Monsignor Olano, a Bishop in World War Ii

MICRONESIAN JOURNAL OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Vol. 4, nº 2 Rainy Season Issue December 2005

MONSIGNOR OLANO, A BISHOP IN WORLD WAR II

Florentino Rodao1 Faculty of Journalism,Complutense University of Madrid

Monsignor Olano, the last Spanish bishop in Guam (1935-45), presided a period of intense political disputes, ordered to exile from the island both in 1941 and in 1945. Japanese, Spaniards and Americans pulled strings through him, both during the Pacific War and before, but the whereabouts of the prelate relate also to the attempts to influence the lives of Guamese. Olano and the Catholic church was perceived as a way the Chamorro in Guam historically expressed their agency and efforts were done by the foreign powers in order to reduce it. The article analyzes the issue mostly though Spanish documentation, at different archives.

The last Spanish priest to head the Catholic his actions allow us to better understand the church in Guam, Miguel Ángel de Olano y Ur- conflicting interests over the fate of the Gua- teaga (Alzo, Guipuzcoa, 1891- Guam, 1970), manians. represents much more than the final name of a long list. Monsignor Olano, who lived in Guam SPANISH MISSIONARIES IN AN AMERICAN both under the American Naval Administra- COLONY tion and the Japanese occupation, provides an Spanish cultural legacy and religious ties re- good example of the difficulties missionary mained strong in Guam, just as they did in the work can face when it becomes entangled with Philippines, despite that fact that Madrid ig- strong political pressures. Although Olano ar- nored Guam and the rest of Micronesia after rived when the missionaries were already sus- its defeat in the Spanish-American War in pected by Navy governors as being a disruptive 1898. The underlying reasons for this are easy force, the challenge against missionary influ- to understand: official contacts stopped almost ence over the island increased over time, while completely because of the small number of at the same time the Guamanians became in- Spanish citizens resident there and the great creasingly less influenced by Olano’s mes- distances that separated the two territories. sages—partly due to the convoluted years of However, there are also other factors that ex- war and tension. This article traces Olano’s ac- plain why the separation was abrupt: on the tivities in prewar Guam, his life following the part of Spain there was a sense of relief of get- Japanese occupation of the island, and the con- ting rid of an unwanted venture, as in the frontational interests of the three countries he Philippines, while, Washington displayed an dealt with during the war: Japan, Spain, and the understandable reluctance to allow contact United States. Given that Olano held a key po- with the former colonialists. Indeed, the Navy sition during the violent times of World War Department refused the Spanish consul in Ma- II, his personal situation and the significance of nila to exercise any jurisdiction over Guam.2 This is a peer reviewed contribution. Received: 23 Jul 2005 Revised: 16 Apr 2005 Accepted: 20 May 2006 © Micronesian Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences ISSN 1449-7336 HeritageFutures International, PO Box 3440, Albury NSW 2640, Australia 85 86 Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II

Spanish identity remained strong on Guam, tinian Recollects, the Spanish missionaries in mainly through the efforts of the Catholic charge of apostolic work among the Chamor- church, which remained as the only link be- ros. The only priest allowed to remain was the tween the Chamorro and their former me- secular José Torres Palomo, later to become tropolis. But it was in part also due to the the first native of Guam to be ordained a priest Chamorro themselves, who had assimilated the of the Roman Catholic Church. They also Spanish legacy as part of their own identity and strove to remove the Mariana Islands adminis- felt the need to maintain it, at least as a way to tratively from the Diocese of Cebu. At first, counterbalance the might of their new colonial Guam and the rest of the Marianas were as- power, the United States of America (Rodao signed under an apostolic prefecture in charge 1995, pp. 175-80). of a German priest residing in Saipan, then un- There are references about the Chamorros’ der German rule (Spennemann 1999, pp. 150- desire to maintain some aspects of the former 152). But due to personality conflicts, access to colonial identity; Lt. William Edwin Safford, Guam was denied, with Navy officials made aide to the first U.S. naval governor of Guam, difficult to monitor the mission in Guam from found the elite or manak’kilo of Agaña “well the outside—even the Catholic archbishop of educated, highly Hispanicized, and rather dis- New Orleans and apostolic delegate to all new dainful of the Americans as less sophisticated U.S. territories was denied to visit Guam on his than the Spaniards” (quoted in Rogers, 1995, way to the Philippines (Rogers, 1995, p. 120). pp. 118-19). Such references are neither limited The American navy was a much more powerful to the first years on American colonization, nor political authority than the previous Spanish to the island of Guam, where the U.S. physical governors and since the Spanish-American war presence was concentrated. Willard Price, an American lay power dealt on more balanced American traveler through the Pacific islands terms with the missionaries. For the first time after World War I, shared his astonishment since the Spanish-Chamorro wars, in the sev- with the Japanese governor of the Micronesian enteenth Century, the influence of the Church island of Yap, upon the way the Chamorro in in Guam was balanced by the political power the town of Kolonia, maintained an “Spanish The Navy, on its side, had to accept some aura” (Price, 1944, p. 98) based around the changes to fulfil the religious needs of the is- Catholic traditions: “More than one hundred landers. Due to the lack of funds and the diffi- per cent Catholics,” (Price, 1944, p. 98) the culties in replacing the expelled Augustinians, Japanese Governor remarked to him. in 1901, the only solution available was to The enduring influence the Catholic Church bring three Spanish Capuchins from Yap to had over the inhabitants of Guam due to their Guam. Later, Navy officials changed merely strong religious feelings, was one of the aspects the religious order in charge of providing mis- of the Spanish Era that American Navy offi- sionaries, from Augustinians to Capuchins; the cials most endeavored to change. Their first latter assigned this task to their Province of declaration, on August 10, 1899, stressed the Catalonia. And finally, in 1911, the status of the separation of church and state. Apart from Catholic Church in Guam was raised to that of striving to diminish the enormous autonomy an independent vicariate. In the same year, the from the political authority the Catholic church provenance of the missionaries was changed had enjoyed until then, the U.S. Naval adminis- permanently to Navarre, the same province trators tried to make the missionaries more from where the Augustinians Recollects origi- akin to accept their instructions, using different nated. During the year 1915, the first group ar- strategies, such as isolating the priests from rived from Navarre, led by Bishop Joaquín M. their superiors and disrupting their chain of Oláiz y Zabala, who also received (from Gov- command, or searching for missionaries more ernor Willis Bradley) commissary privileges for likely to follow their orders. The new American the priests, because of their service to Ameri- rulers were keen to get more appropriate mis- can military personnel. sionaries and removed from Guam all Augus- Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II 87

