“Hybrid” Regimes: Why Do Citizens Vote

DUKENBAEV, ASKAT, PH.D., AUGUST 2017 POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNDERSTANDING ELECTIONS IN “HYBRID” REGIMES: WHY DO CITIZENS VOTE

IN ELECTIONS THEY DO NOT TRUST? A CASE-STUDY OF POST-SOVIET

KYRGYZSTAN, 1991-2015, WITH GENERALIZATIONS TO POST-SOVIET CENTRAL

ASIAN STATES (227 PP.)

Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Andrew S. Barnes

Elections under non-democratic regimes have been studied so far mostly from an elite point of view, focusing on how elections support a regime’s stability and provide opportunities for its opposition. Consequently, the role of ordinary voters in elections in non-democratic countries has thus far been neglected on the grounds that these elections are meaningless to ordinary voters due to the absence of a real choice, as well as voters’ general lack of efficacy. Despite this claim, this dissertation argues that elections and voters in “hybrid” regimes need to be studied independently, as different from the other non-democratic political systems. The 25-year period of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, as discussed in this research, presents ample and important experience to make such a case.

Thus, based on the analysis of the existing studies and literature, this dissertation begins by asking, “Why do voters keep voting in ‘hybrid’ regimes when they know the regime is non- democratic and they possess high levels of mistrust in the elections?” Are there any other reasons for them to vote beyond compulsions of state-run mobilization, coercion or manipulation? How do elections in the “hybrid” regimes differ from elections in strictly authoritarian ones?

Based on analysis of election results and voter-level data in the case of Kyrgyzstan, this dissertation argues that elections in “hybrid” regimes do have important implications and meanings both for the opposition and for ordinary voters. Kyrgyzstan’s example confirms

Levitsky & Way’s (2010) assertion that elections in such regimes polarize a ruling elite and help the opposition. But this dissertation goes on to discern how elections also affect voters. In particular, the findings of this research demonstrate that individual voter turnout is positively influenced by such objective sociodemographic factors as age, marital status, ethnicity, religion, education, and income as well as by attitudes towards a country’s direction, state of democracy, electoral efficacy, political affiliation, and interest in politics. On the subjective level, most

Kyrgyzstanis consider the “right to choose” to be the most important reason for voting, but they likewise refer to voting as an important act of “civic duty” and “contribution for the better future of the country.” The voters of Kyrgyzstan enjoy having choice and opportunities for contribution to the country’s development provided by the elections, even under the uncertain conditions of a

“hybrid” regime.

The findings of this dissertation, generalized to other Central Asian states, offer a new perspective in understanding of voters’ behavior in the post-Soviet region and suggest important implications for the study of prospects of democratization in the other “hybrid” regimes in the

Central Asian region and beyond. Regular elections provide opportunities not only for the government and its opposition, but also for ordinary voters who view elections not only as a fulfillment of their civic duty, but also as a meaningful contribution to the country’s overall well- being, even though they know they cannot trust their government. In addition, elections play an important role in the political socialization and learning process, which has longer-term implications for the regime: should the government ever arrive at a breaking point, voters will be

there to support the change and legitimize a new political order, as happened in the Soviet Union during Gorbachev’s perestroika and in Kyrgyzstan since independence and onward.

UNDERSTANDING ELECTIONS IN “HYBRID” REGIMES:

WHY DO CITIZENS VOTE IN THE ELECTIONS THEY DO NOT TRUST?

A CASE-STUDY OF POST-SOVIET KYRGYZSTAN, 1991-2016,

WITH GENERALIZATIONS TO POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN STATES.

A dissertation submitted

to Kent State University in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Askat Dukenbaev

July 2017

Dissertation written by

Askat Dukenbaev

B.A., Kyrgyz National University, 1993

M.Sc., University of Edinburgh, 2001

Ph.D., Kent State University, 2017

Approved by

Andrew S. Barnes Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Mark K. Cassell, Member Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Ryan L. Claassen, Member Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Kelly McMann, Member Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Ann Heiss, Representative Member of Dean’s Office

Accepted by

Andrew S. Barnes Chair, Department of Political Science

James L. Blank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

TABLE OF CONTENTS.…………………………………………………………………vi

LIST OF FIGURES.……………………………………………………………………… xi

LIST OF TABLES..……………………………………………………………………… xii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..………………………………………………………………..xv

DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………………….xvii

CHAPTERS:

I. Chapter 1: Introduction: Puzzles and goals of the research…………………………….1-23

1.1. Elections in “hybrid” regimes and puzzling questions of the research……………....1-8

1.1.1. Elections in “hybrid” regimes……………………………………..………..1-4

1.1.2. What elections mean for politicians and voters of a “hybrid” regime………4-8

1.2. The case of Kyrgyzstan and the goals of the research…………………………………9-23

1.2.1. Why Kyrgyzstan?...... 9-18

1.2.1.1. Kyrgyzstan as a “hybrid” regime…………………………………..9-14

1.2.1.2. The state of scholarship on election in Kyrgyzstan…………..14-18

1.2.2. Goal and structure of the dissertation research…………………………18-22

1.2.3. Steps of the research…………………………………………………….22-23

II. Chapter 2: Literature review: Main concepts, their applications and limitations………………………………………………………………………………24-36

2.1. State of the scholarship on “hybrid” regimes………………………………………24-27

2.2. “Hybrid” regimes and elections……………………………………………...... 27-29

2.3. Overview of the main explanatory models of voting turnout……………….…...... 30-36

III. Chapter 3: Methods of the research: Data, variables and hypotheses………………..37-58

3.1. Sources of data on elections and voting behavior in Kyrgyzstan……………………37-39

3.2. Details of the dissertation’s 2011 nationwide survey in

Kyrgyzstan………………………………………………………………………….....39-52

3.2.1. Questionnaires and the sampling frame of the survey………………….39-42

3.2.2. Sampling methods………………………………………………………42-43

3.2.3. The issue of non-response………………………………………………43-49

3.2.3.1. Unit non-response…………………………………………….44-46

3.2.3.2. Item non-response…………………………………………….47-48

3.2.3.3. Imputation method for missing data………………………….48-49

3.2.4. Qualitative data…………………………………………………………50-52

3.3. Variables and hypotheses…………………………………………………………52-58

IV: Chapter 4: The Soviet elections and their legacy in Kyrgyzstan………………….59-72

4.1. Elections and voting behavior in the pre-Gorbachev’s Soviet Union…………….59-62

4.2. Elections during Gorbachev’s perestroika and their aftermath……………………62-70

4.3. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………70-72

V. Chapter 5: Elections and presidential regime breakdown in post-Soviet

Kyrgyzstan (1991-2016)……………..…………..……………………………………..73-108

5.1. Independence and formation of the post-Soviet political order (1991 – 1994)……73-80

5.2. Elections, opposition, and fall of the first president (1995 – 2005)………………..81-94

5.3. Elections, opposition, and the fall of the second president (2005 – 2010)………….94-101

5.4. Political transition after April 2010: Challenges, changes, and elections (2010 – 2016)………………………………………………………………….101-105

5.5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...... 105-108

vii

VI. Chapter 6. Role of social and economic influences on voting turnout in

Kyrgyzstan...... 109-136

6.1. Defining voters and non-voters in the 2005 and 2010 parliamentary elections……109-111

6.2. Demographic and identity variables (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, and religion)……………………………………………………………………………..111-120

6.2.1. Age………………………………………………………………………..111-113

6.2.2. Gender…………………………………………………………………….113-114

6.2.3. Marital status………………………………………………………………114

6.2.4. Ethnicity……………………………………………………………………114-117

6.2.5. Religion…………………………………………………………………….118-120

6.3. Socio-economic status (education, employment, income, and residence)…………..121-130

6.3.1. Education…………………………………………………………………..121-123

6.3.2. Employment………………………………………………………………..123-126

6.3.3. Household income…………………………………………………………126-127

6.3.4. Level of urbanization and residence……………………………………….128-130

6.4. Summary and conclusions…………………………………………………………..130-131

6.5. Multivariate (logit) analysis of voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan………………………132-136

6.5.1. Multivariate (logit) analysis of voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan…………….132-133

6.5.2. Logit model of voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan with imputed values………134-135

6.5.3. Summary and conclusions………………………………………………...136

VII. Chapter 7. Reasons for voting and meanings of the elections for the

Kyrgyz electors……………………………………………..……………………137-145

7.1. Reasons for voting…………………………………………………………………..137-140

viii

7.2. Reasons for non-voting……………………………………………………………..140-141

7.3. Meanings of the elections for the Kyrgyz voters……………………………………141-142

7.4. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...... 142-145

VIII. Chapter 8. The case of Kyrgyzstan and post-Soviet Central Asia:

Comparisons and generalizations...... 146-169

8.1. Elections in post-Soviet Central Asia: Commonalities and differences

(1991 – 2016)…………………………………………………………………………….146-157

8.1.1. Common characteristics of the Central Asian elections…………………..146-153

8.1.2. Electoral differences among the Central Asian states..……………………153-157

8.2. Social structure of the Central Asian societies………………………………………158-159

8.3. Subjective motivations of the Central Asian voters…………………………………159-161

8.4. Political regime(s)…………………………………………………………………...161-164

8.5. Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………164-169

IX: Chapter 9: Summary, contributions, and suggestions for future

research……………………………………………………………….…………170-188

9.1. Summary of the research……………………………………………………………170-173

9.2. Contributions of the dissertation research…………………………………………..173-176

9.3. Suggestions for further research…………………………………………………….176-188

9.3.1. Voting behavior in “hybrid” regimes of Central Asia

and beyond………………………………………………………………..176-177

9.3.2. Methodology of study of voters and elections in

“hybrid” regimes…………………………………………….……………177-179

9.3.3. Elections in “hybrid” regimes as instruments of

state oppression/control?...... 179-180

9.3.4. Longer-term consequences of regular elections for authoritarian

regimes…………..…………………………………………………………...... 180-188

BIBLIOGRAPHY……..……………………………………………….………………..189-221

APPENDICES

A. Map of Central Asia………………………………………………………………….222

B. Basic Facts about the post-Soviet Central Asian countries ….…..…………………..223

C: Questionnaire of the 2011 Kyrgyzstan survey……………………………………….224-226

D: Kent State University Institutional Research Board approval e-mail notification…..227

LIST OF FIGURES Figure: Distribution of 101 articles from 16 leading journals, 1990-2000 (by country) (p.17)

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Voters and non-voters in Kyrgyzstan: Assessment of the quality of

elections (2011 parliamentary elections)……………………………………….22

Table 2: Population vs sample data by regional residence……………………………..40

Table 3: Population vs sample data by ethnicity……………………………………….41

Table 4: Variables, missing values and method of imputation…………………………48

Table 5: List of plebiscites (presidential, parliamentary and local elections,

and referenda) in Kyrgyzstan since independence (August 1991-

December 2015)…………………………………………………………………106

Table 6.1: Share of electors who voted in the previous national elections………………110

Table 6.2: Official and reported voter turnout rates……………………………………..110

Table 7.1: Voters and non-voters: Age (2005 parliamentary elections)…………………111

Table 7.2: Voters and non-voters: Age (2005 parliamentary and presidential

elections combined)………………………………………………………………112

Table 7.3: Voters and non-voters: Age (Parliamentary elections of October 10, 2010)…112

Table 8: Voters and non-voters: Gender (2005 and 2010 elections)……………………..113

Table 9: Voters and non-voters: Marital status……………………………………….….114

Table 10: Population vs sample data by ethnicity……………………….………………..115

Table 11.1: Voters and non-voters: Ethnicity (2005 parliamentary elections)……….…..115

Table 11.2: Voters and non-voters: Ethnicity (2005 parliamentary and presidential

elections combined)………………………………………………………………116

Table 11.3: Voters and non-voters: Ethnicity (2010 parliamentary elections)…………..116

xii

Table 11.4: Voters and non-voters: Ethnicity (forthcoming presidential

elections of 2011)………………………………………………………………….117

Table 12.1: Religious denomination of the survey’s respondents…………………………118

Table 12.2: Voters and non-voters: Religious denomination (2005 and 2010 elections)….119

Table 12.3: Religious service attendance (2011)………………………………………….120

Table 12.4: Voters and non-voters: Religious service attendance (2010 elections)………..120

Table 13.1: Voters and non-voters: Education (2005 parliamentary elections)……………121

Table 13.2: Voters and non-voters: Education (2005 parliamentary and presidential

elections combined)…………………………………………………………………122

Table 13.3: Voters and non-voters: Education (2010 parliamentary elections)…………….123

Table 14.1: Voters and non-voters: Employment (2005 parliamentary elections)………….123

Table 14.2: Voters and non-voters: Employment (2011)……………………………………124

Table 15.1: Voters and non-voters: Main occupation (2005 Kyrgyzstan CSES data)………125

Table 15.2: Voters and non-voters: Main occupation (2010 Kyrgyzstan data)………………126

Table 16.1: Household income distribution between voters and non-voters (2011 survey)….126

Table 16.2: Voters and non-voters: Household income (2011)……………………………….127

Table 17.1: Voters and non-voters: Rural-urban residence (2010 parliamentary elections)….128

Table 17.2: Voters and non-voters: Capital city-rest of the country residence

(2005 parliamentary elections)………………………………………………………..129

Table 17.3: Voters and non-voters: Capital city-rest of the country residence

(2010 parliamentary elections)………………………………………………………..129

Table 18: Turnout of social groups in 2005 and 2010 parliamentary elections (summary)…..131

xiii

Table 19.1: Logit models of individual voting turnout and independent variables

(2011 data)……………………………………………………………………………132

Table 19.2: Imputed models of individual voting turnout and independent variables

(2011 data)……………………………………………………………………………134

Table 20: Categories of responses to “Why do you vote?” question…………………………138

Table 21: Turnout of presidential and parliamentary elections and referenda in Central

Asia states (in per cent), 1991-2016…………………………………………………..152

Table 22: E-Parliament Election Index for the post-Soviet Central Asian countries…………155

Table 23: Presidential elections in post-Soviet Central Asia, 1991-2016…………………….157

xiv

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My interest in politics began to rise and form as I grew up in the former Soviet Union: first, at the high school in Kazakhstan during the tumultuous political reforms of Mikhail

Gorbachev and then at the National University of Kyrgyzstan where I studied history and lived through the dramatic years of the Soviet Union’s collapse and emergence of the newly independent states from the end of the 1980s to the early 1990s. My understanding of modern governance and politics increased during public administration studies in Turkey and a rigorous master’s program at the University of Edinburgh in the United Kingdom. But, I believe, the most transformative experience for me came through the Ph.D. studies in political science that have contributed immensely to my professional growth and, as a result, changed me forever. I will be always grateful to Kent State for giving me this great experience and opportunity.

This dissertation, to be sure, would not be possible without my professors at the

Department of Political Science of Kent State University, who taught me classes and reviewed my comprehensive examinations. My dissertation advisor Dr. Andrew S. Barnes provided me with crucial guidance and support from the early stages of the dissertation prospectus development back in 2008-2009 to the final moments of the dissertation completion, defense, and graduation. I am also deeply thankful to the other members of the Dissertation Committee—

Dr. Mark K. Cassell, Dr. Ryan L. Claassen, as well as Dr. Kelly McMann, who served as an external advisor from Case Western University—for their advice, expertise, and good will throughout my long-time work on the dissertation. Certainly, any limitations, errors, or omissions in the dissertation are solely my own.

My path towards the Ph.D. degree would not have been successful without encouragement from my family – my Dad Zhumanbay and Mom Tokhtagul, my wife Ilfa and my children (Kamshat, Bekarys, Aliah) as well as from the other members of my extended family back in Kazakhstan, to whom I owe my greatest gratitude.

To all my friends, old and new, in my two home countries - Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, here - in the Unites States of America, and elsewhere around the world: I am deeply grateful to you for being next to me all these years, sharing my successes and hardships. In particular, I would like to mention and thank Almaz Tolymbek, another graduate from this Department, for pointing me towards Kent State as a place for my Ph.D. studies. Heartfelt thanks are also go to my friends William W. Hansen, Martha C. Merrill, Soiuzbek Saliev, and Thomas J. Wood for their long-time comradeship, encouragement, and support during my studies in the United States of America.

My doctoral education would not have been possible without four years of tuition waivers and graduate assistantships from the Kent State University Department of Political

Science, as well as scholarships from the Open Society Institute founded by Mr. George Soros and from the University of Central Asia established by His Highness the Aga Khan IV. I also appreciate the IFES Mannat Fellowship that allowed me to spend two months in Washington,

D.C., to complete the analysis of empirical data that I collected in Kyrgyzstan. I will be always most thankful for all these contributions that helped me achieve this accomplishment and advancement to a new stage of my life.

Askat Dukenbaev

Spring, 2017, Kent, Ohio

xvi

DEDICATION

In memory of my Grandfather Dukenbay (1904-1989) and Grandmother Rakul (1920-2015).

xvii

I. Chapter 1: Introduction: Puzzles and goals of the research

1.1. Elections in “hybrid” regimes and puzzling questions of the research

1.1.1. Elections in “hybrid” regimes

Competitive, fair, transparent, and regular elections are regarded as one the fundamental and most important defining characteristics of a modern democracy (Dahl, 1971; Duverger,

1963; Huntington, 1993; Mackenzie, 1958; Riker, 1965; Schumpeter, 1942). Elections are important because they perform vital functions in maintaining political order. Among many other functions, elections legitimize governmental authority, allow governments to be formed, recruit political leaders, foster public discussion and debate about issues, and facilitate the development and exercise of citizenship (Heywood, 1997). Democratic elections provide a means for a reliable periodic and peaceful transition of political power, legitimize a country’s leadership, and enable citizens to participate in the political process by electing public officials and holding them accountable for their actions (Dennis, 1970; Ginsberg & Weissberg, 1978; Hess & Torney, 1962;

Katz, 1997; Kornberg & Clarke, 1992; Lyons, 2005; Rose & Mossawir, 1967).

In the 20th century, elections also became an indispensable part of many non-democratic regimes as imperative characteristics of “modernity” and “civility” (Jessen and Richter, 2011a,

2011b). Even the totalitarian governments that emerged as a result of the First World War – such as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany – could not openly ignore these normative values of the modern world as they had to establish their political narratives about unity among the people, the state, and the ruling Party by claiming that this unity manifested itself in elections and plebiscites

(Jessen and Richter, 2011a). In this regard, even though dictators turned elections into mere

rituals of political participation “without choice” (Hermet, Rose, Rouquie, 1978), elections became grounded in a constitutional basis as a manifestation of “popular will and sovereignty” to fulfill, as the Soviet political propaganda often maintained, the basic reason for holding elections

(Smith, 2011). At the same time, as Patzelt (2011) identified, elections in the Soviet Union carried many important latent political functions, providing evidence for the legitimacy of the

Soviets’ political system, achieving convincing “impression management” in order to create a democratic façade in front of a dictatorial regime, discouraging dissent, and distributing or withdrawing favors, albeit in limited doses.

The “third wave” of the global expansion of democracy by the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s (Diamond & Plattner, 1995; Huntington, 1993) contributed significantly to the increased importance of elections as an essential characteristic of modern-day politics, even in authoritarian regimes where elections represent only a semblance of an open political contest

(Bielasiak, 2006). In fact, as of 2011, out of 80 authoritarian regimes of the world, only six countries (namely, Brunei, China, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) had never held parliamentary or presidential elections on a national level (Patzelt, 2011, p.126).

It should be noted, however, that contrary to hopeful expectations of the scholars of the

“transition” paradigm (e.g. Diamond, 1999; Diamond & Plattner, 1995; O’Donnell & Schmitter,

1986; Fukuyama, 1992), including its application attempts to Central Asia (Pilon, 1998), China

(Pei, 1995), Russia (Colton, 1992), and Latin America (Alfonsin, 1995), a global wave of democratization produced not only democracies, but also many examples of “democratically disguised” and “modernized” non-democratic regimes that political scientists now tend to term

“democratic/authoritarian hybrids” (Brooker, 2014). Inhabiting a “grey zone” between fully democratic and authoritarian regimes (Carothers, 2001), “hybrid” regimes represent, in the words

of Ottaway (2003, p.3) “ambiguous political systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political rights with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits.” Though

“hybrid” regimes regularly use the democratic institution of elections, these elections are not free nor fair nor truly competitive, despite (an often staged) participation of multiple parties and an opposition (Bielasiak 2006, pp.407-408; Schedler 2002a).

In this regard, Aleprete (2013, p.2) maintained that, after realizing that “hybrid” regimes

“represent alternative paths of political development rather than simply way stations on the road towards full democratization,” scholars began to develop various conceptualizations and classifications of these regimes. One particular type of a “hybrid” regime is “competitive authoritarianism” conceptualized by Levitsky & Way (2002, 2010). Unlike single-party or military dictatorships, “competitive authoritarianism” uses elections to legitimize a regime by giving an opportunity for the opposition to compete for power, but skewing the playing field in favor of incumbents through electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and varying degrees of harassment and violence against opposition candidates or parties (Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010). According to Levitsky & Way (2010), 35 such regimes existed in the world by 1995, including such post-Soviet states as Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,

Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine; this later included Kyrgyzstan after 1995 (Levitsky & Way,

2010).

Elections and voting rank among the most important forms of political participation, even in more democratic political systems than exist in post-Soviet Central Asia, where unsanctioned governmental political activism is either strictly controlled (in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) or suppressed (in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). For example, in the countries of Latin

America in general, more than 50% of the citizenry normally participate in voting, while other forms of political participation attract only more than a quarter of the adult population (Diaz &

Payne, 2007). In the case of post-Soviet Central Asia, elections register extraordinarily high turnout rates. Calculations of the average turnout for the elections from 1990 to 1999, directly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (as shown on Table 21 on page 150 below), revealed

79% participation in Kazakhstan, 85% in Kyrgyzstan, 92% in both Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and about 94% in Uzbekistan, with the cross-regional average at 88%. This is higher than the average turnout in twenty democracies in the same decade, which was almost 78% (Franklin,

2004). In the following decade, 2000-2009, the average for the same twenty democracies declined to 73.9% (Franklin, 2004), but in Central Asia it also declined, though only to 80.7%.

Nevertheless, a review of the literature concerning elections in non-democratic regimes suggests that scholars have not yet studied sufficiently nor in depth the role of elections for ordinary voters as well as longer-term consequences of elections in such regimes, as discussed in the following section.

1.1.2. What elections mean for politicians and voters of a “hybrid” regime

In discussing the main functions of elections under non-democratic regimes, scholars have emphasized that in such countries, incumbent rulers remain the primary beneficiaries of elections; they use and manipulate elections to ensure that they maintain power and gain at least a veneer of legitimacy (Schedler, 2002a), even though they achieve this status at the expense of voters’ long-term trust in the state as well as electoral institutions (Markova, 2004; Pammett &

DeBardeleben, 1996; Rothstein, 2004; Sakwa, 1995; Wyman, Miller, White, & Heywood, 1994).

The government will manipulate election rules and processes to assure their own success while the opposition will certainly suffer some clear disadvantages—yet not enough to cause the

opposition’s early withdrawal from the election (Patzelt, 2011). Benefitting secondarily are opposition candidates who participate in the non-democratic elections without any hope of winning office, but motivated by different goals from their counterparts in established democracies. In post-Soviet Russia, for example, some candidates enter a political race to introduce their concerns into the public debate, build a political career, try to influence public policies, or build a political party; others run as spoilers to defeat opposition candidates, to extract rents and bribes, or to broker deals with government officials (Smyth 2006). In strategic terms, opposition parties might play “two-level games” in which electoral competition for votes and seats is “nested” inside the simultaneous struggle to change the basic rules and conditions of the authoritarian regime (Schedler, 2002b).

Even though scholars have studied the consequences of this type of election for political elites (mostly incumbents and opposition), the literature review (as discussed in Chapter 2) revealed a notable lack of studies on ordinary voters who exist between the authorities and the opposition. What do they gain from the non-democratic and flawed elections? How do elections affect voters? What motivates them to vote (or not to vote) in the elections? Indeed, even though the electoral processes in authoritarian countries might produce some benefits for the citizenry such as promoting a dialogue between them and the government, it is still unclear for two reasons. First, under what electoral structure and context could this be true; and second, whether the benefits that citizens accrue through elections are short-term at the expense of long-term costs in the form of even stronger incumbents (Manion, 1996; Shi, 1999a, 1999b).

Further, as an overview of the literature suggests (in Chapter 2), most current studies on the influence of elections on voters in both democratic and non-democratic countries focus on voter choice (e.g., how different characteristics of an electoral campaign affects voters’ decisions

on candidates) and turnout (e.g., whether election campaigns and regulations rules affect turnout on the day voters cast ballots). But what of the post-election period and longer-term consequences of voting participation for the voters? The review of current literature reveals few studies on this issue. In democratic states, this question is studied in terms of political socialization and its consequences for democracy. Despite this, few studies have been concerned with how elections affect voters in “hybrid” and authoritarian regimes, and why they keep voting in the elections that they do not trust.

In terms of voting turnout as one of the immediate observable effects of the elections and the electoral process, a commonplace explanation for the unusually high turnout in authoritarian elections is the use of political mobilization, either through state coercion as in the case of the former Communist states (Pravda, 1978), or through sheer manipulation of the voting process as currently happens in “hybrid” political regimes (e.g., Schedler, 2002a). Nowadays, however, authoritarian regimes only reluctantly avail themselves of naked repression and open use of coercive power as the totalitarian governments of the 20th century did (e.g. Schedler, 2002a,

Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Reports have likewise emerged that voters in authoritarian countries such as China might participate in elections for reasons other than avoiding punishment for nonparticipation but to exercise their rights to vote (Chen & Zhong, 2002; Li, 2003; Shi

1999a).

Also, elections in “hybrid” regimes are widely staged and the governments manipulate results to their advantage (Hale, 2011; Levitsky & Way, 2010). Rural and poor voters are said to be more prone to manipulation and mobilization by a government to vote (Bunbongkarn, 1996), but an urbanized, middle-class layer of citizens (business people, intellectuals, civic activists – often referred to as a “civil society” in the scholarship on democratization) who also vote in great

numbers. But why does this group of voters – conscientious, educated, urbanized, and less prone to manipulation – continue to vote in the non-democratic elections even though they do not trust the political regimes and know that the opposition cannot win the unfairly managed elections?

How do they, as citizens, benefit from participating and voting in the flawed elections?

Seeing this, it warrants noting that the possibilities for “hybrid” regimes to stage elections are not limitless, unlike in the cases of the strictly authoritarian systems. This could be because fraud will ultimately fail to fool the opposition (which either does not exists or is less active under authoritarian governments) who believe they can undermine incumbents (Magaloni, 2006,

2008), or because the rulers believe they risk adverse effects if outrage over fraud becomes a catalyst for opposition mobilization (e.g., Lindberg, 2006b; Beissinger, 2007; Tucker, 2007; van de Walle, 2002). Participation of international organizations in observing authoritarian elections, which has become normal for many undemocratic regimes, also plays a significant role in deterring electoral fraud where election observers are on the ground (Bader & Schmeets, 2013).

In comparative perspective, understanding motivations of the voters who lack efficacy was conducted in the case of disadvantaged and marginalized classes, such as in India (Ahuja &

Chhibber, 2012; Banerjee, 2014; Carswell & De Neve, 2014). The Indian scholar Banerjee

(2014, p. 146), in his anthropological study of Indian voters, argued that (the passage is worth quoting in full):

While we now have excellent data showing correlations between the socio-economic

groups, residence patters, education levels, gender, and voter turnout, we continue to

remain unsure of why some people vote more than others and what they think they are

doing when they vote. …Indian citizens have plenty of reasons to be dissatisfied with the

performance of governments and they do not hold politicians in great esteem either. Why

then do they bother to vote? And why do poor people vote more than middle-class ones?

And why does 80 percent of the population continue to prefer a democratic albeit

inefficient system to an efficient authoritarian one?

Though India, the highest populated democracy in the world, is not ruled by a “hybrid” regime, the questions asked about the Indian voters are quite relevant to the Kyrgyz voters, who also have a little faith in government and politicians, but still keep regularly voting in large numbers.

Finally, as Darr & Hesli (2010) assert, in addition to the need to broaden the scope of existing theory and empirical work, another compelling reason to extend the study of voting turnout in countries like Kyrgyzstan is that we can use the amount of variance explained by participation models as an indicator of progress toward democracy. If in cases of authoritarian regimes, such as under the various Communist systems where voters’ behavior is fully structured and orchestrated, little room remains for choice as elections become manipulated or ceremonial.

As Darr and Hesli (2010) further noted, in situations that afford considerable scope to behavioral options, like in the cases of “hybrid” and democratic systems. As a result, “[w]hen participation is not controlled from above, variation in the likelihood of voting should be predictable, though the best predictors may shift from one setting to the next” (p.310).

In this regard, the case of Kyrgyzstan offers a useful example for such a study. Such an in-depth study also allows possible generalizations to other countries with similar political and socio-economic contexts like those in post-Soviet Central Asia.

1.2. The case of Kyrgyzstan and the goals of the research

1.2.1. Why Kyrgyzstan?

1.2.1.1. Kyrgyzstan as a “hybrid” regime

One of the five post-Soviet countries of the Central Asian region1, Kyrgyzstan is the geographical focus of this research. Unlike its neighbors in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan committed to a political liberalization and radical economic reform from the first years of its independence from the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan emerged as the first in Central Asia to fully embrace economic and political liberalization despite being the second poorest country of the region (after Tajikistan). Following prescriptions of the economic reform offered by the IMF and World Bank, as well as becoming the first country of the region to join the World Trade

Organization (WTO) in 1998, Kyrgyzstan’s government launched radical market and trade liberalization, mass privatization, and structural reforms to move away from the strictly centralized and planned economy of the disintegrated Soviet Union. At the same time, a vibrant civil society began to flourish, including active opposition political parties, independent media outlets, and non-governmental organizations that became influential in public affairs (Gleason,

2003).

In the fall of 1995, Kyrgyzstan held its first contested presidential election: the country’s first president Askar Akayev became the only national leader in the post-Soviet Central Asian region to be popularly elected to a second term, while the presidents of neighboring countries extended their subsequent terms in the office through government-staged national referendums

(Olds, 1997). The new electoral system, which Kyrgyzstan adopted after the breakup of the

Soviet Union, was the most open and inclusive in the region. Despite its shortcomings, the

1 See Appendices A and B for a map and basic facts about the post-Soviet Central Asian states. 9

system allowed local communities and newly formed political parties to nominate an unlimited number of candidates for office, in contrast to the more restrictive electoral systems that regional neighbors used (Luong, 2000).

Thus, Kyrgyzstan led Central Asia in liberal political and institutional reforms, with the freest mass media, the most contested elections, a vocal and active political opposition, and the strongest civil society in the region by the mid-1990s (Anderson, 1999; Gleason, 2003). These achievements inspired commentators such as Strobe Talbot, then the Special Adviser to the U.S.

Secretary of State on the Newly Independent States in 1992, to refer to Kyrgyzstan as an “island of democracy in Central Asia” (as quoted in Anderson & Beck, 2000, p. 81), recognizing the liberal accomplishments of Kyrgyzstan in contrast to its authoritarian neighbors, including communist China to the east, Tajikistan to the south, Uzbekistan to the west and Kazakhstan to the north.

From the second half of the 1990s onward, however, Akayev’s rule began gradually to shift towards the patterns of the non-democratic presidencies of its authoritarian neighboring states. He began to rely increasingly on his family members, cronies, and regional-based clans to run the country (Collins, 2006). The regime became increasingly corrupt and intolerant, persecuting its critics, jailing the most vocal opposition leaders and journalists, and adding constitutional amendments that guaranteed the executive’s dominance over the other branches of government by use of several staged national referendums. Akayev’s third term in office

(although, initially he was allowed only two terms) was formally legitimized through carefully managed and rigged elections, which he won by large margins. The relatively competitive presidential and parliamentary elections of 1995, 2000, and especially of 2005 (as well local

elections of 2000 and 2004), however rigged and unfair they were, still provided political avenues for the opposition to achieve and maintain power.

As Beachain & Kevlihan (2014) asserted, elections in Kyrgyzstan (and to a lesser degree in other Central Asian states) divided and polarized the country’s political class. Aided by growing grievances and dissatisfaction among the population caused by corruption, mismanagement, and impoverishment of the people, this political fragmentation resulted in mass unrest that ultimately ousted Akayev from power in March 2005. The second president

Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who was elected as the country’s second president for a five-year term in

July 2005, promised to conduct a series of political reforms including constitutional changes to dismantle cronyism and “family rule” and to fight corruption and poverty. But Bakiyev failed to take any significant steps to address the political, economic, and social factors that had prepared the ground for dismissal of his predecessor. Mass opposition demonstrations demanding

Bakiyev’s resignation followed in 2006 and 2007, culminating in April, 2010 when a popular uprising overthrew Bakiyev and his cronies.

These political changes transformed the post-Soviet political order in Kyrgyzstan from a president-dominated regime into a mixed presidential-parliamentary system (Huskey & Hill,

2011) under the 2010 Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, which limited powers of the president and established a multi-party parliament and coalition-based government (consisting of a cabinet of ministers). The two following relatively free and fairly-contested national elections (the parliamentary election of October, 2010 and the presidential election of September, 2011) had transformed Kyrgyzstan into the only “partly free” country in Central Asia, whereas the others remained “not free” due to the estimates of Freedom House (2011) in recognizing the country’s progress in moving from an authoritarian to a semi-authoritarian type of a political regime.

Nonetheless, in the “Nations in Transit 2017” report, Freedom House (2017) dropped Kyrgyzstan back in to the range of Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes, a category the country had left after competitive parliamentary elections in 2011. As the report indicated (Freedom House, 2017), this change occurred due to the constitutional revisions that took place in 2016 that further entrenched President Almazbek Atambayev’s Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) and an oligarchic elite. The constitutional changes appeared through a referendum that “was held on short notice, with little debate and poor public understanding of the changes, and with intimidation and state patronage that ensured passage” (Freedom House, 2017, p.17).

Despite these drawbacks, the country, unlike its neighbors in the region, retains a political pluralism that prevents total domination by one person or group. Kyrgyzstan is also the only country of the region that experienced a peaceful transition of presidential power from one president to another via democratic procedures. This took place in 2011, from the interim president Roza Otunbayeva to the incumbent president, Almazbek Atambayev, the country’s fourth president since post-Soviet independence. The next transition of power is expected in fall,

2017, when Atambayev, who cannot run for a second term, should free the office for a newly- elected president. Observers warn, however, that the approved constitutional amendments could pave the way for president Atambayev to retain power by shifting to the prime minister’s seat

(Puddington & Roylance, 2017).

These dramatic political developments in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan have been quite challenging to scholars in trying to define Kyrgyzstan’s regime (Alkan, 2009). The Kyrgyz political system has been described as illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997), weak autocracy or autocracy (Wood, 2006), and hybrid regime (Diamond 2002, McMann, 2006). However, as mentioned in the previous section, even though noted as falling into the standards of competitive

authoritarianism after political changes in this country since 1995, Levitsky & Way (2010) did not include the case of Kyrgyzstan in their analysis of the 35 “competitive authoritarianisms.”

In relation to this, Kyrgyzstan’s case presents a unique opportunity to study the role of elections in a “hybrid” regime. The best approximation is provided by broadly defining the political system of Kyrgyzstan as a “hybrid regime,” which cannot be identified as either democratic or authoritarian. Or, as Morlino (2009, p. 277, quoted in Lopes, 2012, p. 5) maintained, “hybrid” regimes are those that “no longer configure some form of nondemocracy and do not yet configure a complete democracy. Such institutions still bear traces of the previous political reality” that subsequently creates an “intricate balance that can result in further democratization or in a setback to the previous authoritarian phase.” Despite the non-inclusion of

Kyrgyzstan, as explained in detail in the following section of the dissertation, several types of

“hybrid” regimes exist in the world. In a narrow sense, this dissertation will thus use the concept of “competitive authoritarianism” developed by Levitsky & Way (2002, 2010), as described in detail in the literature review chapter of this dissertation in Chapter 2.

In addition, as mentioned above, a major limitation of the earlier studies of “hybrid” regimes consist of their emphasis on elite-level processes as well as neglect of the role of ordinary voters. Meanwhile, it is important to keep in mind the role of the masses’ political participation under competitive authoritarian regimes. For instance, average turnout from 1990 to

2001 was 79% in Oceania, just ahead of Western Europe with 78%. During that same period, both Asia and the Central and Eastern European regions had an average voter turnout of 72%.

Central and South America averaged 69%. The average in North America and the Caribbean was

65%, the same as in the Middle East. Africa’s average turnout was the lowest at 64% (Pintor,

Gratschew, & Sullivan, 2002). In the case of Kyrgyzstan, voter turnout from 1995 to 2009

averaged a remarkable 79.6% in the presidential elections, and 68.2% in the parliamentary elections (Beachain, 2011).

Additionally, as noted earlier, elections represent one of the most important parts of political participation for the citizenry. For example, even in the Latin American countries in general, more than 50% of the citizenry normally takes part in voting, while the other forms of political participation attract only more than a quarter of the adult population (Diaz & Payne,

2007). As a result, it is important to study the role of ordinary voters in the elections process.

This dissertation accomplishes this by applying both quantitative and qualitative explanatory factors that influence and explain voter turnout in the case of Kyrgyzstan, with generalizations made for the other states of Central Asia.

1.2.1.2. The state of scholarship on elections in Kyrgyzstan

The current literature suggests several important points that support this dissertation research. First of all, even though there is a growing literature on voting turnout in post- communist elections, the theme remains underdeveloped (Hill and Huskey, 2015). Only recently have scholars of Central Asia begun to conduct such studies, and as of today the literature review reveals only a few such works related to voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan. One is a study by Darr &

Hesli (2010), “Differential Voter Turnout in a Post-Communist Muslim Society: The Case of the

Kyrgyz Republic,” as published in the journal Communist and Post-Communist Studies (Vol. 43,

2010, No. 3, pp. 309-324). There, the authors estimate using logistic regression an individual’s likelihood of voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections. The authors found an important role of the traditional rural networks in the voters’ mobilization. In addition, the study reveals that education, occupation, and trust in government as well as by ethnic and religious backgrounds of the voters influenced turnout in the 2005 elections in

Kyrgyzstan. The authors suggest that the political behavior of the Kyrgyzstani people is supportive of democracy, despite elite-level obstacles to a successful transition (Darr & Hesli,

2010).

In other research that Huskey & Hill (2013) conducted, the authors studied social and economic factors influencing voter’s preferences for the top seven political parties that participated in Kyrgyzstan’s 2010 parliamentary elections. In the most recent work of Hill &

Huskey (2015), study a voter turnout difference between northern and southern regions of

Kyrgyzstan during the 2011 presidential election. The scholars revealed that instead of the traditional socio-economic factors associated with variation in voter turnout, differences in levels of labor migration and perceptions of the electoral stakes explain the turnout gap between voters from the northern and southern regions of the country.

Even though these studies are closely related to the theme of this dissertation, they do not provide specific information about factors influencing voting turnout after the 2005 elections, including the 2010 parliamentary election. Neither do these other studies discuss the role of the meaning of the voting process as an influencing factor for the voter turnout. Thus, the dearth of published research on voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan, where elections are becoming substantial part of the new political order, necessitates further studies on this important topic.

In this regard, the work of Ismailbekova (2014) – who studied elections in Kyrgyzstan from the ethnographic point of view – should be mentioned. Based on fieldwork in a Kyrgyz village in 2007 and 2008, the author noticed that “while villagers acknowledged that the election itself was thus flawed, it was their active participation and moral investment in the event as such that constituted their sense of belonging part of a larger collective project of making the state” (p.

78). The author shows how local villagers try to make sense of the unfair elections by

manipulating and redefining of the rules and conditions of the elections through the lenses of local discourses of fairness and respect in order to help to elect their “native sons” into the national parliament, which voters see as the best guarantee that local demands will be heard in the halls of power. The research is an important contribution to the understanding of voters’ behavior in Kyrgyzstan, and it is akin to the goals and findings of this dissertation.

Building on prior research and using the “mixed” method, this dissertation breaks new ground in that it not only tests the existing theories but also discovers a whole range of various meanings that voting behavior carries for Kyrgyz citizens. Further, since the data were collected through a countrywide survey of voters, this dissertation’s findings are more generalizable than a local case study. In the concluding chapter, the dissertation will feature a specific reference to the re-emerging discipline of a political ethnography as a promising field that provides new perspectives and useful research tools for studying (and better understanding) political behavior in countries like Kyrgyzstan.

Finally, the lack of studies on politics of the Central Asian region is especially impressive when compared to the other countries of the world. In particular, review of publications devoted to post-communist countries reveals a field still dominated by analyses of Russia, followed by analyses of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as shown in the following figure reflecting distribution of 101 articles from 16 leading journals (eight general political science journals and eight post-communist area studies journals) between 1990-2000, as indicated by country (Tucker, 2002, p.278):

Figure: Distribution of 101 articles from 16 leading journals, 1990-2000 (by country)

*Source: Tucker, 2002, p.278

My own recent overview of the literature on the topic suggests that the situation by 2017 remains the same as described by Tucker (2002) 15 years ago. Only limited number of academic publications (in the English language) are available on a systematic and extensive analysis of elections in Kyrgyzstan (e.g., Beachain, 2011; Beachain & Kevlihan, 2014; Hierman, 2010;

Huskey, 1995; Sjöberg, 2011; Koehler, 2009; Kuchukeeva & O’Loughlin, 2003). But even in these works, the major emphasis is not on the role of ordinary voters; instead, they focus on the rise of contested politics in Kyrgyzstan in the late 1980s (Huskey, 1995), use of electoral rules by the Central Asian regimes in the institution-building process (Luong, 2002), attitudes of ethnic

Uzbeks minorities towards elections in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Hierman, 2010), role of district-level elites in the elections in Central Asia (Sjoberg, 2011), use of elections for power consolidation by President Bakiyev (Koehler, 2009), the role of elections in the state building process in the region (Beachain & Kevlihan, 2014), and the meaning of unfair elections for rural electors in the case of a village voters (Ismailbekova, 2014). Overall, in light of increasing role of fair elections in the politics of post-2010 Kyrgyzstan, a great need still exists for more scholarly studies of voting behavior in this unique country of Central Asia.

Finally, the scholarship on voter turnout has developed theories of voter behavior to describe mainly voters in established democracies as argued by Darr & Hesli (2010). In this regard, Kyrgyzstan presents a valuable test case for theories of individual voter turnout, because it differs from Western industrial societies along numerous dimensions. As Darr & Hesli (2010, p.310) pointed out among Kyrgyzstan’s population, “1) approximately 80%” are Muslim; 2) the population is mainly rural, as only 35% live in urban areas; 3) the economy is underdeveloped, with GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) of $2150; 4) about 43% live below the national poverty line” and that “5) association membership is low, with civil society spoken of by scholars as a prospect rather than a reality.” In this regard, this dissertation represents one of the first attempts to understand the Kyrgyzstani voting behavior by examining social and political influences on voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan after the 2005 and 2010 parliamentary elections.

1.2.2. Goal and structure of the dissertation research

The main goal of this dissertation is to understand why citizens in Kyrgyzstan vote despite their deep mistrust in both the elections and government that results. Electors in

Kyrgyzstan, like their counterparts in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern

Europe, are voters without trust (Rose & Munro, 2009). Decades-long intrusive political mobilization resulted in deep insulation of the people under Communist regimes from a distrusted party-state, the legacy of which remained widespread even 20 years after the fall of the

Berlin Wall (Rose & Munro, 2009). For instance, not a single Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Election Observation report explicitly used the code words “free and fair” in describing elections from 1995 to 2010 in Kyrgyzstan (Sjöberg, 2011).

As a result, throughout post-Soviet history, the Kyrgyzstani public viewed political and public sector institutions with a strong degree of scepticism and distrust. According to the 1996 survey of the International Foundation of Electoral Studies (Olds, 1997), a large majority of

Kyrgyz considered the government, at both the national and local levels, as not responsive to their needs. More than six in ten Kyrgyz had no confidence in the courts, and the public regarded official corruption as either very common (47%) or somewhat common (33%). Furthermore,

42% of respondents thought that their government respected human rights only a little, while

20% thought not at all.

According to a national poll conducted by the UNDP (2000) in 1998, the parliament

(Jogorku Kenesh) and judicial system received the least public trust: both institutions garnered the trust of as few as 38% and 34% of respondents, respectively. The government (the office of the prime-minister) was considered to be trustworthy by 46% of the respondents. Interestingly, the most trusted state institution then was the president (by 60% of the respondents), followed closely by the local government institutions (58%). In another survey, conducted four years later among civil society activists (leaders and employees of the non-government organizations) in

Kyrgyzstan (Kuchukeeva & O’Loughlin, 2003), only slightly over a third of respondents trusted parliament (34.9%) and local state governments (akimiats) (33.1%), with confidence in courts reported at even lower levels of 13.3%.

