The Case for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

An Arms Control Association Brief

December 2010

Tom Z. Collina, Daryl G. Kimball and the ACA Research Staff

An Arms Control Association Brief

The Case for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

December 2010

Tom Z. Collina, Daryl G. Kimball and the ACA Research Staff About the Authors

Tom Z. Collina is Research Director at the Arms Control Association. He previously served as Director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists and Executive Director of the Institute for Science and International Security.

Daryl G. Kimball is Executive Director of the Arms Control Association. Before joining ACA in 2001, he served as Executive Director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, a consortium of 17 of the largest U.S. non-governmental organizations working together to strengthen national and international security by reducing the threats posed by nuclear weapons.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful for the generous support of the members and donors of the Arms Control Association, without which the report and ACA’s work would not be possible. We also thank Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow Rob Golan-Vilella for his assistance in preparing this report.

About the Arms Control Association (ACA)

Founded in 1971, ACA is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today, ACA provides policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press brieﬁ ngs ACA holds on major arms control developments, the Association’s staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad.

For more information: Visit ACA’s Web site http://www.armscontrol.org Check out ACA’s blog http://www.armscontrolnow.org Follow ACA on Twitter at http://twitter.com/armscontrolnow

Cover Photos

Left: Department of Defense. Center: Dmitry Kostyukov/AFP/Getty Images. Right: Department of Defense.

©Arms Control Association, December 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Analysis: The Case for New START

8 Appendix I: New START at a Glance

11 Appendix II: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START

12 Appendix III: U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance

16 Appendix IV: The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise: Shrinking Arsenal and Growing Cost

18 Appendix V: U.S. Military Leaders and National Security Ofﬁ cials Overwhelmingly Support New START

22 Appendix VI: Additional Resources 1 Arms Control Association past Republican and Democratic administrations administrations Democratic and Republican past from leaders security national and commanders gic strate- U.S. former seven including leaders, military accord. START original the under available was than forces strategic Russian of status the on information more provide would that inspections on-site enhanced and exchanges information of system updated an establish would treaty The gap.” “verifi cation this close to way possibleboth worlds.” no insight into what they’re doing. it’sSo the worst of developmenttheir and... we of forcehave structure get the treaty, not in are [the Russians] constrained Strategic U.S. testifi Command, June,ed in we “If don’t Chilton, of Kevin Commander General inspections. it and with went and on-site limits START’s arsenal byattack Russia or any other potential adversary. forceclear more suffi than cient tosize in deter nuclear pliance. UnitedThe States nu-awould modern retain monitoringcom- robust, system up-to-date to verify a vehicles (missiles and bombers) and re-establishing strategic nuclear warheads deployed on delivery 700 Russia toby limiting no more1,550 than security 8, Signed2010, April New wouldSTART U.S. increase to reducetheirarsenalsbyabout30percent belowcurrentlimits. Strategic ArmsReductionTreaty (NewSTART) wouldkeepWashington andMoscowontrack earlier agreementsnegotiatedbyPresidentsRonaldReaganandGeorgeH.W. Bush,theNew T For these and other reasons, a long list of U.S. U.S. of list long a reasons, other and these For only the is START New of ratifi cation Prompt 5, Dec. 2009, expired treaty START original The ANALYSIS The Case for New START won thesupportofRepublicansandDemocratsalike.Inbipartisantradition the endofColdWar, thankstobilateralarmscontrolagreementsthathave he UnitedStatesandRussiahavedramaticallyreducedtheirnuclearstockpilessince Moreover, New START would lock-in these limits for limits these would lock-in Moreover, START New United at States. the aimed be could that missiles would no longer deployed on be warheads ballistic nuclear of Russian hundreds that meaning or less, forceto 1,550 this would reduce START New Service. Research Congressional to the storage,in according weapons bomber not counting warheads, nuclear Today, strategic deploys2,000 approximately Russia Russia’s arsenal. nuclear strategic 1. New START and reduce cap would prompt approval. Senate serves (Ga.). Isakson Johnny and (Tenn.), Corker Bob (Ind.), Lugar Richard Senators Republican and members committee 11 Democratic all able to was satisfy and skeptics, treaty by posed vote of 14 to 4. bipartisan a by consent and of advice resolution START New the passed (SFRC) Committee Relations Foreign Senate 16 Sept. On the senators. from questions 900 than more answered has administration Obama the and briefi and hearings pact, held on the ngs have been START. New support Below are the top ten reasons why New START de- why START New top reasons ten the are Below answered resolution This Senate 20 more eight than months, last the Over all of the majorof the questions The Case for New START 2 . New START allows to up Moreover, the originalMoreover, START’s 28 inspec- However, for all for practicalHowever, purposes, the num- On-Site Inspections Without New STARTWithout in the force, U.S. intelligence alent the to 28 inspections under START. facilitiestions 70 cover had to in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as the Soviet nuclear was complex spread across these four all former now-independent nations. Today, Soviet nuclear weapons and facilities been have • inspections on-site 18 per including year, direct monitoring Russian of nuclearwarheads, something treaty no has allowed before. Some raisedsenators have concerns that New START allows fewer annual inspections than did the original START. ber inspections of in New START is the same as New One” START’s “Type inspections,START. which occur bases missiles at deployed for and rm data bombers, can achieve two goals (confi deliveryon vehicles and warheads) the at same time, and thus ten these of inspections provide the same amount information of as 20 START inspections. with the Together “Type eight inspectionsTwo” non-deployed of systems, the New START inspections18 are essentially equiv- mation gathering about Russianstrategic forces that For the any States could get other United not way. example, satellites and other intelligence assets can- inside look not Russian missiles many see to how warheads they carry, New inspec- but START’s on-site tion provisions just do that. would The treaty would provide predictability about Russian strategic forces, allowing the make States to better-informed United decisions about investments in nuclear forces and other military capabilities. community predict be to able not would with high dence the status nuclear forces, and Russia’s of confi both in be sides would engage more-cost- to tempted force modernizationly and hedging strategies. able. verifi effectively is START New 3. tions that would provide high confi dence that Russia tions that provide would high confi is limits complying lower with deployed on the new, strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems. New START establish would an updated system of information exchanges and enhanced inspec- on-site lost thelost to conduct to intrusive, inspections on-site of At the same time, New START would allow the the allow would START New time, same the At provisions. The New START longer remains in limbo, thisthe longer strategic will blackout continue. New START reestablish would on-the-ground infor- Russia’s nuclear arsenalRussia’s START mandated by the 1991 accord. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions cation (SORT),Treaty still in contains force, verifi no It hasIt been a year since the States United ability 2. New START would resume resume would START New 2. forces. strategic Russian of inspections nuclear adversary is China, which has fewer than 50 than50 fewer has which China, is adversary nuclear missiles. long-range nuclear-armed the United States with nuclear forces that are “more “more are that forces nuclear with States United the military our responsibili- handle to us for thanenough potential only States’ United the Russia, Besides ties.” submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and and (SLBMs), missiles ballistic submarine-launched StaffChairman Adm. of Chiefs Joint bombers. heavy leave would START New that 11 Nov. said Mullen Mike United States to maintain a devastatingly powerful nu- powerful devastatingly a maintain to States United delivery nuclear of “triad” a on arsenaldeployed clear (ICBMs), missiles ballistic intercontinental systems: the next decade longer. or New START would reduce Russian deployednuclear strategic forces by hundreds of warheads. Dmitry Kostyukov/AFP/Getty Images After hearing testimony in closed session from U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) witnesses, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded in its Oct. 1 report that “the New START Treaty is effectively verifi - able.” A July 30 letter from Secretary of Defense Gates to the committee reached the same conclusion:

Jewel Samad/AFP/Getty Images Samad/AFP/Getty Jewel “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, the Commander, U.S. strategic Command, and I assess that Russia will not be able to achieve militarily signifi cant cheating or breakout under New START, due to both the New START verifi cation regime and the inher- ent survivability and fl exibility of the planned

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates: “The New START U.S. strategic force structure.” Treaty has the unanimous support of America’s military leadership.” “If Russia were to attempt to gain political ad- vantage by cheating or breakout, the U.S. will centralized in Russia, and New START’s 18 in- be able to respond rapidly by increasing the spections need to cover only 35 Russian sites. alert levels of SSBNs [strategic submarines] and bombers, and by uploading warheads on SSBNs, • Telemetry. Telemetry,Telemetry, oorr mmissileissile fl ightight testtest bombers, and ICBMs. Therefore, the survivable information, was needed under START I to de- and fl exible U.S. strategic posture planned for termine the maximum number of warheads that New START will help deter any future Russian might be loaded onto Russian ballistic missiles. leaders from cheating or breakout from the trea- Since New START requires data exchanges on ty, should they ever have such an inclination.” the actual warhead loading of each deployed missile and allows direct on-site inspections to Nevertheless, SFRC member Sen. Jim Risch (R- confi rm this, telemetry sharing is no longer re- Idaho), who voted against the treaty in committee, quired. Even so, New START provides for telem- said Sept. 16 that the IC had revealed “very serious in- etry sharing on up to fi ve missile tests per year formation” that in his view should have held up com- as a confi dence-building measure. mittee approval of New START. Committee Chairman “Telemetry is not nearly as important for Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) replied that the new infor- this treaty as it has been in the past,” said Sec- mation “in no way alters [the IC’s] judgment, already retary Gates March 26. “In fact, we don’t need submitted to this committee, with respect to the [New] telemetry to monitor compliance with this START treaty... It has no impact, in their judgment.” treaty,” he said. 4. New START bolsters U.S. nuclear • Votkinsk. Although the George W. Bush nonproliferation efforts. administration agreed in 2008 to end mobile missile production monitoring at Russia’s Vot- New START helps to demonstrate that the United States kinsk plant, under the new treaty Russia must and Russia are keeping up their end of the bargain un- notify the United States 48 hours before a new der the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or sub- New START would increase Washington’s leverage in marine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) leaves seeking stronger non-proliferation measures, such as Votkinsk and when it arrives at its destination, more effective nuclear inspections, tougher penalties which will facilitate monitoring by national for states that do not comply with nonproliferation technical means, such as satellites. obligations, and faster action to secure the most vul-

Arms ControlAssociation nerable nuclear weapons materials. Improving the NPT

3 system is essential to stopping the spread of nuclear New START if the United States deploys such systems weapons to terrorists and additional nations. in large numbers. The revival of U.S.-Russian strategic dialogue has The SFRC resolution of advice and consent clearly already improved cooperation in a variety of fi elds. states that it is the committee’s understanding that “the For example, Russia supported the U.S.-led effort to New START Treaty does not impose any limitations enact U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran, on the deployment of missile defenses” other than the and Russia has cancelled its sale of the S-300 air-de- treaty’s ban on converting ICBM and SLBM launchers fense system to Iran. New START will help strength- for use by interceptors--which the Pentagon has said it en U.S.-Russian joint efforts to keep nuclear materials has no intention of doing in any case--and that any fur- out of the hands of terrorists, as well as keep pressure ther limitations would require Senate approval. on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program. The resolution clarifi es that “the April 7, 2010, uni- Without New START, Russian support will be hard- lateral statement by the Russian Federation on missile er to obtain. On Nov. 8, for example, Sen. Lugar said defense does not impose a legal obligation on the it is unlikely that Moscow would sustain cooperative United States.” It also reaffi rms language in the 1999 threat reduction efforts indefi nitely without New Missile Defense Act that it is the policy of the United START coming into force. “The prospects for extend- States to deploy an effective national missile defense ing Nunn-Lugar work in Russia after [2013] would be system “as soon as technologically possible” and that especially complicated without New START’s trans- nothing in the treaty limits future planned enhance- parency features that assure both countries about the ments to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense sys- nuclear capabilities of the other,” Lugar said. tem or the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Indeed, the Obama administration is going full- 5. New START protects U.S. missile bore on its plans to increase SM-3 intermediate- defense options. range interceptor deployments in Europe. Some may bemoan the decision to revise the Bush-era plan to Claims that the treaty’s nonbinding language on the deploy unproven strategic interceptors in Poland, “interrelationship” between strategic offenses and but the new plan better addresses the existing Ira- defenses will limit U.S. missile defense options do nian short- and medium-range missile threat, and not add up. As Secretary of Defense Gates bluntly opens the way for cooperation, not confrontation said May 18, “the treaty will not constrain the United with Russia on missile defense. States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible.” Some treaty critics erroneously suggest that Ar- ticle V, which prohibits both sides from converting launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs into launchers for missile defense interceptors, and vice versa, limits U.S. missile defense plans in the future. However, the United States has no plans for any such conversions. “It’s a limit in theory, but not in re- ality,” wrote then-U.S. National Security Adviser James Jones on April 20. “We have no plans to convert any additional ICBM silos. In fact, it would be less expen-

sive to build a new silo rather than convert an old one. Defense of Department In other words, if we were to ever need more missile The Case for New START New for Case The defense silos in California, we would simply dig new holes, which is not proscribed by the treaty.” Russia is concerned that future U.S. strategic missile interceptor deployments could undermine its nu- According to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, New clear retaliatory capability, and has made a unilateral START would not constrain U.S. missile defense plans statement that it could potentially withdraw from or deployments.

