Can Wondrous Signs Determine Law? a Comparison of Two Talmudic Traditions*

Itzhak BRAND University of Bar-Ilan

CAN WONDROUS SIGNS DETERMINE LAW? A COMPARISON OF TWO TALMUDIC TRADITIONS*

RÉSUMÉ

L’histoire du four d’Akhnaï a été largement débattue dans des contextes différents, mais la relation entre les versions du Talmud de Babylone et celui de Palestine n’a attiré que peu d’attention. Notre article tente de présenter d’une manière systématique les différences entre les deux traditions rabbiniques de ce récit — celle du Talmud de Palestine et celle du Talmud de Babylone. Ces dissemblances sont, à notre avis, fondées sur des divergences d’opinions quant au poids ou au statut des signes mira- culeux dans le cadre de la halakha. Elles résultent, comme nous le démontrerons, de la polémique judéo-chrétienne qui se trouve être un des moteurs principaux du développement de la tradition de Jérusalem.

ABSTRACT

The story of the oven of Akhnai has been discussed extensively in various contexts, but not enough attention has been paid to the relationship between the differing accounts in the Babylonian and Palestine Talmuds. This article attempts to present, in a systematic way, the differences between the two rabbinical traditions of the story — that of the Palestine Talmud and that of the Babylonian Talmud. We propose that the differences are grounded in differences of opinion as to the weight or status of miraculous signs within the framework of halakhic proceedings. These differences, it is claimed, arise from the Judeo-Christian controversy which, in fact, is the principal factor in the molding of the Jerusalem tradition.

1. Introduction

The story of the oven of Akhnai is one of the best-known Talmudic legends. It records a fierce halakhic dispute among the Sages of the generation following the destruction of the Second Temple, concerning the status of an

* My thanks to Prof. Menahem Kahana and to Prof. Amichai Radziner for their illuminating comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Revue des études juives, 172 (1-2), janvier-juin 2013, pp. 1-22. doi: 10.2143/REJ.172.1.2979738

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oven comprising a series of separate units which had come into contact with some impure agent. The majority of the Sages, led by Rabban Gamaliel II (ha-Nasi) and Rabbi Yehoshua, argued that such an oven would be rendered ritually impure, while R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, in a vigorously-expressed minority opinion, maintained that it would not. According to the generally accepted tradition (that recorded in the Babylonian Talmud), R. Eliezer resorted to signs and wonders — even invoking a heavenly voice — in support of his view. His colleagues refused to be swayed by these miracles. They argued that halakhic disputes must be conducted exclusively on a rational basis and decided in accordance with the majority opinion. R. Eliezer stubbornly adhered to his viewpoint, ignoring the ruling of the rabbinical establishment, and this ultimately led the Sages to impose a ban (nidduy) on him. This story raises several fundamental questions regarding the nature of religious law. Among them, one basic dilemma stands out: to what extent is the halakhic process subservient to God? Does the system of religious law recognize any kind of “heavenly” decision-making process or proofs? The conventional approach answers these questions in the negative, viewing religious law as terrestrial law, dependent on rational proofs, with its proceedings and rulings resting in human hands alone. In this article we propose a different reading of the legend, leading to the opposite conclusion: that religious law does, in principle, recognize signs and wonders, and that sometimes its rulings are indeed decided by God. This conclusion is supported by a careful comparison between the well-known version of the story as it appears in the Babylonian Talmud, and a different tradition which appears in the Jerusalem (Palestine) Talmud.1

1. For a general discussion of the differences between Babylonian and Palestinian versions of Talmudic aggadot, see S. SAFRAI, “Tales of the Sages in the Palestinian Tradition and the Babylonian Talmud”, in J. HEINEMANN and D. NOY (eds), Scripta Hierosolymitana Vol. XXII, Jerusalem, 1971, p. 209-232; Y. FRAENKEL, “Qawim boltim be-toldot masoret ha-teqst shel sippurei ha-Aggada”, in Proceedings of the Seventh Congress of Jewish Studies 3, Jerusalem, 1980, p. 45-51; S. Y. FRIEDMAN, “La-Aggada ha-Historit ba-Talmud ha-Babli”, in S. Y. FRIEDMAN (ed.), Saul Lieberman Memorial Volume, New York and Jerusalem, 1983, p. 120-122; P. D. MANDEL, Midrash Lamentations Rabbati — Criticism and Inter- pretation, vol. I, PhD, Hebrew University, 1997, p. 23-24. For such discussion concerning specific legends, see, e.g., Y. FRAENKEL, Darkhei ha-Aggada we-ha-Midrash, Givatayim, 1991, p. 317-319; G. HAZAN-ROKEM, Web of Life: Folklore and Midrash in Rabbinic Litera- ture (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1997, p. 45-48, 69-73, and recently V. NOAM, “Ma‘ase be-sippur she-nishba: le-gilgulaw shel ma‘ase bein EreÒ Yisra’el le-Babel”, Jerusalem Studies in Hebrew Literature 19 (2003), p. 9-21. My thanks to Prof. Menahem Kahana for this reference.

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The differences between these two accounts have been noted in the past,2 and have been attributed to technical corruption or, alternatively, to their respective legal contexts. These approaches are unsatisfactory. Firstly, the discrepancies between the two versions are too numerous and systematic to arise from arbitrary corruption. Secondly, while the legal context may influence the structure and form of the account, the redactor’s decision to place it within a certain context itself arises from some prior consideration which connects the context with the content of the narrative, and the nature of that connection remains to be explored. In this article we therefore propose a different approach to the differences and to the analysis of their background. We shall examine the differences from two perspectives — the principled/theoretical and the personal/ethical, pointing out the connection between them. Finally, we shall argue that the two traditions arise from disparate ideological perceptions concerning the legitimacy of signs and wonders in religious consciousness in general, and in the halakhic process in particular. We shall present these differing perceptions against their respective cultural and religious backgrounds.3

2. Two traditions of the same legend

For the purposes of comparison, let us examine briefly the version that appears in the Babylonian Talmud, and then — in greater detail — the lesser-known version in the Jerusalem Talmud.

2.1 Context and plot of the story in the Babylonian Talmud

In the Babylonian Talmud, the story of the oven of Akhnai appears in a legal chapter dealing with economic exploitation or oppression, ona’a (Baba MeÒi‘a 59a-b).4 The context relates specifically to the laws of hurtful or oppressive speech (ona’at debarim),5 and is introduced by the statement, “All gates are locked, with the exception of the gate of ona’a — meaning

2. See A. GUTTMANN, “The Significance of Miracles for Talmudic Judaism”, Hebrew Union College Annual 20, 1947, p. 378; J. L. RUBENSTEIN, Talmudic Stories — Narrative Art, Composition, and Culture, Baltimore-London, 1999, chap. 1. 3. The article makes no pretense at a comprehensive review of all approaches to this issue. Our discussion is limited to the views of the Amoraim — in Babylon and in Palestine — and the possible influences of the respective cultural, ideological environments on their positions. 4. The halakhic term ona’a refers to the false representation of the price involved in a transaction (whether committed by the buyer or the seller). 5. Ona’at debarim means the anguish that one person causes another through speech.

