ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF MICROREGIONS

ON MACROREGIONS: CAN EUROREGIONS

LEGITIMIZE THE EUROPEAN UNION?

By

Aaron Russell Martin

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

In

International Affairs

Chair: J \fam~ tv'itTTBLM·A-N ~ Dr. James Mittelman, Ph.D ' k.w~~ Dean Louis W. Goodman, School of International Service aooq

2009 American University Washington, D.C. 20016

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ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF MICROREGIONS

ON MACROREGIONS: CAN EUROREGIONS

LEGITIMIZE THE EUROPEAN UNION?

BY

Aaron Russell Martin

ABSTRACT

As a polity, the European Union (EU) is lacking in political legitimacy. Several failed referenda indicate that certain majorities within EU member states have actively rejected European treaties and concordantly, rule by Brussels. This thesis asserts that

Euroregions, cross-border cooperative microregions, have the potential to become a local level interface that can connect the marginalized residents of the member states directly to the EU. In principle, the activities and projects taking place along the borders may persuade the people living within the jurisdictions of the Euroregions to look more favorably upon the EU's actions and therefore increase the legitimacy of the European macroregion. To test this hypothesis, France and Poland were taken as case studies and voting data analyzed to see if Euroregion residents are more or less likely to support

Eurosceptic parties. Although the results were inconsistent, the potential for future study of Euroregions remains intriguing.

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

LIST OF TABLES ...... iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... iv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... v

Chapters

Introduction ...... 1

1. DEFINING THE TERMS ...... 13

Weber vs. Habermas ...... 14

The European Debate on Legitimacy ...... 20

The Euroregion ...... 29

Re-scaling Legitimacy ...... 34

2. CONTEXTUALIZING THE ARGUMENT ...... 39

"New Regionalism" and the Euroregions ...... 39

Connecting the Micro- to the Macroregion ...... 43

Scale and Economics ...... 45

Scale and Politics ...... 48

Scale and Society ...... ; ...... 52

3. LOCATING THE ARGUMENT ...... 57

iii Redrawing Borders/Reshaping Identity...... 57

Transferring Identification ...... 64

4. TESTING THE TRANSFORMATIVE OF EUROREGIONS ...... 70

Matching Funds and Per Capita Numbers ...... 73

Budgets and Accounting for Legitimacy ...... 80

France and Support for Le Pen in the Euroregions ...... 85

Poland and the Eurosceptics in Euroregions ...... 92

CONCLUSIONS ...... 102

APPEND ICES ...... 108

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 116

iv LIST OF TABLES

TABLE

1 French Euroregions: Budgets, Populations, and Per Capita Spending ...... 74

2 Polish Euroregions: Budgets, Populations, and Per Capita Spending ...... 75

3 Itemized Budget for Saarland-Moselle/Lorraine-Westem Palatinate Euroregion According to Priority and Type of Legitimacy ...... •...... 81

4 Kopecky and Mudde Model of Euroscepticism ...... 93

5 Euroregion Budgets and Legitimacy Codes ...... 108

6 Independent T-Test for French Presidential Election: Percentage Support for Le Pen ...... 112

7 Correlations Between Per Capita Spending and Presidential Candidates ...... 113

8 Independent T -Test Comparing Percent Support for Pro- or Anti-Europe Party Groupings ...... 114

9 Independent T-Test Comparing Individual Pro- and Anti-Europe Parties (Percentage of Votes) ...... 115

v LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE

French Euroregions ...... 72

2 Polish Euroregions ...... 73

3 Comparison in Funding Distribution: Polish and French Euroregions ...... 78

4 France: Per Capita Number Regions ...... 79

5 Poland: Per Capita Number Regions ...... 79

6 French Euroregions, Percentage of Total Spending: Projects Focusing on Input Oriented, Output Oriented, and Social Legitimacy ...... 83

7 Polish Euroregions, Percentage of Total Spending: Projects Focusing on Input Oriented, Output Oriented, and Social Legitimacy ...... 83

8 Series Showing Relationship Between Per Cent Support for Le Pen And "Non" Vote on Constitutional Referendum ...... 87

9 Voting Results for Top Four Presidentital Candidates: Total Votes of Combined Departments Aggregated by Per Capita Number...... 90

10 The Effect of Per Capita Spending on Support for Aggregated Anti-Europe Parties ...... 94

11 The Effect of Per Capita Spending on Support for Euroenthusiast Parties ...... 9 5

12 Voting Results for Polish Sejm: Percentage of Votes Grouped by Political Orientation, Combined Powiats Aggregated by Per Capita Number ...... 97

13 Aggregated Euroenthusiasts Parties ...... 98

14 Aggregated Anti-Europe Parties ...... 98 vi 15 Dot Density with Six Largest Metropolitan Areas Highlighted: Euroenthusiast Parties vs. Anti-Europe Parties ...... 99

vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries

CBC Cross-border Cooperation

CBR Cross-border Region

EC European Community

EEC European Economic Community

EMU European Monetary Union

EP European Parliament

EU European Union

FN National Front

GDR German Democratic Republic

IR International Relations

NCG Non-Central Government

PCN Per Capita Number

QMV Qualified Majority Voting

TPB Theory of Planned Behavior

TEU Treaty on European Union

viii INTRODUCTION

Analyses of the European Union, its institutions, and its overall development derive from a singular space within the realm of international relations (IR). This is so partly because the European Union (EU), as a political institution, resists simple definition and partly because its ultimate goal is not clearly defined. Stating that the EU defies definition merely supports the claims that the polity is sui generis in nature. James

Caporaso states, "To say that the EC is unique is simply a shorthand for saying that we have not yet developed the categories, abstract enough, to see the EC as an instance of a more general class of phenomena;" the EU must be contextualized using its own terms because there is nothing else like it. 1 Such difficulties in defining the polity confound analysis because observers find it easy to project on to the EU whatever they like, and these characterizations are colored largely by the intent or the ideology of the critic. This subjectivity could be mitigated ifleadership would define Europe not only as a project, but as a process and a product; however, because these qualifications do not yet exist, it is fair to say that the ultimate goals of the EU are undefined.2 Academic conjecture would be unnecessary were the Commission or the Council simply to pronounce that the final ambition of the entire process is a European superstate, a post-

1James Caporaso, et al., "Does the European Union Represent a n of 1?" ECSA Review X, No. 3 (Fall 1997): 1-5.

2Glyn Morgan, The Idea ofA European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 2005), 4-7. 1 2 sovereign Europe, or a Europe of nations. But because this has not happened, the process moves forward unevenly and under much contestation.

The EU has several sui generis institutional characteristics~ For example, the

European Parliament (EP) does not draft Community legislation, the Commission acts as a hybrid organ combining qualities of a legislature and a bureaucracy, and the ultimate execution of any decision made at the European level depends on the individual member states' compliance and enforcement. Because the EU directs the decision-making process for such a broad array of issues, it has many of the functional trappings of a state without possessing the Weberian credentials to actually exist as one. Such qualities make it structurally unique within the realm of IR, yet this analysis will focus on a different criterion to judge the EU as a sui generis polity.

The foremost attribute to be investigated here is that of scale. The EU rivals other institutions, whether they be states or international organizations, in its ability to work on multiple scales in multiple arenas simultaneously. Geographers define scale as a,

"graduated series, usually a nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size, such as the local, regional, national, and supranational."3 In future discussions, the point of reference will be the national scale. When referring to "scaling-up," the analysis will refer to the shifting of competences from the national to the supranational scale. The merging of economies and the coordination of political decision making within the realm of the EU exemplifies "scaling up." Likewise, when the term, "scaling down" is used, this will refer to allocating responsibilities from the national to either the regional or local

3Helga Leitner, "Reconfiguring the Spatiality of Power: The Construction of a Supranational Migration Framework for the European Union," Political Geography 16, No. 2 (1997): 123-143. 3 scale. The construction of Euroregions across European borders is an example of "scaling

down." These concepts will be more fully elaborated on in chapter 2.

The term scale, as defined in this paper and as it relates to the European context,

will address the relativity of large to small or deep to wide, the projection of certain

political and economic qualities onto smaller or larger entities, and the enhancement of

those characteristics across the entire spectrum of actors. Scale is not to be confused with

size, magnitude, population, or any other quantitative measure, although size will at times

be a constraint on or an attribute to realizing certain European agendas. A major

difference between size and scale is in distortion. If something simply becomes larger,

no assurance exists that the basic qualities of the thing itself will remain the same. For

instance, a city that faces an explosion in population growth will not likely resemble its

former self after absorbing the influx of people. The effects will be asymmetrical and

unpredictable. Shanty towns may rim the city's outer edges, roof tops may become

livable spaces, and utilities may fail under increased strain. This is an example of a

change in size or magnitude but not in scale.

The difference between a population boom and the European Union's "big bang"

enlargement into central and eastern Europe is that the EU utilized a host of tools to

ensure that the foundation of the Community would remain qualitatively unchanged after

the expansion. Prescription of conditionality measures, enforcement of the acquis

communautaire, and the institutionalization of the Copenhagen criteria exemplify the measures taken to harmonize the differences between the two regions and to ensure a

smooth transition. Whether the outcome conformed to expectations has yet to be

determined, but since concluding the latest enlargement in 2007 and welcoming twelve 4 new members into the club, the internal workings of the Commission and the Council have exhibited no significant lapses in efficiency.4 The ability to virtually double its size

without significantly altering the efficiency of its governance structure is what is meant

when referring to the EU as a scalar entity.

Within this first example, a second instance of scale exists. The Copenhagen

criteria stipulate a set of prerequisite qualifications that candidate states wishing to join the EU must first meet. These include political, economic and social standards that, when lacking in candidates, the EU aids in transferring to the potential members. In the case of the former Soviet satellite states, these criteria ensured a working market system and adherence to the rule of law. Such transparent clarification of expectations between the involved parties ensures that the newest member states understand their responsibilities to the Community. Similarly in the Balkans, the meta-level principles of the Copenhagen criteria give Serbia, Macedonia, and the other potential candidate states in that region coherent guidelines for accession. This benefits the EU as well as its candidates, and it illustrates how qualities may be transferred from the macroregional to the state scale.

Size can complement or hinderthe relative effectiveness of the EU as a scalar polity. The expansion in the size of the single market absolutely increases economies of scale. In a purely economic sense, this should benefit both producers and consumers.

4Sara Hagemann and Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, "Decision-Making in the Enlarged Council of Ministers: Evaluating the Facts," Policy Brief, Centre for European Policy Studies, No. 199, January 2007, 7-8. "A decrease in the overall adoption rate oflegislation can be observed, yet this may partly result from the Commission's decision to table fewer policies .... Although a large number of acts are still adopted by the Council each year, official disagreement in voting situations has not been found to increase at all. Thus other mesures must be in place to ensure a smooth legislative process, since the representation of more divergent preferences surely cannot have lead to a decrease in the level of contest in meetings .... There is no doubt that these changes in negotiation style and atmosphere also reflect the fact that to a certain degree member states must become accustomed to a new logic in decision making." 5 However, without the coordinate scaling of market regulations to ensure the equitable softening of harsh market forces, this increase in size could fray the social fabric of the

EU.

Acknowledging the need to balance economic gains with social cohesion brings the analysis to two key points. First, the European Union's structural funds represent an effort to maintain solidarity within the EU by assisting poorer regions through community-wide income redistribution. In order to increase the transition states' economic output, to close the efficiency gap between the new and the old member states, and to structurally align the aggregated economies, the EU offers multiple sources of developmental aid. This is an effort at creating greater horizontal equity by re-scaling economies.

Second, any capitalist system will produce some mixture of relative winners and losers. The methods used by the EU to regulate these economic gains and losses must be agreed upon within a distinctly political sphere, however. As the common market expands, the benefits to the economy may be generally positive but specifically detrimental-those western European workers whose jobs are re-located to more cost­ efficient areas of the EU may feel both relative and absolute deprivation. Attempts to maintain protective social policies in a continentally integrated economy strain the legislative organs of the EU. These problems are further exacerbated by the increased number of member states that bring with them a broader set of interests and concerns to the bargaining table. This type of problem is fundamentally not sui generis-tension between the state and the market is as old as politics itself. 6 Economically, the EU attempts to raise the total output of the macroregion by redistributing wealth to its least productive regions via structural funds. Politically, and this is where many of the contemporary conflicts arise, the EU must manage a more heterogeneous and larger group of self-interested decision makers. The economic

policies of market liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, necessary for the

completion of the single market, face political opposition from those social democrats in

favor of a strong welfare state as well as those populists in support of the independently

sovereign nation. As these political questions became more contentious, observers began using terms such as the "democratic deficit" and the "legitimacy crisis," to

describe the incongruous interests of the EU and some of its member states. Can the EU

utilize scalar tools to deal with this newly salient variety of issues?

One of the major characteristics of something being either scaled up or scaled down is that the quality of the entity does not change; the shift in scale does not distort

core principles. If an observer states, "France is a democracy," then it would also be

assumed that the constituent parts of the French Republic adhere to a set of standards

contiguous with either direct or indirect democracy. This is a reasonable assumption and

exhibits a certain kind of scale. When scaling down even further, the person may also

say, the political structures of Alsace are democratic, and furthermore, Strasbourg displays democratic qualities as well. The characteristic of the entity, in this case democracy, does not change as the scale moves to lower levels. Does this work in reverse?

If"scaling up" worked as easily as "scaling down," then there would be no problem regarding the democratic credentials or the lack oflegitimacy within the EU 7 This shift to a higher scale is not as intuitive, however. It seems odd to argue that an

institution consisting of twenty-seven democratically elected governments could be

anything other than democratic, but a large body of literature contends that democracy

loses something as it is aggregated, bureaucratized, and Europeanized. For years, this was a non-issue. The people of Europe gave their tacit consent to the European

Economic Community (EEC), or the European Community (EC), and they trusted that

integration of the European markets would be beneficial to all, that direct oversight was

unnecessary, and that economic decisions were best left up to Commissioners, technocrats, and heads of state and government.

This all changed with the popular debate surrounding the Treaty on European

Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992.5 In order to streamline the legislative process and to reform institutional inefficiencies, the TEU expanded Qualified

Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council and introduced the codecision procedure for policy-making within the European Parliament (EP). The move to QMV replaced unanimity as the major decision making process within the intergovernmental European

Council. Consequently, when certain thresholds of population and member states are met, a winning coalition may push through legislation against the will of a defeated minority. This regime change transferred sovereignty from the states to the EU in competences within the first pillar and also represented a major scaling up of politics to the macroregional level.

5For a copy of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) please see: http://eur­ lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0001 :0l :EN:HTML. 8 A popular backlash resounded throughout much of the Community. As the EU attempted to fashion a more efficient policy-making procedure by decreasing the threshold necessary for passing legislation, fierce resistance to the adoption of the

Maastricht treaty arose from individual constituencies voting "No" during national referenda. Denmark did not pass the TEU and instead negotiated opt-outs in the areas regarding citizenship, European Monetary Union (EMU), and defense policy. The

French passed the treaty, but only 51 percent voted in favor of ratification. The British signed, but like the Danes, did so on their own terms and opted out of the treaty's social chapter.

Here, for the first time, the EU, as it was known after the TEU finally came to force, confronted major popular opposition. While heads of state and government may have agreed on the benefits entailed within the Maastricht Treaty, individual citizens were not yet convinced. On the smallest scale, the EU failed to project its values effectively, and the result was a growing chorus of voices arguing that pooled sovereignty was a threat to the nation-state, that the EU was not democratic enough, and that the peoples being governed by this polity had yet to offer the necessary assent to be ruled. If this was the beginning of the end of permissive consensus, then the failed Constitutional

Treaty referenda in France and the Netherlands during 2005 surely defined the conclusion of an era.

To this point, two trends emerge. The expansion of the single market through several enlargements, known as wider integration, has increased the absolute size of the

EU. The parallel efforts to deepen political integration, to modernize the institutions, and to maintain a functioning regulatory framework have met with public opposition at the 9 ballot box and through the mainstream media and academia. To maintain the social

cohesion and to avoid structural distortion, political integration must be enacted at a

similar scale to that of economic integration. Because this has not happened, the very

legitimacy of the EU is being called into question as observers inquire into the

fundamentals of the Union's democratic pedigree.6

If this adverse condition arises from the EU' s political and economic regimes

being out of scale, perhaps the best response would come from developing a similar

conceptual framework. As a macroregion, the EU is composed of a variety of

subregions. For example, the entire EU itself is divided into a set of four regions, North,

South, East, and West, which foster cooperation among certain geographically proximate member states. There is also a Committee of the Regions (CoR) which includes 344 representatives from regional and local authorities. Mainly used as an advisory board, the CoR must be consulted before decisions regarding regional policy, the environment,

education and transport are taken up by the Commission.7

Of particular interest to the current analysis are the Euroregions: transnational, cross-border regional governance units constructed and funded under the Interreg IHA program. In terms of scale, these administrative units operate on a very local level, usually within 50 to 100 kilometers on either side of European borders. These microregions have the potential to resolve some of the problems entailed by the European democracy deficit and the concordant lack of political legitimacy. In order to prove this,

6Legitimacy issues and the European Union will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 1.

7The Europa Website, "European Union Institutions and Other Bodies," European Union, http://europa.eu/institutions/consultative/ corf index_ en.htm. 10 the terms must first be defined, and the potential solutions contextualized into the broader discussion on regionalism and the European Union. The concept of scale will be utilized

at every level of the analysis to examine the possible benefits associated with scaling down economic development, multilevel governance, and civil society projects. The aim of this research project will be to explore the relationship between microregions and macroregions; specifically, the goal is to determine whether or not Euroregions play a role in developing a stronger connection between the European polity and its people.

The first section of this thesis will use theoretical arguments to investigate the hypothesis that Euroregions are effective tools for expanding legitimacy within the EU.

The terms "legitimacy" and "Euroregion" must be defined and contextualized into the larger conversation regarding not only the EU but also the "new regionalism." After establishing these concepts, the paper will assess the potential for cultivating three different types of European legitimacy: social, input-, and output-oriented. In order to elaborate on the special significance of the Euroregions' transnational, transborder character, the literature regarding identity and demos-formation along borders will be surveyed. Next, the European multilevel governance framework, and the Euroregions' position within this system, will be considered. As the most localized component of this political structure, Euroregions allow border residents access to Brussels by more fully embedding their localities into the multi-level framework of the EU-a prerequisite for enhanced input legitimacy. Finally, the infrastructure and integration projects will be recognized as a major source of economic development and therefore an engine for output legitimacy. In this first section, the case will be made that cross-border 11 cooperation (CBC) on the subregional, transnational level has the. potential to affect positively all three types oflegitimacy.

The second section of this paper will use two case studies to determine if quantifiable data exist to support the hypothesis. Voting data from the 2007 French

Presidential election and the 2007 Polish Sejm election will be analyzed to detect which parties are supported by Euroregion residents. After deriving a per capita spending number (PCN) for Euroregion residents in France and Poland, tests will be run to see if this money has any effect on ballots cast either in support of or in opposition to the EU.

If the hypothesis is supported, the analysis will reveal that those regions with a higher per capita number should be more supportive of the EU than those with lower numbers. For instance, the French citizens living in the Haut Rhin region of Alsace reside in two

Euroregions at once. They therefore receive more funds than those Poles living in the

Euroregion bordering Ukraine. The hypothesis states that the Alsatian French should be less likely to support Eurosceptic parties than the Podlaskien Poles, who in tum should be more sympathetic to the EU' s goals than those Poles who do not live in a Euroregion at all.

The legitimacy issues arose from the individual ballots cast in national referenda.