In the 1930s, after Oláiz resigned, the rela- (Anonymous, n.d., 5). The Capuchins’ political tions between priests and Navy officials soured ideas, however, were not extremely reactionary, dramatically. Oláiz’s substitute was another especially when compared to other missionar- Capuchin who had long been the parish priest ies under American rule. During the Civil War of Sumay, Msg. Olano. Appointed in Guam as (1936-39), Basque and Navarrean Capuchins in Titular Bishop of Lagina and Vicar Apostolic the Philippines were the only missionaries sid- of Guam, Olano sailed for Rome to attend the ing with the Spanish Republic, following the Episcopal consecration on 5 May 1935. Upon fervently Catholic Basque Nationalist Party. his return trip through the United States, And while the Spanish Civil War had no no- Olano was not received by the Apostolic Dele- ticeable impact in Guam while it happened, we gate in Washington (Vera, 1949b). Finally, at can assume that the Spanish priests were not Guam, under the new American Navy Gover- idle bystanders. This can be demonstrated by nor George Alexander, Olano understood the fact that on the anniversary of the death of clearly that the audience with the Pope did not the late King Alphonse XIII—deposed by the smooth his task in the island. During his ab- Spanish Republic in 1931—Olano celebrated a sence, there had been two campaigns asking to Mass in Tokyo in 1943. This act implied an substitute the Spanish missionaries. The first overt support to the restoration of monarchy campaign was apparently not followed through in Spain, the option favored by the United while the second one was mixed with an appli- Kingdom against the desires of General cation to allow a Japanese ship laden with rice Franco.3 entering into the port of Guam (Vera, 1949b; On Guam, Americans seemingly were dis- 1949c). The American officials had already tressed by the reaction against their new ways clear ideas as what to do and in the meantime of life, and Laura Thompson noticed the reluc- they started efforts to substitute the Spaniards tance among Chamorros to a woman traveling by inviting American missionaries to Guam. by herself and living alone, but this was the The Spanish padres had a very conservative same opposition to be found by urbanites at ideological attitude and therefore the priests these times in many rural places in America. It were accused of being, as Robert Rogers was probably most important that missionary writes, “all still ultraconservative Basques [who] opposition to some of the American innova- opposed coeducation and other practices in- tions was seemingly shared by many locals, troduced by the Americans” (1995, p. 159). who agreed with the idea of deciding by them- Governor Alexander was not the only raising selves which foreign influences should be this kind of ideological alarms; Laura Thomp- adapted to local habits, and which not. While it son, who stayed then at Guam, referred to the reflects a kind of conservative thinking, it did “Spanish padres” similarly, as “ill-fitted to un- not necessarily mean that Chamorros blindly derstand or sympathize with the new influ- followed the missionary discourses. ences rapidly gaining a foothold in Guam” In the Philippines, the mixing of genders in (1947, p. 186). the classrooms was opposed not only by many The importance of political opinions or the of the schools of Spanish missionaries but also American zeal to push for social advances in by many Filipinos who considered those meas- Guam cannot be overstated. The Spanish ures introduced by Americans as socially in- church was conservative and its missionaries convenient. Some of the opponents were even abroad, certainly, expressed very traditional anticlericals, like senator Vicente Sotto (McCoy points of view, as reflected also in the Capu- and Roces 1985, 134). Last but not least, chin documentation. They were disgusted at American officials in the colonies tended to be their fellow American Capuchins who were ideologically more conservative. Differences dressed with shoulder strap and trousers, and with Olano, furthermore, had existed before one of the brothers actually being divorcee his arrival in Guam, and were well known to (Vera 1949b). Another Spanish priest pro- the Navy officials in Guam, since the Monsi- claimed belonging to freemasonry a mortal sin gnor had preached in Sumay, the Navy’s big- 88 Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II gest concentration. The conservatism argu- ticed it mostly through the so-called Sawada ment, then, appears as the overt argument to Incident. In 1933 a comment by a Japanese liv- justify a measure motivated for more covert ing on Guam appeared in an article in the reasons; probably it was mostly a smoke newspaper Osaka Mainichi, titled “Anti- screen. Japanese Agitation is Strong in Guam.” This The reason for the drive against Spanish publication triggered an unusually strong reac- missionaries seemingly rested in the need to tion from the Navy (Higuchi 1997, 164-65). reinforce the American power, naval and oth- It is easy to guess that suspicion towards erwise, over Guam at a time when the Japanese missionaries was also affected, and from both empire showed an increasingly assertive policy sides. Dispersed throughout Micronesia after in Asia and the Pacific. Mutual contacts be- the exit of the Germans when defeated at the tween the US and Japan remained stable for World War I, Spanish missionaries could circu- some years after World War I, when Tokyo ob- late information among themselves without tained the rest of Micronesian islands as a previous knowledge of their respective gov- “Class C” mandate from the League of Na- ernments, and both American and Japanese tions—which amounted to a territorial cession. Governors appear sensitive to this possibility While the Washington Naval Conference of of leakage, regardless of who could benefit 1921-22, between the United States, Japan and more from an hypothetical exchange of infor- the United Kingdom, reached an agreement mation. The Japanese government increased not to construct additional fortifications and pressure against missionaries under its rule, thus contained suspicion of the other’s motiva- making requests in 1936 to the Bishop in tions, the Japanese military triumphs in Man- charge of the South Seas District to replace churia of 1931 dramatically changed the Spanish and Americans with Japanese (Higu- context. Although the possibility of war was chi, 2006, 150). American authorities also in- still perceived as remote, the perception of the creased suspicions, partly because Protestants, Japanese menace was amplified and convinced with merely 1-2% of backing among Chamor- the Americans, despite the absence of clear ros, never matched the influence of the foreign proof, that the Tokyo was secretly fortifying Catholics over the Chamorros. Protestant in- their islands in the rest of Micronesia (Peattie fluence was much lower even to the levels of 1985, pp. 200-201; Naga 1988, p. 159). Tension the Philippines, where it neared 10%. Security provoked a “swift” reaction by Washington, reasons coloured how the Spanish missionaries ordering naval maneuvers, which were fol- were perceived: it was more directed at their lowed by the Japanese fleet with their own, in “foreigness” than at their “catholiciziness”. sight of Guam (Maga 1988, pp. 119-120). The Being mindful that his period as bishop of increasing tension in the world, certainly, mat- Guam was destined to be the last provided by a tered for a strategically located island with a Spaniard, Olano seemingly focused on the ef- closed port that played a key role in eaves- forts to maintain the local blend of Catholi- dropping on foreign communications. The cism. On the one hand, he guided the American Navy was searching for confidential incorporation of the new missionary arrivals information—and preventing others from ob- when in 1936, the first American Capuchins taining it. were posted to Guam from Pennsylvania. In the 1930’s, security concerns surpassed Later, additional Americans arrived from De- any other. The welfare of Chamorros was di- troit, bringing to a total of ten the priests who rectly affected, because shortages of rice devel- came to Guam to work before Pearl Harbor. oped as commerce was cut with the Japanese At the same time, Olano’s attempt to bring mandated islands or through ships of Japanese American teaching sisters to Guam failed. But nationality. Japanese companies that traded on the other hand, Olano established new insti- copra and other goods with Saipan and Japan tutions that would remain after his departure. (Higuchi 1997, 158-159) were especially af- He organized catechetics and established pon- fected, but the community living in Guam no- tifical works, following the instructions of ei- Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II 89 ther the Pope or Monsignor P. Piani, the Apos- the number of missionaries in charge was re- tolic Delegate to the Philippines. A strongly duced to some of the Americans, the two conservative Catholic youth organization, ‘The Chamorro recently ordained as Catholic priests Knights of Christ the King’ ( Caballeros de Cristo (Fathers Jesús Baza Dueñas, in 1938, and Os- Rey), was founded under his Vicariate (Thom- car Luján Calvo, in 1940), and a Baptist minis- son 1947, p. 185; Olano 1949, 210). ter, the Reverend Joaquín Flores Sablán. On 8 The bishop caused further problems to the January 1942, scarcely a month after the inva- Navy officials. In March 1937, Olano did criti- sion, however, Olano and Jáuregui were or- cized the American educational system as less dered to leave the island, to be taken aboard effective than the Catholic, which provoked a the Japanese ship Argentina Maru, together with strong reaction by the Navy governor B. V. prisoners from Allied countries, such as their McCandlish. He accused the church of corrup- fellow American missionaries. tion in the handling of fees for marriages and Olano and Jáuregui traveled first to the is- the like, but the Monsignor won the row, basi- land of Shikoku, then to Kobe where they were cally thanks to the backing of the Guam Con- interrogated. In Japan, both were released after gress, both with regard to his criticism to the verification of their nationality and enjoyed new educational system and against the accusa- relative freedom, living at a Jesuit convent in tions of misusing fees. Itabashi, Tokyo, then headed by the Rev. Fr. At the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Berganza, the superior of the Jesuits. Olano process of replacing Spanish with American