4 Despite this, some senators are concerned that the administration might not deliver on its commitments. In response, the SFRC’s resolution of advice and consent states that “the United States is committed to proceeding with a robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons production capabilities and capaci- ties.” To achieve these goals, the resolution says that the United States is committed to providing the necessary resources, “at a minimum at the levels set forth in the President’s 10-year plan.” The resolution also states that “if at any time

Ofﬁ ce of Senator Richard Lugar Richard Ofﬁ Senator of ce more resources are required than estimated in the President’s 10-year plan,” the President shall submit a report detailing: 1) how he proposes to remedy the shortfall; 2) the proposed level of funding required; 3) the impact of the shortfall on the safety, reliability, and performance of U.S. nuclear forces; and 4) “whether and why, in the changed circumstances

Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.): “The prospects for brought about by the resource shortfall, it remains extending Nunn-Lugar work in Russia after [2013] would in the national interest of the United States to re- be especially complicated without New START’s main a Party to the New START Treaty.” transparency features that assure both countries about the nuclear capabilities of the other.” Congress passed a Continuing Resolution (CR) Sept. 30 that includes the administration’s $7 billion FY 2011 budget request for weapons activities 6. New START allows for the at NNSA. Sen. Kerry said Sept. 30 that this funding maintenance of modern, effective “sends a strong signal about this administration’s nuclear forces. commitment to keeping our nuclear arsenal at a vi- able and suitable level” under New START. The CR The Obama administration has pledged, pursuant to runs out on Dec. 3. If the Senate does not approve section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization New START, the administration may not be able to Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, to spend $85 billion protect the program from cuts. over the next ten years to maintain the nuclear stock- Senators of both parties should recognize that pile and modernize the weapons complex. The plan delaying approval of New START—and reconsidera- calls for spending another $100 billion over the same tion of the Test Ban Treaty next year—would create period to upgrade strategic nuclear delivery systems. uncertainty about U.S. nuclear policy and jeop- The administration’s $7 billion request for the ardize the fragile political consensus to increase weapons complex for FY 2011 was 10 percent higher funding to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile in than the previous year. Linton Brooks, the head the years ahead. of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in the Bush administration, said in April, 7. New START allows conventional “I’d have killed for that budget and that much high- global strike weapons. level attention in the administration.” As Secretary of Defense Gates wrote in his preface to the April Conventional warheads that the United States may 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), “These invest- in the future decide to deploy on strategic ballistic ments, and the NPR’s strategy for warhead life ex- missiles would be subject to New START limits. How- tension, represent a credible modernization plan ever, there are no ﬁ rm plans to deploy Conventional necessary to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) weapons, and any fu-

Arms ControlAssociation support our nation’s deterrent.” ture deployments are likely to be small in number.

5 The Case for New START 6

Department of Defense , ,

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y r a , former former , t e r c e S

r Stephen Hadley Stephen Hadley Stephen Hadley e m r o f

, former Secretary of former , , Lt. General Brent Scowcroft Brent General Lt. James R. Schlesinger Schlesinger Schlesinger R.R.R. James James James Central of Director former and Defense administra- Ford and Nixon Intelligence, tions; George and Ford Security Advisor, National administrations; Bush H.W. “Because of their limited range and very dif- ferent roles from those played by strategic nuclear forces, the vast majority of Russian tactical nuclear weapons could not directly uence the strategicinﬂ nuclear balance between the United States and Russia... Because the United States will retain a robust strategic force structure under New START, Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons will have little or no impact on strategic stability.” cials, both Republicans and Democrats, including: of State Clinton State of andDefense Secretary in Gates, a answerjoint the for SFRC record, said that: is supported START New the 9. by militaryU.S. bipartisan and national security leaders. New START has the support the of U.S. military establishment- and former senior national securityofﬁ Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the JointStaff: Chiefs “The ofNew START treaty is absolutelyThis December, critical. we are coming up on a fullno year treaty with with the Russians, and thesehistorically treaties have been broadly bipartisan.”

Moreover, the SFRC resolution clarifi es that New the SFRCMoreover, resolution clarifi The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conclud- In an answer for the SFRC record, Secretary of De- of Secretary record, SFRC the for answer an In President Obama has said that he intends to work work to intends he that said has Obama President On this question, the SFRC resolution calls the on ons--after New START is ratifi ed. Moreover, Secretary Moreover, ed. ratifi is START ons--after New with Moscow to pursue further nuclear reductions in reductions further pursue nuclear to Moscow with tacticalweap- warheads--including alltypes nuclear of and the of States and United secure would and reduce manner.” able tactical nuclear weapons in a verifi lies, an agreement with the Russian Federation that addresswould the disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles the of Russian Federation cord tactical on nuclear weapons reductions. Presidentpursue, “to following consultation with al- short-range weapons be New START settled lays now. the diplomatic foundation necessary a future for ac- addresses strategic nuclear weapons. does make It not reductionable long- in Russia’s sense risk to verifi range nuclear weapons by insisting that the policy for Some complain that New START does reduce not tacticalRussia’s nuclear warhead levels, which have been never By design,covered treaty. a by New START 8. New START sets the stage sets the for 8. START New limits on tactical weapons. do not have a ballistic have not do trajectory. START does limitnot potential CPGS concepts that nitions ICBMs of and SLBMs meet the not would defi under the such treaty, as “boost-glide” systems that limited number CPGS of weapons the States is United likely deploy.” to that, least theover at ten-year duration the of treaty, cient room accom- to the treaty’s limits provide suffi bothmodate the strategic nuclear forces and the ed that it saw “no reasoned statements doubt by the “no to saw that it cognizant civilian cials and uniformed military offi toward the treaty limits will not prevent the United United the prevent not will limits treaty the toward deterrent.” nuclear robust a maintaining from States tegic delivery systems and strategic warheads. Should Should warheads. strategic and systems delivery tegic number small this counting them, deploy to decide we warheads their and systems strategic conventional of ners, the number of such conventionally armed deliv- armed conventionally such of number the ners, very be carrywould they warheads the and vehicles ery stra- of levels overall the against measured when small future CPGS deployments. plan- military our by envisaged “As stated: Gates fense Asresult, a there is room within the treaty’s limits for former National Security Advisor, George W. Bush administration; James Baker, for-former Secretary of State, George H.W. Bush administration; Henry Kissinger, formerformer Secretary of State and National Security Advi- sor, Nixon and Ford administrations; George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State, Reagan administration; Colin L. Powell, former Sec- retary of State, George W. Bush administration; former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Carter administration; former Secretary of De- fense Frank Carlucci, Reagan administration; and former Republican Senators Howard Baker UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe Photo/Eskinder UN (Tenn.), John C. Danforth (Mo.), Chuck Hagel (Neb.), Nancy Kassebaum-Baker ((Kansas),Kansas), War- ren Rudman (N.H.), Alan Simpson (Wyo.), and William Cohen (Maine), among others.