In the 2006 CSES cross-national study of the Kyrgyzstani voters (Isaev, 2006), most respondents (43.1%) cited “bribery” as the most common negative side of the electoral system of

Kyrgyzstan, followed by tribal and regional divisions (27.1%) and pressure from authorities

(5.2%). The 2011 Kyrgyzstan voters’ survey conducted by this author recorded similar responses: 47.7% of respondents named vote buying and bribery as the most important problem

of the elections in Kyrgyzstan, 23.4% named tribal and regional divisions, and 12.1% named the use of “administrative resource” (government pressure on the voters and opposition in favor of a particular candidate).

These reports accord with the general perception of a high level of corruption in the country. In the 2006 CSES survey in Kyrgyzstan (CSES, 2008), in responding to the question,

“How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in

Kyrgyzstan?”, most respondents (50.5%) replied that a “majority of politicians were corrupted” and one third (32.4%) responded that “all politicians were corrupted”; only small number of respondents (6.6%) believed that a “majority of politicians were not corrupted” and less 1% thought that “there were no corruption among politicians.”

One reason for the interest in social trust is that, as measured in numerous surveys, it correlates with a number of other variables that are normatively highly desirable (Citrin, 1974;

Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). The same positive pattern works at the public and state levels: cities, regions, and countries with more trusting people are likely to have better working democratic institutions and higher quality of governance, to have more open economies, greater economic growth, and less crime and corruption (Beugelsdijk, De Groot, & Van Schaik, 2004; Putnam,

Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993; Rothstein, 2004; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005).

The importance of trust between society and state could be especially important in case of the dysfunctional governmental institutions of the “hybrid” regimes like Kyrgyzstan. Empirical studies have already demonstrated how level of trust in fellow citizens is positively correlated with voting (Cox, 2003; Holbrook, Krosnick, Visser, Gardner & Cacioppo, 2001; Timpone,

1998), and the level of political support that is related with voting choice, activism, protest, and other forms of political behavior (Acock, Clarke & Stewart, 1985; Anderson and Guillory, 1997;

Clarke & Acock, 1989; Dalton, 2004; Ginsberg and Weissberg, 1978; Finkel, 1985, 1987; Kaase

& Newton, 1995; Norris 1999). Studies of the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe suggested that that among the main factors that caused low voter turnout in these countries were high levels of public mistrust of state institutions, low levels of political efficacy of the voters, and a lack of vigorous civil society (e.g. Berglund, Vogt, & Karasimeonon, 2001; Bernhagen &

Marsh 2007).

In Kyrgyzstan, however, despite the high level of mistrust of state and government, and negative feelings about the elections, citizens vote in relatively large numbers. For instance, in

1996, a majority in a national poll believed that they could improve conditions in the country by voting: a majority (56% up from 49% in 1995) did support an electoral system (Olds, 1997). In the 2002 survey (Kuchukeeva & O’Loughlin, 2003), a majority of respondents believed that their participation in elections has some kind of effect on decision-making in the country: 17.5% completely agreed; 63.9% somewhat agreed; and 18.1 percent completely disagreed with the statement (Kuchukeeva & O’Loughlin, 2003).

These attitudes proved to be stable in the long term. In the survey conducted by the author of the dissertation in 2011 in Kyrgyzstan, 46% respondents characterized the quality of the electoral process as good, and 35.5% as bad (please see the Table 1 below). Also, voting inclination did not depend on the attitudes towards assessment of the election as shown in the

Table above, with no variation among voters and non-voters (in the 2011 parliamentary elections) in relation to the assessment of the quality of the electoral process in Kyrgyzstan.

Table 1: Voters and non-voters in Kyrgyzstan: Assessment of the quality of elections (2011 parliamentarian elections) Quality of elections Non response Total Electors Good Bad Voters 537 411 210 1,158 % within row 46.4% 35.5% 18.1% 100% % within column 79.6% 76.1% 69.3% 76.3% Non-voters 138 129 93 360 % within row 38.3% 35.8% 25.8% 100% % within column 20.4% 23.9% 30.7% 23.7% Total 675 540 303 1,518 % within row 44.5% 35.6% 20.0% 100% % within column 100% 100% 100% 100% Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: see Appendix C.

Therefore, this dissertation studies the attitudes of the Kyrgyzstani voters towards elections and voting and attempts to understand why voters in Kyrgyzstan keep participating in the elections in which they have a little faith. It is believed that finding an answer to this question contributes to an understanding of voter’s behavior in Kyrgyzstan, and other similar “hybrid” governments in the region and beyond.

1.2.3. Steps of the research

In order to address this goal, the research goes through the following methodological steps. First, it provides historical and political background of the elections in Kyrgyzstan from the Soviet times to the current date, which helps to explain the role and consequences of elections for the regime and opposition. Second, based on the available data along with the data collected by the author of the dissertation in Kyrgyzstan in 2011, the research tests theories and hypotheses developed in the U.S. and other established democracies (as mentioned in Chapter 2) about the primary determinants of voting behavior in case of Kyrgyzstan. Third, the author analyzes quantitative data in combination with findings about meanings of elections for ordinary voters. Fourth, the author generalizes the findings of the research to the hybrid regimes in post-

Soviet Central Asia. To conclude, the research helps understand and explain (and thus becoming

another building block of in the study of) why people vote under the conditions of “hybrid” political regimes like Kyrgyzstan, and what it can mean for prospects of democratization.

II. Chapter 2: Literature review: Main concepts, their applications and limitations

2.1. State of the scholarship on “hybrid” regimes

Global political changes initiated by the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s were accompanied by increased importance of the elections both in genuinely democratized states and in authoritarian regimes disguised as democracies (Huntington, 1993; Schedler, 2006a, 2006b).

In the case of democratizing countries, elections represented founding moments for the new political order (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986) in the case of new autocratic regimes elections represented only a semblance of an open political contest (Bielisak, 2006). Thus, contrary to the expectations of the “transitology” (e.g., Huntington, 1993; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986), in many countries the introduction of elections has not led to democratization. Rather, elections accompanied the rise of new types of non-democratic regimes that display essential characteristics of democracy and autocracy. Called by scholars “hybrid,” “semi-authoritarian,” or

“electoral authoritarian” (Hale, 2011; Levitsky &Way, 2002; McMann, 2006; Wigell, 2008), these regimes represent “ambiguous political systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political rights with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits” (Ottaway,

2003, p.3). These countries do hold regular, national-level elections. Still, the elections are neither free and fair nor truly competitive, despite (an often orchestrated) participation of multiple parties and an opposition (Bielisak, 2006; Schedler, 2002a).

According to a survey conducted by Diamond (2002), only 73 states, or 38% of states in the world, are liberal democracies. At the other end of the spectrum, 25 countries, or 13% of the total, are politically closed and repressive. This leaves from 45 to 65 countries that lay in what

Marina Ottaway (2003, p.7) calls “a vast gray zone”—the space between authoritarianism at one end and consolidated democracy at the other.

The review of the literature about “hybrid” regimes suggests that many of them were previously referred to as “authoritarian” regimes, which differed from totalitarian and post- totalitarian regimes (Linz & Stepan, 1996), or that they were “transitional” towards democracy

(e.g., Huntington, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). But as indicated by Koehler (2009), the study of these non-democratic political regimes has been all but neglected by comparative politics since Linz’s (1975) seminal contribution to the field, and also Amos Perlmutter’s (1981) comparative analysis of modern authoritarianism. Koehler (2009) argues further that only recently, in the wake of increasing awareness of the limitations of the transition paradigm

(Carothers, 2001), have attempts been made to revive the study of authoritarian governments, particularly of those that display a range of formal institutions such as multiple political parties, reasonably competitive elections, and parliamentary bodies that normally would be associated with democratic political systems. In this regard, as Hale (2011) hybrid regimes deserve to be studied in their own right because they represent unique political orders, not merely the unsuccessful attempts of democratization or flawed democracies; they are also too numerous (at the start of 2010, 58 countries, or 30% of the world’s political systems) and have been often long-lived and stable; many of them stopped because of foreign occupation not on their own accord (from 1800 to 2007, 47%, or 46 of them have lasted at least 10 years, with 37%, that is

24 countries, lasting over 20 years). The complexity of this concept is acknowledged by Hale

(2011, p.23), who argues that:

Political science has not yet settled on an approach to understanding such systems. The

dominant tendency has been to study these countries primarily through the lenses of what

they are not, treating them as defective democracies, weak autocracies, or unstable

countries in a potentially long process of ‘transition’ to democracy or ‘backsliding’ to

autocracy.

Because of this, as the literature review for this dissertation suggests (Brooker, 2014;

Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Geddes, 2006; Hale, 2011; Levitsky & Way,

2010; Lust-Okar, 2005; Magaloni, 2008; Schedler, 2006b), more studies need to be conducted to clearly differentiate a typical “hybrid” regime from a “typical” authoritarian regime. This dissertation is based on the application of the concept of the “competitive authoritarian regime,” described in the next section, as a form of a “hybrid” regime as applied to the case of

Kyrgyzstan.

Also, there is a disagreement among scholars about the types of “hybrid” regimes. For example, if Levitsky and Way (2010) consider them as mostly post-Cold war phenomenon, Hale

(2011), based on the data set from Polity IV, counts their existence since 1800, and provides the notable examples of Germany from 1871 to 1918, South Africa, 1910 to 1992, Mexico 1977 to

1997, Singapore, 1965 to present, and Malaysia, 1969 as proof for of such regimes.

Whatever their characteristic and chronological limits were, “hybrid” regimes present a new alternative to both democracy and a traditional autocracy, and there now exists an agreement as to this among scholars (Hale, 2011; Levitsky and Way, 2010). In this regard, as studies have found (Hale, 2011), hybrid regimes display more warlike foreign policy behavior,

lower business confidence, more frequent formal institutional disruptions than either democracies or autocracies, and greater environmental problems. As a result, Hale (2011, p. 41) convincingly pointed out that “[b]ecause some of the world’s most influential countries are classified by some definitions as hybrid regimes – such as Russia, Egypt, Nigeria, and Venezuela

– we would seem to ignore a theoretical understanding of their nature at our own peril.”

2.2. “Hybrid” regimes and elections

Incumbents in the “hybrid” regimes use myriad coercive or corrupt methods to ensure stability and continuation of their rules. Such tactics include media manipulation and propaganda, coercing or buying voters, supporting informal groups to attack and suppress the opposition, manipulation of the choice set for the electorate, for instance, by creating false opposition candidates, pressuring, coopting or blackmailing elites, selective persecution, and falsification of election results (Hale, 2011). Since this dissertation focuses on the role of elections and voters in Kyrgyzstan, one of the post-Soviet “hybrid” regimes in Central Asia, the concept of “competitive authoritarianism,” as offered by Levitsky & Way (2010), demands special attention. According to Levitsky & Way (2010), “competitive authoritarianism” is a type of a non-democratic regime that, unlike single-party or military dictatorships, use elections to give an opportunity for the opposition to contest for power, but they skew the “playing field” in favor of incumbents through (1) electoral manipulation, (2) unfair media access, (3) abuse of state resources, and (4) varying degrees of harassment and violence against opposition candidates or parties. Competitive authoritarian regimes proliferated after the Cold War, but according to the methodology of these scholars, by 1995 only 35 regimes were “competitive authoritarian.” Moreover, “competitive authoritarianism” is only of several hybrid regime types.

Three other types include (1) constitutional oligarchies or exclusive republics, which possess the

basic features of democracy but deny suffrage to a major segment of the adult population (e.g.,

Estonia and Latvia in the early 1990s); (2) tutelary regimes, in which elections are competitive but the power elected of elected governments is constrained by nonelected religious (e.g., Iran), military (e.g., Guatemala and Pakistan), or monarchic (e.g., Nepal in the 1990s) authorities; and

(3) restricted or semi-competitive democracies, in which elections are free but a major party is banned (e.g., Argentina in 1957-1966 and Turkey in the 1990s) (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p. 14).

In comparison to definitions of modern authoritarianism offered by other scholars, the definition by Levitsky & Way (2010) is more restrictive and precise in distinguishing between

“competitive” and “noncompetitive” authoritarian regimes. It making distinctions can be usefully applied to the context of post-Soviet Central Asia, and especially in delineating the case of

Kyrgyzstan from neighboring countries, as explained in detail in Chapter 8.

In addition to providing a definition of “competitive authoritarianism,” Levitsky & Way

(2010) delivered an explanatory and predictive framework for the diverging trajectories of competitive authoritarian regimes since 1990. They assume that the main factor explaining different consensuses of the elections in these regimes is incumbents’ capacity to hold onto power. This capacity hinges on two factors: (1) linkage to the West, or density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) with the U.S.A. and the EU; and (2) the incumbent’s organizational power, or the scope and cohesion of state and governing-party structures (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In short, where linkage to the West was extensive, as in

Eastern Europe and the Americas, competitive authoritarian regimes democratized during the post-Cold War period; where linkages were low, as in the former Soviet Union, external democratization pressure was weaker. And where state and governing party structures

(organizational power) were underdeveloped and lacked cohesion, regimes were less stable:

depending on the level of linkage to the West, they ended up either in democratization or remained in unstable competitive authoritarianism. Overall, the theory correctly predicted regime outcomes in 28 states of 35 cases (Levistky & Way, 2010).

Also, Kyrgyzstan was not included in the initial count of competitive authoritarian regimes by Levitsky and Way (2010); consequently, the country was left out of consideration of their analysis of competitive authoritarian regimes in their seminal publications (in 2002 and

2010) even though they did recognize Kyrgyzstan as a competitive authoritarianism after 1995

(2010). This dissertation fills this gap and studies Kyrgyzstan in depth, applying Levitsky and

Way’s concept to elections in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.

Finally, despite growing scholarship on elections under semi-authoritarian “competitive regimes,” most studies focus on the elite level, that is, the studies so far have mostly focused on how elections support the stability of a regime and provide opportunities for its opposition (e.g.,

Norris, Frank, Martinez & Coma, 2015; Levitsky &Way, 2010; Schedler, 2006b). Consequently, the role of ordinary voters in elections in non-democratic countries has been neglected on the grounds that these elections are meaningless to ordinary voters due to absence of a real choice and the voter’s general lack of efficacy. The “hybrid” regimes also experience some of these techniques used by authoritarian rules to create uneven playground for the opposition (Levitsky

& Way, 2010). A “hybrid” regime like Kyrgyzstan, however, is more open than autocratic governments, and therefore, its capabilities to exploit violence and manipulations is somehow limited. There is thus a great need to study behavior of voters in the “hybrid” regimes beyond simple models of the state coercion, mobilization, and manipulation in order to understand other factors that may play a role in motivating citizens to cast their votes despite lack of public confidence in government institutions, including electoral processes.

2. 3. Overview of the main explanatory models of voting turnout

Voting is one of the most important forms of regular engagement in politics for many ordinary citizens in societies with free and competitive elections. Whether individuals cast a vote because of traditional loyalties or consciously rational reasons, their choice is a significant affirmation of a political identity and connection to the state. Elections also have consequences for government, as they strengthen or weaken the position of leaders of organized political groups bargaining for power (Rose, 1974).

As a rule, in most democratic countries somewhat more than 50% of the citizenry takes part in voting during national elections, and not more than 25% of the adult population participates in the other types of political activities (Diaz & Payne 2007). In established democracies, level of voter turnout serves as an indicator of “the health of [a] democracy”

(Franklin, 2004, p. 4). Low electoral turnout is often considered to be bad for democracy, whether because it calls legitimacy into question or by suggesting a lack of representation of certain groups and skewed public policies (Franklin, 2004, citing Piven & Cloward, 2000).

Similar ideas have been proposed by Patterson (2002), Teixeira (1992), and Wattenberg (2002).

In general, political scientists who study electoral behavior identify various factors that influence turnout. They can be grouped into five approaches, namely (1) socio-psychological, (2) sociological, (3) historical-institutional, (4) rational-choice, and (5) communication approaches

(Harder & Krosnick, 2008; Knight & Marsh, 2002).

According to the first approach, a motivation to vote is affected by attitudes towards politics, government, and society. Scholars of this approach have studied the role of attitudes and values, including attitudes toward politics, political parties, campaign issues, and candidates

(e.g., Gimpel, Lay & Schuknecht, 2003; Hetherington, 1999; Riker & Ordeshook, 1968); trust in

politicians and government, political efficacy, and satisfaction with government performance

(e.g., Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; McCann & Dominguez, 1998; Powell, 1986; Rosenstone &

Hansen, 1993; Southwell, 1985); support for democracy (Abramson, 1983; Abramson et al.

1995; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960); sense of civic duty (e.g., Knack 1992, 1994) and participation in civic organizations (e.g. Tate, 1991; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995); trust in fellow citizens (e.g. Cox, 2003; Holbrook et al. 2001; Timpone, 1998); and role of habit (e.g.

Gerber, Green & Shachar, 2003; Plutzer 2002). For instance, scholars demonstrate that the level of political support can be both a cause and a consequence of voting choice, activism, protest, and other forms of political behavior (e.g. Acock, Clarke & Stewart, 1985; Anderson & Guillory,

1997; Clarke and Acock, 1989; Dalton, 2004; Ginsberg & Weissberg, 1978; Finkel, 1985, 1987;

Kaase & Newton, 1995; Norris 1999). These theories of electoral behavior have been confirmed by elections in the post-communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Scholars emphasize that among the main factors that caused low voter turnout in these countries were high levels of public mistrust of state institutions, including elections, low levels of political efficacy of the voters, and a lack of vigorous civil society (e.g. Berglund et al., 2001; Bernhagen & Marsh 2007;

Birch, 2008, 2010; Norris, 1999, 2002, 2004; Norris, et al., 2015).

The sociological approach to voting focuses on voters’ social demographics such as social status, age, gender, and religion (Claassen, 2015; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948;

Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al.

1995; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). These studies established, for example, that people who command higher levels of socio-economic resources – i.e., education and money – tend to vote more often that those with low levels of resources (e.g., Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Nie et al., 1996;

Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). With respect to demographic factors, for instance, people appear

to become increasingly likely to vote as they progress from early adulthood through middle adulthood until later years in life (e.g., Strate, Parrish, Elder, & Ford, 1989; Turner, Shields, &

Sharp, 2001).

Another school of voter turnout analysis, follows traditions laid down in the famous study of Anthony Downs (1957), and focuses on the rational-choice perspective that explains voting in terms of a person’s self-interest. According to this model, whether or not a person votes depends on that person’s cost-benefit analysis of the potential gains from the elections. For instance, whether the potential gains from his or her preferred candidate being elected in comparison to the costs he or she must pay to vote – the time involved in voting, gathering information about the election and the candidate(s), and so on. The rational-choice approach has over time become identified with the idea of “economic voting” (Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, & Weisberg,

2008), focusing on how the state of an economy influences voting behavior (e.g., Lewis-Beck &

Paldam, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Nannestad & Paldam, 1994; Paldam &

Nannestad, 2000; Van der Brug, Van der Eijk, & Franklin, 2007). In this regard, comparative case-studies find relatively strong support for the hypothesis that turnout is higher in economically advanced countries (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998; Fornos, Power, & Garand, 2004;

Norris, 2002). But this relationship is not linear, meaning that the main difference is between the poorest countries and all others (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998). Other studies have produced contradictory conclusions on the relations between the economy and turnout. One approach argued that bad economic conditions negatively affected political participation, including voter turnout (e.g., Rosenstone, 1982; Scholzman & Verba, 1979; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).

The other approach maintains that negative economic situation increases citizens’ concern over politics and precipitates their political and electoral activism (e.g., Lipset 1959). Radcliff (1992)

pointed out that both effects are possible—economic hardship can induce people to mobilize to redress grievances, but it can also lead them to withdraw entirely from the political process. Most researchers, though, reported no overall effect of economic adversity on voter turnout (e.g.,

Arcelus & Meltzer, 1975; Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998; Fornos et al., 2004; Kostadinova, 2003;

Lane, 1965).

According to scholars of the institutional approach, the legal regulations and administrative arrangements (such as the qualifications for citizenship and franchise, the efficiency of registration and balloting procedures, the use of compulsory voting laws, the ease of obtaining absentee and postal ballots, the frequency of electoral contests, the number of electoral offices and referendum issues on the ballot, whether voting day is a national holiday, and so on) are more powerful explanations of election turnout than political culture (Aldrich,

1993; Crewe, 1981; Downs, 1957; Franklin 1996, 2000; Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2003; Gimpel,

Dyck & Shaw, 2004; Jackman, 1987; Jackman & Miller, 1995; Norris, 2004; Powell, 1982,

1986; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Schur & Kruse, 2000; Schur, Shields, Kruse, & Schriner,

2002; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Broader structural factors influencing voters’ behavior include political and constitutional institutions of the political system that set the rules of the game, such as whether the electoral system is proportional, mixed, or majoritarian; the type of party system; and the level of electoral competition (e.g., Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Daalder &

Mair, 1983; Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1984, 1994, 1999; Pedersen, 1983; Powell 1980; Rae,

1967).

Finally, other scholars focused on the study of communication in affecting voters’ turnout, including mass media (Lipset, 1959), canvassing (e.g., Gerber & Green 2000, 2001,

2005, Green, Gerber & Nickerson, 2003; McNulty, 2005; Michelson, 2003; Cardy, 2005),

actions of politicians and candidates during the campaign (e.g., Holbrook et al. 2001; Enelow,

1986; Plane & Gershtenson, 2004), and election surveys and polls (e.g., Granberg & Holmberg,

1992; Greenwald, Carnot, Beach, & Yong, 1987; Epstein & Strom, 1981; Patterson & Caldeira,

1983; Yalch, 1976). For instance, one theory argues that exposure to negative advertising encourages cynicism about candidates and apathy among citizens, which demobilizes them

(Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Min, 2004). Contrasting theory argues that negative ads strengthen attitudes toward candidates (either positive or negative) and create more interest in a campaign (e.g., Freedman & Goldstein, 1999; Wattenberg & Brians, 1999). A third approach has asserted that negative ads exert no overall effect on turnout, because they depress turnout among some individuals and stimulate it among others (Clinton & Lapinski, 2004; Lau & Pomper, 2001;

Martin, 2004).

Each of these five approaches emphasizes a particular set of factors that could be important under some circumstances yet less-important under others. Therefore, the author will not choose between competing schools of thoughts but will instead attempt to apply all of them to Kyrgyzstan to identify conditions under which the determinants of voting turnout are or are not significant. At the same time, as Blais (2006) argued in his comprehensive review of the current studies of the factors influencing voting turnout, even though cross-national studies of turnout have produced the number of robust findings, there remain gaps in our knowledge. In this regard, he highlighted the usefulness and importance of some of the standard hypotheses about the determinants of turnout in a new environment, as the number of elections greatly expands around the world to “check whether the patterns that we observe among them hold in new democracies” (Blais, 2006, pp.122-123). Thus, the spread of elections to “the East” (the former Soviet Union, Middle East, and Asia) over the last two decades gives scholars an

opportunity to re-examine old findings in new contexts and learn about electoral systems from those regions (Blais, 2006).

Nevertheless, there remains an issue of comparability. Current models and concepts on voter turnout have been developed to describe electoral behavior in the established democracies.

Some scholars argue that this creates problems of comparability of political behavior not only between the old and new democracies (Bernhagen & March, 2007; Bunce, 1998, 2000; Norris

2002), but also between elections in democratic and non-democratic countries that possess some unique characteristics (e.g., regarding the behavior of voters, candidates, and incumbents) that are worthy of exploration (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009).

Indeed, empirical studies of concepts of voting turnout produced contradictory findings in cases of non-Western countries (Norris,2002). For instance, according to studies by Blais and

Dobrzynska (1998), Powell (1982), and Norris (2004), turnout tends to be higher in economically developed countries, mainly where the GDP per capita is high. On the contrary, scholars studying Indian democracy observe that the poor turn out to vote in large numbers, and that the turnout rate among the poor is almost as high as for those who are either middle class or wealthy (Ahuja & Chibber, 2012). Studies on Africa and Latin America report similar findings

(Bratton, 2008; Booth & Seligson, 2008). For example, Radcliff (1992) empirically demonstrated that the relation between the economy and voter turnout differed in various parts of the world: in industrialized democracies economic distress resulted in withdrawal, but the impact of economic downturn was the opposite in developing countries.

In this regard, the most recent study about the north-south regional difference in a voter turnout in Kyrgyzstan, Hill & Huskey (2015, pp.7-8) argue that, in general:

In the West, higher levels of turnout are associated with citizens who feel more deeply

invested in, and attached to, the political, social, and economic system. In the Western

turnout model, therefore, the “supervoter” is more likely to be an older, married

individual with higher levels of income and education. In much of the post-communist

world, on the other hand, faithful voting is associated with rural residents who tend to

have lower levels of income and education. The literature explains this reversal of roles

in several ways, including the fact that the less privileged tend to be deferential voters

who are more amenable to cues and mobilizational appeals from local authority figures.

Furthermore, unlike in the West, in wide swaths of the post-communist world, the more

sophisticated and better-informed the voter, the more disillusioned they are with the

existing political order and therefore the more likely they are to regard elections as

ineffective instruments of political expression. Thus, in flawed democracies, high-

information voters, who tend to populate urban areas, are likely to feel a lower sense of

efficacy, which translates into lower turnout.

In relation with this, the author of this dissertation believes that Kyrgyzstan presents a valuable test case for theories of individual voter turnout developed by the current scholarship.

III. Chapter 3: Methods of the research: Data, variables and hypotheses

3.1. Sources of data on elections and voting behavior in Kyrgyzstan

Primary data about the history and political contexts of elections that have been held in

Kyrgyzstan since independence derived from post-election observation reports of the Office for

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This office provides support, assistance and expertise to participating states and civil society to promote democracy, rule of law, human rights, and tolerance and non-discrimination, as well as election observation, legislation review, and advice to governments on how to develop and sustain democratic institutions (OSCE, 2016). Scholarly publications on politics and elections in Kyrgyzstan as official statistics comprised another main source of data for the dissertation.

In Central Asia, unlike in Western democracies or even the Russian Federation, one does not have the luxury of reliable data from multiple elections to serve as the basis for a longitudinal study of voter behavior (Huskey, 2012), comparable to the American National Election Study

(ANES) that has been conducted in the United States since the 1940s. To the best knowledge of the dissertation’s author, only two previous nationwide surveys related solely to electoral behavior have been carried out in Kyrgyzstan whose results are available to the public. The first one was conducted by International Foundation of Electoral Studies (IFES) in 1995 and the survey inferences were reported in a publication (Olds, 1997). Regrettably, the publication does not contain primary (raw) data nor was the survey continued afterwards.

The second nationwide survey related to electoral behavior was conducted in Kyrgyzstan by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) in 2005 (CSES, 2008). The CSES is a systematic cross-national project on comparative electoral behavior containing data from over 50 countries, including Kyrgyzstan. The findings for each country come from nationally representative random stratified cluster samples, with face-to-face, local language interviews of at least 1,200 respondents using a standardized questionnaire instrument.

The CSES data for Kyrgyzstan (CSES 2008), which this dissertation used, comes from the January – March 2006 post-election survey (N = 2,000) as a part of the 2nd module of the

CSES surveys among 39 countries from 2001 to 2006. This data is available to the public for secondary analysis, and can be downloaded from the CSES online Data Center (CSES, 2008).

The CSES has done only one survey in Kyrgyzstan.

The CSES survey design used in Kyrgyzstan is similar to that of applied by the author of this dissertation in his survey conducted in Kyrgyzstan in 2011. This can be considered the third nationwide survey in the history of Kyrgyzstan that is related solely to electoral behavior. A local team of professional surveyors in all seven regions (oblasts) of Kyrgyzstan and in the capital city of Bishkek conducted this survey in September and October 2011 (before the October 30, 2011

Presidential election). The number of eligible electors (persons who are eligible to vote) and their regional distribution was obtained from the Central Election Commission’s published information prior to the parliamentary elections in September, 2010. The details and methods of the Survey are provided in the following section.

That investigation adhered to a rigorous survey design and analysis, thus assuring high levels of validity and reliability for the 2011 survey’s research findings. Another strength of this dissertation research is the ability to compare these 2011 survey findings with findings of the

similar CSES Kyrgyzstan survey conducted in 2006 (CSES 2008). Most of the questions posed in this dissertation’s survey were also asked in the CSES survey, which makes it possible to identify differences and similarities of voters’ behavior in Kyrgyzstan as well as changes in voting behavior between 2005 and 2011.

3.2. Details of the dissertation’s 2011 nationwide survey in Kyrgyzstan

3.2.1. Questionnaires and the sampling frame of the survey

The author and a team of professional surveyors conducted the field survey for the research using best-practices of survey methodology in all seven regions and two major cities

(capital Bishkek as well as Osh, which is also unofficially referred as the country’s “southern capital” of the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan). In total, 1,527 voters (electors) of at least 18 years of age were interviewed face-to-face, and 1,518 (99.4%) usable questionnaires (i.e., those that contained responses on the main dependent variable: whether the respondent voted or not in the previous elections) were obtained by a team of professional and competent surveyors, using a multi-stage random sampling method. Respondents received assurances of absolute confidentiality and encouragement to provide answers that best captured their attitudes and feelings. Out of 1,517 interviews, 107 were conducted by the author of this dissertation himself in Bishkek and Osh and surrounding townships and villages. (More details about the sampling method are provided in the following sub-section.)

The research questionnaire2 consisted of 43 carefully-worded questions (77 items in total), including questions about demographic and attitudinal predictors of the voter turnout (age, education, biological sex, income, attitudes towards the government, policies, politicians and institutions of the regime). The original wording of the questionnaire was designed by the author

2 English language version is enclosed in Appendix C 39

of this dissertation in the U.S.A. and was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review

Board of Kent State University.3 The questionnaire then was translated from English into the three main languages used in Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz, Russian, and Uzbek), which was important in order to avoid measurement error while interviewing the respondents. The translators used the best cross-linguistic equivalents of the concepts used in the survey to measure voters’ attitudes of different ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan, even though many Kyrgyz, mostly from Bishkek and northern regions, answered the questionnaire in Russian.

The frame population of the survey includes all the eligible electors (both voters and non- voters) in Kyrgyzstan. Data was obtained from the official statement of the Kyrgyz Central

Election Commission, which was publicized on October 5, 2010 (Akipress, 2010, October 5), a few days before conducting the parliamentary elections on October 10, 2010. The number of respondents for the survey was proportionally distributed according to these figures from the

Central Election Commission as shown in the table below:

Table 2: Population vs sample data by regional residence Two major cities and regions Population data, Sample data, Frequency, frequency, age, 18+, 2010 (%)* age 18+, 2011 (%)** Bishkek (capital, north) 340 511 (12.3%) 119 (7.8%) Batken region (south) 228 356 (8.3%) 71 (4.7%) Chui region (north) 468 040 (17%) 269 (17.7%) Issyk-Kul region (north) 234 623 (8.5%) 115 (7.6%) Jalal-Abad region (south) 497 328 (18%) 282 (18.6%) Naryn region (north) 155 380 (5.6%) 100 (6.6%) Osh region (south) 714, 499 (25.8%) 462 (30.4%) Talas region (north) 121 273 (4.5%) 100 (6.6%) Total*** 2,760,010*** (100%) 1,518 (100%)

Sources: *Akipress, 2010; **See Appendix C; *** Percentages in the sample data may not total due to rounding; **** This figure excludes 76,557 voters who had resided abroad during the 2010 elections; otherwise, the total number of the Kyrgyzstani voters is 2,836,567 people.

3 See Appendix D 40

It should be added that national statistics present slightly inflated numbers of the population because the figures do not take into account the scope of migration within the country or immigration abroad. The share of the rural population in Kyrgyzstan is 63.4% for 2010 by the

World Bank (2016). The sample data revealed 49.5% of respondents from rural areas (villages),

7.8% from suburbs, 26.9% from small- or middle-sized towns, and 15.8% from large towns

(meaning the only two major cities - Bishkek and Osh). In Kyrgyzstan, most suburban settlements are rural-like, making the total share of the rural respondents in the sample frame closer to the population data.

Kyrgyzstan is a multi-ethnic country, which necessitated stratification of the respondents’ ethnicity according to their shares in the population. According to the 2009 national population survey, there were 71% Kyrgyz, 14.3% Uzbek, 7.8% Russian, 0.4% Ukrainian, 0.9% Dungan,

1.1% Uighur, and 4.5% other ethnicities. (UNDP, 2012). Kyrgyzstan’s people, with a total population of 5,496,737 as of July 2012, includes more than 80 ethnic groups (IndexMundi,

2017). The country experienced two major inter-ethnic conflicts, one in June, 1990 and another in June, 2010; clashes occurred between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan and claimed the lives of hundreds of people on both sides. The population frame for ethnicity was derived from the Kyrgyz National Statistic Committee (KNSC) Census data for 2009, as shown in the following Table.

Table 3: Population vs sample data by ethnicity Ethnicity Population data (%)* Sample data (%)** Kyrgyz 71.0 58.6 Uzbeks 14.3 22.9 Russian 7.8 9.3 Others 6.9 7.6 No response -- 1.6 Total**: 100% 100%

Notes: *KNSC, 2009 ** See Appendix C ***Percentages may not total due to rounding.

As for the age structure, 51% of the respondents in the sample were between 18 and 39 years of age, 20.5% between 40 and 49 years of age, and the remaining 28.5% were over 50 years of age. There is no data available on demographics of the voters in Kyrgyzstan, but according to the 2008 National Statistic Committee report (quoted in UNDP, 2009, p. 19), as of

January 1, 2008, 39% (2,049,000 of the 5,224,000 people in the country) were between the ages of 14 and 34.

The collected data was analyzed using the STATA statistical software package, with use of multiple regression models in order to establish determinants of the electoral participation in

Kyrgyzstan. Since the sampling share of the Survey’s respondents in each of Kyrgyzstan’s seven regions was proportional to the number the voters, weighing was not used in the analysis of the

Survey’s results. The details of the data collection for the Survey are provided below.

3.2.2. Sampling methods

The survey’s design sought to obtain a highly representative sample that includes all the main elements of the population pertaining to the study. In order to achieve this purposes, the

Survey applied a combination of random and non-random sampling methods that were used at different stages of the unit selection (households) within the population frame.

Stratified random sampling was used in order distribute the households across demographic (biological sex and age), regional (including rural and urban residences), and ethnic quotas consistent with the Kyrgyzstan’s voting population. This method resulted in an approximately even split of the respondents in terms of gender and in proportional stratification of the respondents according to their age and the region of residence. The same approach was also used in regard to the three major ethnic groups (Kyrgyz, Russians, and Uzbeks), labeling the fourth ethnic category “Others” for the small number of the remaining ethnicities. In addition to

include the seven regions, the Survey was conducted in the two major cities of Kyrgyzstan located in the different parts of country – Bishkek (in the north, the capital city), Osh (in the south, again colloquially referred as “the second capital city”), and various smaller towns and villages across the country.

The non-probability method was used in selecting towns and villages based on the judgmental opinions of the field supervisors. Even though this technique is related to non- probability sampling, it aimed to select different towns and villages representing different social, economic, and cultural parts of each particular region. The streets in each location were selected randomly, and the units (households) were selected via a systematic random sampling method at regular intervals.

All these procedures were prepared in advance in a form of a survey protocol and distributed to the field supervisors who controlled the field surveyor’s work. The survey protocol was designed to obtain a highly representative sample of the frame population, and it included the steps that a field surveyor was supposed to follow in order to sample and interview the voters.

3.2.3. The issue of non-response

Even the most carefully designed and executed studies produce missing values. In the social sciences, it is nearly inevitable that some respondents will refuse to participate or to answer certain questions (van Buuren, 2012). Seeing this, the author of the dissertation remained quite mindful of the issue of nonresponse and its implications for causing a possible bias in the collected data (e.g., Groves, Dillman, Eltinge, & Little, 2002; Tourangeau & Plewes 2013). In this regard, the author and the surveyors of the field study made fairly effective efforts to keep

the response rate as high as possible, which is considered as “[t]he first line of defense against nonresponse error” (Salant & Dillman 1994, p.21).

3.2.3.1. Unit non-response

Consequently, the surveyors reported only a few cases of unit nonresponse and refusal to take part in the survey. For the most part, all the approached sample persons responded positively and were able to participate in the interview. Out of 1,527 filled-in questionnaires,

1,518 (99.4%) were deemed usable and were included in the analysis because they contained responses concerning the dependent variable (whether or not a respondent voted in the previous elections).

This high rate of unit response was achieved following the best practices and survey designs suggested in the literature. In particular, the survey applied the framework suggested by

Groves et al. (2004), who maintained that most non-response problems caused by influences at the four following levels:

1) the social environment (i.e., large urban areas tend to generate more refusals in

household surveys; households with more than one member generate fewer refusals

than single persons’ households [Groves & Couper 1998, quoted in Groves et al.,

2002, p.176]);

2) the person level (i.e., males tend to generate more refusals than females ([Smith 1983,

quoted in Groves et al., 2002, p.176]);

3) the interviewer level (i.e. more-experienced interviewers obtain higher cooperation

rates than less-experienced interviewers, [Groves and Couper 1998, Smith 1983,

quoted in Groves et al., 2002, p.176]);

4) The survey design level (i.e., factors related to better response rate include incentives

offered to sample persons or shorter questions and questionnaires).

Starting from the last, the design level, numerous studies demonstrated that, compared to all the other forms of surveys, on average face-to-face surveys have the highest response rates, followed by telephone, then mail surveys (e.g., Hox & De Leeuw 1994, quoted in Groves et al.,

2002, p.153).

In this regard, all 1,518 usable questionnaires included into analysis were filled in by professional surveyors through face-to-face interviews. Also, the number of questions was kept to a minimum, so it usually took only 20 minutes to respond to all the questions in the questionnaires. Low refusal levels can also be attributed to familiarizing the respondents with the purpose of the research at the start of the interview, as well as assuring them of confidentiality of their responses.

At the interviewer’s level, professional demeanor and abilities of the surveyors helped them to establish contacts and maintain high level of cooperation from contacted sample persons.

As argued by Groves et al. (2004), the first two influences (at the social and respondent’s levels) are out of the researchers’ control. The author believes that, due to the particularities of the survey environment in Kyrgyzstan, the dissertation’s nationwide survey was able to minimize these influences to an acceptable level as explained below. Because a majority of Kyrgyz electors still live in the countryside (63.4% of the country’s population lived in the rural areas in

2010, according to the World Bank (2016), but only 15.8% respondents were from the only two large cities - Bishkek (the capital in the north) and Osh, (the other largest city of Kyrgyzstan, in the south), and 7.6% were from suburbs of Bishkek. Also, the level of freedom of speech and thought in the country is developed enough that many respondents feel that they can freely share

opinions about politics, government, and other sensitive issues. Resultantly, the survey was able to collect high response rates from all the surveyed areas and regions of Kyrgyzstan. The rest of the respondents were from villages (49.7%) and small- or middle-sized towns (26.9%). Also, researchers gave all respondents assurances of absolute confidentiality and encouraged them to provide answers that best captured their feelings; moreover, as annual polls, conducted by

International Republican Institute (IRI, 2015) in Kyrgyzstan from 2011 to 2015 demonstrate, more than half of the Kyrgyzstani respondents are not afraid to openly express their political views. This is apparently due to the highest levels of freedom of speech in the region and the country’s unique political experience since independence (Freedom House, 2011). Also, while it proved difficult to measure all the personal characteristics that can influence respondents’ nonresponses, the survey received a fairly balanced gender representation (female 50.7% and male 49.3%) that minimizes at least gender-related bias.

All these efforts assured high rate of unit responses (96.4% of the respondents of the usable questionnaires). Indeed, every group of surveyors reported only a few cases of refusal, which makes the cases of unit non-response not a significant factor for producing bias and error in survey statistics. In addition, as argued by in the related literature (e.g., Curtin, Presser &

Singer, 2002; Holbrook, Mclanie & Krosnick, 2008; Keeter, Meeler, Kohut, Groves & Presser,

2000), low response rates are not per se evidence of nonresponse bias; they merely indicate the possibility of bias, and if a probability sample is drawn from a population and serious efforts are made to collect data from as many sampled individuals as possible, results appear to be minimally affected by response rates.

3.2.3.2. Item non-response

While the survey achieved a good unit response rate, not all of the respondents were able to answer to all the questions in the questionnaire, making the issue of item nonresponse an important one for the survey’s data inferences. Biemer & Lyberg (2003) assert that the main reasons that not all the items in a questionnaire are answered could be related to the difficulty in understanding the question or sensitivity of the question. For example, if the question offers response alternatives such as “don’t know” or “no opinion,” these alternatives can serve as escape routes for respondents who otherwise might have left the question unanswered. As a result, in some situations item nonresponse becomes closely associated with measurement error.

The length of the questionnaire might be another factor reducing item nonresponse. For example, both Heberlein and Baumgartner (1978, cited in Groves et al. 2002, p. 193) and Goyder (1985, cited in Groves et al. 2002, p. 193) found that each additional page of a self-administered questionnaire reduced the response rate by 0.4%.

How does this dissertation research address the issue of item non-response? First of all, before the survey started, the author of the dissertation paid careful attention to the design of the questionnaires and questions, which is believed to be the best preventive measure (e.g., Biemer

& Lyberg 2003). In this regard, as advised by Biemer & Lyberg (2003), the survey avoided questions that put too much burden on the respondents (for instance, using only absolutely necessary questions and avoiding questions unrelated to the focus of the dissertation. Also, the author used fewer sensitive questions in order to include only absolutely needed items (or their rephrased options). For instance, as to questions on income, the author used broader categories instead of numbers, in case respondents might be hesitant to provide numerical estimates of their income. Thus, the question was phrased as “In general, how would you describe your own

present living [in local languages: ‘material’] conditions?)” and the following five choices appeared: 1) “Not enough money for food”; 2) “Enough money for food, but we cannot buy clothes”; 3) “Enough money for food and clothes, but we cannot buy expensive things”; 4) “We can buy expensive things sometimes, but not all we want”, 5) “We can afford to buy everything we want.” Only 57 respondents (3.7%) of 1,518 refused to answer.

Despite methodically following the procedures aimed at minimizing item nonresponse, on average for all the 23 variables included into analysis, the average rate of nonresponse was nevertheless at the 10.5% level, with detail provided in the following Table.

Table 4: Variables, missing values and method of imputation* # Variable Amount (%) of missing values Method of imputation Demographics: 1 Age 6 (3.9%) Mean 2 Gender no missing units 3 Marital status 18 (1.2%) Mode 4 Ethnicity 24 (1.6%) Mode 5 Religious denomination 28 (1.8%) Mode Social-economic status: 6 Level of education 20 (1.3%) Mean 7 Main occupation 2 (0.1%) Mode 8 Household income 56 (3.6%) Mean 9 Place of residence (Urban/Rural) no missing units Government evaluation: 10 Evaluation of the country’s direction 324 (21.3%) Mode 11 Economy evaluation 66 (4.3%) Mode 12 State of democracy 159 (10.5%) Mode Trust in elections: 13 Electoral efficacy 115 (7.6%) Mode 14 Quality of the elections 303 (19.9%) Mode 15 Trust in electoral process 195 (12.8%) Mode Political attitudes and values: 16 Religiosity 101 (6.6%) Mode 17 Trust in government (president) 136 (8.9%) Mode 18 Party identification 134 (8.8%) Mode 19 Attitude towards democracy 144 (9.4%) Mode 20 Interest in politics 228 (15%) Mode Social attitudes and values: 21 Living conditions evaluation 90 (5.9%) Mode 22 Trust in people 258 (17%) Mode 23 Attitude towards life 90 (5.9%) Mode *Notes: Independent Variable is Voting Turnout in the previous election

3.2.3.3. Imputation method for missing data

The current scholarship practice accepts the fact that even the most carefully designed and executed studies produce missing values. Dealing with incomplete data is thus becoming an important and standard part of contemporary research publications involving data analysis (Van

Buuren, 2012). In this regard, the literature offers several ways of correcting nonresponse rate through imputing missing values such as mean substitution, regression imputation, and hot-deck imputation: each of these methods has its own advantages and limitations, well described in the related literature (e.g., Van Buuren, 2012; Dillman, Eltinge, Groves, & Little, 2002; Groves et al., 2004).

This research applied mean imputation (mode imputation for categorical values) as suitable as well as simple, fast fixes for missing data. Mean imputation does have several disadvantages: when there are many missing values for instance, mean imputation can create a

“spike” in the distribution of the variable at the mean level (Groves et al., 2004); however, it is still useful when, such as in the case of this dissertation, only a small number of values are missing (van Buuren, 2012). As shown in Table 4 above, the average rate of nonresponse for all

23 variables was at the 10.5% level, with the following non-response frequency distribution

(with 5% range): 2 variables have no missing values; 8 variables have from 0.1% - 4.9% nonresponse rate; 7 variables have 5% - 9.9% nonresponse rate; 2 variables have 10% - 14.9% nonresponse rate; 3 variables have 15% - 19.9% nonresponse rate; and only 1 item has 21.3% nonresponse rate.

In sum, the author believes that following to the rigorous survey design and analysis assured high levels of validity and reliability of the research findings. In addition, the reliability of the 2011 survey’s findings were externally validated by their concurrence with the similar

findings of the other sociological survey on the related questions of this survey previously conducted by Darr & Hesli (2010) in Kyrgyzstan.