and Jáuregui stayed together with fellow missionaries was nearly complete. From the Basques especially devoted to Micronesia. Jes- group of ten missionaries and two brothers,4 uit father José Herreros Cervera, who had trav- only Fray Jesús de Begoña, born as Ramón eled occasionally to Micronesia as the solicitor Jáuregui Aranzábal, remained, working as the of the Caroline Islands and had published a Bishop Olano’s secretary. In the meantime, as book on the Catholicism there,5 was the most the international situation worsened, the num- prominent, but among them were also Juan ber of American officials on Guam had also Bizcarra, who spent the rest of his life in the decreased due to the Roosevelt administration’ Palau, and Brother Juan Arizeta, who had lived increasingly pessimistic perception about also many years on Pohnpei and Pala (Hezel Guam’s future. It considered the island as the 1991, pp. 116, 243). Olano’s status in the most “impractical” (Maga 1988, p. 169) terri- church hierarchy encouraged many visits from tory to defend in case of Japanese attack and, fellow clerics, such as those from members of as a consequence, most of the American per- the Adoratrix of the Most Holy Sacrament, sonnel had been evacuated. Olano’s preoccu- who lived nearby; the Handmaidens of the Sa- pations about the demise of his strand of cred Heart, some of whom also came from Catholicism among Guamanians, certainly, Navarre; the Mercedarian Sisters of Berriz, in were marginalized by the shadow of the war. charge of the missions in Micronesia; Marianist Leonardo Meninabeitia; and the cloistered THE PACIFIC WAR Carmelite Sisters, from Tokyo’s Seminary On 8 December 1941, Agaña was bombed and Mayor. the island fell to the Japanese Navy. Bishop Spanish diplomats managed to include Olano learned about the war immediately, since Olano and Jáuregui in the second citizens’ ex- the first news of bombings in Sumay, Apra change between Japan and the Allies and they Harbor and Piti Navy Yard arrived while he were permitted to leave Axis territory. On 15 was celebrating the Mass of the Immaculate September 1943 both priests sailed on the Teia Conception in the Agaña Cathedral (Carano Maru (taking with them a gift from their fellow and Sanchez 1964, p. 269). Olano’s task be- Jesuits of 200 yen, the total amount of money came much more pressing, partly due to the permitted to be taken out of Japan)6 and dis- change-over itself (although it had been rela- embarked in Goa, then a Portuguese colony in tively peaceful), and partly due to the fact that India. Here, Olano and Jáuregui could not 90 Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II board the exchange ship that carried most then, Olano was able to fly finally to Guam on other fellow evacuees, USS Gripsholm, and had on 21 March 1945 After 21 months in Tokyo, to decide by themselves what to do: leaving 4 months in Goa, 9 months in Bombay and 2 Axis territory was the easy part, finding a place months in Australia, and with a weight loss of to reside was not. 21 kilos, as noted in a manuscript note, Olano The two Spaniards had different options returned to his island (Arrayoz 1943, p. 7). about their final destination. First, they could The bishop’s joy was short lived, however, both wait and apply for permission to travel to partly because the hundreds of shocking stories the United States. Secondly, they could also he listened to but also because of the changes travel to Spain, one of the few countries in the in the Catholic church itself. Olano learned of world at that moment that was not involved in the violence and the suffering of the Chamorro the War. Capuchins had sent them enough people during the Japanese occupation, which money through the Spanish Consulate in included also the recent death of one of the Bombay, apparently 500 rupees, (Anonymous priests he had ordained, Jesús Baza Dueñas8. 1945, p. 211) for their return trip to Spain, that The other priest, Oscar Lujan, offered him his could be made by plane via the coast of Africa house, since the Episcopal palace was de- and London. The third option, and their final stroyed, but Olano could not rebuilt the rela- decision, was to return to Guam as soon as tions they had before the war—Lujan evaded possible and therefore remain in India until by not sharing time at home with the bishop. permitted to return to Guam. Olano and Olano noticed Lujan as being “very cold” [bas- Jáuregui remained for several months in Goa, tante frío], reserved, trying to conceal what he from October 1943 to February 1944, and thought, and therefore making Olano feel that were received by Mgr. José Nuñez, patriarch of his return to Guam had not been completely India. When they were allowed to move to welcome, even finishing with a self-question British India, invited by Archbishop Mgr. T. “Was he [Lujan] waiting to become a Bishop?”9 Roberts, the Spanish Capuchins proceeded to After three months, Olano left Lujan’s house Bombay. There they carried out pastoral work, to return to his Episcopal Palace, where a small living with the Catalan Jesuits (Bandra) and en- house made of sagnali (canes and straw) had gaged in a social life as intense as in Japan. been built.10 Finally, Olano became also the Olano and Jáuregui often participated in activi- subject of one of the shocking news: Most Rev. ties: they visited Capuchin missions in the Apollinaris W. Baumgartner, OFM Cap. Had countryside, broadcasted at radio stations and been consecrated titular Bishop of Joppe and again met many people, mostly to collect dona- Vicar Apostolic of Guam. Olano left the island tions in order to return to Micronesia. Among aboard the USS Pastora, two deays after his the acquaintances made at this time were successor’s arrival. With his depature the cen- Fernando Navarro Ibáñez, a Spanish military turies of Spanish predominance over the attaché on his way to Japan (Olano 1949, p. Chamorros Catholicism ended. It was ap- 215)7 and a former apostolic envoy to Guam, proximately half a century after Spain’s politi- Father Villalonga, who bragged of having con- cal departure, when the Spain’s position in the vinced Philippine President Manuel Quezon to world was at her lowest ebb. His departure oc- leave the Masons. curred, more importantly, at a time when the In December 1944, after fourteen months need of ensuring the security strategic island in India, Olano and Jáuregui traveled to Aus- involved, for the first time, the decision to tralia, where the general headquarters for the shape as much as possible the life and culture counter offensive against Japan was located. of islanders. The stay was complicated by a disease that had emerged again and forced him to stay most of OLANO, BETWEEN THREE GOVERNMENTS the two months in a hospital. In March 1945, To understand the definite departure of Olano while Manila was still embattled, Olano flew from Guam as a Bishop, the Pacific War pro- from Brisbane to the Philippines. From Leyte, vides an overall context, but also the conflict- Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II 91 ing interests of the governments playing Labrador O.P. expressed favorable impressions around the issue. For years, the fate of the of the new masters in religious affairs: “[Japa- Basque Bishop depended, more than on his nese authorities] reiterated their assurances that own deeds or personal beliefs, on the confron- they would respect religious beliefs in occupied tational interests of three governments: those countries [...] In a broad sense, one could say of Tokyo, Madrid and Washington, all of that they comply with their commitments.”11 which were more interested in their propa- And the particular situation in Guam did not ganda machines and their own interests in preclude any harsh measure, since even the Guam than in the welfare of thousands of is- American fathers were free for about two landers. All three governments were acutely weeks following the Japanese invasion. This aware of the value of the personal authority of situation turned sour soon, however. First, the a person who held the title of Bishop on fer- American fathers were interned and, later, vently Catholic Guam; an island with a strate- Bishop Olano and Jáuregui followed suit and gic value much bigger than its size. Not were taken to the Episcopal Palace, where they surprisingly all three governments did their ut- remained under guard until being expelled. Af- most to adapt that prestige to their purposes. ter Guam was pacified, the soldiers departed to And although the world experienced the same fight elsewhere, the Japanese Navy governed war, the interests of each country must be the island and all missionary activity was left to traced separately. the two recently ordained Chamorro priest. The reasons for the Japanese decision Japan against Olano do not appear clearly expressed, After the Japanese invasion of Guam, Olano and the arguments provided, when asked about and with him Jáuregui could expect to be well it, were not much convincing. Pascual Artero, treated by their new masters, both because of an Spanish entrepreneur and landowner who Olano’s Spanish identity and his religious posi- was also taken temporarily in prison but re- tion. As citizens of Franco’s Spain, a regime leased just before the Argentina Maru departed friendly to the Japanese Empire, they could with the Americans and the Spaniards, was told easily hope to remain in the island working as that he was not included in the list because he before. Their other identity as missionaries was “good” for Chamorros and Japanese alike could help also at smoothing their contacts (Flores Montoya 1984, p. 111). Later, when the with the Japanese authorities. Tokyo’s “South- Spanish government did ask the same question, ern Advance” (南進) was coupled with propa- more than a year later, the Japanese Foreign ganda campaigns proclaiming how much they Ministry argued that the evacuation should be cared about the religious beliefs professed by considered as having been unavoidable. 