Seven former U.S. military commanders of Stra- tegic Command announced their support for New Failure by the Senate to approve New START would undermine U.S. nonproliferation leadership and START. In a July 14 letter to senators, the fi ve Air jeopardize U.S.-Russian cooperation, including joint Force Generals and two Navy Admirals wrote that efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear program. they “strongly endorse [New START’s] early ratifi cation and entry into force” because “the treaty will enhance American national security.” prevent such improvements. In fact, the Obama administration has outlined a plan to invest $100 billion 10. New START allows command to modernize U.S nuclear weapons delivery systems and control upgrades. over the next decade, while New START would be in force. As a result, Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, head of the On Oct. 23, a communications failure occurred at United States’ new Global Strike Command, said Nov. F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyo., involving 50 9 that the Warren incident “has absolutely no link at nuclear-armed Minuteman III ICBMs. Even though all to the START Treaty.” this incident, which lasted one hour, could have pre- vented offi cers at the base from launching the missiles, Stalling New START undermines back-up airborne command and control systems could U.S. security still have launched on orders from the commander-in- chief. An administration offi cial, speaking about the For all of these reasons, New START deserves the president’s ability to control nuclear forces, said: “At Senate’s prompt support. In particular, given START’s no time did the president’s ability decrease.” expiration in December 2009, there is currently no bi- Meanwhile, even without the 50 ICBMs in ques- lateral system for monitoring Russia’s nuclear forces. tion, the United States at the time still had over 800 Failure by the Senate to approve New START would strategic missiles and bombers deployed with 1,900 not only delay the re-establishment of an effective nuclear warheads in its active force. Moreover, even U.S.-Russian inspection and monitoring system, but if this incident had happened after New START had it would undermine U.S. nonproliferation leadership been fully implemented, the United States would still and jeopardize U.S.-Russian cooperation, including have had over 600 missiles and bombers with 1,500 joint efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear program. nuclear warheads ready to go. It is time for senators on both sides of the aisle to Nuclear command and control systems can and will come together to strengthen U.S. and global security

Arms ControlAssociation be improved and New START would not in any way by voting in favor of New START ratiﬁ cation.

7 The Case for New START 8 1 Each side has the fl exibility to Each has side the fl New START does not limit the number of non- structure nuclear its forces wishes, as it within the overall limits the of treaty. agreed under the treaty to prohibit systems designed for “rapid reload” of non-deployed missiles (Fifth Agreed Statement). Force structure: bombers assigned nuclear to missions are limited to 700. Deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and bombers are limited 800. to This number includes test launchers and bombers submarinesand Trident in and overhaul, is approximately a 50 percent reduction from the 1,600 launcher-limit set under START (SORT did cover not launchers). The 800 ceiling is intended limit to the ability “break for out” the of treaty by preventing either from side retaining large numbers non-de- of launchersployed and bombers. deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, but it does monitor them and provide for continuous information on their locations and on-site inspections rm to confi that they are not added to the deployed force. Non-deployed missiles must edbe located at specifi facilities away from deployment sites and labeled withers” to reduce“unique concerns identifi about hidden missile stocks. Moreover, the strategic sig- cance of non-deployednifi missiles is reduced given that non-deployed launchers are limited. Both sides Deployed Seven years after entry

New START at a Glance New START

in Prague by Russia and the United States. New START would replace the 1991 2002 Strategic 2009, and supersede the which expired December START I treaty, he New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) was signed on April 8, 2010 was signed on April 8, 2010 (New START) Arms Reduction Treaty he New Strategic APPENDIX I APPENDIX Missile, bomber and launcher limits: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Subma- rine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and heavy able limitable 6,000. of Each heavy bomber is counted as warheadone (see below). strategic nuclear warheads and down bombs 1,550, to approximately 30 percent from the 2,200 limit set by percentSORT from and down the START-account- 74 Nuclear warhead limit: New force, STARTinto limits accountable deployed Main Treaty Limits (ArticleMain Treaty II) technical annexes the to All protocol. treaty docu- arements publicly available here: http://www.state. gov/t/vci/trty/126118.htm New START includes a main treaty text with a pream- nitions, andble sixteen articles; with a protocol defi cation procedures, and agreed statements; and verifi New START’s Key Provisions Key START’s New New START would be the fi rst verifi U.S.-Russianable rst verifi New START be would the fi nuclear arms treaty control take to effect since 1994. ably reducingably U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals begun by former Presidents Ronald Reagan and ed by both nations, Bush. Once ratifi George H.W. New START continues the bipartisan process of verifi New- START continues the bipartisan process verifi of

Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which would terminate when New START enters into force. into enters START New when terminate would which (SORT), Treaty Reductions Offensive T Counting Rules (Article III) warheads to each launcher; a count of the launchers gave an upper limit on the number of warheads that Warheads: For deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, the could be deployed, but not necessarily an actual number of warheads counted is the actual number count. New START includes direct limits on de- of re-entry vehicles (RVs) on each missile (an RV ployed warheads and allows for on-site inspections protects the warhead as it re-enters the atmosphere to give both sides confi dence that the limits are from space; it can carry only one warhead). START I being upheld. Under the new treaty, both sides will did not directly count RVs, but instead counted mis- exchange lists of the number of warheads deployed siles and bombers that were “associated with” a cer- on individual missiles. During “Type One” inspec- tain number of warheads. New START counts each tions, each side can choose one ICBM or SLBM to heavy bomber as one warhead (although the maxi- inspect on short notice and count the warheads. mum loading is 16-20), the same counting rule that The re-entry vehicles (RVs) can be covered by the START used for bombers carrying short-range weap- host nation to protect sensitive information, but the ons. Neither side typically deploys nuclear bombs actual number of RVs must be evident to the inspec- or cruise missiles on bombers, but keeps them in tors. These inspections are designed to help deter storage. Thus inspections of bombers would fi nd no both sides from deploying a missile with more than weapons to inspect. The parties agreed to arbitrarily its declared number of warheads. count each bomber as one warhead. (Under SORT, For missile-generated fl ight test data, known as Russia did not count stored bomber weapons at all.2) telemetry, START I called for telemetry to be openly New START, like START I, does not track or limit shared, with limited exceptions, to monitor missile warheads or bombs once they have been removed development. New START does not limit new types from deployed launchers. of ballistic missiles, and thus the old START formula for extensive telemetry sharing was no longer neces- Delivery vehicles and launchers: Each deployed sary. New START requires the broadcast of telemetry ICBM, SLBM and nuclear-capable bomber is counted and exchange of recordings and other information as one delivery vehicle against the 700 limit. Each de- on up to fi ve missile tests per side per year to promote ployed and non-deployed missile launcher or bomber openness and transparency. is counted as one launcher against the 800 limit. Under the new treaty, the United States and Rus- Non-deployed missiles are monitored but not limited sia will continue to depend on NTM to monitor the in number. other’s strategic forces. To monitor Russian mobile ICBMs, all new missiles are subject to the treaty as Monitoring and Verifi cation (Article VI, soon as they leave a production facility, and each IX, X, XI, Protocol and Annexes) missile and bomber will carry a unique identifi er. Russia must notify the United States 48 hours before New START’s verifi cation regime includes relevant a new solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM leaves the Votkinsk parts of START I as well as new provisions to cover production facility and when it arrives at its destina- items not previously monitored. For example, the tion, which will facilitate monitoring by national new treaty contains detailed defi nitions of items lim- means, such as satellites. The treaty does not pro- ited by the treaty; provisions on the use of National hibit the modernization of strategic forces within the Technical Means (NTM); an extensive database on the overall treaty limits (Article V). numbers, types and locations of treaty-limited items Verifi cation of treaty limits and conversion or and notifi cations about those items; and inspections elimination of delivery systems is carried out by to confi rm this information. Even so, the verifi cation NTM and 18 annual short-notice, on-site inspections. system has been simplifi ed to make it cheaper and The treaty allows ten on-site inspections of deployed easier to operate than START and to refl ect new stra- warheads and deployed and non-deployed delivery tegic realities. New START monitoring has also been systems at ICBM bases, submarine bases and air bases designed to refl ect updated treaty limitations. (“Type One” inspections). It also allows eight on-site For example, the old treaty did not directly limit inspections at facilities that may hold only non-de-

Arms ControlAssociation warheads but instead assigned a certain number of ployed delivery systems (“Type Two” inspections).