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that the gates of heaven are always open to the cry of a person who has been hurt by the words of someone else. This teaching is repeated again at the end of the story.6 The message is clear: Rabbi Eliezer maintained his position quite legitimately; the Sages refused to recognize any of his proofs, and even imposed a ban on him in view of his stubbornness. The Sages are guilty of hurtful speech towards R. Eliezer. In terms of the plot, the story is divided — in terms of both subject and form — into five parts.7 The first part presents a debate among the Tannaitic Sages concerning the ritual status of an oven built from separate units — the oven of Akhnai — in the event that it comes into contact with some agent of impurity. R. Eliezer, representing the minority opinion, maintains that the oven cannot contract ritual impurity, and declares the food baked in it to be permissible for consumption. The other Sages disagree, ruling that the oven and its contents are rendered ritually impure.8 This part ends with a brief Amoraic explanation9 of the name Akhnai: “What is (the meaning of the term) Akhnai? That (the Sages) surrounded him with words, like an akhnay (a type of serpent), and declared it impure.” The second part of the story10 records the wondrous signs that Rabbi Eliezer performs in his attempt to convince the other Sages: a carob tree is

6. Concerning this repetition, See RUBENSTEIN, Talmudic Stories, p. 35-36; D. ROSENTHAL, “ ‘Arikhot qedumot ha-meshuqqa‘ot ba-Talmud ha-Babli”, in MeÌqerei Talmud 1, 1990, p. 185- 186. This sort of repetition, as a literary phenomenon, has been studied in relation to biblical narratives. See, e.g., F. POLLACK, Bible as Literature, Jerusalem 1994, p. 78-79; M. STERN- BERG, “Mibne ha-Ìazara be-sippur ha-miqra’i — As†ra†egiot shel ‘odafut informaÒionit”, Ha-sifrut 25 (1976), p. 113-117. My thanks to Dr. Y. Jacobs for these references. 7. The indications of formal division are two-fold: the introduction with a reference to a Tannaitic source (tenan [They taught]; tena [He taught]; amru [They said]), and a transition from Tannaitic speech to Amoraic speech. Concerning amru as a reference to a Tannaitic source, see e.g. Y. N. EPSTEIN, Introduction to the Mishnaic Text (Hebrew), Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1964, p. 726-728; M. Y. KAHANA, The Two Mekhiltot on the Amalek Portion (Hebrew), Jeru- salem, 1999, p. 299 and n. 47. For our discussion, see A. ELON, The Symbolization of the Epos’ Components in the Talmudic Story (Hebrew), Masters’ dissertation, Jerusalem, 1993, p. 105. 8. For an explanation of the disagreement, see R. NISSIM GAON, Sefer ha-mafteaÌ shel man‘ulei ha-Talmud, Berakhot 19a, R. D. METZGER (ed.), Jerusalem, 1990, p. 42 (based on Rabbi Hai Gaon); OÒar ha-Geonim on Berakhot, p. 24; MAIMONIDES, Perush ha-Mishna, Berakhot 19a; early commentators on Baba MeÒi‘a 59a (Rashi, Ramban, Ritba, and others); Y. BRAND, Ceramics in Rabbinical Literature (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1993, p. 565. 9. According to most manuscripts (Escorial I G 3 [E], Hamburg 165 [H], München 95 [M], Firenze 79 I-II [F]) this is an Amoraic teaching (attributed to either Rabbi Yehuda or Samuel). However, according to MS Vatican 115 (V 1) and MS Vatican 116-117 (V 2) it is simply an unidentified narrative note. 10. Based on the formal indications of separation (see n. 7), this section is likewise Tannaitic in origin, opening with the word tana (according to most of the manuscripts). However, in MSS H and F, this introduction is absent.

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uprooted from its place; the water in an aqueduct flows backwards; the walls of the study hall lean over; and a heavenly voice is heard, declaring that the halakha follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. The Sages grant no recognition to these wonders. Their position is explained in a parenthetical comment on the plot: the Torah establishes the principle of ruling in accordance with the majority view; hence, that is the relevant consideration in the event of a dispute — even where the minority view is supported by a heavenly voice. The third part11 describes the sanction applied by the Sages against Rabbi Eliezer when he refuses to accept the majority ruling: they place a ban on him.12 The text describes the notification of the ban and Rabbi Eliezer’s contradictory reactions: he accepts the ban with sorrow and mourning; at the same time, he objects to it and uses his supernatural powers to sow destruction. The fourth part, describing his acts of fury and destruction towards the world and towards Rabban Gamliel, continues the previous one. The fifth part concludes the legend with the death of Rabban Gamliel as a result of the prayer of his brother-in-law, Rabbi Eliezer.13 The five parts of the story are well organized and follow a logical pro- gression: first there is the halakhic dispute, then the attempts at persuasion, followed by the ruling on the dispute, and finally the results — both immediate and more remote.

2.2 Context and plot in the Jerusalem Talmud

In the Jerusalem Talmud the story appears in the context of the laws pertaining to a ban (nidduy), and opens with the ban placed upon Rabbi Eliezer. This version includes no reference to any Tannaitic source (other

11. This section opens with amru, according to MS E, and with tana according to MS V 2. In most of the manuscripts there is no introductory word for this section; its parameters are inferred from the other sections. 12. Seemingly, the sages imposed Rabbi Eliezer a ban. Nevertheless, Rabbi Eliezer’s response to being “blessed” (a Talmudic euphemism) seems inappropriate and not in keeping with the relevant laws. This led some of the early commentators to suggest that what the sages imposed was not a ban (nidduy), but rather excommunication (Ìerem), a more extreme form of exclusion. See Rabbeinu PERETZ, Baba MeÒi‘a ad loc., HERSCHLER (ed.), Jerusalem, 1986, p. 123; RAMBAN, Baba MeÒi‘a 59b, and — in his wake — also RASHBA, RITBA and RAN, ad loc. See further: R. S. DE VIDAS, Shita mequbbeÒet, Baba MeÒi‘a 59b; Responsa of RIBASH, 173. For more extensive discussion, See R. DAVID LURIA, Quntres ‘Emeq ha-berakha, Pirqei de-Rabbi Eliezer, Warsaw, 1851 (Jerusalem, 1969). 13. This part, in contrast to its predecessors, is non-Tannaic in its language, and has no introductory reference to a Tannaitic source.

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than the dispute in Mishna Kelim),14 and the plot lacks coherent order.15 The following is a literal translation of the text (Mo‘ed Qatan 3,1 [81c-d]): [a]They sought to place a ban on Rabbi Eliezer. They said: “Who will go and notify him”? Rabbi Akiva said: “I shall go and notify him.” He came to him and said to him: “My teacher, my teacher! Your colleagues are placing a ban on you.” They took him with him,16 and he went outside. He said: “Carob [‘tree’], carob! If the halakha is as they say it is — be uprooted!” But it was not uprooted. [He repeated] “If they halakha is as I say it is — be uprooted!” And it was uprooted. [Afterwards] “If the halakha is as they say it is — return to your place!” And it did not return. [He repeated:] If the halakha is as I say it is, return”. And it returned. [Following] all of this praise, is the halakha not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer? Rabbi Îanina said: “Since [the Torah] has been given, it was given only [in accordance with the rule], you shall incline after the majority.” (Gloss: Did Rabbi Eliezer not know that one must follow the majority?) He would not have been bitter, except that they burned his sanctified things in front of him. [b] There [Mishna, Kelim] we learn: They broke up [the oven] into pieces [and put it together again], placing sand between one piece and the next. Rabbi Eliezer declared [the oven] ritually pure, while the Sages declared it impure. This is the Oven of Hakhinai. [c] Rabbi Yirmiya said: “A great calamity took place on that day.” Every place where Liezer looked, was scorched; even [if he looked at] a single [grain of] wheat — half was burned and half was not burned, and the pillars of the house of meeting were weakened. Rabbi Yehoshua said to [the walls]: “If colleagues are debating one another, of what concern is it to you?” And a heavenly voice emerged and said, “The halakha is in accordance with Eliezer, My son.” [Concerning which] Rabbi Yehoshua said: “It is not in heaven.”17

The plot here comprises three interlocking parts which are not clearly differentiated. The first part describes the ban of Rabbi Eliezer and his initial reactions to it, with two contradictory reflections on what happened: the first wonders at the fact that the halakha was not decided in accordance

14. The second part seems to include Tannaitic material that is not original in terms of the Jerusalem tradition. See GUTTMANN, “The Significance of Miracles”, maintaining that this is “doubtless” a later addition, from some source or compilation preserving Tannaitic material, inserted with a view to rounding out the original description of the event which, in the Jeru- salem tradition, was deficient. 15. J. NEUSNER, Eliezer ben Hyrcanus — The Tradition and the Man I, Leiden, 1973, p. 425-426; ELON, The Symbolization of the Epos’ Components, p. 105; RUBENSTEIN, Talmu- dic Stories, p. 50. 16. According to MS Leiden, Academy for Hebrew Language Edition, Jerusalem, 2000, p. 810. 17. Further on, we find an appendix to the plot, including a general rule for disputes between Rabbi Eliezer and his colleagues, and an anecdote indicating that the ban on Rabbi Eliezer was eventually lifted.

