DOCSLIB.ORG

Lecture 12-13 Materialists' Conception of Mind and Mind-Body Identity

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Lecture 12-13 Materialists' Conception of Mind and Mind-Body Identity Lecture 12-13 Materialists' Conception of Mind and Mind-Body Identity About the Lecture: Materialism argues against the above Cartesian conception of mind. The Cartesian conception of the reality divides the mind and the body into two different realms of existence. The materialists try to bring in the scientific hypothesis that ‘consciousness is a brain processes and maintains that there is nothing mystical about the notion of mind. Behaviourism, Physicalism, and Functionalism are in general maintained that consciousness is not ontologically real. Rather, the matter is fundamental for the study of consciousness. The consciousness or the mind is potentially embedded in the body or causally related to the function of the brain. Keywords: Materialism, Behaviourism, Physicalism, Mind-Body Identity, Consciousness as Brain Process, Phenomenological Fallacy, Disposition, Manifestation, Central-State Identity, Epiphenomenon Materialism argues against the above Cartesian conception of mind. The Cartesian conception of the reality divides the mind and the body into two different realms of existence. And insofar as consciousness is concerned, it is the metaphysical foundation for the scientific as well as commonsensical explanation of the mental phenomena. Materialism as an alternative conception of mind explains the reality of the mental through the reality of the physical. The concept of body is defined inter terms extension. The body exists as an independent substance. Its existence does not depend on the existence of the mind. Thomas Hobbes has initiated the study of the mechanical function of the body. According to him “The body is also called the ‘subject’, because it is so placed in and subjected to imaginary space, that it may be understood by reason, perceived by senses.” 1 The body as a subject for the discourse of experience and action necessitates a separate ontological status. In this regard, Hobbes was interested in studying the causal function of the body. The function of the body is an accident – ‘an accident is that faculty of any body by which it works in us a conception of itself.’2 For him, the conception of the body is such that it has the power to bring out certain effects. So the production of effect presupposes 1 (Copleston 1994: 24) 2 Ibid., p.21 1 the causal power of the body. ‘If body A generates motion in body B, A is the agent and B is the patient. Thus, if fire warms my hand then fire is the agent and the hand is the patient.’3 The agent-patient relationship shows the active and passive power of the body so far as the change of events is concerned. So far as human beings are concerned, there are two kinds of events; the mental events and the physical events. For the materialist, the mental events are causally connected to the bodily/ physical events of the body. In other words, the mind is just a part of the physical organism. The function of the organic system would unfold the causal relationship existing in the system and causing action. In this regard, the mind can be known through the various activities of the body/ the brain, i.e., it involves the physical behaviour of the brain comprising of the different states and events that are occurring in the brain. Hence there is no dualism between the mental and the physical. Materialism includes various theories of the mind like behaviourism, physicalism and functionalism. All these theories talk about some sort of identity relationship between the mental phenomena and the neurophysiological states and processes of the brain. Behaviourism, as a theory of mind, advocates the empirical study of the mind through behaviour. As Churchland puts it, "By 'behaviour', behaviourists' mean the publicly observable, measureable, recordable activity of the subjects at issue: bodily movements, noises emitted, temperature changes, chemical released, interaction with environment, and so forth."4 It is the behaviour which is the source of our knowledge of the mind. Rather mind, as such, is nothing but the behaviour itself. We do not, therefore, observe the mental phenomena. It is basically the behaviour which is observed. And this observable behaviour is to be taken into account in order to explain the mental phenomena. In this sense, the definition of the behaviour of human beings includes both voluntary or conscious actions as well as involuntary or unconscious actions. Voluntary action includes the person's intention and will, whereas the involuntary actions exclude the persons’ intention and desires. It includes the biological actions of the body. The behaviour is studied by undertaking both the outer environmental conditions as well as the inner potential capacities of human beings. As Churchland puts it, "Instead of appealing to mental states, behaviourists proposed to 3 Ibid. 4 Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1989, p.88. (Henceforth MC) 2 explain any organism's behaviour in terms of its peculiar environmental circumstance. Or, in terms of environment plus certain observable features of the organism. Or, in terms of certain unobservable features of the organismdispositions, and innate and conditioned features meet a very strict condition: they must be such that their presence or absence could always be decisively determined by behavioural test, as solubility of sugar is revealed by its actually dissolving (the behaviour) when placed in water (the environmental circumstances)."5 Insofar as the mental state is concerned, there are two aspects which count mostly for explaining the mind: they are the dispositional capacity as an intrinsic feature of the human beings' organic structure and the environmental condition as an outer condition in which a person is being situated. Environment is an external condition which has a direct impact on human behaviour. Behaviourism as a philosophical thesis reasonably motivated to critique dualism. Gilbert Ryle’s response to Descartes’ substance dualism is a famous example of philosophical behaviourism. Ryle’s philosophical behaviourism is stirred by the development of philosophical thesis of logical positivism and the ‘general assumption of analytic philosophy that philosophical problems arise due to linguistic or conceptual confusions which can be dissolved by a careful analysis of language. The logical positivists emphasized that ‘meaning of the sentences is determined by the observable circumstances.’ Human behaviours are external observable facts. As the expressions of the mind, behaviours are public state of affairs. Descartes’ conceptualization of the mind is a private phenomenon and does not exist in space. And it can be known through introspection was something problematic for Ryle. According to Ryle, the very division that Descartes draws between the mind and the body is the reason for creating substance dualism. Descartes commits a kind of category mistake by conceptually categorizing the mind and the body as two different substances. To place mind as a substance within the framework of the body is to conceptualize the existence of the mind in a dogmatic way. Ryle calls it ‘the dogma of the ghost in the machine.’ The body is conceptualized as an organic system that causally operates like a machine; to say that the mind or the soul resides in the centre of pineal gland and controls the bodily movements while performing voluntary actions, but the intervention of the mind not an observable fact. Rather, it is directly and immediately accessible itself. In other words, the soul is self-conscious – it is conscious and is aware of its existence. To explain consciousness with the help of consciousness is to commit the fallacy of circularity. The 5 Ibid., pp.88-89. 3 Cartesian explanation of the mind is thus a problematic thesis does not go along with the scientific discovery of the fact that there is a causal-mechanical process through which body operates. The behaviourists give importance to the study of actual and the potential pattern of the behavior. Emotion, belief, desire are not about ‘ghostly inner episodes’, rather they are observable when expressed in behaviours. For instance, desire to feel thirsty is a potential dispositional state of the living body. To quench the thirst, when someone looks for water or any kind of drinks implies state of belief. Ryle and other behaviourists talk about multi-track dispositions. The inner feature of behavioural capacity is known as the dispositional property of behaviour. The disposition is an unobservable factor which gets manifested in the behaviour itself. For example, brittleness is the dispositional property of glassware. Glass, being a physical phenomenon, contains brittleness as its physical dispositional property. Similarly, human beings' behaviour is determined basically by the dispositional feature of the brain or brain states. That is, for all of our outer physical behaviour there must be a causal dispositional state in the brain. Dispositions are thus built into the structure of an object. For example, whenever any glassware falls from my hand or is hit heavily, it lies broken on the ground. The brittleness is a part of the atomic structure of each piece of the broken glass. It is also true that there is some external factor operating for causing the glass to slip from my grip. The disposition of the glass is simply that if breaks whenever it falls to the ground. Similarly, in certain environmental and physical conditions human beings behave in a particular order. Hence, in order to determine the human dispositions we must observe or measure the particular order of the external behaviour of the human beings. Besides in the case of human behaviour, we must observe the dispositional features of the brain states. Brain states, for the behaviourists, are the physical states. Behaviour is identified with the brain states, i.e. corresponding to a particular behaviour there must be a dispositional state in the brain organism. We generalize about dispositions by seeing the constant occurrence of the same type of behaviour in typical external condition.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin
    Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato Volume 6 Article 5 2006 Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin Ryan Feldbrugge Minnesota State University, Mankato Follow this and additional works at: https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Feldbrugge, Ryan (2006) "Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin," Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato: Vol. 6 , Article 5. Available at: https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur/vol6/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Research Center at Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato by an authorized editor of Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato. Feldbrugge: Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin INTENTIONALITY IN KANT AND WITTGENSTEIN Ryan Feldbrugge (Philosophy) Dr. Richard Liebendorfer, Faculty Mentor, Philosophy How is thought about and experience of a world possible? This has been the framing question of the present work and it is generally understood as the problem of intentionality. The more specific problem dealt with has been whether or not intentionality has an internal structure that can be made explicit through science, particularly cognitive science. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant outlines an internal, mental structure that, when imposed on our sensory data, makes thought about and experience of a world possible, which can be viewed as highly anticipatory of modern cognitive science. On the other hand, there are a number of philosophers who have it that the structure of intentionality cannot be made explicit nor can it be understood within science, notably Ludwig Wittgenstein.