12 The their conquered populations, whether Bud- responses were mere smoke screens as there is dhist, Islamic, or Christian. In the rest of Mi- no trace of Olano obstructing the new Japa- cronesia, the officials had shown some nese regime. The bishop himself could count appreciation because of the missionaries’ at- on his own experience in maintaining the tempts to “civilize” and since the early 1920’s, Catholic Church in Guam through strong co- their fellow missionaries working in their operation among Catholics, either Spaniards, “mandates” had even received occasional sub- Chamorros or even Japanese. It is difficult to sidies from the governors to support their ac- believe that Japanese priests asked for it. Mgr. tivities (Peattie 1988, p. 84). After Pearl Fukahori Sen’emon, the prelate from the Dio- Harbor, furthermore, the bishop’s fellow cese of Fukuoka [wrongly spelled as Fukuhoku Spaniards in the Carolines remained in location in Olano’s Diary] in charge of religious affairs, as before, same as in the other territory with who later would be appointed Bishop of Japan, majority of Catholics, the Philippines, where or Mgr. Ideguchi Miyoichi, the Apostolic Ad- the Church was glad to recognize even the re- ministrator of Yokohama and the South Seas, covery of their privileges. Even a wartime diary or Nan’yô (南洋), demonstrated cordial rela- written in secrecy by a Dominican Father, Juan tions—and during his exile in Japan, Olano 92 Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II maintained a collaborative attitude. He ac- mand in Guam did not show much sophistica- cepted plainly the new masters by writing a let- tion, as demonstrated by some of their ter appointing Dueñas as pro-vicar apostolic decisions. The comments and conversations and priest in charge of the vicariate in his ab- recorded of the Japanese in Guam show that sence (Olano 1949, p. 48)13 and transferred his they did not go deep in nuances about the dif- work in Guam to Japanese prelates, like Idegu- ferent legacies left by Spain and the United chi, who expressed sympathy for his mistreat- States, and even the biggest political issues ment. Even, thanks to their shared religious were expressed in very vague terms, such as beliefs, Olano and Fukahori maintained a rela- asserting “Franco is a good friend of us” tion apparently above their national identities; (Olano 1949, p. 23). Asking the Catholic priests the Japanese took the risk of carrying letters to to write a letter to George Tweed, a U.S. ra- and from Guam—which Ideguchi refused— dioman hiding in the jungle, encouraging his and prevented father Dueñas from being sent surrender, as the Minseibu (民政部), or De- to the island of Rota. Even, Fukahori referred partment of Civil Affairs did, points at least to to Olano his frustration better than to Japanese an erratic policy in their search of the only militarists, as Wakako Higuchi has shown, American out of their control, as does the since he asserted to the army that the Church temporary arrest of the only another Spaniard efforts were doing “well, more than […] ex- in the island, entrepreneur and landowner Pas- pected”, but, when visiting Olano in Tokyo, cual Artero (Flores Montoya 1984, p. 110). acknowledged a deep failure about the low Guam, however, was part of a much wider Chamorro attendance to Mass (Higuchi, 2006, Empire. Then, placing the focus in the Tokyo 150) headquarters, we can find two more explana- Three reasons related to Guam can be sur- tions to the expelling of Olano, and perhaps mised that may explain the decision to expel more significant. Firstly, the fact of Guam be- Olano. First, as Olano himself suggested, the ing a small island without foreign contact al- authorities wanted to use his home. The deci- lowed the Japanese officials more freedom to sion of using his well preserved buildings for act as they wished. This fact may suggest why military offices or residence could have been an Olano was expelled while his fellow missionar- important reason even if the premises were ies in the Philippines were not: as a way to test seized partially: Olano was to be asking con- the reaction towards a much more important tinuously the devolution of Church’ properties, personage, again a foreigner belonging to a both in person and through written complaints, Neutral country (Ireland) and heading the and, if allowed to stay at the premises, the Catholic church of another recently conquered neighborhood would be, at least, unpleasant. overwhelmingly Catholic territory: the Arch- Secondly, the Japanese could think that despite bishop of the Philippines, Monsignor Michael deporting Olano, they could retain some of his J. O’Doherty. Olano’s position was resolved influence by appointing a local—and inex- soon, but the Archbishop’s issue was stalled pert—prelate. In fact, just before the outbreak during the whole occupation, waiting for a ne- of the Pacific War, in 1941, Tokyo had man- gotiation with Rome (Terada 1999, pp. 237 - aged to convince Rome to order the replace- 240). Secondly, the intense Japanization policy ment of all foreign priests who headed dioceses to be carried out on Guam. Different to other in Japan, as “suggested” by its apostolic dele- areas conquered in the first stages of the Pa- gate in Tokyo, Monsignor Paolo Marella. Fur- cific War, the Japanese command designated thermore, the Army’s General Staff Guam as a “permanent possession”, that is, an Headquarters opened a Catholic pacification area where “independence or even political work office (Higuchi, 2006, 151): if given a participation was [not] likely” (Higuchi, 2001, chance, they would try to substitute Olano with p. 23). Having in mind the experience in the a local priest, who could be given also the op- rest of Micronesia, but also the example of the portunity of working without the shadow of Ainu in the island of Hokkaido, the Minseibu the former bishop. Thirdly, the Japanese com- started the Japanization soon and forcefully. Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II 93

The early opening of elementary schools, three stages that show the different aims of scarcely one month after the occupation, and Spain’s foreign policy: pro-Axis, Neutrality and, the longer number of hours dedicated to teach the last one, looking for survival. During the Japanese language, as compared to other con- first months after Pearl Harbor, Olano’s prob- quered territories, such the former Dutch East lems were hardly noticed in Madrid, mostly be- Indies (Higuchi, 2001, p. 22-23), shows the dif- cause his distress was set against Spain’s ferent objectives aimed at the Chamorros. political friendship with Tokyo. General Fran- While Indonesia or the Philippines were to be cisco Franco’s brother-in-law and leader of the granted independence, Guam was not. Perhaps Falange Party, the Spanish counterpart of the with too much voluntarism, because the impe- Italian Fascists, Ramón Serrano Suñer, was the rial government perceived Chamorros in Guam minister for Foreign Affairs. He helped Japan’s as beig too much influenced by the United war effort after Pearl Harbor, either providing States and the Catholic church, the Minseibu intelligence, accepting the representation of considered the Japanization “easy to imple- Japanese interests in most of the Americas or ment” (Higuchi, 2001, p. 22)—and that en- exchanging goods. Therefore, when Spain’s tailed a harsher treatment of the Bishop. ambassador in Tokyo, Santiago Méndez de The Japanese did not respect Chamorro Ca- Vigo, informed him of Olano’s difficult situa- tholicism as they did in the Philippines, and tion, the report, together with those concerning bishop Olano’s exile was the first consequence the problems suffered by other missionaries of this. While the Japanese were desireous to scattered about the Asia-Pacific area, was de- get the Catholic church in the Philippines to moted in importance. Since the Catholic cooperate, with a policy based on negotiation, Church was an influential lobby that supported gradual steps and care to avoid further difficul- the regime, the news about Olano created ties (Terada, 2003, p. 235), the Department of some unrest among officials and weakened re- Civil Affairs in Guam opted for prioritizing lations between Madrid and Tokyo, but little strategic targets, like using priests in pacifica- was done officially to alleviate Olano’s situation campaigns. The decision by the Japanese tion. Political relations were paramount.14 military to send Olano