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Planning for Preventive War, 1945–1950 By GIAN P. GENTILE

Nagasaki, . U.S. Air Force History Office

striking premise underpins war plans Billy Mitchell outlined the optimum targets and developed between 1945 and 1950. objectives of strategic air campaigns. Although Planners (and probably most other historians may debate the extent of their influ- A Americans) believed that a conflict ence on planning during World War II, airpower with the would be total. As the was commonly seen as a distinct and perhaps de- head of the Joint Strategic Plans Group, George cisive form of modern combat. Lincoln, observed: “It must be understood that In the aftermath of World War II planners another war will be the equivalent of an Ar- did not see atomic weapons as revolutionary. mageddon and that we must count on the use of They thought of strategic bombing, conventional atomic weapons....This point is an essential and atomic, as a method of attack against enemy basis for U.S. planning.”1 It was accepted that the war-making capacity that could lead to the break- Nation would mount a strategic bombing cam- down of enemy will. This concept helped shape paign using atomic weapons against key targets. military strategy in the late 1940s and was based Destroying the means to make war was seen as on war-winning, not war-deterring. leading to the collapse of enemy will. This approach was not new. During the in- Thinking the Unthinkable terwar years strategists such as Guilio Douhet and Airpower theorists suggested that for strategic bombing to be successful it would be highly ad- vantageous to attack first. As one general put it, Major Gian P. Gentile, USA, is currently a student in the School of “If you want to prevent getting hit, hit.”2 Since Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff there was no complete defense against strategic College and has taught history at the U.S. Military Academy. bombers, it was logical to destroy the bombers

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and their support facilities before they Drawing on lessons learned, the plan called for were used against the United States. The advanced bases in Britain, Egypt, and for notion of preventive war—striking an the Air Force to launch an immediate strategic air enemy when it appeared to threaten the offensive. The Navy would again play a key role Nation with a strategic air attack—be- by securing the sea lines of communications to came widespread. Yet since that meant at- the bases and blockading Soviet naval forces and tacking first, which went against a power- shipping. While the Navy and Air Force carried ful American ideal of never throwing the out these operations the Nation would mobilize first blow, leaders were often cryptic in to invade the Soviet Union. Even though a advocating preventive war against the So- ground invasion was critical to Pincher planning, viet Union. Still the concept existed and emphasis was on a quick, powerful atomic air of- influenced postwar planning. fensive that might obviate its need. In the Joint Chiefs ap- In four draft plans produced between April