The best way to address people on the national and subnational levels is to scale down the integration project and therefore make it more accessible and understandable to those citizens wary of an expansionist EU. In so doing, this research suggests that there may be a reciprocal relationship between the microregion and the macroregion. By scaling down to the level of the Euroregion, the benefits gained from economic development, political inclusion, and social transformation may filter back up to the European level. The 12 architecture of the Euroregion is necessary to establish the cooperative relationships across borders, to make the frontier residents feel directly involved with the integration project, and to institutionalize the disbursal of European developmental aid to these areas.

This framework goes far beyond direct transfers to individuals. The Euroregion is a forum established and funded by the EU in order to enhance economic growth as well as to instantiate positive relationships among foreign border inhabitants; because of these efforts, one would hope that the people living within the Euroregions would have a positive impression of the work being done at the supranational level. Legitimacy is as much an individual belief as it is an artifact of political institutions. For this reason, scaling down to a unit closer to the citizens appears to be a viable strategy for legitimizing the greater Community. CHAPTER I

DEFINING THE TERMS

To begin this study oflegitimacy and the European Union, the terms under consideration must be defined. In many cases, the context of a given investigation will delineate how the term legitimacy is used, and for this reason, variations on the theme complicate much of the literature. To untangle the concept, this chapter will call on Max

Weber's foundational definition of legitimacy to clarify what it is, why it is important, and how states go about achieving it. Jurgen Habermas explores legitimacy as well, and his analysis will be compared to Weber's. Because Habermas concerns himself more with the potential crises oflegitimacy, his work will offer insight into the current problems facing the EU. By utilizing these two thinkers' definitions, the analysis will situate itself both historically and philosophically.

Following this general discussion, the specific issues facing the EU and the contemporary debates surrounding the legitimacy crisis will be discussed. This review will outline the various ways that scholars unpack the term, and more importantly, how the topic relates explicitly to the EU. After examining Fritz Scharpf s work on the differences between input- and output-oriented legitimacy, a clear connection will be drawn between Habermas's hypothetical assertion that crises arise from the state's inability to steer the economy effectively and the problems currently confronting the

Community.

13 14 Because the term "Euroregion" is unfamiliar to many people, the history and administrative organization of this type of microregion will be made clear. This introduction to the term will explain generally how Euroregions fit into the framework of

European multi-level governance, and it will also define the goals set for the regions by the EU. The section will conclude with a conceptual argument explaining why this research project hypothesizes that Euroregions can influence output-oriented, social, and input-oriented legitimacy within the EU.

WEBER VS. HABERMAS

Although he did not write extensively on the subject of legitimacy, Weber's foundational definition became the touchstone for later analyses. In his view, legitimacy is a component qualification of "domination." Weber defines domination as "the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a group of persons," and thus builds a conceptual link between the terms "domination" and

"authority."8 He states, "every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience."9 If domination, obedience, and authority are to be legitimate, the powerful must persuade the powerless to believe that their social position is justly held; similarly, the social relations convince the ruled that the rulers possess the reigns of

8Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. I (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978),

9 Ibid., 212. 15 power not out of chance, but because they are exceptionally able to do so. 10 This sleight

of hand is a hallmark of Weber's position on legitimacy.

Weber takes a non-cognitivist stance on legitimacy. In his view, there is no

inherent truth-claim regarding the nature oflegitimacy because it is not amenable to the

demonstration of proof. I I The concept only has meaning if it is successfully incorporated

into an overarching social belief system. It is only when the people believe that the

dominant power is legitimate that the concept becomes actualized. "Every... system

attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. But according to the

kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative

staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ

fundarnentally."I 2 This is the connection between domination and legitimacy.

Legitimacy represents the means by which the state persuades the people to

comply with the dominant power structure, and it may be obtained in three different

ways. First, rational rules can codify systemic norms and therefore establish that

"obedience is claimed by him whom the rule designates."13 In this instance, the rule

rather than the man makes the power relation legitimate. Weber refers to this pure type

10Max Weber. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. and trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946); 271. "The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that has a right to his good fortune. He wants to be convinced that he 'deserves' it, and above all, that he deserves it in comparison with others. He wishes to be allowed the belief that the less fortunate also merely experience his due. Good fortune thus wants to be 'legitimate' fortune."

11 Deborah Cook, "Legitimacy and Political Violence: A Habermasian Perspective," Social Justice Vol. 30, No.3 (2003): 108-126.

121bid., 213. My italics.

13Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. II (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 954. 16 oflegitimation as 'legal' and associates it with modern 'servants of the state' or bureaucrats. 14

A second means to legitimate a power relationship is through personal authority, and this can be subdivided into either traditional or charismatic. Traditional legitimation

stems from, "the authority of the 'eternal yesteryear,' i.e. of the mores sanctified through the unimaginably and habitual orientation to conform."15 This is unlike the 'legal' legitimation because the obedience is directly linked to the person holding the position of power-princes and patriarchs, for example.

The third type oflegitimation is personal authority derived from charisma, or as

Weber called it, the 'gift of grace.' Those leaders with this quality inspire individual devotion because of their extraordinary demonstrations of heroism or revelation. The great prophet or the elected warlord often utilizes this sort of legitimation to secure the obedience of followers; 16

Weber's non-cognitive approach defines legitimacy as circumstantial; it is simply a belief that connects people to power, and this reciprocation and reflection of authority back to the power structure brings equilibrium to the system. In modern times, Weber sees legal/rational legitimation as the foundation of the modern state. The citizens take for granted the legal right of the state to make certain demands on them. In the West, these demands are deemed valid and legitimate because both the citizens and the system,

"simply affirm without question their legal formality and procedural regularity;"

14Weber 1978, 79.

15Ibid., 79.

16Ibid., 79. 17 furthermore, "individuals generally recognize (if only through avoidance behavior) the

binding character of the maxims and rules of a state." 17

How does the European Union, a polity without a homogenous body politic,

without ultimate sovereignty over its internal or external boundaries, and without the

power to exercise decisive coercive force, fit into Weber's conceptualization? First, it must be noted that Weber defines legitimacy as a necessary quality of domination.

Because of the pooling of sovereignty within the EU, it is difficult to attribute this sense

of domination to Brussels. Even if the EU is not dominant over its constituents, however,

Weber still believes that all powers must be legitimated in some way, especially those powers that aid in defining systemic winners and losers. Of the three available options, the 'legal/rational' most readily applies to the EU. The Commission is nothing if not bureaucratic, and the 80,000 pages of the acquis communautaire certainly embody a penchant for legalism. Additionally, the quote regarding "affirmation without question," reflects the general atmosphere of permissive consensus that characterized the public

system of belief prior to the debate over the Maastricht Treaty.

In many ways, Habermas's discussion oflegitimacy confronts Weber directly.

For example, in his chapter "The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion" in Toward a Rational Society, he dissects Weber's "legal/rational" legitimation scheme by illustrating how the rationalization of politics turns bureaucrats, people whose, "technical knowledge did not differ fundamentally in form from professional knowledge of the sort possessed by the military," into technocrats, people, "orienting themselves to strictly

17Cook 2003, 111. 18 scientific recommendations in the exercise of their public function." 18 Habermas understands this shift as an inversion of roles. In previous times, bureaucrats served as administrative organs and advisors, but now politicians are becoming "mere agents of the intelligentsia," and in Habermas's view, this leads down a very slippery, un-democratic slope.

Habermas uses a rational ontology that immediately distinguishes his version of reality from Weber's. 19 Because Habermas believes that legitimacy is grounded in truth, he also judges that legitimation can be either accepted or rejected on the basis of evidence. Using this criterion, he can reject the over-rationalization of the political sphere as being un-democratic and therefore bordering on illegitimate. Habermas traces the origin of this illegitimacy to the contentious relationship between the state and the market. It is here that he finds the root of a legitimacy crisis.

Habermas asserts that the capitalist system perpetuates a vicious cycle whereby the success of the market economy erodes the foundational ethics of the actors whom compose the system. Cultural factors such as the middle class focus on a religious-based achievement ethic, the fatalism of the lower classes, and the rejection of immediate gratification, ingrained in the early stages of capitalism political and economic self- restraint which aided in stabilizing the nascent system; furthermore, these ethics defined the individuals' relationship to the economic organization and fortified the cultural

18Jiirgen Habermas; Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 62.

19Cook 2003, 114-115. 19 boundaries of the new capitalist society.20 As the market economy matures, the successes of economic growth erode the cultural underpinnings of the society. If social integration presumes a certain degree of shared meaning among its members, then the skewing of the cultural fundament has dire effects not only on the individual, but the economy, the state, and the entire fabric of society. Individuals build up "expectations about consumption, and these have increased pressures on governments to steer the economy to produce more goods. The non-provision of goods to meet expectations becomes a dysfunctional feature of the market which it has become the task of the government to correct."21 Furthermore, the triumph of profit within the system only leads to "commodity fetishism" that is both a

"secularized residual ideology" supplanting traditional values, as well as a "functioning steering principle of the economic system."22

The theory gains momentum, and as it does so, the contagion of the legitimacy crisis begins to infect all aspects of the society. The people expect the government to steer the economy towards expansion and greater wealth but their individualist foci on unrestrained accumulation only maneuver the society towards ethical doldrums. The complexity of the market system drives the politicians to become more and more dependent on the technocrats whose over-rationalized view of the world has dis- embedded their policies from the society at large. This causes a rupture between the people and their leaders who watch as their political mandate disappears.

20Raymond Plant, "Jiirgen Habermas and the Idea of the Legitimation Crisis,'' European Journal ofPolitical Research Vol. 10 (1982): 341-352.

21 Ibid., 343.

22Jiirgen Habermas, The Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), 30. 20 This cycle is the negative force that Habermas observes as the basis for the

legitimation crisis and the breakdown of social integration within advanced Western

societies. In his introduction to Legitimation Crisis, he describes the nature of crisis:

Crises in social systems are not produced through accidental changes in the environment, but through structurally inherent system-imperatives that are incompatible and cannot be hierarchically integrated.

Disturbances of system integration endanger the continued existence only to the extent that social integration is at stake, that is, when the consensual foundations of normative structures are so much impaired that the society becomes anomic. Crisis states assume the form of a disintegration of social institutions.23

Weber offers a definition and explicates the relationship between legitimacy and

power. Habermas takes this definition and pushes it to its limits by applying it to the

practical examples of the developed states in western Europe and North America.

Understanding these two positions will make the contemporary debate regarding the

EU's lack oflegitimacy clearer; furthermore, the analysis will illustrate that Habermas

presaged these 21st century issues many years prior to the practical legitimacy crisis

facing the EU today.

THE EUROPEAN DEBATE ON LEGITIMACY

In his book What's Wrong With the European Union and How to Fix It, Simon

Hix examines three main problems facing the EU: policy gridlock, lack of popular

legitimacy, and a democratic deficit. His discussion of these topics will help to typify the larger debate within the EU regarding issues of legitimacy. In Hix' s chapter on popular legitimacy, he describes how European citizens have lost trust in their national

23Ibid., 2-3. 21 governments and, by extension, this skepticism has extended to the supranational level.

He believes that the multiple rejections of referenda by national constituencies indicate a hesitancy among Europeans to support further integration. He then uses demographic measures to illustrate who supports the EU and why, or why not.24

Hix ultimately proposes that the EU should become a more politicized polity; that

is, the institutions should be more open to contestation and political party groups should have more influence within those institutions. He tracks the voting records of the

European Parliament (EP) to show how European political groups have coalesced around

certain ideologies even across national boundaries. Believing that this indicates a maturation of the political foundations of the EU, he suggests institutional reforms which

would allow for a more transparent "political soap opera" to take place publicly. This would in turn afford citizens a closer connection to politics of the EU and thus alleviate

some of their Eurosceptic fears.

This is an interesting argument because it describes two different aspects of the debate surrounding legitimacy. Hix recognizes the popular nature of the legitimacy deficit; he sees a lack of support as being the root of the problem. However, his policy proposal is institutional in nature. In this case, Hix is not differentiating between political and normative legitimacy. Political legitimacy is measured by popular support, and normative legitimacy indicates the acceptability of certain institutions when judged against democratic standards.25 Even after illustrating the divided levels of support that

24Simon Hix, What's Wrong With the European Union and How to Fix It (Oxford: Polity, 2008), 50-66.

25 Achim Hurrelmann, "Multilevel Legitimacy: Conceptualizing Legitimacy Relationships Between the EU and National Democracies," in Democratic Dilemmas ofMultilevel Governance: 22 exist between the "elite" and the "lower classes," Hix still supposes that institutional tinkering will somehow convince the people to offer their support, to recognize the rule of the EU, to legitimize the Community. This mismatches the problem and the solution.

If the problem is political in nature, then the solution must be based on popular appeal; re-writing a new constitution that establishes multiple spheres of influence within the Community firmament will not convince the European citizens on the ground to authorize its actions precisely for the Weberian reason that the rational/legal foundations of the EU's institutions are not sufficiently convincing to the masses.

Conflating political and normative legitimacy is an understandable mistake because, as Hix notes, the twin issue of the democratic deficit must also be addressed.

Because normative legitimacy rests on democratic credentiais, it is easy to assume that making the EU more democratic would make it more legitimate. This either misunderstands the EU as a state-like polity or it assumes that the EU will inevitably become a state. Either way, such a presumption disregards the role of the citizens who, politically, must recognize the authority of the polity if it is to be legitimate. Just as all states are not legitimate, it does not necessarily follow that all democracies are also legitimate. As Kohler-Koch and Rittberger note, "the preconditions for democratically elected legitimate government lie in the capacity of the citizens of any given political system to view majority decisions as legitimate."26 This quote reveals how a negative political account can nullify even institutionally, normatively legitimate states.

Legitimacy, Representation and Accountability in the European Union, eds. Joan DeBardeleben and Achim Hurrelmann (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 17-37.

26Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger, "Charting Crowded Territory: Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union," in Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European 23 In the conclusion of Legitimacy and the European Union, T. Banchoff and M.

Smith incorporate both political and normative aspects oflegitimacy in their definition.

They state:

Many observers have expressed concern about the legitimacy of the European Union without considering what constitutes legitimacy in a polity that is not a conventional state. This volume has sought to address this shortcoming by defining a legitimate polity as a recognized framework for politics with representative institutions, and by underscoring the particular dynamics of recognition and representation in the multi-level EU."27

This definition includes both a conceptual grounding in democracy, "representative

institutions," but it goes farther than that and identifies the importance of "recognition

and representation." On one hand, recognition implies a constituency, whether it be

European or national, and on the other, it seems to adhere to Weber's reciprocity

principle. The recognition is the reflection of the people's will onto the polity that is

itself constituted through institutions consisting of the peoples' representatives. Implicit

in the term recognition, is also its inverse, or rejection. This satisfies Habermas's

criterion that through rational deliberation, the public may in fact fail to recognize a

polity as legitimate.

Legitimacy, as a concept, can be broken down further into its constituent parts. If

political and normative are measures oflegitimacy, then input, output, and social

legitimacy are forms oflegitimacy. Fritz Scharpf wrote a groundbreaking work on

European legitimacy and he distinguished between the first two classes, input and output.

Union, eds. Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 1-32.

27Thomas Banchoffand Mitchell P. Smith, "Conclusion," inLegitimacy and the European Union: A Contested Polity, eds. Thomas Banchoffand Mitchell P. Smith (New York: Routledge, 1999), 212-219. 24 Scharpf s arguments seem to resonate with those of Weber and Habermas. He states that "the legitimacy of political systems has come to depend entirely on the belief in, and practice of, democratic self-determination which must assure that government of the people must also be government by the people and for the people."28 That he emphasizes the importance of the belief in the system underscores his recognition of

Weber. Furthermore, this definition includes both the institutional and the individual criteria necessary to satisfy the requirements of political and normative legitimacy.

Scharpfs hypothesis sounds as ifhe draws directly from Habermas's Legitimacy

Crisis. He argues: "The weakening of political legitimacy in Western Europe is a consequence of the loss of problem-solving capacities of political systems which has been brought about by the dual and interrelated processes of economic globalization and

European integration."29

His use of the terms input and output legitimacy correlates to government by the people and for the people respectively. He uses these terms to contextualize his theory of legitimation within the specific realm of the European Union, and these distinctions will play a particularly important role in evaluating the potential for Euroregions to legitimize the EU.

Input-oriented legitimacy stems from the general sense of inclusivity within the political system. The citizens must suppose that they have a voice in the decision making process; more importantly, they must have faith that even if they are on the losing side of a deliberation, the winners will not take advantage of their majority position. In this

28Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

29Ibid., 2. 25 sense, Scharpf s conceptualization of input legitimacy is both procedural as well as ideational. Beyond the apparatus of democratic institutions, the members of society must believe that the tyranny of the majority will do them no wrong. This trust emanates from what Weber calls Gemeinsamkeitsglaube, or a belief in togetherness, that helps to form a thick collective identity based in mutual trust. 30

Many times, the question of legitimacy rests on the complications inherent to political systems based on the subjugation of the minority. Scharpf clarifies this position when he states, "For most practical purposes, therefore, the justification of majority rule must be considered as the crucial problem of input-oriented theories of democratic legitimization."31 In the European Union, the debate regarding the institutionalization of

QMV speaks directly to this point. All crucial decisions prior to the Maastricht Treaty were made according to unanimity and consensus. With the spread of QMV, the majority voting system would necessarily introduce a "losing position" in opposition to the "win set." If the people living within a small member state believe that they are too often in the minority, then they may not feel that their interests are being properly represented.

This would lead to an input-oriented legitimacy problem.

To complicate this matter even further, if, as stated by Christopher Lord, the EU is a postnational polity with low levels of "community," or demos, then the question must be asked, "A majority of what? A majority of whom? Not a majority of anything that I

30Ibid., 7. In later discussions, this sense of community, what some may call government of people, will be categorized as social legitimacy and will be discussed in conjunction with demos formation. Scharpf did not make this distinction, however.

31 Ibid., 7. 26 can recognize as a single people and feel myself a part of."32 Although technically this question could be answered by defining QMV, adding up total population and percentage of votes cast per member state, the underlying issue is not resolved. Too heterogeneous to have anything approaching a common identity, the EU will continually face the troubles associated with majority voting, losing coalitions, and faltering input-oriented legitimation.

Under Scharpf s dual characterization oflegitimacy, he joins institutional and social aspects to characterize the term input-oriented legitimacy, but it is also possible to utilize identity formation as a distinctive means to legitimate a polity. Social legitimacy, government ofthe people, refers to "the role played by the boundaries of a political community and hence emphasize[ s] issues of collective identity or social homogeneity."33 Identity politics can resurrect painful memories for Europeans.

Nevertheless, attaining a certain level of collective identity among member states would, as Scharpf rightly points out, soften the blows of a majoritarian political system. The goal would not necessarily be to eliminate the "other." That is, there is no reason that national identities should become subsumed under a "European" identity or that

Lithuanians should suddenly feel a deep kinship with their fellow Portuguese citizens.

The hope would be that all citizens may benefit from adding an extra layer to their

32Christopher Lord, "Parliamentary Representation in a Decentered Polity," in Debating the Democratic Legitimacy ofthe European Union, eds. Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 139-162.

33Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger, "Charting Crowded Territory: Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union," in Debating the Democratic Legitimacy ofthe European Union, eds. Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 1-29. 27 political self. Of course, this is a process that cannot be dictated or prescribed, but it is a necessary component to consider when discussing the troubles of legitimacy and the EU.

Output-oriented legitimacy, government for the people, derives from the

government's ability to solve problems that individuals, markets, and civil society cannot manage by themselves.34 This type of legitimation relies less on factors of identity and

community and more on common interests, usually economic in nature, which also makes it less politically contentious than the input-oriented variety. In an output-oriented

model, the benefits of free-trade, visa-less travel, and open capital markets increase

economic opportunities for a large portion of the population. These benefits, coupled

with the fact that the first phase of integration did not tread too far into the realm of national politics or identity, explains why the first phase of integration met with relatively little popular resistance.