away from the island, After September 1942, when Serrano Suñer then, shows that neither Americans after their was substituted as Foreign Minister by Count arrival in nineteenth century, nor the Japanese Jordana, the Olano affair changed to a second after Pearl Harbor, wanted the presence of a stage. A military officer of conservative ideas, foreign bishop, both being afraid of its influ- Jordana started gradually a policy move to- ence. But its also shows the difficulty of put- wards neutrality, which he did by compensating ting into practice what the propaganda had the pro-German activities of the Spanish re- said, since the postulated respect to the relig- gime in the European theater with pro- ious beliefs of the conquered populations American moves in the Pacific area. For this stopped not only at the vicinity of battlefields policy in search of neutrality, Bishop Olano’s but also at the imperial perceptions held in To- case became an excellent asset for Madrid: he kyo. Respect of religious beliefs depended on was a high-ranking Spaniard with a task not po- general assumptions related to the overall in- litically related, being in “desperate straits” due terest of the Empire, upon which the decision to mistreatment and, furthermore, the Japanese to respect them ultimately rested: they were to were to be blamed, not the Germans or Ital- be maintained so long as Tokyo considered ians. In the Spring of 1943, furthermore, To- them useful. kyo proposed to up-grade their legations to embassies and the new Minister preferred not Spain to oppose the proposal straightforwardly (it The interest of Madrid in Olano increased as was previously accepted, and promoted by his the war progressed, but it was related mostly to predecessor Serrano Suñer) but complained its foreign concerns. From the Spanish per- about Olano’s treatment. The first reaction of spective, we can divide the Olano affair in the Japanese was to defend their deeds— 94 Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II neither Olano nor Jáuregui had been mis- out on the deck or had to carry his own lug- treated, their property was maintained, as were gage. With it, on one side, the government of the religious services at the cathedral15—but general Franco rallied the backing of the later, regardless of the arguments, realized that Church. Heralding the preoccupation for a it would be better to accede to Spanish de- priest doing its missionary work was a good mands and agreed to include Olano and mark, while the government’ task was helped Jáuregui among those nationals departing war- by concerned Capuchins, in Navarre, who pub- time Japan via the exchange ships. It was a last lished a leaflet with reports taken from differ- minute decision, taken only after the United ent media about Olano’s whereabouts, entitled, States had agreed to accept Olano and Jáuregui “What is happening in Guam?” as well as a let- —and a fact made known to Madrid only after ter from secretary Jáuregui, written in Basque Olano had already disembarked in Goa. In any to avoid censorship (Arrayoz, n.d., pp. 1, 4). case, by allowing the exchange, Japan, in fact, On the other hand, the campaign was prepared chose the easiest demand to comply with of as a useful way to rally fellow Spaniards behind the various number of Spanish complaints a changing foreign policy leaning towards the concerning the treatment of their citizens in Allies, as it was the first time that the Madrid the Philippines.16 During Jordana’s pro- Government allowed this level of open criti- Neutrality policy, searching for a solution to cism against a former friend. General Franco the problem of Bishop Olano became one of had been caught in a extremely difficult situa- Madrid’s more strongly voiced complaints tion: he desperately needed to side with the against the Japanese, and the pressure got a fa- former enemies while maintaining the same vorable result. ideological appearance inside the country. That The third stage in the Olano affair shows strange article clearly expressed the difficult the lack of resources of Madrid when the tide perspectives for the regime under the Allies. of the war was against the Axis. Olano ceased Voicing Bishop Olano’s case, that Spain had to be a subject of discussion with the Japanese been deluded by Japan and that its fate was diplomats, but then became a propaganda none of their business, even to the point of weapon and, by the beginning of 1944, when suggesting that Japan’s defeat was welcomed the growing possibility of an Allied victory was a strange volte-face. Dictatorships rarely made desireable for Spain to display openly the acknowledge publicly their past mistakes, cer- ill feeling with Japan, Olano appeared in rele- tainly, and The Times referred to this comment vant articles of the Spanish press. He was men- as “eye-opening news”17. tioned in a purported news item dated As the time passed, Madrid was in even February 11, from the branch of the official more precarious situation. Once the end of the Spanish News Agency, EFE, in Buenos Aires, war could be foreseen, Madrid needed, more that stated: “intellectual circles in Latin Amer- than ever, to approach the Allies with argu- ica are disturbed by the bad behavior toward ments demonstrating their confrontational atti- Bishop Olano and the near suppression of the tude against the Axis. Then, Olano’s case was Spanish language [in the Philippines].” On the remembered again, in spite that there were no February 16, the front page of the Falangist more news about him. For instance, in Sep- daily, ¡Arriba!, recognized that Spaniards should tember 1944, General Franco mentioned to the have been aware earlier of the occupying Japa- American ambassador in Madrid, Carlton nese army’s prosecution against Spain, its citi- Hayes, that he had been on the brink of break- zens and their culture in the Philippines. ing off relations with Japan a year earlier, men- Olano’s presumed mistreatment was ex- tioning explicitly Olano’s case and the situation pounded and newspapers started to offer news in the Philippines (Hayes 1945, pp. 332-333). contrary to the Japanese, such as his trip with Later, as the end of the war drew near, the the American prisoners, that he was assigned need to reveal their problems with the Axis in- to the lower deck of the ship, that he had to creased in leaps and bounds, and the news endure 39 hours without being able to come concerning Olano was exaggerated more than Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II 95 ever. Therefore, in March 1945, the Spanish personally called on Admiral Chester Nimitz, media included now false accounts of Olano; it commandant of the Pacific Fleet. The Ameri- was said that he had been incarcerated because can answered him merely to write a letter re- of his complaints against the Japanese authori- questing the favor, which was later denied ties; also that he was put in a concentration through a message written in pencil on a “small camp in Japan.18 Of course, they did not men- piece of paper”19. Olano, then, tried to circum- tion that, by then, Olano was traveling from vent the refusal by talking with a Major coop- Australia to Guam and no attempt was made to erative with the Catholics, William P. McCahill, help the bishop in his aim of entering the is- but he had been sent to the United States in land. Madrid was thinking of declaring war on early May and replaced by Captain Charles Japan as a way of participating in the San Fran- McVarish (Olano 1949, p. 127). cisco Conference and of gaining a place in the Olano soon understood that he was next on Allies-dominated world, but there was ample the list. On the very day that Japan surren- proof of its friendly relations with Germany dered, 15 August 1945, Olano had a crucial and Italy. Accusations against Japan were in- lunch with the American prelate who arguably terpreted as last minute lifesavers. had played the biggest role in U.S. foreign pol- Regardless of the effectiveness of these at- icy in World War II (by visiting, for example, tempts, Spain’s foreign policy made a complete Spain, the Vatican, and other countries, in about-face toward Japan, much more radical 1942-43), New York’s Archbishop Cardinal than toward Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. Francis Spellman. Spellman delivered Olano a Olano’s case was an appropriate excuse, used letter from the Pope, counseling him to re- by the Spanish propaganda machine when it nounce the vicariate, while joining personally fitted into its overall foreign policy, making use this advice, that others had transmitted Olano of facts that best suited its situation vis a vis the before, such as Buffalo’s Bishop O’Hara, also United States. But after departing Japan, the present at the lunch, who had informed Olano fate of Olano and Jáuregui was no longer rele- earlier of Nimitz having opposed his entry to vant, much less so when they desired to return Guam (Olano 1949, p. 132). The bishop re- as soon as possible to Guam—and it involved signed this same day and five days later Pope difficult negotiations with the American gov- Pius VI named Baumgartner as Bishop, who ernment that Madrid was not ready to carry on. was to stay in the island until the year 1970. The grievances