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with Rabbi Eliezer, following “all this praise”; the other assumes the impossibility of the dispute being decided in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, since the halakha follows the majority. The second part cites the halakhic dispute in the Mishna concerning the ritual status of the “oven of Hakhinai”. The third part describes Rabbi Eliezer’s response to the ban, along with the “cosmic” reactions in support of him. Despite the marked differences between this version of the story and that recorded in the Babylonian Talmud, the essential elements of the plot are identical: a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the other Sages concerning the Oven of Hakhinai or Akhnai; the results of the dispute (a ban, or “blessing”, on Rabbi Eliezer), and the reactions in protest against these results.18

3. Comparing the two traditions

There are numerous differences between the two traditions — some striking, others more subtle; some substantive while others are purely “stylistic”.19

3.1 The differences

3.1.1 Context In the Babylonian Talmud, the story appears within the context of hurtful speech. The significance of this context is twofold: it conveys indirect criticism of the Sages, and at the same time expresses identification with Rabbi Eliezer as the victim of the hurt. The context in the Jerusalem tradition — the ban — suggests the very opposite. Rabbi Eliezer is presented as a transgressor deserving of his punishment, while there appears to be no criticism of the Sages.20

18. GUTTMANN, “The Significance of Miracles” p. 382; RUBENSTEIN, Talmudic Stories, p. 9. We may also point to two further similarities: a. Details of the plot: the uprooting of the carob tree, the burning of the crops, the heavenly voice; b. The biblical citations that are integrated into the plot: “It is not in heaven” and “You shall incline after the majority”. 19. Most have been noted in the past by GUTTMANN, ibid., especially p. 379-380, 382; and RUBENSTEIN, ibid., p. 50-51. Our principal contribution here is to establish the systematic nature of the differences and to provide an explanation for them. 20. See J. GOLDIN, “On the Account of the Banning of R. Eliezer ben Hyrqanus: an Analysis and Proposal”, Journal of the Ancient Near Eastern Society 16-17 (1984-1985), p. 85-86. For Goldin, while the ban appears in both traditions, in the Jerusalem Talmud it represents the crux of the story, while in the Babylonian Talmud the focus is on the hurtful words, with the ban serving merely as “part of the molding of the drama”.

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3.1.2 Rabbi Eliezer’s attempts at persuasion In the Babylonian tradition, Rabbi Eliezer’s signs and wonders are part of his efforts at persuasion, and they appear prior to the ruling on the dispute. When conventional methods of rational argumentation fail to achieve the desired result, he resorts to signs and wonders. These are recognized, by Rabbi Eliezer and his colleagues alike, as proofs — or at least as support, as expressed repeatedly in the narrative. Rabbi Eliezer declares, “Let the carob (tree) prove (it)”; “Let the aqueduct prove it”, “Let it be proven from heaven”. The Sages do not dismiss these signs as meaningless, but rather as irrelevant to the ruling: “One does not bring a carob tree as evidence”, etc. In the Jerusalem tradition, the wondrous signs are invoked only after the ban is imposed.21 Seemingly, by this stage persuasion is no longer relevant.22 Here, the uprooting of the carob tree expresses Rabbi Eliezer’s anger and bitterness towards his colleagues for their ban (“He would not have been bitter, except that they burned his sanctified things in front of him”). The weakening of the pillars and the heavenly voice are likewise integrated into the third part of the story, introduced with the words (of R. Yirmiya): “A great calamity took place on that day”, following R. Eliezer’s scorching gaze upon the wheat. Thus, in the Jerusalem version, these changes in the natural order are not “proofs” for the purpose of persuasion, but rather acts of protest and anger which R. Eliezer directs towards the Sages. Furthermore, the descriptions of the wonders in the Babylonian Talmud are more pronounced and emphatic23: the carob tree is uprooted and lands at a considerable distance — a hundred cubits or four hundred cubits24; the walls of the study hall threaten to collapse; the heavenly voice declares unequivocally that the halakha follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer “in all cases”. The corresponding descriptions in the Jerusalem version are more

21. A. SCHREMER, “Stammaitic Historiography”, in J. L. RUBENSTEIN (ed.), Creation and Composition, Tübingen, 2005, p. 225. However, S. Abramson doubts at this point. See “Ba-miqra’ot, be-Îazal u-be-fiyyutot”, in M. BAR-ASHER et al. (eds.), Hebrew Language Studies, Dedicated for Z. Ben-Haim, Jerusalem, 1983, p. 1-3: “To ban: they sought to ban but had not yet banned; or, they sought to ban and had already banned.” 22. M. ABERBACH, “Did Rabban Gamliel II Impose the Ban on Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyr- canus?”, The Jewish Quarterly Review 54 (1964), p. 201, n. 1; GUTTMANN, “The Significance of Miracles”, p. 379. 23. Some are discussed by GUTTMANN, ibid., p. 380, and RUBENSTEIN, Creation and Com- position, p. 50. 24. MSS E, V1, V2: “And it moved a hundred cubits; some said: four hundred cubits”. However, MSS H, F: “And it moved four hundred cubits”. See Y. GOLDIN, “Tokh kedei ‘iyyunim be-massekhet Abot de-Rabbi Natan”, in Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 46-47 (1980), p. 63-65: “The number four hundred can be an expression of hyperbole and exaggeration.”

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moderate: the carob tree is uprooted some indeterminate distance; the walls of the study hall are “weakened”, rather than threatening to fall;25 and the heavenly voice declares, “The halakha is in accordance with Eliezer, My son” — apparently with reference to this particular dispute, rather than “in every case”.26 To this we must add the description of the aqueduct flowing backwards, which appears in the Babylonian Talmud but is entirely absent from the Palestine version.

3.1.3 Who is Îakhinai or Akhnai? In the Mishna, and apparently also in the Palestine Talmud27, Îakhinai seems to be a personal name. In the Babylonian version, Îakhinai becomes Akhnai — a serpent, and the explanation is forthcoming: “For they surrounded him with words like a snake, and declared it impure.” This image is not a flattering one, and it may reflect misgiving on the part of the Baby- lonian tradition towards the style of argument adopted by the Sages in their dispute with Rabbi Eliezer.28

25. The realia is slightly different in each case: the Babylonian version speaks of “the walls of the study hall”; in the Palestine version we find the “pillars of the house of meeting”. See L. GINZBERG, Interpretations and Innovations in Yerushalmi (Hebrew) 3, New York, 1941, p. 198: “The Sages in Palestine, like the stoic philosophers, sat and studied in a covered hall supported by pillars.” 26. R. NISSIM GAON, Sefer ha-mafteaÌ: “For the heavenly voice does not say that the halakha is in accordance with him in this matter, but rather speaks generally about ‘every case’. Perhaps the intention is, ‘in every place except for this instance’, or the like”; NEUSNER, Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, p. 426. 27. Note the variant readings of Mishna, Kelim 5.11: MS Kaufman, shelÌakhinai; and in MS Cambridge-Loewe, shel Îakhinai. However, in MS Parma-De Rossi 497 and the Yemenite MS (MS Jerusalem 1336 4o), the reading is shel Akhinai /Akhnai. Cf. J. N. EPSTEIN, “Tirgum ‘arabi shel mishnayot”, in S. LIEBERMAN (ed.), Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume, Hebrew section, New York, 1950, p. 29: “In the (tenth century) manuscript, the reading is shelÌakhinai, and in the margin it is written, ‘And the people of Iraq call it Akhnai and the people of Syria call it Îakhinai’.” See, e.g. S. ABRAMSON, R. Shmuel bar Hofni’s Talmud, Introduction (Hebrew), In any event, from both versions it would appear that this is a personal .(חנינא בן חכינא) p. 113ff name. See Tosafot Baba MeÒi‘a 59b; Tosafot ha-Rosh Baba MeÒi‘a 59b, J. GRODZINSKY and M. HERSCHLER (eds.), Jerusalem, 1958; p. 162. Indeed, we do find “Akhnai” as a name: see Shabbat 49a — “Jonathan ben Akhnai” (MS Vatican 108: Rabbi YoÌanan ben Akh(?)ni/M(?)ai; MS Munich 95: YoÌanan ben Akhiai; MS Oxford (366) 23: Jonathan ben Akhmai); Mo‘ed Qatan 9,1 (MS Colombia T-893X141): YoÌanan ben Akhnai; Sanhedrin 14a (MS Munich 95): Rabbi YoÌanan ben Akhnai; some called him Rabbi YoÌanan Akhinai. At the same time, Îakhinai may be a word derived from the Ìakhakh gadol (“great hurt”) which took place on that day. See The Geonic Commentary on the Order Toharot, J. N. EPSTEIN (ed.), Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, 1982, p. 15-16. Similarly, Cf. Qit‘ei ha-Geniza, Appendix 1, Perush ha-Ge’onim, ibid., p. 150 (ll. 1-4); ibid., Perush millei de-taharot, tashlum perush ha-Ge’onim, p. 179 (ll. 2-18); and to all these compare GUTTMANN, “The Significance of Miracles”, p. 379. 28. ELON, The Symbolization of the Epos’ Components, p. 14-20. See R. NISSIM GAON, Sefer ha-mafteaÌ and OÒar ha-Ge’onim, Berakhot, p. 24: “This is what they meant by comparing the