DOD proved a report on the impact of the and , the primary task “was a prompt General Billy Mitchell. atomic bomb on postwar organization strategic air offensive” that would “destroy the So- and strategy. The United States would use the viet war-making capacity.” The bomb would be bomb as a strategic weapon against concentrated critical because the United States in 1946 held sole industrial areas and “centers of population with a ownership of atomic weapons, which produced a view to forcing an enemy state to yield through distinct advantage. War would be total. To destroy terror and disintegration of national morale.”3 the Soviet will to resist would require first destroy- This report simply endorsed the traditional con- ing the effectiveness of the Soviet war machine. cept of strategic airpower as a means of destroy- Just as the overall concept of Pincher drew ing enemy war-making on the experience of World War II, so did target JCS reflected conflicting views capacity. However, per- selection. Industries devoted to transport, petro- toward atomic weapons that haps because of Hi- leum, tanks, ball bearings, and other military roshima and Nagasaki, needs were generally the same types of targets at- many war plans would manifest they gave equal weight tacked in Germany and Japan. The plan also rec- to the bomb as a ognized that attacking such industries could re- weapon of terror, which could force an enemy to quire area bombing of cities. Although the Joint surrender by directly attacking its will to resist. Chiefs never officially approved Pincher’s JCS reflected conflicting views toward atomic warfighting concepts, its premise survived in sub- weapons and strategic airpower that many of the sequent plans. ensuing analyses and war plans would manifest. In the chiefs approved war Was the bomb delivered by strategic bombers in a plan Broiler. Like its predecessor it relied on an way that destroyed enemy war-making capacity early atomic campaign and advanced bases to or collapsed its morale? While equal weight launch an air offensive. But where Pincher had seemed to be given to both, the dominant theme assumed that massive force requirements would in postwar plans was to treat strategic airpower be met, Broiler reflected the reduced resources and the bomb first and foremost as a means to available in 1948. destroy the industrial base—an operational in- The Broiler target lists still emphasized in- strument of war, not a deterrent weapon of terror. dustrial systems. The plan did acknowledge that Military leaders after August 1945 down- atomic attacks on urban industries would kill played the notion that the bomb made conven- many civilians and destroy political control cen- tional land and naval forces and missions obso- ters. Suffering by the civilian population was seen lete. This was more than a parochial effort to as a bonus. The primary objective was destruction prop up the services at a time when military re- of Soviet war-making capacity. ductions were anticipated. It rested on a basic no- A number of factors shaped the overall ap- tion of the way industrialized nations made war proach in the plans. There was a political need in the 20th century. The Armed Forces would be to maintain unity against Soviet aggression needed in a total war. Roles and missions would among friendly European nations. Planners thus be modified, but the basic wartime structure moved away from the Pincher concept of with- would remain. drawing from Europe and by 1948 adopted a Combat experience in World War II shaped new approach: American and British forces con- the concepts contained in Pincher, the first plan ducting a fighting retreat would attempt to hold produced for hostilities against the Soviet Union.4 the Soviets at the Rhine. Detonation of the first Soviet atomic device in 1949 also had an im- pact. The Joint Chiefs became increasingly fo- cused on blunting Moscow’s ability to occupy Western Europe and to attack the United States