against Japan were easier to use. Then, on 23 October the new bishop arrived Like Tokyo, Madrid cared very little for on the island almost secretly, aboard Nimitz’ Olano’s real interests, much less for the Gua- personal aircraft, and on 25 October, Olano manians welfare. was directed to leave the island. Bishop Olano decried it as being a surprising move because The United States of America he was given only two hours to pack every- United States’ first reaction to bishop Olano thing, but the same had occurred when former should have been surprise, after his appearance American missionaries arrived in the island in Australia insisting on returning to Guam, (Olano 1949, 134; Rogers 1995, 201). followed by a kind of uneasiness. They were Two broad arguments can explain such a suspicious of the Prelate trying to chase the ad- strong American position to the point that the vances of the American troops in Guam in or- Pope was forced to accept: security reasons, der to reach the island as soon as possible and like during the 1930s, gave preference to US or Olano must have anticipated the unease local priests, and the Denazification policy, as through the permission denied to his personal agreed during the Potsdam conference. Foreign secretary. First, Jáuregui’s authorization to eavesdropping and intelligence activities con- travel to Guam did not reach Australia at the tinued to be crucial to the American presence same time as Olano’s. Then, the bishop never in Guam, but it is difficult to accuse Spanish managed to arrange a permission for his secre- priests of obstructing the gathering of intelli- tary to follow him to Guam, in spite that he gence, especially after the Japanese were gone 96 Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II and the whole of Micronesia was under the missionaries had also an anti-Japanese record, American umbrella. The possibility of Span- besides Olano and Jauregui’s exile. Six of the iards sending information to the Soviet Union Spanish Jesuits in Micronesia were killed in or to another foreign power does not seem to Yap and Belau by Japanese soldiers. Certainly, be a realistic possibility, and much less to nobody could point to traces of any Spaniard Spain, a pariah in the world at that time fearing in Guam or Micronesia having acted as anti- reprisals for its pro-Axis past. Nimitz showed American in Micronesia let alone as clearly also his personal preferences at Olano’s fifth-columnists. first visit, who wrote later about his “rude” be- Although Guam presented a different pic- havior in contrast with that to the Chamorro ture to the Philippines, Nimitz preferred to Padre: “Whereas, how charming with Padre used the same simple ideas in relation to the Calvo” (Arrayoz 1943, p. 29). Spanish missionaries and argued they were Getting rid of Axis remains was a cherished “Francoists and Fascists”, as noted in a deleted policy by Admiral Nimitz. He wanted not only text in the manuscript of the History of the Mis- to expel Japanese from the islands, but also sion by father Román de Vera (1949, p. 16). Italians, Germans and Spaniards. In October The Commander of the Pacific Fleet informed 1945, for instance, Nimitz asserted that the ten Cardinal Spellman that he did not want Span- Germans living in Micronesia were a “subver- iards in Guam and, as for the Spanish mission- sive element” (Friedman, 2001, p. 121), and aries representation, he himself pressed and seemingly had a similar perception of the many managed to have the Vatican accept the chang- other foreigners. Spain was widely identified as ing of nationalities. The references to Fascism Fascist at this time, with a Falange Party in look like, again, as a smoke screen to hide the charge whose foreign branches during the war real motivations. years were said to have been working as a se- At the end of the Pacific War, there was cret army for the Axis interests. Partly, it was another difference compared to the previous true; Falange admired Fascist Italy and Nazi stages of American presence in Guam: Wash- Germany and displayed openly their anti- ington’s policy towards islanders aimed a step Americanism while there were Falangist further up in their control of Micronesians. branches in many foreign countries, through Cultural security, meaning that “American the Spanish communities scattered not only in planners hoped to couple Pacific Islanders’ Latin America. However, they had stopped it loyalty to the United States through the use of activities in the years 1940-41, although in religion, language, and social values” (Fried- some cases continued underground work. man, 2001, p. 119) appears as the main reason There was also a Falange branch in the Philip- for the American decision to do away in haste pines but, in any case, Nimitz’s perception with Olano. Between 1945 and 1947, American could not be applied to the Spanish citizens in strategic planners were seriously interested in Guam. They had a remarkable anti-Japanese the future racial composition and cultural ori- record, both laymen and missionaries. There entation of the Pacific Islands, especially Mi- had been no Fascist or anti-American activities cronesia (Friedman, 2001, p. 118). Bishop prior to the war and the only American who Olano was perceived as a possible hindrance, remained free in Guam during the Japanese then, in forging the loyalty towards the United occupation, the already mentioned radioman States, both through the language he used George R. Tweed, managed to do so because through the religion he defended and the social he was hidden on family lands by Antonio Ar- values attached to it. tero, the son of the only Spanish lay citizen liv- English does not seem to be extensively ing in Guam, Pascual Artero. The U.S. widespread at this time. Father Pastor de Ar- government recognized this risk by giving Ar- rayoz in his notes on the History of the Mission of tero the only Medal of Freedom awarded to Guam mockingly comments on the data offered Guam after the war, in spite that many others by World’s Almanaque, that in the 1936 edition had helped Tweed while he was in hiding. The pointed to a 10% of islands as English speak- Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II 97 ers, while the next year raised the percentage to The position of American officials in rela- a 70% after a new census. The priests asserted tion to religion and the social values of the that the Census was elaborated on by the population appears as having the same line of schools teachers, much akin to adding crosses thinking. While the American usage and habits on the questions related to the speaking of seem to have made little inroads among the English language. Furthermore, he considered population, the more conservative ideas held that even the 10% was an excessive figure and by the Spanish priests fitted better with tthe asserted that “the Chamorro people still today raditional points of view of the elders of the do not speak English” (Arrayoz, n.d., p. 29). islands. They surely shared Olano’s comments Spanish was almost not used anymore, except in a letter dated August 27 1945, against the among religious priests and the most deeply 200,000 soldiers “hungry for pleasure” and his hispanicized. Oscar Luján Calvo, or Pale Scot, as suspicions towards girls attending dances on he is called, the only Chamorro priest to sur- Saturdays and Sundays “it is not strange that vive the Japanese occupation of Guam, can misfortunes happen (they are countless)” (Ar- show these feelings as thorough the references rayoz 1943, p. 20). Besides any kind of cultural that can be read in Olano’s Diary of the Japanese attachment to Spain, that was even more re- Occupation. On one occasion, he heard the con- mote after the Pacific War, the popularity of fession of eleven blind Puerto Ricans, surely in those values relied on being assumed by the Spanish and on another, he decided to speak, population as their own. The diminishing of again in Spanish, when asked to record, pho- the importance of Hispanic culture as a part of nographically, about his experiences during the the Chamorro identity can again be understood Japanese occupation (Olano, Diary..., pp. 129, as the continuation of the pre-war policy that 131) There are also other references that point considered Christianity and the English lan- to a language not yet forgotten but, in any case, guage as the two most important aspects in as- Spanish was not a viable alternative to English similating the Micronesians to US control, but and was not used anymore for preaching after with a reinvigorated strength. The substitution 1916 (Vera 1949b, [12]). of Spaniards by the American clergy could help Washington’s policy of Chamorros speaking speed a ‘‘… more rapid Americanization of the English, then, had to be detracted from the use natives.’’20 of Chamorro. Olano seems to suggest this as In 1945, there was a crucial difference in the reason for his departure, when, in his Diary, the policy towards the Chamorros that had he warned American officials that without been carried out before: this time the Navy did more Chamorro-speaking priests, in addition to not pursue its policy towards the islands exclu- Father Calvo, many islanders would die with- sively. Spellman’s