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3.1.4 Confrontation between R. Eliezer and Rabban Gamliel29 In the Babylonian Talmud, there are two stages to the conflict. The first takes place at sea: Rabbi Eliezer, in his anger, tries to cause the ship in which Rabban Gamliel is sailing, to sink. Ultimately, the sea is quieted and Rabban Gamliel is saved. At a later stage, R. Eliezer falls upon his face and prays for the down- fall of those who shamed him. This stage concludes with the death of Rabban Gamliel. The Jerusalem version makes no mention of these two struggles.

3.1.5 R. Eliezer’s position following the ruling on the dispute The Babylonian account seems to indicate that R. Eliezer remained stead- fast in his principled position, according to which wonders and heavenly voices are to be heeded. The Jerusalem account, in contrast, seems to suggests that R. Eliezer relinquished his principled stand: “Did R. Eliezer not know that we follow the majority?30 He was bitter only because they burned his sanctified things before him.” The implication here is that R. Eliezer would agrees that the majority opinion must be followed.31 From his point of view, the heavenly signs are not an attempt to undermine the majority decision; rather, they represent a show of protest against the behavior of the Sages towards him, for “burning his sanctified things before him”.32

matter to a snake, since they circled their words around him […] like a snake — which, if it surrounds something and closes on it, (the prey) will have no means of escape.” According to this explanation, the text offers no criticism of the sages. On the contrary, what we have is a graphic description of their decisive proofs against Rabbi Eliezer. See further Y. FELIX, Animals in Rabbinical Literature, Jerusalem, 1972, p. 120-121. 29. The accepted assumption is that it was Rabban Gamliel who had issued the ban on R. Eliezer. See I. H. WEISS, Dor Dor we-Dorshaw 2, New York-Berlin, 1923, p. 78, 86-89 ff.; Z. JAWITZ, Toldot Yisra’el 6, Tel Aviv 1933, p. 49-52. Nevertheless, according to Aberbach, whether the actual issuer of the ban was Rabban Gamliel is questionable; it may have been R. Yehoshua. 30. In MS Leiden, the words “And did not R. Eliezer know that one inclines after the majority?” only appear in the gloss (although the omission may be unintentional, resulting from the repetition of the word le-hattot). However, in other texts this section appears in the body of the manuscript. See L. GINZBERG, Seridei ha-Yerushalmi, Jerusalem, 1993, p. 198; R. NISSIM GAON, Sefer ha-mafteaÌ. 31. We may find traces of R. Eliezer’s retreat from his original stance in Tannaitic sources. See Y. FRAENKEL, The Aggadic Narrative — Harmony of Form and Content (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 2001, p. 361, n. 59, raises such a possibility (“by way of metaphor”) based on Mishna, Yadayim 4,3. For the opposite position concerning the relationship between the legend and the Mishna, Yadayim, see E.E. URBACH, “Halakha u-nebu’a”, Tarbiz 18 (1946), p. 11 (= Me-‘olamam shel ha-Îakhamim — QobeÒ meÌqarim, Jerusalem, 1988, p. 31); GOLDIN, “On the Account of the Banning”, p. 95-96; E. A. FINKELSTEIN, Mabo’ le-massekhtot Abot we-Abot de-Rabbi Nathan, New York, 1951, p. 42. 32. The protest becomes clearer in light of Goldin’s suggestion (p. 87) that the phrase “they burned his pure things before him” refers not to a literal burning of sanctified food, but rather to a cancellation of his teachings concerning the laws of purity.

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3.2 Systematic differences

It would seem that the differences between the two traditions are consist- ent and systematic, around two axes: the principled/ideological and the personal/ethical.

3.2.1 Principled/ideological axis: halakhic rulings by means of wonders The Babylonian tradition presents the dispute between R. Eliezer and the Sages against the backdrop of the question as to whether signs and wonders are a legitimate basis for halakhic ruling.33 R. Eliezer maintains that such devices are indeed legitimate, and the Sages might even agree — so long as the signs do not contradict the ruling of the majority.34 The Jerusalem tradition opposes this view, rejecting outright the legitimacy of sings and wonders as devices for deciding halakha. This principled, ideological rift between the two traditions, gives rise to two of the differences between them (above, 3.1.3 and 3.1.5): The Babylonian tradition grants legitimacy, in principle, to signs and wonders. Therefore, it presents them as attempts at persuasion and as halakhic supports, and describes them with powerful imagery. R. Eliezer seeks to establish halakhic truth by means of signs and wonders.35

33. See, e.g., E.E. URBACH, Ha-halakha — meqoroteiha we-hitpatÌuta, Tel Aviv, 1984, p. 173 (in connection with Mishna Yadayim 4,3). Others have posited other dilemmas as the focus of the dispute: 1) Hermaneutical dilemma: does the text contain its own interpretation, or is it given over to the autonomy of its commentators? Who is sovereign over the exegesis of Torah — the community, or the Giver of the Torah? See Y. HEINEMANN, Darkhei ha- Aggada, Jerusalem, 1953, p. 11; D. BOYARIN, Intertextuality and the Reading of Midrash, Bloomington, 1990, p. 35-36. 2) Hearing vs. discretion: should halakha be decided in accordance with received wisdom or at the discretion of the rabbinical authority? See Y. D. GILAT, Mishnato shel R. Eliezer ben Horqanos, Tel Aviv, 1968, p. 324; GOLDIN, “On the Account of the Banning”, p. 88-90, p. 95-96; Y. SILLMAN, Qol gadol we-lo’ yasaf — Torat Yisra’el bein shelemut le-hishtalmut, Jerusalem, 1999, p. 42 and n. 6. To all of these cf. ÎIDA, Mar’it ha-‘ayin, Baba MeÒi‘a 59b, Jerusalem, 1985 (Livorno Edition, 1804), p. 62. 3) Status of the Oral Law in relation to the Written Law, see FRAENKEL, Darkhei ha-Aggada we-ha-Midrash, p. 359-361. 34. We may deduce this from a linguistic analysis of R. Yehoshua’s retort, “We do not heed a heavenly voice”. This is generally understood to mean that there is no such obligation — i.e., one may heed it. See Y. A. EFRATI and E. YITZHAKI, Massekhet Yom Tob — Pereq shelishi, Tel Aviv, 1992, p. 115-116. The same conclusion arises from R. Yirmiya’s dual justification of R Yehoshua’s words. “Since Torah was given at Mount Sinai, we do not heed a heavenly voice”, and “Since You wrote, at Mount Sinai, in the Torah, ‘to incline after the majority’.” The second justification is distinguished from the first in that it could grant recognition to a heavenly voice, if it does not contradict the majority. See B. JACKSON, “Ha-hakkara ha-enoshit we-ha-yedi‘a ha-eloqit”, Shenaton ha-mishpat ha-‘ibri 6-7 (1979-1980), p. 169-170. 35. Some early commentators draw a distinction between the use of signs and wonders as cognitive devices (to establish truth) and their use as a tool for halakhic rulings. The former, they insist, is in no dispute; it is the latter use that is subject to controversy. See Derashot ha-Ran ha-shalem, Third Sermon, A. L. FELDMAN (ed.), Jerusalem, 2002, p. 121: “Everyone

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He maintains this position and does not abandon it even after the dispute is decided contrary to his view. The Jerusalem tradition is not accepting of miracles.36 It presents the “wonders” in this instance — the uprooted carob, the weakened walls of the meeting hall, the destructive gaze — as gestures of protest, described in relatively moderate terms, and appearing after the halakhic process has been exhausted. Indeed, according to the Jerusalem Talmud, even R. Eliezer agrees that the majority opinion must be followed. He performs the “wonders” only as an expression of his bitterness and anger towards the Sages.