3.2.4. Qualitative data

The 2011 survey conducted in Kyrgyzstan by the author of the dissertation included two qualitative-type of questions, enough to satisfy the standards of a “minimum qualitative research” (Creswell & Plano Clark 2007). One of the questions was open-ended and aimed at studying the elector’s inner motives and reasoning for participation (or non-participation) in the voting. The second question was closed-ended and aimed at learning about the meaning of the elections that the Kyrgyz voters (and non-voters) attach to the elections. These questions aim to identify the underlying ideas, understandings, and assumptions of citizens about the elections and their electoral participation in Kyrgyzstan.

In this regard, the phrasing of the open-ended question was quite straightforward and asked a respondent why he votes (“Why do you vote?”). As a result, most answers to this question containing a respondent’s meaning about his or her act of voting, were also straightforward and short (transcribed by one or two sentences), though some respondents provided more elaborate answers and comments (transcribed in several sentences). Then, units

(responses to the questions) were analyzed and recurring themes were identified and classified into several one-dimensional, mutually-exclusive and independent categories, following standard methods of a qualitative research (e.g., Creswell, 2003; Creswell, Clark, 2007; Strauss, 1987;

Strauss & Gorbin, 1990), and in congruity with the fundamentals of the grounded theory analysis

(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The identified categories were coded as expressed through patterns and summarized according to the degree of frequency in the responses (in percentages) that provided numerical data about the spread of particular categories

and themes among the total survey sample. It is worth mentioning that even though qualitative data consisting of short sentences and brief comments hardly involves rich contexts and detailed information from participants (Morse & Richards 2002), it does meet the minimum criteria of qualitative research as a part of a quantitative survey study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).

Further, the author of the dissertation is familiar with the warnings of some scholars about risks of asking “why?” question. For instance, Pasek & Krosnick (2010) maintain that even though it might seem much more efficient simple to ask people to describe the reasons for their thoughts and actions, citing Lazarsfeld (1935), respondents rarely know why they think and act as they do. Concluding their argument, Pasek & Krosnik (2010, pp. 41-42) suggest that:

People are willing to guess when asked, but their guesses are rarely informed by any

genuine self-insight and are usually no more accurate than would be guesses about why

someone else thought or acted as they did. Consequently, it is best not to ask people to

explain why they think or act in particular way.

In order to overcome this limitation of the “Why did you vote?” question, and also to double-check the answers of the respondents to this open-ended question, the survey offered to a respondent a “closed” variation of the question: a list of several meanings of the elections, based on the methodology developed by Pammett (1999) in his study of the Russian voters to measure the degree of accountability, policy, and benefit functions that elections conveyed to the voters in

Russia. As in Pammett’s study, the current study also asked respondents about the relative importance (i.e., Large, Moderate, Small, or Don’t know) of the following nine meanings of the elections: (1) Choose among particular policies; (2) Hold governments accountable for past actions; (3) Advance social class interests; (4) Advance ethnic/national/religious interests; (5)

Gain things for self and family; (6) Comment on state of country; (7) Keep politicians honest; (8)

Choose among leaders’ personalities; and, (9) Deceive the people.

Finally, because this survey gathered nationwide data, it is possible to generalize the findings of the qualitative data provided by the participants’ views regarding their voting to the overall population of voters in Kyrgyzstan. This addresses one of the major problems of qualitative data, namely its lack of its generalizability due to small, non-representative samples

(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). Thus, it is believed that the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and research provided the most complete approach for better insights and understanding of the main factors influencing voting behavior in Kyrgyzstan.

3.3. Variables and hypotheses

The Dependent Variable (DV) of the research is an individual voting turnout that is measured through a respondent’s answer to a question, “Did you vote in the previous election?” in both data sets (2006 and 2011). Variables from both data sets will be used to test hypotheses about the determinants of individual voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan in a time-comparative fashion.

Indeed, as a multivariate phenomenon, an act of voting includes a complex of external and internal motivational factors and reasons (Niemi, Weisberg, & Kimball, 2011). Political scientists have identified a number of factors that affect individual-level turnout, which is the dependent variable (DV) in this research. These factors are helpful in setting a few testable hypotheses for the purposes of this dissertation research.

(1) Demographic and identity factors (age, gender, marital status, religion, and ethnicity)

A vast number of studies have examined and found relationships between demographic factors (age, biological sex/gender, religion, and ethnicity) and voting turnout. In terms of age differences, people usually appear to become increasingly likely to vote as they get older (e.g.,

Strate et al. 1989; Turner et al. 2001). Empirical findings also demonstrate variations in voting depending on a voter’s gender (e.g., Inglehart & Norris 2000) and marital status (e.g. Wolfinger

&Wolfinger 2008). Also, many studies showed positive relationship between religion and voting turnout (in the U.S.: Hougland & Christenson, 1983; Macaluso & Wanat, 1979; Milbrath &

Goel, 1977). Other studies found relationship between ethnicity and turnout (in the U.S.: Cain &

Kiewiet, 1984; Claassen, 2004, 2005; Graves & Lee, 2000; McClain & Garcia, 1993; Parenti

1967). Therefore, the research will test if voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan depends on such demographic factors as (1.1) age, (1.2) gender, (1.3) marital status, (1.4) ethnicity and (1.5) religion of the voters. These factors were measured and tested through standard demographic questions about age, gender, ethnicity, and religion in both 2006 and 2011 surveys.

(2) Social structure and voting turnout

The second set of hypotheses is related to social structure and provides that people who command higher levels of socio-economic resources – i.e., education and money – tend to vote more often that those with low levels of resources (Campbell et al., 1960; Lazarsfeld et al., 1948;

Nie et al., 1996; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993, Verba et al., 1995; Verba & Nie, 1972; Wolfinger

& Rosenstone, 1980). In this regard, the second set of hypotheses indicates that citizens with higher socio-economic status tend to vote more often than the citizens with lower socio- economic status. In particular, this set of hypotheses maintains that people with (1.6) education,

(1.7) higher occupational status, and (1.8) better living conditions tend to have a higher turnout of voting in the elections.

Hypothesis 1.6 and 1.7 were tested using such variables as “EDUCATION” and “MAIN

OCCUPATION” available in both the 2006 and 2011 data sets.

Hypothesis 1.8 was tested using the variable “HOUSEHOLD INCOME,” which is derived from the answers to the following question: “In general, how would you describe your own present living [material] conditions?” (This variable is presented only in the 2011 survey.)

(3) Urban-rural residence

The gap between rural and urban society is one of the many fractures that score the political landscapes of modern nations (Tarrow, 1971). In some countries, these fissures have shown important implications for differences in voting behavior between urban and rural voters, the latter voting in higher rates (e.g., Kyogoku & Ike, 1960). In the case of Kyrgyzstan where a majority of the voters live in the rural areas, we would also expect that there would be differences between rural and urban residents in voting. Thus, for Kyrgyzstan, we can put forward the hypothesis (1.9) that people in rural areas tend to vote in higher rates than people living in urban areas, which is tested using the variable “RURAL OR URBAN RESIDENCE.”

(4) Political attitudes and voting turnout

The fourth set of hypotheses is related to the role of political attitudes and values, relating to trust in politicians and government (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; McCann & Doingues, 1998;

Powell, 1986; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Southwell, 1985), attitudes toward politics, political parties, campaign issues, and candidates (Gimpel et al., 2003; Hetherington, 1999; Riker &

Ordeshook, 1968), satisfaction with government performance, e.g., measured through the state of the economy (Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Nannestad &

Paldam, 1994; Paldam & Nannestad, 2000; Van der Brug et al., 2007), and support for democracy (Abramson et al., 1995; Campbell et al., 1960).

In particular, it is hypothesized that if respondents have positive views towards government and its performance, such views will reveal higher level of voter turnout. In this

regard, the research tests whether voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan is correlated with positive evaluation of the country’s direction (1.10), a better state of economy (1.11) and (1.12) and state of democracy.

The hypothesis 1.10 (voting and direction of the country) will be tested using the variable

“DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY” derived from the question, “Thinking about the political situation in Kyrgyzstan, in your opinion, is it going in right direction or in wrong direction?” (5- point “direction of the country” scale). This variable is presented only in the 2011 survey.

The hypothesis 1.11 (voting and economy) was tested using the variable

“SATISFACTION WITH STATE OF ECONOMY” derived from the question “In overall, are you satisfied with state of economy?” (5-point scale).

The hypothesis 1.12 (voting and level of democracy) is tested using the variable

“SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY” derived from the question: “In overall, are you satisfied with the state of democracy in Kyrgyzstan?” (5-point scale). This variable is presented only in the 2011 survey.

A separate set of hypotheses related to voting turnout and attitude towards electoral processes and institutions. In particular, it has been hypothesized that higher level of turnout among voters are correlated with higher sense of (1.13) electoral efficacy, (1.14) better evaluation of the quality of the electoral process, and (1.15) higher trust in the electoral process.

Thus, the hypothesis 1.13 (voting and electoral efficacy) was tested against the variable

“HOW WELL VOTERS' VIEWS ARE REPRESENTED IN ELECTIONS,” which is derived from question: “Thinking about how elections in [country] work in practice, how well do elections ensure that the views of voters are represented by Majority Parties: very well, quite well, not very well, or not well at all?”

The hypothesis 1.14 (voting and evaluation of the electoral process) will be tested against the variable “QUALITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS” derived from the question, “In general, how would you characterize the electoral process in Kyrgyzstan?” (5-point “quality of the electoral process” scale).

The hypothesis 1.15 (voting and confidence in elections) will be tested against variable

“TRUST IN ELECTIONS” derived from the question, “How much confidence do you have in each of the following institutions (lists 18 state institutions, including elections)?” (4-point “trust in elections” scale).

Another set of hypotheses are related to the level of a political socialization of a voter and maintain that if people hold (1.16) higher level of religiosity, (1.17) more trust in government,

(1.18) political identification, and (1.19) stronger political beliefs as well as (1.20) have interest in politics, and (1.21) political participation, they tend to reveal higher levels of voter turnout.

The hypothesis 1.16 (voting and religiosity) is tested against the variable “RELIGIOUS

SERVICE ATTENDANCE” derived from the question, “How often do you attend mosques or churches or religious services? (never; once a year; two or eleven times a year, once a month, two or more times a month, once a week)”.

The hypothesis 1.17 (voting and trust in government) is tested against the variable

“TRUST IN PRESIDENT” derived from the question “Q: Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the President?”

The hypothesis 1.18 (voting and political identification) is tested against the variable about party identification - “IS THERE A PARTY THAT REPRESENTS R’S VIEWS,” which was derived from the answers on a question, “Is there a political party in Kyrgyzstan that represents your interests the best?” (present in both the 2006 and 2011 surveys).

Hypothesis 1.19 (voting and political beliefs) is tested against the variable

“DEMOCRACY BETTER THAN ANY OTHER FORM OF GOVERNMENT,” which is derived from the answers to the following question: “Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘A democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government’” (on a 5-point scale “democracy is better than any other form of government”).

The hypothesis 1.20 (voting and interest in politics) will be tested using the variable

“INTEREST IN POLITICS,” which is derived from the answers on a question “Q.: How interested are you in politics and government?” (5-point scale “interest in politics” scale). This variable is presented only in the 2011 survey.

(5) Social attitudes and voting turnout

The fifth set of hypotheses tests relationships between voting turnout and such social values such as trust in fellow citizens (Cox, 2003; Holbrook et al., 2001; Timpone, 1998), life satisfaction, and positive attitude towards life (Flavin & Keane, 2012; Weitz-Shapiro & Winters,

2011).

Therefore, it is hypothesized that citizens who demonstrate higher level of trust in people

(1.21) and higher levels of satisfaction with living standards (1.22) are more likely to vote.

The hypothesis 1.21 (voting and trust in people) is tested using the variable as “TRUST

IN PEOPLE,” which is derived from the question: “Speaking about the people of the community

(neighborhood, village, city), do you think, you can trust most of them… or better be careful when dealing with them?” (2-point scale). This variable presented only in the 2011 survey.

The hypothesis 1.22 (voting and standards of living) used the variable “SATISFACTION

WITH LIVING STANDARDS” derived from the question, “Q: Thinking about your life, do you

feel that you are satisfied or dissatisfied with your current living conditions?” (4-point scale).

This variable is presented only in the 2011 survey.

(6) Reasons for turnout and meanings of elections for the voters (qualitative assessment)

In addition to the quantitative data and methods of analysis, the dissertation also uses qualitative data that was collected through the same nationwide survey carried by the author in

2011. The purpose of the qualitative data and method is to find out the leading inner motivations for participation (or non-participation) among the voters of Kyrgyzstan. The details of methodology have been described in subsection 3.2.4 above.

IV: Chapter 4: The Soviet elections and their legacy in Kyrgyzstan

4.1. Elections and voting behavior in the pre-Gorbachev Soviet Union

Kyrgyzstan’s political and elector system originates in the Soviet institutional legacy of

Central Asia (Luong, 2002). With this, it is important to track the historical and political background of Kyrgyzstani elections in order to better understand the issues of the current electoral process and behavior in Kyrgyzstan.

The Soviet elections, in nearly every stage, were polar opposites of elections in democratic states. Even though everyone had the right to vote and rates of turnout were very high, the elections were not democratic in the accepted sense because of the lack of choice between candidates and that the government was not accountable to freely elected representatives (White, Rose, McAllister, 1997). For instance, a list of nominees was drawn discreetly, mostly by private consultation through the Communist Party channels and nominations had to made through officially approved organizations such as professional unions or Komsomol (the Party’s youth organization), all of which occurred with little open discussion; the final decision on the candidate came unanimously (Ponton, 1994). As a result, the people’s councils (Soviets) at all the levels to which candidates were being “nominated” and “elected,” had little real political power but were subjugated to the Communist Party’s over-arching dominance: these councils were a mere façade of representative government (Luong, 1996). It all meant that the functions of these “elections” would be expected to be quite different from those established in the democratic countries.

Some scholars of the Soviet Union have argued that even though the Soviet elections were quite effective in eliciting and providing a “manifested” support for the regime, it was achieved at the cost of wide-spread political apathy and demoralization among the voters that made the Soviet citizens view elections with cynicism and contempt (e.g., Friedgut, 1979;

Harrop & Miller, 1987; Zaslavsky, 1979). This was especially true among educated and urban dwellers who comprised the greatest share of nonvoters (Tedin, 1994). The wide-spread cynicism and indifference among voters might have played a crucial role in eroding public support for the Soviet system in the long run, even though for that period of the Soviet history – between Stalin and Brezhnev – it seemed to work well in maintaining Soviet political order

(Tsipursky, 2011).

At the same time, the Soviet “elections without choice” were not necessarily elections without political significance. Soviet elections appear in fact to have performed at least three main functions: legitimation; political communication between the regime and the citizenry; and political mobilization and socialization (White, 1985). In particular, the Soviet elections served the interests of the regime by fulfilling the following functions: maintaining the unanimity of a monolithic popular consensus in virtually unanimous support for the regime; screening candidates for the party and rewarding them for faithful state service; measuring the public mood; communicating official information, ideas and rhetorical constructions – propaganda – to the population; satisfying outsiders from the West; socializing and integrating new generations of the citizens into a totalitarian political order; and, whenever possible, discovering dissidents and overt opponents of the regime (Patzelt, 2011; Smith, 2011; Tsipursky, 2011; Zaslavsky & Brym,

1978). Conversely, the elections also gave an opportunity for the people (electors) to extract minor concessions from the authorities, such as repairing municipal infrastructure, e.g., unpaved

roads, leaky roofs and the like (Zaslavsky & Brym, 1978).

Electoral campaigns presented venues of all-encompassing mass propaganda activities led by the Communist Party. For example, in the 1947 election to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Soviet

Socialist Republic (Tajikistan), more than 23,000 agitators worked in the campaign; 8,883 groups were organized to study the USSR constitution; 19,244 lectures were given by Party officials; 522,000 copies of electoral pamphlets were distributed in the three major languages

(Russian, Tajik, and Uzbek); special film shorts were shown at approximately 900 shows; candidates held 647 meetings with the voters; question-and-answer programs were carried on the radio in addition to 12 concerts and 158 literary and musical broadcasts; brigades of artists and writers performed in various electoral districts; the press carried electoral articles every day; and economic competitions in all fields were held in honor of the elections (Rakowska-Harmstone,

1970).

These functions and patterns of the Soviet elections remained basically unchanged until

Gorbachev’s rise to the power in 1985 when, in the course of his political reforms, he introduced the practice of choosing among two or more pre-approved candidates, first in workplace elections and later in local and national level elections (Shabad, 1987). Mikhail Gorbachev’s electoral reforms and their consequences for the post-Soviet states are discussed in more detail in the next section.

In the light of the Soviet electoral practices, the answer to the question, “Why did voters in the Soviet Union vote in the elections ‘without choice’?” seems to be quite obvious. The studies present convincing evidence that people were compelled to vote, with the government providing strong incentives for voters and punishments for the non-voters. In the Soviet Union, election days, usually Sundays, were organized in a celebratory manner, with a district Party secretary personally responsible for the local arrangements to make all voters appear at the 61

polling stations and to vote for the candidate (Merl, 2011). Voters were attracted to the polling stations by organizing various kinds of public entertainment: movie screenings highlighting the achievements of Soviet power, children’s and veterans’ choirs, orchestra performances and other cultural events, as well as buffets selling sausages otherwise unavailable in the state trade over long periods of the year. Sometimes even alcoholic drinks were served. A report from the city

Party committee of Rybinsk serves to demonstrate a typical example of voting day festivities: the committee reported that for the RSFSR-Supreme Soviet election on March 4, 1963, this city of about 300,000 inhabitants was treated to 135 concerts and 35 movies (Merl, 2011).

Thus, even though the Soviet elections did not perform their basic democratic function

(electing politicians and government), they did play important role in the political socialization of Soviet citizens, even though in a very limited way before the start of Gorbachev’s perestroika.

As maintained by Rakowska-Harmstone (1970) in her case study of Soviet Tajikistan, even though campaign activities were superficial and inefficient and tended to concentrate in urban areas, “they did teach the people, however, the habit of political participation” (p.211). Despite this, the Soviet legacy of elections and voting had long-term effects for the post-Soviet behavior of the voters that became important during Gorbachev’s Perestroika as discussed in the next section.

4.2. Elections during Gorbachev’s perestroika and their aftermath

In March, 1985, the world witnessed the emergence of a new Soviet leader, Mikhail

Gorbachev, whose name soon became closely associated with the previously-mentioned

Perestroika (Restructuring) as well as Glasnost (Openness) – unprecedented liberalization efforts in nearly all the areas of the Soviet politics, society, and economy. One of the priorities of these changes aimed to increasing meaningful participation by active citizens in public affairs in order

to encourage them to speak up on local problems and take an interest in public discussions

(Tucker, 1987). By June, 1987 when the first trial local elections with participation of multiple candidates took place, the practice of choosing among two or more pre-approved candidates was introduced in elections of the managers of some industrial enterprises, directors of research institutes, and Communist Party secretaries at lower levels (Shabad, 1987). Local elections of

June 1987 were held in approximately 5% of all the USSR’s 50,000 villages, towns, cities and raions (districts), and the voters for the first time were given a choice of candidates, though still only in selected counties. Outside the experimental multi-candidate areas, the elections still involved the traditional endorsement of unopposed candidates (Shabad, 1987).

One particularly important reform in 1988 altered the USSR’s institutional structure, shifting power to non-Party institutions. In that year, Gorbachev created a new body, the

Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD), via a Supreme Soviet decision. Consisting of 2,250 members, to be elected directly by the people, it became the highest body of state authority, the first real parliament of the Soviet Union until the country’s break up in 1991.

The CPD elections, conducted in March, 1989, became the first instance where Soviet voters were offered a real choice among competing candidates since the 1917 elections for the all-Russian Constituent Assembly (Uchrditelnoe Sobraine, in Russian) that was dissolved on

January 19, 1918 (Tedin, 1994), and therefore, became the first real, honest elections in the

Soviet Union (Chiesa, 1993) For example, in only one-quarter of the contests did district candidates run unopposed. For example, in the Baltic republics, only 3 of 36 districts in Estonia and 7 of 40 in Latvia had single candidates; in Lithuania, pro-independence nationalists won 42 of 96 seats reserved for the republic in the Congress; in Ukraine, at least 40 of the 175 deputies belonged to the Party apparatus (nomenkltura) and only 27 of them won election without

competition; in Moldova, out of 43 electoral districts, only 15 had only one candidate; in

Kazakhstan, 35 out of 73 districts featured one candidate; Tajikistan had only one single- candidate district out of 46; in Turkmenistan, only three of 39 districts were single-candidate

(Chiesa & Northrop, 1993). In Moscow, all districts witnessed competitions amongst at least two candidates, and in Leningrad, only five of 21 districts had only one candidate (Chiesa &

Northrop, 1993, p. 39).

As a result, although about 80% of those elected members of the Congress were

Communist Party members and only a fifth were women, a number of prominent non-Party leaders, activists, and intellectuals won (Ponton, 1994, pp. 82-84). These included Russians Boris

Yeltsin, Andrei Sakharov, and Roy Medvedev, and nationalists who won about two-thirds of the seats reserved for the three Baltic republics (Ponton, 1994, pp. 82-84). From Kyrgyzstan, the elections brought Askar Akayev – then the head of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences – as representative from the district in northern Kyrgyzstan: one year later he would be elected by

Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council as the republic’s first president (discussed in detail in the next

Chapter). As insightfully put forward by Chiesa and Northrop (1993, p. 35) who closely observed these first multi-candidate and open Soviet elections:

The participation figures in Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltic republics, and many parts of

the Russian Federation, Belarus, and the Ukraine reflected the presence of an already

high level of political consciousness and civic organization, and this fact alone might

seem surprising in a country lacking traditions of meaningful electoral competition.

Thus, even though situations varied widely in different areas and republics, the Congress elected on March 26, 1989 was unrecognizable in terms of the old system, bringing “new men” and “new women” – independent-minded, uncontrolled by and not beholden to the Party

apparatus – to the forefronts of the new Soviet political arena (Chiesa & Northrop, 1993).

Furthermore, the elections to the CPD were accompanied by innovations in electoral laws that, despite limitations, made the process more transparent and contested, transforming the electoral campaign into a truly public event (Chiesa & Northrop, 1993). For instance, the chosen candidates, though still under tight control of the Party officials, could campaign politically by publicizing and presenting their programs, which they could debate with each other. Such debates allowed the opportunity to denounce some of the shortcomings of the Soviet system, which was unprecedented for the Soviet citizens. The new laws no longer required candidates to be Party members, and self-nominations became possible. If more than two people ran but no one received more than 50% of the votes cast, the top two took part in a run-off not more two months later. If only one candidate was nominated, he or she had to get more than 50% of the votes cast to be declared the winner (Ponton, 1994).

Many Soviet voters responded enthusiastically to the improvements in the electoral process. As shown by Merl (2011) in his data on the elections of the Supreme Soviet from 1958 to 1989, the number of contacts (mainly by letters, personal reception and phone) between people and the Central Election Commission concerning questions of preparation and execution of the elections increased significantly during the 1989 campaign, reaching up to 13,191 contacts. This achievement is especially impressive in contrast to just 288 relevant contacts in

1984, 350 in 1979, 341 in 1974, 288 in 1966, and 372 in 1962 (Merl, 2011). A public opinion survey carried out by the Soviet Association of Social Sciences on the eve of the elections demonstrated wide support for contested elections and a multi-party system (Tedin, 1994;

Ponton, 1994). For instance, on a question of whether they favored pluralism, 46% of the respondents said “yes” and only 10% said “no”; the rest either declined to answer or said it

would make no difference (Ponton, 1994, p.83). Also, support for competitive elections was strongest among the better educated, younger, male voters as well as urban dwellers, those interested in politics, and those who had engaged in past unconventional political behavior

(Tedin, 1994).

At the same time, amid the new electoral rules and structures, old habits continued. The

Communist Party’s apparatus dominated the overall process in favor of official candidates starting from carefully managed nominations, excluding “undesirable” candidates from the final ballot, to campaigning and vote counting (Chiesa & Northrop, 1993). In Kyrgyzstan (then the

Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic), in only nine of the 41 electoral districts did a single candidate pass through the filter to stand for office. Three candidates stood in one district and two candidates contested each of the remaining 31 seats. More than half of the uncontested seats were in the southern Osh region, known for its economic backwardness and political conservatism (Huskey, 1995). Soviet patterns of electoral behavior were evident also among the voters who continued to regard voting as a form of political exchange in which electors cast their ballots for candidates in return for specific promises of assistance from the local authorities. For example, one group of Kyrgyz villagers threatened to withhold their votes from the candidate, a chairman of a local collective farm, unless he laid gas lines to the village and put water pipes along one of the streets (Huskey, 1995).

Despite these obvious shortcoming, these elections formed the Soviet Union’s new legislative body that proved to be considerably more independent than many observers had expected, transforming the new Supreme Soviet from a Party rubber stamp into a vivid parliament that in some respects resembled those in Western representative democracies (Chiesa

& Northrop, 1993). Further, as an important indication of the changing mood among the

populace, abuses of power by local officials sparked a strong public outcry, evidenced in more than 8,000 letters received by the Central Election Commission from the Soviet citizens protesting violations of the electoral code by Party officials (Chiesa & Northrop, 1993).

As the economic situation in the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate, nationalist, pro- independence protests and movements across the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1990 increased

(Ra’anan, 1990; Szporluk, 1992). In response, Gorbachev initiated a series of far-reaching reform programs providing the Union’s republics greater autonomy and financial responsibility for economic policy on their territories (Noren & Kurtzweg, 1993). Following these changes,

Gorbachev called for the creation of popularly elected legislatures in the national republics and for the loosening of central political controls to make such elections possible (Olcott, 1997a).

Even though under guidance of the Communist party, the 1990 elections for the republics’ Supreme Soviets (representative and legislative councils) turned out to be the most passible fair and competitive “parliamentary” elections in the Soviet Union since its formation in

1922. Usually under umbrella of nationalist “popular fronts,” anti-Communist groups had a genuine chance of winning in all the European and Transcaucasian national republics (Colton,

1992; Colton & Legvold, 1992). Specifically, in the Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania), pro-independence candidates received an overwhelming majority in the Supreme

Soviet elections that subsequently led to the declaration of their independence, the first in the

Soviet Union (Hiden & Salmon, 1994). In Moldova, the opposition Popular Front of Moldova

(PFM) also won a majority of votes and obtained 101 of the 380 seats in the Supreme Soviet of the republic; the defeated Moldovan Communist Party took only 53 of the seats (Mason, 2009).

In Georgia, the pro-democracy “Round Table – Free Georgia” block was the clear winner, ultimately capturing 155 of 250 Supreme Soviet seats (62%). The Communist Party of Georgia

won 95 seats (37%), and other parties claimed two seats (1%) (Nelson & Amonashvili, 1992).

In Russia, the reformist groups won a majority in the two main cities: Moscow, where they won

56% of the city’s Soviet (council) and in Leningrad (modern-day Saint-Petersburg,) where they took 54% of the places on the city Soviet (Ponton, 1994). These elections formed the Russian

Congress of People’s Deputies on March 4, 1990 (dissolved on September 21, 1993), was conducted with an average of 6.3 candidates per seat, though 86% of the candidates were CPSU members (White, et al., 1997). The Congress, consisting of 1068 deputies, chose a 252-member

Supreme Soviet with Boris Yeltsin elected as its chairman, who next would be popularly elected as the first president of post-Soviet Russia a year later (White, et al., 1997).

In the other republics, Communist Party nomenklatura had little trouble manipulating the nomination and election processes, and opposition parties achieved only modest results. In

Azerbaijan, an opposition coalition gained only 40 seats in the republic’s 350 Supreme Soviet

(Nichol, 1995). In Belarus, the pro-democracy Popular Front managed to gain only 27 seats in the 345 seat legislature (Savchenko, 2009). In the Ukraine, the nationalist and “green” candidates enjoyed modest success, particularly in the western provinces and in the capital city soviet of

Kiev, together took 43 seats in the first round, but the Ukrainian Communist Party won a clear majority of the 450-seat Supreme Soviet (Ponton, 1994; White, et al, 1997).

Even more modest results were achieved by independent candidates in the Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), where winners overwhelmingly represented the Communist Party elite. For instance, in the 230-seat Supreme

Soviet of Tajikistan, only three seats belonged to the members of non-Communist parties; a similar situation obtained in the other Central Asian states’ legislatures (Atkin, 1996). In the 350- member Supreme Soviet of Kyrgyzstan, only five seats went to the opposition Democratic

Movement of Kyrgyzstan, DDK (Olcott, 1997b), even though only 86 of the 350 seats were uncontested (Huskey, 1995).

Nevertheless, despite vigorous attempts on the part of the Communist party’s apparatus to preserve the status quo, the first competitive elections opened serious fissures in the

Communist Party’s monopoly on political power and laid seeds for the rise of contested politics in each of the national republics of the Soviet Union (Huskey, 1995). Another far-reaching consequence of the 1989-1990 elections was the rise of a new generation of local Party leaders who had assumed leadership positions in their republics during the last years of the Soviet

Union. The Congress of People’s Deputies elected Gorbachev to be President of the USSR during the second half of 1990; subsequently, his election was mirrored in a number of Union republics as various freshly-elected Supreme Soviets chose Communist Party first secretaries as

Presidents of their respective republics. The list of such presidents included Ayaz Mutallibov of

Azerbaijan (1990 – 1992), Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine (1990 – 1994), Islam Karimov of

Uzbekistan (1990 – to present), Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan (1990 – to present), Saparmurat

Niyazov of Turkmenistan (1990 – 2006), and Kahar Makhkamov of Tajikistan (1990 – 1991). At the same time, even though national presidents openly renounced and abandoned their

Communist Party affiliations after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the lower levels of leaders, nomenklatura, remained remarkably continuous and secure at virtually all levels of bureaucracy in newly independent states. Their influence accompanied an eventual retreat from democratization in much of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and the European republics shortly after gaining independence (Batalden & Batalden, 1993).

In Kyrgyzstan, Absamat Masaliev, a first secretary of the Communist Party in

Kyrgyzstan (1985 – 1990), a half-hearted supporter of Gorbachev’s perestroika (but in reality an ally of the Moscow Communist hardliners), initially declined to seek the post of president. But when he decided to run for office in October, 1990, an intense intra-party rivalry along regional lines arose within the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet. The conflict reflected the deadly Kyrgyz-Uzbek interethnic riots that had erupted in the south of the republic a few months prior. Masaliev failed to obtain the majority in two run-offs in the Supreme Soviet against two opponents, thereby disqualifying all three candidates from the election. After a few days of procedural uncertainty, a new slate of nominees was put forth, including Askar Akayev, a forty-six-year old physicist who had spent about 15 years from 1962 to 1977 in Leningrad (St. Petersburg) studying optics and computer science. At the time, he served as head of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences and was a member of the Kyrgyzstan’s delegation at the Congress of People’s Deputies in Moscow.

Akayev narrowly won the run off a few days later on October 27, 1990 (Spector, 2004). Askar

Akayev’s ascent to power as president of Kyrgyzstan was the first in a series of unique developments in the politics of Kyrgyzstan, and it transpired in sharp contrast to the neighboring

Central Asian republics where all the presidents were former first secretaries in local Communist parties.

4.3. Conclusion

To be sure, the Soviet elections “without choice” cannot be compared to elections in democratic countries. Still, they were not necessarily elections without political significance and meaning. Two of the main functions of Soviet elections were political mobilization and socialization (White, 1985) as well as regime legitimation and political communication between the regime and the citizenry. Thus, even though the Soviet elections did not perform the

democratic function of electing politicians and government, they did play an important role in political socialization of the Soviet citizens, though in a limited way before Gorbachev’s perestroika commenced.

However, it was popular elections held during Gorbachev’s perestroika years that had, according to Chiesa and Northrop (1993, p. 25), “contributed to the expansion of a public space in Soviet politics by establishing a broad series of new rights for the public, for candidates for office, and for elected deputies.” This transformed the Soviet elections from the semblance of the static power balance among workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and Party functionaries into politically dynamic competition for votes among various, newly emerging political and social groups.

Also, elections in early 1990s in the constituent republics of the federal Soviet Union, as

Munro and Rose (2001) relate, created opportunity for Communists, who won there (including

Boris Yeltsin, the first president of Russia, from June, 1991 – December, 1999) to claim popular support for greater freedom from Moscow, a process that culminated in the collapse of the USSR in 1991. As a result, all the newly-inaugurated presidents of the Central Asian countries, including Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, would lead their republics through the tumultuous years of a post-Soviet transition, with their presidential mandates reconfirmed through carefully- managed popular elections within months after the failed coup of Gorbachev by party hardliners in August, 1991 in Moscow. Therefore, it can be argued that the Soviet elections of 1989-90 had significant and lasting influence on the formation of the new political order of the newly- independent, post-Soviet countries long after the Soviet regime’s breakdown. And, as of 2016, twenty-five years later, two former first secretaries of the Communist Parties of Kazakhstan and

Uzbekistan – Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov, respectively – maintain their strong grip

on the power in these two biggest and most populous countries of post-Soviet Central Asia.

Overall, as Olcott (2005) reminds, the current leaders of all five countries of the region were members of the Soviet elite.

V. Chapter 5: Elections and presidential regime breakdown in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan (1991 – 2016)

5.1. Independence and formation of the post-Soviet political order (1991 – 1994)

The military-communist coup attempt in Moscow of August 19-21, 1991 ended not only

Gorbachev’s attempt to reform the Soviet Union, but also, ultimately, the Soviet Union’s very existence. The coup also marked an historic watershed for all 15 Soviet national republics, including Kyrgyzstan. On the first day of the coup, other Central Asian leaders remained silent waiting for the outcome in Moscow; only Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev openly opposed the takeover (Rywkin, 1994) and declared support for the actions of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who opposed the GKChP (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po Chrezvychainomy Polozheniu - Putsch

Emergency Committee). Locally, Akayev took steps to prevent hard-line communists from staging a coup of their own. After the Moscow coup failed, the Kyrgyz government suspended the Kyrgyz Communist Party, seized its property all over the country, and on August 31, 1991 became the first Central Asian republic to declare independence from the Soviet Union. The decisive actions of President Akayev in August 1991 earned him a popularity and support both in

Kyrgyzstan and abroad. Using his initial popularity as well as the political vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet governing institutions, Akayev acted to consolidate his power during the last months of the imploding Soviet Union.

The failed GKChP putsch created a number of crises, especially a crisis of political legitimacy and continuity for local rulers in the national republics, many of whom had ascended to power under Gorbachev’s support during the final years of the USSR. In order to maintain legitimacy in this radically changed political situation, the republics’ national leaderships turned to popular elections that had been conducted – with various degrees of fairness and competitiveness – during the closing months of 1991 and then early 1992.

Kyrgyzstan became the first post-Soviet Republic to conduct a leadership re-election after the failed August putsch. On October 12, 1991, 89% of votes were cast for the incumbent Askar

Akayev, who ran as a single and unopposed candidate (Eschment & Grotz, 2001). The suggestion came about that Akayev became the consensus candidate for the majority of the voters in political and ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan as “a natural national leader,” which made a multicandidate (and expensive) presidential election unnecessary in the last months of the agonizing Soviet Union (Spector, 2004). In actuality, Akayev’s single-candidacy was guaranteed by a requirement for candidates to collect 25,000 (from an electorate of 2.5 million) signatures to be allowed to run. Given the short pre-election period, this relatively small number proved to be a difficult threshold for potential candidates, making incumbent president Akayev the only one eligible (Eschment & Grotz, 2001) and paving his way to become the first popularly-elected president of Kyrgyzstan.

Backed by a renewed popular mandate, President Akayev launched series of liberal reforms. They would fundamentally transform the social and economic structure of the Kyrgyz society and turn Kyrgyzstan into an “island of democracy in Central Asia,” as so described in the speech of the U.S. Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott in 1992 (quoted in Anderson &

Beck, 2000, p. 81). Thanks to these reforms, the country had the freest political environment,

mass media, and civil society in the region – all present throughout Akayev’s stay in power

(1990 – 2005).

For instance, Kyrgyzstan became the first Central Asian country in the economic field to leave the Russian rouble zone and introduce its own currency. It was the first to begin large-scale privatization of state-owned small enterprises and to renovate the country’s banking and financial systems. In 1998, Kyrgyzstan allowed private land ownership and became the first post-Soviet country to enter the World Trade Organization (Gleason, 2004). Leading international financial institutions guided – the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – market-oriented reforms as a precondition for providing Kyrgyzstan with desperately-needed foreign financial assistance.

The liberalization of the economy accompanied proliferation of civil society activism that gave rise to several prominent human rights groups, independent newspapers, religious groups, and various other types of non-government organizations. By February, 1993, the Justice

Ministry had registered 258 non-governmental organizations (including 15 political parties, 46 professional associations, 17 creative organizations, and 21 ethno-cultural centers). By 1997, that number reached 1000 (Anderson, 1997, 1999), and the number continued to grow to several thousands in the years afterward.

Also, in contrast to neighboring Central Asian states, post-Soviet Kyrgyz politics allowed the rise of an active and vocal opposition to the ruling president. In this regard, the Kyrgyz parliament became the only legislature in the post-Soviet Central Asian countries that was relatively autonomous, not a mere façade of representative government: for instance, the legislature had the power to frustrate the executive by occasionally attempting to interfere with the activities

of the Council of Ministers and resisting initiatives of the president (Ochs, 2005). One remarkable example of the parliament’s opposition was the adoption of the first Kyrgyz

Constitution in 1993, a compromise between parliament and the president. Indeed, the parliament had rejected President Akayev’s draft for a new Constitution and presented its own alternative version, which granted more powers the parliament. The final version of

Kyrgyzstan’s first post-Soviet Constitution was approved and adopted in May, 1993 after a long bargaining and compromising process between the Supreme Soviet and the president (Olcott,

1997b).

In many ways, the new Kyrgyz Constitution was more democratic than its Soviet predecessor. It stipulated a relatively balanced system between executive and legislative powers, emphasizing basic human and civil rights and freedoms as well as vitally important protection of private property; it thus legitimized the political, social, and economic transformations that had taken place in Kyrgyzstan since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Numerous international organizations praised the original version of the 1993 Constitution as the most progressive in

Central Asia (Freedom House, 2003). But the Constitution had not been put into full force when some of its important stipulations were modified, through several staged national referendums, to favor a stronger presidency (Olcott, 1997). This modified Constitution gave more powers to the president than to the other branches of power. In one example, the president appointed the prime minister (with consent of the parliament, which he would always receive); members of the

Supreme Court; and other key political and administrative figures at central, regional, and even district levels of Kyrgyzstan’s public administration. All his appointees would eventually become powerful decision-making representatives of the president, implementers of his policies at the local level, and supervisors of local leaders’ activities. In particular, his appointees

controlled local budgets and oversaw compliance of local representative bodies, including even judicial institutions and local electoral commissions (Luong, 2002).

Having legitimized the country’s new political order through a Constitution, Akayev’s next move to extend power came as he dissolved the increasingly unruly parliament. Parliament had begun to investigate large-scale corruption cases among a dozen of top-level officials involved in privatizing state property and providing concessions to a Canadian gold-mining company without announcing official tenders. Concerned by an increasingly confrontational legislature, President Akayev initiated a referendum to obtain a popular mandate to replace the single chamber of 350 members with a smaller, bi-cameral legislature of 105 (Pryde, 1995). For the public, justification for the referendum was presented by Kyrgyzstan’s urgent need for radical economic reforms: after adoption of the new Constitution, the president would need sufficient power to implement such reforms.

The referendum, the first since independence, was held in January, 1994, and President

Akayev received 96.2% of the vote, in the best traditions of the Soviet era. Most independent observers regarded the results of the referendum as political fiction (Olcott, 1997). Indeed, the referendum occurred through heavy mobilization of the entire state bureaucracy in favor of

Akayev, a phenomenon that would be known as “administrative resource”: the use (or abuse) of bureaucratic advantages and material resources associated with public institutions for purposes of electoral campaigns of one or more candidates (Ledeneva, 2006). This includes unequal distribution of resources for the election in favor of certain candidates (usually those supported by the government), limiting information and access to the mass media outlets (Patzelt, 2011), selective law enforcement (and when necessary, non-enforcement), and enabling legal

constraints against opposition candidates (Ledeneva, 2006). Patzelt (2011, pp.130-131) renders an apt description of the phenomenon that is worth quoting in full:

…[T]he government can use cars and planes [and other public resources] at the

expense of the state, and they may even make use of the PR departments of the

ministries, while the opposition has to pay for everything [or, often, is denied a

lawful access to the public sources, such as venues for public gatherings and mass

media]. In addition, laws or police powers intended to ensure public safety may

be formulated in such a way that election meetings and demonstrations held by

the opposition can easily be banned. Thus, the government enjoys clear

advantages in terms of having a higher [and safer] profile in the election

campaign. However, because these types of rules – as unfair as they might be –

are known in advance, the opposition can adapt itself to them and indeed may

count on particular sympathy and support, being seen as a victim of these rules.

Moreover, even in unfair elections the opposition will have a much greater public

profile than would normally be the case, and thus it is a rational decision for the

opposition to take part even in unfair elections. This is all the more so if elections

are taking place under the auspices of international observers. For although direct

election success may be far from attainable, participation can well be a step

toward the introduction of fair elections in the future.4

4 Patzelt (2011, pp. 131-132) also makes a case for the closed authoritarian elections, where, in addition to all the aforementioned practices, the opposition is given no chance of victory at all. It is done through weakening of the opposition parties by the government, and manipulation of the voting procedures. But the author of this dissertation finds this distinction to be not relevant to the case of Post-Soviet Central Asia as these instruments are practiced in case of the competitive authoritarian elections, too. 78

After the 1994 referendum, the use of “administrative resources” would become the typical practice for managing and fixing the results of popular plebiscites and elections to favor the president’s interests. For instance, in the 2000 presidential elections, the OSCE observers reported two types of use of state resources: pressure on state servants and use of professors and students. In the case of state employees, they sustained pressure to take part in the electoral process from the early signature collection phase, when state institutions and companies were

“allegedly obligated to collect a certain number of signatures for the incumbent [president]”

(OSCE, 2001, p. 8). During the campaign, state employees were expected to campaign on behalf of the incumbent president and then obliged to vote for the incumbent or risk losing their jobs. In at least one case, the head of the district (raion) administration dismissed a head of a village after allegedly campaigning for an incumbent’s opponent. In many occasions, the incumbent’s campaign staff members were from state institutions and had received paid leave to work on the campaign. In some cases, the incumbent’s campaign office was located in the building of the local state administration. University professors were forced to donate part of their salary to the incumbent’s campaign funds and take a leave of absence from work to campaign for the incumbent; university students across the country were likewise pressured during the campaign to vote for the incumbent or risk “failing” their exams or losing their university-provided student housing (OSCE, 2001).

Widespread falsification of the results of the first 1994 referendum angered Akayev’s political opponents. Members of the increasingly-rowdy parliament continued to oppose his various initiatives. The special parliamentary commission continued to investigate corruption among top officials and was due to report its findings in the fall 1994 legislative session.

Consequently, Akayev moved to dissolve parliament by building up a coalition of his supporters

among its members who boycotted the first scheduled session after the summer vacation. This left the parliament unable to constitute a quorum, giving Akayev a (legally questionable) pretext to dissolve the Supreme Soviet on September 13, 1994. Apparently, understanding that the

Constitution not clearly stipulate this decision , the president followed it up by announcing a referendum for October 22, the second such action within one year. The referendum would endorse two amendments to the Constitution—one that would allow the Constitution to be amended by means of a referendum, and the other creating a bicameral legislature (with 105 members in total) to replace the existing 350-seat unicameral legislature (Pryde, 1995; Eschment

& Grotz, 2001). With a carefully administrated pre-referendum campaign dominated by the presidential agenda, it was not surprising that people overwhelmingly approved the proposed amendments into the Constitution – the first amendment by 85.23% and the second by 88.9%, with 88.1% voter turnout (Nohlen, Grotz, & Hartmann, 2001). The two consecutively staged referendums, followed by forced dissolution of the parliament – all within the same year – dealt major blows to the weak foundations of democratic politics in Kyrgyzstan that had begun to form under Akayev’s first years as president.

The government gained invaluable political and administrative experience in dealing with political dissent and managing plebiscites and elections, despite President Akayev’s statements that Kyrgyzstan was continuing to follow the way to the progress and democracy (Akaev, 1995).

The regime began to use increasingly the institutions of democracy simply as masquerades to cover their authoritarian behaviors. Such disrespect and blatant disregard for democracy, accompanied by the rise of presidential authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan, eventually laid the groundwork for a longer-term political crisis. This is discussed in detail in the next section.

5.2. Elections, opposition, and fall of the first president (1995 – 2005)

The dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and the constitutional amendments that changed the structure of the parliament paved the way for a series of staged national referenda and elections that would transform Kyrgyzstan’s post-Soviet political order. Scholars have dubbed this as illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997), semi-liberal democracy (Collins 2002), hybrid regime (Diamond, 2002), or competitive authoritarian regime, in which, as maintained by

Levitsky & Way (2002, p. 52), “formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fail[ed] to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy.”