9 The Case for New START 10 4 Trident submarinesTrident converted carry to conven- Conventional (Preamble, Warheads Protocol and Annexes) The treaty’s duration is ten years from entry into force unless is superseded it by a subsequent agree- ve andment can be extended an for additional fi years. As in START I, each party can withdraw if it decides itself for that “extraordinary events related to the subject matter this of treaty jeopardized have its Thesupreme interests.” treaty terminate would three months from a notice withdrawal. of The 2002 SORT agreement terminate would New when START enters force. into ENDNOTES 1. Article-by-Article Analysis ofhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/142041.pdf New START, p. 4. ResearchService,Congressional Woolf, 2.F. Amy Provisions,” CentralKey Limits and Treaty: START New “The 5. p. May 3, 2010, 3. Ibid., 16. p. 4. Article-by-Article Analysis, 6. p. New START either does prohibit from side not deploying conventional warheads ballistic long-range on missiles.Such deployments be would counted under the warhead and missile limitations the of treaty. The preamble states that both sides are “mindful theof impact conventionally of armed ICBMs and SLBMs The strategic U.S. on position stability.” is that “there is military no utility in carrying nuclear- armed and conventionally-armed reentry vehicles on the same ICBM SLBM.” or tional cruise missiles be not counted would under the formerly would nuclear-capable nor treaty, bombers beenthat have fully converted conventional to mis- suchsions, as the B-1B. Duration and Withdrawal (Article XIV) The ban 3 Finally, bothFinally, made unilateral sides have state- The missile defense launcher provision is designed Article V prohibits both sides from converting the ABM treaty in 2002, Russia did withdraw not from START and, in SORT. fact, negotiate to on went would constitutewould reason withdrawal. for However, thewhen States actually United did withdraw from with previous treaties, including START I. Under START I, the Soviet said Union that U.S. withdrawal Anti-Ballisticfrom the 1972 Missile (ABM) treaty ments about ments the relationship between missile defense deployments and the These treaty. statements are not legally binding,and similar statements were issued on siloon conversions means that silo inspections are unnecessary and permitted. not been able to visit and inspect those silos to confi rm been visit to able and inspect those silos confi to that missiles they did hold not limited by the treaty,” states the Congressional Research Service. regime. “If the parties were permitted convert to missile defense silos ICBM to silos, they also would have that missile held once defense interceptors. In prac- tice, the provision will protect U.S. missile defense interceptors from falling under the treaty inspection to addressto Russian concerns that the U.S. could “break out” New of START by placing ICBMs in silos previously converted missile to defense interceptor launchers. The States has United plans no any for such conversions in the future. vision does not apply to fi U.S.ve ICBM silo launchers vision fi to does apply not Air Vandenberg at Force Base, in California, that were launchers ICBMs for and SLBMs launchers into for missile defense interceptors and vice versa. This pro- “current strategic defensive arms undermine not do the viability and effectiveness the of strategic offen- armssive the of Parties.” are constrained not The by New preamble START. ac- knowledges the “interrelationship between strategic offensive armsand strategic defensive arms” and that Current andplanned U.S. missile defense programs Ballistic Missile Defense (Preamble, UnilateralArticle Statements) V, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces

APPENDIX II Under New START

he U.S. strategic nuclear stockpile will change between 2010 and 2018, when reductions under New START would be completed, assuming the treaty takes T effect in 2011. Current delivery vehicle numbers and the Pentagon’s plan for reductions under New START were announced May 13, 2010. Warhead numbers as of 2009 were announced by the Department of State April 27. The planned 720 deployed delivery vehicles under New START will need to be reduced to 700 by, for example, moving 20 to nondeployed status to comply with the treaty limit. Under New START, each bomber is counted as one warhead, but in fact can carry up to 20. On May 3, the Pentagon, revealing exact stockpile numbers for the ﬁ rst time, said that as of 2009, the United States had a stockpile of 5,113 strategic and tactical warheads. That number includes active and inactive weapons, but does not include an estimated 4,500 warheads that have been retired and are awaiting dismantlement. Shaded warhead numbers are estimates based on the known number of deployed delivery vehicles, the known total number of deployed warheads, and typical warhead loadings.

2010 2018 Delivery Vehicles Warheads Delivery Vehicles Warheads

ICBMs

Minuteman III 450 500 420 420 SLBMs Trident II D5 336 1,152 240 1,070 Strategic Bombers B-52H 76 42 316 60 B-2A 18 18 Total Deployed 880 1,968 720 1,550

Total Stockpile 5,113 Arms ControlAssociation

11 The Case for New START 12 nuclear forces to 2,250 delivery vehicles (definedas an ICBM silo, a SLBM launch tube, or a heavybomber) and placed a variety of other restrictionson deployed strategic nuclear forces. The agreement would have required the Soviets to reduce their forces by roughly 270 delivery vehicles, but U.S. forces were below the limits and couldactually have been increased. However, PresidentJimmy Carter asked the Senate not to consider SALT II for its advice and consent after the So-viet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and the treaty was not taken up again. Both Washington and Moscow subsequently pledged to adhere to the agreement’s terms despite its failureto enter into force. However, on May 26, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said that future decisionson strategic nuclear forces would be based on thethreat posed by Soviet forces and not on “a flawedSALT II Treaty.” START I Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bomber-based The Strategic Arms Reduction Treatyrst (START I), ﬁ proposed in the early 1980s by President Ronald nally signedReagan andin Julyﬁ required 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,600 delivery vehicles, carrying no more than 6,000 warheads as counted using the agreement’s rules. The agreement

progression of bilateral agreements and other measures to limit and reduce their substantial nuclear warhead and strategic missile and bomber arsenals. ver the past four decades, American and Soviet/Russian leaders have used a

At a Glance U.S.-Russian Nuclear Nuclear U.S.-Russian Arms Agreements Control APPENDIX III APPENDIX

In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed to pursue a follow-on treaty to SALT I. SALT II, signed in June 1979, limited U.S. and SALT II SALT Soviet was Union limited ICBM silos and 1,607 to SLBM launch740 tubes. In January 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM treaty. based forces. The agreement limited the States United ICBM silos 1,054 to and 656SLBM launch tubes. The head numbers,head leaving both sides free enlarge to their forces by deploying warheads multiple onto (MIRVs) their ICBMs and SLBMs and increasing their bomber- cantly,” and capped the number SLBM of cantly,” launch tubes and SLBM-carrying submarines. The agreement ignored strategic bombers and did address not war- SLBM forces. the Under Interim Agreement, both construct to not sides pledged ICBM new silos, not - increaseto the size existing of ICBM silos “signiﬁ strategic missile defenses 200 to (later 100) interceptors each, and the Interim Agreement, an executive agreement that capped U.S. and Soviet ICBM and tion Talks both (SALT) the produced 1972 by May Anti-Ballistic Missile which limited (ABM) Treaty, SALT I SALT Begun the Strategic Arms in November 1969, Limita- Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements Control Arms Nuclear Strategic