3.2.2 Personal/ethical axis: the dispute and the disputants Other differences between the two traditions center around the personal/ ethical axis. Here we refer not to the content of the controversy, but rather to the style of the dispute and the personal, moral behavior of the disputants.37 The Jerusalem tradition highlights R. Eliezer’s “transgression” and the fact that he was worthy of the ban, while the Babylonian tradition emphasizes the problematic behavioral style of the Sages, headed by Rabban Gamliel.38

saw that R. Eliezer was closer to the truth than they were, and that his signs were all true and right, and that in heaven the matter was ruled in accordance with his words, but nevertheless they acted in accordance with their consensus, since their logic tended to declare it impure…” (Almost identically, see ibid., Seventh Sermon, p. 254. However, compare his Eleventh Sermon, p. 43); R. HISDAI CRESCAS, Or Hashem, R. S. FISHER (ed.), Jerusalem 1989, p. 354; R. YOSEF ALBO, Sefer ha-‘Iqqarim, Tel Aviv 1963, p. 463. See also: Sefer ha-Ìinnukh, Jerusalem, 1991 [1991/2], law 496. See further: E. E. URBACH, “Halakha u-nebu’a”, p. 11; SILLMAN, Qol gadol we-lo’ yasaf, p. 103, n. 2; B. S. JACKSON, “The Concept of Religious Law in Judaism”, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.19.1, Berlin, 1979, p. 44-52 (esp. 47). 36. Some scholars have sought to demonstrate that the Jerusalem tradition does recognize wonders. See D. HALIVNI, Peshat and Derash, New York, 1991, p. 207, n. 15; Y. TAMAR, Alei Tamar, vol. 3, Gush Etzion, 1991, p. 317-318 (based on TJ Sanhedrin 6,4 [23b]; TJ Yebamot 15,4 [14c]). 37. Some have viewed this axis as the crux of the dispute. See HALIVNI, Peshat and derash, p. 7 (and Halevi’s criticism, p. 374-375); Y. BRANDES, “‘Al aÌer we-aÌerut — he-Ìarig u-ma‘amado be-beit ha-midrash”, in H. DEUTSCH and M. BEN SASSON (eds.), Ha-aÌer — bein adam le-‘aÒmo u-le-zulato, Tel Aviv, 2000, p. 425-426 (illumination of the dispute from the perspective of the unusual, elevated and “otherly” personality of R. Eliezer). See also ibid., p. 536, n. 77. Alternatively, it may be that R. Eliezer’s principled, ideological stand is bound up with his personal qualities and abilities: R. Eliezer is found worthy of Divine inspiration (according to TJ ‘Aboda Zara 3,1 [42b]; TJ Sota 9,16 [24c]), and therefore believes that a heavenly voice must be heeded. See URBACH, “Halakha u-nebu’a”, p. 11. 38. RUBENSTEIN, Talmudic Stories, p. 59, emphasizes a further difference in this regard. On one hand, the story in the Jerusalem Talmud speaks little of R. Eliezer’s feelings following the ban. On the other hand, the Babylonian Talmud elaborates on the honorific descriptions of the Sages, so as to highlight the degree of their insult to R. Eliezer.

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This contrast in emphasis is the key to a chain of further differences between the traditions: The Jerusalem tradition places this legend in the halakhic context of the ban, so as to highlight R. Eliezer’s “criminal” status. The Babylonian tradition introduces the story within the framework of the laws of verbal injury, such that it is the Sages whose problematic conduct becomes the focus.39 Furthermore, the Babylonian version does not shy away from criticizing the Sages, as the phrase “oven of…” itself testifies. The oven here is not referred to by the name of its owner (Hakhinai), as in the Mishna. Rather, it is given a name that reflects the behavior of the Sages: “they surrounded R. Eliezer with many words, like a snake.”40 The fact that R. Eliezer, according to the Babylonian tradition, is not a transgressor but rather a victim, and the fact that the behavior of the Sages is improper and disrespectful, together seal the “verdict” of Rabban Gamliel.41 It is no coincidence that the two stages of his “punishment” appear only in the Babylonian version, while the Jerusalem Talmud omits them completely.

Thus, these two axes — the ideological and the personal — encapsulate the differences between the two versions of the story. They axes are distinct from one another, running parallel but not converging. Nevertheless, we may point to a hidden connection between them. The Babylonian tradition does not negate R. Eliezer’s ideological position outright. For this reason, perhaps, it is inclined to side with R. Eliezer in his personal dispute with the Sages. The Jerusalem tradition, on the other hand, rejects R. Eliezer’s position out of hand. Therefore, in this version his audacity and stubbornness render him deserving of the ban.

39. ELON, The Symbolization of the Epos’ Components, p. 105-106, maintains that the redactor chose to locate the story specifically within a discussion about verbal injury, rather than as part of the theoretical, institutional question, so as to bring the reader down from the lofty, abstract questions pertaining to the man-God relationship, to the simple, mundane problem of hurtful speech — a problem pertaining to the relationship between man and his fellow. 40. R. NISSIM GAON, Sefer ha-mafteaÌ. See further Yebamot 16a: “They began to surround him with laws”. At the same time, the term “to surround (le-haqqif, le-sobeb) with laws” (or “with words”) can describe intensive discussion, and not necessarily a personal attack. See Baba MeÒi‘a 84b: “You have surrounded us with bundles of answers which have no substance.” See RUBENSTEIN, Talmudic Stories, p. 58-59. 41. In a responsum of Rabbi Sherira Gaon or Rabbi Hai Gaon, L. GINZBERG (ed.), Genizah Studies in Memory of Doctor Solomon Schechter (Hebrew), New York, 1928, vol. 2, p. 150-151: “What was the hurt towards R. Eliezer?… For it is not proper to act this way towards a great person… It was not proper to insult him concerning this matter.” See also: HALIVNI, Peshat and derash, p. 107-108; D. HARTMAN, A Living Covenant, New York, 1985, p. 48.

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4. A background of Jewish-Christian polemic

4.1. Original tradition vs. reworked tradition

The prevailing view in the world of Talmudic scholarship is that if the Jerusalem Talmud and the Babylonian Talmud present two different versions of the same story, it is likely that the former is the authentic one, while the latter is drawn from it. In other words, the version in the Baby- lonian Talmud underwent corrections and improvements to the point where it attained the polished, refined form in which it is known to us today.42 This view is based on the accepted convention that the Jerusalem tradition is more reliable in its transmission of Tannaitic sources than the parallel Babylonian version, since the former was consolidated in the immediate geographical, cultural and religious environment of the Tannaitic sources.43 Notwithstanding this prevailing view, we might propose the opposite position, viewing the Babylonian version — at least in the present instance — as the original one.44 The Jerusalem version of our legend is fragmented