The new political reality was further solidified by the parliamentary elections of

February, 1995, the first since the fall of the Soviet Union, allowing voters to choose members for both chambers of the new, bi-cameral parliament: a 35-seat full-time Legislative Assembly and a 70-seat part-time People’s Representative Assembly. Despite serious pre-election irregularities, over a thousand candidates registered: of these, 936 candidates, a number unprecedented since the times of the Soviet elections, actually contested for the 105 seats of the two-chamber parliament. The first round of elections recorded a 76.25% turnout. Only 16 deputies received more than the 50% of votes necessary to be elected in the first round. These included Absamat Masaliev, leader of the Communist Party, and Omurbek Tekebaev, leader of the Socialist Party “Ata-Meken”, both who hailed from the southern region and both soon to become uncompromising opposition leaders against President Akayev. The second round of voting, held on February 19, showed 65.58% turnout and brought the total number of elected

deputies to 90; thus, parliament managed to convene for its first session in late March, 1995.

Additional elections went forward in April and May to fill the rest of the seats (Anderson, 1996).

Despite the previous two troubling referenda, hope remained that these parliamentary elections would mark the next stage in the country’s efforts towards democracy by bringing more professional and competent lawmakers into the new parliament, lawmakers who would show greater commitment and support to reforms initiated by Akayev during his first years in office

(Pryde, 1995). Expectations were dashed by serious pre-election problems and election day irregularities, mainly the widespread use of “administrative resource” that provided state resources and protection for candidates loyal to the president. At the national level, the Central

Election Commission often arranged various technical barriers for registration of opposition candidates. At the local level, governors (heads of the local state administrations) controlled local electoral commissions, influencing the nomination procedure in favor of candidates of their preference (Eschment & Grotz, 2001).

The presidential election that followed in December of the same year continued the established trend: it was rigged. Just before the election, the Central Election Commission, favoring the incumbent president, issued a rule requesting that the 50,000 signatures to be collected by a presidential candidate had to be gathered proportionally in the capital Bishkek and each of the (then) six regions (pl., oblasti) of the country. The signatures would be then verified by both regional officials and the Central Election Commission, which would have the final say in deciding which candidates’ names would appear on the ballot paper. This stipulation clearly worked to favor President Akayev, who had possessed the necessary state resources in hand to collect the required number of signatures across the country in the short amount of time before the elections. Still, five other candidates collected enough signatures and to get registered by the

Central Election Commission. After the campaign had begun, however, the Central Election

Commission removed three contenders from the ballot on the grounds of irregularities in the collection of names – something of which all opposing candidates were almost certainly guilty

(Anderson, 1997b). As a result, the main rivals were two of the three remaining candidates:

Askar Akayev (the incumbent president) and Absamat Masaliev (a member of the parliament and former First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic).

Carrying out his campaign using government resources such as mainstream state-owned media, the incumbent President Akayev won re-election by a landslide to a second five-year term. He gained 72.4% of votes, with 86.2% voter turnout (Eschment & Grotz, 2001). But

Masaliev, although nationally had been beaten easily with only 24.7% of the total votes

(Eschment & Grotz, 2001), polled nearly half (46.53%) of the votes in his native southern Osh region, despite the efforts of presidential loyalists to bring in the “right” results. There were suggestions that in truth he out-polled the incumbent who officially gained 50.01% of the region’s votes (Anderson 1997).

Aside from their contributions to the increasingly strengthening authoritarian political regime, the elections of 1995 had other far-reaching implications. The huge rifts they opened between president Akayev and the opposition began to take on overtones of an intra-regional power struggle between north and south: that is, representatives of the historically more

Europeanized northern and the more Islamized southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. It should be noted that though the initial dynamics of the north-south rivalry were set up back in the Soviet times, Kyrgyzstan’s independence gave each faction new momentum. One reason was that

President Akayev’s initial democratic reforms caused political and economic authority and decision-making power to shift to the local leaders at the expense of central authority and control

(Luong, 2002). The rise of contested politics had brought pre-existing rifts to the surface in the form of the “southern” groups’ opposition to various initiatives of the “northener” President

Akayev. In this regard, the parliamentary elections of February, 1995 gave the southern regions their first real opportunity to elect parliamentary local candidates instead of placemen from the northern parts of the country. The south was no longer prepared to accept traditional northern political and economic dominance (Pryde, 1995). The presidential election turned into a rivalry between incumbent President Akayev, the northerner, and powerful opposition candidate- southerner Masaliev, and this became an important open demonstration of the (traditionally covert) competition between the “northern” and “southern” elites of Kyrgyzstan for power and economic resources (ICG, 2004).

Unalarmed by the negative political implications of the rigged elections, immediately after his re-election as the president on December 24, 1995, President Akayev called for further expansion of his powers. A new referendum was held in February, 1996. Despite the signs of emerging “voter fatigue” in a fifth popular poll in last two years (from February ,1994 to

February, 1996), the referendum recorded a Soviet-style 96.62% turnout and 94.31% approval rate of the proposed amendments to the Constitution: Akayev was able to expand his powers once more (Anderson, 1997a). In particular, the president gained the right to appoint and dismiss the prime-minister and the government, taking away the 1993 constitutional right of parliament to approve the president’s own ministerial. In addition, the changes gave the president the right to appoint or dismiss court chairpersons at all levels, and to dissolve parliament in certain circumstances (Anderson, 1997a).

The results of the referendum demonstrated for many that this was an event with more ritualistic than substantive content. It moved “the oasis of democracy in Central Asia” toward a

more-controlled political environment, resulting in damage to the goodwill Akayev had previously enjoyed, with detrimental effects to both the political life of the republic and people’s confidence in the political system (Anderson, 1996, 1997a, 1997b). According to the IFES’

(International Foundation for Electoral Systems) survey conducted in Kyrgyzstan in 1996 (Olds,

1997), a large majority of the Kyrgyzstanis did not believe that the executive and legislative branches of the national government were responsive to their needs and concerns, nor did they feel that local government, being under control by the national executive branch, was responsive either. In addition, more than 60% of the respondents did not have confidence in the judicial system. They were also troubled by the growing scale of corruption in government, with 47% of respondents asserting that corruption was common in the government and 33%, somewhat common. Furthermore, 42% of respondents thought that their government respected human rights only a little, and 20% thought that the government did not respect human rights at all. A majority were dissatisfied with the electoral system and wanted better enforcement of the current laws, better monitoring of elections, and equal and fair conditions for all candidates. On a positive note, a majority still kept faith in elections and believed the people could change the situation in Kyrgyzstan by participating in elections.

In the summer of 1998, the Constitutional Court’s decision allowed President Akayev to run for one more five-year term in office. The original text of the country’s 1993 Constitution provided for only one re-election, meaning that in 2000 Akayev would not be allowed to run for a third term. But the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of Akayev to make him eligible for one more presidential term on the grounds that his first term had begun in 1991, before the 1993

Constitution was enacted (Eschment & Grotz, 2001). This decision of the Court clearly demonstrated that judicial power had also become a tool in the hands of the president.

In October, 1998, President Akayev held another referendum, the fourth within four years, aiming to make changes in certain areas where he could not gain the support of the parliament; for example, he wanted to change Article 4 of the 1993 Constitution to permit private land ownership as a means of furthering market reforms (Anderson, 1997a). Among other questions, the referendum also asked for the introduction of a national party list for the following parliamentary elections to the lower house of the parliament, and changing the number of seats in the two chambers of the 105-member parliament: the Legislative Assembly would consist of 60 deputies, while the People’s Representative Assembly would have a membership of 45. The amendments were approved by 95.4 %, with 96.4% of voter turnout (Eschment & Grotz, 2001).

The second parliamentary elections took place in February and March of 2000. Some 420 candidates were registered to stand in elections in 45 single-mandate constituencies for both the

Legislative Assembly and the People’s Representative Assembly. Most candidates (407) were identified as independent on the ballot, highlighting the underdeveloped state of the party system. With voter turnout at 65%, the voters elected 105 members to the parliament, 90 of whom were elected individually and 15 as representatives of political parties. As before, the electoral process was not free of serious irregularities. As noted in the OSCE 2000 report, both rounds of the parliamentary elections were characterized by a series of problems that ultimately prevented a number of political parties and candidates from competing in the election on a fair and equal basis (OSCE, 2000). The pre-election period was marred by a high degree of interference in the process by state officials, a lack of independence of the courts that resulted in selective use of legal sanctions against candidates, and bias in state media. Opposition parties and candidates faced a number of serious obstacles: two leading opposition parties were denied registration, an opposition party list was summarily de-registered, leading opposition candidates

were de-registered after the first round, and systematic voting irregularities were committed against a leading opposition candidate (OSCE, 2000). Despite such negative implications, one of the few positive results of the elections was that the elections provided an opportunity for other members of the opposition to gain seats in the parliament and receive access to a public forum to use to criticize Akayev openly.

With his leading rivals jailed or out of the race, independent mass media curtailed, and state resources behind him, Akayev easily won re-election in the October 2000 presidential election with 74.47 % of the votes. Meanwhile, the second and third major candidates received

13.89% (Omurbek Tekebaev) and 6% (Almazbek Atambayev), and the remaining three candidates receiving less than 2.5% in total (OSCE, 2001). The reported voter turnout was 64.4%

(Nohlen, Grotz, & Hartmann, 2001).

The OSCE severely criticized the presidential election, reporting that despite some positive features, it neither complied with OSCE commitments for democratic elections nor reversed the negative trends identified during the previous parliamentary elections in the spring of 2000 (OSCE, 2001). The OSCE found numerous irregularities. The government restricted candidate registration, sometimes on the basis of failure to pass a recently instituted Kyrgyz language proficiency exam (thus excluding of a number of prominent opposition leaders from the election). There was pressure against a leading independent monitoring organization, thereby undermining its capacity to observe the election effectively. Also, pressure against private media hampered the media in the country, or it the pressure made them willing to take an editorial policy independent of the presidency. Overt bias in state media emerged in favor of the incumbent. Harassing opposition candidates’ activities took place in ways that influenced negatively the fairness of the campaign. The Central Election Commission failed to reflect the

interests of all candidates in the election equally. Finally, irregularities during the tabulation process raised questions about the accuracy of the reported results (OSCE, 2001).

The rigged elections further reduced the public’s confidence in state institutions throughout the years following the elections. In survey conducted by Kuchukeeva and

O’Loughlin (2003) among civil society activists (leaders and employees of the non-government organizations) in Kyrgyzstan in 2002, only slightly over a third of respondents trusted in parliament (34.9%) and local state governments (akimiats) (33.1%), with confidence in courts reported at even lower levels of 13.3%. Yet even though only 27.7% of respondents had confidence in elections, a majority of respondents still believed that their participation in elections had some kind of effect on decision-making in the country: 17.5% completely agreed,

63.9% somewhat agreed, and 18.1% completely disagreed with the statement (Kuchukeeva &

O’Loughlin, 2003). This distribution nearly mirrored one generated by the 1996 survey (Olds,

1997) in which a majority of respondents believed they could improve conditions in the country by voting: a majority (56% up from 49% in 1995) supported an electoral system (Olds, 1997).

Indeed, 17% completely agreed, 64% somewhat agreed while 13% completely disagreed with the statement that voting gives people like then a chance to influence decisions made in their country (Olds, 1997).

The staged elections did not provided safeguards from the future troubles for the regime, however. The increasing concentration of power around Akayev, his family, and his close associates led to discontent among rival elites, who wished for more participation in both the political sphere and in business. The usurpation of power and corruption in all branches of government by the ruling elite led to a crisis of legitimacy in the leadership, in the courts, and in the political system itself (ICG, 2004).

The looming crisis did not take long to appear. It arrived in January, 2002 after the politically-charged arrest of parliamentary deputy Azimbek Beknazarov, a lawyer from the southern Aksy district of the Jalal-Abad region. He had come to prominence as an opposition activist after the government’s decision to cede 125,000 hectares of territory to China during border negotiations between the two states. When his supporters took to the streets in the town of

Aksy on March 17, 2002, police opened fire, killing five people and wounding between 50-100; the killings, unprecedented in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, shocked the country and caused several months of agitated protests and marches across the southern regions (ICG 2002). The government’s legitimacy and its capacity to control the situation there was significantly weaker than in the northern regions of the country.

Hoping to deescalate the growing political crisis, President Akayev forced Prime Minister

Kurmanbek Bakiyev to resign and called for the formation of a Constitutional Council.

Consisting of members of the opposition, the government, and neutral figures, this council was to develop amendments to the Constitution and consequently to the political system in the light of the Aksy killings. Widely welcomed by the opposition (though some viewed it as a “tactical concession” to the opposition to divert political attention from the continuing fallout from the

Aksy crisis), the process initially seemed to signal a positive direction, producing a compromise draft document that proposed significant limitations to the president’s power and an enhanced role for parliament (ICG, 2004, OSCE, 2003). But at the final stage of the process, an Akayev- appointed “commission of experts” significantly revised the draft and produced an alternative report that differed significantly from the Council’s document. It proposed much weaker constitutional amendments;5 despite protests from the opposition’s, the presidential version of

5 One of the amendments reformed the parliament, reducing the numbers of the deputies to 75, elected for the term of five years from single member constituencies. This represented a major change from a bi-cameral parliament to a 89

the amendments was put forward in a national referendum, scheduled for February 2003 (ICG,

2004).

In the referendum, held on February 2, 2003, voters decided on two separate ballots containing the following questions. (1) “Should the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On a New

Version of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic” be adopted?” and (2) “Should Askar

Akayev remain President of the Kyrgyz Republic until December 2005 (to the end of his constitutional term) in order to implement the approved constitutional amendments?” A few days later, the Central Election Commission announced that out of 2,465,684 registered voters,

86.68% participated and 76.61% supported the first question and 78.74% supported the second question. Only 9.23% opposed the first question and 7.07% opposed the second question (OSCE,

2003, p. 7).

Observing groups included a delegation from the National Democratic Institute for

International Affairs (NDI) and the local monitoring group Coalition for Democracy and Civil

Society, which deployed 3,400 observers across the country. They reported irregularities similar to those commonly observed during parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000, especially serious interference in and control of the election process by state and local administration officials and a lack of adherence to proper procedures in the conduct of the vote. The observers doubted official turnout figures, claiming that local administrations had reported inflated figures on voting day, which later had to be reduced. In all, reports from international and domestic

unicameral one, with a decrease in the total number of MPs, from 105 (60 in the Legislative Assembly and 45 in the People’s Representative Assembly) to 75 in one body. In the previous system, a provision existed for election to the Legislative Assembly for 45 single mandate constituencies and 15 seats elected from national party lists. This system stimulated and supported the development of political parties. However, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed them that the previous system was an “experiment,” which had failed (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003, pp.9-10).

groups reflected most of the same negative irregularities identified by the ODIHR Election

Observation Missions for the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000 (OSCE, 2003).

The referendum results further incited the opposition’s preparations for the forthcoming parliamentary elections in 2005, the third in the history of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. The results of these elections would determine the balance of political forces and set the stage for a presidential election at the end of 2005. The parliamentary election results suggested mechanisms to Akayev as he completed his third consecutive five-year term. His choices would be to step down and pass his power on a new president or to retain his office, perhaps through a referendum. The latter option would be likely to provoke angry reactions both within Kyrgyzstan and from influential figures abroad. For the impending parliamentary election, Akayev would try to ensure loyal candidates a majority of seats, since a reliable parliament would give him a base for further moves to assert control over the political process. These elections would probably be highly contested and would put considerable pressure on opposition candidates. But if the government rigged results, it risked conflict around controversial races (ICG, 2004). Given the two successful and pro-democracy post-electoral “color revolutions” in Georgia of 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 that dismissed ineffective and corrupt post-Soviet regimes in those countries (which Akayev’s increasingly autocratic and kleptocratic presidency had begun to resemble), his administration had reason to worry.

As the February, 2005 parliamentary elections approached, 389 of 425 originally registered candidates (both from political parties and running as independent candidates) were able to run for 75 seats in the highly-contentious race. Despite the government’s official assurance, the electoral campaign proved to be the same as previous ones and marred by similar shortcomings. Questionable exclusion of several opposition candidates, biased state-controlled

media, other heavy government use of administrative resources, and problematic voter lists plagued the election (Nichol, 2005).

The first round of the balloting filled fewer than half the seats. Run-offs were held on

March 13, 2005 in districts where no one candidate had received over 50% of the votes cast.

Seats won by Akayev’s family (his daughter Bermet and son Aidar) further incited anger, apparently pushing the opposition past the tipping point (McMillan, 2005).

After opposition candidates learned that they won only two seats in the first round, the opposition organized post-electoral protests across the country on a scale never before experienced, with calls for resignation of Akayev and re-election of parliament. In southern

Kyrgyzstan, the initial power base of the anti-presidential opposition, protestors stormed and occupied government facilities including those in the regional centers of Osh and Jalalabad.

Many of these southerners (including a majority the ethnic Uzbek community) viewed themselves as discriminated against both economically and politically by a central government dominated by northerners (Nichol, 2005). Protests widened throughout both the north and south in the wake of the March 13, 2005 run-off, which after completion the Central Election

Commission had announced that results for 71 districts (out of 75) were valid. Opposition candidates won fewer than 10% of seats, although there were reportedly many close races where they “lost” only by a few votes (Nichol, 2005, p. 2). The incensed opposition camp alleged massive vote fraud. The international observers’ mission reported substantial shortcomings of the elections, asserting that they fell short of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections (Kartawich, 2005).

On March 24, 2005, two days after Akayev swore in the hastily convened members of the newly chosen parliament, thousands of angry demonstrators gathered in Bishkek’s main square,

to demand Akayev’s resignation and new parliamentary and presidential elections. A violent attack on the protesters by some of Akayev’s supporters enraged demonstrators, who then stormed and occupied the presidential and other government offices and seized control of the major state-owned television station. With this, Akayev fled Kyrgyzstan to Russia, throwing his power into the hands of the opposition.

On that same day, victorious opposition members formed a provisional government. They appointed Kurmanbek Bakiyev, (the main leader of the protest movement and a former prime minister under Akayev from 2000 to 2002) as acting prime minister. The next day they appointed him acting president as well.

Even though the country’s Supreme Court had ruled that the parliamentary elections were invalid, acting President Bakiyev ordered the old parliament to remain in office until presidential elections could be held. The Constitutional Court supported the presidential decision in proclaiming that the new legislature was constitutionally legitimate and should be empowered, although the court granted that twenty or more district races might need to be held again. The reconfirmed parliament convened on March 28, 2005 and elected Omurbek Tekebayev, long-time opposition leader against Akayev, to be speaker of the parliament; it also re-affirmed Bakiyev as prime minister and acting president and scheduled a new presidential election for July 10, 2005.

A formal resignation of the president-in-exile Askar Akayev on April 4, 2005 further solidified the legitimacy of the new government (Nichol, 2005).

The “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan became CIS’s (Commonwealth of Independent

States) third case within 18 months (after Georgia and Ukraine) of a so-called “color revolution,” a relatively peaceful toppling of a presidents in the aftermath of mass protests after rigged elections. As with previous successful post-electoral uprisings of 2000 in Serbia and 2001 in

Madagascar, these color revolutions raised enormous expectations for countries lagging behind the third wave of democratization in East Central Europe and throughout the world. Nonetheless, the years following these revolutions demonstrated that the electoral revolutions were more often symptoms of the problems of “hybrid” and authoritarian regimes rather than solutions to their ills

(Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009). In this regard, fraudulent elections were only one of many deficiencies in pseudo-democracies; therefore, addressing electoral shortcomings and changing top leadership did not resolve such deeper issues of authoritarian regimes as corruption, clientelism, underdeveloped political parties, and lack of transparent decision making

(Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009).

5.3. Elections, opposition, and the fall of the second president (2005 – 2010)

The new leadership declared its commitment to establishing the rule of law, combating corruption, and investigating the deeds of the previous president and his family. Among other promises, Constitutional reform received a high priority. Indeed, during the transitional period between the overthrow of Akayev in March and the presidential elections in July, 2005, a committee on constitutional reform had been created under the chairmanship of pro-reformist parliamentary speaker Omurbek Tekebayev. It proposed a draft constitution significantly limiting presidential power in June, 2005 (Koehler, 2009).

The July, 2005 presidential election was influenced by an agreement between acting

President “southerner” Bakiyev and a “northerner” Felix Kulov, a leading opposition leader released from prison following President Akaeyv’s ouster. The agreement stipulated Kulov’s withdrawal from the presidential election on the condition that Bakiyev, if elected president, would appoint Kulov as prime minister. While many interlocutors viewed this agreement as key to maintaining stability in the country, the agreement lessened the degree of electoral

competitiveness. Nevertheless, participation of six candidates (the highest number in the history of presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan), including a first-ever woman presidential candidate, offered voters a degree of choice, even though the candidacy of acting President Kurmanbek

Bakiyev dominated the campaign and was significantly better resourced than his opponents

(OSCE, 2005).

As a result, Bakiyev received an easy victory with 88.71 % of the votes on the basis of a reported turnout of 74.67%. In six regions of the country turnout was reported as being over

90%, with 69 PECs in these areas reporting over 98% turnout (OSCE, 2005, p. 23).

Thus, even though international observers reported that “use of administrative resources to favor the incumbent was largely absent, or unsolicited” (OSCE, 2005, p. 1), these high turnout rates suggested that authorities, at least at the local levels, were not able to readily shed their old habits of serving the incumbent president. Nevertheless, the presidential election, held in the wake of the post-revolutionary optimism, by many accounts went well and “marked tangible progress by the Kyrgyz Republic towards meeting OSCE commitments, as well as other international standards for democratic elections” (OSCE, 2005, p. 1).

But in the months following the presidential election, the ruling coalition—having little in common apart from their opposition towards the rule of Askar Akayev—began to disintegrate after achieving their goals of overthrowing the president and legitimizing the new government.

As differences between various groups resurfaced and led to the disbanding of the ruling coalition, a new and resourceful opposition movement against Bakiyev emerged (ICG, 2005;

ICG, 2006). The foundation for the new opposition movement arose from the Tulip Revolution’s central demands for constitutional reform and limits to presidential powers. This minimal consensus around which the new opposition against Bakiyev could rally eventually consolidated

into the Movement for Reforms (Dvizhenie Za Reformy). Mass opposition-led protests during spring and fall of 2006 prompted negotiations between opposition leaders and President Bakiyev, leading parliament to adopt a new Constitution that significantly strengthened the parliament’s powers, thus reflecting some of the demands raised by the Movement for Reforms. Only weeks later on December 30, 2006, however, pressure from the president caused parliament to adopt yet another constitution that revoked most of the concessions made in the wake of the November protests (Koehler, 2009).

Facing strong challenges by a group of disaffected elites that included some of the very same actors who had supported ousting Askar Akayev two years earlier, Bakiyev undertook a few decisive steps to avoid looming political crisis in the country. He took back the initiative in the field of constitutional reform and reshaped the institutional face of the political system. In

May, 2007, opposition deputies and members of the Movement for Reforms, Melis Eshimkanov and Kabay Karabekov, filed legal complaints against both rounds of constitutional changes in

2006, and the Constitutional Court duly declared these amendments unconstitutional and reaffirmed the legality of the 2003 constitution. Reacting to this, President Bakiyev called for a referendum on October 21, 2007 to adopt still another new constitution as well as an electoral law based on party list voting. Specifically, the first ballot proposed to increase the size of parliament from 75 to 90 members and to give parliament authority to appoint and dismiss both the chair of the National Bank and the head and members of the Accounting Chamber, upon nomination by the president. The second ballot concerned the new Election Code, establishing a party-list proportional (PR) system to replace the existing single-member district system with a

5% threshold, and establishing explicit quotas for women, youth, and ethnic minorities in the parties’ lists of candidates (Nussberger, 2007).

On referendum day, 76% of the electorate voted in favor of the new version of the constitution, with an 82% participation rate (Alkan, 2009). Though the referendum itself was widely criticized by international observers as a sham to justify pushing through constitutional changes to the liking of the incumbent elite (ICG, 2008), the new regulations themselves were greeted with mixed reactions by both the opposition and independent observers. Most opposition representatives were generally in favor of introducing a PR system for parliamentary elections because they expected this to positively affect party system institutionalization; on the contrary, the 2007 constitutional changes strengthened executive authority by bringing regional administration under the control of the president, thus contradicting the aims of the oppositional pro-reform movement (ICG, 2008). Thus, the constitutional referendum arguably deprived the opposition of their unifying cause and thus prompted the dissolution of the Movement For

Reforms.

With the new constitution adopted, Bakiyev dissolved parliament and called for early parliamentary elections on December 16, 2007 to be held under the new PR electoral system.

Complementing this new course, Bakiyev also announced the creation of a new pro-presidential

“Ak Jol” (Bright Path) ruling party, thereby consolidating the number of pro-presidential parties and individuals that would represent his camp in the upcoming parliamentary elections vis-à-vis the fragmented opposition. In addition, the short timeframe and insecurity about the electoral rules arguably prevented the opposition from preparing properly for the electoral contest

(Koehler, 2009).

Altogether, 12 political parties competed in the 2007 elections, including pro-presidential

Ak Jol. The main representatives of the opposition were Ata Meken, SDPK, Asaba, and Ar

Namys. In order to gain seats in parliament, a party had to gain both 5% of the national vote and

0.5% in each of the country’s seven regions as well as the cities of Bishkek and Osh. This second barrier, disputably introduced to prevent ethnically-based smaller parties from gaining representation, was a source of considerable confusion (ICG, 2008). Since the text of the electoral code failed to state on what basis the second 0.5% hurdle was to be calculated, this important detail was left for the Central Election Commission to decide. The Central Election

Commission original decided that this threshold should be calculated against the number of all registered voters nationwide, a decision against which Ak Jol appealed. Two days after the election, the Supreme Court invalidated this decision of the Central Election Commission and ruled that the 0.5% threshold was to be calculated against the number of registered voters in each district (OSCE, 2008). This post factum adjustment can be considered as a part of the manipulation of the electoral rules, that effectively meant that the candidates learn on what basis they were contesting the election until after the election day (OSCE, 2008).

The first semi-official results on the day after the elections claimed a 100% “victory” for the presidential Ak Jol party. Arguably, the Presidential Administration even overproduced in their attempts to secure favorable electoral outcomes and a controllable parliament. After being left with a single-party parliament on the day after the elections, the results were again manipulated so as to include two opposition parties, the Communist Party and the Social

Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK), with 11 and eight seats respectively, before the publishing of the final results on December 20, 2007. Still, Ak Jol controlled 71 of the 90 seats in the current Jogorku Kenesh, or about 79%, leaving the pro-presidential communists with 12% and the SDPK, the only real opposition force, with a mere 8% of the seats (Koehler, 2009). As

Koehler (2009, p. 13) cogently asserted, “[t]hese blatant manipulations completely dissociated the composition of the Jogorku Kenesh from the actual votes cast in the elections and effectively

reduced the once recalcitrant Kyrgyz parliament to a pliant rubberstamp of policies emanating from the Presidential Administration.”

These were minor problems when compared to the extent of more or less open manipulations, however. International observers from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and from OSCE noted widespread violations on basically all levels of the electoral process. In the words of the IRI/NDI joint statement, the allocation of seats in the newly elected parliament did “not correspond to Kyrgyzstan’s commitment under the OSCE’s Copenhagen Document […] to count and report honestly and publicly ballots cast by a free voting procedure” (NDI/IRI, 2008, p. 1, as quoted in Koehler,

2009). Domestic observers affiliated with opposition parties or independent NGOs also noted an unprecedented increase in violations and produced alternative protocols that reflected the extent of manipulations with some accuracy. Overall, the degree of manipulation in the 2007 elections reached such an extent that the opposition believed that the president and his team had actually appointed the MPs, rather than their being truly elected (Koehler, 2009).

The elections evidently demonstrated that the new government – a government that had come into the power on promises to address the political, economic, and social factors that had prepared the ground for the Tulip revolution of 2005 – was not qualitatively different from its predecessor. It still presided over the same political and bureaucratic systems inherited from the first president, Akayev (Peimani, 2009). But in distinction to Akayev, Bakiyev introduced in

Kyrgyzstan an even more repressive regime. His government concentrated power in the hands of the president’s family on an even bigger scale, forced some members of the opposition into exile (Huskey & Hill, 2011), and even targeted dissenting prominent politicians and public activists for assassination.

Bakiyev, too, wanted to guarantee his second term and secure his grip on the power, and to do it before introducing unpopular measures to tackle the mounting problems in the country’s economy, an economy already suffering from the consequences of the then-current global economic crisis. He called early presidential elections on July 23, 2009, one year before the end of his first five-year term in the office. As expected, the incumbent won the election by a huge margin, securing more than 76% of the votes, while his main opponent, Almazbek Atambayev, barely exceeded 8%. There were numerous irregularities and again the election failed to meet key OSCE commitments for democratic elections (OSCE, 2009).

The opposition, headed by Atambayev, denounced the validity of the entire process, declaring they would strive to overturn the outcome and hold a repeat election. Authorities were accused of rigging the results of the election by organizing multi-voting, ballot box stuffing, and controlling the voting process in rural areas, especially in southern Kyrgyzstan. Atambayev appealed to the international community to put pressure on Bakiyev and organized some public protests, although only a few people appeared on the streets. This presidential election marked another stage in the process of concentration of power by Bakiyev and the growing consolidation of a “simulated democracy” system, far from the expectations generated during the early 1990s

(De Pedro, 2010).

By the spring of 2010, the regime’s base significant decrease in numbers became apparent (Kubicek, 2011): the government raised the price for public utilities and allegations about the Bakiyev’s family members’ rampant corruption spread via independent mass media outlets. When a rally against the government in the northern city of Talas on April 6 descended into violence, authorities ordered the arrest of leading members of the opposition. The arrests prompted large-scale demonstrations outside presidential headquarters in the capital city of

100

Bishkek on April 7. During the Tulip Revolution, President Akayev had refused to fire on the crowds: in contrast, President Bakiyev’s troops used force to quell the rally, resulting in the death of 86 demonstrators at the hands of government marksmen. This enraged the crowd and led them to storm government buildings (Huskey & Hill, 2011). By the end of the day, President

Bakiyev had fled Bishkek to his home region of Jalalabad in the south of the country. On the same night, the opposition assumed power and formed the Provisional (Interim) Government, headed by former Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva. A week later, Bakiyev left the country for

Kazakhstan en route to Belarus where he found a refuge under auspices of President

Lukashenko.

5.4. Political transition after April, 2010: Challenges, changes, and elections (2010 – 2016)

The Interim Government immediately dismissed the Parliament and Constitutional

Court. By late May, the ensuing constitutional reform process had produced a draft constitution which, despite promises that it would usher in the first “parliamentary republic” in post- communist Central Asia, in fact envisioned a form of semi-presidentialism (Huskey and Hill,

2011). The president would continue to be directly elected and would retain oversight of security and law-enforcement organs, but responsibility for forming a government would now rest with party leaders in parliament rather than with the president. In order to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a single party, the draft constitution advanced two novel provisions: no single party could gain more than 65 seats in the new 120-member unicameral parliament, and the opposition bloc in parliament would chair the two most important committees, those on the budget and on law and order (Huskey & Hill, 2011).

As the new government struggled to secure its power all over the country, riots spread to the southern regions of the country (Jalalabad, Osh, and Batken), in major areas of the ousted

101

president’s political base. These areas included ethnic Uzbeks, the largest ethnic minority in

Kyrgyzstan, constituting 14.5% of the country’s entire population and about 30% of the population in southern Kyrgyzstan (IRIN, 2010). As leaders of the Uzbek community aligned themselves with the new government, the stand-off between the northern-based Interim

Government and the supporters of ex-President Bakiyev in the south took on nationalistic overtones. Supporters of the interim government began participating in political actions against

Bakiyev’s allies, reawakening dangerous grievances from the past that had been left unsettled since the end of the bloody Kyrgyz-Uzbek riots of June, 1990 in the Osh region.

Rising tensions erupted into massive interethnic violence between the Kyrgyz and

Uzbeks in the southern regions of the country on June 10, exactly on the 20th anniversary of the

1990 Kyrgyz-Uzbek clashes. Approximately 200 people died, a number of people were injured, and many fled to bordering countries, especially Uzbekistan. Lack of a coherent ethnic policy, perceived social and political exclusion of the Uzbek minority, differences between the north and south, and the weakness of the new government in the aftermath of the April, 2010 revolt are considered major contributing factors to this tragic conflict (Melvin, 2011). The new government, however, was able to withstand these major blows, recognized by observers as “the greatest political and humanitarian challenge of the post-communist era in Kyrgyzstan” (Huskey

& Hill, 2011, p. 877). In the following weeks, the new government carried out the planned national referendum that adopted the country’s next new Constitution, dismissed the

Constitutional Court, and confirmed Roza Otunbayeva as president of the country until

December 31, 2011. Henceforth, presidents would be elected for six-year terms (Huskey & Hill,

2011).

102

Despite widespread concerns about possible mass abstention from voting due to instability of the post-conflict situation, especially on the part of the Uzbek voters, the traditionally high turnout was maintained, achieving 69.5% nationwide, ranging from 85% in the northern region of Issyk-Kul to 51% in the southern region of Osh, the site of the most intense interethnic violence two weeks earlier; 90.6% of voters cast a “yes” vote, confirming the new

Constitution of Kyrgyzstan (OSCE, 2010a). The government worked hard to maximize turnout

(e.g., the Interim Government had worked with Uzbekistan authorities to facilitate the return of refugees by referendum day) and also waived portions of the electoral code in order to allow citizens to vote outside the precincts in which they were registered (Huskey & Hill, 2011). Many voters willingly participated in the constitutional referendum that they viewed as a mean to bring peace and security (Aslam, 2011). Despite the chaotic situation that cast a shadow on the referendum, observers from the OSCE concluded that the Interim Government “had succeeded in creating the necessary conditions for the conduct of a peaceful constitutional referendum”

(OSCE, 2010a, quoted in Huskey & Hill, 2011, p.877).

In September, 2010, the new constitutional order withstood its first important test during the freest and fairest parliamentary elections in the Central Asian region. The southern-based opposition Ata-Jurt party surprisingly won a thin plurality with 8.89% of the votes.

Simultaneously, of the three pro-government parties, the pro-presidential Social Democratic

Party came in second with 8.04% of the votes, and Ata-Meken took only 5.6%. The two other winning parties - Ar-Namys and Respublika - polled 7.74% and 7.24% respectively. The elections led to the formation of the first multiparty coalition government in Kyrgyzstan.

International observers praised the elections for political pluralism, the civic responsibility and evidently reflecting the will of the people (OSCE, 2010b). As another interesting indication of

103

the fairness of elections, the head of the OSCE monitoring unit remarked that, in his years long experience in Central Asia, this was the first election in which he could not predict the outcome

(OSCE, 2010b).

Elections legitimized and consolidated the new political order that appeared after the popular uprising of April, 2010 and created conditions for further democratic transition in

Kyrgyzstan. Consequently, three of the five parties managed to form a coalition government after two months of political bargaining and compromises, consisting of the three parties (Ata-

Jurt, Social Democrats, and Respublika), another unprecedented way of power-sharing among different political groups in Kyrgyzstan and wider in the region.

The presidential election of October, 2011 that elected the current Kyrgyz president

Almazbek Atambayev, the country’s fourth president since independence from the Soviet Union, was the first fair and competitive presidential election to mark the peaceful transfer of power from one president to another in the history of post-Soviet Central Asia. In total, some 83 candidates filed their bids to contest the October elections by the August 15, 2011 deadline. But only 16 (the highest number of presidential candidates allowed to run) managed to meet criteria for presidential candidacy. The criteria required candidates to pay the equivalent of $2250 as a registration fee, to collect 30,000 signatures, and to pass a Kyrgyz language test. The serious contenders were even fewer, consisting of the prime minister Almazbek Atambayev, the leaders of the Ata-Zhurt party Kamchybek Tashiev, and leader of the Butun Kyrgyzstan, party Adakhan

Madumarov. The elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the front-runner, Almazbek

Atambayev. Due to a clear majority (62.5% of the vote), Atambayev won in the first round, with decisive support in all parts of the country, while Madumarov and Tashiev ended the campaign in a distant second and third places, with 14.8% and 14.3% of votes, respectively. Turnout was

104

low overall (1,858,632 voters, or 61.3% of all those eligible), but with significant regional disparities between the high participation in the north (84% in Chui and Talas) and much lower turnouts in the southern regions (49% in Jalalabad and 48% in Batken) (Fumagali, 2011).

Although international observers have criticized some evident shortcomings, the election was assessed overall as encouraging, marking the final step in the transition period after the 2010 events that led to the ouster of President Bakiyev (OSCE, 2010b). In this regard, the parliamentary and presidential elections legitimized and consolidated the new political order established after popular uprising of April 2010, and created a pathway to continue democratic development in Kyrgyzstan for the following years. The new political system is far from a genuine democracy. It is still regulated by powerful leaders of the patronage system.

Nevertheless, the new Constitution and its implementation between 2010 and 2015 have produced the first signs of genuine political debate and fair competition among different political groups in Kyrgyzstan (Marat, 2012).

Despite advancements, developments since April, 2010 have not resulted in democratic consolidation. Moreover, by 2017 Kyrgyzstan eventually dropped back in its unstable political developments into the range of Consolidated Authoritarian regimes, according to Freedom

House’s (2017) methodology. This change happened due to the constitutional revisions that took place in 2016 that further entrenched the president Almazbek Atambayev’s Social Democratic

Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) and an oligarchic elite (Freedom House, 2017).

5.5. Conclusion

After gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Kyrgyzstan turned into a country with a “competitive authoritarian” political system, with regular but not free or fair elections. As in the other non-democratic post-Soviet regimes, elections in Kyrgyzstan have been

105

used by the government to legitimize a hold on power in the political situation after the country gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and afterwards. At the same time, since

1995, with the second cycle of national elections in the history of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan since independence, the government has been always conducting elections with the participation of an opposition. Even though these elections have never fully satisfied the international standards, for instance, not a single OSCE Election Observation report explicitly used the code words “free and fair” in describing elections from 1995 to 2010 in Kyrgyzstan (Sjoberg, 2011), Kyrgyzstani elections were the most contested elections among the five post-Soviet Central Asia states. In this regard, elections gave the opposition venues to mobilize their supporters and challenge the increasingly corrupt but basically weak presidency. The role of the opposition in Kyrgyzstan has always been uniquely more influential than in neighboring countries, eventually leading to two popular uprisings that exiled the first two increasingly corrupt presidents in 2005 and 2010.

Moreover, elections have had important long-term consequences ruling in the post-Soviet era. Based on the facts provided in this dissertation, it can be argued that these elections played an important role in bringing the opposition into power when a weak and increasingly-corrupt presidency led to regime breakdown in 2005. Further, elections have become part of the game, thus helping to develop a new political culture in the country and creating expectations among the political class.

By the end of 2015, the country experienced twenty various kinds of national level plebiscites (namely, six presidential and six parliamentarian elections as well as five referenda on constitutional changes) in total, in addition to three country-wide local elections. The new presidential election that will replace the current president-incumbent is scheduled on October

15, 2017 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2017).

106

Table 5: List of plebiscites (presidential, parliamentarian and local elections, and referenda) in Kyrgyzstan since independence (August 1991 to December 2015)

№ Month/Year Elections Referenda Presidential Parliamentary Local

1 October 1991 X 2 February 1994 X 3 Fall 1994 X (only in the capital city) 4 Spring 1995 X 5 December 1995 X 6 Fall 1996 X 7 Fall 1998 X 8 February 2000 X 9 October 2000 X 10 Fall 2000 X 11 Spring 2003 X 12 Spring 2005 X 13 Fall 2004 X 14 July 2005 X 15 Fall 2007 X 16 Fall 2008 X 17 July 2009 X 18 June 2010 X 19 October 2010 X 20 September 2011 X 21 Spring/Fall 2012 X 22 October 2015 X

In this regard, the case of Kyrgyzstan is a clear confirmation of the Levitsky and Way’s

(2010) concept of elections that can lead to regime break-down through opposition mobilization and polarization of the political elite. During Bakiyev’s presidency, the 2007 parliamentary and

2009 presidential elections contributed to the mobilization of the “northern” opposition, which led to the popular uprising against him in April, 2010. The case of Kyrgyzstan also confirms

Beachain & Kevlihan’s (2014) observations that elections contributed to the regime’s fragmentation. Even though these elections were neither free nor fair, and have long suffered 107

from the government manipulations and forgery as admitted by President of Kyrgyzstan Roza

Otunbayeva on the eve of the 2011 presidential election (Akipress, 2011, 25 October). Yet people continued to retain faith in the elections and in their voting.

After 2010 political changes, despite establishment more transparent political system,

Kyrgyzstan remained in the status of a “hybrid” regime as the country eventually fell back into the range of Consolidated Authoritarian regimes, according to Freedom House’s (2017) methodology. As further noted in this report (Freedom House, 2017, p.18), the case of

Kyrgyzstan illustrates:

[H]ow authoritarianism continues to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances, even

in weaker states with superficially competitive political environments. Faced with large-

scale popular discontent and lacking the resources to completely co-opt or repress civil

society and the opposition, presidents and ruling parties in these countries must find more

subtle ways of retaining their grip on power. They may be changing the very structure of

the state, but the goal is to preserve the political status quo.

This dissertation provides a detailed account of what and how it happened.

108

VI. Chapter 6. Role of social and economic influences on voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan

6.1. Defining voters and non-voters in the 2005 and 2010 parliamentary elections

The Kyrgyz electoral authority, the Central Election Commission does not compile and maintain socio-demographic data about voters in the Kyrgyz elections in a publicly available electronic voter database. Because of this, the individual characteristics of the voters presented in this research are based on the 2005 survey of the CSES (2008) and 2011 survey conducted in

Kyrgyzstan by the author of the dissertation. Since these surveys have been conducted with proper methodological procedures, their findings can be generalized to the broader voting population (electorate) of Kyrgyzstan.

For the purposes of this dissertation, differentiation between voters and non-voters was made based on their voting (or non-voting) behavior in the previous national elections. In this regard, a 2005 CSES data set reveals that 1,386 of respondents (70.4%) reported that they voted in the first round of parliamentary elections (February, 2005) and 1,641 (82.1%) of respondents reported that they voted in the following presidential election (July, 2005). According to the

2011 data, 1,158 (76.3%) cast their ballots in the previous (October, 2010) parliamentary elections.

109

Table 6.1: Share of electors who voted in the previous national elections

Voted 2005 Parliamentary 2005 Presidential elections 2010 Parliamentary elections elections Yes 1,386 (70.4%) 1,641 (82.8%) 1, 158 (76.3%) No 582 (29.6%) 341 (17.2%) 360 (23.7%) Total 1,982 (100%) 1,982 (100%) 1,518 (100%) Notes: Totals do not include respondents who did not answer the question whether they voted or not in the previous election (32 non-responders in the 2005 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey, and 9 non-responders in the 2011 Kyrgyzstan survey). Sources: 2005 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008); See Appendix C.

As in other studies, Kyrgyzstani respondents tend to over-report their voting. Table 5 below indicates that official turnout rates for all elections were lower than those reported by the surveys’ respondents.

Table 6.2: Official and reported voter turnout rates

Elections Official voter turnout Reported voter turnout in the 2005 and 2011 surveys** February 2005 60.0%* 70.4%** parliamentary elections October 2010 56.6%*** 76.3%**** parliamentary elections Sources: *Beachain, 2011, p.212; **CSES, 2008; *** OSCE 2010(b) **** See Appendix C

The factors most often cited in the literature as driving the over-reporting of voting include social desirability, respondent’s memory, and sampling issues (e.g., Bernstein, Chadha,

Montjoy, 2001; Blais, Gidengil, Nevitte & Nadeau, 2004; Corbett 1991; Duff, Hanmer, Park, &

White, 2007; Granberg & Holmberg, 1991; Karp & Brockington, 2005; Traugott & Katosh,

1979). Assuming that that most respondents in the sample were truthful about their voting in the previous elections, we can infer basic characteristics of Kyrgyz voters and their differences from non-voters, as presented in the following sections of the report.

The following subsections 6.2 – 6.4 analyze demographic and socio-economic data about

Kyrgyzstani voters using cross-tabulation that provides a more detailed look at objective factors influencing voting turnout. Chi square was applied to identify whether a statistically significant

110

relationship existed between the two variables presented in the tables. Subsection 6.6 analyzes

2006 and 2011 data using logit regression modeling, with both missing and imputed (complete) values.

6.2. Demographic and identity variables (age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, and religion)

6.2.1. Age

The findings of the research revealed that, as in many countries of the world (Franklin,

1996), younger citizens in Kyrgyzstan tend to be less inclined to vote than their older compatriots. In both the 2005 and 2010 parliamentarian elections, half of non-voters were under

30 years old (57.4% in 2005, and 49.7% in 2010), and in both elections a large proportion of non-voters (79.2% and 68.6%, respectively) were under 40 (see the tables 7.1 – 7.3 below).

In particular, in the February, 2005 elections (table 7.1), only 45% of respondents aged

18-29 said that they took part in the elections, while 57.4% reported non-participation. These figures present a big contrast with the other age groups: among the 30 – 39 age range, the share of the voters versus non-voters was 74.3% and 25.6%; among those 40 – 49 years old, it was

84.3% and 15.6%, and among 50 and older, 85.9% were voters and only 12.3% were non-voters.