O The following is a brief summary. required the destruction of excess delivery vehicles number of warheads.” Negotiations were supposed which was verifi ed using an intrusive verifi cation to begin after START II entered into force, which regime that involved on-site inspections, the regular never happened. exchange of information, including telemetry, and the use of national technical means (i.e., satellites). SORT The agreement’s entry into force was delayed for several years because of the collapse of the Soviet On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Union and ensuing efforts to denuclearize Ukraine, Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduc- Kazakhstan, and Belarus by returning their nuclear tions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty) under which weapons to Russia and making them parties to the the United States and Russia are reducing their strate- NPT and START agreements. START I reductions gic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads each. The war- were completed in December 2001 and the treaty head limit takes effect and expires on the same day, expired on Dec. 5, 2009. December 31, 2012. Although the two sides have not agreed on specifi c counting rules, the Bush adminis- START II tration had asserted that the United States would reduce only warheads deployed on strategic delivery ve- In June 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush and hicles in active service, i.e., “operationally deployed” Boris Yeltsin agreed to pursue a follow-on accord to warheads, and will not count warheads removed START I. START II, signed in January 1993, called from service and placed in storage or warheads on for reducing deployed strategic arsenals to 3,000- delivery vehicles undergoing overhaul or repair. The 3,500 warheads and banned the deployment of agreement’s limits are similar to those envisioned for destabilizing multiple-warhead land-based missiles. START III, but the treaty does not require the destruc- START II would have counted warheads in roughly tion of delivery vehicles, as START I and II did, or the the same fashion as START I and, also like its prede- destruction of warheads, as had been envisioned for cessor, would have required the destruction of de- START III. The treaty was approved by the Senate and livery vehicles but not warheads. The agreement’s Duma and entered into force on June 1, 2003. SORT original implementation deadline was January will terminate when New START enters into force. 2003, ten years after signature, but a 1997 protocol moved this deadline to December 2007 because of New START the extended delay in ratifi cation. Both the Senate and the Duma approved START II, but the treaty On April 8, 2010, the United States and Russia signed did not take effect because the Senate did not ratify New START, a legally binding, verifi able agreement the 1997 protocol and several ABM Treaty amend- that limits each side’s deployed strategic nuclear ments, whose passage the Duma established as a warheads to 1,550 and strategic delivery systems condition for START II’s entry into force. START II (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) to 800 deployed was effectively shelved as a result of the 2002 U.S. and nondeployed, such as submarines in overhaul, withdrawal from the ABM treaty. with a sublimit of 700 deployed. The treaty-accountable warhead limit is 30 percent lower than the 2,200 START III Framework upper limit of SORT, and the delivery vehicle limit is 50 percent lower than the 1,600 allowed in START In March 1997, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris I. The treaty has a verifi cation regime that combines Yeltsin agreed to a framework for START III ne- elements of START I with new elements tailored to gotiations that included a reduction in deployed New START. Measures under the treaty include on- strategic warheads to 2,000-2,500. Significantly, in site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and addition to requiring the destruction of delivery notifi cations related to strategic offensive arms and vehicles, START III negotiations were to address facilities covered by the treaty, and provisions to fa- “the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads…to cilitate the use of national technical means for treaty promote the irreversibility of deep reductions monitoring. The treaty also provides for the contin-

Arms ControlAssociation including prevention of a rapid increase in the ued exchange of telemetry (missile ﬂ ight-test data on

13 The Case for New START 14 1,550 April 8,2010 non-deployed To Be Ratifi ed Ratifi Be To New START New Ten years after after years Ten entry into force entry into force Seven years after after years Seven 700; 800 including N/A 95-0 2012 2003 2002 2003 2,200 1,700- START START SORT June 1, June 2012 or 2012 In Force May 24, May Dec. 31, Dec. 31, March 6, 6, March when New when New takes effect N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Never Never START III START Negotiated 2,000-2,500 N/A N/A N/A N/A 87-4 1993 1996 Never Never Jan. 3, Jan. Jan. 26, Jan. Entered Into Force START II START 3,000-3,500 breakup the of Soviet and Union, current active par- ticipants in the agreement include the States, United Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Turkmeni- stan and Uzbekistan are also parties the to agreement participate not do but in treaty meetings on-site or inspections. The ban intermediate-range on missiles is unlimited of duration. missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilome- ters. Distinguished unprecedented, by its intrusive inspection regime, including inspections, on-site the cation of INF laid Treaty the groundwork verifi for the subsequent START I. The INF entered Treaty into 1988, and theforce June 1, two their sides completed destroying reductionstotal a 1991, 2,692 of by June1, missiles. The agreement was multilateralized after the 93-6 2001 1994 1991 2009 1,600 6,000 Dec. 5, Dec. 5, Dec. 5, Expired July 31, July START I START Oct. 1, 1992 1, Oct. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1979 2,250 Never Never Entered SALT II SALT June 18, 18, June Into Force Into N/A N/A 88-2 Expired SALT I I SALT & SLBMs Oct. 3, 1977 Oct. 3, 1972 Aug. 3, 1972 Aug. USSR: 2,347 May 26, 1972 May US: 1,710 ICBMs ICBMs US: 1,710 Expiration Date Implementation Deadline Date Entered Into Force Ratifi cation Ratifi U.S. Vote, Date Ratifed, U.S. Date Signed Deployed Delivery Delivery Deployed Limit Vehicle Warhead Limit Warhead Status Deployed Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements Control Arms Nuclear Strategic Signed December 8, 1987, the INFSigned December required Treaty 8, 1987, ably the States and United the Soviet verifi to Union eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Nonstrategic Nuclear Arms Control Measures effect years, if 10 longer or agreed for by both parties. limit missile defenses conventional long-range or strike capabilities. The treaty limits take effect seven years after entry and force, into the treaty will be in up to fi testsve per and year) does meaningfully not fi to up Presidential Nuclear Initiatives tegic nuclear warheads from surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Soviet On September 27, 1991, President George H. W. leader Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocated on October 5, Bush announced that the United States would pledging to eliminate all nuclear artillery muni- remove almost all U.S. tactical nuclear forces from tions, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, and deployment so that Russia could undertake similar nuclear landmines. He also pledged to withdraw actions, reducing the risk of nuclear prolifera- all Soviet tactical naval nuclear weapons from de- tion as the Soviet Union dissolved. Specifically, ployment. However, significant questions remain Bush said the United States would eliminate all about Russian implementation of its pledges, and its nuclear artillery shells and short-range nuclear there is considerable uncertainty about the current ballistic missile warheads and remove all nonstra- state of Russia’s tactical nuclear forces. Arms ControlAssociation