42. RUBENSTEIN, Talmudic Stories, p. 51, suggests that the additions in the Babylonian version (beyond that which appears in the Palestine Talmud) are meant to “enhance” and “complete” the original story, using various literary techniques: embellishment, expansion and supplements. To his view (ibid., p. 57), “The process of composition allows us to identify the narrators with the unidentified editor” and “The story in the Bavli must be the work of the unidentified editors” (p. 58). Cf. NEUSNER, Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, p. 425-426, cited below, n. 54. 43. S. SAFRAI, “Meqorot ereÒ-yisre’eliim qedumim be-masoret ha-Talmud ha-Babli”, in ID., Bi-yemei ha-Bayit u-bi-yemei ha-Mishna, Jerusalem, 1994, p. 599: “The Palestinian tradition is preferable… at least in terms of its reliability and its proximity to the reality of the lives of the Jewish people in their land…” Safrai’s general statement is supported by the punctiliousness of the Jerusalem Talmud in conveying laws found in the Tosefta in their original form (in contrast to the Babylonian approach). See, e.g., S. LIEBERMAN, Tosefet Ri’shonim 1, Jerusalem 1936, p. 2; EPSTEIN, Mebo’ot, p. 246; S. Y. FRIEDMAN, Talmud ‘arukh — Baba MeÒi’a, Jerusalem 1991, p. 99, n. 12; ID., “Ha-beraitot ba-Talmud ha-Babli we- yaÌasan le-maqbilotehen she-ba-Tosefta”, in ‘Atara le-Ìayyim — Studies in Talmudic Litera- ture in Honor of Professor Hayim Zalman Dimitrovsky, Jerusalem 2000, p. 199-200, and others. At the same time, efforts have been made to demonstrate the connection of the Baby- lonian narrative to the reality in Babylon. See ELON, The Symbolization of the Epos’ Compo- nents, p. 24-29, 82-103, and (in his wake) RUBENSTEIN, Talmudic Stories, p. 53-57. These scholars suggest that the milieu and realia in the Babylonian tradition are not original, but rather reflect the conditions within the Babylonian environment (ELON, ibid., p. 133: “…the unique Pumbeditan reality of those times”). It must be emphasized that the connection between the text of our legend and Babylonian life pertains, mainly, to the anonymous additions to the legend or to its final (fifth) section — which is almost certainly Babylonian, and does not concern us here. 44. In general, the Babylonian Talmud demonstrates a careful preservation of the original formulation. See A. WEISBERG, “Ha-lashon ha-aramit be-Babel bi-tequfat ri’shonei ha-

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and corrupted, lacking a logical sequence of events: first (section 1) it describes the ban; only afterwards (section 2) do we learn of the dispute and conflict which were its cause.45 Further on (section 3) the text first describes the response to the ban and only afterwards the argument that preceded it. Furthermore, the language of the Jerusalem version is uneven, with transi- tions from Tannaitic speech to Amoraic speech.46 There is, of course, a third possibility: that both versions are Amoraic, each developing the early Tannaitic nucleus of a plot.47 It is therefore difficult to determine with certainty the question of authenticity. Nevertheless, a comparison of the two versions gives rise to the impression that the Jerusalem tradition is corrupted — and in a way that appears to be intentional.48 What, then, is the intent underlying the Jerusalem version of the story?

4.2. Attitude of the Talmuds towards magic and witchcraft

While the story in the Jerusalem Talmud may reflect local considerations, it is possible that the differences between the two versions originate in different approaches of the two Talmuds to magic and witchcraft in general. Indeed, it is widely maintained among scholars that there is a significant discrepancy between the attitudes of the Amoraim of Babylon and of Pales- tine, respectively, towards various spheres of a-rational activity (astrology, angelology, magic, and witchcraft). This claim was raised, with respect to

Amora’im”, Leshonenu 60 (1997), p. 102-103. Sometimes, the Babylonian version is more reliable than its Jerusalem counterpart. See J. HEINEMANN, Aggadot ve-toldoteihen — ‘iyyunim be-hishtalshelutan shel masorot, Jerusalem, 1974, p. 39: “Concerning the actual question of which is the original version and which the reworked one, there is room for debate”; SAFRAI (op. cit. n. 43, ibid.): “However, there are some traditions … where it is clear that that of the Babylonian Talmud is clearly preferable to that of the Jerusalem Talmud.” 45. Admittedly, there are times where the fact that a story appears in this form is actually a testimony to its authenticity (the rule of lectio difficilior). S. LIEBERMAN cautions concerning its implementation: Mabo’ la-Tosefta ki-feshuta, Mo‘ed [Shabbat-‘Erubin], Jerusalem 1993, p. 15-16. See further: RUBENSTEIN, Talmudic Stories, p. 53. 46. Concerning the phenomenon in general, See S. Y. FRIEDMAN, “‘Al derekh Ìeqer ha-sugiyya”, in H. Z. DIMITROVSKY (ed.), MeÌqarim u-meqorot, New York, 1978, p. 301-302. 47. See Tosefta, ‘Eduyot 2,1, ZUKERMANDEL (ed.), p. 457: “And it was called the oven of Akhnai, for conflicts multiplied in Israel on its account.” 48. HEINEMANN, Aggadot ve-toldoteihen, n. 54: “Sometimes some or other story is changed — not only in its unimportant details, but in the essence of the ideas and the meaning, to the point where there can be no doubt that the original story has indeed been amended with a view to adapting it to the views and aspirations of its editor…”. Further on, with some reservation, he writes: “But even in such cases, one cannot always easily and clearly determine the motivations that led to the change.”

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the Talmudic view of magic, in the nineteenth century by Shelomo Yehuda Rappaport.49 Later, Louis Ginzberg50 developed this thesis, arguing that one of the most prominent differences between the Talmuds concerns their respective attitude towards angels and demons: while the redactors of the Jerusalem Talmud rejected almost completely the popular conventions concerning these supernatural beings, in Babylon — owing to popular pressure and under Zoroastrian influence — these conventions were acknowledged, and they found their way into the Babylonian Talmud. Ginzberg notes a similar discrepancy between the Talmuds in their attitude towards magic, astrology, and other superstitions. There is little mention of these in the Jerusalem Talmud,51 which tends to doubt the authenticity of acts of witchcraft and dismisses them as “sleight of hand”. The Baby- lonian Talmud, in contrast, presents differences of opinion as to the authenticity of witchcraft, and the dominant view maintains that it is a real phenomenon (and one who puts his faith in it is said to “deny the heavenly entourage”52). Ginzberg suggests that the various popular charms men- tioned in the Babylonian Talmud, meant to counteract magic spells, likewise testify to the widespread belief in witchcraft and magic among the Jews of Babylon.53 Following Ginzberg’s view, Neusner likewise maintains that the Amoraim of Babylon were not reticent concerning magic and witchcraft; on the contrary, they routinely engaged in such practices.54 Kimberley Stratton, too, notes a striking discrepancy between the Talmuds in their attitude towards witchcraft. She claims that the Babylonian sources praise the supernatural abilities of the Sages as superseding those of their Babylonian adversaries. The Palestine Talmud, in contrast, takes a negative view of witchcraft as a “dangerous praxis of the other”.55 A more

49. ‘Erekh millin, part II, Warsaw, 1852, p. 81, “EreÒ Yisra’el”. Rappaport was preceded, in this view — according to his own testimony — by L. BLAU, Das altjüdische Zauberwesen, Budapest, 1898. 50. On Jewish Law and Lore, New York, 1970, p. 22. 51. GINZBERG, ibid., p. 23. 52. GINZBERG, ibid., p. 24, citing TJ Sanhedrin 7,13 (25d); Sanhedrin 67b. 53. Concerning the use of amulets and charms, it is possible that “there is no significant difference between the Land of Israel and Babylon”. See Y. GAFNI, The Jews of Babylonia in the Talmudic Era (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1990, p. 172-173. 54. J. NEUSNER, A History of the Jews in Babylonia, vol. III, Leiden, 1968, p. 110, 124- 125; ID., Talmudic Judaism in Sasanian Babylonia — Essays and Studies, Leiden, 1976, p. 79-82. 55. “Imagining Power: Magic, Miracle, and the Social Context of Rabbinic Self-Repre- sentation”, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 73 (2005), p. 361-393. Recently, a critique of this view was proposed by Y. LEVINSON, “Gebulot u-mekhashshefot: sippurei immut bein rabbanim li-mekhashshefim be-sifrut Îazal”, Tarbiz 75 (2005), p. 295. LEVINSON, ibid., p. 308, n. 52, is aware of the “prevailing view” that in the Babylonian Talmud — in

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cautious and moderate formulation is proposed by Lieberman and Urbach, although they do still note a certain discrepancy between the two Talmud in this regard. Lieberman shows that the Babylonian Sages did recognize certain magical customs (such as placing ashes or a black cloth upon the head of a groom or bride, so as to ward off evil spirits), while the Sages of Jerusalem ignored them56. Urbach, in his review of the rabbinical attitude towards witchcraft and the miraculous, offers no clear, unequivocal distinction between the Sages of Palestine and those of Babylon. Nevertheless, at various points he notes a certain discrepancy between them. Thus, for example, he states that “Sages, especially in Babylon, implemented treatments of an overtly magical nature”.57 Discussing a particular magical act (the killing of a camel and cutting it into parts), he highlights the difference between the Babylonian Rav, who regards it as real, and Rabbi Îiyya, in the Land of Israel, who describes it as “sleight of hand”.58 In summary, a review of the research indicates a discrepancy in the respective positions of the two Talmud concerning magic and witchcraft. The Jerusalem Talmud adopts a negative view, and this may be the background to its version of our story, highlighting its opposition to the involvement of signs and wonders in the halakhic process.