disagreements with Nimitz out receiving the last sacraments. The answer forced the Cardinal to write President Truman, was clear: “There are orders that English must soon after the admiral’s dismissal in November be used”(Olano, Diary..., p. 133). Of course, 1945, warning on the consequences of the de- Spanish could be an impediment to that policy parture of western missionaries: ‘‘… all the and the arrival, on 19 July 1945, of Francisco good done in the interest of Christianity will be Ramón Espinosa, a Spanish professor at An- lost and the natives will then have only one napolis, in order to translate Spanish docu- path open to them—the return to their former ments concerning the history of Guam into pagan and savage lives.’’21 President Truman English, emphasizes the American concern ordered the State-War-Navy Coordinating with the Spanish language as a hindrance for Committee to study it. Following Friedman, their desire (Olano 1949, p. 156). But the main they came to the agreement that those mission- obstacle to American planning was the still aries would not be removed (unless they had widespread usage of Chamorro, which is what been members of Fascist parties) but that it Father Arrayoz asserted the Guamese were was inadvisable to allow new ones. And the speaking. Joint Chiefs of Staff “more specifically,” wanted to limit Spanish priests and nuns while 98 Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II

American missionaries were to be “utilized to the Philippines and Guam, both during the the maximum extent possible,” (Friedman, Spanish and the pre-war American period. The 2001, p. 121). It was the definite resolution of reaction against Tweed can be seen as an ex- the administration about the Catholic mission- ample of that lost pattern. The American ra- aries, since Truman seemingly accepted the dioman criticized Fathers Calvo and Dueñas in recommendations and Spellman didn’t protest his memoirs for their behavior during the further. Japanese Occupation, and Calvo was the orga- The course of these events resembled the nizer of a protest against Tweed when he re- decision after the Spanish-American War to turned to the island for a while. But this time, expel Spanish missionaries, later partially over- the impact of the protest was scarce, without turned just for the lack of other candidates to the backing of the American Bishop. Olano fill the post. And the need to secure the terri- surely was also enraged, but his only opportu- tory can be traced back to the 1930’s, since nity was to reduce the importance of the con- Nimitz in 1945 simply revived a policy that the flict, as he referred to them merely as “small U.S. naval governors had pursued before the tribulations” in a letter to Cardinal Fumasoni war. After the war, the policy was more vigor- (Olano, Diary..., pp.154-55). By then, Olano’s ous: preparing the island to become the base influence was too weak to resist in any way the for a bigger and better military defense, this American wave. When Olano was ordered to time against the Soviet Union and needing leave Guam for the second time, besides the more space than before. Yet, many decisions uncertainty about his future, he also carried a remained in the air: for example, the regime to sense of puzzlement about the islands in which govern Guam remained to be decided (Maga he lived for almost three decades: so many 1985, p. 188). And, in relation to the Catholics, things had changed in the last weeks that he the American officials finally were satisfied was unable to grasp them completely. His de- enough with the removal of the head. Since parture had a deep meaning for Guam since 1946, there was a kind of relaxation towards with him went away Catholicism’s association Spanish missionaries, that were allowed to en- with old Spain and, with it, for better or worse, ter, even while Fr. Bizcarra, for instance, had an identity that for centuries had been part of attended Falange celebrations in Japan. Guam. Some time later, when Olano returned For the first time there was an ample Guam, his arrival was merely as a person who agreement in Washington on policy towards wished to live on the island. And he died there, Guam, that focused on the cultural security. in spite of all the changes undergone. The results are obvious. Julius Krug, Ickes’ successor as Secretary of the Interior, visited NEW ERA, ADAPTED IDENTITY Guam in February and March of 1947, and he In the midst of the violence generated by the asserted that naval administration had taught Pacific War, when many people lost their lives, the Guamanians the general principles of the the personal story of a bishop who wanted to American way of life and that the Guamanians remain among his people and continue preach- were ready for autonomy since they ‘‘… speak ing was of minor importance. Olano’s rank, or our language with facility; they understand our the influence he could wield over the people of political philosophy and have the same social Guam, were much more important than his organization and institutions that we have on personal drama and his desire to stay at the is- the mainland. They have been devout Chris- land. Regardless of the regime, whether Japa- tians for generations and their loyalty to the nese, Spanish, or American, all looked on United States is attested to in suffering and Bishop Olano’s case as a means of achieving a bloodshed.’’22 particular goal, either to exert a stronger hold Things Spanish entered definitely into the over the Chamorros, or to set the foundations historical sphere and the Church stopped being for a new policy. Olano, definitely, was a loser an instrument of agency by the Chamorros because he was powerless among the strings against the political power, as had occurred in pulled by the opposing foreign interests. Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II 99

The policy with more lasting consequences church for salvation—material and spiritual— occurred at the end of the Pacific War, when in difficult moments, first when the nationality the Bonins, the Volcanoes, and the Aleutians of the governor and that of the priest were the became the ‘‘ultimate’’ line of American de- same, and later when they were different. But fence in the Pacific. It meant that Guam, dif- after the Pacific War, the political power was ferent than during the Pacific War was to be not to be overwhelmed easily. If the Guam leg- defended as an American territory, and made islature and the bishop defeated the Navy gov- the Americanization of the islanders a target to ernor before the war, the case was to be achieve. That is, that Chamorro identity, or kos- different. The Chamorros seem to have been tumbren chamorru, should be re-elaborated, so as peripheral losers in the struggle among the to be as similar as possible to American culture. great powers to profit from the bishop’s influ- By this time, an outdated and especially con- ence and, later, they also lost a part of their servative strand of the Hispanic language, cul- ability to influence their own identity. ture and social values had become part of Chamorro ethnicity, supplementing their own ENDNOTES original indigenous ethnicity--such as when 1 An earlier draft was edited by Marjorie G. they used the Chamorro language as a way to Driver; the author thanks her not only this con- distance themselves from their rulers. The rea- tribution but also the documentation provided sons to expel Olano, then, appear to have been for research for this article; without it, this work more pro-American than anti-Spanish or anti- would have not been written. Comments from Wakako Higuchi and an anonymous reviewer Catholic. have been also very helpful. Americans were devoted to the idea think- 2 Office of Coordination and Review, Depart- ing it was the best also for the islanders who, in ment of State, Washington, February 8, 1932. most cases, shared the idea. Many Chamorros NARA. Record Group 59. Box 3716. in 1945 were inside this category, eager to 3 Spanish Foreign Ministry Archives (henceforth, comply with American suggestions and accept- AMAE, for its name in Spanish), Leg. 1737, exp. ing the culture of the victor as their own. In- 13. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana, 8 March 1943. stead of asking the priests to learn Chamorro, 4 M.R.P. Xavier de Sangüesa, M.R.P. Román de as had happened in the past, they rushed to Vera, M.R.P. Bernabé de Cáseda, M.R.P. Blas de learn English themselves. They were accepting Cáseda, R.P. Gil de Legaria, R.P. Marcelo de Villavax, R.P. Eugenio de Legaria, R.P. Pastor themselves the convenience of using the Eng- de Arrayoz, R.P. Serafín de Lazaun, R.P. Santi- lish language considering the rejection of part ago de Ibiricu and Br. Vicente de Beortegui. of their own identity as a necessary trade-off 5 Interview with Fr. Juan Bizcarra, Koror, May with the path of modernity. 30, 1994. I thank Wakako Higuchi for the in- Regardless of the contradictions of search- formation about the book. ing for a better future that entailed for them a 6 See corresp. in AMAE, Leg. 3195, esp. 36. more limited autonomy than to other territo- 7 Traveling with his wife, daughter, and maid, ries, the faith placed in the Americans after Navarro Ibáñez’s was an attention-grabbing late their liberation from Japan seemingly provoked appointment made in order to learn of devel- a certain loss to the Chamorros. By at least in opments in the Pacific War. He was told to pro- ceed first to Río de Janeiro but, in Brazil, his par renouncing their different practice of Ca- itinerary was changed to travel to India in order tholicism Chamorros lost also an agent for to board the Teia Maru. agency, since the Spanish strand can be consid- 8 Interview with Doris Lujan Carrillo, Guam, 1 ered, in Vicente Diaz’s words, as “a virtual December 1990. Chamorro domain, a kind of surrogate cultural 9 Notes taken apparently after a question “Which space.” Catholic church had worked in the sev- was the reason that you left the house of P. enteenth century to justify their extermination, Calvo?” In Arrayoz 1943, p. 28. but later had been their main defender against 10 Notes taken alter a letter from Bishop Olano to the despotism of the governors and the rest of the Convent in Burlada, apparently dated Sep- authorities. Chamorros had always run to the tember 27, 1945. Arrayoz, 1943, p. 18. 100 Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II