    [Show full text]
  • Levels And/Or States of Consciousness Level Label Definition Ascending Mental State Statements
    Appendix X: Book- Transformative Educator’s Guide to Mindful Practice: Daily reflections and exercises for Peace of Mind, Excellence and Teaching from the Heart----By John Shindler Levels and/or States of Consciousness At any one point in time our mental activity is defined by what we could call a “state of consciousness.” And any particular state could be located on a continuum/level – from low - lost in our ego and victim thinking to high - seeing reality clearly and feeling a sense of ease and oneness. We may stay in a particular state for a moment or for weeks or more. The thinking and mental messages that define the levels is outlined in the table below. At the bottom is the victim level in which we feel that things are against us and we cannot be OK with our situation the way that it is, we feel things and others should be different, and our current lot is unfair in the vast configuration of things. The next level up is defined by the active state of trying to control our world with effort, manipulation, overcoming our situation, and basically trying to win the game of life. The top level is defined by a letting go of the controlling attitude and opening to more conscious thinking and coming into alignment with our true nature and the world around us. For each level, we can identify the kinds of mental and/or spoken statements that would represent the thinking at and within that level. Level Label Definition Ascending Mental State Statements Aligned/ At this level of consciousness • I feel as sense of oneness with everything Aware/ one feels a sense that • I just forget myself and get into the flow and fundamentally life is in order.
    [Show full text]
  • Consciousness
    Consciousness Jon Opie* School of Humanities, University of Adelaide, SA, Australia *Correspondence: [email protected] Understanding consciousness and its place in the natural world is one of the principal targets of contemporary philosophy of mind. Australian philosophers made seminal contributions to this project during the twentieth century which continue to shape the way philosophers and scientists think about the conceptual, metaphysical and empirical aspects of the problem. After some scene setting, I will discuss the main players and their work in the context of broader developments in the philosophy of mind. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, scientific psychology set itself the task of systematically exploring the mind, understood as the conscious activity that accompanies perception and thought. Labs in Germany and the United States began the tedious work of determining the structure of experience via the reports of trained subjects operating under carefully controlled stimulus conditions. The hope was that the phenomena revealed by this means might eventually be correlated with activity in the central nervous system. Many philosophers considered this project misguided. The logical positivists, who insisted that a statement is only meaningful if one can specify observable conditions that would render it true or false, rejected the view that psychological predicates such as „pain‟ have any subjective content. A statement like „Paul has a toothache‟ is merely an abbreviation for a list of physical events (such as Paul weeping, Paul‟s blood pressure rising, etc.) which collectively exhaust the meaning of the statement (Hempel 1980). Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (1953) regarded the so called „mind-body problem‟ as the result of a misuse of ordinary language.