Table 7.1: Voters and non-voters: Age (2005 parliamentary elections)

Age Total Electors 18-29 30-39 40-49 50+ Voters 273 368 334 411 1,386 % within Age 19.7% 26.6% 24.1% 29.7% 100% % within Electors 45.0% 74.3% 84.3% 87.5% 70.4% Non-voters 334 127 62 59 582 % within Age 57.4% 21.8% 10.7% 10.1% 100% % within Electors 55.0% 25.6% 15.6% 12.6% 29.5% Total 607 495 396 470 1,968 % within Age 30.8% 25.2% 20.1% 23.9% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Notes: The chi-square statistic is 294.6303. The P-Value is < 0.00001. The result is significant at p < 0.05 Percentages may not total due to rounding Source: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008)

111

The results for the year of 2005 look even more pronounced when only regular voters

(and non-voters) – defined as those who voted (or did not vote) in both the February and July,

2005 consecutive elections – are counted together, as demonstrated in Table 7.2 below.

Table 7.2: Voters and non-voters: Age (2005 parliamentary and presidential elections combined): Age Total** Electors 18-29 30-39 40-49 50+ Voters 226 327 304 380 1,237 % within Age 18.3% 26.4% 24.6% 30.7% 100% % within Electors 67.9% 88.4% 95.9% 94.3% 86.9% Non-voters 107 43 13 23 186 % within Age 57.5% 23.1% 7.0% 12.4% 100% % within Electors 32.1% 11.6% 4.1% 5.7% 13.1% Total** 333 370 317 403 1,423 % within Age 23.4% 26.0% 22.3% 28.3% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Notes: * The chi-square statistic is 30.28. The P-Value is < 0.00001. The result is significant at p < 0.001 **Percentages may not total due to rounding Source: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008)

This pattern is confirmed in the 2011 survey as shown in the following 7.3. table.

Table 7.3: Voters and non-voters: Age (Parliamentary elections of October 10, 2010)

Age Non- Total Electors 18-29 30-39 40-49 50+ response Voters 257 275 255 366 5 1,158 % within Age 22.2% 23.8% 22.0% 31.6% 0.5% 100% % within Electors 58.9% 80.2% 81.2% 87.4% 83.3% 76.3%

Non-voters 179 69 59 53 1 360 % within Age 49.7% 18.9% 16.4% 14.7% 0.3% 100% % within Electors 41.1% 19.9% 18.8% 12.7% 16.7% 23.7%

Total 436 343 314 419 6 1,518 % within Age 28.7% 22.6% 20.7% 27.6% 0.4% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Notes: * The chi-square statistic is 107.3279. **The P-Value is < 0.00001. The result is significant at p < 0.05. *** Percentages may not total due to rounding Source: See Appendix C

The figures in the table suggest that variations exist among different ages of voters vis-à- vis nonvoters. Among the 18 – 29 age group, voters constituted 58.9% and non-voters 41.1%;

112

the proportion between voters and the non-voters for the 30 – 39 age range was 80.2% and

19.9%; for 40 – 49 age: 87.4% and 18.8%; and for 50 and older it was 83.3% and 16.7%. These figures support existence of a positive relationship between age and voting turnout.

6.2.2. Gender

The research findings confirmed that influence of gender on the Kyrgyz electors’ turnout was not significant in differentiation between voters and non-voters, as shown in Table 8 below.

Table 8: Voters and non-voters: Gender (2005 and 2010 elections)

Gender Total Electors Man Women 2005 Voters 655 721 1,386 Parliamentary % within Gender 48.0% 52.0% 100% elections % within Electors 70.2% 70.6% 70.4% Non-voters 282 300 582 % within Gender 48.5% 52.0% 100% % within Electors 29.8% 29.4% 29.6% Total 947 1,021 1,968 % within Gender 48.1% 51.9% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 2005 Voters 593 644 1,237 Parliamentary % within Gender 47.9% 52.1% 100% and % within Electors 86.6% 87.3% 86.9% Presidential Non-voters 92 94 186 elections % within Gender 49.5% 50.5 100% (combined) % within Electors 24.0% 23.4% 13.1% Total 685 738 1,423 % within Gender 48.1% 51.9% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 2010 Voters 569 589 1,158 Parliamentary % within Gender 49.1% 50.9% 100% elections % within Electors 76.0% 76.6% 76.3% Non-voters 180 180 360 % within Gender 50.0% 50.0 100% % within Electors 24.0% 23.4% 23.7% Total 749 769 1,518 % within Gender 49.3% 50.7% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding Sources: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008); See Appendix C.

113

Both 2006 and 2011 surveys found a nearly equal (50/50) split between voters and non- voters within the same gender group. Additionally, the rate of an individual turnout remained the same in the both gender groups throughout all the three elections: it was 70% among both male and female electors in the February, 2005 elections, and nearly 76% in the both gender groups in the 2010 parliamentary elections.

6.2.3. Marital status

Findings of the 2011 survey confirm the general pattern of voting turnout in regard to marital status. As in many other countries, in Kyrgyzstan married people vote more often than unmarried people. Data on this variables was not available in the 2006 survey.

Table 9: Voters and non-voters: Marital status

Marital status Non response Total Electors Married Not married Voters 857 287 14 1,158 % within Marital status 74.0% 24.8% 1.2% 100% % within Electors 81.7% 63.6% 77.8% 76.3% Non-voters 192 164 4 360 % within Marital status 53.3% 45.6% 1.1% 100% % within Electors 18.3% 36.4% 22.2% 23.7% Total 1,049 451 18 1,158 % within Gender 69.1% 29.7% 1.2% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% Notes: *The chi-square statistic is 56.8364. ** The P-Value is < 0.00001. The result is significant at p < 0.01. ***Percentages may not total due to rounding Source: See Appendix C

6.2.4. Ethnicity

Kyrgyzstan is a multiethnic country. A national population survey in 2009 (UNDP,

2012). Revealed 71% Kyrgyz, 14.3% Uzbeks, 7.8% Russian, and 6.9% of other ethnicities, which included Uighurs, Ukrainians, Dungans, Kazakhs, Tatars, and so on, as shown in Table 10 below. Overall, there are more than 80 ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan’s total population of

5,496,737 as of July, 2012 (IndexMundi, 2017). In this regard, both the 2005 and 2011 surveys’ samplings were constructed to reflect the ethnic composition of the population of Kyrgyzstan. 114

Thus, the share of the ethnic groups among the respondents approximately equaled to the ethnic composition of the country’s total population as shown in the following table.

Table 10: Population vs. samples data by ethnicity

Ethnicity 2009 Population data (%) 2005 CSES Kyrgyzstan 2011 sample data (%) sample data (%) Kyrgyz 71.0 66.4 58.6 Uzbeks 14.3 10.5 22.9 Russian 7.8 15.5 9.3 Others 6.9 7.7 7.6 No response -- -- 1.6 Total 100% 100% 100% Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding Sources: National Statistic Committee Census data, 2009; 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey; See Appendix C.

According to the 2006 CSES survey results (see table 11.1), in the February, 2005 elections, the voting population consisted of 66% ethnic Kyrgyz, 16.7% ethnic Russians, and

10.2% ethnic Uzbeks, while the non-voting population consisted of the nearly same share of

Kyrgyz (67.5%) and Uzbeks (11.7%), but even fewer Russians (12.5%).

Table 11.1: Voters and non-voters: Ethnicity (2005 parliamentary elections)

Ethnicity Total Electors Kyrgyz Russians Uzbeks Others Voters 914 232 141 99 1,386 % within Ethnicity 66.0% 16.7% 10.2% 7.1% 100% % within Electors 69.9% 76.1% 67.5% 67.4% 69.3% Non-voters 393 73 68 48 582 % within Ethnicity 67.5% 12.5% 11.7% 8.3% 100% % within Electors 30.1% 23.9% 32.5% 32.7% 29.6% Total 1,307 305 209 147 1,968 % within Ethnicity 66.4% 15.5% 10.6% 7.5% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008).

The results did not differ much when only regular voters and non-voters and voters of both 2005 elections were compared (Table 11.2).

115

Table 11.2: Voters and non-voters: Ethnicity (2005 parliamentary and presidential elections combined) Ethnicity Total Electors Kyrgyz Russians Uzbeks Others Voters 804 209 134 90 1,237 % within Ethnicity 65.0% 16.9% 10.8% 7.3% 100% % within Electors 86.7% 89.7% 89.9% 79.0% 86.9% Non-voters 123 24 15 24 186 % within Ethnicity 66.1% 12.9% 8.1% 12.9% 100% % within Electors 13.3% 10.3% 10.1% 21.1% 13.1% Total 927 233 149 114 1,423 % within Ethnicity 65.1% 16.4% 10.5% 8.0% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008).

According to the 2011 survey results, the population of electors consisted of 58.1%

Kyrgyz, 23.0% Uzbeks, and 8.8% of Russians as shown in the following table.

Table 11.3: Voters and non-voters: Ethnicity (2010 parliamentary elections)

Ethnicity Non- Total Electors Kyrgyz Russians Uzbeks Others response Voters 673 102 266 97 20 1,158 % within Ethnicity 58.1% 8.8% 23.0% 8.4% 1.7% 100% % within Electors 75.6% 72.3% 76.7% 83.6% 83.3% 76.3% Non-voters 217 39 81 19 4 360 % within Ethnicity 60.3% 10.8% 22.5% 5.3% 1.1% 100% % within Electors 24.4% 27.7% 23.3% 16.4% 16.7% 23.7% Total 890 141 347 116 24 1,518 % within Ethnicity 58.6% 9.3% 22.9% 7.6% 1.6% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: See Appendix C.

Taking into account the importance of ethnic identity as well as ethnic diversity in the country, it was expected that an ethnic factor would play a somewhat important role in determining the patterns of the voting participation. Among the three major ethnic groups –

Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Russians – the findings of the 2006 and 2011 surveys showed increasing differences in voting participation among the three main ethnic groups of Kyrgyzstan. In this regard, both surveys revealed a slight decline in number of voters among the ethnic Kyrgyz and a

116

sharp decline of voting among the ethnic Russians, with a significant increase in the number of the ethnic Uzbek voters.

In particular, in the parliamentary elections of February, 2005 (Table 11.1), the share of the voters among the Russian community was 76.1%, the highest among all ethnic groups, compared to the Kyrgyz’ 69.9% and the Uzbeks’ 67.5%. But in the 2010 parliamentary elections

(table 11.3), the voting turnout rate of ethnic Russians sharply declined to 72.3%, the lowest among all ethnic groups, in comparison to 76.7% of Uzbek voters and 75.6% of Kyrgyz voters.

The question about the intention to vote in the forthcoming (October, 2011) elections also produced decreasing rates among the ethnic Russians (83.7%), in comparison to Uzbeks (85.9%) and Kyrgyz (91.4%).

Table 11.4: Voters and non-voters: Ethnicity (Forthcoming Presidential Elections of 2011)

Ethnicity Non- Total Electors Kyrgyz Russians Uzbeks Others response Voters 813 118 298 107 23 1,359 % within Ethnicity 59.8% 8.7% 21.9% 7.9% 1.7% 100% % within Electors 91.4% 83.7% 85.9% 92.2% 95.8% 89.5% Non-voters 61 17 42 7 1 128 % within Ethnicity 47.7% 13.3% 32.8% 5.5% 0.8% 100% % within Electors 6.9% 12.1% 12.1% 6.0% 4.2% 8.4% Non-response 16 6 7 2 0 31 % within Ethnicity 51.6% 19.4% 22.6% 6.5% 0% 100% % within Electors 1.8% 4.3% 2.0% 1.7% 0% 2.0% Total 890 144 347 116 24 1,518 % within Ethnicity 58.6% 9.3% 22.9% 7.6% 1.6% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: See Appendix C.

To sum up these Tables, the surveys revealed a dramatic decline in the share of both electors and the voters of ethnically Russian origin (from 16.7% in 2005 to 8.7% in 2011), but an increase in the share of the ethnically Uzbek electors and voters: from 10.8% in 2005 parliamentary elections to nearly 22% in 2011. The share of the ethnic Kyrgyz electors and voters also declined, although less dramatically, from 65% in 2005 to nearly 60% in 2011.

117

6.2.5. Religion

About 75% of the population in Kyrgyzstan is Muslim, almost all of whom are Sunni,

20% is Russian Orthodox, and 5% adheres to other religious groups (U.S. Department of State,

2013). It also bears noting that there is a strong connection between religion and ethnic identity across the region; for most indigenous Central Asians, to be Central Asian – be it Kazakh,

Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, or Turkmen – is to be Muslim (Omelicheva 2011, 2015). Such is the case of Orthodox Christianity, where followers in the region primarily consist of ethnic Russians as well as Ukrainians.

Both the 2006 CSES and 2011 surveys reflect the general distribution of the respondents according to the religious denomination in the population of Kyrgyzstan.

Table 12.1: Religious denomination of the surveys’ respondents

Muslim Orthodox Others* Atheists Non- Total** response 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan 1,611 307 1 - 49 1,968 survey (81.9%) (15.6%) (0.1%) (2.5%) (100%) 2011 Kyrgyzstan survey 1,303 153 1 33 28 1,518 (85.8%) (10.1%) (0.1%) (2.2%) (1.8%) (100%)

Official data*** 80% 17% 3% -- -- 100%

Notes: * Others includes Buddhists, Christians of other denominations, and Jews; **Percentages may not total due to rounding; ***U.S. Department of State (2013).

Despite these numbers, data did not show a relationship between level of religiosity

(measured through religious service attendance) and inclination to voting, as presented in the following Table 12.2.

118

Table 12.2: Voters and non-voters: Religious denomination (2005 and 2010 elections)

Religion Total Electors Muslim Orthodox Others Atheists Non- response 2005 Voters 1,128 225 -- -- 33 1,386 Parliamentary % within Religion 81.4% 16.2% -- -- 2.4% 100% elections % within Electors 70.0% 73.3% -- -- 67.4% 70.4% Non-voters 483 82 1 -- 16 582 % within Religion 83.0% 14.1% 0.2% -- 2.8% 100% % within Electors 30.0% 26.7% 100% -- 32.7% 29.5% Total 1,611 307 1 -- 49 1,968 % within Gender 81.9% 15.6% 0.1% -- 2.5% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% -- 100% 100% 2005 Voters 1,003 203 0 -- 31 1,237 Parliamentary % within Religion 81.1% 16.4% 0% -- 2.5% 100% and % within Electors 86.7% 87.5% 0% -- 91.2% 86.9% Presidential Non-voters 154 29 -- -- 3 186 elections % within Religion 82.8% 15.6% -- -- 1.6% 100% (combined) % within Electors 13.3% 12.5% -- -- 8.8% 13.1% Total 1,157 232 -- -- 34 1,423 % within Gender 81.3% 16.3% -- -- 2.4% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% -- -- 100% 100% 2010 Voters 1,003 111 0 23 21 1,158 Parliamentary % within Religion 86.6% 9.6% 0% 2.0% 1.8% 100% election % within Electors 77.0% 72.6% 0% 69.7% 75.0% 76.3% Non-voters 300 42 1 10 7 360 % within Religion 83.3% 11.7 0.3% 2.8% 1.9% 100% % within Electors 23.0% 27.5% 100% 30.3% 25.0% 23.7% Total 1,303 153 1 33 28 1,518 % within Gender 85.8% 10.1% 0.1% 2.2% 1.9% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Sources: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008); See Appendix C.

A probable explanation might be that after 70 years of Soviet rule, intensity of faith among the population of Kyrgyzstan still remains at low levels. Findings of the 2011 survey

(which contained a related question) show that nearly half of the respondents of the Muslim faith

(48.7%) and nearly one-third (almost 27%) of the Christian Orthodox faith never attended religious services in the mosques or churches, except in special cases such as weddings or

119

funerals. Only a quarter of the Muslim (24.2%) and one-tenth (9.8%) of the Orthodox respondents visit mosques and churches weekly (Table 12.3).

Table 12.3: Religious service attendance (2011)

Religion Non- Total Religious services Muslim Orthodox Others Atheists response attendance Never 634 (48.7%) 41 (26.8%) 1 (100%) 30 (91.0%) 0 (0%) 706 (46.5%) Two to eleven 181 (13.9%) 62 (40.5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (7.1%) 245 (16.1%) times a year Once a month 108 (8.3%) 27 (17.7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (3.6%) 136 (9.0%) Once a week 315 (24.2%) 15 (9.8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 330 (21.7%) Non- response 65 (5.0%) 8 (5.2%) 0 (0%) 3 (9.1%) 25 (89.3%) 101 (6.7%) Total 1,303 (100%) 153 (100%) 1 (100%) 33 (100%) 28 (100%) 1,518 (100%) Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: See Appendix C.

The level of religiosity did not influence the voting inclinations as Table 12.4 shows.

Table 12.4: Voters and non-voters: Religious service attendance (2010 elections)

Religious service attendance (religiosity) Total Electors Never Two to eleven Monthly Weekly Non- response 2010 Voters 539 179 109 253 78 1,158 Parliamentary % within 46.6% 15.5 9.4% 21.9% 6.7% 100% election Religiosity % within 76.4% 73.1% 80.2% 76.7% 77.2% 76.3% Electors Non-voters 167 66 27 77 23 360 % within 46.4% 18.3% 7.5% 21.4% 6.4% 100% Religiosity % within 23.7% 26.9% 19.9% 23.3% 22.7% 23.7% Electors Total 706 245 136 330 101 1,518 % within 46.5% 16.1% 9.0% 21.7% 6.7% 100% Religiosity % within 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Electors Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: See Appendix C.

120

6.3. Socio-economic status (education, employment, income, and residence)

The socio-economic status of a respondent is identified and studied through examination of such important social characteristics as the level of education, status and type of employment, and level of household income.

6.3.1. Education

Level of education, along with employment, income, and place of residence, is one of the important indications of social status. The findings of the surveys demonstrate a significant relationship between education and voting turnout. There, citizens with postsecondary degrees

(vocational and bachelor-level) tend to vote in higher numbers than people with only secondary degrees. First of all, both the 2006 and 2011 surveys have produced nearly the same patterns of educational backgrounds among the Kyrgyz electors.

A majority of Kyrgyzstani voters (about 95.5%) in 2005 had at least completed secondary schools. In addition, nearly 30% of voters have vocational school degrees while 32.6% graduated from higher education institutions (see table 13.1 below).

Table 13.1: Voters and non-voters: Education (2005 parliamentary elections)

Education No Total Electors Incomplete Secondary Specialized Incomplete University Response secondary school (vocational) university (undergraduate) school secondary (undergraduate) Degree school degree Voters 62 363 412 96 452 1 1,386 % of Education 4.5% 26.2% 29.7% 6.9% 32.6% 0.1% 100% % of Electors 82.7% 69.0% 79.4% 38.3% 75.8% 100% 70.4% Non-voters 13 163 107 155 144 0 582 % of Education 2.2% 28.0% 18.4% 26.6% 24.7% 0% 100% % of Electors 17.3% 31.0% 20.6% 61.8% 24.2% 0% 29.6% Total 75 526 519 251 596 1 1,967 % of Education 3.8% 26.7% 26.4% 12.8% 30.3% 0.1% 100% % of Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Notes: *The chi-square statistic is 124.8587. The P-Value is < 0.00001. The result is significant at p < 0.01. **Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008).

121

Non-voters produced almost the same proportions of the educational attainment, with 98% high school degrees, including 18.4% with vocational school degrees, and nearly 25% with completed higher education.

The similar results appeared for “staunch” voters and voters in 2005 as shown in Table

13.2 below.

Table 13.2: Voters and non-voters: Education (2005 parliamentary and presidential elections combined)

Voters 56 313 368 81 418 1 1,237 % of Education 4.5% 25.3% 29.8% 6.6% 33.8% 0.1% 100% % of Electors 90.3% 84.1% 91.5% 64.3% 90.9% 100% 86.9% Non-voters 6 59 34 45 42 0 186 % of Education 3.2% 31.7% 18.3% 24.2% 22.6% 0% 100% % of Electors 9.7% 15.9% 8.5% 35.7% 9.1% 0% 13.1% Total 62 372 402 126 460 1 1,423 % of Education 4.4% 26.1% 28.3% 8.9% 32.3% 0.1% 100% % of Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Notes: *The chi-square statistic is 73.998. The P-Value is < 0.00001. The result is significant at p < 0.01. **Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008).

Findings of the 2011 survey were similar to the results of 2006 CSES survey. A majority of Kyrgyzstani voters in 2010 parliamentary elections (about 92.7%) had completed secondary schools, 33% had vocational school degrees, and 27% graduated from the higher education institutions. The non-voters produced almost the same proportions of the educational attainment, with 91.6% high school degrees, including 21.7% with vocational school degrees, and nearly

15% with completed higher education (refer to Table 13.3 below).

122

Table 13.3: Voters and non-voters: Education (2010 parliamentarian elections)

Education No Total Electors Incomplete Secondary Specialized Incomplete University Response secondary school (vocational) university (undergraduate) completed secondary (undergraduate) Degree School degree Completed completed Voters 84 385 298 59 315 17 1,158 % of Education 7.3% 33.3% 25.7% 5.1% 27.2% 1.5% 100% % of Electors 71.2% 70.9% 79.3% 66.3% 84.7% 85.0% 76.3% Non-voters 34 158 78 30 57 3 360 % of Education 9.4% 43.9% 21.7% 8.3% 15.8% 0.8% 100% % of Electors 28.8% 29.133% 20.7% 33.7% 15.3% 15.0% 23.7% Total 118 543 376 89 372 20 1,518 % of Education 7.8% 35.8% 24.8% 5.9% 24.5% 1.3% 100% % of Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Notes: * The chi-square statistic is 31.5028. The P-Value is <0.00001. The result is significant at p <0.01. **Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: See Appendix C.

6.3.2. Employment

The research findings confirmed a positive correlation between employment status and voting. Employed people demonstrated higher voting inclinations than the unemployed. As shown in Table 14.1 below, 58% of employed voted in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and only 42% among non-employed.

Table 14.1: Voters and non-voters: Employment (2005 parliamentarian elections)

Employment Total Electors Employed Unemployed/Out of labor force* Voters 805 581 1,386 % within Employment 58.1% 41.9% 100% % within Electors 78.2% 61.9% 70.4% Non-voters 224 358 582 % within Employment 38.5% 61.5% 100% % within Electors 21.8% 38.1% 29.6%

Total 1,029 939 1,968 % within Employment 52.3% 47.7% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% Notes: * The chi-square statistic is 31.5028. The P-Value is <0.00001. The result is significant at p <0.01. **Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008).

123

This pattern remained the same over the time. The 2011 survey found the same correlations between employment status and voting turnout, with almost the same ratios, as shown in the next table.

Table 14.2: Voters and non-voters: Employment (2011)

Employment Total Electors Employed Unemployed/ Out of labor force* Voters 617 541 1,158 % within Religion 53.3% 46.7% 100% % within Electors 82.3% 70.4% 76.3% Non-voters 133 227 360 % within Religion 36.9% 63.1% 100% % within Electors 17.7% 29.6% 23.7% Total 768 750 1,518 % within Gender 50.6 49.4 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100%

Notes: *The chi-square statistic is 29.3. The P-Value is < 0.00001. The result is significant at p < 0.01. **Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: See Appendix C.

When employed people are identified and grouped into specific professional categories, the findings confirm that the highest voting behavior is demonstrated among office workers, state

(government) employees, and peasants (persons employed in agriculture). In the 2005 survey,

81.5% of office workers, 80% of state servants, and 77% of peasants reported that they voted in the previous elections (Table 15.1 below).

124

Table 15.1: Voters and non-voters: Main occupation (2005 Kyrgyzstan CSES data) Occupation Total** Electors Entrepreneur State Office Peasant Laborer Out-of-work* service worker Voters 120 166 233 114 172 581 1,386 % within 8.7% 12.0% 16.8% 8.2% 12.4% 41.9% 100% Occupation % within 75.5% 80.2% 81.5% 77.0% 75.1% 61.9% 70.4% Electors Non-Voters 39 41 53 34 57 358 582 % within 6.7% 7.0% 9.1% 5.8% 9.8% 61.5% 100% Occupation % within 24.5% 19.8% 18.5% 23.0% 24.9% 38.1% 29.6% Employment Total** 159 207 286 148 229 939 1,968 % within 8.1% 10.5% 14.5% 7.5% 11.6% 47.7% 100% Employment % within 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Electors

Notes: *This category includes housewives, students, and pensioners. **The chi-square statistic is 66.648. The P- Value is < 0.00001. The result is significant at p < 0.01. ***Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008).

Similar results were obtained in the 2011 survey (Table 15.2 below). There, 90.5% of the

respondents employed in the state (government) service reported that they voted in the 2010

parliamentary elections, compared to nearly 85% peasants, 76.8% entrepreneurs, 72%

laborers/workers, and 70.5% of the “out of labor force” category, including housewives,

students, pensioners, and the unemployed.

125

Table 15.2: Voters and non-voters: Main occupation (2010 Kyrgyzstan data)* Occupation Total** Electors Entrepreneur State service Peasant Laborer Out-of- No labor-force* response Voters 185 219 132 77 543 2 1,158 % within 16.0% 18.9% 11.4% 6.6% 46.9% 0.2% 100% Occupation % within 76.8% 90.5% 84.6% 72.0% 70.5% 100.00 76.3% Electors Non-Voters 56 23 24 30 227 0 360 % within 15.6% 6.4% 6.7% 8.3% 63.1% 0% 100% Occupation % within 23.2% 9.5% 15.4% 28.0% 29.5% 0% 23.7% Employment Total** 241 242 156 107 770 2 1,518 % within 15.9% 15.9% 10.3% 7.1% 50.7% 0.1% 100% Employment % within 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Electors

Notes: *This category includes housewives, students, pensioners and unemployed. **The chi-square statistic is 48.2369. The P-Value is < 0.00001. The result is significant at p < 0.01. ***Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: See Appendix C.

6.3.3. Household income

Overall, the distribution of household income among the respondents of the 2011 survey reflected well the general income distribution of Kyrgyzstan as one of the poorest republics of the former Soviet Union. (The 2006 survey data does not contain this variable.) In the 2011 survey, the respondents were divided based on their answers among the following five categories, with the share of the voters and non-voters in each group of the electors.

Table 16.1: Household income distribution between voters and non-voters (2011 survey) № Household income level Voters Non-voters 1 Not enough money for food 2.9% 3.3% 2 Enough money for food, but we cannot buy clothes 20.0% 15.3% 3 Enough money for food and clothes, but we cannot buy expensive things 51.3% 50.8% 4 We can buy expensive thing sometimes, but not all we want 20.5% 25.8% 5 We can afford to buy everything we want 1.6% 1.4% No response: 3.8% 3.3% Total: 100% 100% Note: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: See Appendix C.

126

For the purposes of our research, it was important to understand the influence of household income to the voting behavior of the respondents. The direct correlation between the respondents’ voting (in the previous election) and their households’ income level produced the following figures in the 2011 survey (see Table 16.2).

Table 16.2: Voters and non-voters: Household income (2011) Household Income (HI) Non- Total Elector Not Enough Enough We can We can response enough money money for buy afford to money for food, food and expensive buy for but we clothes, thing everything food cannot but we sometimes, we want buy cannot but not all clothes buy we want expensive things Voters 33 231 594 237 19 14 1,158 % within HI 2.3% 20.0% 51.3% 20.5% 1.6% 3.8% 100% % within 73.3% 80.8% 76.5% 71.8% 79.6% 78.6% 76.3% Electors Non-voters 12 55 183 93 5 12 360 % within HI 3.3% 15.3% 50.8% 25.8% 1.4% 3.3% 100% % within 26.7% 19.2% 23.6% 28.2% 20.8% 21.4% 23.7% Electors Total 45 286 777 330 24 56 1,518 % within HI 2.3% 18.8% 51.2% 21.7% 1.6% 3.7% 100% % within 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Electors Notes: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: see Appendix C.

Each of the five social groups revealed the same proportion of voters and nonvoters, which means that there is no variation in terms of voting turnout when considering household income. The figures in the table suggest that the variable “household income” – in comparison to the other two social variables (as discussed above) – education, and employment – has little or no influence on voting behavior.

127

6.3.4. Level of urbanization and residence

This section discusses differences between urban and rural electors. By the variable

“residence,” the author means the respondents’ rural or urban living locations. According to the findings of the 2011 survey, 50.7% of the voters lived in villages and rural areas, compared to

46.4% of non-voters. The remaining live in the small- or middle-sized town (26.6% of voters and

27.8% of non-voters) and suburbs of a large town or city (8.4% and 5.3%). In addition, the two largest cities of Kyrgyzstan – Bishkek (the capital, located in the northern part of the country) and

Osh (in the south of the country) – have 14.3% share of the voters and 20.6% share of the non- voters out of the entire population of the electors.

Table 17.1: Voters and non-voters: Rural-urban residence (2010 parliamentary elections) Residence (level of urbanization) Total** Electors Rural Small/middle- Suburbs Large town or area/ sized town of large city* village town or city Voters 587 308 97 166 1,158 % within Residence 50.7% 26.6% 8.4% 14.3% 100% % within Electors 77.9% 75.5% 83.6% 69.2% 76.3% Non-voters 167 100 19 74 353 % within Residence 46.4% 27.8% 5.3% 20.6% 100% % within Electors 22.1% 24.5% 16.4% 30.8% 23.7% Total** 754 408 116 240 1,518 % within Ethnicity 49.7% 26.9% 7.6% 15.8% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Notes: *Two largest cities in Kyrgyzstan include capital Bishkek in the north, and Osh in the south, both comprising 1/5 of the country’s population. ** The chi-square statistic is 11.3. The P-Value is 0.010034. The result is significant at p < 0.05. ***Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: See Appendix C.

Thus, in absolute numbers, the majority of the Kyrgyz voters come from rural areas (refer to Table 17.2). The correlation between voting and rural-urban variables confirms this pattern: in

2005 parliamentary elections, the large cities (Bishkek and Osh) have the least share of voters

(almost 63%) as compared to rural locations (72%).

128

Table 17.2: Voters and non-voters: Capital city-rest of the country residence (2005 parliamentary elections)

Region of residence Total Electors Bishkek (capital) The rest of the country Voters 247 1,139 1,386 % within Residence 17.8% 82.2% 100% % within Electors 62.9% 72.3% 70.4% Non-voters 146 436 582 % within Residence 25.1% 74.9% 100% % within Electors 37.2% 27.7% 29.6% Total 393 1,575 1,968 % within Ethnicity 20.0% 80.0% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% Notes: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008).

Findings of the 2011 survey showed similar results (table 27.3 below), demonstrating lower turnout in the capital city (Bishkek) in contrast to the rest of the predominantly rural country (77.5%).

Table 17.3: Voters and non-voters: Capital city-rest of the country residence (2010 parliamentary elections)

Region of residence Total Electors Bishkek (capital) The rest of the country Voters 74 1,084 1,158 % within Residence 6.4% 93.6% 100% % within Electors 62.2% 77.5% 76.3% Non-voters 45 315 360 % within Residence 12.5% 87.5% 100% % within Electors 37.8% 22.5% 23.7% Total 119 1,399 1,518 % within Ethnicity 7.8% 92.2% 100% % within Electors 100% 100% 100% Notes: Percentages may not total due to rounding. Source: 2006 CSES Kyrgyzstan survey (CSES, 2008).

These numbers, showing higher turnout in rural areas than in cities, remains consistent with the experience of other countries, but specifically, those in the post-communist region can be attributed to specific conditions of post-Soviet countries (Hill & Huskey, 2015). More

129

specifically, as argued by Hill & Huskey (2015) in the case of Kyrgyzstan, the low turnout in the

capital appears to be due primarily to the traditional indifference of better-educated and more

urban voters toward voting as a civic or social duty.6 Among other explanations of the higher

rates of voting participation of the rural residents is that in rural communities, the obligation to

vote is socially sanctioned more effectively than in urban localities, as demonstrated by Ahuja &

Chhibber (2012) in case study of voters in India.

6.4. Summary and conclusions

Examination of bi-variate relationships in the variables of the 2006 CSES survey and the

dissertation’s 2011 survey in Kyrgyzstan found important patterns of voting turnout between

voters and non-voters, as summarized in Table 18 below.

First, there is a positive relationship between voting turnout and such demographic

variables as age and marriage. Most Kyrgyzstani voters tend to be older and married.

Correspondingly, nonvoters tend to be younger as well as single (regardless of age).

Second, the data revealed a consistent pattern of a positive correlation between and

individual inclination to voting and such elements of socio-economic status as education and

employment (including type of employment). The higher levels of education and occupational

status the citizens possess, the higher rates of voting participation they report. Nevertheless,

another factor of the socio-economic status – household income – produced mixed results, which

does not allow us to form a definite conclusion about the role of this particular variable in

determining the voting participation. But based on the two other variables (education and

6 It needs to be noted that authors Hill & Huskey (2015) further attribute, as an additional factor, suppressing of voter turnout in the capital city by voters’ lists manipulation that made the disproportionate share of voters in Bishkek unable to find their names on the voter rolls in October 2011. They were therefore unable to cast a ballot for president, but the author of this dissertation is not so convinced in this explanation as the capital city voters’ turnout has been low throughout all national level elections in Kyrgyzstan since 1991.

130

employment), we can conclude that socio-economic status in Kyrgyzstan, overall, tends to be positively correlated with the inclination to vote.

Third, residents of rural areas reported higher voting participation rates than the inhabitants of the urban areas, consisting of the two major urban centers of Kyrgyzstan – the capital Bishkek and Osh. Moreover, the capital city shows the lowest voting turnout rates when compared to the rest of the country. Finally, such factors as gender, ethnicity, and religion did not reveal significant influence on the voting turnout.

Table 18: Turnout of social groups in 2005 and 2010 parliamentary elections (summary)

2005(1) 2005 (2) 2010 2005 (1) 2005 (2) 2010 % % % % % Age Education 18-29 45 68 59 Incomplete 83 90 71 30-39 74 88 80 secondary 40-49 84 96 81 Secondary 69 84 71 50+ 88 94 87 Vocational 79 92 79 incomplete 38 64 66 Gender undergraduate Men 70 87 76 Undergraduate 76 90 85 Women 71 87 77 Employment Employed 78 93 82 Marital status Non-employed 62 80 70 Married -- -- 82 Occupation Single -- -- 64 Businesspeople -- -- 77 State service -- -- 91 Ethnicity Peasants -- -- 85 Kyrgyz 70 87 76 Workers -- -- 72 Russians 76 90 72 Uzbeks 68 90 77 Household income Religion Top fifth -- -- 80 Muslim 70 87 77 Second fifth -- -- 72 Orthodox 73 88 73 Middle fifth -- -- 77 Atheists -- -- 70 Fourth fifth -- -- 81 Lowest fifth -- -- 73 Religious service attendance Urbanization: Regular -- -- 79 capital vs country Irregular -- -- 75 Bishkek (capital) 63 78 62 Rest of the country 72 89 78

131

6.5. Multivariate (logit) analysis of voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan

6.5.1. Multivariate (logit) analysis of voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan

The results of the regressions analyses performed with 2011 data reinforced most of the

correlations in the bi-variate analyses presented in the previous section. Table 19.1 below reveals

that variables that have significant effects on the likelihood of voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan.

Table 19.1: Logit models of individual voting turnout and independent variables (2011 data)

Variables Coeff. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] Demographics

*Age (.118) .77 6.51 0.000 .537 – .999 Female (.305) .55 1.86 0.071 -1.146 – .047 *Married (.247) .99 3.99 0.000 .503 – 1.473 Kyrgyz (.276) -.33 -1.18 0.236 -.869 – .214 Muslim (.492) .54 1.10 0.270 -.421 – 1.508 Socio-economic status *Education (.108) .42 3.93 0.000 .212 – .634 Peasant (.426) .37 0.87 0.386 -.466 – 1.206 **Income (.170) -.41 -2.39 0.017 -.742 – -.074 Urban (.114) -.15 -1.27 0.202 -.370 – .078 Political attitudes **Country’s direction (.304) .69 2.26 0.024 .091 – 1.284 Economy evaluation (.209) .28 1.32 0.187 -.134 – .684 *State of democracy (.203) .64 -3.15 0.002 -1.037 – -.242 *Electoral efficacy (.182) .55 2.99 0.003 .187 – .903 Quality of elections (.219) -.05 -0.22 0.828 -.477 – .382 Trust in elections (.185) -.04 0.24 0.814 -.319 – .406 Religiosity (.119) .08 0.67 0.500 -.153 – .314 Trust in government (.177) .26 -1.49 0.136 -.610 – .083 *Party identification (.256) .73 2.85 0.004 .226 – 1.228 Attitudes towards democracy -.04 -0.43 0.668 -.216 – .138 (.090) *Interest in politics (.254) .68 2.66 0.008 .177 – 1.173 Social attitudes Trust in people (.284) .30 1.07 0.287 -.254 – .858 Living conditions evaluation .37 1.78 0.075 -.037 – .772 (.206) Constant (.824) -2.766 -3.36 0.001 -4.382 – -1.150 Notes: (1) Dependent variable: Voting in the previous (September 2010) parliamentary elections; (2) Each row is a logit model; (3) Standard Error is in the parentheses; (4) *P < 0.01, **P<0.05.

132

In sum, eight variables have significant effects on likelihood of voting turnout in

Kyrgyzstan, including two demographic variables (age and marital status), two socio-economic status factors (education and household income), and five political attitudes (the country’s direction, state of democracy, electoral efficacy, party identification, and interest in politics).

This confirms the earlier theoretical expectations as described in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

The model shows that turnout inclination of the Kyrgyzstani voters increases with age and marriage. Education (years of schooling) also has a positive effect, with likelihood of voting increasing as the level of education increases. Also, the model shows the importance of income

(measured by household income) for voting turnout. Satisfaction with the country’s direction and state of democracy also increases likelihood of voting. Finally, the logit analysis also indicates that, not surprisingly, people who had higher levels of electoral efficacy, party identification, and interest in politics are also were more likely to come to fill out ballots on election day.

It also bears noting that these distributions of the voters across social and geographic clusters can have important electoral consequences for the parties and, consequently, for the representation in the national parliament, which can be skewed due to their higher voter turnout, towards traditional groups and ideologies. Seeing this, further investigation of this particular question is needed.

133

6.5.2. Logit model of voting turnout in Kyrgyzstan with imputed values

The previous model was based on data with many missing values. The following logit

model (Table 19.2 below) was developed with imputed values (imputation was made through

mean replacement as described in the subsection 3.2.3.3 of Chapter 3).

Table 19.2: Logit models of individual voting turnout and independent variables with imputed variables and predicted probability (2011 data) Variables Coeff. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Change in Interval] predicted probability Demographics *Age (.061) .47 7.74 0.000 .350 – .589 0.22 Female (.160) -.20 -1.23 0.218 -.511 – .117 - *Married (.140) .62 4.48 0.000 .352 – .900 0.11 *Kyrgyz (.158) -.46 -2.90 0.004 -.768 – -.148 -0.07 *Muslim (.225) .62 2.76 0.006 .179 – 1.062 0.11 Socio-economic status *Education (.059) .30 5.18 0.000 .189 – .419 0.19 **Peasant (.263) .54 2.06 0.040 .025 – 1.057 0.07 *Income (.095) -.29 -3.06 0.002 -.475 – -.104 -0.18 Urban (.064) -.07 -1.11 0.266 -.197 – .054 - Political attitudes Country’s direction (.154) .23 1.48 0.138 -.074 – .530 - Economy evaluation (.107) .03 0.27 0.787 -.181 – .239 - State of democracy (.097) .12 -1.29 0.198 -.314 – .065 - *Electoral efficacy (.102) .34 3.29 0.001 .136 – .537 0.16 Quality of elections (.112) -.11 -1.01 0.311 -.333 – .106 - Trust in elections (.097) .02 -0.25 0.805 -.214 – .166 - Religiosity (.065) -.01 -0.10 0.922 -.134 – .121 - Trust in government (.098) .03 0.31 0.759 -.163 – .223 - *Party identification (.150) .60 3.98 0.000 .303 – .892 -0.003 Attitudes towards democracy .04 -0.82 0.412 -.144 – .059 - (.051) *Interest in politics (.139) .68 4.83 0.000 .402 – .949 0.11 Social attitudes Trust in people (.172) .19 1.08 0.278 -.150 – .522 - Living conditions evaluation .14 1.47 0.142 -.048 – .337 - (.098) Constant (.465) -1.583 -3.40 0.001 -2.494 – -.672 Logit estimates: Number of obs = 1518, LR chi2(21) = 245.11, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000, Pseudo R2 = 0.1474, Log likelihood = -708.97 Notes: (1) Dependent variable: Voting in the previous (September 2010) elections; (2) Each row is a logit model; (3) Standard Error is in the parentheses; (4) *P < 0.01, **P<0.05.

134

The imputed model added two more variables into demographics (ethnicity and religion – dummy variables “Kyrgyz” and “Muslim”) and one variable in the two socio-economic status factors (occupation – dummy variable “Peasant”). In the political attitudes, the new model removed the country’s direction and the state of democracy. In overall, in both models seven variables remained significant, namely age, marital status, education, household income, electoral efficacy, party identification, and interest in politics.

In addition, the last column of this Table presents each significant variable’s change in the predicted probability of voting turnout moving from the minimum to the maximum value of each variable.7 The results suggest that age was the most significant predictor of turnout, as the predicted probability increased by 22%, holding all other variables constant at their means.

Education, marital status, religious affiliation (Muslim), electoral efficacy, and interest in politics were also significant predictors of attitudes toward voting, while ethnic identity (Kyrgyz), income, and party identification each bore a negative effect on predicting voting turnout for the citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Returning to the set of hypotheses that were put forward in Chapter 3, these findings support hypotheses about positive correlations between such variables as—1.1. (age), 1.3

(marital status), 1.4 (religion), 1.6 (education), 1.12 (positive evaluation of the country’s direction and state of democracy), 1.13 (higher sense of electoral efficacy), 1.20 (higher interest in politics)—and likelihood of voting. The results of the logit regression reject all the other hypotheses.

7 Predicted probabilities were produced using prchange-command in the SPost add-on for STATA as suggested by Long & Freese (2006). 135

6.5.3. Summary and conclusions

Several important conclusions can be drawn from the quantitative analysis of the 2011 data on voters in Kyrgyzstan. First of all, the findings of the research are in accordance with empirical evidence presented in the studies of voters in other countries of the world, regardless of the regime type. Age and marital status, education, income, country’s direction, state of democracy, electoral efficacy, party identification, and interest in politics (and ethnicity and religion in the model with imputed values) are as important in Kyrgyzstan as in Europe and the

U.S.A. It means that voters in a country with “hybrid” regime are influenced by the same factors as voters in democratic societies.

Finally, it should be noted that the findings of the dissertation research corroborate the results of the recent studies and publications on voters’ turnout in Kyrgyzstan. Namely, Darr and

Hesli (2010) found out that by using logistic regression, the likelihood of voting in Kyrgyzstan’s

2005 parliamentary and presidential elections was influenced by long-standing cultural cleavages based on religion and ethnicity, as well as by education, occupation, and trust in government.

Based on their findings, Darr & Hesli (2010) also suggested that that the political behavior of the

Kyrgyzstanis was supportive of democracy, despite elite-level obstacles to a successful transition.

136

VII. Chapter 7. Reasons for voting and meanings of the elections for the Kyrgyz electors

The 2011 survey contained two qualitative-type questions. One open-ended question studied voters’ motives and reasoning for participation (or non-participation) in voting. The other question was close-ended in order to learn about the meaning of the elections that the Kyrgyz voters (and non-voters) attach to the elections. These two questions aimed to identify the underlying ideas, understandings, and assumptions of the citizens about the elections and their electoral participation in Kyrgyzstan.

7.1. Reasons for voting

The open-ended question was quite straightforward and asked a respondent why he or she voted (Question: “Why do you vote?”). As a result, most answers to this question were also straightforward and short, which minimizes the above-mentioned problem of response interpretation. The units (responses to the questions) then were analyzed and recurring themes were identified and classified into several one-dimensional, mutually exclusive, and independent categories. These categories were coded as expressed through recurring phrases and ordered according to the degree of frequency of responses (in percentages).

Of the 1,518 respondents, 1,372 (90%) answered the question. The responses then were coded into several main categories according to the following table:

137

Table 20: Categories of responses to “Why do you vote?” question

Categories Number of respondents (percentage) To elect the better leadership/support own 373 (24.6%) candidate Civic duty 353 (23.3%) Bring positive changes to the life of the 232 (15.3%) country Contribute to the fairness of the elections 104 (6.9%) Hope for the better life/future 86 (5.7%) Exercise my voting right/make my own 76 (5.0%) choice For the sake of stability, peace, and 41 (2.7%) security in the country Compulsion (at the work place/peer 30 (1.2%) pressure) Habit 26 (1.7%) Interested in elections 19 (1.3%) Miscellaneous 32 (2.1%)

These findings clearly revealed that for the Kyrgyz electors, the main reason for voting is either about exercising their right to choose the better leadership, civic duty, or hope for a better future (the top three categories as answered by 73% of the respondents). The remaining important reasons included “Contribute to the fairness of the elections”: 104 (6.9%), “Hope for the better life/future”: 86 (5.7%), “Exercise my voting right/make my own choice”: 76 (5.0%),

“For the sake of stability, peace and security in the country”: 41 (2.7%), and “Interested in elections”: 19 (1.3%). Only a few respondents reported “Compulsion (at the work place/peer pressure)”: 30 (1.2%) and “Habit”: 26 (1.7%).