According to Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, output-oriented legitimacy serves two major purposes: first, it should curtail the abuse of public power, and second, it should

facilitate problem solving. 35 In other words, if a government is able to protect its people

from corruption and vice, and if it can also make its people feel safe, secure, and strong, then those people, theoretically, should render that government as legitimate--they

should assent to be ruled. The rule of law, checks and balances, and regularized elections

embody the key mechanisms for achieving this first goal. These characteristics make it difficult for the government to overstep its bounds, and when caught doing so, they allow the citizens to overturn that government.

34Ibid., 10.

351bid., 12-14. 28 Such an outcome-based method of legitimation makes it difficult for the EU to

confront problems that it sees as highly controversial or zero-sum in nature. By limiting

its range, these constraints ensure that the EU focuses primarily on consensus oriented

decision making. This does not mean that all decisions made via majoritarian methods

are illegitimate, "but it means that they are legitimate only because they do in fact respect

the limitations of their legitimacy base."36 This refers back to Hix's argument that

through embracing the quid pro quo of professional politics, the issues under debate will

become more public and the constituency will feel more involved in the process. Hix

asserts that this sense of involvement would aid in legitimating the Community. Scharpf

seems to imply that the EU has made monumental efforts to avoid such public

contestation so that it may retain, at the very least, its hold over output legitimacy.

Within the European, national context, the welfare state represents the greatest

example of output legitimacy. Scharpf describes the conundrum as a conflict between the

negative forces associated with European integration-the politically fashioned removal

of trade barriers and other impediments to economic efficiency-and the economic

pressures associated with maneuvering through managing a highly interdependent global

economy.37 Each of these factors constrains the EU's capacity to solve problems.

Furthermore, the welfare state, the most costly as well as the most beloved example of output-oriented legitimacy at the member state level, is in jeopardy of becoming an inefficient burden, obsolete and unsustainable in the hypercompetitive global economy.

Scharpf believes that:

361bid., 23.

37Ibid., 121-123. 29 If they [welfare provisions] should now be revoked under the pressures of economic globalization or the asymmetry of negative and positive integration in the European Community, there is indeed a danger that rising political disaffection will again undermine either the political legitimacy of democratic governments or their political commitment to economic integration.38

This, in a nutshell, is the Habermasian legitimacy crisis come to full fruition on the

continent of Europe.

On one hand, the heterogeneous nature of the European polity precludes it from

obtaining a singular body politic. This diversity makes governing effectively though

unanimity an impossibility. As the EU enlarged, it began to shift its policy-making regime towards QMV out of necessity. This move invigorates the deterioration of input- oriented legitimacy because it presupposes a losing minority. As the EU attempts to reform its institutions and stave off gridlock, the global economy continues to exert downward pressure on the member states attempting to remain competitive while still securing output-oriented legitimacy by providing the welfare services that most

Europeans have come to view as part of the social contract. This cycle embodies the legitimacy crisis as it pertains to the European Union, and it is the major obstacle facing future integration. Now that this term has been fully defined and contextualized, the next section will address what this thesis sees as a potential solution-the Euroregion.

THE EUROREGION

A Euroregion is a transnational administrative unit that allows the people living along the borders of EU member states a platform from which to coordinate the regional interests of their cross-border localities. Across every internal European border, and most

38Ibid., 122. 30 of the external boundaries, a Euroregion exists. Perkmann defines them as,

"institutionalized collaborations between contiguous subnational authorities across

national .borders."39

The term Euroregion derives from the first cross-border region (CBR) constructed

within the EU. The local governments on either side of the German-Dutch border

identified common interests and recognized familiar disadvantages arising from their

peripheral location within their home state. They decided that more could be gained by

working together to overcome these problems than by relying solely on the largesse of

either Bonn or Amsterdam. By forming EUREGIO, they not only initiated the first

example of formalized cross-border cooperation (CBC) withinthe EU, but they

established the appellation that would be used for all similar ventures in the future--

Euroregions.

In sketching the history and development of EUREGIO, a better understanding of the inner workings and goals of the general Euroregion will be gained. Formed in 1958 between the German community of Gronau and the Dutch community of Enschede,

EUREGIO spans 13,000 km2 and contains 3.37 million inhabitants.40 It consists of the

Dutch provinces of Gelderland, Overijssel, and Drenthe as well as parts of the German federal states North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony. As stated on its website:

The objectives ofEUREGIO correspond to the aims of a unique Europe, but on a smaller, more comprehensible scale. In the past, national borders often came

39Markus Perkmann, "Euroregions: Institutional Entrepreneurship in the European Union," in Globalization, Regionalization, and Cross-Border Regions, ed. Markus Perkmann and Ngai-ling Sum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 103-124.

40Euregio Website, "Living Without Borders," http://www.euregio.de/cms/publish/content/showpage.asp?pageid=2 l 3. 31 into being by chance or arbitrarily, and people, cultures, and areas which belonged together were tom apart. In a united Europe and in the single European market, there are still obstacles at the borders because of different structures, terms of reference, and legislation in the individual member states. Coordination and intensive cross-border contacts can eliminate these obstacles.41

The governance structure ofEUREGIO consists of an Association Assembly which offers representation to all 130 participating towns, municipalities, and administrative districts. The members of this assembly then elect a cross-border regional parliament known as the EUREGIO Council that consists of 81representatives,41 each from the Netherlands and Germany. In tum, this council selects an executive Board to aid in coordination and management of the Euroregion. 42 While the governing system of each individual Euroregion may have its own specialized internal configuration, most have a council, a president, working groups, and a secretariat.43

This management structure is necessary to adequately organize and distribute the

99.9 million Euros that have been allocated to EUREGIO between the years 2000-2006.

These transfer payments originate from the European Regional Development Fund

(ERDF), and are meant to, "strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions."44 First established in the

41 Euregio Website, "Vision," http://www.euregio.de/cms/publish/content/showpage.asp?pageid=216.

42Euregio Website, "Working Fields," http://www.euregio.de/ ems/publish/content/showpage.asp ?pageid=214.

43Markus Perkmann, "Euroregions: Institutional Entrepreneurship in the European Union," in Globalization, Regionalization, and Cross-Border Regions ed. Markus Perkmann and Ngai-ling Sum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 103-124.

44Wikisource Fulltext, "The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community." http:!/en. wikisource.org/wiki/The_Treaty_ establishing_ the_ European_ Economic_ Community_ (EEC). The 32 Preamble to the Treaty of Rome, this objective evolved into an entire "Solidarity" policy- area that today includes the ERDF, the European Social Fund (ESF), the European

Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) (known collectively as "structural finds") as well as the "cohesion fund," aid set aside specifically for environmental and infrastructural concerns. 45

The ERDF's involvement differentiates simple CBCs from Euroregions. As

Perkmann's definition suggests, Euroregions are institutionalized. This does not only refer to their management structure, but it relates to the fact that the ERDF takes portions of the EU budget and redistributes these monies via the Interreg programs to various projects around the Community. Founded in 1990, lnterreg's first iteration lasted until

1993, had a budget of 800 million European Currency Units (ECUs) and distributed funds directly to localities in order to, "remedy the poor economic condition resulting from peripheral location and alienation from the centres of the national economies."46

Interreg II worked from 1994-1999 with an initial budget of 2.9 billion ECU that was later increased to 3.065 billion after the accession of Sweden, Finland, and Austria.

Interreg III ran from 2000 until 2006, worked with a 4.857 billion EUR budget, and is divided into three strands: A, B, and C.47 Each strand relates to a different aspect of

SCADPlus website no longer carries a link to the full text of this treaty. Although I would prefer not to use Wikisource, it is the only place that I could find the original text.

45Bernard Funck, Lodovico Pizzati, and Martin Bruncko, "Overview," in European Integration, Regional Policy, and Growth, eds. Bernard Funck and Lodovico Pizzati. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003, 1-19.

46Kazu Takahashi, "Migration and Cross-Border Cooperation in Central and East European Countries," in Migration, Regional Integration and Human Security, ed. Harald Kleinschmidt (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 245-258.

471bid., 252. 33 regionalism within the EU. Strand A funds 'cross-border cooperation,' and these

transfers go exclusively to development projects proposed by Euroregions. The funds

given to the Interreg IIIA project represent the lion's share of the Brussels-based money

open to the Euroregions, and this thesis will use these transfers as its testing ground for

all analyses regarding the EU and legitimacy.

Like other Euroregions, working groups within EUREGIO analyze project

viability and decide on which development schemes to undertake. Hoping that a

multifaceted approach will provide the most impact on the border region, the Interreg

funds are utilized in a variety of ways. EUREGIO lists five broad working fields: social-

cultural cooperation, social-economic development, intermunicipal cooperation, advisory

services, and inter- regional cooperation. Increased transparency and improved

coordination represent a major step towards bettering the life of the border residents.

Education, health care, and emergency response teams have all been formed as a result of

the EUREGIO's focus on intermunicipal and interregional cooperation.

As it pertains to socio-economic development, the Euroregion plays an important

role in connecting all of the layers of the multi-level governance (MLG) regime.

According to the website:

EUREGIO ... handles applications from beginning to end. Partners are the ministries of Economic Affaires of the Netherlands and the German federal states Nordrhein-Westfalen and Niedersachen, the "Bezirksregierungen" (district administrations) Miinster and Weser-Ems as well as the Dutch provinces Gelderland and Overijssel.48

48Euregio Website, "Working Fields," http://www.euregio.de/cms/publish/content/showpage.asp?pageid=219. 34 By working within the EU-based framework, the Euroregions have become a

localized, governance structure tied into the overall multi-level governance regime of the

Union. The local governments create a CBC because they feel left out of the decision making process in their capitals. They form working groups and make proposals for development projects to Brussels. Brussels allocates that money via the Interreg IIIA program, thus bringing the locality into direct contact with the suprastate governance structure. This connection also transforms the generalized CBC into the institutionalized

Euroregion. As the money is distributed, the member states, at various levels within their own political system, participate in releasing the funds. In this way, the once marginalized border residents have played a significant role in flattening out a policy space-that is, their presence aids in turning a hierarchical system into a more horizontal framework where all levels of governance coordinate and work together to bring benefits to the citizens of the member states.

The specific projects that Euroregions undertake will be discussed later, but at this point, the definition of these transnational, localized governance structures should be clear. They play a key role in connecting people, otherwise marginalized, to the EU.

Furthermore, they offer substantial funding for various projects meant to level out disparities in regional wealth within the EU.

RE-SCALING LEGITIMACY

Now that these two seemingly unrelated concepts have been defined and placed into a European context, they must be drawn together. This thesis will test to see whether the projects undertaken by the Euroregions influence citizens' support for Eurosceptic 35 parties. It will attempt to see ifEuroregions contribute to political legitimacy by making the benefits of the EU more tactile to the citizens of these border regions. As noted earlier, political legitimacy is a composite concept made up of input, social, and output classes oflegitimacy. Therefore, the foundation of the hypothesis rests on the belief that

Euroregions can effectively contribute to building linkages to all three of these constituent parts oflegitimacy.

While it is true that all Euroregions decide individually what projects they should undertake, it is also true that most follow a pattern similar to the overarching set of priorities set out by EUREGIO. Without question, economic development is of primary concern to both the EU as well as the Euroregions. Economic growth and the enrichment of the population is an underlying necessity to maintain social cohesion. Without such a feeling of community, any moves to deepen integration will be met with public reservation. If the Euroregions can succeed in bringing viable economic growth to the periphery by way of infrastructure development and investment in small- and medium­ sized firms, then this could be seen as a viable form of output-oriented legitimacy­ govemment/or the people.

Along with socio-economic concerns, there is also a move towards socio-cultural cooperation in many Euroregions. In acknowledging that the boundaries dividing different cultural nations are largely politically contrived through no fault of the divided peoples, the border regions can begin to build bridges between those groups. Many times these projects focus on developing a bond between the children of these areas. The "Mini

Chefs" project gave 40 children from Rijn-Waal the occasion to participate monthly in a program that focused on healthy diets, environmentally-aware food production, and 36 regional purchasing. Furthermore, the children were exposed to various cuisines and foreign language acquisition opportunities.49 This kind of activity highlights the cultural exchange that is occurring in the Euroregions, and it also illustrates how the foundation for an actual European community is being formulated. While it is difficult to manufacture a demos, socio-cultural programs such as this are meant to instill in the next generation a sense of European-ness that extends beyond national boundaries. In so doing, it will be argued that Euroregions are a prime location for developing social legitimacy, government ofthe people.

As presented earlier, the very nature of the Euroregion as a recipient ofERDF funds presupposes that, as a governance structure, it is already embedded into the overall

MLG system. This also presumes that over time, a political connection between the border residents and Brussels is undergoing a maturation process. The greater flows of money that are being distributed to the Euroregions necessitate a more efficient organization to procure increased levels of aid, to distribute those new funds, and to oversee the completion of projects. In time, this process may lead people to recognize the viability of the Euroregion as a conduit that offers them representation and voice. By diminishing the feelings of alienation, by bringing Brussels metaphorically closer to the marginalized populations, and by making people feel that they are "winners" within the system, the Euroregions offer the possibility to forge a strong linkage for input-oriented legitimacy.

49Euregion Website, "Projects: Interreg IIIA 2000-2008," http://www.euregio.org/upload/files/Prioriteit5%20-%20engnew.pdf. 37 This hypothesis states that because of their access to developmental funding, their

legal-embeddedness, and their territorial location as cross-border structures, Euroregions

offer a singular opportunity to develop all three forms oflegitimacy. Each of these

improvements can be easily translated to th.e individual/personal level because the scale

of the project is reduced from the vastness of a macroregion to the comfort of the cross-

border, microregion. The EU can regard Euroregions as an effective vehicle for scaling

down its economic opportunities, its multilevel governance structure, as well as a

transnational identity to the most local level possible.

Before the most recent enlargements, the borders of the EU 15 were 81.5 percent

coastline and 18.5 percent land; since 2004, however, those numbers have shifted to only

41 percent coastline and 59 percent interior land borders. so This development signals an

opening in potential policy-space; the increase in absolute size of the border areas within

the EU allows for the rescaling of key integration goals. The Euroregions represent the

tool most capable of transferring the sensibilities of the core to the periphery and in doing

so, creating a sense of convergence within the EU. As the once-marginalized residents of

the microregion begin to experience the benefits afforded them by the macroregion, it is

likely that they will more readily assent to the rule of the EU and that the polity will

50European Spatial Planning Obser\ration Network (ESPON), "Territory Matters for Cohesion and Competitiveness: Facets of Regional Diversity and Potentials in Europe," Espon Synthesis Report III, 2006, pg. 69. http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/publications/98/l 229/file_ 24 71/final­ synthesis-reportiii_web.pdf. 38 become more legitimate in the eyes of its citizens. This conceptual framework represents the justification for the proposed hypothesis; only after testing this, however, will it be possible to conclude, or disprove, that Euroregions actually affect the way that border residents support the EU. 39

CHAPTER2

CONTEXTUALIZING THE ARGUMENT

The practical relationship between the micro-level and the macro-level of

European regionalism is largely unexplored. The next section of this thesis will address the "new regionalism," Euroregions' location within this framework, and how "the politics of scaling," to use Brenner's term, can address this lacuna in the literature.

"NEW REGIONALISM AND EUROREGIONS

A fundamental conceptualization of political space and regionalism underscores this discussion of Euroregions. According to Keating, regionalism has undergone three

1 major phases, each highlighted by its own crisis. In the first case, he points to the l 9 h century, the consolidation of the "modernizing, bureaucratic state," and its penetration into traditional societies.51 To the emerging state, regions represented obstacles blocking the construction of a unified, national identity, which needed to be either culturally subsumed or politically satiated ifthe state were to predominate.

Keating sees the second major crisis occurring generally after the conclusion of

World War II and specifically in the 1960s. Where the state once viewed regions as hindrances to their hegemony, in the rapidly integrating, post-war economy, "territorial

51Michael Keating, "The Invention of regions: Political Restructuring and Territorial Government in Western Europe" Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy Vol. 15 (1997): 383-398. 40 disparities were recognized as a problem which resisted the macroeconomic management of the Keynesian era, and the region was chosen as the most appropriate level at which to address them."52 This period ofregionalization focused mainly on economic modernization and utilized a top-down, technocratic, state-centrist model that encouraged local collaboration only as a means to guarantee the completion of the state's program.

Problems arose as political contestation between the states and their regions developed.

Territorial protests in the 1960s and 1970s exemplify the antagonistic tum taken as regions began mustering their political power to react against the state. As regions became more influential, they began setting their own agendas and framing issues to suit their own ends. Regardless of the intended benefits that states hoped to gain from this

"developmental regionalism," overt political competition between the state and the region led to an overall deterioration in the situation.53

The third phase .of regionalism, the "new regionalism," began in the late 1980s.

For his part, Keating sees the "new regionalism" deriving from the growing tensions between global and local factors of production. Multinational corporations (MN Cs) and global financial institutions work in a realm characterized by high levels of mobility.

These institutions come into direct conflict with the relatively immobile communities that rely on outside investment and capital to survive. In this context, regions represent "a level which is intermediary both in territorial and in a functional sense."54 Euroregions can be seen as territorial constructs adhering to this "new regional" logic because they act

52Ibid., 385.

53Ibid., 385.

541bid., 386. 41 as a point of reference between the supranational, the national and the local. It is this connection between the regions that needs further exploration.

Soderbaum, in his chapter titled, "Exploring the Links Between Micro-

Regionalism and Macro-Regionalism," states: "There is in particular a great divide between the discourse of macro-regionalism and the discourse of micro-regionalism.

This gap is unfortunate and constitutes in my view one of the missing links in the study ofregionalism as conducted so far." 55 By focusing on regional scale, Soderbaum utilizes one of "new regionalism's" fundamental precepts. Previous strains of scholarship concentrated exclusively on the state's commanding role in creating and managing regional structures;56 however, "new regionalism" moves beyond this singular unit of analysis, and recognizes the dispersal of power throughout the global political system, both up, in the direction of macro-regions, and down, towards the micro-region.

Mittelman, citing Hettne's research,57 uses a political economy approach to categorize these scales as macro-, sub-, and micro-regional, each bearing a relationship to the meso-region, or the state. 58 A macroregion is a loose geographical unit consisting of states that collectively coordinate capital flows, provide opportunities to engage global

55Fredrick Soderbaum, "Exploring the Links Between Micro-regionalism and Macro-regionalism," in Global Politics ofRegionalism: Theory and Practice, ed. Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hettne, and Luk Van Langenhove (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 87-104.

56Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy ofInternational Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 397-401; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 264-6.

57Bj6rn Hettne, Andras lnotai, and Osvaldo Sunkel, eds. National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the North (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 2000), xv-xxix.

58James Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 9-10. Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 2 ist Century, 4th ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2003), 75. 42 markets, and delineate the overall structure of the region. Examples include the EU, the

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Southern Cone Common

Market (Mercosur).