    [Show full text]
  • Expressions of Mind/Body Dualism in Thinspiration
    MIND OVER MATTER: EXPRESSIONS OF MIND/BODY DUALISM IN THINSPIRATION Annamarie O’Brien A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS August 2013 Committee: Dr. Marilyn Motz, Advisor Dr. Rebecca Kinney Dr. Jeremy Wallach © 2013 Annamarie O’Brien All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Dr. Marilyn Motz, Advisor Thinspiration images, meant to inspire weight-loss, proliferate online through platforms that encourage the circulation of user-generated content. Despite numerous alarmist critiques in mass media about thinspiration and various academic studies investigating ‘pro-anorexia’ sites, surprisingly little attention has been given to the processes of creation and the symbolic potential of thinspiration. This thesis analyzes the formal hybridity of thinspiration, and its use as an expressive medium. The particularities of thinspiration (including its visual characteristics, creative processes, and exhibition) may be considered carefully constructed instances of self- representation, hinging on the expression of beliefs regarding the mind and body. While these beliefs are deeply entrenched in popular body management discourse, they also tend to rely on traditional dualist ideologies. Rather than simply emphasizing slenderness or reiterating standard assumptions about beauty, thinspiration often evokes pain and sadness, and employs truisms about the transcendence of flesh and rebellion against social constraints. By harnessing individualist discourse and the values of mind/body dualism, thinspiration becomes a space in which people struggling with disordered eating and body image issues may cast themselves as active agents—contrary to the image of eating disorders proffered by popular and medical discourse. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First, I would like to thank my thesis committee chair, Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Knowledge As a Mental State Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology
    Jennifer Nagel – September 28, 2011 Knowledge as a mental state Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology ABSTRACT: In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution incluDes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative anD social psychologists have classifieD knowleDge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is traced back to a difference in how each side unDerstanDs the relationship between the concepts of knowledge anD belief, concepts which are unDerstooD in both Disciplines to be closely linkeD. Psychologists anD philosophers other than Williamson have generally have disagreed about which of the pair is prior and which is derivative. The rival claims of priority are examineD both in the light of philosophical arguments by Williamson anD others, anD in the light of empirical work on mental state attribution. One striking feature of research into mental state ascription or ‘mindreading’ is the extent to which it has involved cooperation between psychology and philosophy. Contemporary empirical work on mindreading is often traced back to a 1978 target article in comparative psychology, an article which raised the question of whether chimpanzees attribute mental states to themselves and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Three of the most influential responses published with that article were written by philosophers, each of whom drew attention to the importance of probing the capacity to represent states of ignorance and false belief (Bennett, 1978; Dennett, 1978; Harman, 1978).
    [Show full text]
  • Food for Thought About Words for Thoughts: Why Mental State Vocabulary Should Be on Our Radar by Lauren Lowry Hanen SLP and Clinical Staff Writer
    Food for thought about words for thoughts: Why mental state vocabulary should be on our radar By Lauren Lowry Hanen SLP and Clinical Staff Writer With so many goals to address in order to help the children on our caseloads, something like “mental state words” may not be high on your list. You may think that this is a goal only for older children or children on the autism spectrum. However, this special group of words that describe our thoughts and feelings may develop earlier than you think and may be relevant for many of the children with whom you work. What are mental state words? This class of vocabulary includes words that describe the contents of someone’s mind or general cognitive processes (Barnes & Dickinson, 2018). Understanding mental state words gives children the ability to analyze others’ goals and motives and how these relate to the child's own goals and motives (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982). An early study about the development of mental state words by Bretherton et al. (1982) described them according to different categories: Types of Mental State Words (Bretherton et al., 1982) Perceptual – includes words related to the five senses, pain, and temperature, such as “see”, “look”, “watch”, “cold”, “hurt”, etc. Physiological – includes words related to hunger, thirst, and states of consciousness, such as “hungry”, “tired”, “sick”, “wake up”, etc. Emotional and affective – these include both positive and negative words related to feelings, such as “like”, “love”, “cry”, “kiss”, “hug”, “funny”, “happy”, “angry”, “nice”, etc. Volition and ability – words related to desires, needs, and abilities, such as “want”, “need”, “have to”, “hard”, “can”, etc.
