru/7_8_11_2016.htm

RAS Institute of Philosophy Tibetan Culture and Information Center in Moscow

First International Conference “ and Phenomenology”

November 7–8, 2016 RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow

Supported by:  Save Foundation

Urbanaeva Irina DS (Philosophy), principal research fellow, Department of Philosophy, cultural and religious studies, the Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan studies of the Siberian Branch of Russian Academy of Sci- ences.

BUDDHIST AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD: GROUNDS AND MEANING OF COMPARISON 1. The tradition of using the term “meditation” (Lat. meditatio – “deliberation” or meditari – “to ponder”, “to contemplate”) with the connotation of religious “de- liberation”/“contemplation”, widespread in modern psychology and religious stud- ies literature, has its roots in Judeo-Christian (the Old Testament, Bi- ble). According to this tradition, meditation means mental exercise of various tech- niques, as used in different spiritual traditions and modern relaxation practices. Buddhism alone, the and the two lines of – the Indo-Tibetan and the Far Eastern, uses quite a number of meditation methods, diverse in tech- nique, aims and results. To compare the phenomenological reduction with “Bud- dhist meditation”, one should know, what the latter is. However, as its essence, methods and effects, due to their dependence on the interpretation of basic doc- trines, are not the same in different branches and , one should also specify, which tradition of Buddhism and which type of meditation are meant.

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2. The practices common for all Bhuddism reflect the Tripitaka structure and boil down to the “” ( sikkha; Tibetan lab gsum) – in higher virtue, higher mind and higher wisdom. The Theravada tradition understands sik- kha as elimination of mental defilements (klesha) in their three respective stages – the latent stage, the arousal stage, the active stage. What modern literature calls meditation is the practice of developing concentration (shamatha; gzhi gnas). 3. The and shastras of Indo-Tibetan Mahayana [“” by /; “Shravakabhumi” by Asanga; “Bhavanakrama” by Kamalashila; “The Lamp” by Atisha; “-Chenmo” by Tsongkhapa, 18 texts on Lamrim, texts on Lamrim from , , and schools)] present a theoretically grounded and practically proven system of , called the gradual path. The path is explained as having three main aspects (rnam gtso gsum) – great compassion, bodhichitta, the wisdom of emptiness) – five paths and grounds (sa-lam), and three stages (skyes-bu gsum-gyi lam-gyi rim-pa) in the gradual change of consciousness from common to enlightened. According to this theory, meditation (bhavana; sgom) is habituation to the positive way of thinking. There are two types of meditation – the analytical (dpyad-sgom) and the stabiliz- ing or fixating (‘jog-sgom) one. Shamatha (zhi-gnas) is full control over con- sciousness in stabilized concentration, when five faults are overcome by applying eight antidotes. For Mahayana the practice of concentration as an exercise of bod- dhisattvas means the development of the respective paramita. The paramita of con- centration is achieved only if the object of concentration is the emptiness of exist- ence through self-nature. Vipashyana is the insight into the nature of a knowable object (, non-self, emptiness), achieved by analytical meditation and supported by realized shamatha. Shamatha and vipashyana together give the wis- dom of direct understanding that all things, persons, and consciousness are empty, which acts as an antidote to ignorance – the root of sansaric existence. Thus both the unidirectional contemplation and the analytical meditation are part of the Lamrim system (stages of the path transforming consciousness) and have philo- sophical foundation. 4. The main strong point of M. Bitbol’s approach to the comparison of the phenomenological method and Buddhist meditation is that he sees their proximity in ontology: they “go down to the bases of experience”, “to the things themselves”, as they are without conceptual constructs and the “natural attitude” based on the faith in the reality of phenomena perceived. 5. Its weakness is that the phenomenological reduction is compared to Bud- dhist in general, as if “Buddhist meditation” is something clearly de- finable. This wrong premise leads professor M. Bitbol to the thesis that “phenome- nology has obvious similarities to meditation methods”, which “obvious similari- ties” he illustrates by characteristics of meditation, that are not common for Bud- dhism, but are specific for its Chinese version, distorted by the influence of Dao- ism. Thus, in particular, to prove that the result of phenomenological research is close to what the Buddhist concept of thusness (tathata) means, professor quotes T. Berry (“Religions of India: Hinduism, Yoga, Buddhism”, Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 170) describing thusness, tathagatarabha, dharmakaya according

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to the “Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana”: “In its very origin suchness is of it- self endowed with sublime attributes. It manifests the highest wisdom which shines throughout the world, it has true knowledge and a mind resting simply in its own being. It is eternal, blissful, its own self-being and the purest simplicity; it is invig- orating, immutable, free…Because it possesses all these attributes and is deprived of nothing, it is designated both as the Womb of Tathagata and the Body of Tathagata”. This tractate, however, whose authorship is usually ascribed to the Indian thinker Ashvaghosha, was in fact written in China [see: E. Torchinov. In- troduction. In: The Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana. Saint-Petersburg, 1997]. 6. The Buddhist concepts of “thusness” (tathata; de-bzhin nyid), “dharmakaya” (chos-sku), and “Buddha-nature” (tathagatagarbha; de gshegs snying po) in the text are distorted by absolutist ontology as in “sudden path” practices of . Other Buddhist quotes given by M. Bitbol are also not representative of Buddhism as a whole and are particularly not characteristic of the Indo-Tibetan Mahayana, based on the Word of the Buddha and other works by scientists of the Ancient Indian monastic university at . 7. There is some similarity of meditation on emptiness (Prasangika Madh- yamaka) and phenomenological reduction (Husserl, Heidegger). Both are aimed at showing and “cancelling” the natural (naturalistic, substantialistic) attitude of the mind. All philosophical schools of Buddhism seek to overcome the extremes of “exaggerating” being and nihilistically renouncing being, and only Prasangika goes as far as to fully deny the existence of knowable objects in its rangtong theory. Rangtong is not equivalent to Nothingness, as Heidegger’s Being is not Nothingness. However, phenomenological reduction, attracting the attention of philosophers to the transcendental subject, retains some substantialism in ontol- ogy, at least with respect to the transcendental subject itself, whereas Prasangika performs full “emptying” of being: all knowable objects have no true nature, which would exist on its own part. 8. To correctly compare Buddhist meditation and phenomenological method one should not only find relevant grounds, but also know the aim of such compari- son. What does it give us? How can phenomenology help the Western intellectuals better understand and practice? This requires special research. The language of phenomenology may give Buddhist philosophers a presentation of Buddhism more understandable for the West, because Western phenomenological “readings” of Buddhism, as well as other interpretations to this day rather obscure the moments of contact of the Western and the Buddhist philosophies, as they lack the knowledge of Buddhist philosophy from authentic sources in the variety of cur- rents and schools.

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