4.3. Attitude towards magic in the environments of the Talmuds

What underlies the differing attitudes of the Talmuds? Perhaps the cultural environment of each offers the key to this question. The Jerusalem Talmud developed within an environment dominated by Greco-Roman culture and Christianity. The Babylonian Talmud was consolidated against the background of the Sasanic world. What were the attitudes of these two cultures towards magic and the supernatural?

contrast to the Jerusalem Talmud — we encounter a multiplicity of spells and magic. Never- theless, in n. 10, he is hesitant to draw such a distinction — at least in relation to the matters of witchcraft discussed in Sanhedrin, chapter 7 (67b-68a; TJ 7,11 [25d]). He claims (p. 308) that in the discussion in the Babylonian Talmud, “The Sages perform almost no acts of witchcraft”. However, this assertion is questionable in view of Levinson’s own findings (n. 52): One Sage refrains from resorting to witchcraft, while four Sages do make use of witchcraft. Do these facts truly match the description of the Sages as performing “almost no acts of witchcraft”, and of those who do as “a few individuals”? 56. S. LIEBERMAN, Greek in Jewish Palestine, New York, 1962, pp. 97-98, 113-114. 57. E. E. URBACH, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1986, p. 85. 58. Sanhedrin, 67b. URBACH, ibid., n. 40*.

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4.3.1. The Greco-Roman world Magic and witchcraft were widespread in the ancient Greek empire. (The Greek language includes some twenty terms describing different magical practices.59) Classical ancient literature includes dozens of indications of frequent and widespread use of magic in both Greek and Roman societies.60 In addition, the Greeks consulted extensively with oracles and other prophets, over a period of about a thousand years (7th century B.C.E. - 3rd century C.E.).61 Following the Greek and Roman conquests, these cultures — including the firmly established and ubiquitous magical element — spread their influence eastward.62

4.3.2. Early Christianity and magic Under Greco-Roman influence, magic occupied a central place in the molding of early Christianity.63 The tradition of the New Testament describes exorcisms, miraculous healings, miracles of nature, and other wondrous acts using supernatural powers.64 Jesus was perceived as a magician in both Jewish and pagan traditions,65 as well as in the New Testament itself: in Mark 6:14-15 we find that he acquired fame early on as a seer and a wonder- worker,66 and therefore became known as a “prophet” (John 6:14-15 — the

59. G. LUCK, “Witches and Sorcerers in Classical Literature”, in B. ANKARLOO, S. CLARK (eds.), Witchcraft and Magic in Europe — Ancient Greece and Rome, Philadelphia, 1999, p. 98-101. 60. See D. E. AUNE, “Magic in Early Christianity”, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II 23.2, Berlin, 1980, p. 1516-1523; D. OGDEN, Magic, Witchcraft, and Ghosts in the Greek and Roman World, Oxford, 2002. 61. D. AUNE, Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World, Michigan, 1983, p. 49-79; A. B. KOLENKOW, “Relationships between Miracle and Prophecy in the Greco-Roman World and Early Christianity”, in Aufstieg und Niedergang II 23.2 (see n. 60), p. 1476-1478; L. S. NASRALLAH, An Ecstasy of Folly: Prophecy and Authority in Early Christianity, Cambridge, 2003, p. 1-3 (prophetic experience); A. KARP, “Prophecy and Divi- nation”, in R. M. BERCHMAN (ed.), Mediators of the Divine: Horizons of Prophecy, Divina- tion, Dreams, and Theurgy in Mediterranean Antiquity, Atlanta, 1998, p. 16-34. 62. LUCK, “Witches and Sorcerers”, p. 157; E. R. DODDS, The Greeks and the Irrational, Boston, 1957, ch. 8, p. 236-252, 268-269. 63. For an extensive scholarly review, examining also the Greco-Roman influence, See AUNE, “Magic”, p. 1507-1509. Concerning the use of visions and dreams in early Christianity, see NASRALLAH, An Ecstasy of Folly, p. 9; HANSON, “Dreams and Visions in the Graeco- Roman World and Early Christianity”, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II 23.2, Berlin, 1980, p. 1395-1427. 64. AUNE, “Magic”, p. 1523-1524, 1529-1538. 65. AUNE, “Magic”, p. 1525, n. 78-79; M. SMITH, Jesus the Magician, New York, 1978; LUCK, “Witches and Sorcerers”, p. 124, n. 66. 66. See also Matt. 21:10-11; Mark 8:28

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miracle of the loaves and the fish).67 Jesus’ successors — the early Chris- tians — likewise testify to experiencing Divine revelations.68 Thereafter, every significant stage in the development of early Christianity was accom- panied by visions, dreams, or other prophetic experiences.69

4.3.3. Sasanic world In Babylon, too, there was widespread popular use of magic. This is evi- denced by the many incantation bowls (incantations inscribed upon earthen- ware bowls) that have been found in Babylon, used for protection from demons and other evil forces,70 as well as extensive testimony to involvement in incantations and spells.71 Morony, in a comprehensive study of Babylonian incantation bowls,72shows that a considerable portion of them carry inscriptions in Aramaic in rabbinical style.

4.3.4. The Talmuds in the wake of their respective environments While magic and witchcraft were prevalent both in the Land of Israel and in Babylon, it would appear that their status and role was different in each case. In the Land of Israel, magic was a fundamental and significant element in the origins of the Christian religion, whose faith and ethos were built around it. Moreover, Christianity and Judaism — both monotheistic religions — maintained a relationship of tension, mutual suspicion and conflict. Against this background, in the eyes of the Sages of the Land of Israel, magic was perceived as a significant and threatening religious element. They therefore sought “the removal of spiritual, transcendent forces as determi- native factors in matters of halakha, law and practice”.73

67. AUNE, Prophecy, p. 154 68. Ibid., p. 255-256. 69. Ibid., p. 262- 265, 266-281, 320-325. 70. Ibid., p. 96; R. GYSELEN, Sceaux magiques en Iran sassanide, Paris, 1995. 71. See S. SHAKED, “Incantation Bowls and Divination Boards: How Does One Free Oneself of Ghosts and Spirits?”, Qadmoniot 129 (2005), 2-13, and references there to J. A. MONTGOMERY, Aramaic Incantation Texts from Nippur, Philadelphia, 1913; J. NAVEH, S. SHAKED, Amulets and Magic Bowls: Aramaic Incantations of Late Antiquity [Heb.], Jeru- salem, 1985; J. NAVEH, S. SHAKED, Magic Spells and Formulae: Aramaic Incantations of Late Antiquity [Heb.], Jerusalem, 1993; D. LEVENE, A Corpus of Magic Bowls, New York, 2002; J. B. SEGAL, Catalogue of the Aramaic and Mandaic Incantation Bowls in the British Museum, London, 2000. 72. M. G. MORONY, “Magic and Society in Late Sasanian Iraq”, in S. NOEGEL et al. (eds.), Prayer, Magic and the Stars in the Ancient and Late Antique World, Pennsylvania, 2003, p. 84-85. The study includes 885 bowls, of which 62% are written in rabbinical-style Aramaic. 73. E. E. URBACH, “Derashot Îazal ‘al Nebi’ei ummot ha-‘olam we-‘al parashat Bil‘am le-or ha-wikkuaÌ yehudi noÒri”, Tarbiz 25 (1955), p. 6-7 (= Me-‘olamam, p. 452-543). See further: ID., “Matai pasqa ha-nebu’a”, Tarbiz 17 (1946), p. 9-10 (= Me-‘olamam, p. 17-18);

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The Sages of Babylon imbibed a totally different atmosphere. While Christians were presents in the Sasanian environs of the Babylonian rabbis, they were no longer an internal threat.74 At the same time, the magic and witchcraft in Babylon were not a fundamental element of the Zoroastrian religion. They operated alongside it, playing a largely socio-cultural role. Furthermore, the relations between Judaism and Zoroastrianism, for the most part, are not antagonistic: Judaism is monotheistic, while Zoroastri- anism is dualistic.75 Against this backdrop, the conciliatory attitude of the Babylonian Amoraim toward magic is understandable.