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with atomic weapons. Whatever the influence, Russell Weigley found that the emerging the key concept in war plans and studies at this concept of deterrence in postwar strategic time was a quick, devastating strategic air attack, thought was based on a massive atomic capability relying heavily on atomic bombs, to destroy in- to retaliate against the Soviets using strategic air- dustrial infrastructure. No external threat, inter- power. He argued that the use of combats to deter national event, domestic issue, or amount of in- an attack on the United States had always been terservice rivalry over budget allocations would part of military policy, but that prior to 1945 that change this approach. idea was secondary to using the Armed Forces to In 1948, in the Crankshaft war plan, the achieve national objectives. It was not until after Joint Chiefs made important modifications. With August 1945 that, because of the revolutionary regard to taking the war to the Soviet Union, nature of atomic weapons, war deterrence was Crankshaft demonstrated remarkable continuity adopted as military policy.6 with Broiler and Pincher. It called for “an air of- American war planning, however, does not fensive against vital strategic elements of the So- support this assessment. Planners continued to viet war-making capacity.” place primary importance on fighting and win- Crankshaft envisioned using strategic ning wars. If atomic capabilities could deter war, bombers to attack critical elements such as com- all the better. But the priority was still on using mand and control facilities, industrial parks, pe- the preponderance of strategic airpower to de- troleum refineries, submarine docks, transport stroy Soviet war-making capability. systems, aircraft factories, foundries, and power Some leaders theorized that due to techno- plants. The plan recognized logical advancements the incredible destruction deterrence was based on a that many of these sites were of total war could come without warning like the massive atomic capability to in built-up areas. Like Broiler, attack on Pearl Harbor. That might be prevented Crankshaft considered di- by anticipating enemy intentions to attack the retaliate against the Soviets rectly targeting morale by United States and initiating massive preemptive killing civilians in cities. At action. Adopting that policy would not deter war one point it even acknowledged that “it may be- but rather win it by launching a surprise attack. come advisable to abandon the concept of de- Admiral Ralph Ofstie, a director on the U.S. struction of the enemy’s physical means to wage Strategic Bombing Survey and a senior board war in favor of a concept involving destruction of member for Operation Crossroads (atomic tests at his will through massive attack [on the Soviet] the Bikini Islands in 1946), had no problem with people.” But the planners withdrew, calling for a “knock[ing] hell out of Moscow with atomic better understanding of the link between attack- bombs.” America should also use the weapons on ing people and breaking their will. other urban and industrial areas. In a classified The Joint Chiefs released the Harmon Report memo to the Navy General Board, Ofstie hinted in 1949, which analyzed the probable effects of at a willingness to launch a surprise bacteriologi- atomic bombs on seventy Soviet cities. It con- cal attack if there was evidence of the Soviet in- cluded that the United States could launch such tention to attack the Nation with biological an offensive; but while it would destroy 30 to 40 weapons.7 In the same memo, he strongly advo- percent of Soviet industry, it would not apprecia- cated a heavily nuclear preventive war. bly affect public will. In fact it could “validate So- viet propaganda against the United States, unify Offense as Defense the people, and increase their will to fight.” The Preventive war such as that suggested by study concluded that the most tangible benefit of Ofstie raised some troubling questions. Were the offensive was speed: it “would constitute the threats declaring the defeat of capitalism justifica- only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious tion for launching war? Once the Soviet Union damage to vital elements of the Soviet war-mak- exploded the bomb, would a preventive attack be ing capacity.”5 Striking first and hard could be a warranted because the United States could be at- credible warfighting concept. tacked with atomic weapons? Such uncertainties, along with the ideal that America should not Deterrence or Warfighting? throw the first punch, meant preventive war According to early postwar studies the Sovi- never became official policy. ets had a considerable conventional advantage Yet in selected fora and under certain condi- over American, British, and French forces and tions key military and political leaders advocated could easily overrun major portions of Western preventive war. General Orvil Anderson, primary Europe. But the studies showed that they would avoid a major conflict with the United States for several years. If war did occur it would be due to Soviet miscalculation of the risks.