15 The Case for New START 16 By any common sense defi nition, the U.S. nuclear By any common sense defi Then, in May, the administration outlined its $80 the administration Then, in May, weapons laboratories have more than enough resources to maintain the effectiveness of the enduring U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile for years to come. ture and support our nation’s deterrent.” ture and support our nation’s weapons billion, 10-year plan for the NNSA nuclear above current activities, which is almost 15% percent the request of spending levels. On November 17, at the Obama Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), administration delivered revised estimates for funding the nuclear weapons complex over the next decade. The plan now totals $85 billion, including an addi- scal years 2012- tional $4.1 billion in spending for fi 2016, mainly to cover possible cost increases for two scal new facilities and a revised estimate of cost for fi years 2017-2020. The $85 billion total represents a 21 scal year 2011 NNSA weapons rise above the fi percent activities spending level. , Nuclear Posture Review Nuclear Posture

and Growing Cost Growing and The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Nuclear U.S. The Arsenal Shrinking Enterprise: ighteen years after the last U.S. nuclear test, it is abundantly clear that maintaining clear that maintaining is abundantly the last U.S. nuclear test, it ighteen years after not weapons stockpile does the steadily shrinking U.S. nuclear the reliability of test explosions. Over the past decade the U.S. Life depend on a program of nuclear APPENDIX IV APPENDIX

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote in In February requested $7 2010, the administration Beginning with its fi scal year 2011 budget request, Beginning with its fi head life extension, represent a credible modernization plan necessary to sustain the nuclear infrastruc- his preface to the April 2010 strategy for war- “These investments, and the NPR’s NNSA administrator, said in April, “I’d have killed for NNSA administrator, that budget and that much high-level attention in the administration.” complex. The request is about 10 percent higher complex. The request is about 10 percent nal year of the George than the budget was in the fi former Bush administration. Linton Brooks, Bush’s W. Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which oversees the U.S. nuclear stockpile and production budget is available to support the task. 2011 funding for the National scal year billion for fi the Barack Obama administration has shown it is the Barack Obama administration has than adequate committed to making sure that a more process of upgrading all of its strategic nuclear delivery systems, the warheads they carry, and nuclear deliveryprocess of upgrading all of its strategic systems, the warheads they carry, next 20-30 years or more. the production complex for the forces are also reliable, effective, and modern. The United States is already engaged in the also reliable, effective, and modern. The United States is already are forces pes, and with suffi cient refurbished major warhead types, and with suffi Extension Program has successfully the delivery systems for U.S. nuclear Moreover, nitely. can continue to do so indefi resources E �� Figure�� I:�� Total�� Number �of� ��Warheads in the United�� States�� Active Nuclear �Arsenal�� from�� 1962-2009

��

� �� Source: Department of Defense Fact Sheet “Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile” May 3, 2010.

Note: The “active” arsenal are those nuclear warheads that need to be maintained for deployment on delivery systems or for the strategic reserve. It does not include warheads that have been retired from service that are awaiting dismantlement.

Figure�� 2:� Past,�� Current,�� and� ��Proposed Spending�� for�� U.S. Nuclear�� Weapons �Research,�� Development,�� Maintenance�� Activities�� by�� Fiscal�� Year,�� 1989-2020 ��

��

Sources: Sources: Data for the years 1989-1996 are from Atomic Audit, by Stephen Schwartz et al, Brookings Institution Press, 1998, Data for ﬁ scal years 1997-2011 are from the annual National Nuclear Security Administration Congressional Budget Requests. Projections for ﬁ scal years 2012-2018 are from the May 13, 2010 White House Fact Sheet “The New START Treaty – Maintaining a Strong Nuclear Deterrent.” The higher level projections for the years 2012-2020 are from the November 17, 2010 “Update to the National Defense Au- thorization Act of FY2010 Section 1251 Report -- New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans.”

Note: According to Atomic Audit, the Cold War annual average for the years 1948 to 1990 was $5.1 billion for comparable nuclear weapons design, testing, production, and maintenance programs (now designated as the National Nuclear Security Administration “Total Weapons Arms ControlAssociation Activities” budget category).

17 The Case for New START 18 Wall Street Wall , Secretary Defense; of , May 13, 2010: 13, , May "The New START Treaty has the unanimous

been approved by the U.S. Senate by strong bipartisan majorities. This treaty deserves a similar reception and result--on account of the dangerous weapons it reduces, the critical defense capabilities it preserves, the strategic stability it maintains, and, above all, the security it provides to the American people." • support of America's military leadership-- to include the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of the service chiefs, and the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, the organization responsible for our strategic nuclear deterrent. For nearly 40 years, treaties to limit or reduce nuclear weapons have Journal Below is a sample statements the of of notable most support New START: for Current U.S. Military Leaders Robert M. Gates

n Veterans Day, Nov. 11, 2010, Adm. Mike Mullen, ChairmanChiefs of ofthe Staff, Joint said, “The New START treaty is absolutelyDecember, wecritical… are coming This up on a full year with no treaty with the

Overwhelmingly Support New START U.S. MilitaryU.S. and Leaders cials Ofﬁ Security National APPENDIX V APPENDIX

support of New START. of the U.S. Strategic Command support it as well. Indeed, a Secretary of Defense or State from every administration since Richard Nixon’s is on record in overwhelmingly supports cation prompt U.S. ratiﬁ of New START. The current U.S. military leadership strongly favors the treaty. Seven former commanders Throughout this eight-month process, one fact has become unmistakably clear: military opinion must now be approved by the full Senate for it to enter into force. questions regarding the treaty. The Senate ForeignRelations Committee approved the treaty on Sept.16, with a bipartisan vote of 14-4. The treaty of the treaty. Senate committees have held 18 public hearings and four briefings on New START,and the administration has answered over 900 signed New START in April. Since then, there beenhas an extensive public debate on the merits Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev the aisle. support for the New Strategic Armssenior Reduction U.S. military Treaty isleaders broadly and formershared national among security officials from both sides of O Russians, and these treaties have historically been broadly bipartisan.” Adm. Mullen’s Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Lt. General Frank G. Klotz, Commander of Air Chiefs of Staff; Senate Armed Services Committee, Force Global Strike Command; Defense Writers June 17, 2010: Group breakfast, November 9, 2010:

• "I am pleased to add my voice in support • "My sense is that the START Treaty ought to of ratifi cation of the New START treaty and be ratifi ed and ought to be ratifi ed as soon as to do so as soon as possible. We are in our possible.” seventh month without a treaty with Russia. This treaty has the full support of your • "I think [the recent missile incident at uniformed military . . . the conclusion and Warren Air Force Base] has absolutely no link implementation of the New START Treaty is at all to the START Treaty.” the right thing for us to do - and we took the time to do it right." Former U.S. Military Leaders

General Kevin Chilton, Commander of U.S. General Larry Welch, General John Chain, Strategic Command; Senate Foreign Relations General Lee Butler, Admiral Henry Chiles, Committee, June 16, 2010: General Eugene Habiger, Admiral James Ellis, and General Bennie Davis, former commanders • "If we don't get the treaty, [the Russians] of Strategic Air Command and U.S. Strategic are not constrained in their development of Command; letter to the chairmen and ranking force structure and... we have no insight into members of the Senate Foreign Relations what they're doing. So it's the worst of both Committee and the Senate Armed Services possible worlds." Committee, July 14, 2010:

Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, MMissileissile DDefenseefense • "We will understand Russian strategic Agency Director; Senate Foreign Relations forces much better with the treaty than Committee, June 16, 2010: would be the case without it. For example, the treaty permits on-site inspections that • "Throughout the treaty negotiations, I will allow us to observe and confirm the frequently consulted the New START team number of warheads on individual Russian on all potential impacts to missile defense. missiles; we cannot do that with just national The New START Treaty does not constrain technical means of verification." our plans to execute the U.S. Missile Defense program." • "The New START Treaty will contribute to a more stable U.S.-Russian relationship. We General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the strongly endorse its early ratification and Joint Chiefs of Staff; letter to the chairman and entry into force." ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 2, 2010: James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence, Nixon • "I believe the treaty limitation of 700 and Ford administrations; Senate Foreign Relations deployed strategic delivery vehicles imposed Committee, April 29, 2010: by New START provides a sound framework for maintaining stability and allows us to • "I think that it is obligatory for the United maintain a strong and credible deterrent that States to ratify [New START]...[F]or the ensures our national security while moving to United States at this juncture to fail to ratify lower levels of strategic nuclear forces." the treaty in the due course of the Senate's deliberation would have a detrimental effect

Arms ControlAssociation on our ability to influence others with regard

19 The Case for New START 20 , (R-NE); George Shultz , U.S. chief negotiator , former Vice Chairman , former Senator , former Secretary of State , former Secretary of State, George Chuck Hagel "The current agreement is a modest "[New START] appears to take our country "Currently, we have no verification regime

reintroduces many verification measures thatlapsed with the expiration of the last START agreement; it encourages what the Obama administration has described as the reset ofpolitical relations with Russia; it may providepotential benefits in dealing with the issueof proliferation." New START, we respectfully call on the Senate to ratify the New START Treaty in 2010.” • in a direction that can enhance our national security while at the same time reducing the number of nuclear warheads on the planet." • step forward stabilizing American and Russian arsenals at a slightly reduced level. It provides a measure of transparency; it • to account for Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons. Two hundred and ninety seven (297) days have elapsed since American teams have been allowed to inspect Russian nuclear forces, and we are concerned that further inaction will bring unacceptable lapses in U.S. intelligence about Russia’s strategic arsenal. Without New START, we believe that the United States is less secure. As part of the vast consensus of national security professionals who have endorsed Ambassador Richard Burt James Baker H.W. Bush administration; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 19, 2010: Henry Kissinger and National Security Advisor, Nixon and Ford administrations; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 25, 2010: of START I; Admiral William Owens of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and former Secretary of State, Reagan administration; joint statement, September 28, 2010: , Frank , , former , former , former , former Senator , former White Howard Baker Alan Simpson Warren Rudman , former Senator (R- Samuel Berger Harold Brown , former Secretary of State, , former Governor and 9/11 former Secretary of Defense, John C. Danforth , former Secretary of State, , former Secretary of Defense, Reagan Kenneth M. Duberstein "Now is the time for a thorough and "[T]he New START Treaty is a positive step Thomas Kean

to particularly the nonproliferation issue." We, the undersigned Republicans and Democrats, support the new START treaty..." we must remember that a world without a binding U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons agreement is a much more dangerous world. balanced national discussion about nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. But • restrictions that existed under the previous START treaty. cation." I recommend ratifi nuclear arsenal. Additionally, the treaty puts no meaningful limits our Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense program, and in fact it reduces current or future threats, nor does it prevent the future modernization of the American safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. This treaty does not limit America's ability to structure its offensive arsenal to meet in U.S.-Russia arms negotiations. This treaty establishes a ceiling on strategic arms while allowing the United States to maintain a • Madeleine Albright Clinton administration; National Security Advisor, Clinton administration; Senator (R-WY); joint statement, June 24, 2010: KS); Commission Chair (R-NJ); former Senator (R-NH); and (R-MO); House Chief of Staff, Reagan administration; Nancy Kassebaum-Baker Secretary of Defense, Carter administration; Carlucci administration; George W. Bush administration; former Senator (R-TN); Former Senior Government Offi cials Offi Government Senior Former Colin L. Powell Committee, April 29, 2010: William J. Perry, Clinton administration; Senate Foreign Relations Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, former National New START at their November 19-21, 2010 summit Security Advisor, Ford and George H.W. Bush in Lisbon, Portugal. administrations; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 10, 2010: Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi:

• "[T]he principal result of non-ratification • “My country has a very special experience would be to throw the whole nuclear with Russia, and also a special geographic negotiating situation into a state of chaos, location. We advocate ratification of START. and the reason this treaty is important It is in the interest of my nation, of Europe is over the decades we have built up all and most importantly for the trans-Atlantic these counting rules, all these verification alliance.” procedures and so on, so that each side feels, 'Yes, we can take these steps.' If you wipe Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nickolay Mladenov: those out, you're back to zero again..." • “Don’t stop START before it’s started.” Linton F. Brooks, former START I negotiator and former Administrator of the National Nuclear Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Azubalis: Security Administration, Bush administration; Arms Control Association briefing, April 7, 2010: • New START is a necessary “prologue, an entrance” to discussions with Russia • "[Y]ou'll hear concerns by some that the about other forms of nuclear arms in the treaty may or may not be a good idea but you region “that are much more dangerous - we can't possibly accept it because the U.S. nuclear who are living in Eastern Europe know this.” weapons program is in disarray. And I think the administration's answer to that is the fi scal Latvian Foreign Minister Girts Valdis Kristovskis: 2011 budget with a very substantial increase for my former home, the National Nuclear • “I want to underline that NATO Atlantic Security Administration. And I will say fl atly, cooperation is very important for the security I ran that place for fi ve years and I'd have of my state. START treaty ratifi cation in killed for that budget and that much high- Congress we support very strongly and level attention in the administration and I just also the policy of President Obama and his - nobody in government ever said 'my program administration is very important for the has too much money' and I doubt that my security of our region.” successor is busy saying that. But he is very happy with his program and I think it does put NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen: us on a very fi rm, fi rm basis." • “The New START treaty will contribute to NATO Allies an improvement of security in Europe and the whole Euro-Atlantic area, and I would NATO heads of state and ministers expressed their strongly regret if ratifi cation is delayed.” strong support for U.S. and Russian ratifi cation of Arms ControlAssociation

21 The Case for New START 22 Arms Arms , May 2010 May , Arms Control Today Control Arms , Sept. 2010 Sept. ,

Additional Resources Additional APPENDIX VI APPENDIX http://foreign.senate.gov/reports/ Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report: Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Further for Measures on Russia with Treaty Report: Committee Relations Foreign Senate 2010 Oct. Arms, Offensive Strategic of Limitation and Reduction New START text and offi cial documents cial offi and text START New www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c39903.htm www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_09/Gottemoeller www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Pifer Gottemoeller, Rose by cation, Verifi Century 21rst Through Security START: New Control Today Control New START: Good News for U.S. Security, by Steven Pifer, Pifer, Steven by Security, U.S. for News Good START: New Arms Control Association 1313 L Street, NW Suite 130 Washington, D.C. 20005 www.armscontrol.org