Subregions are located within the larger context of the macroregion but are not necessarily geographically bound. These units rely on comparative advantage and technological expertise to increase productivity while their location within the macroregion offers them access to global markets. Within the EU, the "Four Motors" region, consisting of Stuttgart, Barcelona, Lyons, and Milan, exemplifies an urban constellation that has at times been the driving force behind Europe's economic expansion. 59

Microregions can be found within the territories of sovereign states and may hold a level of autonomy higher than that of other political units within that same state. In

China, special economic zones (SEZs) and export processing zones (EPZs) have been earmarked as "national pace-setters" and "locomotives to power economic growth."60

Within the European context, Euroregions are not primarily economic engines, but

5'1>erkmann also refers to the 'Four Motors of Europe' as an Interregional co-operation of non­ contiguous territories. Markus Perkmann, "Cross-Border Regions in Europe: Significance and Drivers of Regional Cross-Border Co-operation," European Urban and Regional Studies Vol. 10, No. 2 (2003) 158. This "Four Motors" concept has been re-evaluated, however, and is now called the Pentagon, a region including London, Hamburg, Munich, Milan, and Paris, that covers 14% of the ESPON space, 32% of its population, produces 46% of the GDP and enjoys 75% of the R&D investments and the highest levels of multimodal accessibility. European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON) "Territory Matters for Cohesion and Competitiveness: Facets of Regional Diversity and Potentials in Europe," Espon Synthesis Report III, 2006, pg. 69.

6°Mittelman 2000, 9-10. 43 institutionalized, administrative microregions mandated with organizing and managing developmental projects capable of increasing economic and political efficiency. 61

Mittelman's division ofregions into a multi-scalar spectrum is different from previous political economic discussions of regionalism that fixated mainly on relative geographic proximity to markets, capital flows, and macroeconomic policy coordination. 62 This evolution in the scholarship shifts the focus from understanding regions as monolithic competitors for political power and economic advantage to a more nuanced view of regions as both producers and receivers of the power distributed throughout a more interdependent international system. Such re-articulation of power and space presumes that in the contemporary system the state neither monopolizes the right to institute regional undertakings nor necessarily holds a position of authority when dealing with non-central government (NCG) actors. In the new regionalism, interactions between sub- or microregions and macroregions rriay occur without any direct contact with the mesoregion.

CONNECTING THE MICRO- TO THE MACRO-REGION

Scale is an integral concept, necessary to understanding not only the "new regionalism" but also the interplay between the micro- and macroregions. To clarify this point, the analysis will show how Euroregions attempt to re-scale the economy, the politics and the society of transborder territories.

61 Julian Minghi, "Changing Geographies of Scale and Hierarchy in European Borderlands," in Boundaries and Place: European Borderlands in Geographical Context, ed. David H. Kaplan and Jouni Hfil

62Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, eds. The Political Economy ofRegionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 3. 44 Cartographers identify scale as, "the size relationship or ratio between the map

document and the portion of the earth it represents," and a scale change as, "the process

of changing the size of part or all of a cartographic object. "63 Geographers define scale

first, as a, "graduated series, usually a nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing

size, such as the local, regional, national, and supranational;" 64 additionally, scale is,

"conceptualized as socially constructed rather than ontologically pre-given, and that the

geographic scales constructed are themselves implicated in the constitution of social,

economic, and political processes."65

This analysis attempts to interpret scale in both senses. First, as a map is rescaled,

the object does not change. France is still France regardless of the location from which

an observer views it. When applied to the EU, this principle of non-distortion helps

explain how the macroregion redefines internal and external political spaces without

altering its own core fundamentals; in other words, this notion explains how power and

influence flows from the top level downward throughout the system.

If scale is also socially constructed, as defined by the geographers, then this

assumes a discursive interplay between the regions being rescaled; such a relationship would allow the microregion to reflect certain qualities back up to the macro-level. Even though nested, the various nodes of power cannot be hierarchically dominated, especially in the European system of pooled sovereignties. The macro-region may be compelled to·

63 Michael Demers, Fundamentals of Geographic Information Systems, 4th ed. (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009), 429.

64Helga Leitner, "Reconfiguring the Spatiality of Power: The Construction of a Supranational Migration Framework for the European Union," Political Geography Vol. 16, No. 2 (1997): 123-143.

65David Delaney and Helga Leitner, "The Political Construction of Scale," Political Geography Vol. 16, No. 2 (1997): 93-97. 45 adapt to influences over which it has little control, and therefore, it is completely possible

that the micro-region may become a producer and transmitter of values to the macro-

level.

SCALE AND ECONOMICS

Jessop defines four scalar responses to what he calls the 'crisis of the national

scale,' or states' growing inability to effectively manage the complications of global

capitalism. Of the four, two are specifically interesting to the discussion of economies,

Euroregions, and the EU. The state's first option is to, "widen or deepen the scalar

division oflabour within an integrated, vertically nested set of scales," and this represents the first, necessary step taken by member states when joining the EU. 66 He continues by noting that such a response may either originate from the top or from the bottom since

agents on either level may see advantages in cross-scalar divisions of labor.

The second response, building same'-scale, horizontal linkages within the vertically nested set of scales, entails cross-border regional projects such as

Euroregions.67 Jessop believes that this strategy utilizes common territorial interests to exploit complementary resources and capacities; furthermore, "they involve the production of new types of place or space for producing, servicing, working, or consuming ... [and] create location-specific advantages for producing goods and services

66Bob Jessop, "The Political Economy of Scale," in Globalization, Regionalization, and Cross­ Border Regions, ed. Markus Perkmann and Ngai-ling Sum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 25-49.

67Ibid., 32. 46 and offer new regulatory structures, infrastructures, scale economies, new labour markets

and so on. "68

The evidence to verify these claims is contradictory. Attempts to measure the

effectiveness of structural funds on CBRs have taken place, and some scholars have

attempted to discern whether or not the economies of border regions are positively

influenced by the presence ofEuroregions. For example, Kratke analyzes the Polish-

German border regions and concludes that most of the trade taking place in Polish borderlands occurs within supraregional networks linked to major German industrial

centers, bypassing the regionally oriented, cross-border area. 69 He does not render future intra-regional relationships impossible because he sees the potential for, "transnational

enterprises ... grant[ing] strategic privileges to selected production locations in Eastern

Central Europe," specifically in the border regions.70 He does caution, however, that any

future interactions between the German and Polish side of the border should not be

predicated on a consistently asymmetrical wage differentials if the goal is equitable

economic development.

While Kratke points out the various problems with these Euroregions, he never

acknowledges that the border region shared between Poland and what was once the

German Democratic Republic (GDR) remains one of the most moribund economic

spaces in the entire EU. Despite considerable support from the German Federal

68Ibid., 37.

69Stefan Kriitke, "Cooperation and Development on the German-Polish Border," in Globalization, Regionalization, and Cross-Border Regions, ed. Markus Perkmann and Ngai-ling Sum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 125-147.

70Ibid., 144. 47 Republic, this region remains depressed. The Euroregion Spree-Neisse-Bober contains the south-western portion of Brandenburg, which is still considered an 'Objective 1' region, that is a region that has per capita gross domestic product below 75 percent of the

EU average. 71 Even as Germany looks to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of reunification, it seems likely that there are other factors holding back the economic development of this specific border region. This particular area may not be the best example to either prove or disprove the economic benefits of Euroregion projects.

Some scholars claim that structural funds do indeed increase economic development. Castells and Espasa conclude that these transfers have a positive and

significant effect on the reduction of regional disparities but that this impact could be higher than the 5 percent that they have recorded if a greater magnitude of funds were delivered. 72 Furthermore, as these funds pertain to scale, both the Castells and Espasa report and Bruncko's paper on economic convergence in the Slovak Republic, argue that directing payments to the lowest income areas, such as the Euroregion Spree-Neisse-

Bober, is less effective than funding non-peripheral, domestic growth-poles such as

Bratislava that could utilize the investment more efficiently.73 They believe that, "if

Structural Actions were allocated to more productive regions of the poorest states, there would be a greater effect on the global growth of these states ... a higher GDP in the

71 0n Objective 1 criteria, see Antoni Castells and Marta Espasa, "Do Structural Actions Contribute to Reduced Regional Disparities in the European Union?" in European Integration, Regional Policy, and Growth, ed. Bernard Funck and Lodovico Pizatti (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003), 167.

72Castells and Espasa 2003, 175.

73Martin Bruncko, "Real Convergence in the Slovak Republic and European Regional Funds," in European Integration, Regional Policy, and Growth, ed. Bernard Funck and Lodovico Pizatti (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003), 193. 48 richest regions of the poorest states spreads, via the national budget, to the poorest regions."74

Following this plan would entail a re-orientation of policy as well as a shift in scale; these authors propose sending the funds directly to the states who would then distribute them to the most efficient regions or cities. If this were to happen, however, the scalar benefits of political integration and societal transformation would not be possible because the Euroregion apparatus would be negated. Any external benefits associated with increased cross-border cooperation or political connections to Brussels would be sacrificed for increased efficiency and an as yet unsubstantiated confidence in economic spillover from areas of high efficiency to lower capacity regions. As in most cases pertaining to economic development, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact causes of growth or stagnation in a dynamic global system. On the other hand, it is possible to grasp the more finite benefits of scale as they pertain to the EU' s multilevel governance structure.

SCALE AND POLITICS

The term "multi-level governance," defined as a, "system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers-supranational, national, regional and local" fits perfectly into the new regionalist scalar paradigm. 75 Just as different economic goals can best be met at various regional levels, governments also need flexibility; indeed, ''multi-level governance allows decision makers to adjust the

74Castells and Espasa 2003, 176.

75Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance," American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 2 (May 2003), 233-243. 49 scale of governance to reflect heterogeneity."76 Euroregions represent an integral link in the chain of European multi-level governance connecting the local to the supranational, the microregion to the macroregion. Scholte makes this association when he states that globalization is, "increasing possibilities for substate sites of governance to take greater initiative. Moreover, devolution from states to substate institutions has often come with the explicit urgings and financial sponsorship of suprastate agencies like the EU.'m By understanding Euroregions as multi-level governance structures on the substate level, the analysis gains access to one of the "new regionalism's" key concepts, one that will

support the claim that microregions may transfer qualities, such as legitimacy, to macroreg10ns.

As defined by Hettne, regionness develops as territories transform, "from a passive object, that at the most could create problems for more organized core regions, to a subject with capacity to articulate the interests of the emerging region, as well as resolving conflicts internal to the region."78 As regionness increases, the goals of the microregion converge with the macroregion and become mutually reinforcing, implying that, "authority, power, and decision making are not centralized but layered, dispersed across multiple scales of governance."79 This term therefore, relates to a discursively oriented position that encourages microregions to become a self-aware locus of power.

76Ibid., 236.

77Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2"d Ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 203.

78Bjom Hettne, Andras Inotai, and Osvaldo Sunkel 2000, xix.

79Soderbaum 2005, 115. 50 The time horizon for the development ofEuroregions to increase their regionness

is unknown, but in a comparative analysis ofEuregio Meuse-Rhin (bordering Germany,

Belgium and the Netherlands) to the Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa (bordering Germany,

Poland, and the Czech Rpublic), Kepka and Murphy definitely recognized a higher level

of political embeddedness in the Western Euroregion, established in 1976, than in the

newer region, founded in 1989-90. 80 Perkmann acknowledges this lag in political

consolidation as well; he differentiates "integrated micro-CBRs" from "emerging micro-

CBRs," using the year 1990 as the relevant dividing line. After the 1990s, an explosion

in cross-border regionalism swept across central and eastern Europe. Each of these new

border regions believed that by forming Euroregions they would gain greater access to

the structural funds, and the EU saw a dramatic increase in the total number of CBRs as a

result.

Those regions that have had a longer period of time to develop their local

governance framework have become better integrated into the European MLG system.

The newer central and eastern European Countries (CEEC) states face intense political

restructuring at every level of government. They must not only transition from a

command to a market economy, but they are in the process of consolidating their

democratic governments, integrating themselves into the EU, and revising their internal

administrative boundaries.81 Because of the complexity involved with integrating

80Joanna M.M. Kepka and Alexander B. Murphy, "Euroregions in Comparative Perspective," in Boundaries and Place: European Borderlands in Geographical Context, ed. David H. Kaplan and Jouni Haldi (Oxford: Rowman and Littelfield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 50-69.

81 For a discussion of the internal reformation of Polish administrative units, see Ann Kennard, "Transnational Planning in the German-Polish Border Region," in Margin in European Integration, ed. Noel Parker and Bill Armstrong (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), 140-3. 51 governments, such a lag in the development of CEEC microregions should come as no surprise; however, because the newer Euroregions have not fully established themselves yet does not indicate that they cannot, only that the process is in its preliminary stages.

Perkmann adds an institutional approach to this discussion. He concludes that the development of Euroregions may be understood as a, "process of institutional innovation through which these small-scale CBRs [Euroregions] became a legitimate partner of the

European Commission in implementing regional policy measures targeted at border areas."82 The EU influences certain sub-scalar innovations in governance and policy­ making competences because it lacks truly proprietary implementation tools.

Euroregions can therefore be understood as devices utilized by the EU to project their goals and values to a lower scale. 83

The consequences of this are twofold. First, the Euroregions not only act as distributional devices for the EUs structural funds, but they also become a ground-level governance structure to aid in its larger political system. Second, as the Euroregions interact more regularly with the EU and they begin to understand better their role within the overall system, the microregions develop their own political savoir faire, what Hettne refers to as regionness and what Perkmann calls 'co-operation intensity.' This allows them to view themselves as active participants in the European Union's project.

However, the threat of regions becoming independence-minded and vying for autonomy, as they did in 1960s and 1970s, is mitigated by the fact that Euroregions are by design, not legal entities. Authors describe them as "political-administrative" entities

82Perkmann 2003, 168.

83Ibid., 168. 52 and "consultative" organs, but during their formative years, the Council of Europe's

(CoE) efforts to award them a legal identity was pushed aside, "in favor of a more

pragmatic and economically oriented approach."84 For this reason, there should be no

political confrontation between the Euroregions and their states. The EU is providing its

. members with legitimate avenues to pursue their political and economic goals, and in

return, the member states aid in distribution and management of structural funds and

Euroregions. In this framework, the EU acquires access to power at every political scale.

SCALE AND SOCIETY

Because the next chapter will deal exclusively with identity formation along

border regions, this final section will briefly review Keating's ideas regarding scale,

society, and identity. As Scharpf points out, it is difficult to have input-oriented

legitimacy ifthere is no sense of belonging among the members of the polity. Because

rescaling the social fabric of the Community is equally as necessary to legitimizing the

EU as growing economies of scale or developing a more robust MLG network, it should

not be overlooked.

Keating states: "The construction of a political space depends on a number of

factors. One is a sense of identity, which may itself be the product of ethnic or linguistic

solidarity, or be founded on institutions and civic cooperation."85 To understand how

scale can influence issues of social cohesion, he discusses the role of regional civil

society. In a vast macroregion such as the EU, it would be difficult to formulate a

841bid., 155.

85Keating 1997, 391. 53 coherent, functioning, transnational movement that could overcome not only time and

space, but also language barriers. On a smaller scale however, people can overcome those obstacles by using the Euroregion governance structure as a proper venue to voice

concerns regarding specific issues. 86 Mobilization on this scale is a much easier

proposition, especially if the framework is already in place to allow such dialogue to take

place.

Referencing Putnam, Keating states that regional governments will work better if,

"there is a well-developed civil society, a sense of identity, civic traditions, an associative life, and relationships of confidence and exchange within the territory."87 Kepka and

Murphy corroborate this belief in their comparative analysis ofEuregio Meuse-Rhin and

Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa. Germany's role in the partitioning of Poland as well its

occupation of that state during World War II leaves a historical residue on any relationship between the two nations. Trust issues still shaded the border associations' perceptions of one another well into the 1990s. Over half of the Polish population considered the Odra-Nysa border 'insecure' because Germany had never, to that point,

formally recognized that post-WWII boundary.88 Additionally, when local German

administrators approached their Polish counterparts about organizing a potential

86Ibid., 390.

87Ibid., 394, in reference to Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

88Kepka and Murphy 2002, 65. 54 Euroregion, over 30 percent of the Polish residents viewed it as a German trick to subjugate the region. 89

The border between Germany and Poland is not the only site of long-standing border tensions in Europe. For this reason, most Euroregions have an explicit mandate to develop intercultural relationships, and to aid in developing a bottom-up "we-feeling."

Kepka and Murphy believe that just such a spirit of transnationalism is evident in the

Council of the Euregio Meuse-Rhin because the representatives sit, not by nationality, but by political party. Even at this simple level, the Euroregion embodies at least a site for intercultural interactions, and at best a motivating force for shifting how cross-border residents identify themselves politically and socially.

Of course, measuring identity and social cohesion is no easy task. Eder and

Sandther attempted to do just that through a series of interviews conducted in the Regio

TriRhena, a region consisting of the Upper Alsace in France, Southern Baden in

Germany, and Northwest Switzerland, specifically Basel. Part of the difficulty with this analysis is that the interviewers did not question a control group outside of non­

Euroregion residents. For this reason, they had no way to compare their results against other peoples' territorial affiliation. In their conclusion, they state that they found,

"something like a transborder identity ... at least in large parts of the border zone population ... [and] many of those interviewed consider the common grounds to be

89Ibid., 65. 55 language and culture, which not only unite but also serve as a basis for fencing it off

against the respective nation-states."90

The research here attempts to find a regional identity, but no more than 30

percent of any block from either Germany, France, or Switzerland identified with the

Regio as a first or second priority. Interestingly however, each block identified with the

European Union at over 40 percent, with France having 25 percent identify with the EU

as a first and second priority.91 For the purpose of the current research project, this is an

interesting result. Although the nation-state remains the primary referent for identity,

Europe is close second within this particular Euroregion, ahead of sub-national regional

identities such as German Lander or French Departments. This could indicate that that

Euregio acts as a surrogate for the EU on a microregional scale, a point of contact with which it is easier for these residents to identify.

Eder and Sandther conclude by stating that, "To create transborder identity or a common regional spirit, the elimination of economic obstacles does not suffice. Use has to be made of marketing strategies, focusing for example on cultural common ground, the

careful introduction of suitable symbols, and the promotion of active cultural exchange."92 Within this statement lies Keating's conceptualization of civil society, and beneath that, there is the assumption that identity and society are more malleable at the

90Susanne Eder and Martin Sandther, "Common Spirit in the Upper Rhine Valley?" in Boundaries and Place: European Borderlands in Geographical Context, ed. David H. Kaplan and Jouni Haldi (Oxford: Rowman and Littelfield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 141-158.

91 Ibid., 155.

92Ibid., 157. 56 regional level than at the national. In this way, the rescaling of civil society and culture is equally as important as the economic and political concerns.

The studies done by other scholars fail to support any single claim regarding a consistent relationship between the Euroregions and the EU; however, the developments observed in particular Euroregions, such as a propensity for some border residents to identify closely with the EU, reveal a possible justification for further investigation into the topic. Although the strong states, France, Britain, and Germany for example, will always act as an authoritative component within the sphere of IR, it is necessary to reevaluate the distribution of power within that system. This chapter describes how many of the activities usually associated with the state can be scaled down, and laterally, to the regional level; furthermore, it has shown how the microregional level can utilize discursive interactions to transmit values vertically through the system and thus positively influence the macroregion. From this theoretical basis, the current analysis derives its hypothesis. If the residents of Euroregions can feel more connected to the EU, that is if the economic development programs can precipitate output-oriented legitimacy, if the governance system can catalyze input-oriented legitimacy, and if civic society projects can encourage a 'we-feeling' that causes shifts in social legitimacy, then the discursive bonds between the micro- and macroregions should allow for these qualities to spread throughout the entire system. CHAPTER3

LOCATING THE ARGUMENT

Because this analysis is site specific, that is, since the argument is predicated on the fact that Euroregions are cross-border entities, this chapter will analyze how and why borders shape political identity. The emphasis placed on Euroregions' territorial location as transborder governance structures is essential to the argument. This quality makes the microregions uniquely qualified to redefine the nature of borders within the EU, and by extension, to re-contextualize the political identities of the border residents. This chapter will first consider borders as they pertain to IR, then place them in a European context, and conclude with a discussion of how identification with governance structures is constructed and transferred across scales.