The “Miscellaneous” category included the following responses to the question as to why a respondent voted. They answered as such: the government paid my pension before the election day (one answer); a respondent was a member of the electoral commission (one answer) or an observer (one answer); there was nothing else to do (one answer); a respondent wants the [old,

138

good] Soviet times to return (one answer); as a step into adult age (one answer); a ballot place was very close to a respondent’s house (one answer); a respondent did not know why he or she went to vote (nine answers); and vote buying (one answer).

To provide some examples, one of the respondents (A-3016, southern Batken region, ethnic Kyrgyz, female) answered, “Election is a process that we need to take seriously because our future life and future are decided.” Many respondents from the northern parts of the country have expressed a similar attitude. For instance, one respondent from the capital city of Bishkek

(A-29, ethnic Russian, female) said that she voted “for the better, and also for a man who can advance the country.”

Forty-seven respondents emphasized the importance of “stability” that the elections would bring to Kyrgyzstan. For example, a respondent from the southern Batken region (A-3019, ethnic Kyrgyz, male) thought that he had voted in the previous elections “for normalization of the situation in the country, in hope for a better future.” It needs to be noted that referring to the elections as a stabilization factor was widespread among the respondents from the southern

(Batken, Jalalabad and Osh) provinces of Kyrgyzstan, the most affected parts of the country during bloody ethnic conflict in June, 2010, in comparison to the respondents of the less-affected northern regions (Chui, Issyk-Kul, Talas, and the capital, Bishkek).

Voters provided voting across ethnicities and regions of Kyrgyzstan as a civic duty. A voter of a Tatar ethnicity from the Jalalabad region (A-2171, Tashkumyr city, male, age 33) provided that he votes because of the “destiny of my country and also of my own is at the stake,” therefore, “How would I not vote when the destiny of my country is decided?” – he asked the interviewer.

139

Another important theme that came out in the responses concerned the fairness of the elections in Kyrgyzstan. As mentioned in the 4th category of answers, out of 104 respondents, 77 respondents specifically voted because they wanted to counter possible tricks and not give someone a chance to use their unused votes if the respondents would not vote. This concern was evenly distributed from all the regions (Bishkek: 2 responses, Chui: 13, Issyk Kul region: 13,

Naryn: 2, Osh region: 29, Jalalabad region: 16).

7.2. Reasons for non-voting

The 2011 survey data shows that of its 1518 survey respondents, 360 respondents

(23.7%) reported that they did not vote in the previous (2010 parliamentary) elections. Of this number of non-voters (353), 129 gave open answers about why they did not vote. In the given answers, the following main themes (reasons) recurred:

- “Cannot change anything”/“It does not make difference” (37 respondents, including 25 from the southern regions, 28.6%);

- “Was busy”/“Went abroad” (33 respondents, including 22 from the southern regions,

25.6%);

- “Wasn’t on the voters’ list”/ No ID (28 respondents, 21.6%);

- “Don’t trust politicians/candidates” (10 respondents, 7.7%);

- Miscellaneous (personal reasons/ no reasons) (21 respondents, 16.3%), including “No particular reason” 10 respondents, “Was sick” 6 respondents; “Husband did not allow to go” 4 respondents, all from the southern Osh region);

-- Total: 129 respondents (100%).

Thus, we can see that the three most important answers are related to (1) disbelief that their vote can make a difference, (2) being too busy, and (3) problems with access, which in total

140

occupy 75% of the reported non-voting reasons. The share would reach 82% if we add 7.7% of those who did not vote because they did not trust candidates or politicians.

7.3. Meanings of the elections for the Kyrgyz voters

The findings in the previous section are further corroborated by the meanings that Kyrgyz electors attach to elections. Respondents were given a list of predetermined “meanings” of the elections, and the respondents were asked if they “completely agree”, “agree”, “disagree” or

“completely disagree” with each of the given “meaning” of the elections in Kyrgyzstan.

(Respondents were also given a “no-opinion” or “refuse to answer” option.) Specifically, respondents were asked about the relative importance (Large, Moderate, Small, Don’t know) of the following nine meanings of the elections: (1) Choose among particular policies; (2) Hold governments accountable for past actions; (3) Advance social class interests; (4) Advance ethnic/national/religious interests; (5) Gain things for self and family; (6) Comment on state of country; (7) Keep politicians honest; (8) Choose among leaders’ personalities; or (9) Deceive the people.

An important factor differentiating voters from non-voters was about the meaning of elections. Most voters (73%) agreed that “choosing new leaders” is the most important meaning of elections in Kyrgyzstan. The next most important meaning of elections to most of the voters were “choosing a new political course for the country” (answered by 61% of voters) and both

“providing respect for human rights” and “providing information for the public” (60% of voters for each meaning), “commenting on the state of the country” (57.5% of voters). Yet at the same time, 56% of voters reported that elections in Kyrgyzstan promote the “interests of the ruling class.” The other meanings of the elections included “holding government accountable” and

“keeping politicians honest” given by 47% and 46% of voters, respectively. Interestingly, the

141

meaning that elections serve the “interest of the politicians” was the only one where nonvoters outbalanced voters 56% to 51.8%.

Most nonvoters (63%) also agreed that “choosing new leaders” was the most important meaning of elections in Kyrgyzstan. The next most important meaning of elections for the nonvoters was, as for voters, “choosing a new political course for the country” indicated by 54% of the nonvoters. The other important meanings for nonvoters included “commenting on the state of the country” (50.7% of nonvoters) and “interests of the ruling class” (50% of nonvoters).

Nonvoters chose “Providing respect for human rights” at a rate of 48%, “providing information for the public” at 47% , “holding government accountable” at 35% of nonvoters, and “keeping politicians honest” at 34%.

Other responses concerning the meaning of elections were quite similar for both voters and nonvoters. In particular, the responses consisted of “interests of the ethnic groups” (33% voters and 29% nonvoters), “interests of the religious groups” (27% of voters and 25% of non- voters), and “deceiving people” (57% voters and 56% nonvoters).

7.4. Conclusion

The median Kyrgyz voter was born and grew up in the Soviet Union, where denial of choice was central to the practice of elections. The elections in the conditions of the “hybrid” political regime in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan do provide such a choice, and the qualitative assessment of the field data confirmed that having an opportunity to elect their own candidates is one of the strongest inner-motivational factors for Kyrgyzstani voters.

The findings of the research about positive inner motivations and reasoning of the voters in Kyrgyzstan suggest that more attention should be paid to the role of inner motivations and

142

rationalizations of both voters’ participation in non-fair elections and in understanding high turnout rates in elections of “hybrid” regimes like Kyrgyzstan.

It is important to note that these findings are comparable to the results presented in the similar studies of voters in other countries. In the recent anthropological study of elections in

India, Banerjee (2014) found sets of responses from poor Indian voters that overall coincide with the feelings of the Kyrgyz voters: (1) resignation (voting out of a feeling of not having any choice in the matter); (2) instrumentality (using their vote instrumentally, to get something); (3) loyalty (to see their choice of party leader in power); (4) protest and affectivity (to send out a message against a party, however dominant, rather than not vote at all, or abstain from voting);

(5) peer pressure (voting because it might look bad if they didn’t do so); (6) voting for recognition (voting to be recognized as equal); and finally, (7) voting as an expression of citizenship, duty, and right. But in contrast to this dissertation, the author of the study did not provide numerical amount of responses for each category, so it is difficult to say what the prevailing category is for Indian voters.

In another study of the Indian voters via focus groups (Ahuja & Chhibber, 2012), the authors learned that the marginalized groups at the bottom of the social hierarchy vote to gain a sense of empowerment by exercising their right to vote as well as out of fear of losing their rights or the benefits that the state gives them. Based on his own study, Banerjee (2014) notes that poor and illiterate people use the vote to gain a sense of empowerment, which in addition reveals that they “can also be conscious of their civic duties and the importance of voting as an end itself” (p.

168).

Voters in China indicated similar findings. In a survey conducted among 843 village voters, He (2007) found that 67.7% regarded voting as their right or responsibility, including

143

30% who viewed elections as their “sacred duty.” The second motive for voting was “to get those I trust elected” (33.3%). Almost 90% of respondents saw elections as either “important” or

“very important.”

Similar results appeared among American and European voters. In a survey conducted by the U.S. National Opinion Research Center in 1944, as many as 59% chose “duty”, and 36%

“right (Dennis, 1970, p. 827). Similar patterns revealed themselves in France (Stoetzel, 1955) and in Britain (Rose & Mossawir, 1967), where a majority of respondents (64% of women and

55% of men in France and 82% in the UK) reported that they voted out of a duty.

These findings contribute to doubts that have been raised regarding the rationality of a voting decision (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1966; Buttler & Stokes, 1969; Converse,

Miller, Rusk, & Wolfe, 1969; Key, 1966). It was argued that the irrationality of voting decisions is a consequence of the lack of clear and consistent sets of positions on issues among a great portion of the population (Campbell et al., 1966), their low level of interest (Butler & Stokes,

1969), and lack of information (Lane & Sears, 1964; Miller & Stokes, 1963), or due to altruistic reasons (Flower, 2006). In this regard, the dissertation supports an argument put forward by

Blais (2000) who maintained, on the basis of empirical evidence, that moral obligations and civic duty play a more important role than perceived costs over benefits in the decision to vote. In the empirical studies provided by Blais (2000, p. 95), 84% of respondents (university students in

Canada) agreed with the statement that “it is the duty of every citizen to vote,” including 43% who indicated that they strongly agreed. In the representative samples of the electorate in the

1995 Quebec referendum and the 1996 British Columbia election in Canada (Blais, 2000), 83% and 72% strongly agreed with the statement that voting was the duty of every citizen.

144

Finally, the findings of this dissertation contribute to an understanding of voters’ behavior in Kyrgyzstan and suggest important implications for the study of “electoral authoritarianism.” In particular, it sheds some light on understanding the “longevity” of electoral authoritarianism by which regimes gain legitimacy through regular elections, even though prior elections might have been staged and falsified. Regular elections provide opportunities not only for the government and its opposition, but also for ordinary voters who view elections as both fulfillment of a sacred civic duty and as a meaningful contribution to the country’s well-being. It is these sincere motivations of the citizenry that the authoritarian regimes parasitize on in order to continue their undemocratic rules.

145

VIII. Chapter 8: The case of Kyrgyzstan and post-Soviet Central Asia: Comparisons and generalizations

After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the vast region called “Central Asia”

(twice the size of Western Europe), one of the most obscure and isolated regions of the world throughout most of the 20th century, emerged on the international arena as five separate independent states named “Kazakhstan”, “Kyrgyzstan”, “Tajikistan”, “Turkmenistan”, and

“Uzbekistan.”8 These countries possess common social, cultural, political, and institutional legacies (as well as challenges) influenced by both their pre-Soviet and Soviet pasts (e.g.,

Allworth, 1967, 1973; Banuazizi & Weiner, 1994; Cummings, 2002, 2010, 2012; Fierman, 1991;

Gleason, 1997; Kangas, 2004; Rywkin, 1990), that have not been overcome. There have been important political and socio-economic similarities among the Central Asia states during all the years of post-Soviet development (Akyildiz & Carlson, 2014). These striking similarities between Kyrgyzstan and the other post-Soviet Central Asian states make it possible to argue that

Kyrgyz electors’ voting behavior is similar to that of other voters in the region.

8.1. Elections in the post-Soviet Central Asia: Commonalities and differences (1991 – 2016)

8.1.1. Common characteristics of the Central Asian elections

(1) The legacy of the Soviet past

The most significant common traits deriving from the pre-Soviet and pre-Russian historical period are cultural, defined mainly in terms of religion and language. A large majority

8 Dates of declarations of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991: Kyrgyzstan – August 31, Uzbekistan – September 1, Tajikistan – September 9, Turkmenistan – October 27, and Kazakhstan – December 16. 146

of the peoples in the five republics profess Sunni Islam. National languages used in four of the states are variations of the Turkic language family, and that used in Tajikistan is a variation of

Persian. (All the Central Asian states also use Russian as an official common lingua franca.) But the most direct legacies (as well as challenges) of the Soviet heritage are ethnic, political, institutional, and economic, all of which are in line with the central theme of this dissertation.

Indeed, all the current Central Asian states are creations of the Soviet “nationality policy” implemented in the region between 1924 and 1936. That policy determined not only their current frontiers, but also their names, their reinvented pasts, and even their current ethnic identities and language (Haugen, 2003; Roy, 2000). As a consequence, not one of these states existed as a sovereign entity in modern history, and when they gained independence from the Soviet Union, they had to rely on the political and administrative institutions and governing experience inherited from the old regime, thus leaving the Soviet-style power patterns and structures unchanged.

All the first presidents of the five Central Asian states (Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan,

Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Rahmon Nabiyev of

Tajikistan, and Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan) were members of the Soviet elite who ascended to power in their republics at various time during Gorbachev’s perestroika. Except for

Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan, all of them were also first secretaries of the Communist Parties in their republics on the eve of the USSR’s breakup. When their republics gained unexpected independence from the Soviet Union without having to fight for it, the Central Asian presidents lacked the political legitimacy gained from leading a struggle for national independence (Olcott,

2005). As a result, all of them had their presidential positions confirmed through organized popular elections in the fall of 1991. When their first terms in office approached their ends in the

147

middle of the 1990s, presidents in every country except Kyrgyzstan used the instrument of referendum to extend their stays in power for another term, all four planning to use that power to organize staged presidential elections to retain power continuously when further terms approached. Two of these presidents – Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan – remain up in power to date, both still the first and only presidents of the biggest and most influential states of post-Soviet Central Asia.

In the aftermath of the failed August, 1991 coup d’état, the Central Asian presidents dissolved the Communist Parties in their republics. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, they were transformed into presidential parties, by changing their names to “Democratic Party” in

Turkmenistan and “People’s Democratic Party” in Uzbekistan, and retaining the dominant position in the executive and legislative branches of government, similar to the single-party dominated system that the Communist Party had previously enjoyed (Gleason, 2003). For instance, within months after its establishment, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan had

52,000 members, 48,000 of whom were former Communist Party members (Gleason, 2003). In

Tajikistan, although the Communist Party was suspended after the failure of the coup in Moscow in August 1991, it was able to retain its property during its suspension, and it also changed the adjective in its name from “Communist” to “Socialist.” In December, 1991, the party reassumed its original name and began a vigorous campaign to recapture its earlier monopoly of power.

After the Tajik civil war in 1992-1993, the Communist Party remained the country’s largest party, although its membership was far smaller than it had been in the late Soviet era. It is also rather remarkable that communists, who had taken 60 seats of 181 seats in Tajik parliament in elections of 1995, gave President of Tajikistan Rahmonov solid support (Gleason, 2003). In

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Communist Parties, declared illegal in September 1991, re-

148

registered with permission in 1993 but never acquired the influence they had prior. Despite these reappearances of outlawed parties in all Central Asian countries, while their post-Soviet leadership officially denied communists access to the political and public administration positions, the Soviet Communist Party cadres re-established themselves as “national leaders who now changed their political lexicon from Marxism-Leninism to national independence, democracy, and market reforms” (Beachain, 2011, p. 207).

As a result, elections were inaugurated in all the post-Soviet Central Asian states in fall

1991 to legitimize and confirm the president’s offices in the new political situation. For the first and last time since independence, elections in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were freer than elsewhere in the region: opposition candidates in both republics gained unprecedentedly high shares of votes against the incumbent presidents, with 30% and 12% of votes respectively (Roy,

2000). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan presidents, running unopposed, registered

Soviet-style figures of near 90% (Roy, 2000). When their second terms approached, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan each gave up the earlier experiments with elections and opted for the safer instrument of managed referendum to extend their stays in power. In the referendum of January, 1994, the president of Turkmenistan extended his tenure for six years by a 99.99% of vote with 100% turnout (Nohlen, et al., 2001, p. 478). His counterparts in neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan quickly adopted this kind of initiative, which held similar referendums in March and April of 1995, prolonging their terms until 2002 and 2000 with 99.6% and 95.5% of “yes” votes (Nohlen, et. al., 2001, pp. 419, 492).

Afterwards, Central Asian presidents all simply ignored the constitutional limitations on the number of presidential terms of office. The first president of Turkmenistan, Niyazov, ruled until the end of 2006 when he unexpectedly passed away and was replaced by the current

149

president, Gurbanugly Berdymuhammedov. The two biggest and most populous states,

Kasakhstan and Uzbekistan, have the longest-serving presidents: each was elected in 1991 and continues to hold office through the most recent elections in spring 2015. President Rakhmon of

Tajikistan was first elected in 1995, and after two terms, changed the constitution to give himself

14 years in office (Golosov, 2011). Only Kyrgyzstan remains an exceptional case: when its fourth president’s term expires in 2017, the country will elect another president.

(2) Establishment of electoral authoritarianisms

Back in the 1990s, the conditions were ripe for consolidating authoritarian-presidential systems. Parliamentary elections also became instruments designed to strengthen the existing regime rather than to express genuine popular will. In all the Central Asian states, the first parliamentary elections held in 1994 and 1995 were marred by large scale falsifications, setting up foundations for all the future rigged elections in Central Asia. And in this sense, they can be called “foundational” for establishing authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet Central Asia, in contrast to similar elections in democratizing countries where elections serve as foundations for a democratic consolidation. For example, in the first post-independence parliamentary elections in

Kazakhstan in March, 1994, candidates supporting President Nazarbayev won an overwhelming majority of the parliament’s 177 seats, including 64 candidates nominated by the president for 42 reserved seats in parliament (CSCE, 1994). An observer delegation from the Commission

(currently – Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) concluded that the election did not meet international standards and could not be considered free and fair. The delegation noted such violations as the arbitrary exclusion of many independent candidates during the registration process; the state list of candidates, which allowed the president to influence the election of legislators; the brevity of the campaign; the pressures exerted on the

150

local media; and rampant multiple voting on election day (CSCE, 1994). The Constitutional

Court invalidated the results of the 1994 elections; however, the second parliamentary elections were conducted in essentially the same manner as previous elections a year later, even though opposition parties gained 22 of 67 seats in the lower house (Majlis), and another 14 seats went to independent candidates (Curtis, 2003). Observers questioned the integrity and fairness of the elections that became a major step in the direction of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan (CSCE,

1994).

In the first parliamentary elections in Tajikistan in February, 1995, opposition parties were not allowed to put candidates forward; as a consequence, the elected deputies were predominately from the former Communist Party, the military, and state apparatus (Glenn,

1999). In the first parliamentary election in Uzbekistan, of December 1994, out of the 250 seats,

144 seats were filled by candidates nominated by the presidential People’s Democratic Party, which had been previously established from the remnants of the dissolved Communist Party in

1991 (Glenn, 1999). In all the presidential elections, the registered alternative candidates openly vied to support the incumbent, the president Islam Karimov.

Turkmenistan, however, has never experienced even a semblance of free and fair parliamentary elections. In 1994, the majority of the seats in the lower house (Mezhlis) were uncontested so that all but one deputy were mostly from the former Communist Party, renamed the Democratic Party in 1991 (Glenn, 1999). The second chamber (Khalk Maslakhaty) consists of 100 presidentially appointed deputies. Until other parties were legalized in 2012,

Turkmenistan had been a single-party state, with only one (the presidential Democratic Party) legally allowed to contest elections.

151

(3) High turnout rates in the elections

All the Central Asian elections register extraordinarily high turnout rates, as shown in the numbers of the Table 21.

Table 21: Turnout of presidential and parliamentary elections and referenda in Central Asia states (in per cent), 1991-2016: Presidential Election Parliamentary Election Referendums Kazakhstan 1991: 88% 1991: 84% 1991 (March): 88% 1999: 87% 1994: 73% 1995 (Apr): 91% 2005: 76% 1995: 79% 1995 (Aug): 90% 2011: 89% 1999: 62% 2004: 56% 2007: 65% Kyrgyzstan 1991: 89% 1990: 89% 1991 (March): 92% 1995: 86% 1995: 76% 1994 (Jan): 96% 2000: 78% 2000: 64% 1994 (Oct): 86% 2005: 74% 2005: 75% 1996: 96% 2009: 79% 2007: 71% 1998: 96% 2011: 61% 2010: 55% 2007: 81% 2015: 57% 2010: 69% Tajikistan 1991: 84% 1990: 91% 1991 (March): 94% 1994: 95% 1995: 84% 1994: 95% 1999: 98% 2000: 93% 1999: 91% 2006: 90% 2005: 92% 2003: 96% 2013: 86% 2010: 90% 2015: 87% Turkmenistan 1990: 96% 1990: 96% 1991 (March): 97% 1992: 99% 1994: 99% 1991 (Oct): 97% 2007: 95% 1999: 99% 1994: 99.9% 2012: 96% 2004: 76% 2008: 93% 2013: 91% Uzbekistan 1991: 94% 1990: 93% 1991 (March): 95% 2000: 95% 1994: 93% 1991 (Dec): 94% 2007: 90% 1999: 95% 1995: 99% 2015: 91% 2004: 85% 2002: 94% 2009: 87% 2014: 88% Sources: Nohlen, et. al. (2001), Beacháin, (2011), IFES (2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e).

152

This provides convincing suggestions about the manipulative character of these elections.

As calculations from the table demonstrate for the elections from 1990 to 1999, average voter turnout in Kazakhstan was about 79%, with 85% in Kyrgyzstan, 92% in Tajikistan and

Turkmenistan, and about 94% in Uzbekistan, with cross-regional average at 88%. This is higher than the average turnout in twenty democracies in the decade, which was almost 78% (Franklin,

2004). In the following decade, 2000-2009, the average for the same twenty democracies declined to 73.9% (Franklin, 2004), while in Central Asia it also declined, but only to 80.7%.

Adding a note to the discussion about the role of country’s overall well-being in the population’s voting turnout (please refer to Chapter 2), the numbers from Central Asian countries are inconsistent with the findings of scholars (e.g., Blais, 2006) who argue that participation rates in poor countries are significantly lower than in established democracies.

The high turnout rates can be partially explained by government-led mobilization of the voting population. In all the countries of the region, the Central Election Commission is controlled by the presidential administrations and used as an administrative tool for electoral manipulation. For instance, executive power in Uzbekistan unduly interferes with the election process, particularly through local branches, and heads of the local governments at regional, district, and city levels execute determinative influence on the electoral process, from nomination of candidates to the conduct of elections (Gleason, 2003). The same is true for the other states of the region, except the case of Kyrgyzstan after 2010 when a successful popular uprising ousted authoritarian government of President Bakyiev and established a more open and democratic political order.

153

8.1.2. Electoral differences among the Central Asian states

Central Asian regimes are clearly divided between Levinsky and Way’s (2002, pp. 51-

56) definitions of “competitive authoritarianisms” (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan). In these countries, elections are held with participation of oppositions even though pro-presidential candidates and parties winning is guaranteed, and “façade electoral regimes” (Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan) where officially-registered opposition parties and electoral politics serves only as a sham for the dictatorship.

In Kyrgyzstan, opposition parties and candidates have always participated in all national and local elections and have gained seats in parliament as explained in detail in Chapter5. The same applies to Kazakhstan, though with some limitations. For instance, in the December, 1995 parliamentary elections, despite efforts of the pro-presidential People’s Unity Party to minimize competition and opposition activity, the top three opposition parties were able to gain 22 of 67 seats in the lower house (Majlis), and another 14 seats went to independent candidates (Curtis,

2003). In the next parliamentary elections in 2000, the only opposition party to pass the 4% threshold was the Communist Party, which received 17.6% of the vote and two mandates

(Furman, 2005). In 2004, the only opposition group allowed to take part in the elections, Ak-

Zhol, received 12% of the vote, which translated into a single seat (Golosov, 2011).

After the end of Tajikistan’s civil war in 1997, the opposition, which included secular groups but was dominated by the Islamic Renaissance Party, had 30% of the positions in government (Nohlen, et al., 2001). In the 2000 parliamentary elections of Tajikistan, the first since the end of the civil war, the opposition Communist Party won seven seats, the Islamic

Revival Party won two seats, and independent candidates won in eight constituencies, though two were declared invalid, requiring a new vote (Gleason, 2003). But it should be pointed out

154

that the share of the opposition in the government of Tajikistan has dramatically decreased since

1997, and that in the March, 2015 parliamentary elections, opposition parties gained no seats at all (OSCE, 2015).

These differences among the Central Asian nations can be exemplified the following

Parliament Election Index developed by Fish (2009), Table 22:

Table 22: E-Parliament Election Index for the post-Soviet Central Asian countries: Central Asian states: KZ KG TJ TK UZ Year of the election: 2007 2007 2005 2007 2004 A. Freedom of Candidate Participation 1 3 2 0 1 B. Fairness of Voter Registration, Voting 1 1 1 0 1 Procedures and Vote Count: C. Freedom of Expression in Electoral 2 2 2 0 0 Campaign: EEI SCORE: 4 6 5 0 2 Abbreviations and notes: KZ = Kazakhstan, KG = Kyrgyzstan, TJ = Tajikistan, TM = Turkmenistan, UZ = Uzbekistan. Scores for the items A, B, and C are ranged from 0 (least open) to 4 (most open). The EEI score is “the e-Parliament Elections Index” -- an overall summary score ranging from 0 to 12, meaning that a countries’ parliamentary elections may fall into one of the following categories: 0-5 = closed or no electoral process; 6-8 = restrictive electoral process; 9-10 = mostly open electoral process; 11-12 = open electoral process. Source: Fish (2009). More evidence demonstrating some variations in the role of the competition and participation of the opposition in the elections in the Central Asia’s states can be inferred from the results of the presidential elections. While opposition candidates in all of Central Asia’s states have been losing these elections, what is remarkable is that in the “competitive authoritarianisms” (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan), opposition candidates were able to show much higher (sometimes in the double digits) figures overall than in “façade electoral regimes” (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).

In contrast to the cases of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, electoral campaigns in

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, like their Soviet predecessors, are conducted under strict governmental (presidential) control. As succinctly described by Beacháin (2011, p. 210):

155

In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, candidates are not allowed to organize meetings with

voters by themselves but instead are invited to participate in the discussions organized by

the District Election Commission. At such controlled gatherings, candidates speak to

small groups of voters, a format that forbids debate between candidates in favor of

establishing a dialogue with the voters. However, the candidates as a rule say little or

nothing about their policies or those of their parties but merely provide the audience with

details of their talents and professional background… The authorities provide meager

funds for each party or candidate to conduct their campaign and the parties are often

prohibited by law from obtaining alternative campaign funds. This produces a very

modest election campaign and further skews resources in favor of the ruling regime.

Currently, only four parties exist in Uzbekistan, all supporting the state’s president

(Golosov, 2011) and none representing a real opposition. In order to give an image of a “party politics,” they are provided with seats in the parliament. For example, in the elections in 2009, 53 out of 135 seats went to the Liberal Democratic Party, 32 to the National Democratic Party, 31 to the Democratic Party and 19 to the Social Democratic Party (Golosov, 2011).

Based on this detailed discussion about differences among the Central Asian states in the case of elections, it is plausible to refer to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, using Levinsky and Way’s definitions (2002, pp.51-56, as quoted in Beacháin, 2011, pp.204-205), as “competitive authoritarianisms” (where meaningful competition is permitted despite abuse of administrative resources to guarantee pro-presidential candidate’s success), while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan more closely resemble “façade electoral regimes” where electoral politics are a sham disguising outright dictatorships. This differentiation makes the case of Kyrgyzstan more applicable to

156

Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, where voters are provided some choice, rather than to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where elections resemble those of the Soviet times with no choice at all.

Table 23: Presidential Elections in post-Soviet Central Asia, 1991-2016

Number of Incumbent Opposition vote Opposition vote candidates vote in per cent (top runner) in per (combined) in per cent cent Kazakhstan 1991: 2 1991: 98.8 1991: 0.1 1991: 0.01 1999: 4 1999: 81.0 1999: 11.9 1999: 17.4 2005: 5 2005: 91.15 2005: 6.61 2005: 8.84 2011: 4 2011: 95.55 2011: 1.94 2011: 4.45 2015: 3 2015: 97.75 2015: 1.61 2015: 2.25 Kyrgyzstan 1991: 1 1991: 95.4 1991: 0 1991: 0 1995: 3 1995: 72.4 1995: 24.7 1995: 26.4 2000: 6 2000: 76.4 2000: 14.2 2000: 26.9 2005: 6 2005: 88.9 2005: 3.8 2005: 9.4 2009: 6 2009: 76.12 2009: 8.41 2009: 19.22 2011: 15 2011: 63.24 2011: 14.77 2011: 36.25 Tajikistan 1991: 6 1991: 56.9 1991: 30.1 1991: 30.1 1994: 2 1994: 59.5 1994: 34.7 1994: 34.7 1999: 2 1999: 97.6 199: 2.1. 1999: 2.1. 2006: 5 2006: 79.3 2006: 6.2 2006: 19.4 2013: 6 2013: 83.92 2013: 5.04 2013: 16.08 Turkmenistan 1990: 1 1990: 98.3 1990: 0 1992: 0 1992: 1 1992: 99.5 1992: 0 1992:0 2007: 6 2007: 89.23 2007: 3.23 2007: 10.84 2012: 8 2012: 97.14 2012: 1.07 2012: 2.86 Uzbekistan 1991: 2 1991: 87.1 1991: 12.5 1991: 12.5 2000: 2 2000: 95.7 2000: 4.3 2000: 4.3 2007: 4 2007: 90.76 2007: 3.27 2007: 9.24 2015: 4 2015: 90.39 2015: 3.08 2015: 8.05 Sources: Nohlen, et al. (2001), Beacháin (2011), IFES (2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e)

157

8.2. Social structure of the Central Asian societies

Central Asian societies have similar social structures, which can also be attributed to the consequences of the Soviet legacy. Here, despite impressive beneficial achievements of the

Soviet modernization policies such as mass literacy and education, industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and gender equality (Akyildiz & Carlson, 2014), the region remained the least-economically developed part of the Soviet Union (e.g., Fierman, 1991;

Stinger, 2003). Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, economic crises hit all the countries of the region and living standards fell below poverty lines, especially during the initial years of transition to a market economy. For example, from 1990 to 1995, the GDP fell by 55% in Kazakhstan, 49% in Kyrgyzstan, and 18% in Uzbekistan, and agricultural production decreased by 45% in Kazakhstan, 38% in Kyrgyzstan, and 16% in Uzbekistan (Rumer and

Zhukov, 1998).

After two decades of economic changes, the landlocked region remains on the periphery of the global economy. Poverty levels vary significantly among these countries, the opposite poles being the poorest, Tajikistan, (which experienced a devastating civil war in 1992-1997) and the fastest growing economy of Kazakhstan, which has registered a double-digit growth rate since 2001 (Cummings, 2012).

These economic upheavals brought significant changes in the social structure of Central

Asian societies. During the first decade of the post-Soviet economic transformation, living standards in Central Asia deteriorated sharply and poverty increased. Kyrgyzstan, for example, experienced a rise in the poverty headcount to 64% in 1998; the headcount subsequently dropped to 37% in 2011 (UNDP, 2014). In Tajikistan, according to the Living Standards Survey of 2007, the percentage of families without income adequate to satisfy basic needs fell to 53.5% (Amir

158

and Berry, 2013). The other countries have seen a similar poverty trends, although it was not in all cases so pronounced as in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In oil-rich Kazakhstan, poverty levels reached to almost 40% of the population during the 1998 crisis (Pomfret, 2006); however, the subsequent economic growth in the country decreased the level of poverty to less than 7% of the population living below the poverty line in 2011 (UNDP, 2014). According to a survey conducted in 2004 in Uzbekistan, 7.4% of respondents identified themselves as poor, 53.9% below middle income, 33.1% on the middle-income range, and 1.4% as wealthy (Ubaydullaeva,

2004, as cited in Rakhmatullaev, 2015). Data on household income level in Turkmenistan has not been available.

Taking into account the similar structure of the societies in the region, it is possible to suggest that individual social and economic variables influencing voting turnout will be similar to those in Kyrgyzstan. There, as the findings of this research have demonstrated, individual voting turnout is influenced positively by such objective sociodemographic factors such as age, education, rural residence, employment, attitudes towards democracy, and political affiliation.

For instance, in case of Kazakhstan, the “southern capital” Almaty traditionally shows sharply lowest turnout rates than average in the country during parliamentary elections. According to the figures presented by an official of a district election commission, it was about 25% in the 2007,

41% in 2012, and only 34% in the most recent March, 2016 elections (Tengrinews, 2016, 23

March), while nationwide turnout average rate has been 81% in the last nine national level elections from 1999 to 2016 (IFES, 2016a).

8.3. Subjective motivations of the Central Asian voters

On the subjective level, most Kyrgyzstanis consider the “right to choose” to be the most important reason for voting. Voters enjoy having choice and opportunities provided by the

159

elections even in the political conditions of the “hybrid” regime. Available data suggest that in the other countries of Central Asia people also vote for the same reasons as the Kyrgyz.

For instance, in the case of Kazakhstan, the voters have little trust in elections, as elsewhere in the Central Asian region. In a survey conducted in 2015, only 22% said that elections were not democratic and fair, and 56% said they are not. Nevertheless, 60% reported that they would cast ballots for the forthcoming presidential elections (DEMOSCOPE, 2015).

The actual turnout was 96% (IFES, 2016a). Further, the evidence presented in this dissertation reveals that it is not only due to social desirability, but also due to a genuine belief in elections.

For instance, despite mistrust in government and elections, 71% of the Kazakhstan respondents supported the idea of local administration elections in 2013, even though many respondents remained pessimistic about capacity of the elected heads of local administrations to solve the local problems (DEMOSCOPE, 2015).

In the case of Tajikistan, according to the national poll conducted in 2014, a total of 73% believed that voting at elections makes it possible for ordinary citizens to have an influence on the decisions made in the country (Olimova & Olimov, 2014), which is an increase from 64% in

1996 (Wagner, 1996). Only 6.4% of respondents stated they were categorically against elections, believing that they did not correspond to local traditions and cannot be realistically implemented in Tajikistan (Olimova & Olimov, 2014). At the same time, despite the largely positive attitude of Tajikistan residents to elections, the level of expectations about the fairness of the real electoral process is not very high. Only 25% of the polled believed that elections in the country were fair. Despite the existing doubts, most respondents believed that voting was their civic duty

(Olimova & Olimov, 2014).

160

According to the recent survey designed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development in collaboration with the World Bank and administered by the global market research firm Synovate from August to October, 2006 in the four states of Central Asia, excluding Turkmenistan (Nikolayenko, 2010), there is overall strong support for elections in the region. The survey indicates that the proportion of those Central Asian respondents who consider free and fair elections as important for their home country ranges from 85% in Uzbekistan to

92% in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan (Nikolayenko, 2010).

8.4. Political regime(s)

After gaining independence from the Soviet Union, none of the Central Asian states had developed political institutions necessary to support a democratic transition (Olcott, 2005).

Rather, they became “hybrid” authoritarian regimes based on nominally-recognized separation of powers, legalized political parties, and civil society organizations. They also formally held regular and open electoral processes, declared protection for freedom of speech and other basic human rights, and developed other institutions of a modern-looking state (Cummings, 2012). In practice, all the Central Asian presidents successfully built presidential authoritarian political systems that dominated enfeebled legislatures and judiciaries. Maintaining tight control over opposition parties, mass media, and civil society, power was still based upon clan and regional groupings, repressive power structures, and extraction of public resources in the interest of the ruling presidents and their cronies (Collins, 2006; Cummings, 2012; Gleason, 2003). Only

Kyrgyzstan, after two decades of post-Soviet development, by 2011, established a more open and multi-party political system after two popular uprisings of 2005 and 2010, though the country still struggles to develop a genuinely democratic and effective political and administrative system.

161

Civil and political freedoms have been worsening continuously throughout the region since the first years of independence. Major international human rights organizations, such as

Human Rights Watch and Freedom House, have documented various human rights abuses by

Central Asian governments since 1991, and they rank the most countries of the region at or near bottom of their ratings for political and civil liberties among the countries of the Eurasian region

(Freedom House, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2016).

Since the beginning of their independence, all the Central Asian countries have been ranked among the most corrupt nations of the world (Cummings 2012). Illegal activities penetrate all the areas of public affairs including not only state-business relations, but also such important areas of the government services as law enforcement, education, health care, the military, and other public sector areas (Engvall, 2011). These negative trends increased the security and internal weaknesses of these states, making them prone to internal conflicts and instability (Peimani 2009).

It is not an accident, therefore, that in all the post-Soviet Central Asian states, people view their governments with great lack of confidence, much lower than in the democratic states.

For example, as reported by the 2005 Asia Barometer survey, only 19.5% of the respondents in

Kazakhstan, 17.8% in Tajikistan, 11.3% in Kyrgyzstan, and only 9% in Uzbekistan answered that they had absolute trust in government. The share of those who trust in their governments only “to a degree” was 51.9% in Tajikistan, 47.6% in Kazakhstan, 43.9% in Uzbekistan, and

38.4% in Kyrgyzstan (Dadabaev, 2006). In another cross-regional survey, in overall, a great number of respondents in each country—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—considered their current governments as inadequate relative to the former Soviet state. In particular, 45.8%

162

of Kazakhs, 50.6% of Kyrgyz, and 57% of Uzbeks disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the current state responds to the people’s needs (McMann, 2007).

At the same time, as mentioned above, most Central Asians still retain faith in elections.

The proportion of those Central Asian respondents who consider free and fair elections as important for their home country ranges from 85% in Uzbekistan to 92% in Kazakhstan, the

Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan (Nikolayenko, 2010). In addition, the public support for such democratic procedures as free and fair elections and freedom of expression is more than 20% higher than the overall support for democracy (Nikolayenko, 2010).

Based on these data it is possible to conclude that authoritarian rulers exploit the people’s genuine willingness to vote in the interests of continuation of the existing system. Elections in the region in general “are seen not as a plebiscite on public policy choice but as an opportunity to demonstrate patriotism,” as convincingly argued by Gleason (2003) in the case of elections in

Uzbekistan. This suggestion is echoed by Matveeva (2010, p. 28), who states that, in Central

Asia:

Rather than being a means of political choice, elections are expression of loyalty and

perform the function of regularly held rituals where citizens are reminded of the existence

of the central state and of mutual obligations between the state and the citizens.

In addition to legitimizing and socializing functions of the elections, another important function of the post-independence elections in the region warrants mentioning. As Beacháin &

Kevlihan (2014) argue, elections became important instruments of the nation- and state-building process in the hands of the ruling elites of Central Asia in a number of ways. One of the visible consequences of this process became ethnic homogenization of the Central Asian parliaments. If in the Soviet Union, Soviets represented the ethnic composition of each republic, then after

163

independence the “national” ethnic groups became over-represented in the parliaments as well as in all other state offices. In the first parliamentary elections since the independence in

Kazakhstan, 105 of the 176 members of the parliament were ethnic Kazakhs, 49 were Russians,

10 Ukrainians, and a small proportion of deputies represented other minorities (Glenn, 1999,

Roy, 2000). In Uzbekistan, 86% of the members of the national parliament elected in December,

1994 were ethnic Uzbeks (compared with 77% in 1990), which was higher than the percentage of Uzbeks in the population as whole (75%) (Roy, 2000). The trend remains stable as of 2016.

8.5. Conclusions

The findings of this dissertation also suggest important implications for the study of prospects of democratization in the other “hybrid” regimes in the Central Asia region and beyond. As it was shown in the case of Kyrgyzstan, regular elections provide opportunities not only for the government and its opposition, but also for ordinary voters who view elections not only as a fulfillment of their civic duty, but also as a meaningful contribution to the country’s well-being. Elections also play important role in the political socialization and learning process, which has longer-term implications for the regime: should the government ever arrive at a breaking point, voters will be there to support the change and legitimize a new political order, as happened in the Soviet Union during Gorbachev’s perestroika and in Kyrgyzstan since independence and onwards.

In order to understand longer-term implications of elections in Central Asia, it is important to understand the differences among these regimes. By the end of the second decade of post-Soviet development in 2010, it was possible to differentiate between “soft” (Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan) and “hard” (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) authoritarian regimes in the region (Schatz, 2006, 2009; Matveeva, 2010). These variations were displayed in degrees of

164

power-sharing and ruthlessness of the authoritarian rulers (Cummings, 2012). As further explained by Cummings (2012, pp.63-64):

These shades of authoritarianism, functions of institutions, personalities, foreign actors

and civil societies, have been described in a variety of ways, with

‘semi-authoritarianism’, ‘competitive authoritarianism,’ ‘liberalized autocracy,’

‘delegative democracy,’ ‘managed democracy,’ ‘defective democracy’ and ‘electoral

authoritarianism’ all attempting to capture the Central Asian experience.

It must be noted that dramatic political changes that took place in Kyrgyzstan after the April,

2010 popular uprising have moved this country from the range of the authoritarian regimes to a more open political system, even though not yet to a democratic one, as discussed in detail below.

Taking all these considerations into account, the author of this dissertation emphasizes the following three political dimensions that are important in differentiating among the Central

Asian states: (1) the treatment of opposition; (2) the status of human and civil rights; and (3) tolerance for religious, ethnic, and territorial differences. Based on these variables, it is possible to delineate between Kazakhstan and Tajikistan (on one side) where regimes permit limited free expression and other rights, including opposition activities, and are more inclusive to minorities and more open to the world; and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (on the other side) where governments use extremely oppressive ways of dealing with any kind of dissent against the established order, are less inclusive, and overall are less transparent to the world. Kyrgyzstan is considered as a third, separate case altogether.

Opposition political groups and parties in both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are permitted to function, as are independent mass media and civil society organizations, so long as they do not

165

directly challenge the government and its policies, even though the countries’ presidents have concentrated all the power in their own hands. For instance, despite efforts of the pro-presidential

People’s Unity Party to minimize competition and opposition activity in the December, 1995 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, the main three opposition parties were able to gain 22 of

67 seats in the lower house (Majlis), and another 14 seats went to independent candidates

(Curtis, 2003). By 2005, civil society institutions had penetrated quite deeply into the society; a vocal opposition, both inside and outside of the ruling elite, existed to challenge the power of president Nazarbayev. Unlike Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov and Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat

Niyazov, Nazarbayev did not create a cult of his own personality, which had been done by most premiers in Moscow during the Soviet era (Cummings, 2005; Olcott, 2005).

In Tajikistan, which experienced a tragic civil war between government loyalists and a coalition of Islamic, democratic, regional, and ethnic opposition factions from 1992 to 1997

(Heathershow, 2009), President Rakhmon did not spend the first half of the 1990s consolidating his political power nor his family’s control of the economy as all of his counterparts had done

(Olcott, 2005). After the end of the civil war, President Rakhmon emerged as a leader of the victorious region, successfully in coopting and controlling the leading opposition party – Islamic

Resurgence Party – as a part of power-sharing and national reconciliation measures. In the 2000 elections, the first parliamentary elections since the end of the civil war, the opposition

Communist Party won seven seats, the Islamic Revival Party won two seats, and independent candidates won in eight constituencies, though two were declared invalid and required a new vote (Gleason, 2003). Even though President Rakhmon was able to consolidate and strengthen his power following the general pattern in the region by 2000, his power was never as absolute or

166

strong in regionalized Tajikistan as it was in the cases of the Turkmen, Uzbek, and the Kazakh presidents.

Both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have a significant number ethnic minorities, mainly

Russians in Kazakhstan (20% of the total population) and Uzbeks in Tajikistan (15.3% of the total population) (CIA, 2016). In addition, Tajikistan is de facto a federal state, with the geographic region where most Ismailis live enjoying a substantial autonomy (in the southern part of the country). These ethnic and cultural differences preclude national leadership from conducting strong unifying policies, which are characteristics of strong authoritarian regimes.

Even in Tajikistan, despite the fact that political values of the Tajiks remain fragmented and inconsistent (many respondents thought that both a parliamentary system and the rule of a strong leader were best suited to Tajikistan), according to the recent public poll (Olimova and

Olimov, 2014), the most acceptable political system for the Tajik respondents was still the parliamentary form of rule with general, honest, and transparent elections. Almost 42% of respondents believed this system was good, 35.7% thought it was probably good, and only

16.6% thought that it was unsuitable or not very suitable for the country (Olimova and Olimov,

2014).

By contrast to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, the repressive political systems of

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan represent examples of “sultanistic regimes,” using the term and concept developed by Linz and Stepan (1996). There, individuals, groups, and institutions are permanently subject to the unpredictable and despotic intervention of the ruler (“sultan”), whose rules based on his personal whim rather than on established set of laws and stable rules. Even though some observers distinguish between Uzbekistan as a “softer” authoritarian regime and

Turkmenistan as a totalitarian system much like the Soviet Union under Stalin (e.g., Olcott,

167

2005), the author of the dissertation considers both countries fairly equivalent due to reasons explained below.