    [Show full text]
  • Ludwig.Wittgenstein.-.Philosophical.Investigations.Pdf
    PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS By LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN Translated by G. E. M. ANSCOMBE BASIL BLACKWELL TRANSLATOR'S NOTE Copyright © Basil Blackwell Ltd 1958 MY acknowledgments are due to the following, who either checked First published 1953 Second edition 1958 the translation or allowed me to consult them about German and Reprint of English text alone 1963 Austrian usage or read the translation through and helped me to Third edition of English and German text with index 1967 improve the English: Mr. R. Rhees, Professor G. H. von Wright, Reprint of English text with index 1968, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, Mr. P. Geach, Mr. G. Kreisel, Miss L. Labowsky, Mr. D. Paul, Miss I. 1981, 1986 Murdoch. Basil Blackwell Ltd 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be NOTE TO SECOND EDITION reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or THE text has been revised for the new edition. A large number of otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. small changes have been made in the English text. The following passages have been significantly altered: Except in the United States of America, this book is sold to the In Part I: §§ 108, 109, 116, 189, 193, 251, 284, 352, 360, 393,418, condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re- 426, 442, 456, 493, 520, 556, 582, 591, 644, 690, 692.
    [Show full text]
  • The Relationship Between Consciousness and Intentionality
    University of Central Florida STARS HIM 1990-2015 2013 The relationship between consciousness and intentionality Jordan Bell University of Central Florida Part of the Philosophy Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015 University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIM 1990-2015 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Bell, Jordan, "The relationship between consciousness and intentionality" (2013). HIM 1990-2015. 1384. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015/1384 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY by JORDAN BELL A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Philosophy in the College of Arts & Humanities and in The Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Spring Term 2013 Thesis Chair: Dr. Mason Cash ABSTRACT Within the Philosophy of Mind two features of our mental life have been acknowledged as the most perplexing—consciousness, the phenomenal “what it is likeness” of our mental states, and intentionality, the aboutness or directedness of our mental states. As such, it has become commonplace to develop theories about these phenomena which seek to explain them naturalistically, that is, without resort to magic or miracles. Traditionally this has been done by analyzing consciousness and intentionality apart from one another. However, in more recent years the tide has turned. In contemporary theories these phenomena are typically analyzed in terms of the other.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Philosophy of Mind and Metaphysics Lecture XI: Mind As a Computer
    Philosophy of Mind and Metaphysics Lecture XI: Mind as a Computer: Machine Functionalism Tim Black California State University, Northridge Spring 2004 I. MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY AND FUNCTIONALISM a. Mental states (and events and properties) are multiply realizable. That is, one and the same mental state can be realized in different ways in different physical systems. “Mental property M—say, being in pain—may be such that in humans C-fiber activation realizes it but in other species (think of octopuses and reptiles) the physiological mechanism that realizes pain may well be vastly different” (p. 74). Moreover, the multiple realizability of mental states creates a problem for the Psychoneural (Type) Identity Theory. For, if one and the same mental state can be realized in different ways in different creatures, then there is no one type of physical state with which any particular type of mental state is identical. Pain, for example, is not identical to C-fiber activation since pain is realized in other creatures by some other type of physical state. b. The multiple realizability of mental states pushes us away from the Psychoneural (Type) Identity Theory, and toward Functionalism. “According to functionalism, a mental kind is a functional kind, or a causal-functional kind, since the “function” involved is to fill a certain causal role. … Thus, the concept of pain is defined in terms of its function, and the function involved is to serve as a causal intermediary between typical pain inputs (tissue damage, trauma, etc.) and typical pain outputs (winces, groans, escape behavior, etc.). The functionalist will say that this is generally true of all mental kinds: Mental kinds are causal-functional kinds, and what all instances of a given mental kind have in common is the fact that they serve a certain causal role distinctive of that kind.