REDRAWING BORDERS/RESHAPING IDENTITY

Peter Katzenstein utilizes three main concepts in his examination of regions: globalization, internationalization, and porous borders. In globalization, he sees

"transborder" forces gradually degrading the domain of the traditional state system.93

Internationalization is a "political process in which different actors seek to exploit asymmetric power relations to their advantage" through managing territorially-based

93Peter J. Katzenstein, A World ofRegions: Asia and Europe in the American Jmperium (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2005), l-42.

57 58 exchanges across state borders.94 These two terms set up a dynamic relationship between the Westphalian, state-based system and the "new regionalist" system of multi-scalar, multi-nodal centers of power. What connects these two regimes is the definition of porous borders. "Regionalism is made porous by international border-crossing exchanges and global transformations in interstate relations. Often such processes move to alter borders ...." 95 Katzenstein still recognizes states as strong agents of internationalization, but also observes that the heightened level of cross-border interactions tend to increase globalization. Borders act as a common reference point for these two systems because they define the relations of the constituent entities, states or regions, that participate in cross-border activities such as trade, investment, diplomacy, or war; as the borders change, so do the bases for these relationships.

Katzenstein draws a direct connection between porous regionalism and multi- level governance by maintaining that both are essential for the EU's strategy of

"stabiliz[ing] adjacent regions by tying them politically more closely to Europe and by linking them more fully to global and international processes."96 If the assumption made in the last chapter holds and intensified relations within MLG increases regionness, then this supports the claim that Euroregions both benefit from and help to sustain porous borders. In addition, according to Slocum and Van Langenhove, "changes in governance can lead to changes in how we think about ourselves; similarly changes in our identity constructions can promote new conceptions of how we govern 'ourselves' and who 'us'

94Ibid., 13-17.

951bid., 24.

961bid., 28-9. 59 is."97 The creation of highly interconnected, cross-border microregions at a local level of interface with the EU represents a change in governance that could alter how border residents view themselves within the overarching system.

These concepts build upon one another, reinforcing the thesis. If Euroregions are intended to establish a greater "we-feeling" among border residents, if they are essential linkages connecting the state-based regime to the transnational regime, and if their maturing governance structures redefine the way people see themselves, Euroregions should be viable sites for developing a European-based demos among border residents.

Those people who view political identity and citizenship as a singularity often find fault with this argument. They believe that the state is so firmly rooted in the social mind that people will not transfer their allegiance from the meso- to the macro- level.

Keating responds to this critique: "Regional identity is not to be seen as a competitor to national identity ... .Instead it is an additional identity, to be mobilized and exploited for specific purposes."98 To believe that political beings can only see themselves in singular terms dictated to them by the nation-state is to not only ignore history, but also to assume that the international system is completely resistant to change.

Before states became the pre-eminent political unit, political identities were often marked not by singularity but by multiplicity. For example, in the post-Partition areas of the former Republic of Poland-Lithuania, the concept of being Polish, once defined solely by fealty to the Polish King, splintered into multiple allegiances. People redefined

97Nikki Slocum and Luk Van Langenhove, "Identity and Regional Identity," in Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, ed. Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hettne, and Luk Van Langenhove (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 137~155.

98Keating 1997, 391. 60 themselves as Russo-Poles, Austro-Poles, Prusso-Poles, Polish Russians, Polish

Austrians, or Polish Germans. The schism does not stop there, however. As recorded by

Davies, the Polish diaspora found solace in four sources: Church, language, history, and race. But even then, the appellation "Pole" might refer to a person who, "said his prayers in Latin and spoke to his family on Byelorussian or Ukrainian," while living in present- day Lithuania.99 This example offers a practical, European example of how identity can be dependent on both territoriality as well as political allegiance. If the Community can persuade European citizens to add even the thinnest layer of an EU veneer to their Polish or French selves, then it may be able to sow the seeds of a fledgling European demos.

European nation-states have always been concerned with border relations. In the aftermath of World War I, Marshall-Cornwall, in his book Geographic Disarmament: A

Study ofRegional Demilitarization, posited that creating demilitarized zones along the borders of contentious states could decrease the likelihood of armed conflicts. In the case of the Rhineland, a territorial space where one finds several Euroregions, he states:

What is wanted in the Rhineland is not so much demilitarization as immunization, namely a pledge on the part of France and Germany, reinforced by a guarantee of all the other Powers concerned, that the territory in question will be definitely and for ever placed 'out of bounds' for military operations. To prepare the ground for such a desirable result a reciprocal scheme of demilitarization would be of enormous advantage. 100

He suggests multilateral immunization for cross border regions. What institutions could be fashioned that would result in such a favorable outcome? The Euroregions, a generation later, do not measure up exactly to demilitarized zones, but through the

99Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History ofPoland, Vol. II, 1795 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 19-22.

10°Marshall-Cornwall, Major-General J.H, Geographic Disarmament: A Study ofRegional Demilitarization (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), 158. 61 integration of their economies, local governments, and civil societies, they definitely revolutionize what it means to be a European border.

Marshall-Cornwall states that fixed borders cause friction between neighbors because frontiers as lines embody a compromise, a compromise that in many cases is not satisfactory to all parties. He makes an argument that coincides nicely with the conceptualization of the Euroregions when he states: "It is in almost every case an impossibility to separate two adjacent States by drawing a single line-which has length but no width-so as to fulfill fairly all the geographic, ethnic and economic conditions d eman d e d ....,,101

The Major-General proposes thickening the border. He suggests taking the concept 'border' and transforming its meaning from 'a line of demarcation' to a 'zone of interface' concerned with the security and well-being of its inhabitants. By taking the

"single line-which has length but no width" and thickening it by placing a Euroregion across that line, then it is possible to fulfill Marshall-Cornwall's prediction that, "in the future we must think of frontiers, not as lines, but as zones ...." 102 This analysis contends that Euroregions are exactly these kinds of zones.

In general, four varieties of borders can be observed. First, "alienated borders" exist between neighboring states with divergent interests or claims to territory. Second, a border may be defined by "temporary co-existence" as states avoid direct conflict but acknowledge that chronic possibility. Third, "mutually cooperating borders" are present where states develop stable and well established relationships across their borders.

IOllbid., 173.

1021bid., 175. 62 Finally, "integrated border areas" occur where neighbors merge their economies and border regimes to ensure permanent stability. 103 The creation of Euroregions is not only an attempt to avoid the disadvantages highlighted by Marshall-Cornwall but an effort to form a complete network of internal, integrated borders throughout the Community.

It is clear then that the EU is altering the status quo as it pertains to borders. As cited earlier, an alteration in governance patterns can often lead to a change in the identification process. Is this also true when border regimes are manipulated? Can changing how people perceive the border actually change how they perceive themselves?

Many authors have discussed the apparent disjuncture between European integration and European identity-the so-called "demos-problem,"104 while others have studied how borders shape identity. 105 To combine these two areas of study is a theoretical leap but one of comprehensible proportions. In many ways, identity is formed through the process of"othering," that is distinguishing between "us" and

"them." The "us" originates in a nationalistic imagined community based on shared history, language and culture which coincides with the sovereign boundaries of the

103Zsuzsanna Bacsi and Erno Kovacs, "The Role of Cross-border Cooperation in Rural Development-A New European Perspective," Proceedings from the First International Conference on Agriculture and Rural Development Topusko, Croatia, November 23-25, 2006.

104See Jurgen Habermas, "Is the Development of a European Identity Necessary, and is it Possible?" in The Divided West, ed. and trans. Ciarin Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 67-82; Karl­ Dieter Opp. "Decline of the Nation State? How the European Union Creates National and Sub-National Identifications," Social Forces Vol. 84, No. 2 (Dec. 2005): 653-680; Marion Demossier, "The Political Structuring of Cultural Identities in Europe," and Ralph Grillo, "European Identity in a Transnational Era," in TheEuropean Puzzle, ed. Marion Demossier (New York: Berghahan Books, 2007), 49-66 and 67-84, respectively.

105See: Malcolm Anderson, "The Political Problems of Frontier Regions," West European Politics Vol. 29 No. 1 (January, 2006): 1-17; Kenneth D. Madsen and Ton van Naerrsen, "Migration, Identity, and Belonging," Journal ofBorderlands Studies Vol. 18, No.I (Spring 2003): 61-75; Gokce Yurdakul and Michal Bodeman, "Introduction" in Migration, Citizenship, and Ethnos, eds. Y. Michal Bodemann and Gokce Yurdakul (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1-9. 63 state. 106 The "them," therefore, becomes anyone outside of that community or on the other side of the border. In this way, the border acts as a boundary, en exterior perimeter, and a symbol of difference which delimits the people living on either side.

This is the basic principle necessary to understand how borders create identity.

Migration exemplifies how a person's relation to a border may alter their legal identity.

Only after crossing a border does an individual's identity shift from being a resident to an immigrant. The intent to stay, to work, and to build a family differentiates the immigrant form the visitor. Member state governments perceive this flow of labor seeking individuals, this invasion of the other, as a threat to domestic social cohesion. Any action taken to secure or harden borders against such immigration breaches the Single European

Market's tenets of free flowing labor, capital, goods, and services. This conflict exemplifies how borders become a point of contention between the EU and its member states. On one hand the EU promotes "fully integrated" borders, but on the other, the member states find it necessary to protect their own labor markets through border controls.

The process of crossing borders, the "othering" of supposedly European citizens within the Single Market, and the defensive posture taken by some member states becomes a pivot on which the integration debate turns. 107 Euroregions attempt to soften these issues by transforming borders from de-limiting boundaries into frontier zones.

The threatening qualities of the "other" becomes less intimidating as "European borders

106See: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983), for a more in depth discussion.

107See the case ofltaly: Spiegel Online International, 2007, "Italy Cracks down on Immigrant Crimewave." http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,515008,00.html 64 have transitioned from places of separation to places of linkage, becoming more transparent in the process."108 The Euroregions encourage interactions within the frontier zone, and they fund projects that allow person-to-person contact, thus seeking to mitigate the repressive nature of the border.

This is not to say that the long-entrenched identities of Poles and Germans along the Oder-Neisse line will in some way converge. It does recognize that "however dominant the nation and its national identification, human beings retain a multiplicity of allegiances in the contemporary world. They have multiple identities."109 Because identity is a fluid quality that can be re-constructed over time, this analysis asserts that the reformation of the border regimes, in particular the institutionalization of Euroregions as organized associations able to augment economic development, foster political communication, and increase cross-cultural interactions, can indeed advance the project of constructing European identification in these regions.

TRANSFERRING IDENTIFICATION

Even if observers support the notion that Euroregions can act as a sub-scalar surrogate for the EU, does it follow that this identity can be transferred up to the macroregional level? Karl-Dieter Opp uses the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) to analyze how attitudes change in relation to scales of European government, either sub- state, state, or EU. The first hypothesis that he tests declares that there is a negative relationship between European integration and "identification" with the national and sub-

108Madsen and van Naerrsen 2003, 63.

109 Anthony Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity," International Affairs Vol. 68, No. I (Jan. 1992): 55-76. 65 state levels. This zero-sum hypothesis assumes that an increase in European identity must come at the expense of national and sub-national identification.

He argues against this hypothesis by stating:

For example, nations contribute to the formation of a unified Europe by transferring rights to the EC. If this is regarded as advantageous by the citizens, then the nations and other subordinate regions such as federal states have contributed to this process, and they contributed voluntarily. If there is such a give and take between regions and if this results in outcomes that are regarded as positive, it is plausible that these outcomes are ascribed to all participating units. We would expect positive correlations between the three 1.d entI.fi 1cations. . i 10

This is precisely the definition of non-distortion used to explain how the benefits of the

EU could be translated to lower scales. Opp supports this viewpoint by defining top-to- bottom identification as possible given three conditions: one, an institutional or regional hierarchy such as the EU develops; two, that institution is regarded as the major agent of forging this hierarchy of institutions; and three, this hierarchy is considered very advantageous by the citizens. Furthermore, "positive features of Europe are ascribed to the nation and lower-level units because what is ascribed to the whole is also a property of its parts."111 In the terms delineated by this analysis, the positive features would be those benefits from economic development defined as contributing to output-oriented legitimacy.

Opp defines bottom-to-top identification as a process of socialization that engulfs the child at its earliest stages. Perceptions of the lowest level will be developed first, only

1100pp 2005, 657-8.

111 1bid., 659. 66 to color the eventual understanding of the higher levels later. 112 This corresponds

favorably to the child-based projects taking place throughout many of the Euroregions.

Opp's theory of socialization fits very nicely into the Euroregion schema, one that fosters

social legitimacy.

The second part of the paper addresses how identification may be transferred

across the different scales within the system. Opp's second hypothesis asserts: (a) There will be positive correlations between European, national and sub-national identifications.

(b) Sub-national identification has a strong positive effect on national identification and a

weaker positive effect on European identification. (c) European identification has a

strong positive effect on national identification and a weaker effect on sub-national

identification. II3 Here, his argument corresponds, although weakly, with this thesis's

proposition that involvement in a subregional scale could increase identification with macro-governance structure. He believes that the strongest connections exist between the

closest levels, and his data supports this hypothesis.

This is troublesome for several reasons. First, he uses Saxony, Germany, and the

EU as his test subjects. The Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa indeed overlaps his test

space-the German state of Saxony, as well as portions of Poland and the Czech

Republic, belongs to this Euroregion. His survey asked people to rate, on a scale of 1-5,

1 being very bad and 5 being very good, European institutions such as the EP as well as

European policy outcomes such as monetary union. The only question that averaged a

score higher than 3 was "Open Borders for Germany." Additionally, a significant

1121bid., 659.

113Ibid., 661. 67 number of people refused to answer on the grounds that they "Could Not Judge." 114

When asked to identify with the most relevant governance scale, those surveyed ranked the sub-region highest, followed by Germany and the EU.

Recalling the study on identity in the TriRhenna Euroregion by Eder and

Sandther, the respondents within that microregion, also containing a German state, offered considerably different answers. Germans living in Southern Baden identified primarily as European (just under 30 percent), followed by their Land (25 percent), and then at the national level (24 percent). 115 Perhaps the federal nature of the German

Republic, and the historical allegiances to sub-national scales plays into this confusing picture. It is also true that the TriRhenna is one of the oldest Euroregions and the Neisee­

Nisa-Nysa is a relatively young construct. On one hand, this may indicate that the maturity of the Euroregion is a significant factor as it pertains to identity formation, and on the other hand, that higher levels of aid correspond to higher rates of identification.

Because TriRhenna has been receiving structural funds for much longer than the Neisse

Euroregion it could be argued that the residents have gained more, to this point, than those people living in the newer member states. While it is difficult to judge the effects of time on attitudes, quantifying the amount of structural monies paid out to these regions is relatively easy to measure. This will be discussed at length in a following chapter.

While Opp offers tenuous support for the claims made thus far, the fact that

Saxon residents gave "open borders" the highest marks of all European policy initiatives points to the fact that those surveyed gain benefits from a more integrated and open

11 'Tuid., Table 2, 666.

115Eder and Sandther 2002, 155. 68 border regime. Whether this will influence how they identify themselves remains to be seen; however, given the time to mature, it is possible that they will exhibit inclinations similar to those people surveyed in Baden.

Opp' s research into the causes and relationships between scalar identification offers both insights and questions. Given the large number of people who refused to answer because they felt under-informed, can the results of those who did answer be trusted? Given a highly developed sub-national identity profile, is Germany the best member state to test EU-level identification? If this research were framed in a similar fashion to the Eder/Sandther survey and referred explicitly to the Euroregions, would the results be different? Given that the respondents supported "open borders," it is logical to suggest that they may also approve of Euroregions.

The purpose of this chapter was to show that borders, identity, and European integration share some highly dependent variables. Borders and identity are tightly bound up in a complex bundle of construction, reconstruction, and deconstruction. By reconstituting the borders, the EU can not only offer the benefits oflocally scaled development funds (top-to-bottom identification), but it can utilize Euroregional social programs to help initiate bottom-to-top identification. Socialization into the multi-scalar world of the EU, the member-state, and the Euroregions could eventually evolve into a shared European identity, an extra layer of Community skin that does not take the place of the national heart, but only covers it, giving it a uniform, external figure. For this to happen, it may take time for the Euroregions to mature and to increase their functional capabilities within this system, or it may take increased levels of funding to ensure that 69 the border residents see the Euroregions and the EU as "very advantageous" to their everyday lives. CHAPTER4

TESTING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWERS OF EUROREGIONS

At this juncture in the analysis, the hypothesis that Euroregions can be particularly relevant sites for building legitimacy in the EU needs to be tested. The terms have been defined, the theories have been articulated, and the argument has been epistemically and geographically located. The final step in this process is to evaluate whether the data validates, or refutes, this supposition. Under consideration will be the

Euroregions bordering France and Poland. Several indicators will be utilized to discern public acceptance or rejection of the European integration project. This paper believes that the EU is not lacking in normative legitimacy, that is, this investigation asserts that the institutions already in place meet the threshold requirements for democracy and offer suitable representation to the citizens of the EU. 116 Therefore, it will instead focus on political legitimacy by analyzing popular voting trends in an attempt to reveal how individuals use their ballots to either support or oppose the EU.

Without having in-depth survey data at the appropriate administrative level, voting records offer the best way to measure how residents living within certain

Euroregions disclose their preferences. Attempting to untangle the reasons behind why a person, or in this case a microregion, voted for a particular party or candidate is a difficult

116This portion of the argument dovetails with Andrew Moravcsik's large body of work that describes why the EU is not suffering from a democratic deficit. As with Hix however, he fails to address the question of political legitimacy, that is the popular assent to be ruled. For a representative article on Moravcsik's position see: Andrew Moravcsik, "In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 40, No. 4 (2002): 603-624. 70 71 task; however, because the Euroregions are constructed from administrative units at the

NUTS 3 level in the case of France and at the Local Administrative Units level (LAU) in the case of Poland, voting outcomes offer the only measurable variable that can be

assured to originate specifically within the borders of the Euroregions being studied. 117

This chapter will begin with an overview of the Euroregions within France and

Poland. It will analyze the budgets to see how they are similar and how they are different; furthermore it will illustrate how the budgetary priorities fit into classes of aid labeled either as output-oriented, input-oriented, or socially-oriented. The final section will review the voting data to determine whether the people in Euroregions show signs of

significantly higher or lower support for Eurosceptic parties than those living in the rest of the country. The French Presidential election of 2007 will be the first case dataset, and the Polish Sejm, or Parliament, elections of 2007 will be examined in the second case.

Before moving into the analysis, it is important to understand why France and

Poland were chosen as case studies. First, and foremost, they offer a distinction between an original member and a new member within the EU. As earlier explorations have indicated, there is a maturing process that occurs as Euroregions become older, more established, and better able to utilize the available EU funds. By choosing one state that has older regions and one that has young regions, comparisons can be made regarding maturity. Along these same lines, France and Poland have very different GDP per capita

117NUTS stands for Nomenclature for Territorial Units for Statistics. For more information, see: http:// ec.europa.ew'eurostat/ramon/nuts/home _regions_ en.html. 72 statistics which makes the cases apt for comparisons. 118 While France is both larger in

terms of area and population, Poland is slightly larger in terms of population density.