11 “[Las autoridades japonesas] ha reiterado la ries 371, exp. 39735. C2386/216/41, 28 afirmación y promesa de que respetarán la February 1944. Regarding Japanese comments, creencias religiosas de los pueblos conquistados. Magic Summaries, Shigemitsu to Suma, March [...] En general, se puede decir que han cumplido 1, 1944. su promesa” Typescript copy at the Convent of 18 “El obispo de Guam, de origen español, fue Santo Tomás [Ávila]. Entry of 8 Feb. 1942, pp. encarcelado por sus protestas ante las 42-43. The published English translation, in autoridades niponas. Se quejó de las matanzas Labrador 1989, pp. 60-61. realizadas por los japoneses entre la población 12 Magic Summaries, July 5 1943. indígena. Chile va a declarar la guerra a Japón”, 13 Before this comment from April 24, 1942, in Arriba, 27 March 1945. March 8, Olano refers to the same letter as “ad- 19 Olano, 1949, p. 126; Arrayoz, 1943, pp. 29-30. vising” Dueñas to take charge. A manuscript comment adds “Due to this denial 14 AMAE, Leg. 3195, exp. 32. Méndez Vigo to some miles of dollars hidden under the earth Serrano Suñer, Madrid, 31 January; and Serrano were lost.” Suñer to Méndez Vigo, 30 March 1942. 20 House Committee on Naval Affairs, Study of Pa- 15 Magic Summaries, 5 July 1943. Foreign Minister cific Bases, 1012–1013, quoted in Friedman, p. Shigemitsu to Ambassador Suma, Tokyo, 16 121. June 1945. 21 Spellman to Truman, January 15, 1946, file 16 AMAE, Leg. 3196, exp. 36. Jordana to Méndez ‘‘State Department Correspondence, 1946– Vigo, 7 July 1943. On 23 November 1943, the 1947,’’ box 38, White House Central Files, Spanish Foreign Minister still did not know that HSTL, QUOTED IN Friedman, ibid. Olano and Jáuregui had left Japan. AMAE, Leg. 22 See ‘‘Report to the President: Pacific Island In- 3195, exp. 30. spection Tour Of J. A. Krug, Secretary of the 17 British comments can be seen in The Times, 17 Interior, February–March 1947,’’ file OF 85-L, February 1944, “Spain and Japanese Injustices. White House Official Files, box 572, HSTL, A Change of Opinion”; also from the Ambassa- quoted in Friedman, op. cit., p. 140. dor in Public Record Office, Foreign Office, se- Friedman, Hal M. (2001) Creating an American Lake: BIBLIOGRAPHY United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the Anonymous (1945) Guam. España Misionera vol. II, Pacific Basin, 1945-1947. Westport, CT.: Green- Num. 6 (April-June 1945), pp. 207-211. wood Press. Anonymous (n.d.) Historia de los Misioneros Capuchinos Hayes, Carlton H. (1945) Wartime Mission in Spain. en Guam, 1900-1941. Original in the Archive of New York: MacMillan. the Jesuit Fathers in Guam Herrero, Jose (1936), “Nanyo Gunto to Kasorikku” Arrayoz, Pastor de, OFM, P (n.d.) La Misión de [Catholics and the South Seas Archipelago]. Guam, apuntes por el P. Pastor de Arrayoz. Typed Komatsu Shigeru (ed.), 南洋群島と manuscript. Archivo de los Padres Recoletos. カトリック: (1936) 日本神学生を募る, Copy in MARC. 東京, 公教南洋教区供給部 (Kôkyô Nanyô Arrayoz, Pastor de, OFM, P (1943) Padre Jesús kyôkyôbu). Dueñas, sacerdote y mártir de Jesucristo (Apuntes o Hezel, S.J., Francis X. (1991), The Catholic Church in sugerencias). Tokio, 1 de junio de 1943. Manu- Micronesia. Historical essays in the Catholic Church in script, partly typed and with the manuscript the Caroline-Marshall Islands. Micronesian Semi- texts written after 1943. Archivo de los Padres nar., Chicago: Loyola University Press. Recoletos. Copy in MARC. Higuchi, Wakako (1997) A History of Pre-War Carano, Paul and Pedro C. Sanchez (1964) A com- Japanese Residents of Guam. in Lee D. Carter, plete history of Guam. Ruthland, Vt: Charles E. William L. Wuerch and Rosa Roberto Carter Turtle. (eds) Guam History: Perspectives. Vol. I. Mangilao, Diaz, Vicente (1994) Simple Chamorro: Telling Guam: Richard F. Taitano Micronesian Area Tales of Chamorro Demise and Survival. The Research Center – University of Guam. Contemporary Pacific. Volume 6 (1): pp. 29-58. Higuchi, Wakako (2001) The Japanisation Policy for Flores Montoya, Clemente (1984) La golondrinas no the Chamorros of Guam, 1941-1944. The Journal volverán (De Mojácar a Guam). Autobiografía del mo- of Pacific History 36(1), pp. 19-35. jaquero Pascual Artero “el rey de Guam”. Almería: Cajal. Monsignor Olano, A Bishop In World War II 101

Labrador, Juan. O.P. (1989) A Diary of the Japanese Yu Jose (eds) Philippines-Japan Relations. Manila, Occupation, Manila, Santo Tomás University Ateneo de Manila University Press. Pp. 223-260. Press. Vera, Román de, OFM, Cap. (1949a) Historia de los Maga, Timothy P: (1988) Defending Paradise. The Padres Capuchinos en Guam. Philippines, May 17, United States and Guam 1898-1950. New York & 1949. Typed Manuscript. Navarra, Copy in Mi- London, Garlad Publishing cronesian Area Research Center. Date of acqui- McCoy, Alfred & Alfredo Roces (1985) Philippine sition: August 1970 Cartoons. Political Caricature of the American Era Vera, Román de, OFM, Cap. (1949b) Notas para la 1900-1941, Quezon City: Vera Reyes. Historia de Guam por el Padre Román de Vera. Olano Urteaga, Miguel Ángel de (1949) Diary of a Typed Manuscript. Navarra, Copy in Microne- Bishop. (Since the invasion of Guam – World War II) sian Area Research Center. Date of acquisition: Manila: University of Santo Tomas Press February 1971 (Note: In spite of the data as- Palomo, A. (1984). An Island in Agony. s.1. [Guam], signed, the typescript appears to be written dur- Tony Palomo. ing the Pacific War) Peattie, M.R. (1984) The Nan’yô: Japan in the South Vera, Román de, OFM, Cap. (1949c) Misión de los Pacific, 1885-1945. in Ramon H. Myers and Padres Capuchinos en Guam. Notas del Padre..., escri- Mark R. Peattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, tas en 1949. Typed Manuscript. Navarra, Copy 1895-1945. Princeton: Princeton University in Micronesian Area Research Center. Date of Press acquisition: August 1970 Peattie, Mark R. (1988) Nan’yô. The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1941. Honolulu: AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY AND CONTACT Hawai’i University Press. Florentino Rodao holds a Ph.D at the University Pomeroy, Earl S. (1951), Pacific Outpost. American Complutense of Madrid in Contemporary History Strategy in Guam and Micronesia. Stanford, CA: and is to get a second degree at the University of California University Press. Tokyo in Area Studies in 2006. He has taught at the Price, Willard (1944) Japan’s Islands of Mystery. New Universities of Wisconsin-Madison, Keiō (Tokyo), York: John Day Company. Ateneo de Manila and presently works at the Uni- Rodao, Florentino (1995) The Spanish Culture in versidad Complutense. He was appointed Associate the Pacific after 1898. in Max Quanchi and of MARC and Visiting Fellow at the Australian Na- Alaima Talu (eds) Messy Entanglements. Brisbane: tional University. Pacific History Association. Pp. 175-180. Florentino Rodao, Depto. of History of Social Commu- Rodao, F (2002) Franco and the Japanese Empire. Bar- nication, Faculty of Journalism, Universidad Complutense celona: Plaza & Janes. de Madrid, E-28040 Madrid, Spain. E-mail: tinoro- Rogers, Robert F. (1995) Destiny’s Landfall. A History [email protected] of Guam. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Sanchez, Pedro, C. (1983), Wartime Occupation and Liberation in Guam, 1941-1945. Guam: P.C. San- chez Publishers. Shuster, Donald R. (1982) State Shinto in Microne- sia during Japanese Rule, 1914-1945. Pacific Stud- ies, 5(2), pp. 20-43. Spennemann, Dirk H.R. (1999) Aurora Australis. The German Period in the Mariana Islands 1899–1914. Division of Historic Preservation Occasional Historical Papers Series No. 5. Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands : Division of Historic Preservatio., Terada, Takefumi (1999) The Religious Propaganda Program for Christian Churches. In Ikehata Setsuho & Ricardo Trota Jose (eds), The Philippi- nes under Japan. Occupation Policy and Reaction. Ma- nila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Pp. 215-246. Terada, Takefumi (2003) Christianity and Japanese Occupation. In Ikehata Setsuho and Lydia N.