5. Judeo-Christian Polemic

We have seen that the differences between the two versions of the story arise from differing attitudes of the Talmuds to wonders and to magic in general. The Jerusalem Talmud reflects a negative view, arising from its polemic position vis-à-vis Christianity. This may have some bearing on the questionable status of the wonders in the Palestine version of the legend —

ID., The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1982, p. 95-98; M. SMITH, Tannaitic Parallels to the Gospels, Pennsylvania, 1968, p. 81 ff. These studies present a fairly uniform attitude of opposition to signs and wonders on the part of the sages. In contrast, GUTTMANN, “The Significance of Miracles”, p. 385-386, describes a varying rabbinical attitude on the matter: up until the year 90 the question was undecided (dispute between the academy of Shammai and the academy of Hillel concerning the halakhic status of a heavenly voice as proof — Tosefta Nezirut 1,1, LIEBERMAN (ed.), p. 124; Yebamot 122a). After the year 90, the sages present a uniform anti-Christian stance, opposed to signs and the use of prophecy. 74. D. BOYARIN, Border Lines: the Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, Philadelphia, 2004, p. 223-224; A. SCHREMER, “Stammaitic historiography”, in J. RUBENSTEIN (ed.), Creation and Composition, Tübingen, 2005, p. 224 (and n. 21): “various Christian sources show that Christianity was well established in Babylonia at least as early as the fourth century and that Jews and Christians engaged in religious polemics at that time… Scholars nevertheless speak about a difference between Babylonia and Palestine in this respect”; P. SCHÄFER, Jesus in the Talmud, Princeton, 2007, p. 113-115 (The texts that most graphically refer to Jesus’ life and fate are preserved only in the Bavli and not in Palestinian sources: “The Palestinian sources reveal the threat that the Palestinian rabbis must have felt, their fear, but also the mecha- nisms of their defense”). See also E. E. URBACH, “Teshubat anshei Ninveh we-ha-wikkuaÌ ha-yehudi noÒri”, in Sefer ha-yobel li-khbod Y.N. Esptein, Jerusalem, 1950, p. 121 (= The World of the Sages, p. 559): “In the eyes of Babylonian Jewry, Christianity was an unimportant factor, and for this reason the Babylonian aggada was exempt from the obligation of maintaining a polemic with the new religion… This fact is sufficient reason to explain the change that took place in the perception of this topic in Jewish lore.” 75. S. SHAKED, Dualism in Transformation — Varieties of Religion in Sasanian Iran, London, 1994, p. 25-26. See further: ibid., p. 109-110 (a questioning of the typological distinction between the religions).

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especially in view of the use made of these very same wonders in the Greco-Roman world, and afterwards in the Christian world (in the New Testament).

5.1. Greco-Roman

In the Greco-Roman world, the same sort of miracles that appear in the legend of the Oven of Akhnai, were invoked for the purposes of verification or persuasion. Thus, for example, the falling of a tree and its restoration to its place served Vespasian as a sign of his future ascent to greatness.76 A heavenly voice appears as an acceptable sign in Homer and in Cornelius Tacitus, as well as in Herodotus.77 Moreover, in the Greek world legal deci- sions were accepted by means of supernatural signs.78

5.2. Christianity

Some of the wonders in our story also appear in the New Testament: the uprooting of a mulberry tree and its return (Luke 17:5-6); leaning walls (Acts 4:31); olives destroyed (Revelations 8:6-7); a storm at sea (Matthew 8:23-27). We may therefore establish that the signs that appear in our legend have clear parallels in the religious-cultural environment of the Land of Israel. The confrontation between the Sages and Christianity regarding the question of the status of miracles, in the context of our legend, is not abstractly theoretical; it is concrete and direct. This polemical reading of the text casts the story’s main character — Rabbi Eliezer — in a new light. R. Eliezer is suspected by the Sages of being identified with Christianity. Their concern is that his image as a holy man, and his invocation of wonders, points to sectarianism — or, at least, could lead others to heresy.79

76. See CORNELIUS TACITUS, The Histories II.78, W. H. FYFE (transl.) Oxford, 1997, p. 102. 77. See HOMER, The Odyssey I.282-283, R. MERRILL (transl.), Ann Arbor, 2002, p. 92; CORNELIUS TACITUS, The Annals 11.21, A. J. WOODMAN (transl.), Indianapolis, 2004, p. 205; HERODOTUS, The Histories 1.59, G. C. MACAULAY (transl.), New York, 2004, p. 58. 78. See for example, ANTIPHON, On the Murder of Herodus, 81-83, in Greek Orators, I, Antiphon & Lysias, M. EDWARDS, S. ASHER (transl.), London, 1993, p. 61. 79. See M. G. HIRSHMAN, Midrash Qohelet Rabbah, part I, Ann Arbor, 1982, p. 52, citing Saul Lieberman (unpublished lectures): “Lieberman connected the suspicions of Rabbi Eliezer of sectarianism (being Christian) with his excommunication on the part of the Sages in the matter of the Akhnai Stove.” See further: R. T. HERFORD, Christianity in Talmud and Midrash, New Jersey, 1966, p. 138-145; D. BOYARIN, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism, Stanford, 1992, p. 32-34; G. LEIBSON, “‘Al ma mennadin (‘illot ha-nidduy be-EreÒ Yisra’el u-be-Babel bi-tequfat ha-Mishna we-ha-Talmud)”, Shenaton ha- mishpat ha-‘ibri 2 (1975), p. 303-304, and n. 51,55.

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6. Summary

The Jewish-Christian polemic may thus be viewed as a central factor in the variant versions of the Oven of Akhnai story. The Babylonian tradition describes a debate of principle concerning the status of revelation after the cessation of prophecy in Israel.80 Such debate is certainly legitimate, and within this framework R. Eliezer’s view is per- fectly acceptable. For this reason, the behavior of the Sages towards him is unnecessarily harsh; it falls into the category of “hurtful speech”, and incurs Divine punishment. The Jerusalem Talmud story was formulated as it was for polemical rea- sons directed against the Christian position. Therefore, the role of the signs and wonders in the plot is somewhat obscure, and even R. Eliezer is aware that the halakha cannot be decided on their basis. Hence the strict view of R. Eliezer’s conduct. The battle that the Sages wage against such behavior is justified and proper. The Sages are the standard-bearers of the anti-Christian approach, in the name of which they seek to rein in the magical powers of individuals.81

Itzhak BRAND [email protected]

80. The Babylonian Talmud takes pains to show that the question of “heeding a heavenly voice” is mired in controversy. See Berakhot 52b; ‘Erubin 7a; PesaÌim 114a; Yebamot 14a; Îullin 44a. Likewise, according to various sources, it is on the basis of a heavenly voice that the halakha is decided in accordance with the Academy of Hillel. See above, n. 73 (Guttmann). Admittedly, the Amoraic additions to the legend (the words of R. Yirmiya; R. Natan’s words to Elijah) adopt a view that is manifestly opposed to revelation. See H. BEN-MENACHEM et al. (eds.), Controversy and Dialogue in Halakhic Sources, Jerusalem, 2002, p. 169. It is possible that these additions were introduced with a view to shifting the legend from its original focus, which leaves room for recognition of revelation. 81. Y. BAER, Israel Among the Nations (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1969, p. 106-109: As opposed to “the pious ones, the apostles, the martyrs and the monks of the Christian church”, “our camp does not recognize a ‘man of God’ whose entire life is nothing but a display of miraculous acts, healing the sick, reviving the dead, exorcising demons and expressing para- doxical statements”. In relation to the story of the Oven of Akhnai: “Ultimately, they saw a need to rein in the magical power of this individual sage, in order to reach a ruling that would oblige everyone.”

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