Each country is largely rural with the exception oflarge, urban agglomerations such as

Paris and Warsaw. In addition, Germany shares borders with both France and Poland,

which means that there will be Euroregions in both countries that recognize German

localities as working partners. Finally, both countries had a major election in the year

2007. The Interreg IIIA program ran from 2000 until 2006 and although Poland was not

a member for the entire period, what budgetary expenditures that they did receive would

have been allocated and put into use by the time of the 2007 Sejm election. For these

reasons, France and Poland were chosen as the two cases to compare and contrast voting

patterns and support for the EU within the Euroreigons.

Figure 1. French Euroregions119

118According to the CIA World Factbook, the per capita GDP for France is $32,700, and Poland in Poland it is $17,300. "France," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html and "Poland," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html.

119I constructed this map using ArcGIS software. Certain Departments are in two Euroregions. I attempted to shade one Euroregion as a color and the other as cross-hatched to show these overlapping jurisdictions; for example the Alsace region is in two Euroregions, Haute-Savoie is in two Euroregions, and Nord and Meurthe-et-Moselle are in two Euroregions. This map shows that all French borders are covered by Euroregions, even when those borders cross water as in the case of the France/United Kindgom Euroregion and the French Islands/Italy Euroregion. 73

Figure 2. Polish Euroregions120

MATCHING FUNDS AND PER CAPITA NUMBERS

To begin the analysis, the actors must be defined. Tables 1 and 2 list the

Euroregions currently functioning within France and Poland, respectively; Figures 1 and

2 illustrate the boundaries of the Euroregions in these states. The tables were compiled using the Interact-EU.net website, a site especially designed to disseminate information regarding all three strands of the Interreg program. 121 For organizational purposes, several of the smaller Euroregions sharing the border with the same neighboring country have been consolidated into larger catch-all Euroregions. In the border area where

Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic meet, the Euroregion Neissa/Nisa/Nysa

12°This map can be found at: http://www.interreg.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/D84863F2-18B9~4898- 91B9-846E620B9069/0/interrr_bigggg.gif. I used this map rather than one that I constructed myself because I feel that it illustrates more clearly the overlapping jurisdictions of the Polish Euroregions. Every kilometer of border area is engaged in a Euroregion. All of the following maps were made using ArcGIS software.

121 Interact Website, "Sharing INTERREG Experiences," http:l/archive.interact­ eu.net/604900/604902/656368/0; and "European Commission, Regional Policy, Development Programmes," http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/index _ en.cfm?gv_pay=CZ&gv _reg= ALL&gv_ obj=S&gv_the= 1O&gv _per= 1. 74 Table 1. French Euroregions: Budgets, Populations, and Per Capita Spending

Per Euroregion Partner Total Budget EU Contri- Matching Capita Name States (Euros) bution Funds Population Number (Euros) Italy- IT/FR 115,688,099 53,928,379 61,759,720 Total 941,069 100.00% 122.93 French Islands 46.62% 53.38% IT 646,951 68.75% FR 294,118 31.25% Spain-France ES/FR 172,347,762 86,173,881 86,173,881 Total 5,334,756 100.00% 32.31 50.00% 50.00% ES 2,705,440 50.71% FR 2,629,316 49.29% France- FR/UK 245,136,789 110,083,085 135,053,704 Total 8,100,000 100.00% 30.26 United 44.91% 55.09% FR 5,700,000 70.37% Kinedom UK 2,400,000 29.63% ALCOTRA IT/FR 160,768,709 65,444,385 95,324,324 Total 5,441,960 100.00% 29.54 40.71% 59.29% IT 2,984,178 54.84% FR 2,457,782 45.16% Saarland- DE/FR 52,435,086 26,217,543 26,217,543 Total 1,865,461 100.00% 28.11 Moselle/ Lorraine-W. 50.00% 50.00% DE 828,740 44.43% Palatinate FR 1,036,721 55.57% Wallonia- BL/FR/LX 56,735,465 25,141,949 31,593,516 Total 2,587,706 100.00% 21.93 Lorraine- 44.31% 55.69% BL 151,765 5.86% Luxeinbourg FR 1,955,719 75.58% LX 480,222 18.56% France/ FR/BL 177,395,900 88,697,950 88,697,950 Total 9,000,000 100.00% 19.71 Wallonia- 50.00% 50.00% FR 3,387,971 37.64% Flanders BL 5,612,029 62.36% PAMINA DE/FR 28,210,663 14,105,329 14,105,334 Total 1,600,000 100.00% 17.63 50.00% 50.00% DE 1,300,000 81.25% FR 300,000 18.75% Oberrhein- DE/FR/CH 64,136,732 32,068,366 32,068,366 Total 4,008,671 100.00% 16.00 Mitte-Sud 50.00% 50.00% DE 2,193,178 54.71% FR 1,815,493 45.29% France- FR/CH 21,065,948 21,065,948 0 Total 4,788,867 100.00% 4.40 Switzerland 100% FR 2,177,752 45.48% CH 2,611,115 54.52% Total 1,093,921,153 522,926,815 570,994,338 43,668,490 25.05 75 Table 2. Polish Euroregions: Budgets, Populations, and Per Capita Spending

Per Total Euroregi Partner EU Matching Capita Budget . on Name States Contribution Funds Population Number (Euros) (Euros)

Brand- enburw DE/PL 176,360,000 132,250,000 44,110,000 Total 1,544,158 100.00% 114.21 Lubuski e 74.99% 25.01% DE 574,442 37.20% PL 969,716 62.80% Mecklen -burl?f DE/PL 157,600,000 118,200,000 39,400,000 Total 2,200,000 100.00% 71.64 Branden bur2 75.00% 25.00% DE 586,750 26.67% PL 1,613,250 73.33% Saxony/ DE/PL 95,930,000 71,950,000 23,980,000 Total 1,800,000 100.00% 53.29 Lower Silesia 75.00% 25.00% DE 608,847 33.82% PL 1,191,153 66.18% Poland/ PL/CZ 46,000,000 34,500,000 I 1,500,000 Total 4,442,684 100.00% 10.35 Czech Republic 75.00% 25.00% CZ 3,389,248 76.29% PL 1,053,436 23.71% Lithuani LI/PL/R a/ u 58,200,000 46,000,000 12,200,000 Total 6,730,000 100.00% 8.65 Poland/ 79.04% 20.96% LI 1,494,447 22.21% Kalin- in2rad PL 4,285,553 63.68% RU 950,000 14.12% Poland/ PL/SK 26,670,000 20,000,000 6,670,000 Total 4,200,000 100.00% 6.35 Slovakia 74.99% 25.01% PL 2,071,481 49.32% SK 2,128,519 50.68% PL/BY/ Poland/ UA 58,400,000 45,800,000 12,600,000 Total 14,901,035 100.00% 3.92 Belarus/ 78.42% 21.58% PL 5,998,722 40.26% Ukraine BL 4,040,313 27.11% UA 4,862,000 32.63% Total 619,160,000 468,700,000 150,460,000 35,817,877 17.29 76 has done exceptional work helping to revitalize the most environmentally degraded area in Europe, the Black Triangle. 122 However, according to both the Interact website and the

European Commission's website on Regional Policy, all the Euroregions along this border have been combined into a single unit-The Poland/Czech Republic Euroregion.

The overall budgets are allocated in terms of these larger Euroregions, but funds are distributed according to particular project proposals made by the smaller regions such as

Neisse/Nisa/Nysa. For accounting purposes, however, the EU tracks these disbursements using the Euroregion categories labeled in Tables 1 and 2. This analysis will also use these large-scale Euroregions as a standard unit of measure across all borders and thus avoid the problems associated with trying to gather information from the less developed

Euroregions (for example, those crossing the Poland-Belarus border) that do not have detailed statistics available via individual websites.

Whenever possible, the Interact and Commission websites provided the primary source data for budget and population figures. However, rarely did either break down the population between neighboring countries into small enough administrative units. In such cases, the 2008 "Population: Size and Structure Report," published by the Poland

Central Statistical Office (GUS), 123 and the French INSEE website were utilized as the chief population data resources. 124 After locating which French departments and Polish

122Joanna M. M. Kepka, "The NYSA Euroregion: The First Ten Years," Eurasian Geography and Economics Vol. 45, No. 3 (May 2004): 162-189.

123Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS), "Population: Size and Structure Report," (2008) http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PUBL_P _population _size _structure _30 _ 06_ 2008.pdf.

124Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economique, "Populations legales 2006 pour les departements et les collectivites d'outre-mer," http://www.insee.fr/fr/ppp/bases-de­ donnees/recensement/populations-legales/france-departements.asp#departements. 77 powiats were included in each Euroregion, these documents could be used to derive the

total French or Polish population within each specific microregion. 125 By dividing the total populations, including those people living in the neighboring states, into the total budgets of each Euroregion, a per capita number (PCN) can be derived. This PCN will be

the key variable used later in the analysis to test whether a higher PCN leads to lower

support for Eurosceptic parties.

When looking at the numbers in Tables 1 and 2, it is important to notice that the

EU does not provide for the entirety of the budgets. The row titled "Matching Funds"

defines the amount and the percentage of the total Euroregion working budget that

originates directly from member state coffers or private investors. In the

France/Switzerland Euroregion, for instance, there are no matching funds; consequently, this region has the lowest PCN ( 4.40 Euros) of all French Euroregions. Figure 3 illustrates the disparity in matching funds between the French and Polish Euroregions.

Favoritism from Brussels does not explain the differential between the budgets of

French and Polish Euroregions; by measuring the matching funds, it becomes clear that a more supportive central government and a more active private sector is the defining variable. This could be indicative of the maturity of the French Euroregions when

compared to their Polish counterparts. As projects become completed, private investors identify these ventures as profitable pursuits. Therefore, both time and historical returns

125To derive the populations of the Euroregions, the other participating countries' populations were added to the those of France and Poland. Several other websites provided the necessary data when official numbers were not available. The Kaliningrad Oblast population came from: http://russia.rin.ru/guides_e/2780.html, Information on Belarus came from: http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/republic/regions/grodno/, Information on Ukraine came from: http://ukrainetrek.com/ , and all information for various population statistics came from: http://www.citypopulation.de/. 78 to investment are valuable factors that could lead to a more active "matching fund" sector for Polish Euroregions in the future. Given the disparity in GDP, this difference could also indicate that France simply has a larger pool of assets to use for developmental projects. If, as expected, Poland's economy grows and converges with the western

Ca '1J0rism in Fundi~ llsbibutim: Polish and F1"ench Euroregions

1,200,000,000: / / , ...... ' ,,.,.. ' 1,CXX>,CXXJ,000~ / / ,...... • - =

800,000,000 l , / : /_,,-" • M.tchi rg Funds 600,000,000 , / / •BJFunds 400,000,000"/ ,,-

200,000,~r:;//~ ...... _ Poland France

Figure 3. Comparison in Funding Distribution: Polish and French Euroregions

European states, then perhaps similar matching funds would become available for Polish

Euroregion projects in the future.

It is also interesting to note the difference between French/German and

Polish/German PCNs. In Poland, the top three per capita Euroregions all share a border with Germany, more specifically, with what was once East Germany. In fact, of the regions studied, those on the Polish/German border have three of the top four PCNs.

Despite this fact, the average French PCN is higher by 7.76 euros per person when compared to Poland. This indicates that the Euroregions on the western border of Poland, neighboring the non-EU members, such as the Russian Kaliningrad Oblast, Belarus, and

Ukraine, receive substantially less than those with internal EU borders.

In many cases, single departments or powiats fall within the jurisdiction of more than one Euroregion. For example, every powiat in the Saxony-Lower Silesia Euroregion 79

Figure 4. France: Per Capita Number Regions126

-~ .· . ,,,.·

Figure 5. Poland: Shaded Per Capita Numbers Regions 127

126 This map shows the differences in the Per Capita Numbers in French Euroregions-the darker the color, the higher the PCN. The Departments in blue are not part ofEuroregions. The highest PCN is in Corsica, but the multiple overlaps in the Alsace and Lorraine Regions lead to relatively high PCNs along the Franco-German border as well. As noted earlier, the Euroregion across the Swiss-French border has the lowest PCN of all and it is therefore the lightest color. All data for deriving PCNs comes from: Interact Website, "Sharing INTERREG Experiences," http:l/archive.interact-eu.net/604900/604902/656368/0; and "European Commission, Regional Policy, Development Programmes," http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/ country/prordn/ index_en.cfm? gv_pay=CZ&gv _reg= ALL&gv_ obj=5&gv_the= 1O&gv _per= 1.

127This map illustrates the differences between the Per Capita Numbers in Polish Euroregions-the darker the color, the higher the PCN. This map also shows how the overlapping jurisdictions lead to compound PCNs. Those powiats in the North-West receive a higher PCN because they are in two Euroregions; even then, however, 12.57 Euros does not compare to the Brandenburg-Lubelskie Euroregion on the border with Germany that receives 114.21 Euros per person. I created both of these maps using ArcGIS. 80 is also a member of the Poland-Czech Republic Euroregion. In such cases, because there

is no way to tell how project money is disbursed within the different powiats, the PCNs

were added together. Therefore, a resident of Poland, according to this analysis, could

have one of ten different PCNs. Those living in central Poland, outside of any

Euroregion, receive a number of zero, but citizens residing in counties covered by

overlapping jurisdictions will have a compound PCN. Likewise, in France, eleven

different PCNs are possible.

BUDGETS AND ACCOUNTING FOR LEGITIMACY

The next step is to illustrate that Euroregion budgets are organized in a fashion

that prioritizes projects based on their input-oriented, output-oriented, and socially­

oriented value. This is a critical portion of the argument because it reveals how the EU

defines goals that the Euroregions should be attempting to attain or enhance. While in

previous portions of this thesis, specific projects were reviewed, in this section, the

budgets as a whole will be categorized according to the relevant type of legitimacy

(output-oriented legitimacy, OOL; input-oriented legitimacy, IOL; and social legitimacy,

SL) that fits with each budgetary priority. This will allow for an analysis of the

aggregated distribution of these budget concerns across all of the French or Polish

Euroregions.

The first example will come from France. The Saarland-Moselle/Lorraine­

Westem Palatinate Euroregion crosses a portion of the France/Germany border and has a budget divided into eight specific "priorities." A copy of this budget is listed below. 81 For each of these line items, the Commission website provides a brief description of what

sort of projects would be appropriate for each category. For example, under Priority 1,

"Development of an active strategy towards the border," the site states, "Key actions

Table 3. Itemized Budget for Saarland-Moselle/Lorraine-Western Palatinate Euro region According to Priority and Type of Legitimacy

Type of Match. Le2it. Priority EU Funds Funds 1 Development of an active strategy OOL towards the border 15,091,870 7,545,935 2 Stimulation of an attractive position in OOL the centre of Europe 2,494,024 1,247,012 3 Creation of synergy by cross-border OOL spatial planning 8,268,786 4,134,393 4 Promotion of the common natural and SL cultural heritage 14,067,714 7,033,857 OOL 5 European competence 2,494,024 1,247,012 6 Deepening of institutional co- IOL operation 2,494,024 1,247,012 7 Promotion of "people to people" SL projects 5,030,624 2,515,312 IOL 999 Technical Assistance 2,494,020 1,247,010 Total 52,435,086 26,217,543 concern overcoming border problems between French and German labour markets."128

Because some of these priorities overlap what might be considered both output- and social-oriented legitimacy, certain keywords were used to help ensure consistent labelling. First, output-oriented legitimacy revolves around governmental problem- solving capabilities as well as provision of public goods such as economic growth and prosperity promotion. If there was any mention of economics or concepts that are

128European Commission, "Saarland-Moselle/Lorraine-Westem Palatinate Euroregion," http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/details.cfm?gv_PAY=FR&gv_reg=ALL&gv_PGM=26 4&LAN=7&gv_PER=l&gv _ defL=7. 82 primarily economic in nature, such as 'labour markets,' these priorities were categorized as output-oriented legitimacy.

Priorities that mention terms such as 'person-to-person,' 'socio-cultural exchange,' or 'identity' were categorized as social legitimacy. Also, in every Euroregion, the budget includes Priority 999, 'technical assistance for programme management, information, and assessment,' which in each case was categorized as input-oriented legitimacy. Beyond the fact that the entire budget could, in some sense, be considered

'input-oriented' in that all of these projects bind the Euroregions closer to the EU's governing apparatus, Priority 999 acts as an explicitly managerial mirror between the macro- and the microregion. This budget expenditure allows for oversight as well as guidance from the Brussels center to the Euroregion periphery. Finally, if some variant of the term 'institution building' was used in relation to a field other than economics, then this was also labelled as input-oriented legitimacy. 129

Figures 6 and 7 show how French and Polish Euroregion budgets are divided among the three different types oflegitimacy. When taken as a percentage of the entire budget, it becomes clear that, at least in France and Poland, Euroregions organize their budgets in strikingly similar fashions.

Although the absolute size of the combined French budgets is significantly larger than the Polish budgets, the orientation of fund allocation is almost identical.

Economically grounded developmental programs represent the largest portion of both budgets; This should not be surprising given the EU' s overall strength in this area. Less contentious than attempting to create cross-border identities, infrastructure construction

129For a complete list ofEuroregion Budgets and Legitimacy Codes, refer to Appendix A. 83 and health care integration offer tactile, ground-level benefits to the residents of these

Euroregions. This is the essence of building outcome-oriented legitimacy within

Euroregions.

French Euroregions Percentage of Total Spending: Projects Forusing on Input Oriented, Output Oriented, and Social legitimacy 5.34%

n: IOL •SL Ill OOL

Figure 6. French Euroregions, Percentage of Total Spending: Projects Focusing on Input Oriented, Output Oriented, and Social Legitimacy

Polish Euroregions Percentage d Total Spenclrg: Projects Focusi~ on ll'"flUI: Oiented, Output Oiented &Sodal Legitirray 5.11%

:1:1 IOL •SL II OOL

Figure 7. Polish Euroregions, Percentage of Total Spending: Projects Focusing on Input Oriented, Output Oriented, and Social Legitimacy 84 The only major difference in the two graphs is a five percent swing between social and output-oriented legitimacy. It would take deeper research into the other member states' budgets to recognize a true pattern, but the available data appear to support the claim that the EU is able to project broad, generalized preferences to the microregional level while still providing significant latitude to the local leaders who make the critical decisions regarding how best to meet the priority objectives. The process of prioritizing project criteria within Euroregion budgets allows the EU to give gentle guidance without dictating the shape or specifics of any given project. This is one possible explanation for the apparent similarities between the aggregate budgets.

The social legitimacy component of these budgets is admittedly underdeveloped; however, it is important to recognize that of all of the Euroregions studied, only ohe does not prioritize cultural interconnections. It is doubtful that such projects would work in the France/United Kingdom Euroregion as cross-Channel "person-to-person" enterprises face geographical obstacles unknown to the others. Roughly 20 percent of the budgeted funds under analysis are dedicated to projects grounded in developing a shared, cross­ border identity. If constructing a holistic, European identity seems unattainable, at the very least these projects expose the border residents to one another's cultural differences.

Whether this reinforces negative stereotypes or fosters greater understanding between groups has yet to be tested, but it is a fact that the EU has dedicated a non-trivial portion of the Euroregion budgets to such socio-cultural concerns.

The Euroregions not only act as a local interface for the European MLG structure, but as they develop, it is possible that they will be recognized as effective role players within the broader European schema. Furthermore, as economic convergence continues 85 and the private sector begins to see returns to their investment, they will increase their

support to the Euroregions through matching funds that will also serve to increase the

overall size of the budget and to create necessary connections to local businesses. This

process takes valuable inputs from both the top and the bottom to fashion a multi-scalar

development regime that addresses the macroregional legitimacy crisis as well as the

microregional marginalization. As the intermediary, the Euroregion becomes a local

surrogate for the EU, a conduit connecting the border resident directly to structural funds

on offer from Brussels.