    [Show full text]
  • Eidos Fecha De Recepción: Marzo 3 De 2011 ISSN 1692-8857 Fecha De Aceptación: Julio 28 De 2011 Issne 2011-7477
    eidos Fecha de recepción: marzo 3 de 2011 ISSN 1692-8857 Fecha de aceptación: julio 28 de 2011 ISSNe 2011-7477 IS THE PANPSYCHIST BETTER OFF AS AN IDEALIST? SOME LEIBNIZIAN REMARKS ON CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMPOSITION Michael Blamauer University of Vienna, Department of Philosophy [email protected] RESUMEN Algunos filósofos de la mente han defendido la idea de considerar la mente como otra característica fundamental de la realidad, además de las propiedades físicas. De ahí que la mayoría de ellos sean propiamente dualistas. Sin embargo, algunos de ellos son pansiquistas. En este artículo sostendré que ser propiamente un dualista implica, en esencia, ser pansiqui- sta. Incluso, si el pansiquismo aborda ciertas dificultades relacionadas con el problema de la conciencia de manera muy elegante, éstas permanecen inmodificables. Siendo partidario del carácter fundamental de la mente, de- fenderé la idea de que sólo mediante una revisión radical de la metafísica el pansiquista podrá evitar tales problemas y, en consecuencia, que debe adoptar el idealismo leibniciano. PALABRAS CLAVE Panpsiquismo, Leibniz, filosofía de la mente, dualismo, composición. ABSTRACT Some philosophers of mind have argued for considering consciousness as a further fundamental feature of reality in addition to its physical prop- erties. Hence most of them are property dualists. But some of them are panpsychists. In the present paper it will be argued that being a real prop- erty dualist essentially entails being a panpsychist. Even if panpsychism deals rather elegantly with certain problems of the puzzle of consciousness, there’s no way around the composition problem. Adhering to the funda- mentality claim of the mind, it will be shown that only a radical revision of metaphysics will allow the panpsychist to avoid these troubles, and hence that a panpsychist must adopt Leibnizian idealism.
    [Show full text]
  • QUALIA and MENTAL CAUSATION in a PHYSICAL WORLD Themes Ftom the Philosophy Of]Aegwon Kim
    QUALIA AND MENTAL CAUSATION IN A PHYSICAL WORLD Themes ftom the Philosophy of]aegwon Kim EDITED BY TERENCE HORGAN, MARCELO SABATES, AND DAVID SOSA HCAMBRIDGE ~ UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom Contents Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University's mission by dissenllnating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/978rro7077836 ©Cambridge University Press 2015 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception List ofcontributors page Vil and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, !X no reproduction of any part may take place without the mitten Preface permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2015 l Reality and reduction: What's really at stake in the causal A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library exclusion debate l ISBN 978-r-107-07783-6 Hardback Louise M Antony Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of 2 Two property theories and the causal conundrum for URLS for external or tbird~parry internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, physicalism 25 accurate or appropriate. Frank Jackson 3 Mental causation: The free lunch 40 Barry Loewer 4 Does mental causation require psychophysical
    [Show full text]
  • Testing for the Phenomenal: Intuition, Metacognition, and Philosophical Methodology Miguel Egler, Arché Research Centre, University of St Andrews, UK
    Testing for the phenomenal: Intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology Miguel Egler, Arché Research Centre, University of St Andrews, UK Forthcoming in Mind & Language Accepted: 30th of August, 2018 A"stract Recent empirical studies raise signi cant methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper ma$es use of research on metacognitive states that share the phenomenology of intuitions to argue that this reply fails" Furthermore, it shows how empirical ndings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers ma$e better informed assessments of their warrant for relying on intuitions in in&uiry" #$%&'()* intuition, metacognition, phenomenalism, philosophical methodology, experimental philosophy, feeling of rightness 1. I,TR')-.TI', Recent empirical studies suggest that people(s intuitions show marked variation with respect to a host of epistemically irrelevant factors, such as their culture, or the order in which experimental tasks are presented to them") A common reading of these ndings is that they raise signi cant methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy" * call this the +Experimentalist challenge," In response, some have argued that empirical studies about ) %or a review, see Machery -./)0, ch. .1" 1 intuitions are in need of considerable re nement before they can be put
    [Show full text]