In both states, opposition parties that emerged during Gorbachev’s perestroika and were active in the first years of independence were banned and their leaders were persecuted or went into exile. The remaining political parties became inherent parts and supporters of the ruling political system (in Uzbekistan) or were banned except for the presidential party (in

Turkmenistan).

Independent and autonomous civil society non-government organizations do not exist, and the few that are permitted are financially supported by international donor organizations and are tightly monitored and controlled by the government. Government-society relationships are very paternalistic, and economic activities are managed based on a top-down principle, with little respect to property rights and total disregard for the development of free entrepreneurship as a basis of a self-reliant middle class. Also, although president Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan provides at least an impression of the democratic procedures like holding formal elections to stay in office, the first president of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, has banned all elections and been named president for life in order to establish a repressive regime. Even though after the unexpected death of Niyazov in 2006 elections and political parties were restored, the second president of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who was elected for a five-year term in 2007 (and re-elected in 2012 for another term), continues to rule the country in the same oppressive manner.

Both regimes implement harsh discriminatory policies towards the largest ethnic minorities (Russians and Uzbeks in Turkmenistan, Russians in Uzbekistan). Thus, these policies

168

are worse than in any other part of the region (Olcott, 2005), and both regimes keep religious freedoms and activities under strict government control.

Despite these challenges, however, as the findings of the recent cross-regional survey demonstrated, the majority of respondents in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and

Uzbekistan favor democracy as an ideal form of government (Nikolayenko, 2010). The proportion of those respondents who regard democracy as the preferred political regime ranges from 50.3% in Kazakhstan to 68.4% in Uzbekistan. Furthermore, the results reveal that citizens in the four Central Asian states tend to support such specific political procedures as free and fair elections and freedom of expression more strongly than democracy in the abstract (Nikolayenko,

2010).

In conclusion, the findings of this dissertation contribute to an understanding of voters’ behavior not only in in Kyrgyzstan, but also in the countries on the Central Asia region by suggesting important implications for the study of prospects of democratization in the other

“hybrid” regimes in the Central Asian region and elsewhere. Regular elections provide opportunities not only for the government and the opposition, but also for ordinary voters who continue to keep faith in elections and view elections not only as a fulfillment of their civic duty, but also as a meaningful contribution to the country’s well-being. Elections also play an important role in the political socialization and learning process for the Central Asian voters.

Elections also have longer-term implications for a regime: should the government ever arrive at a breaking point, voters will be there to support the change and legitimize a new political order, as happened in the Soviet Union during Gorbachev’s perestroika and in Kyrgyzstan from independence onward.

169

IX: Chapter 9: Summary, contributions, and suggestions for future research

9.1. Summary of the research

The theoretical base of this dissertation research has been grounded in the works of political scientists who have been engaged in the study of two broad but interrelated themes in current elections studies. The first theme concerns the concept of “electoral authoritarianism” that sheds light on the role of elections in “hybrid” and authoritarian regimes. As Golosov (2011) neatly summarized:

The problem with electoral authoritarianism is that it is quite a complex political

construct. The roots of this complexity lie in the very idea that you have to hold elections

with a semblance of democracy while making sure the political result is predetermined

and the opposition cannot use the election campaign to widen its influence.

The second theme refers to various theories of voting turnout determinants as developed in the works of Western, mostly American, political scientists (Chapter 1 examined both themes).

Based on the in-depth overview of the main concepts, studies and publications of the scholars of the field, and following the deductivist tradition of the scientific inquiry, when the researcher starts with an abstract, logical relationship among concepts then moves toward concrete empirical evidence (Neuman 1997). Following this well-established plan, this dissertation enquired why citizens of non-democratic, specifically “hybrid” states, keep voting, aside from fear and state mobilization in elections organized by a government in which they do

170

not have faith (as discussed in Chapter 2). Following rigorous large sample field survey methods and using “mixed” (combining quantitative and qualitative) techniques, the author collected and analyzed data from about 1,518 respondents (electors, including voters and non-voters) in

Kyrgyzstan in during September and October, 2011 (details are provided in Chapter 3).

The next chapters of the dissertation presented an overview and discussion of the historical background of the elections in Kyrgyzstan from the Soviet era to the present. Thus, the focus was on the longer-term consequences of elections under the Soviet Union (as explained in

Chapter 4), and about the role of elections, however rigged and unfair for the opposition, in dismantling the increasingly authoritarian regime of Kyrgyzstan’s first president Askar Akayev.

The next step is where Kyrgyzstan morphed into the most politically liberal state in Central Asia during and after the second president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was in office (in Chapter 5). The studies of voters in Kyrgyzstan, conducted by various reliable local and international survey organizations, also reveal that the Kyrgyz voters in general have positive attitudes towards elections despite their profound mistrust in the government and the quality of the elections.

Although previous elections studies in Kyrgyzstan occurred, they did not provide data about the internal motivations of the voters, and there was a lack of studies about the determinants and factors influencing the Kyrgyzstani voter’s turnout. This gap in electoral studies in Kyrgyzstan have been filled by this dissertation research, which analyzed the collected data among a large sample of the Kyrgyzstani voters in 2011. The research employed a mixed survey method to collect and analyze both quantitative and qualitative data.

Findings from quantitative analysis of the data (as examined in great detail in Chapter 6) were in accordance with empirical evidence presented in studies of voters in other countries of the world, regardless of the regime type. Age and marital status, education, income, electoral

171

efficacy, party identification, and interest in politics (as well as ethnicity and religion, in the model with imputed values) proved as important in Kyrgyzstan as in Europe and the U.S.A. It means that voters of a country with a “hybrid” regime are influenced by the same factors as voters in democratic societies.

However, the findings of the research about positive inner motivations and reasoning of the voters in Kyrgyzstan suggest that more attention should be paid to the role of inner motivations and rationalizations both in voters’ participation in non-fair elections as well as in understanding high turnout rates in elections of “hybrid” regimes like Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the qualitative analysis of the data (in Chapter 7) revealed that most of the respondents consider the

“right to choose” to be the most important reason for voting; other valued reasons included voting as an important act of “civic duty” and “contribution for the better future of the country.”

The voters of Kyrgyzstan enjoy having choice and opportunities to contribute to the country’s development through elections, even in the uncertain political conditions of the “hybrid” regime.

The findings were generalizable to the other post-Soviet Central Asian states, mostly to

Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and, to a lesser degree, to Turkmenistan (Chapter 8).

According to the available data, attitudes toward elections expressed by citizens of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are similar to those of the Kyrgyzstanis. For example, as reported by the 2005

Asia Barometer survey, few respondents reported absolute trust in government: 19.5% of the respondents in Kazakhstan, 17.8% in Tajikistan, 11.3% in Kyrgyzstan, and only 9% in

Uzbekistan. The share of those who trust in their governments only “to a degree” was 51.9% in

Tajikistan, 47.6% in Kazakhstan, 43.9% in Uzbekistan, and 38.4% in Kyrgyzstan (Dadabaev,

2006). At the same time, most Central Asians still retain faith in elections. The proportion of those Central Asian respondents who consider free and fair elections as important for their home

172

countries ranges from 85% in Uzbekistan to 92% in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and

Tajikistan (Nikolayenko, 2010). In addition, the public support for such democratic procedures as free and fair elections and freedom of expression is more than 20% higher than the overall support for democracy (Nikolayenko, 2010).

It is also important to note that these findings are comparable to the results presented in the similar studies of voters in other countries around the world, such as in India (Banerjee,

2014) and China (Chen & Zhong, 2002; He, 2007; Li, 2003; Shi, 1999a). Similar results appeared among American and European voters, particularly in the U.S.A. (Dennis, 1970),

France (Stoetzel, 1955), and Britain (Rose and Mossawir, 1967).

9.2. Contributions of the dissertation research

This dissertation did not aim to provide exhaustive and all-comprehensive study of the elections and electoral behavior of the Kyrgyzstani voters. Rather, it addressed and discussed research questions that sought – based on the two country-wide surveys in 2006 and 2011 – to add to better understanding of the voting behavior in this country. Open and fairly competitive elections have become an integral part of the new political order in Kyrgyzstan since 2010. But there is a lack of voter studies in Kyrgyzstan, and more studies are needed. In this regard, this dissertation research provides important “interim” data about Kyrgyzstani voters during the period between the elections of 2005 and 2015 that can be used for the time-series analysis and comparison with the future elections.

Second, as it was mentioned in Chapter 2, only recently have political scientists started paying special attention to qualitative factors such as the specific meanings that citizens attach to their voting decisions (Colton and McFaul, 2003) and the implications of these meanings for the electoral behavior and prospects of democracy in the countries-in-transition (Pammett 1999). In

173

this regard, this dissertation compliments these studies by bringing the case of Kyrgyzstan into the discussion and the findings of this dissertation contribute to better understanding of voters’ behavior in Kyrgyzstan.

Third, based on finding of the research, the author of the dissertation argues that a growing need exists to understand ordinary voters’ internal motivations. The notion that elections in authoritarian regimes are meaningless for ordinary voters is still widely circulated in the current scholarship on politics around the world. Israeli scholar Ezrahi (2015) amply illustrates such an argument, and his passage about differences between elections in democratic and authoritarian countries is well worth citing fully:

…[E]lections can be seen as a kind of ritual that produces and distributes legitimacy.

Election results ae usually regarded by the public as evidence of a public choice;

furthermore, the arithmetic character of vote counting tends to encourage claims of the

objectivity of elections. <…>. By contrast, attempts to use elections to produce trust in

authoritarian regimes tend to fail, because the public is aware that such elections are

neither free nor secret and because they usually occur in an atmosphere of fear. One

might ask, therefore, since elections provide a sort of illusion of public choice in both

democratic and authoritarian regimes, whether there is any difference, because – among

other reasons – when the illusion of public choice of the leadership is credible, it

introduces elements of a self-fulfilling fiction. In democracies, elections produce,

therefore, a measure of legitimation that election events and “decisive” majorities are

unlikely to produce in authoritarian states. Moreover, the ritual of elections in

democracies also supports rituals of government transparency and accountability. That is,

elections in democratic societies can create a measure of anxiety among politicians in

174

danger of not being elected and can give voters a sense of their power (which tends

nevertheless to exceed what warrantable). In a state like Russia, in contrast, rituals of

transparency and accountability are either absent or utterly meaningless. Government

officials are concerned more about the possibility of being demoted from above than

about not being re-elected by the people. In Russia, a long political tradition of autocracy

has meant that election events do not usually produce trust in the role of the people in

making or unmaking government… (pp. 19-20).

But as this dissertation work argues, elections in “hybrid” and authoritarian states are not only manipulated from the top, but also supported from the bottom, by the people who cast the ballots. In this regard, the dissertation contributes to the literature about elections in the authoritarian regimes.

Fourth, the findings of the research provide additional support for the criticisms of the rationality of voting, and sustain an argument put forward by Blais (2000) that moral obligations and civic duty, rather than perceived costs over benefits, play the more important role in voting decisions. In the empirical studies provided by Blais (2000), 84% of respondents (university students in Canada) approved with the statement that “it [voting] is the duty of every citizen to vote,” including 43% who indicated that they strongly agreed. In the representative samples of the electorate in the 1995 Quebec referendum and the 1996 British Columbia election in Canada

(Blais, 2000, p. 96), 83% and 72% strongly agreed with the statement that voting was the duty of every citizen.

Finally, the findings of the dissertation suggest important implications for the study of

“electoral authoritarianism.” In particular, it sheds some light on understanding the “longevity” of electoral authoritarianisms in which regimes gain legitimacy through regular elections, even

175

though staged and falsified. Regular elections in such regimes provide opportunities not only for the government and its opposition, but also for ordinary voters who view elections not only as a fulfillment of their civic duty, but also as a meaningful contribution to the country’s well-being.

In order to continue their undemocratic rule, authoritarian regimes parasitize upon the sincere motivations of the citizenry.

9.3. Suggestions for further research

9.3.1. Voting behavior in “hybrid” regimes of Central Asia and beyond

As explained above, more studies of elections in Kyrgyzstan (and in other Central Asian states) are needed. Kyrgyzstan is passing through an important stage in its post-Soviet political development. Since the time of the field work for this dissertation in 2011, Kyrgyzstan has experienced two nationwide local elections in 2012 and 2016 and one parliamentary election in

2015. The country now is looking forward to a forthcoming presidential election in 2017.

Despite these political changes, Kyrgyzstan still remains very much in a “hybrid” state. As

Chapter 8 discussed, it would be possible to classify Kyrgyzstan, with its large public freedoms, in the top tier among the other “hybrid” states of the Central Asia region. Seeing this, Kyrgyzstan should not be placed in the same category with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan as authoritarian regimes recognizing some political opposition and diversity of opinions in the middle tier. And neither can Kyrgyzstan be relegated to the same realm as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with their most repressive governments of the region, in the “bottom” classification.

In this regard, the study of the region’s experience in conducting elections and voters’ behavior in a non-democratic political environment could suggest important lessons for other hybrid and authoritarian regimes of the world, whether they be in post-Soviet Eurasia, East and

South Asia, in the Arab world, Africa, or Latin America. Certainly, the findings of this

176

dissertation about factors that encourage turnout among the voters in Kyrgyzstan are consistent across other countries of the world, whether democratic, hybrid, and autocratic, including Britain

(Rose & Mossawir, 1967), China (Chen & Zhong, 2002; He, 2007; Li, 2003; Shi, 1999a, 1999b),

France (Stoetzel, 1955), India (Ahuja & Chhibber, 2012), and Russia (Pammett & Debardeleben,

1996; Pammett, 1999). Further analysis of these surprising similarities present valuable opportunities for further contributions to the research agenda in the field of the comparative political science.

In this regard, one way to approach this question could be done by operationalizing the voters’ meaning of the elections and the role of the internal/subjective motivations in supporting inherently unfair electoral process of the “hybrid” regimes. As such, the newly re-emerging discipline of political ethnography seem to provide promising tools for studying politics (Aronoff

& Kubik, 2015), especially in “closed” and “hybrid” countries like in post-Soviet Central Asia

(Reeves, Rasanaygam, & Beyer, 2014), including elections in Kyrgyzstan (Ismailbekova, 2014).

The traditional political science emphasized by words of Aronoff & Kubik (2015, p. 23),

“materialist-institutional” conception of politics, as “the allocation of scarce resources in the face of conflict of interests” (March & Olsen, 1989, pp. 47-48). But as Aronoff & Kubik (2015, p.24) suggest, “[n]ot all politics can be reduced to competition over material resources; truly, much of it concerns over collective identity, including often deadly contests over the meaning of symbols signifying this identity.” This leads to the next research suggestion as discussed in the following section.

9.3.2. Methodology of the study of voters and elections in “hybrid” regimes

The initial goal of the research was a theory verification, not a theory generation, and, therefore, the dissertation commenced with a deductive approach. Nonetheless, the findings of

177

the qualitative part of the research eventually led to inductive reasoning, with possible discovery of “grounded theory” to use the renowned concept of Glaser and Strauss (1967). While the author of the dissertation does not claim that the dissertation generates a new theory for understanding voting behavior of the electors in “hybrid regimes,” it is viable to make a case that the work provides a solid foundation for developing, using the words of Glaser and Strauss

(1976), a good “middle range” theory that falls between the “minor working hypotheses” and the

“all-inclusive grand theory.”

This result has become possible due to the use of mixed research methods, including quantitative and qualitative approaches, which can provide more nuanced findings. As discussed in Chapter 2, according to scholars of quantitative, large sample surveys, using multiple-choice answers, can tell us how many people behaved in a certain way, but they may be limited at explaining why people think or act as they do (Wills, Jost, & Nilakanta, 2007). This dissertation’s findings provide support for such an argument. Actually, the use of large survey provided country-wide data and made it possible to make generalizations to all voting populations in Kyrgyzstan. Still, the determinants of voting turnout happened to be the same as in democratic countries and in this sense it did not explain unique attitudes of the voters behaving in the special conditions of “hybrid” political systems, like widespread mistrust to the government and elections. It was the qualitative part of the questionnaire that provided additional explanations for the high rates of the voting turnout, namely, about the meaning of voting behavior of the Kyrgyzstani electorate. As mentioned above, similar findings appeared in the qualitative studies of voters in Britain (Rose and Mossawir, 1967), China (Chen & Zhong, 2002;

He, 2007), France (Stoetzel, 1955), India (Ahuja & Chhibber, 2012), and Russia (Pammett &

Debardeleben, 1996; Pammett, 1999).

178

Seeing this, the author of this dissertation, based on the results of his own field work in

Kyrgyzstan and long-time personal observations of the political processes in the region, would support the need of more studies of political subjects with use of methods of a political ethnography. Scholars of that approach (Aronoff & Kubik, 2015) argue that “the researcher should ask whether the theory is consistent with evidence about the meanings the historical actors themselves attributed to their actions” (Hall, 2003, p. 394). Or, in words of Rasanayagam,

Beyer & Reeves (2014, p. 9), in their ethnographic study of politics in Central Asia, “we need… an approach that extends beyond a limited understanding of rationality as an instrumental calculation of costs and benefits” in order to be able “to explore how the scope for the political, the categories through which political action proceeds, the possibilities for how the political is constituted, are located within Central Asian lifeworlds.” In sum, these scholars argue for “a cultural account of the political” where “the culture concept opens out to alternative possibilities of actions and experience” according to Rasanayagam, Beyer, & Reeves (2014, p. 9).

9.3.3. Elections in “hybrid” regimes as instruments of state oppression/control?

Finally, the findings of this dissertation raise interesting questions about the role of

“power,” which is one of the most important objects of politics and political science (Dahl,

1957). As has been reiterated throughout this dissertation, traditional scholars view voting behavior in non-democratic regimes as a consequence of state coercion, mobilization or manipulation, denying the importance of the act of voting for ordinary voters. The findings of this research, however, as well as similar studies in the other places around the world, show that voters in non-democratic regimes carry deep meanings about their participation in voting, regardless of how unfair and distrustful the electoral system is according to their perception. For example, in one of the recent studies of voters in Russia under the rule of president Putin

179

(Wilson, 2012), many respondents assessed elections held in Russia in 2007-2008 as fair, even though they failed to meet internationally recognized standards. Based on the findings of his research, Wilson (2012) makes an important conclusion that this tendency of the Russian voters to overlook violations and show little concern with the procedural fairness of the country’s elections legitimizes the authoritarianism, and, consequently, leads to the situation when “the regime – while popular – is likely to continue to possess significant latitude to manipulate elections with impunity”.

How can we reconcile these contradictory elements (meaningfulness and mistrust) in voting behavior in the countries where elections provide no meaningful choice for the citizenry?

Do they still vote due to a deep-seated fear or habit or peer-pressure or ritual, and are their answers to the survey questionnaires are signs of their self-justification and rationalization of meaningless act? And if so, from where do these elements of rationalization come? How do rulers see the elections and the voters? In case we are to search for answers to these questions, the author of the dissertation would suggest that the concepts of a politics as a symbolic action

(Edelman, 1971) and hidden faces of power as conceptualized in the works Bachrach & Baratz

(1962), Gaventa (1980), and Lukes (1974). The work of these scholars concern the role of government in influencing and shaping the political beliefs and behaviors of the people and might provide good starting theoretical foundation to be applied for this inquiry in the voters’ behavior in various countries and political regimes around the world.

9.3.4. Longer-term consequences of regular elections for authoritarian regimes

The dissertation’s initial research purpose was not about consequences of the elections for the “hybrid” regime in Kyrgyzstan, but only about the meaning of elections for ordinary voters. Despite this, it became clear during the research that elections have also had significant

180

effects on the ruling regime in Kyrgyzstan. Further, as argued by Tucker (2007), though it has long been accepted that free and fair elections are a necessary component for a country to be considered democratic, far less attention has been paid to the role of elections in the process of democratization: a competitive election is most often seen as an outcome of a democratization process as opposed to a cause (Tucker, 2007). As Lindberg (2006a, p. 105) further argued, theories of democratization “have not modeled elections as a factor endowed with causal or even facilitating qualities,” but “treated them as indicators of consolidation.”

In this understanding, it is true that the public in non-democratic regimes are aware that such elections neither free or honest, which makes some scholars of the Western political science tend to think that such elections are “utterly meaningless” (e.g., Ezrahi, 2015, p.20). It is true that in Russia, for instance, “a long political tradition of autocracy has meant that election events do not usually produce trust in the role of the people in making or unmaking government” (Ezrahi,

2015, p. 20). But as we discussed it in Chapter 4, even the Soviet elections cannot be dismissed as totally meaningless for the voting people; neither can the longer political consequences of regular elections be neglected. Even under Soviet conditions, where people recognized that they had no or very little means of influencing the policymaking process, feelings and voices of growing dissatisfaction flourished among various social groups of population. Moreover, if given a chance, these disillusioned social groups would become an important source for more diverse political landscape, as happened during the new Soviet electoral politics introduced by

Gorbachev in the years of 1989-1990. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4 of the dissertation, these elections demonstrated the presence of an already high level of political consciousness and civic organization in many parts of Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union.

181

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to establishment of the “hybrid” regimes in all of the post-Soviet republics, except in the Baltics. ”Electoral revolutions” that took place in some of these countries in the 2000s (in Georgia in 2003, the Ukraine in 2004, as well as Kyrgyzstan in

2005 and 2010), and elsewhere around the world. They called our attention to the fact that these events can actually presage the coming of democratization and remind scholars of the role that elections can play in bringing about democratic change (Tucker, 2007). It follows that the main challenge of the current scholarship on electoral democratization has become a search for an answer to the puzzle of how elections can contribute to democratization. According to Gandhi &

Lust-Okar (2009), this is likely to happen in two ways: first, by promoting regime breakdown generally; and second, by increasing the likelihood that democracy emerges in its place.

(1) Elections and democratization by regime breakdown

Scholars have identified a wide variety of possibilities for a link between elections and democratization through regime breakdown. One is a succession crisis when the incumbent does not stand for election, generating splits within the ruling elite that opponents can exploit and which lead to the downfall of authoritarian regimes. Another cause is an economic crisis that can weaken an authoritarian regime, changing electoral politics and weakening the incumbent’s grip on power as the public sector shrinks and the regime’s monopoly on economic welfare shatters

(Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Elections in authoritarian regimes could also promote democratization if they result in victory for a democratic opposition playing “nested” contestation: they view authoritarian elections as a dual-natured political struggle over both (1) the positions under contention and (2) the rules of the game (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997;

Greene, 2007; Lindberg, 2006a, 2009; Magaloni, 2006; Schedler, 2002b). Finally, elections might cause regime breakdown through actions outside of the electoral arena. For example,

182

opposition parties should successfully mobilize voters to protest “stolen elections” (most notably in the case of the “color revolutions”). Such protests can lead to elections that result in a democratic transition (Beissinger, 2007; Bunce & Wolchik, 2006; Nadeau & Blais, 1993;

Thompson & Kuntz, 2004).

Elections can also promote the long-term process of “creeping democratization,” which consists of top-down, incremental-institutional changes launched by autocracies as they face the need to economize dwindling resources such as mass-political support and fiscal revenues.

Autocrats faced with these problems must realize that they need new political institutions in order to maintain stability, efficiency, and credibility of the regime during times of change, as has been demonstrated in the case of local elections in China (Pei, 1995). Such changes typically include “a modest strengthening of the rule of law, the establishment of nominally representative institutions under the direction of the regime, the expansion of local autonomy, and even the holding of semi-free local elections” that “may unexpectedly pave the way for genuine democracy” (Pei, 1995, p. 67). Under these political circumstances:

New political actors are able to exploit the institutional changes as they pursue

their own goals and devise more effective political strategies. Such dynamic

interactions between political actors and institutions lead to subtle internal

transformation of the institutions and enhancement of the role of institutional

arrangements in determining political outcomes. (Pei, 1995, p. 68)

In the end, external actors could also play an important role in facilitating the democratic potential of the elections. For instance, states and international organizations can exert pressure on certain regimes, making foreign aid conditional on the holding of multiparty elections (Brinks

183

& Coppedge, 2006; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006, as quoted in Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009, pp. 415-

416).

Under such circumstances, it would be interesting to learn specifically how elections in

Kyrgyzstan led to the regime breakdown under Akayev in 2005 and Bakiyev in 2010. Such inquiries would be aside from ruling elite polarization as was discussed in this dissertation.

(2) Elections and “bottom up” democratization

The findings and discussions in this dissertation adds another aspect of how elections under authoritarian and especially “hybrid” regimes contribute to democratization: through long- term political socialization of the citizenry in the regularly-conducted elections. As was shown in case study of Soviet Tajikistan by Rakowska-Harmstone (1970), mentioned in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, even though election campaigns proved superficial and inefficient and tended to concentrate in urban areas, “they did teach the people, however, the habit of political participation” (p. 211) even under the rigid conditions of the Soviet authoritarianism. Overall, the author of the dissertation suggests that there is need for a new look at the longer-term consequences of elections in non-democratic regimes.

Thus, in addition to top-down changes, elections can also create conditions for “ground up” democratization. In particular, this concept is based on recognizing the importance of the

“civil society” in the process of democratization (Diamond, 1992, 1997; Elliot, 2003). For the purposes of the dissertation, “civil society” is defined as:

[T]he aggregate of networks and institutions that either exist and act independently

of the state or are official organizations capable of developing their own

spontaneous views on national or local issues and then impressing these views on

their members, on small groups and, finally, on the authorities. (Lewin, 1988, p. 80, as

184

quoted in Nagle & Mahr, 1999, p. 64)

According to Diamond (1997), development of civil society contributes to democratization through a host of factors:(1) limiting, controlling, and monitoring state power on the one hand, and on the other hand, complementing and improving the state by enhancing its democratic legitimacy and effectiveness; (2) stimulating political participation and promoting democratic skills amongst the population; (3) helping to promote a democratic political culture;

(4) structuring multiple channels, beyond parties, for articulating, aggregating and representing interests; helping to effect “a transition from clientalism to citizenship” at the local level; (5) generating a wide range of cross-cutting interests thereby reducing political polarity; (6) recruiting and training new political leaders; (7) carrying out other functions such as election monitoring; (8) disseminating information; (9) helping to achieve economic reform in new democracies; (10) offering services and developing techniques of conflict mediation and resolution; and (11) strengthening community initiatives thereby relieving the burden on the state.

In this regard, political scientists have provided numerous examples of the influence of the “civil society” on elections through voter education and election observation and monitoring

(Abbink & Hesseling, 2000; Fischer, 2007), and post-electoral events (Kuzio, 2006). Still, the review of the literature suggests that there is little discussion about the “vice versa” impact of elections on the civil society, as exemplified in the studies of civil society in Central Asia (e.g.,

McMann, 2006; Ruffin & Waugh, 1999).

Meanwhile, the recent studies of democratization in African and Latin American countries have shed some light on this topic. For instance, in their study of six nations in Central

America, Seligson & Booth (1995), argued that more elections promote democracy in a couple

185

of ways. First, elections open up some political space for citizens, enabling them to mobilize and pursue their interests, e.g., petition government and local authorities, obtain and exchange information, and so on, that in effect expands civil liberties. Second, a cycle of several uninterrupted and successful elections reduces mistrust among elite groups. Bratton and van de

Walle (1997) use the significance of holding elections in the past to explain democratic developments in the early 1990s in Africa. They asserted that electoral institutions in the past predisposed the African countries toward a more democratic trajectory in the 1990s. Despite this observation, they did not discuss the role of the current elections in the process of liberalization taking place across Africa. Using their insights, Lindberg (2006a, p. 106) suggested that the elections provided ordinary citizens with:

the institutional framework that bestowed rights (even if strictly limited) of

participation and the practice of participatory and to some extent completive

political process empowered ordinary citizens by experiential learning to demand

more democracy when the time was ripe.

The democratizing role of election was also noted by Barkan (1995, 1998, 2000), who in his studies of elections in Kenya and other African nations noted that elections contributed to democratization. It worked by increasing space for civil society and media, empowering political actors, and bringing more freedom in the social sphere, even when the elections were flawed.

Finally, Lindberg (2006a) provided seven causal links that explain the role of elections in democratization in terms of improvements in ranking in the Freedom House’s Civil Liberties index. The first link is a citizen, who gains invaluable political experience during elections exercising his fundamental rights and freedoms. These include the right to choose between candidates and parties, freedom of opinion and voice, the right to form and belong to

186

associations, and so on. Many citizens are likely to be targeted by voter education campaigns and messages conveyed by officials, activists, and mass media. Such experience will never be forgotten and will have profound and life-long impacts on citizens as voters. A second link refers to those individuals and groups who learn to identify with the values inherent in democratic electoral practices. Thus, with more civically active groups in society, the scope of alternatives increases; in turn, this leads to growing pressures for participation, increased associational participation, growing competition, and demands for legitimate governing of public affairs.

A third set of linkages has to do with the role of self-fulfilling expectations, sometimes referred to as “discounts of the future.” This means that elections spread democratic qualities to society and, as a result, more and more citizens and ruling elite members accept and play by new rules. Fourth and fifth links are provided by already-existing civil society actors (individuals and organizations) that become stronger through participating in the elections and continue their engagement in pro-civic activities after the elections (e.g., organizing pressure for implementation of democratic qualities in the local society). The sixth area of linkage is related to the judicial system. Subsequent elections – with the competition of ideas and organizations and rights, legitimate procedures for hearing and adjudication of them in the social sphere, and so on – create possible avenues for asserting new standards in the protection of political rights.

Finally, the media provide the seventh set of potential causal links between elections and democratization. The more the media serve as transmitters for the pro-democratic calls and complaints of both individuals and political and non-political organizations, the more they enhance democratic participation and the competition of ideas about the governing of society by ensuring open public discussion.

187

Even so, it should be noted that the claim that authoritarian elections facilitate democratization has its skeptics (e.g., Brownlee, 2007; McCoy & Hartlyn, 2007). One problem is establishing causality between elections and democratization, and its direction (Gandhi & Lust-

Okar, 2009). Linbderg (2006a) admitted that his offered list of areas for linkages between elections and democratization has some deficiencies. First of all, the list is not complete.

Undeniably, the list does not include changes in the other areas, such as the government’s appointment of new officials or creation of new political institutions that can bring about positive improvements in the society in terms of civil liberties. Second, some of the linkages (e.g., transferring skills and experience learned by the civic actors during elections to the post-electoral activities in the social or political spheres) need further empirical investigation. Third, the linkages do not explain why the effects of electoral practices tend to occur in conjunction with elections, and not at any other time.

All these issues necessitate an exhaustive continuation of the research concerning the relationship between elections and democratization in general, and understanding the role of elections for ordinary citizens in particular.

188

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbink, J., & Hesseling G. (2000). Election observation and democratization in Africa. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.

Abramson, P.R., & Aldrich J.H. (1982). The decline of electoral participation in America. American Political Science Review, 76(3), 502-521.

Abramson, P.R. (1983). Political attitudes in America: Formation and change. San Francisco, CA: Freeman.

Abramson, P. R., Aldrich, J.H., & Rhode, D. (1995). Change and continuity in the 1992 elections. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Acock, A., Clarke, H.D., & Stewart, M.C. (1985). A new model for old measures: A covariance structure analysis of political efficacy. Journal of Politics, 47(4), 1062-1084.

Ahuja, A. & Chhibber, P. (2012). Why the poor vote in India: ‘If I don’t vote, I am dead to the state.’ Studies in Comparative International Development, 47(4), 389–410.

Akaev A. (1995). Kyrgyzstan on the way to progress and democracy. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Uchkun.

Akipress (2010, 25 October). Prezident Kyrgyzstana zaslushala otchet glavy TsIK o hode podgotovki k vyboram 2011 [President of Kyrgyzstan received a report from the Central Election Commission about preparations to the 2011 elections]. Retrieved from http://www.24.kg/election2011/112433-prezident-kyrgyzstana-zaslushala-otchet-glavy- cik.html.

Akipress (2010, 5 October), Skolko golosov dolzhny nabrat’ partii, shtoby proiti v parlament? Raz’yasneniya po 0.5% i 5% [How many votes parties need to receive in order to get into the parliament? Explanation about 0.5% and 5% {thresholds}] Retrieved from http://kg.akipress.org/news:276181.

Akyildiz, S. & Carlson, R. (Eds). (2014). Social and cultural change in Central Asia: The Soviet legacy. London & New York: Routledge.

Aldrich, J. H. (1993). Rational choice and turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 37(1), 246-278.

Alfonsin, R. (1995). The transition toward democracy in a developing country: The case of Argentina. In D.N. Nelson (Ed.), After authoritarianism: Democracy or disorder? (pp. 17-30). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Alkan, H. (2009). Post-Soviet politics in Kyrgyzstan: Between centralism and localism? Contemporary Politics, 15(3), 355-375.

189

Allworth, E. (1967). Central Asia: A century of Russian rule. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Allworth, E. (Ed.). (1973). The nationality question in Soviet Central Asia. New York, NY: Praeger.

Aleprete Jr., M.E. (2013). Authoritarian persistence in history’s aftermath. In R.Vanderhill & M.E. Aleprete, Jr. International dimensions of authoritarian persistence: Lessons from post-Soviet States (pp. 1-9). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Amir, O. & Berry, A. (2013). Challenges of transition economies: Economic reforms, emigration and employment in Tajikistan. In Social protection, growth and employment: Evidence from India, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico and Tajikistan (pp. 157-199). New York, NY: United Nations Development Program, Bureau for Development Policy.

Anderson, C., & Guillory, C. (1997). Political institutions and satisfaction with democracy: A cross-national analysis of consensus and majoritarian systems. American Political Science Review, 91(1), 66-81.

Anderson, J. (1996). The Kyrgyz parliamentary and presidential elections of 1995. Electoral Studies, 15(4), 529-533.

Anderson, J. (1997a). Constitutional development in Central Asia. Central Asian Survey, 16(3), 301-320.

Anderson, J. (1997b). Elections and political development in Central Asia. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 13(4), 28-53.

Anderson, J. (1999). Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s island of democracy? Amsterdam, Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishers.

Anderson, L. & Beck M. (2000). U.S. political activism in Central Asia: The case of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In G.K. Bertsch, C.B. Craft, S.A. Jones, & M.D. Beck (Eds.), Crossroads and conflict: Security and foreign policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia (pp.75-89). London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Ansolabehere, S., & Iyengar S. (1995). Going negative: How attack ads shrink and polarize the electorate. New York, NY: Free Press.

Arcelus, F., & Meltzer, A.H. (1975). The effects of aggregate economic variables on congressional elections. American Political Science Review, 69(4), 1232–1240.

Aronoff, M. J., & Kubik, J. (2013) Anthropology and political science: A convergent Approach. New York, NY: Berghahn Books.

190

Aslam, S. (2011). Kyrgyzstan: Internal instability and revolt in 2010. Strategic Studies, 31(1), pp. 241-261. Islamabad, Pakistan: Institute of Strategic Studies. Retrieved from https://www.issi.org.pk/kyrgyzstan-internal-instability-and-revolt-in-2010/

Atkin, M. (1996). Tajikistan. In G.E.Curtis (Ed.), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: Country studies (pp. 197-290). Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Bader, M. & Schmeets H. (2013). Does international election observation deter and detect fraud? Evidence from Russia. Representation, 49(4), 501-514. Bachrach, P. & Baratz, M. (1962). Two faces of power. American Political Science Review, 56, 947-52.

Banerjee, M. (2014). Why India votes? London, United Kingdom: Routledge

Banuazizi, A. & Weiner, M. (Eds). (1994). The new geopolitics of Central Asia and its borderlands. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Barkan, J.D. (1995). Elections in agrarian societies. Journal of Democracy, 6(4), 106-116.

Barkan, J.D. (1998). Rethinking the applicability of proportional representation for Africa. In A. Reynolds & T.D. Sisk (Eds.). Elections and conflict management in Africa. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press.

Barkan, J.D. (2000). Protracted transitions among Africa’s new democracies. Democratization, 7(3), 227-243.

Bartolini, S., & Mair P. (1990). Identity, competition, and electoral availability: The stabilisation of European electorates, 1885-1985. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Batalden, S.K., & Batalden S.L. (1993). The New Independent States of Eurasia: Handbook of former Soviet Republics. Phoenix, AZ: Orix Press.

Beachain, D. (2011). Faking it: Neo-Soviet electoral politics in Central Asia. In R. Jessen & H. Richter (Eds.). (2011). Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th century dictatorships (pp. 204-227). Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag.

Beachain, D. & Kevlihan R. (2014), Imagined democracy? Nation-building and elections in Central Asia. Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 20(2), 1- 19.

Berglund, S., F. Vogt A.H., & Karasimeonov G. (2001). Challenges to democracy: Eastern Europe ten years after the collapse of Communism. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar.

191

Bernhagen, P., & Marsh M. (2007). Voting and protesting: Explaining citizen participation in old and new European democracies. Democratization, 14(1), 44-72.

Bernstein, R., Chadha, A., & Montjoy, R. (2001). Overreporting voting: Why it happens and why it matters. Public Opinion Quarterly, 65(1), 22-44.

Beissinger M. (2007). Structure and example in modular political phenomena: The diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip revolutions. Perspective on Politics, 5(2), 259–74.

Beugelsdijk, S., Henri de Groot, L.F., & Anton van Schaik, B.T.M. (2004). Trust and economic growth: A robustness analysis, Oxford Economic Papers New Series 56.

Bielasiak, J. (2006). Regime diversity and electoral systems in post-Communism. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 22(4), 407–430.

Biemer, P.L., Lyberg L.E. (2003). Introduction to survey quality. New York, NY: A. John Wiley & Sons Publication.

Birch, S. (2008). Electoral institutions and popular confidence in electoral process: a cross- national analysis. Electoral Studies, 27(2), 305-320.

Birch, S. (2010). Perceptions of electoral fairness and voter turnout. Comparative Political Studies, 43 (12), 1601-1622.

Blais A. (2000). To vote or not to vote? The merits and limits of rational choice. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Blais, A. (2006). What affects voter turnout? Annual Review of Political Science, 9(1), 111-125.

Blais, A., E. Gidengil, N. Nevitte, & R. Nadeau (2004). Where does turnout decline come from? European Journal of Political Research, 43(2), 221–36.

Blais A. & A. Dobrzynska (1998). Turnout in electoral democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 33(2), 239-261.

Booth J.A., & Seligson, M.A. (2008). Inequality and democracy in Latin America: Individual and contextual effects of wealth on political participation. In K. Anirudh (Ed.), Poverty, participation and democracy: A global perspective (pp. 94-124). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in a comparative perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Bratton M. (2008). Poor people and democratic citizenship in Africa. In K. Anirudh (Ed.). Poverty, participation and democracy: A global perspective (pp. 28-64). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

192

Brinks, D., & Coppedge M. (2006). Diffusion is no illusion: Neighbor emulation in the Third Wave of democracy. Comparative Political Studies, 39(4), 463–89.

Brooker, P. (2014). Non-democratic regimes (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan

Brownlee J. (2007). Authoritarianism in an age of democratization. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Bunbongkran, S. (1996). Elections and democratization in Thailand. In R.H. Taylor (Ed.), The politics of elections in Southeast Asia (pp. 184-200). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press.

Bunce, V. (1998). Regional differences in democratization: The East versus the West. Post- Soviet Affairs, 14(3), 187-211.

Bunce, V. (2000). Comparative democratization: Big and bounded generalizations. Comparative Political Studies, 33(6/7), 703-734.

Bunce V. & Wolchik, S. (2006). Favorable conditions and electoral revolutions. Journal of democracy, 17(4), 5-18.

Cain, B.E., & Kiewiet D.R. (1984). Ethnicity and electoral choice: Mexican-American voting behavior in the California 30th Congressional District. Social Sciences Quarterly, 65, 315-27.

Campbell, A., Converse, P.E., Miller, W.E., & Stokes D.E. (1960). The American voter. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.

Campbell, A., Converse, P.E., Miller, W.E., & Stokes D.E. (Eds.) (1966). Elections and the political order. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.

Carothers, T. (2001). The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 5-21.

Cardy, E.A. (2005). An experimental field study of the GOTV and persuasion effects of partisan direct mail and phone calls. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 601(28), 28-40.

Carswell, G., & De Neve, G. (2014). Why Indians vote: Reflections on rights, citizenship, and democracy from a Tamil Nadu Village. Antipode, 46(4), pp. 1032-1053.

Chen J., & Zhong Y. (2002). Why do people vote in semi-competitive elections in China? Journal of Politics, 64(1), 178–198.

Chiesa, G., & Northrop, D.T. (1993). Transition to democracy: Political change in the Soviet Union, 1987-1991. Hannover, the Netherlands: Dartmouth College Press.

193

CIA/Central Intelligence Agency (2016). The World Factbook: Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_cas.html

Citrin, J. (1974). Comment: The political relevance of trust in government. American Political Science Review, 68(3), 973-988.

Claassen, R. (2015). Godless Democrats and pious Republicans? Party activists, party captures and the “Gold Gap.” New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Claassen, R.L. (2005). Hispanic public opinion. In B. Radcliff & S. Best (Eds.), Polling America: An encyclopedia of public opinion (pp. 297-304). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Claassen, R.L. (2004). Political opinion and distinctiveness: The case of Hispanic ethnicity. Political Research Quarterly, 37(4), 609-620.

Clarke, H.D., & Acock, A.C. (1989). National elections and political attitudes: The case of political efficacy. British Journal of Political Science, 19(4), 551-562.

Clinton, J. D., & Lapinski J.S. (2004). Targeted advertising and voter turnout: An experimental study of the 2000 Presidential election. Journal of Politics, 66(1), 69-96.

Collins, K. (2002). Clans, pacts, and politics in Central Asia. Journal of Democracy, 13(3), 137- 152.

Collins, K. (2006). Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Colton, T.J. (1992). Politics. In T.J. Colton and R. Legvold (Eds.), After the Soviet Union: From empire to nations (pp. 17-48). New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company.

Colton, T.J., & Legvold, R. (Eds.) (1992). After the Soviet Union: From empire to nations. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company.

Colton, T.J., & McFaul M. (2003). Popular choice and managed democracy: The Russian elections of 1999 and 2000. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Converse, P.E., Miller, W.F., Rusk, J.G., & Wolfe, A.C. (1969). Continuity and change in American politics: Parties and issues in the 1968 elections. American Political Science Review, 63 (4), 1083-1105

Creswell, J.W. (2003). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

194

Creswell, J.W., & Plano Clark, V.L. (2007). Designing and conducting mixed methods research. Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage.

Crewe, I. (1981). Electoral participation. In D. Butler, H. Penniman, and A. Ranney (Eds.), Democracy at the polls: A comparative study of competitive national elections (pp. 216- 263). Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.

CSCE/Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1994, March 7). The Parliamentary Elections in Kazakhstan. Almaty, Kazakhstan: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Almaty, Kazakhstan: CSCE.

CSES/Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2008). CSES module 2 full release. June 27, 2007 version. Retrieved from http://www.cses.org/datacenter/module2/module2.htm

Corbett, M. (1991). American public opinion. White Plains, NY: Longman.

Cox, M. (2003). When trust matters: Explaining differences in voter turnout. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(4), 757–770.

Cummings, S. (Ed.). (2002). Power and change in Central Asia. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Cummings, S. (2005). Kazakhstan: power and the elite. London, United Kingdom: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd.

Cummings, S. (Ed.). (2010). Symbolism and power in Central Asia: Politics of spectacular. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Cummings, S. (2012). Understanding Central Asia: Politics and contested transformations. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Curtin, R., Presser, S., & Singer, E. (2000). The effects of response rate changes on the index of consumer sentiment. Public Opinion Quarterly, 64, 413-428.

Curtis, G.E. (2003). Introduction. In L.M. Buyers (Ed.), Central Asia in focus: Political and economic issues (pp. ix-xxvi). New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Dadabaev, T. (2006, May 31). Public confidence, trust and participation in post-Soviet Central Asia. Retrieved from http://www.cacianalyst.org

Daalder, H., & Mair, P. (Eds.) (1983). Western European party systems. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Dahl, R.A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

195

Dahl, R.A. (1957). The concept of power. Behavioral Science, 2(3), 201-215.

Dalton, R.J. (2004). Democratic challenges, democratic choices: The erosion in political support in advanced industrial democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Darr, B., & Hesli, V. (2010). Differential voter turnout in a Post-Communist Muslim society: The case of the Kyrgyz Republic. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 43(3), 309- 324.

De Pedro, N. (2010). Kyrgyzstan after the Elections. Is the worst yet to come? Barcelona, Portugal: CIDOB/Barcelona Institute for International Relations, Barcelona, Portugal. Retrieved from https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/notes_internacionals/n1_22/kyr gyzstan_after_the_elections_is_the_worst_yet_to_come

DEMOSCOPE (2015, 17 February). Opros: dosrochnye presidentskie vybory v Kazakhstane [Survey: early presidential election in Kazakhstan]. Retrieved from http://www.demos.kz/rus/index.php?poll=41

Dennis, J. (1970), Support for the institution of elections by the mass public. The American Political Science Review, 64(3), 819-835.

Diamond, L. (1992). Introduction: Civil society and the struggle for democracy. In L. Diamond (Ed.), The democratic revolution: Struggles for freedom and democracy in the developing world (pp. 1-27). New York, NY: Freedom House.