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Gentile U.S. Air Force History Office U.S. Air Force B–29s at North Field on , 1945. author of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey re- airpower strategy. He argued that a strategic port, provided a glowing assessment of the strate- bombing attack on the United States would gic air campaign against Japan and concluded mostly reach its targets, then posited that the with some signposts for the future. The report ar- only defense would be to take the offensive by gued that because of the changed nature of war, destroying the capacity that produced enemy air- “an overt act of war has been committed by an power. Thus what appeared to be offensive action enemy when that enemy builds a military force against enemy targets was in fact defensive be- intended for our eventual destruction, and that cause it prevented attack on the United States. destruction of that force before it can be This line of thinking allowed Anderson in a 1950 launched or employed is defensive action and not interview to recommend a preventive war against aggression.”8 This phraseology is revealing be- the Soviet Union. cause it places offensive action under the mantle The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General of defense. War is won by preventing, not deter- Hoyt Vandenberg, relieved Anderson from his ring, an enemy from striking first. post for publicly stating views that openly chal- As the commandant of the Air War College lenged the official policy of containing—not beginning in 1947, Anderson often lectured on rolling back—the Soviet Union and terrified the American people. Simply put, he crossed the line. Other officers made similar arguments in Air Quarterly Review. In an article published in 1947

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Just prior to Anderson’s public remarks, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews also stridently ad- vocated such a policy. In a speech at the Boston Navy Yard in August 1950, he argued that the Na- tion “should get ready to ward off any possible at- tack and, reversing the traditional attitude of a democracy, we should boldly proclaim our unde- niable objective to be a world at peace.” Yet for the United States to establish world peace it would have to declare its willingness and inten- tion “to pay any price, even the price of institut- ing a war to compel cooperation for peace.” Reorienting Policy In a memorandum, the Joint Chiefs sought to guide industrial mobilization in case of war. They expressed great concern over the Soviet ability to launch a surprise attack that would preclude the Nation’s ability to expand “war-making industry and training.” If the warn- ing period was not sufficient to allow for indus- trial buildup, the memo argued: U.S. Air Force History Office U.S. Air Force Hiroshima. It would be of the greatest importance that the United States recognize early that a war is practically at hand, the author argued for using strategic bombers to that the war will involve vital American interests, that conduct one-way missions over the Soviet Union. early U.S. entry will yield important military advan- He added that the United States could not rely on tages, and may in fact be essential to the prevention of defensive measures to prevent an atomic attack military domination of the world by the USSR.10 on itself. “The complexion of atomic war reem- Demonstrating the same concern, Lieutenant phasizes the old cliche that the best defense is a General Albert Wedemeyer, the director of plans good offense and alters it somewhat: the best de- and operations on the Army Staff, spoke at the fense is the first offense in force.” Writing a year National War College in about the later, Colonel Matthew Deichelmann spelled out urgent need to understand that the Soviet Union his case for preventive war would have atomic weapons within a few years the Joint Chiefs sought to and national survival. He be- and could launch a surprise attack, inflicting a lieved that the public should guide industrial mobilization catastrophic defeat. be “enlightened” about the At the time the general made his speech he in case of war security problems of the was a member of the board for the evaluation of atomic age. An informed the Bikini Island tests. The Operation Crossroads public would give the National Command Au- evaluation team was headed by the president of thorities the “power to take action in the further- the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Karl ance of the command defense.” And that action Compton, and included General Joseph Stilwell, would be preventive against an enemy that was Admiral Ofstie, and Admiral D.S. Parsons as spe- preparing to attack the United States.9 cial advisors among other military officers. Many military leaders believed that if the So- The board released its final report in Decem- viets opted for war they would certainly launch a ber 1947. It found that the atomic bomb, when preventive attack using strategic airpower (proba- employed in conjunction with other weapons of bly with atomic bombs) on American cities. One mass destruction including biological and chemi- could characterize such thinking as reverse-pre- cal arms, would “depopulate vast areas of the ventive war. Applying the notion of preventive earth’s surface, leaving only vestigial remnants of war to the military policy of the Soviet Union al- man’s material works.” Because an enemy that lowed airmen to endorse a force in being to re- possessed such weaponry could launch a surprise spond to such a strike or launch a preventive at- attack the report stated that America needed to tack of its own. revise its Advocates of preventive war—or reverse-pre- traditional attitudes toward what constitutes acts of ventive war—were not limited to the military. aggression so that our Armed Forces may plan and op- erate in accordance with the realities of atomic war- fare. Our attitude of national defense must provide for

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A–26s over Barksdale AFB, 1947. U.S. Air Force History Office U.S. Air Force

the employment of every practical means to prevent Presidential duty, after consultation with the Cab- surprise attack. Offensive measures will be the only inet, to order atomic retaliation to prevent or hin- generally effective means of defense, and the United der an atomic attack on the United States. By States must be prepared to employ them before a po- using the term retaliation the Secretary hedged on tential enemy can inflict significant damage upon us.11 fully advocating a policy shift toward preventive Reviewing the report’s findings, the Joint Chiefs war. Yet it was implicit that America was already agreed the President should consider reorienting at war and thus retaliation was synonymous with national military strategy to allow for an offen- prevention—that is, launching a surprise attack sive strike against the Soviet Union to prevent de- to “frustrate an atomic energy attack” on the feat in total war. United States. Indeed, when the Joint Chiefs forwarded the Truman noted in his memoirs that many in Crossroads Report to the White House, they the military advocated preventive war; but it was bracketed the paragraphs concerning preventive foolish to theorize “that war can be stopped by war so the President could carefully consider this war. You don’t ‘prevent’ anything by war except proposed crucial shift in policy. They acknowl- peace.” According to the former President, the edged in a cover letter that a substantial turn to- Nation clearly did “not believe in aggression or in 13 ward preventive war was a political decision the preventive war.” commander in chief had to make.12 Yet the chiefs Like others who came after him, Truman made no attempt to discredit a proposed shift. tried to superimpose the framework of deterrence Secretary of Defense James Forrestal attached a that evolved after 1950 on the period 1945–50. covering letter pointing out that bracketed por- This understandable but flawed approach distorts tions related to enacting legislation to redefine the way political and military leaders and defense aggression and incipient attack and make it a analysts thought about bombing and war during that time. They did not fundamentally base mili- tary policy on deterrence but on winning a war by