FRANCE AND SUPPORT FOR LE PEN IN EUROREGIONS

This thesis hypothesizes that those people receiving funds from the EU via the

Interreg IIIA program should be less likely to support Eurosceptic parties. Given the

previous review of the budgets for the French and Polish Euroregions, it would be

counterintuitive to find that people receiving this aid held staunchly anti-Europe political

views. In this section, the first round voting data from the 2007 French Presidential

election will be analyzed to find out if people living within the Euroregions show

significantly different levels of support for Jean-Marie Le Pen and the Front National

(FN).

While the FN is widely regarded as a populist, right-wing extension of its leader's xenophobic and Franco-centric political positions, it is still necessary to verify the assumption that a vote for Le Pen is a vote against the EU. To do this, a scatter plot was constructed to show the relationship between voting for the FN and voting "non" in the

2005 Constitutional referendum. The independent variable is the percentage of people 86 supporting Le Pen, and the dependent variable is the percentage of people voting against

the referendum. The points are correlated by department and graphed in Figure 8.

This correlation was run three times. The first test included all 96 departments.

The results from this test show a positive relationship with a standardized coefficient of

0.578 and an r-squared value of0.334. The r-squared value shows that support for Le

Pen explains 33 percent of the variation in responses to the referendum, and the

regression data show a p-value of 0.00, indicating that the relationship is significant.

The second correlation analyzed only those departments found within the

boundaries of Euroregions. There was still a positive correlation, but it was not as strong.

The coefficient was smaller, only 0.382, which indicates a weaker relationship. By

simply looking at the scatter plot, it would be difficult to infer a relationship, but the p­

value is less than 0.05 which proves that these data are also significant. The r-squared

value is much smaller than in the first regression. Voting for Le Pen only explains 14

percent of the negative referendum vote in the Euroregions.

The final trial examined every department not located in a Euroregion. Again the

p-values indicate that the data are valuable and significant. This standardized coefficient

is the largest from the three regressions, meaning that the departments not in the

Euroregions have the strongest, most positive relationship of three regressions tested.

The r-squared value is 0.408, once again the highest number for its category. Forty percent of the "non" vote in non-Euroregion departments can be explained by support for

Le Pen. 87

All Departments

70.00 0

0 0

z 0z so

0

0 40. 0 0

R Sq Unesr = 0.334

30.

10.0 12.5 150 17.S LePen_Percent

Correlation: Departments Within Euroreglons

700 0

0 0 0 65.0 0

600

z ~ 55.0

0 50.00

0

0 ~ Sqlirlc;lr" 0,146

75 10.0 12.S 15.0 175 LePen_Percent

Departments Not In Euroreglons

40 R Sq uneer = 0-.408 0

35.

50 15 100 12.5 150 115 LePen_Percent Figure 8. Series Showing Relationship Between Per Cent Support for Le Pen And "Non" Vote on Constitutional Referendum 88 Is it fair to say that voting "non" to the referendum is in fact voting against the

EU? Some people, such as Hix, argue that ballots on European issues are second-order votes that have little bearing on people's preferences towards the EU and instead represent a protest vote against domestic policies. This may be correct for EP elections, but it seems weak to argue that voters casting "non" ballots against the European

Union Constitution were in some way unaware of the negative effect it would have on

future integration.

In the Flash Eurobarometer 171, conducted in France after referendum, 31 percent of those voting "no" said that their primary reason was that, "it [the Constitution] would have negative effects on the employment situation in France," 26 percent said they voted

"no" because, "there is too much unemployment in France," 6 percent said they voted

"no" because they, "do not want Turkey in the EU," and finally, 52 percent of the those who vote "no" said that they thought it would, "make it more difficult for new countries to join the EU."130 These are all issues directly linked to the EU's common market and immigration policies and have little to do with protest votes against Chirac or the government. While in other countries it may be true that negative referendum votes were

second-order, in France the reasons were grounded firmly in fear and anti-European

sentiment.

Because all of the regressions were upward sloping and significant, it can be stated that there is a positive relationship between voting for Le Pen in 2007 and voting against the referendum in 2005. The initial assumption is confirmed-a vote for Le Pen

13°Flash Eurobarometer 171, "The European Constitution: Post Referendum Survey in France," (Brussels: European Commission, June 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl 171 _ en.pdf. 89 is a vote against the EU. However, the data also show that in Euroregions, the correlation between these variables is weaker than in non-Euroregion departments. This seems to indicate that the larger hypothesis, asserting that people living in Euroregions should be less supportive of the FN, is on tenuous footing in the French case.

To test whether there is a difference between support for Le Pen in Euroregions and the rest of France, this thesis ran an independent t-test. When analyzing the

"Percentage of Support for Le Pen," per department, the mean of group 0, those outside of Euroregions was 10.29 percent, and the mean of group 1, those departments within

Euroregions, was 12.87 percent. 131 This verifies that voters in Euroregions were more supportive of Le Pen during the first round of the Presidential election and therefore provides evidence countering the hypothesis.

Because the significance level of The Levene's Test is well over the 0.05 threshold, the t-test will assume equal variances and thus find that the two-tailed significance is 0.00 indicating that the difference between the means of group 0 and group 1 is significant. From this test, the hypothesis that people living within

Euroregions should be less likely to support Le Pen is rejected. This result substantiates the correlation results which also pointed to this outcome.

Figure 9 aggregates the votes for the top four Presidential candidates using the PCN regions in order to look for variations in voting patterns resulting from direct EU transfers. While it does not include the total votes, it does show the relative strength of the most popular candidates within these regions. Since the first statistical test proved that voters in Euroregions were more inclined to vote for Le Pen, the secondary

131 The Independent t-test is located in Appendix B. 90 hypothesis can be tested, although anecdotally, using this map. This hypothesis states that people receiving a higher PCN should be less likely to support Le Pen than those with a lower PCN. Corsica has the highest number (122.93 Euros) and the

France/Switzerland Euroregion has the lowest (4.40 Euros) The best way to judge support for or against the EU across PCN regions is to compare support for Le Pen, an avowed Eurosceptic, to support for Bayrou, a member of the EP and supporter of the

European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty .

.1

Sarkozy Royal Bayrou Le Pen Top Second Third Bottom

Figure 9. Voting Results for Top Four Presidential Candidates: Total Votes of Combined Departments Aggregated by Per Capita Number 91 In the France/Switzerland Euroregion support for Bayrou is higher than for Le

Pen; on the other hand, in Corsica, support for Le Pen is much higher than support for

Bayrou. Again, this indicates that the hypothesis is unsubstantiated because the

Euroregion with the highest PCN was a stronger supporters of the anti-Europe candidate than the pro-Europe candidate; conversely, the region with the lowest PCN supported the pro-European candidate. This test simply takes the highest and the lowest in a very raw comparison, but it does seem to offer evidence that disproves the secondary hypothesis.

These tests confirm that in the French case, those people living within

Euroregions and receiving economic development aid from Brussels are more likely to support Le Pen. The secondary claim that there is a relationship between the PCN and the level of support for the FN does not appear to hold up against the evidence either.

Running a correlation between the PCN and percent support for Le Pen resulted in no significant results. 132 Furthermore, when comparing the most extreme PCN's, the result appears to falsify the secondary hypothesis as well.

The independent t-test proves that there is a significant difference between the two populations' voting tendencies, but this difference cannot be attributed directly to the per capita spending. Given a more robust dataset that included per capita GDP per department, education levels, and voting history, for example, a better regression analysis could be run in an attempt to more fully explain these variations. Using the available dataset, it can only be concluded that the populations have distinct preferences; however, this analysis cannot yet explain why those differences exist.

132The Correlation test is located in Appendix C. 92 POLAND AND THE EUROSCEPTICS IN EUROREGIONS

The case of Poland represents a more complex undertaking. Because Poland has undergone a series of administrative re-organizations since 1945, its internal boundaries are highly fragmented. Poland is divided first into five major regions. These are then subdivided into 15 voivodeships that correlate roughly to what residents of the United

States would refer to as states. These voivodeships contain about 390 powiats, or counties, which are then divided into over 2,000 units called Gminy. These units sometimes contain only one-thousand people and may best be described as neighborhoods. Voting data, however, is aggregated across 44 voting districts, the boundaries of which do not coincide with voivodeships. Therefore, any meaningful dataset must be taken at the powiat level because it is the only administrative feature that cuts across all datasets. Powiats are also the primary building blocks of Euroregions.

In the 2007 Sejm election, nine parties actively sought seats. Unlike in France, there is no single, Eurosceptic party on which to focus. Poland did not hold a referendum on the European Constitution, so the method used in the previous case to uncover which parties are against European integration is not available to this portion of the analysis. In order to untangle the Polish party system, the bi-axial categorization system developed by

Kopecky and Mudde to classify Eurosceptic parties will be used. Adding to the work done by Taggart, Kopecky and Mudde take the dichotomous "hard" versus "soft" classification of Euroscepticism and add a second axis. 133 By delineating between diffuse and specific types of support, their analysis divides allegiances between those parties that

133Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, "The Two Sides of Euroscepticism," European Union Politics Vol. 3 (2002): 297-326 responding to the work of: Paul Taggart, "Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems," European Journal ofPolitical Research 33 (1998): 363-388. 93 are conceptually invested in the ideas ofEuropean integration (diffuse) and those that show support for the general practice of integration (specific). The two axes therefore are "support for ideas concerning integration," and "support for the trajectory of

European integration." Their model looks like this:

Table 4. Kopecky and Mudde Model of Euroscepticism

Pro-Integration Anti-Integration Pro- Euroenthusiasts Europragmatists Trajectory (pro-integration and (anti-integration, pro- trajectory) trajectory)

Anti- Euro sceptics Eurorej ects Trajectory (pro-integration, anti- (anti-integration, anti- trajectory) trajectory)

Although this is not a perfect model, it does offer more nuance than Taggart's binary alternative. Of the Polish parties categorized using this rubric, the authors label the League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Self-Defense Party as Eurorejects and Law and Order (PiS) as Eurosceptical. It is important to note that the LPR and Self-Defense are fringe parties that rarely reach five percent of the vote per powiat. On the other hand, the now infamous Kaczynski twins formed the PiS as a conservative party and soon won both the Presidency and the Prime Ministership. Even though the 2007 Sejm election ousted Jaroslaw Kaczynski and installed Donald Tusk (founder of the center-right Civic

Platform Party) as the new head of the government, PiS regularly receives over 30 percent, sometimes reaching into the 50 percent threshold, of votes per powiat. As a force for Euroscepticism, PiS is both active and well supported by the Polish public.

To support the hypothesis, any statistical test should show that Polish citizens living within Euroregions are less likely to support these three parties than those residents 94 living in central Poland. The first test, illustrated in Figure 10, ran a correlation to

uncover any relationship between the PCN and support for the three anti-Europe parties.

By combining the Eurorejects with the Eurosceptics, the dataset was expanded, and the

results reflect the more general sense of anti-Europeanism. For the rest of the tests, the

anti-Europe group will entail the combined parties of the Eurosceptics as well as the

Eurorejects.

There is a clear negative relationship between these variables. According to this

test, as the PCN increases, support for anti-Europe parties declines. This offers positive

support for the hypothesis.

The Effect of Per Capita Spending on Support for Aggregated Anti-Europe Parties

Measuring only Powiats in Euroregions

CD 0 a. 0 o­._ 111 :S CD w~ o.soo ..;;> c- cc !3 -a...... 0 0.500 " 0 f1: 0.400 mu._CD R2 Linear : 0.257 m ... CC II ... a.. 0.300 ..o- .,, t:.!!! 8.'5 0.200 ~ II> 0.100

o 20 40 60 BO 100 120 Per Capita Spending

Figure 10 The Effect of Per Capita Spending on Support for Aggregated Anti­ Europe Parties 95 Kopecky and Mudde define Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People's Party

(PSL) as Euroenthusiast, parties that exhibit pro-trajectory, pro-integration preferences.

Figure 11 shows the results of the correlation between the PCN and these two pro-Europe

parties.

The Effect of Per Capita Spending on Support for Euro enthusiast Parties

Measuring only Powiats in Euroregions

0.700 Ill ·e_GI flS Ill D.. .fl 0.600 ....:::> 0 "iii iii .E ti 0.500 ...... c,._ GI 0 f GI ~ ..~ 0.400 "-C ,f GI u ~ ... 2 o~ 0.300 R Linear= 0.185 ~ ::s fl) 0.200

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Per Capita Spending

Figure 11. The Effect of Per Capita Spending on Support for Euroenthusiast Parties

Supporting the hypothesis, the results show a positive correlation between an increased PCN and stronger support for Euroenthusiast parties. Both correlations were run using only the results from powiats within the Euroregions. This helped to limit any skewing of the dataset by removing the 179 non-Euroregion cases with a PCN of zero.

While both of these tests support the hypothesis, the data is problematic in that there are large gaps between values. Given the data under analysis, this is a problem, but one that is difficult to avoid. 96 Finally, independent t-tests were employed to see if there was a significant

difference between support for anti-European parties within Euroregions and those

outside. The powiats were given either a value of 1, meaning that they were within the

boundaries of a Euroregion and had a PCN > 0, or 0, in which case, the powiats were in

central Poland and had a PCN=O. The first test used the two political party groupings,

Aggregate Anti-Europe, including LPR, Self-Defense, and PiS, and Euroenthusiasts,

including PO and PSL. The results of this test were insignificant; in each case, the 2- tailed score was greater than the allowable 0.05 necessary for a meaningful result. 134

The data, like the administrative organization of Poland are unclear. An

independent t-test run on the five individual parties' (PO, PSL, PiS, LPR, and Self­

Defense) percentages of support, shows that only the LPR and PSL have a significant

difference in their means. Even then, however, the PSL, a Euroenthusiast party, has a

higher mean when voters are outside of the Euroregion, and the LPR, a Euroreject party, has a higher mean score when the voters are inside the Euroregions. This means that if a voter received money from the EU, they are significantly more likely to support the LPR.

To put this result in perspective, it must be recognized that the means under consideration

are only 0.0118 versus 0.0147 percentage points of the total vote.135

Figure 12 illustrates the total percentages of Sejm votes when parties are using the Kopecky and Mudde rubric and graphed against the PCN regions. On the western border, where the PCN is highest, the Euroenthusiast parties gain over 50 percent

134Independent T-Test located in Appendix D.

135Independent T-Test located in Appendix E. 97 of the total vote. On the eastern and south-eastern border, where the PCN is lowest, the

Eurosceptic parties receive a much higher percentage than in the rest of Poland. This

' -.

> ·.. ·,· ..... · ~.· .. j '~ .· ·. ': .:~ ~ ·· .. I . , , •

;. ~~~ ·: .. ·

Euroenthusiasts Euroscpetics Eurorejects Other West Northeast East Southeast

Figure 12. Voting Results for Polish Sejm: Percentage of Votes Grouped by Political Orientation, Combined Powiats Aggregated by Per Capita Number would tend to support the secondary hypothesis. However, the data from central Poland, where no Euroregions exist, show that voters also support Euroenthusiasts more strongly than Eurosceptics. This fact would make it difficult to conclude that higher PCNs lead to greater support for Euroenthusiast parties because the voters in Poland who receive no transfers also support the pro-European parties.

Figures 13 and 14 demonstrate, by powiat, where different concentrations of

Euroenthusiast and Eurosceptic supporters reside using a black to white scale. White indicates the lowest levels of support and black represents the highest. These maps look 98

...... ·:::.=·_: :· ·.•'"· •.. . f .·.--

. '

Figure 13. Aggregated Euroenthusiast Parties

. ·~- ,. : .... ' " ,. '. ~- -~ .. ;:-· . ./'.·,j;:;-;:·,/' .· ~- ....

. ··. ~;

Figure 14. Aggregated Anti-Europe Parties remarkably similar to one another. In each, the highest incidence of either group are located in the same areas. The largest city in the western portion of Poland is Warsaw and the largest city in the east is Lodz, both of which show high levels of Euroenthusiasts and Eurosceptics. 99

Euroenthusiasts Eurosceptics Black Dots Grey Dots

Figure 15. Dot Density with Six Largest Metropolitan Areas Highlighted: Euroethusiast Parties versus Anti-Europe Parties

In Figure 15, the six largest metropolitan areas have been outlined in black and a dot density overlay is used to show where the highest concentrations of supporters for either group reside. The clusters appear to center around urban agglomerations such as

Warsaw and Lodz. The only area of highly concentrated support for either party group not in a specific city is in the southern voivodeship of Silesia, an industrial hub that is also highly urbanized. While it is to be expected that more people will live in urban areas, it is odd to observe that whether it be rural or urban, the population seems consistently split between support for either party group. This is not a question of urban versus rural because the dots seem to be evenly disbursed throughout all areas. There is no single area where a majority of Eurosceptics resides or vice versa. However, given a 100 longer time horizon, the results of previous elections could be added to see ifthere has been political shifting in certain powiats. This would be a very beneficial addition to the research, but until the Polish party system reaches a more solid equilibrium, that is until flash parties are replaced with consolidated and stable parties, more historical studies may not result in significant findings.

What these results mean for Euroregions is unclear. Since the lowest voting totals relate more to scarcely populated areas than to the smaller PCNs, and since the highest support for either party group gravitates towards urban centers, the variable that seems to best describe voter tendency is sheer population, not how much money the people receive from the EU. The statistical tests substantiate this by showing that the PCN is not an affective predictor for Euroscepticism.

In the case of Poland, the data are inconclusive, if not contradictory to the hypothesis. The correlations show trends that support the fact that higher PCNs trend positively with support for Euroenthusiast parties and lower PCNs relate negatively with

Eurosceptics. However, the independent t-tests do not corroborate these findings. This may be due to the fact that powiats are relatively small units of measure, and the dataset does not include pertinent information such as GDP, education, or unemployment rates that could add nuance to the findings.

It is difficult to draw conclusive findings from this case study, but one bit of useful information that can be gleaned from this analysis is the marginalization of the

Euroreject parties and the corresponding strength of the PiS, the most influential

Eurosceptic party. While the Kaczynski brothers may be out of favor presently, the foundation that they built with the Law and Order party remains politically relevant and 101 could play a role in swinging future elections. The PiS stands as the greatest Eurosceptic threat in Poland. If the Euroregions are to become more dynamic political actors that intend to sway voters towards a pro-Europe stance, then they should focus their attention here. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis project has utilized a multidisciplinary approach that includes philosophy, history, geography, and international relations to explore one of the major problems facing the European Union-a crisis of political legitimacy. After reviewing the work of Weber and Habermas, it is now possible to apprehend that the once hypothetical situation proposed by Habermas has, through a series of failed referenda in the Netherlands, France, and Ireland, become an actual legitimacy crisis, the main symptom of which is a four-year caesura in the process of European integration. Scharpf, drawing on Habermas, pinpoints the EU' s major problem as being one of structural inconsistencies that have caused rising tensions over maintaining the dual goals of global economic competitiveness and regional political integration; however, in a very

Weberian sense, what is most lacking in the EU is the belie/by the people in the polity.

It is the sense that the EU represents the best available option for solving the problems of the day that must be established if the citizens of its twenty-seven member states are to begin believing in the legitimacy of Brussels and its lawmakers.

This paper proposed that micro-regionalism and cross-border cooperation in the form of Euroregions could become valuable, transformative institutions able to draw border residents into the EU' s sphere of influence. No longer marginalized, the frontier regions of member states have been connected directly to the EU via the Euroregion's

102 103 three types, output-oriented, input-oriented, and social, and then attempted to show evidence that Euroregions do, in fact, organize their budgets around priorities that take these concepts under advisement.

After examining all of the French and Polish Euroregion budgets, the results reveal that in both cases, the budgets show remarkably similar patterns of allocation preferences. While some observers may say that this is to be expected given that the EU maintains control over the purse strings, this perspective does not take into account the amount oflatitude available to the Euroregions when making proposals, nor does it consider that these "priorities" often reflect vague generalities and not absolute policy prescriptions. Furthermore, there is no mention of the term legitimacy in any of these budgets. The factthat the "priorities" fit so nicely into the three categories established by this analysis supports the supposition that theoretically, the Euroregions can work on multiple levels, political, economic, and social, to increase popular support for the EU.

Of course, theory needs to be tested in practice. Regardless of how well

Euroregions seem to fit into the "New Regionalist" paradigm or how many geographers trumpet the potentialities of such spatial constructs, if they do not function in an appreciable way, then these theories become just that. The second portion of this analysis tests the hypothesis that the Euroregions could in fact offer both direct and external benefits to border residents which would, in tum, influence their perception of the EU in a positive way, therefore increasing political legitimacy by allowing the residents of the

Euroregions to gain from economic development, political inclusion, and socio-cultural interactions. 104 When testing the French and Polish cases to measure the effect of residence

within a Euroregion on voter support for Eurosceptic parties, the results might be judged

as mixed. In the case of France, it is true that the two groups of departments exhibited

significantly different patterns of support for Le Pen in the 2007 Presidential election, but

unfortunately for the hypothesis, those living in Euroregions were more likely to vote for

the FN. Without a dataset that spans a longer period of time, itis impossible to say that

this outcome was neither an anomaly nor a snapshot of one frozen moment in time.

What can be said regarding France, however, is that its Euroregions produce, on

average, more money per capita than those in Poland. This differential arises largely

from the matching funds that more than double the budget for the French regions but

remain largely underexploited in Poland. In several instances both within the French and

the Polish context, overlapping Euroregion jurisdictions lead to compound PCNs. The

analysis has not been able to show a strong relationship between higher PCNs and lower

support for Eurosceptic parties. However, it has illustrated that when non-member states,

such as Switzerland, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine take part in these cross-border

ventures, the Euroregion on the whole receives less money, per capita. This is a

significant finding that many observers may have assumed to be true; after this analysis however, its verity now rests on solid data.

As in most dealings between Poland and the EU, the case study is marked by

conflicting and in some instances counterintuitive results. On one hand, the results of the

correlation/regression analysis confirm the hypothesis; on the other, the results of the t­

tests are not significant when the anti-Europe parties are aggregated because the means 105 display contradictory trends even within the given group. These results show that it is difficult to find a coherent position among the various Eurosceptic parties in Poland.

After reviewing the maps of voter support for the Euroenthusiast and Eurosceptic parties in Poland, it appears that in most cases, Polish Euroregions are much less populated than the French Euroregions. This can be confirmed by looking at the Total

Populations from Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter 4. In the Polish case, support for either group seems evenly distributed throughout the entire country which also casts doubt on there being an urban/rural dichotomy to explain support for Euroenthusiasts or

Eurosceptics. Although this study has been unable to discover a variable that explains these problems, it does not follow that such a variable fails to exist.

While the quantitative portion of this analysis may not reveal groundbreaking results regarding voting patterns within Euroregions, it is a first step towards attempting to understand the relationship between the EU and its Euroregions, the macroregion and its microregions. This relationship can best be understood by looking at the scope of

European payments to these projects. By deriving the per capita spending numbers for each Euroregion, this analysis has offered some perspective into the different scales of

EU spending on the Euroregions. While in absolute terms these numbers appear large, and in fact include a large portion of the entire EU budget, when measured in relationship to the actual border populations, the numbers become diminished. Although Corsicans may feel much loved, those living on the frontiers of the EU receive precious little support. It may be the case that in certain Euroregions the funds are dispersed so thinly throughout such a large swath of land that people do not even realize that these projects are taking place. Furthermore, given the large percentage of matching funds in France, it 106 is not clear whether the citizens actually associate the projects with the Euroregions or

even the EU. A key claim made by this thesis is that Euroregions can become localized

surrogates for the EU. For Euroregions to increase the legitimacy of the EU, people must

associate the benefits gained from the development projects with the EU. If there is a

cleft in the minds of the people, then none of these efforts will be effective at inculcating

political legitimacy at the individual level.

Without interviewing the people living in these regions and without presenting those residents with a standardized survey form, it will be difficult to evaluate whether or not Euroregions are actualizing their potential benefits to the European Community. This thesis spells out an argument for why Euroregions could become important sites for building legitimacy throughout the EU, and it has demonstrated, theoretically, how the

Euroregion may act as an interface connecting the local to the supranational level. This exercise provides a valuable application of New Regionalist theories to the European continent as well as contextualizes the theory of multi-level governance by illustrating the connections between European scales; however, it must also face the reality that the

statistical analysis disproved the primary and secondary hypotheses.

One of the key factors necessary to the further improvement of Euroregions is time. Without having the time to become acclimated to the newly institutionalized structures of the Euroregion and the EU, it may be premature to try to judge the effectiveness of these regions in the new member states. The party system in Poland is in constant flux-new parties arise and old ones fade. Until the domestic political system reaches a level of consistency, microregionalism within Poland may not be able to reach its full potential. 107 Euroregions do not represent a direct threat to the sovereignty of states. The EU must institute programs that benefit its member states but that do not conflict with

sensitive, domestic issues if it is to gain in legitimacy. It would be difficult for parties to

rationally argue against developmental support and socio-:cultural learning opportunities meant to bolster the economy and the society of these outlying areas. This assertion is

supported by the high levels of "matching funds" in the French Euroregions. By bringing

together the private, the public, and the supranational sectors together, Euroregions

provide opportunities to create linkages beneficial to all parties and therefore may be seen

as complementary to both the states and the EU.

Potential is the key quality. This analysis has provided a multitude of reasons to believe that Euroregions can develop into valuable tools for transmitting EU values to the

peripheries of its member states. It has also shown how certain qualities could spread back up through the system and transfer legitimacy to the macroregions. Although the

quantitative analysis does not wholeheartedly sustain these potentials, it is clear that the

EU understands the possibilities. The fact that the budget priorities fit so neatly into the

classes oflegitimacy may be coincidence, but it does point to a multifaceted approach to

development--one that favors not only economics, but political representation and cross­

cultural relations. The Euroregions remain well placed to provide all three of these qualities. APPENDIX A

Table S. Euroregion Budgets and Legitimacy Codes

FRENCH EUROREGIONS Tota) EU Code ALCOTRA OOL 1 Territory 34,097,662 15,343,948 SL 2 Identity 67,637,513 27,714,427 OOL 3 Competitiveness 49,532,532 17,635,509 IOL 999 Technica1 Assistance 9,501,002 4,750,501 Tota) 160,768,709 65,444,385

IT/FR Islands Tota) EU OOL 1 Easier access and better communications 32,064,474 14,364,237 OOL 2 Environment, tourism and sustainable development 56,492,702 26,995,501 SL 3 Cross-border exchanges 18,422,923 8,214,641 IOL 999 Technical Assistance 8,708,000 4,354,000 Total 115,688,099 53,928,379

PAMINA Total EU OOL 1 Improvement of regional competitiveness 8,504,530 4,252,264 OOL 2 Creation of the cross-border labour market 3,623,439 1,811,718 OOL 3 Protection and use of natural resources I 7,001,022 3,500,511 reinforcement of sustainable development SL 4 Socio-cultural integration 7,471,140 3,735,570 IOL 999 Technical assistance 1,610,532 805,266 Total -- 28,210,663 14,105,329

Oberrhein-Mitte-Sud Total EU SL 1 Cross-border cooperation for people and institutions 6,840,000 3,420,000 OOL 2 Balanced land development 21,291,790 10,645,895 OOL 3 Economic integration and human resources 26,470,056 13,235,028 SL 4 Promotion of tourism and culture 7,694,086 3,847,043 IOL 999 Technical Assistance 1,840,800 920,400 Total 64,136,732 32,068,366 108 109

Saarland-Moselle/Lorraine-Western Palatinate Total EU OOL 1 Development of an active strategy towards the border 15,091,870 7,545,935 OOL 2 Stimulation of an attractive position in the centre of Europe 2,494,024 1,247,012 OOL 3 Creation of synergy by cross-border spatial planning 8,268,786 4,134,393 SL 4 Promotion of the common natural and cultural heritage 14,067,714 7,033,857 OOL 5 European competence 2,494,024 1,247,012 IOL 6 Deepening of institutional co-operation 2,494,024 1,247,012 SL 7 Promotion of "people to people" projects 5,030,624 2,515,312 IOL 999 Technical Assistance 2,494,020 1,247,010 Total 52,435,086 26,217,543

Spain-France Total EU OOL 1 Structuring and reinforcing cross-border areas 43,820,000 21,910,000 OOL 2 Developing activities and employment 82,886,960 41,443,480 SL 3 Ooen, suooortive companies: 38,900,802 19,450,401 exchanges, social integration and gender equality IOL 999 Technical assistance 6,740,000 3,370,000 Total 172,347,762 86,173,881

Belgium-France-Luxembourg Total EU OOL 1 Fostering sustainable spatial development 6,859,438 3,429,719 OOL 2 Building an integrated cross-border economic area 23,408;549 8,486,228 OOL 3 Protecting the environment and enhancing its attractiveness 9,920,380 4,960,190 4 Encouraging human development, exploiting human SL resources, 14,099,928 7,042,227 and strengthening social and cultural integration IOL 999 Technical Assistance 2,447,170 1,223,585 Total 56,735,465 25,141,949

France/United Kingdom Total EU 1 Strenghtening cross-border co-operation in the service of OOL citizen 51,335,489 23,634,400 OOL 2 Promoting balanced spatial development 69,847,487 31,036,220 OOL 3 Promoting an attractive and welcoming region 111,809,733 49;340,425 IOL 999 Technical Assistance 12,144,080 6,072,040 Total 245,136,789 110,083,085

France-Wallonia-Flanders Total EU SL 1 Encouraging closer contact between inhabitants 78,664,884 39,332,442 110

and developing cross-border services OOL 2 Promoting sustainable growth and a collaborative 89,449,268 44,724,634 approach to cross-border development IOL 999 Technical Assistance 9,281,748 4,640,874 Total 177,395,900 88,697,950 French Total 1,072,855,205 501,860,867

Table 5 Continued

POLISH EUROREGIONS Code SAXONY/PL Total EU OOL 1 Economic development and co-operation between businesses 9,312,448 6,984,337 OOL 2 Infrastructures 38,079;324 28,559,491 OOL 3 The environment 14,929,403 11,197,054 OOL 4 Rural and urban development 7,464,704 5,598,526 OOL 5 Education, qualification and emplovment 8,174,316 6,130,737 SL 6 Cooperation, culture, social services and security 11,958,715 8,969,037 SL 7 Community action 1,820,000 1,365,000 IOL 999 Technical assistance 4,192,044 3,144,029 Total 95,930.954 71,948,211

Brandenburf?/Lubulskie Total EU OOL 1 Economic co-operation and promotion of SMEs 24,582,570 18,436,926 OOL 2 Development of infrastructures 61,346,254 45,994,691 OOL 3 The environment 30,861,467 23,146,100 OOL 4 Development of agriculture and country areas 12,747,611 9,560,708 OOL 5 Qualification and employment 21,246,020 15,934,514 SL 6 Co-operation 14,711,476 11,033,606 SL 7 Specific aid 4,636,000 3,077,000 IOL 999 Technical Assistance 6,759,873 5,069,903 Total 176,891,271 132,253,448

Mecklenburg/Pomerania Total EU OOL 1 Economic development and cooperation 10,020,014 7,515,010 OOL 2 Improving the technical and tourist infrastructures 84,897,115 63,672,836 OOL 3 The environment 10,110,504 7,582,877 OOL 4 Rural development 9,930,698 7,448,023 OOL 5 Qualification and Employment Promotion Measure 7,633,470 5,725,101 SL 6 Interregional collaboration, investment in cultural 23,933,190 17,949,892 111

and meeting facilities, funding for small projects SL 7 Specific aid for candidate countries 3,542,668 2,657,000 IOL 999 Technical Assistance 7,535,264 5,651,447 Total 157,602,923 118,202,186

PL/CZ Total EU OOL 1 Further development and modernization of the infrastructure 29,442,516 22,081,886 for improving the competitiveness of the cross-border area SL 2 Development of local society in the cross-border area 13,341,141 10,005,855 IOL 999 Technical assistance 3,220,275 2,415,206 Total 46,003,932 34,502,947

PL/RUS/LI Total EU OOL 1 Competitiveness and productivity growth 33,791,307 25,343,480 SL 2 Cooperation between populations 11,263,771 8,447,827 IOL 999 Technical Assistance 3,653,115 2,739,836 Total 48,708,193 36,531,143

PL/BL/UKR Total EU OOL 1 Increasing the competitiveness of the border areas through 28,137,242 21,102,930 modernising and development of the cross-border infrastructure SL 2 Developing the human capital and institutional cross-border 18,758,159 14,068,619 cooperation including security at the European Union borders IOL 999 Technical assistance 3,529,762 2,647,321 Total 50,425,163 37,818,870

PL/SL Total EU OOL 1 Infrastructure development 14,667,928 11,000,946 SL 2 Socio-economic development 10,134,205 7,600,653 IOL 999 Technical assistance 1,866,827 1,400,120 Total 26.668,960 20.001,719 Polish Total 602,231,396 451,258,524 Appendix B

Table 6. Independent T-Te~t For French Presidential Election: Percentage Support for Le Pen

GrOll!l~atislics

o1~.trr~r tRGN YN N M!an ffi~. D!~ia~~n M!an 1s1Jl!t }!rt!nl_l!~tn ij o~ rn.m 1.~m .JlJ) 1 1~ 1W1 rnn 5m

looe• Sam~!s lest

l!V!n!'s T!sH~r t~Ual~ ~f Vinint!s ~1!s1fm t~ualiw ~f M!ans

~~% C~nM!nt! lnl!rval ~f ~! O~!r!nt!

M!an ffim~r r Di~. 1 ~f oi~. 11·1ail!~ Diff!rnnte D~mnt! l~ir u~m 1sjJl!t }mnl_l!~tn t~ual \qfianm .~~i ./Oi ·Hl1 ~~ .~~~ -rn~~ .nJIJ -J.~m ·1.11% aSSUm!~ t~ual\qnantis n~l ·Blo ~~5~~ .~~~ -151~! .orn -mm ·1.Lnoo aSSUm!~

112 Appendix C

Table 7. Correlations Between Per Capita Spending and Presidential Candidates

Descriptive Statistics

Std. Mean Deviation N RRr~Jra 34.0163 28.19568 27

J,.f'...£.fil£ 12.7370 2.87578 27

Correlations

p fftl:-C..eJl.tl~ Pearson Correlation

Sig. (2-tailed) .122 .558 .169 .418 .481

N 27 27 27 27 27 27 tm..J.~~...n Pearson .162 .307 -.451- -.740- .184 Correlation

Sig. (2-tailed) .. 418 .119 .Q18 .000 .359

N 27 27 27 27 27 27

113 Appendix D

Table 8. Independent T-Test Comparing Percent Support for Pro- or Anti-Europe Party Groupings

Group Statistics Std. Std. Error Dummy N Mean Deviation Mean (l,gg_,6.Qti-Europe 1 193 0.3714 0.1170 0.0084 0 179 0.3587 0.0834 0.0062 Enthusiasts@!}~ 1 193 0.4858 0.0833 0.0060 0 179 0.4920 0.0628 0.0047

lncl€penclent Samples Test WJY~.'.iTest for Equalit'! of Variances !-test for Equality of Means 95% Confidence Sig. Interval of the (2- Mean Std. Error Difference F Sig. t Jjf tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 89.l.lh.rw-Europe Equal 32.331 .000 1.201 370 ..231 .0127384 .0106069 .0335957 variances .0081189 assumed Equal 1.216 347.482 .225 .0127304 .0104771 - .0333449 varianaos .0078680 not assumed

Enthusiasts~ Equal 16.970 .000 -.803 370 .423 -.0061757 .0076947 - .0089551 variances .0213065 assumed Equal -.811 355.359 .418 -.0061757 .0076150 .0088004 varianc:es .0211518 not assume cl

114 Appendix E

Table 9. Independent T-Test Comparing Individual Pro- and Anti-Europe Parties (Percentage of Votes )

Group Stati!;tkSc

~<1-:. E,t>±. Er~~r Dummy N Mea:1: Deviat~oc M.:ar: F::rc~rt o n= :;;, ;31'j ';),:~·-:.·.,,.ij 0.:','.;.',./ic~.. i PSL Y:!S G.HO~ iJ.'~'¢~ ;J,·;.;~;;-;=:-

.:-:r;::r"t ~ u ;; :~· .. :l:;:'J '.J. : ·~,.,'Cj.,, :",,;,; .•,,,\.\..i P8 t~3 ·:.·so.:;i "J. r:~J ::J"~':':;e

!-'i'fr: ...l'•l >,; cf':: 'ii.·~ ,,~ '..J/~\.r:J< ~ '.}/.f,j·J:t: Lf·R i'::-:13 fJ:J~.q. ~ iJ,;.;"J4':t \i.<.A.>J4 r-·e~":::em. '-..' o;_{"j ':i,vJL.~ »J.»i>.:.t.:.< V.J.l,):·'..,,' Sett" r:::i:3 \J.?:ili! ~l.\.:>T4~ (if.JJ':i.:_} iJef;;;nse

i-ercer11 v u;; '.i,-!>L'J~ "•.l.\i':i-JO ',,,,/,",,,_\)":f:'41' PXS ~93 •:i.3~% JY.4E G ·:~3&3 lm:lep;::ndent Samples Test -:'C>-/i: .... c·r<'t t:er,::: S~;. l~t:r;:a.i :1' th:;; ~2- Me;;;r. Sti~ Err-or Diff-..ri:rca F Sf;. df !a~P-:i} D:ff:reooe Differ=:~ LOW!H Upp:r !::Cll3.I !),::coo :;n:> '!__ :~(~ :c:,r'j.' ,·.rx- J ... :..,;;:..;-.;;;/ ,'./""'~ r-=.-O .\iO't . ,,;,;, !i•~ ,.,,,, .. -,'..r-..i&r'.n.;i.;.: ).,,'' ~ .Q ?4"3 -. '.},j ~ s:i ~t C./•'tXv'.;i PO vana:rces ass.il'me:I! . i::,Q;iiSJ -.!30 ~~-'°~ ,

=-~!.\al -tiA::;-;;7 3.i.b.SiJ:'j -·~\,,'\) -.t\)~'bl•::J! '•J;;~;}.;2Q'3 -};):0~!¢"='J4 -!./JLG4 5:1 variaroes riot as.sum~ :r-'ift!J"C·eJll :q11.a1 ,\}; l .tH'O - i"L,.~ :; l ~,,j ."¥0! -,',,l'.i i·\1"1'.J~ ):.JJ· 't~bi -.\/J. .>O~Jil /JJ' j 06f Self variaooes Deferr_se assumed t~ual •vf'SJ 3Ci:t.Bb!O 400 -.<.JJ1•J4~<:1 . <~tJ ~ 4:i~ f - '\:'i.\:?.-443 (f')l -':TJ -.!J~~"'·~i~ ,',;,.~,~Qi:;:;< - .'-.F£..'1L 'i'Ci .\J\ PiS variaras """'" as·st:.me:ii Eq;ua1 -~®2 345,4-05 ,~E.S -,C•}lSE2€<3 }:' t 02.~T~5 -.'~:2&a.525 .01 ~So.&B vararx:es :M1 assu;rned

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