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destroying Soviet war-making capacity. This con- 5 Report by the Ad Hoc Committee, “Evaluation of cept of preventive war, although troubling, com- Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from the Strategic fortably fit the logic of airpower theory expressed Air Offensive, 12 ,” in Rosenburg and Ross, by Anderson, Wedemeyer, and Matthews. America’s Plans for War, volume 11, pp. 6–8, 41; also see George A. Lincoln, “Relation of Atomic Power to Post- war Strategy,” , Lincoln Papers; and Renowned postwar strategist Bernard Brodie “The Theory of Atomic Bombing,” June 16, 1947 (box wrote to Anderson shortly after the general’s relief 197, record group 341), Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, as commandant of the Air War College that the National Archives; Ross, War Plans, pp. 6–7; Joint Staff incident had presented the general’s view on pre- Planners, “Concept of Operation Pincher, 4 March ventive war to the Nation “in a much more force- 1946,” in Rosenburg and Ross, America’s Plans for War, ful and commanding way . . . than would other- volume 2, p. 1. wise have been possible.”14 Perhaps Brodie 6 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A His- understood better than anyone else the dilemma tory of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloom- posed by atomic weapons for U.S. security and the ington: University Press, 1977), pp. 366–77. 7 logic of public statements made by Anderson. Re- Memo from Ofstie to Chairman, General Board, “General Board Serial 315,” April 8, 1948 (box 3, Ralph flecting on the first decade and a half of the nu- A. Ofstie Papers), Naval Historical Center, Washington. clear age, Brodie indicated in his classic study, 8 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Military Analysis Strategy in the Missile Age, that at least prior to Division, Air Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington: 1950, when the Soviet Union started to establish a Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 69; also see Joint substantial nuclear stockpile, preventive war was a Chiefs of Staff, “Overall Effect of Atomic Bomb on War- “live issue...among a very small but earnest mi- fare and Military Organization, October 30, 1945,” in nority of American citizens.”15 Some U.S. political Rosenburg and Ross, America’s Plans for War, volume 1, and military leaders believed that the next strug- p. 5. 9 gle would truly be a total war, and a preventive at- Dale O. Smith, “One-Way Combat,” Air University tack to destroy Soviet war-making capacity per- Quarterly Review, vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1947), p. 5; Matthew K. Deichelmann, “Editorial,” Air University Quarterly Re- fectly suited their vision of future conflict. JFQ view, vol. 2, no. 2, (Fall 1948), p. 68. 10 “Strategic Guidance for Industrial Mobilization NOTES Planning, 13 February 1947,” p. 17, in Rosenburg and 1 Memorandum from George Lincoln to Alfred Ross, America’s Plans for War, volume 5. 11 Wedemeyer, dated April 16, 1947 (see GAL file, box 5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The Final Report of the Joint folder, War Department files, George A. Lin- Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for Operation Cross- coln Papers), Special Collections, United States Military roads, 29 ,” in Rosenburg and Ross, Academy, West Point. America’s Plans for War, volume 9, pp. 110–11. 12 2 Interview with Orvil Anderson, September 24–25, Ibid., pp. 97–115. 13 1943 (file 168-7006-2), Air Force Historical Research Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 1946–1952, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Smith- 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Over-All Effect of Atomic mark, 1954), pp. 359, 383. 14 Bomb on Warfare and Military Organization, October Bernard Brodie to Orvil Anderson, September 2, 30, 1945” in America’s Plans for War Against the Soviet 1950 (file 168.7006-3, Anderson Papers), Air Force Histor- Union, 1945–1950, volume 1, edited by David A. Rosen- ical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 15 berg and Steven T. Ross (New York: Garland Publishers, Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Prince- 1989), p. 4. The most thorough account of the war ton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 227–28. plans written between 1945 and 1950 is Stephen T. Ross, American War Plans, 1945–1950 (Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1996). Also see David A. Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security, vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3–71. 4 Walton S. Moody, Building a Strategic Air Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 137, and Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–1976 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans: Combat Studies Institute, 1979), p. 6.

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