Diamond, L.J. (1997). Civil society and the development of democracy. Working Paper, No.101. Barcelona, Spain: Institut de Ciencies Politiques I Socials. Retrieved from http://www.march.es/ceacs/ingles/publicaciones/working/archivos/1997_101.pdf.

Diamond L.J., & Plattner, M.F. (Eds.). (1995). The global resurgence of democracy. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, L.J. (2002). Thinking about hybrid regimes. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 21-35.

Diamond, L.J. (1999). Developing democracy: Towards consolidation. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.

Diaz, M.M., & Payne, J.M. (2007). Trends in electoral participation. In J.M. Payne, D., G. Zovatto, & M.M. Díaz (Eds.), Democracies in development: Politics and reform in Latin America (Revised ed.) (pp. 241-268). Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University.

Dillman, D.A., Eltinge, J.L., Groves, R.M., & Little, R.J.A. (2002). Survey nonresponse in

196

design, data collection, and analysis. In R.M. Groves, D.A. Dillman, J.L. Eltinge, & R.J.A. Little (Eds.), Survey nonresponse, (pp. 3-26). New York, NY: A John Wiley and Sons Publications.

Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York, NY: Harper and Row.

Duff, B. Hanmer, M.J., Park, W., & White, I.K (2007). Good excuses: Understanding who votes with an improved turnout question. Public Opinion Quarterly, 71(1), 67-90.

Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. London, United Kingdom: Methuen.

Duverger, M. (1963). Political parties. New York, NY: Wiley.

Edelman, M. (1971). Politics as symbolic action: Mass arousal and quiescence. New York, NY: Academic Press.

Eisenstadt, T. (2004). Courting democracy in Mexico: Party strategies and electoral institutions. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Elliot, C.M. (2003). Civil society and democracy: A comparative review essay. In C.M. Elliott (Ed.), Civil society and democracy: A reader (pp. 1-39). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Engvall, J. (2011). The State as an investment market: An analytical framework for interpreting politics and bureaucracy in Kyrgyzstan. Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University.

Enelow, J.M. (1986). The linkage between predictive dimensions and candidate issue positions in American presidential campaigns: An examination of group differences. Political Behavior, 8(3), 245–261.

Epstein, L.K., & Strom, G.S. (1981). Election night projections and West coast turnout. American Politics Quarterly, 9(4), 479–491.

Eschment, B., & Grotz, F. (2001). Kyrgyzstan. In D. Nohlen, F. Grotz & C. Hartmann (Eds.). Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A data handbook., vol. 1. The Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia (pp. 431–454). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Ezrahi, Y. (2015). Democracy as a constructive utopia. In M. Shamir (Ed.), The elections in Israel, 2013 (pp. 17-27). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Fierman, W. (Ed.). (1991). Soviet Central Asia: The failed transformation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

197

Finkel, S.E. (1985). Reciprocal effects of participation and political efficacy. American Journal of Political Science, 29(4), 891–913.

Finkel, S.E. (1987). The effect of participation on political efficacy and political support: Evidence from a West German panel. Journal of Politics, 49(2), 441–464.

Fish, M.S. (2009). E-parliament election index: A global survey on the quality of practices in parliamentary elections. Retrieved from http://www.e-arl.net/eparlimages/general/pdf/ 090508 %20eParliamentElectionIndex.pdf.

Fischer, J. (2007). Elections and political transition in Iraq: Transparency and participation as building blocks of public confidence in conflictive electoral environments. In R.W. Soudriette & J.G. Pilon (Eds.), Every vote counts: The role of elections in building democracy (pp. 105-119). Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Flavin, P., & Keane, M.J. (2012). Life satisfaction and political participation: Evidence from the United States. Journal of Happiness Studies, 13(1), 63-78.

Flower, J.H. (2006). Altruism and turnout. The Journal of Politics, 68(3): 674-683.

Fornos C.A., Power, T.J., & Garand J.C. (2004). Explaining voter turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000. Comparative Political Studies, 37(8), 909–940.

Franklin, N.M. (1996). Electoral participation. In L. LeDuc, R.G.Niemi, & P. Norris (Eds.), Comparing democracies: Elections and voting in global perspective. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Franklin, N.M. (2000). Understanding cross-national turnout differences: What role for compulsory voting? British Journal of Political Science, 29(1), 205-216.

Franklin, N.M. (2004). Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established democracies since 1945. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Freedman, P., & Goldstein, K. (1999). Measuring media exposure and the effects of negative campaign ads. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 1189–1208.

Freedom House (2003). Freedom House 2002: Kyrgyz Republic. Nations in Transit, 2002 Report (pp. 233-235). New York, NY: Freedom House. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2003

Freedom House (2011). Freedom in the World 2011: Kyrgyz Republic. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/kyrgyzstan#.VQTZDPm-2G4.

Freedom House (2016). Eurasia. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/regions/eurasia

198

Freedom House (2017). Nations in Transit 2017: The False Promise of Populism (by N. Schenkkan). Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default /files/NIT2017_booklet_FINAL_0.pdf

Friedgut, T. (1979). Political participation in the USSR. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. New York, NY: Free Press.

Fumagalli M. (2012). The 2011 presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan. Electoral Studies, 31(4), 864-867.

Furman, D. (2005). The regime in Kazakhstan. In B. Rumer (Ed.), Central Asia at the end of the transition (pp. 195-266). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp.

Gandhi, J., & Lust-Okar, E. (2009). Elections under authoritarianism. Annual Review of Political Science, 12, 403–22.

Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2006). Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships. Economics & Politics, 18(1), 1–26.

Gaventa, J. (1980). Power and powerfulness: Quiescence and rebellion in Appalachian Valley. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Geddes, B. (2006). Why parties and elections in authoritarian regimes? (revised version of a paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2005). Unpublished Manuscript. Retrieved from https://www.scribd.com/document/133702645/Barbara-Geddes-Why-Parties-and- Elections-in-Authoritarian-Regimes-2006

Gerber, A. S., & Green, D.P. (2000). The effects of canvassing, telephone calls, and direct mail on voter turnout: A field experiment. American Political Science Review, 94(3), 653– 663.

Gerber, A.S., & Green, D.P. (2001). Do phone calls increase voter turnout? Public Opinion Quarterly, 65(1), 75–85.

Gerber, A.S., & Green, D.P. (2005). Correction to Gerber and Green (2000), replication of disputed findings, and reply to Imai (2005). American Political Science Review, 99(2), 301–313.

Gerber, A.S., Green, D.P., & Shachar, R. (2003). Voting may be habit-forming: Evidence from a randomized field experiment. American Journal of Political Science, 47(3), 540–550.

Gimpel, J., Dyck, J., & Shaw, D. (2004). Registrants, voters, and turnout variability across neighborhoods. Political Behavior, 26(4), 343–375.

199

Gimpel, J., Lay, J.C., & Schuknecht, J. E. (2003). Cultivating democracy: Civic environments and political socialization in America. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Gimpel, J.G., & Schuknecht, J.E. (2003). Political participation and the accessibility of the ballot box. Political Geography, 22(5), 471–488. Ginsberg, B., & Weissberg, R. (1978). Elections and the mobilization of popular support. American Journal of Political Science, 22(1), 31-55.

Glaser B., & Strauss A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago, IL: Aldine.

Gleason, G. (1997). The Central Asian states: Discovering independence. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Gleason, G. (2003). Markets and politics in Central Asia: Structural reform and political changes. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Gleason, G. (2004), Reform strategies in Central Asia: Early starters, late starters, and non- starters. In D. Burghart & T. Sabonis-Helf (Eds.), In the tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s path to the 21st Century (pp. 43-63). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University.

Gleditsch K., & Ward, M. (2006). Diffusion and the International context of democratization. International Organizations, 60(4), 911–933.

Glenn, J. (1999). The Soviet legacy in Central Asia. New York, NY: Palgrave.

Golosov, G. (2011, 11 March). Lipstick on a crocodile: Electoral authoritarianism in Central Asia. Retrieved from https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/grigorii-golosov/lipstick- on-crocodile-electoral-authoritarianism-in-central-asia

Goyder, J.C. (1985). Non-response in surveys: A Canada-United States comparison. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 10, 231-251.

Granberg, D., & Holmberg, S. (1991). Self-reported turnout and voter validation. American Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 448–459.

Granberg, D., & Holmberg, S. (1992). The Hawthorne Effect in election studies: The impact of survey participation on voting. British Journal of Political Science, 22(2), 240-247.

Graves, S., & Lee, J. (2000), Ethnic underpinnings of voting preference: Latinos and the 1996 U.S. senate election in Texas. Social Science Quarterly, 81(1), 226-236.

Green, D.P., Gerber, A.S., & Nickerson, D.W. (2003). Getting out the vote in local elections: Results from six door-to-door canvassing experiments. Journal of Politics, 65(4), 1083– 1096.

200

Greene K. (2007). Why dominant parties lose: Mexico’s democratization in comparative perspective. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Greenwald, A.G., Carnot, C.G., Beach, R., & Young, B. (1987). Increasing voting behavior by asking people if they expect to vote. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72(2), 315–318.

Groves, R.M., Dillman, D.A., Eltinge, J.L., & Little, R.J.A. (Eds.). (2002). Survey nonresponse. New York, NY: Wiley-Interscience.

Groves, R.M., & Couper, M.P. (1998). Nonresponse in household interview surveys. New York. NY: Wiley-Interscience.

Hale, H.E. (2011). Hybrid regimes: When democracy and autocracy mix. In N.J. Brown (Ed.), The dynamics of democratization: Dictatorship, development, and diffusion (pp. 23-45). Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press.

Hall, P. (2003). Aligning ontology and methodology in comparative research. In J. Mahoney & D. Rueschemeyer (Eds.), Comparative historical analysis and social sciences (pp. 373- 404). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Harder, J., & Krosnick, J.A. (2008), Why do people vote? A psychological analysis of the causes of voter turnout. Journal of Social Issues, 64(3), 525-549.

Harrop, M., & Miller, W.L. (1987). Elections and voters: Comparative introduction. New York, NY: Meredith Press.

Haugen, A. (2003). The establishment of national republics in Soviet Central Asia. New York, NY: Palgrave.

He, B. (2007). Rural democracy in China: Role of village elections. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Heathershow, J. (2009). Post-conflict Tajikistan: The politics of peacebuilding and the emergence of legitimate order. London, UK: Routledge.

Heberlein, T.A., & Baumgartner, R.M. (1978). Factors affecting response rates to mailed questionnaires: A quantitative analysis of the published literature. American Sociological Review, 43, 447-462.

Hermet, G., Rose, R., & Rouquie, A. (1978). Elections without choice. New York. NY: Wiley.

Hess, R.D., & Torney, J.V. (1967). The development of political attitudes in children. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Hetherington, M.J. (1999). The effect of political trust on the presidential vote, 1968–96. American Political Science Review, 93(2), 311–326.

201

Heywood, A. (1997). Politics. London, United Kingdom: Macmillan.

Hiden, J., & Salmon, P. (1994). The Baltic nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the twentieth century. London, United Kingdom: Longman.

Hierman, B. (2010). What use was the election to us? Clientelism and political trust amongst ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Nationalities Papers, 38(2), 245– 263.

Hill, D., & Huskey, E. (2015). Electoral stakes, labor migration, and voter turnout: The 2011 presidential election in Kyrgyzstan. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Volume 23(1), 3-30

Holbrook, A.L., Melanie C. G., & Krosnick, J.A. (2003). Telephone versus face-to-face interviewing of national probability samples with long questionnaires. Public Opinion Quarterly, 67(1), 79-125.

Holbrook, A.L., Krosnick, J.A., Visser, P.S., Gardner, W.L., & Cacioppo, J.T. (2001). Attitudes toward presidential candidates and political parties: Initial optimism, inertial first impressions, and a focus on flaws. American Journal of Political Science, 45(4), 930– 950.

Hougland, J.G., & Christenson, J.A. (1983). Religion and politics: The relationship of religious participation to political efficacy and involvement. Sociology and Social Research, 67, 405-420.

Hox, J.J., and de Leeuw, E. (1994). A comparison of nonresponse in mail, telephone, and face- to-face surveys: Applying multilevel modeling to meta-analysis. Quality and Quantity, 28(4), 329-344.

Human Rights Watch (2016). Countries: Europe/Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org

Huntington, S.P. (1993). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Tulsa, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Huskey, E. (1995). The rise of contested politics in Central Asia: Elections in Kyrgyzstan, 1989– 90. Europe-Asia Studies, 47(5), 813–833.

Huskey, E., & Hill, D. (2011). The 2010 referendum and parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, Electoral Studies, 30(4), 876-879

202

Huskey, E., & Hill, D. (2013). Regionalism, personalism, ethnicity, and violence: Parties and voter preference in the 2010 parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 29(3), 237-267.

ICG/International Crisis Group (2002). Kyrgyzstan’s political crisis: An exit strategy. Asia Report No. 37. Osh/Brussels, Kyrgyzstan/the Netherlands: International Crisis Group.

ICG/International Crisis Group (2004). Political transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and prospects. Asia Report No. 81. Osh/Brussels, Kyrgyzstan/the Netherlands: International Crisis Group.

ICG/International Crisis Group (2005). Kyrgyzstan: After the revolution. Asia Report No. 97. Bishkek/Brussels, Kyrgyzstan/the Netherlands: International Crisis Group

ICG/International Crisis Group (2006). Kyrgyzstan on the Edge. Asia Briefing No. 55. Bishkek/Brussels, Kyrgyzstan/the Netherlands: International Crisis Group.

ICG/International Crisis Group (2008). Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm. Asia Briefing No. 55. Bishkek/Brussels, Kyrgyzstan/the Netherlands: International Crisis Group.

IFES//International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2016a). Election Guide: Country Profile – Republic of Kazakhstan. Retrieved from http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/111

IFES//International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2016b). Election Guide: Country Profile – Kyrgyz Republic. Retrieved from http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2623

IFES//International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2016c). Election Guide: Country Profile – Republic of Tajikistan. Retrieved from http://www.electionguide.org/elections/ ?inst=&cont=Tajikistan&yr=

IFES//International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2016d). Election Guide: Country Profile – Republic of Turkmenistan. Retrieved from http://www.electionguide.org/elections/ ?inst=&cont=Turkmenistan&yr=

IFES//International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2016d). Election Guide: Country Profile – epublic of Uzbekistan. Retrieved from http://www.electionguide.org/elections/ ?inst=&cont=Uzbekistan&yr=

IndexMundi (2017). Kyrgyzstan population. Retrieved from http://www.indexmundi.com/ kyrgyzstan/population.html

Inglehard, R., & Norris, P. (2000). The developmental theory of the gender gap: Women’s and men’s voting behavior in global perspective. International Political Science Review, 21(4), 441-463.

203

IRI/International Republican Institute (2015). Public opinion survey [of] residents of Kyrgyzstan, February 10 - March 5, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/2015-04- 21_public_opinion_survey_residents_of_kyrgyzstan_february_10-march_5_2015.pdf.

IRIN/Integrated Regional Information Networks (2010, 17 June), “Kyrgyzstan: Delicate Ethnic Balance”, News Report. Retrieved from http://www.irinnews.org/report/89526/ kyrgyzstan-delicate-ethnic-balance.

Isaev, K. (2006). Peculiarities and results of the 2005 elections in Kyrgyzstan. CSES Conference and Planning Committee Meeting, Seville, Spain. Retrieved from http://www.cses.org/datacenter/module2/design/KGZ_2005_Design.pdf

Ismailbekova, A. (2014). Performing democracy: State-making through patronage in Kyrgyzstan. In M. Reeves, J. Rasanayagam, & J. Beyer (Eds.), Ethnographies of the state in Central Asia (pp. 78-98). Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.

Jackman, R. (1987). Political institutions and voter turnout in industrialized democracies. American Political Science Review, 81(2), 405-423.

Jackman, R., & Miller, R. (1995). Voter turnout in the industrial democracies during the 1980s. Comparative Political Studies, 25(4), 467–492.

Jessen, R., & Richter, H. (2011a). Non-competitive elections in 20th century dictatorships: Some observations and general considerations. In R. Jessen & H. Richter (Eds.) (2011b), Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th century dictatorships (pp. 9-36). Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag.

Jessen, R., & Richter, H. (Eds.). (2011b). Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th century dictatorships. Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag.

Kaase, M., & Newton, K. (Eds.). (1995). Beliefs in government. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Kalandadze, K. & Orenstein, M. (2009). Electoral protests and democratization beyond the Color Revolutions. Comparative Political Studies, 42(11), 1403–1425.

Kangas, R.D. (2004), Legal reform in Central Asia: Battling the influence of history. In Burghart, D. & Sabonis-Helf, T. (Eds.), In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the 21st Century” (pp. 65-91). Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy.

Karp, J., & Brockington, D. (2005). Social desirability and response validity: A comparative analysis of overreporting voter turnout in five countries. Journal of Politics, 67(3), 825-840

204

Kartawich, L. (2005, September). Kyrgyzstan: Parliamentary elections, February 2005. NORDEM report. Retrieved from http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/ programmes/nordem/publications/2005/0905.pdf

Katz, R.S. (1997). Democracy and elections. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Keeter, S., Miller, C., Kohut, A., Groves, R.M., & Presser, S. (2000). Consequences of reducing nonresponse in a national telephone survey. Public Opinion Quarterly, 64(2), 125-148.

Key, V.O., Jr. (1966). The responsible electorate: Rationality in presidential voting 1936-1960. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Knack, S. (1992). Civic norms, social sanctions, and voter turnout. Rationality and Society, 4(2), 133-156.

Knack, S. (1994). Does rain help the Republicans? Theory and evidence on turnout and the vote. Public Choice, 79(1-2), 187–209.

Knight, K., & Marsh, M. (2002). Varieties of election studies. Electoral Studies, 21(2), 169–187.

Koehler, K. (2009). Authoritarian institution building electoral politics and ruling party http://www.cses.org/datacenter/module2/design/KGZ_2005_Design.pdf formation in post-revolutionary Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek: OSCE Academy. Retrieved from http://www.osce-academy.net/upload/file/Authoritarian_Institution_Building_ %284%29_Kevin_K.pdf

Kornberg, A., & Clarke, H.D. (1992). Citizens and community: Political support in a representative democracy. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Kostadinova, T. (2003). Voter turnout dynamics in post-Communist Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 42(6), 741-759.

Kyogoku, J., & Ike, N. (1960). Urban-rural differences in voting behavior in postwar Japan. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 9(1/2), 167-185.

KNSC/Kyrgyz National Statistic Committee (2009). Kyrgyzstan census data, 2009. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: KNSC.

Kubicek, P. (2011). Are Central Asian leaders learning from upheavals in Kyrgyzstan? Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2(2), 115-124.

Kuchukeeva, A., & O’Loughlin, J. (2003). Civic engagement and democratic consolidation in Kyrgyzstan. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 44(8), 557-587.

205

Kuzio, T. (2006). Civil society, youth and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39(3), 365-386.

Lane, R.E. (1965). The politics of consensus in an age of affluence. American Political Science Review, 59(4), 874-895.

Lane, R.E., & Sears, D.O. (1964). Public Opinion. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Lau, R.R., & Pomper, G.M. (2001). Effects of negative campaigning on turnout in U.S. Senate elections, 1988–1998. Journal of Politics, 63(3), 804-819.

Lazarsfeld, P.F. (1935). The art of asking why: Three principles underlying the formulation of questionnaires. National Marketing Review, 1, 32-43.

Lazarsfeld, P.F., Berelson, B.R., & Gaudet, H. (1948). The people’s choice. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Ledeneva, A. (2006). How Russia really works: The informal practices that shaped post-Soviet politics and business. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2002). The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 51-65.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press

Lewin, M. (1988). The Gorbachev phenomenon: A historical interpretation. Berkley, CA: University of California Press.

Lewis-Beck, M., Jacoby, W.G., Norpoth, H., & Weisberg, H.F. (2008). The American voter revisited. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.

Lewis-Beck, M.S., & Paldam, M. (2000). Economic voting: An introduction. Electoral Studies, 19(2/3), 113-122.

Lewis-Beck, M.S., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 3(1), 183-219.

Li, L. (2003). The empowering effect of village elections in China. Asian Survey, 43(4), 648- 662.

Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1994). Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945–1990. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

206

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lindberg, S. (2006a). Democracy and elections in Africa. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press.

Lindberg, S. (2006b). Opposition parties and democratization in sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24(1), 123-138.

Lindberg, S. (Ed.) (2009). Democratization by elections: A new mode of transition. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linz, J.J. (1975). Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. In F. Greenstein & N. Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of political science: Macropolitical theory (pp. 175-411). Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.

Linz, J.J. (1978). Non-competitive elections in Europe. In Hermet, G., Richard R., & Rouquie, A. (Eds.), Elections without choice (pp. 36-65). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.

Linz, J.J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S.M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69-105.

Long, J.S., & Freese, J. (2006). Regression models for categorical dependent variables using Stata. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.

Lopes, T.F. (2012). Transformation versus stagnation: A reading on the symbolism beyond recent elections at the Post-Soviet Space. Strategic Outlook - Observatory for Human Security report. Retrieved on 15 January 2015 from http://www.strategicoutlook.org/publications/A_reading_on_the_symbolism_beyond_rec ent_elections_at_the_Post-Soviet_Space.pdf.

Lukes, S. (1974). Power: A radical view. London, United Kingdom: Macmillan.

Luong, P.J. (1996). Ethnopolitics, strategic bargaining, and institutional design: Setting the rules of electoral competition in post-Soviet Central Asia. International negotiation, 1, 445- 470.

Luong, P.J. (2002). Institutional change and political continuity in post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, perceptions, and pacts. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

207

Lust-Okar, E. (2005). Structuring conflict in the Arab world: Incumbents, opponents, and institutions. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Lyons, T. (2005). Demilitarizing politics: Elections on the uncertain road to peace. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Macaluso, T., & Wanat, J. (1979). Voting turnout and religiosity. Polity, 12(1), 158-169.

Mackenzie, W.J.M. (1958). Free Elections. London, United Kingdom: George Allen and Unwin.

Magaloni, B. (2006). Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Magaloni, B. (2008). Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule. Comparative Political Studies, 41(4-5), 715–741.

Manion, M. (1996). The electoral connection in the Chinese countryside. American Political Science Review, 90(4), 736-48.

Marat, E. (2012). Kyrgyzstan: A parliamentary system based on inter-elite consensus. Demokratizatsiya, 20 (4), 325-344.

Markova, I. (Ed). (2004). Trust and democratic transition in post-Communist Europe. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

March, J.G., & Olsen, J.P. (1989). Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of politics. New York, NY: Free Press.

Martin, P.S. (2004). Inside the black box of negative campaign effects: Three reasons why negative campaigns mobilize. Political Psychology, 25(4), 545-562.

Mason, J.A. (2009). Internationalist mobilization during the collapse of the Soviet Union: The Moldovan elections of 1990. Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 37(2), 159-176.

Matveeva, A. (2010). Legitimising Central Asian authoritarianism: political manipulation and symbolic power. In S. Cummings (Ed.), Symbolism and power in Central Asia: Politics of spectacular (pp. 12-38). London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

McCann, J.A., & Domınguez, J.I. (1998). Mexicans react to political fraud and corruption: an assessment of public opinion and voting behavior. Electoral Studies, 17(4), 483-503.

McClain, P.D., & Garcia, J.A. (1993). Expanding disciplinary boundaries: Black, Latino, and racial minority group politics in political science. In A.W. Finifter (Ed.), Political science: The state of the discipline II (pp. 247-279). Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.

208

McCoy, J., & Hartlyn, J. (2009). The relative powerlessness of elections. In Lindberg, S. (Ed.), Democratization by elections: A new mode of transition (pp. 47-76). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

McMann, K.M. (2006). Economic autonomy and democracy: Hybrid regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

McMann, K.M. (2007). The shrinking of the welfare state: Central Asians’ assessments of Soviet and post-Soviet governance. In J. Sahadeo & R.Zanca (Eds.), Everyday life in Central Asia: Past and present (pp. 232-247). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

McMillan, C.J. (2005, June). Kyrgyzstan – failed state or democratic revolution? Policy Options. Retrieved from http://policyoptions.irpp.org/issues/the-gomery- effect/kyrgyzstan-failed-state-or-democratic-revolution

McNulty, J. E. (2005). Phone-based GOTV–What’s on the line? Field experiments with varied partisan components, 2002–2003. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 601(1), 41–65.

Melvin, N. (2011). Promoting a stable and multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the causes and legacies of violence. Central Asia Project Occasional Paper Series, No. 3. New York, NY: Open Society Institute.

Merl, S. (2011). Elections in the Soviet Union, 1937-1989: A view into a paternalistic world from below. In R. Jessen and H. Richter (Eds.), Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th century dictatorships (pp. 276-308). Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag.

Michelson, M.R. (2003). Getting out the Latino vote: How door-to-door canvassing influences voter turnout in rural central California. Political Behavior, 25(3), 247–263.

Milbrath, L., & Goel, M.L. (1977). Political participation: How and why do people get involved in politics? (2nd ed.). Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

Miller, A.H., & Listhaug, O. (1990). Political parties and confidence in government: A comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States. British Journal of Political Science, 20(3), 357-386.

Miller, W.E., & Stokes, D.E. (1966). Constituency influences on Congress. The American Political Science Review, 57(1), 45-56.

Min, Y. (2004). News coverage of negative political campaigns: An experiment of negative campaign effects on turnout and candidate preference. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 9(4), 95-111.

209

Morse, J,. & Richards, I. (2002). Read me first: A user’s guide to qualitative methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Morlino, L. (2009). Are there hybrid regimes? Or are they just an optical illusion? European Political Science Review, 1(2), 273-296.

Munro, N., & Rose, R. (2001). Elections in the Russian Federation (Studies in Public Policy Number 344, Centre for the Study of Public Policy), Glasgow, United Kingdom: University of Strathclyde Press.

Nadeau, R., & Blais, A. (1993). Accepting the election outcome: The effect of participation on losers’ consent. British Journal of Political Science, 23(4), 553-563.

Nagle, J.D., & Mahr, A. (1999). Democracy and democratization: Post-Communist Europe in comparative perspective. London, United Kingdom: Sage Publications.

Nannestad, P., & Paldam, M. (1994). The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 Years. Public Choice, 79(3), 213-245.

NDI/IRI (National Democratic Institute/International Republican Institute), (2008, 7 January). Statement on Kyrgyzstan’s December 16 Parliamentary Elections, January 7, 2008. Retrieved from https://www.ndi.org/files/2264_kg_statement_parlelect_en_020108.pdf.

Nelson, L.D., & Amonashvili, P. (1992). Voting and political attitudes in Soviet Georgia. Soviet Studies, 44(4), 687-697.

Neuman, L.W. (1997). Social research methods, qualitative and quantitative approaches (3rd ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Nichol, J. (1995). Azerbaijan. In Curtis, G.E. (Ed.), Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; Country Studies (pp. 79-148). Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress

Nichol, J. (2005). Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Developments and implications. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL32864. Washington, D.C.. Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41178.pdf

Nie, N.H., Junn, J., & Stehlik-Barry, K. (1996). Education and democratic citizenship in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Niemi, G., Weisberg, H.F., & Kimball, D.C. (Eds.). (2011). Controversies of voting behavior (5th ed.). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Nikolayenko, O. (2010). Support for Democracy in Central Asia. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 23(2), 191-204.

210

Nohlen, D., Grotz, F., & Hartmann, C. (2001). Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A data handbook: Vol. 1. Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Noren, J., & Kurtzweg, L. (1993). The Soviet economy unravels: 1985-91. In R.F. Kaufman & J.P. Hardt (Eds.), The Former Soviet Union in Transition: Study Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, vol.1 (pp. 8-33). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Norris, P. (Ed.). (1999). Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Norris, P. (2002). Democratic phoenix: Reinventing political activism. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Norris P. (2004). Electoral engineering: Voting rules and political behavior. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P., Frank R.W., & Martinez i Coma, F. (Eds.). (2015). Contentious elections: From ballots to barricades. New York, NY: Routledge

Nussberger, A. (2007). Comments on the constitutional situation in the Kyrgyz Republic. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Strasbourg, France. Retrieved from http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/ default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2007)045-e

O’Donnell, G., & P. Schmitter. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ochs, M. (2005). Human rights in Central Asia. In D. Burghart & T.Sbonis-Helf (Eds.), In the tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s path to the 21st century (pp. 93-113). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University.

Olds, H.W. Jr. (1997). Public opinion in Kyrgyzstan, 1996. Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES).

Olcott, M.B. (1997a). Kazakhstan. In G.E. Curtis (Ed.), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: Country studies (pp. 1-98). Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Olcott, M.B. (1997b). Kyrgyzstan. In Curtis Glenn E. (Ed.), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: Country Studies (pp. 101-193). Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

211

Olcott, M.B. (2005). Central Asia’s second chance. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Olimova, S., & Olimov, M. (2014). Public opinion, democracy, and authoritarianism in Central Asia. Retrieved from http://www.ca-c.org/online/2014/journal_eng/cac-02/14.shtml.

Omelicheva, M.Y. (2011). Islam in Kazakhstan: A survey of contemporary trends and sources of Securitization. Central Asia Survey 30(2), 243–256.

Omelicheva, M.Y. (Ed). (2015). Nationalism and identity construction in Central Asia: Dimensions, dynamics, and directions. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books

OSCE/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2000, 10 April). Kyrgyzstan, Parliamentary Elections, 20 February and 12 March 2000: Final Report. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kyrgyzstan/15803

OSCE/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2001, 15 January). Kyrgyzstan, Presidential Election, 29 October 2000: Final Report. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kyrgyzstan/15802

OSCE/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2003, 2 February). Political Assessment Report on Constitutional Referendum in Kyrgyz Republic. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/15800.

OSCE/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2005, 27 December). Kyrgyzstan, Presidential Election, 10 July 2005: Final Report. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/17661.

OSCE/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2008, 24 April). Kyrgyz Republic: Pre-Term Parliamentary Elections, 16 December 2007: Final Report. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kyrgyzstan/28778?download=true.

OSCE/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2009, 22 October). Kyrgyzstan, Presidential Election, 23 July 2009: Final Report. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kyrgyzstan/39923.

OSCE/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2010a, 27 June). Limited Referendum Observation Mission, Kyrgyz Republic–Constitutional Referendum, 27 June 2010. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/70938.

212

OSCE/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2010b). Kyrgyzstan’s Vibrant and Pluralistic Parliamentary Elections Constitute Further Consolidation of Democracy. 11 October 2010. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/72409.

OSCE/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2015, 15 May).Tajikistan, Parliamentary Elections, 1 March 2015: Final Report. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/tajikistan/158081

OSCE/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2016). OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr

Ottaway, M. (2003). Democracy challenged: The rise of semi-authoritarianism. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Paldam M., & Nannestad, P. (2000). What do voters know about the economy? A study of Danish data, 1990–1993. Electoral Studies, 19(2), 363-392.

Pammett, J.H., & DeBardeleben, J. (1996). The meaning of elections in transitional democracies: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine. Electoral Studies, 15(3), 363-381.

Pammett, J.H. (1999). Elections and democracy in Russia. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32(1), 45-60.

Parenti, M. (1967). Ethnic politics and the persistence of ethnic identification. American Political Science Review, 61, 717-726.

Pasek, J., & Krosnick, J.A. (2010). Optimizing survey questionnaire design in political science: Insights from psychology. In J. E. Leighley (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of American elections and political behavior (pp. 27-51). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Patzelt, W. (2011), Elections in modern dictatorships: Some analytical considerations. In R. Jessen and H. Richter (Eds.), Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th century dictatorships (pp. 126-144). Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag.

Patterson, T. (2002). The vanishing voter; public involvement in an age of uncertainty. New York, NY: Knopf.

Patterson, S.C., & Caldeira, G.A. (1983). Getting out the vote: Participation in gubernatorial elections. American Political Science Review, 77(3), 675–689.

Pederson, M. (1983). Changing patterns for electoral volatility in European party systems, 1948- 1977: Explorations in explanation.” In H. Daalder & P. Mair (Eds.), West European part systems: continuity and change. London, United Kingdom: Sage Publications.

213

Pei, M. (1995). Creeping democratization in China. Journal of Democracy, 6(4), 65-79.

Peimani, H. (2009). Conflict and security in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Perlmutter, A. (1981). Modern authoritarianism: A comparative institutional analysis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Pilon, J.G. (1998). Democratic transition in Central Asia: An assessment. SAIS Review, 18(2), 89-103.

Pintor, R.L., Gratschew, M., & Sullivan, K. (2002). Voter turnout rates from a comparative perspective. In R.L. Pintor & M. Gratschew (Eds.), Voter Turnout Since 1945: A Global report (pp. 75-91). Stockholm (Sweden): International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

Piven, F. & Cloward, R. (2000). Why Americans still don’t vote: And why politicians want it that way. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Plane, D.L., & Gershtenson, J. (2004). Candidates’ ideological locations, abstention, and turnout in U.S. midterm senate elections. Political Behavior, 26(1), 69-93.

Plutzer, E. (2002). Becoming a habitual voter: Inertia, resources, and growth in young adulthood. American Political Science Review, 96(1), 41-56.

Pomfret, R. (2006). The Central Asian economies since independence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ponton, G. (1994). The Soviet era: Soviet politics from Lenin to Yeltsin. Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell, 1994.

Powell, G.B. (1980). Voting turnout in thirty democracies: Partisan, legal and socio-economic influences. In R. Rose (Ed.), Electoral participation: A comparative analysis. London, UK: Sage.

Powell, G.B. (1982). Comparative democracies: Participation, stability and violence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Powell, G.B. (1986). American turnout in comparative perspective. American Political Science Review, 80(1), 17-43.

Pravda, A. (1978). Elections in Communist party states. In G. Hermet, R. Rose, & A. Rouquie (Eds.), Elections without choice (pp. 169-195). New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.

Pryde, I. (1995). Kyrgyzstan’s slow progress to reform. World Today, 51(6), 115-118.

214

Puddington, A., & Roylance, T. (2017). Populists and autocrats: The dual threat to global democracy (overview essay). In Freedom in the World 2017. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017

Putnam, R., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ra’anan, U. (Ed.) (1990). The Soviet empire: The challenge of national and democratic movements. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Radcliff, B. (1992). The welfare state, turnout, and the economy. American Political Science Review, 86(2), 444-456.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2017, May 29). Atambaev says Kyrgyzstan to hold presidential vote On October 15. Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan- atambaev-presidential-election-october-15/28516045.html

Rae, D. (1967). The political consequences of electoral laws. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Rakhmatullaev, S. (2015). Socio-economic stratification of Uzbekistan's population: Past and present. In Sengupta, A. & Rakhimov M. (Eds.), South and Central Asia. Insights and Commentaries (pp. 307-322). New Delhi, India: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd.

Rakowska-Harmstone, T. (1970). Russia and nationalism in Central Asia: The case of Tadzhikistan. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press.

Rasanayagam, J., Beyer, J., & Reeves M. (2014). Introduction. In M. Reeves, J. Rasanaygam, & J. Beyer. Ethnographies of the state in Central Asia: Performing politics (pp. 1-26). Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.

Reeves, M., Rasanaygam, J., & Beyer, J. (2014). Ethnographies of the state in Central Asia: Performing politics. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.

Riker, W.H. (1965). Democracy in the United States (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Macmillan.

Riker, W.H. & Ordeshook, P.C. (1968). A theory of the calculus of voting. American Political Science Review, 62(1), 25-43.

Rose, R. & Mossawir, H. (1967). Voting and elections: A functional analysis. Political Studies, 15(2), 173-201.

Rose, R. (Ed.). (1974). Electoral behavior: A comparative handbook. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

215

Rose, R., & Munro, N. (2009). Parties and elections in new European democracies. Colchester, United Kingdom: ECPR press.

Rosenstone, S.J. (1982). Economic adversity and voter turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 26(1), 25-46.

Rosenstone, S.J., & Hansen, J.M. (1993). Mobilization, participation and democracy in America. New York, NY: Macmillan.

Rothstein, B. (2004). Social trust and honesty in government: A causal mechanisms approach. In J. Kornai, B. Rothstein, & S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.), Creating social trust in post- socialist transition (pp. 13-30). New York, NY: Macmillan.

Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E.M. (2005). All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. World Politics, 58(1), pp. 41-72

Roy, O. (2000). The new Central Asia: The creation of nations. London, United Kingdom: I. B. Tauris.

Rywkin, M. (1990). Moscow’s Muslim challenge: Soviet Central Asia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Rywkin, M. (1994). Moscow’s lost Empire. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Ruffin, M.H., & Waugh, D.C. (Eds.). (1999). Civil society in Central Asia. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Rumer, B. & Zhukov, S. (Eds.) (1998). Central Asia: The challenge of independence. New York, N.Y.: M.E. Sharp.

Sakwa, R. (1995). The Russian elections of December 1993. Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 195-228.

Salant, P., & Dillman, D. A. (1994). How to conduct your own survey. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.

Salmon, W.C. (1978). Why Ask, “Why?”? An inquiry concerning scientific explanation. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 51(6), 683-705.

Savchenko, A. (2009). Belarus: A perpetual borderland. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.

Schatz, E. (2006). Access by accident: Legitimacy claims and democracy promotion in authoritarian Central Asia. International Political Science Review, 27(3), 263-284.

Schatz, E. (2009). Soft authoritarian “tool kit”: Agenda-setting power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Comparative Politics, 41(2), 203-222.

216

Schedler, A. (2002a). Elections without democracy: The menu of manipulation. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 36-50.

Schedler, A. (2002b). The nested game of democratization by elections. International Political Science Review, 23(1), 103-122.

Schedler, A. (2006a), The Logic of electoral authoritarianism. In A. Schedler (Ed.), Electoral authoritarianism: The dynamics of unfree competition (1-23). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Schedler, A. (Ed). (2006b). Electoral authoritarianism: The dynamics of unfree competition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner publishers.

Scholzman, K.L., & Verba, S. (1979). Injury to insult: Unemployment, class, and political Response. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York, NY: Harper.

Schur, L.A., & Kruse, D.L. (2000). What determines voter turnout? Lessons from citizens with disabilities. Social Science Quarterly, 81(2), 571-587.

Schur, L., Shields, T., Kruse, D. & Schriner, K. (2002). Enabling democracy: Disability and voter turnout. Political Research Quarterly, 55(1), 167-190.

Seligson. M.A, & Booth, J.A. (1995). Elections and democracy in Central America, revisited. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Shabad, T. (1987, April 15). Soviet to begin multi-candidate election in June. New York Times Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/15/world/soviet-to-begin-multi- candidate-election-experiment-in-june.html

Shi, T. (1999a). Voting and nonvoting in China: Voting behavior in plebiscitary and limited- choice elections. Journal of Politics, 61(4), 1115-1139.

Shi, T. (1999b). Village committee elections in China: Institutionalist tactics for democracy. World Politics, 51(3), 385-412.

Smith, M.B. (2011). Popular sovereignty and constitutional rights in the USSR’s Supreme Soviet elections in February 1946. In R. Jessen, H. Richter (Eds.), Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th Century dictatorships (pp. 59-80). Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag.

Smith, T. (1983). The hidden 25 Percent: An analysis of nonresponse on the 1980 general social survey. Public Opinion Quarterly, 46, 386-404.

217

Smyth, R. (2006). Candidate strategies and electoral competition in the Russian Federation: democracy without foundation. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Sjöberg, F.M. (2011). Competitive elections in authoritarian states: weak states, strong elites, and fractional societies in Central Asia and beyond. Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University.

Southwell, P. L. (1985). Alienation and nonvoting in the United States: A refined operationalization. Western Political Quarterly, 38, 663–674.

Spector, R.A. (2004), The transformation of Askar Akayev, President of Kyrgyzstan, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series. University of California-Berkley. Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0dn0s80v#page-1

Stoetzel, J. (1955). Voting behavior in France. British Journal of Sociology, 6(2), 104-122

Stinger, A. (2003). Soviet development in Central Asia: The classic colonial syndrome? In T. Everett-Heath (Ed.), Central Asia: aspects of transition (pp. 146-166). London, United Kingdom: RoutledgeCurzon.

Strate, J.M., Parrish, C.J., Elder, C.D., & Ford, C. (1989). Life span civic development and voting participation. American Political Science Review, 83(2), 443–464.

Strauss, A.L. (1987). Qualitative analysis for social scientists. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Strauss, A.L., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research. Newbury Rark, CA: Sage.

Szporluk, R. (1992). The national question. In T.J. Colton and R. Legvold (Eds.), After the Soviet Union: From empire to nations (pp. 85-112). New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company.

Tarrow, S. (1971). The urban-rural cleavage in political involvement: The case of France. The American Political Science Review, 65(2), 341-357. Tate, K. (1991). Black political participation in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections. American Political Science Review, 85(4), 1159–1176.

Tedin, K. (1994). Popular support for competitive elections in the Soviet Union. Comparative Political Studies, 27(2), 241-271.

Teixeira, R. (1992). The disappearing American voter. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

218

Tengreinews (2016, 23 March). Nizkuyu yavku na vyborah v Almaty svyzali s obestsenivaniem tenge [Low turnout in Almaty was connected to the devaluation of{national currency} tenge]. Retrieved from https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/nizkuyu -yavku-vyiborah- almatyi-svyazali-obestsenivaniem-291298/

Timpone, R.J. (1998). Structure, behavior, and voter turnout in the United States. American Political Science Review, 92(1), 145–158.

Thompson M., & Kuntz, P. (2004). Stolen elections: The case of the Serbian October. Journal of Democratization, 15(4), 159-172.

Tourangeau, R., & Plewes, T.J. (2013). Nonresponse in social science surveys: A Research agenda. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.

Tsipursky, G. (2011). Integration, celebration, and challenge: Soviet youth and elections, 1953- 1968. In R. Jessen and H. Richter (Eds.), (2011). Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections under 20th century dictatorships (pp. 81-102). Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag.

Traugott, M.W., & Katosh, J.P (1979). Response validity in surveys of voting behavior. Public Opinion Quarterly, 43(3), 359-77.

Tucker, R.C. (1987). Political culture and leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev, New York: Norton Publishing.

Tucker, J. (2002). The first decade of post-Communist elections and voting: What have we studied, and how have we studied it? Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 271–304.

Tucker, J. (2007). Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-Communist colored revolutions. Perspectives on Politics, 5(3), 535–551.

Turner, M.J., Shields, T.G., & Sharp, D. (2001). Changes and continuities in the determinants of older adults’ voter turnout 1952-1996. The Gerontologist, 41(6), 805-818.

Ubaydullaeva, R.A. (2004). Sotsialnyi monitoring i sotsialnoe samochuvstviye grajdan Uzbekistana [Social monitoring of the social feelings of citizens of Uzbekistan], Ekanomika i klass sobstvennikov, No. 3.

UNDP/United Nations Development Program (2000). Public Opinion Survey. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: UNDP.

UNDP/United Nations Development Program (2009), Kyrgyzstan: Successful youth, successful country: NHDR 2010. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: UNDP. Retrieved from http://www. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/kyrgyzstan-nhdr-2010-en.pdf

219

UNDP/United Nations Development Program (2012). Kyrgyzstan in numbers. Retrieved from http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/library/democratic_governance/kyr gyzstan-in-numbers.html

UNDP/United Nations Development Program (2014). Poverty, inequality, and vulnerability in the Transition and Developing Economies of Europe and Central Asia. Retrieved from http://www.eurasia.undp.org/content/dam/rbec/docs/Poverty%20Inequality%20and%20V ulnerability.pdf

U.S. Department of State (2013). Kyrgyz Republic 2013 international religious freedom report. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222545.pdf

Van Buuren, S. (2012). Flexible imputation of missing data. Boca Raton, FL.: CRC Press.

Van de Walle, N. (2002). Elections without democracy: Africa’s range of regimes. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 66–80.

Van der Brug, W., & van der Eijk, C., & Franklin, M. (2007). The economy and the vote: Economic conditions and elections in fifteen countries. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Verba, S., & Nie, N.H. (1972). Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality. New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L., & Brady, H.E. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wagner, S. (1996). Public opinion in Tajikistan, 1996. Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)

Wattenberg, M.P. (2002). Where have all the voters gone? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wattenberg, M.P., & Brians, C.L. (1999). Negative campaign advertising: Demobilizer or mobilizer? American Political Science Review, 93(4), 891-899.

Weitz-Shapiro, R., & Winters, M.S. (2011). The link between voting and life satisfaction in Latin America. Latin American Politics and Society, 53(4), 101-126.

White, S. (1985), Non-competitive elections and national politics: The USSR Supreme Soviet elections of 1984. Electoral Studies, 4(3), 215-229.

White, S., Rose, R., & McAllister, I. (1997). How Russia votes. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.

220

Wigell, M. (2008). Mapping “hybrid regimes”: Regime types and concepts in comparative politics, Democratization, 15(2), 320-250.

Wills, J.W., Jost, M., & Nilakanta, R. (2007). Foundations of qualitative research: Interpretive and critical approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Wilson, K. (2012) How Russians view electoral fairness: A Qualitative analysis. Europe-Asia Studies, 64 (1), 145-168.

Wolfinger, R.E., & Rosenstone, S. J. (1980). Who votes? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Wolfinger, R.E., & Rosenstone, S.J. (1993). Mobilization, participation, and democracy in America. New York, NY: Macmillan Press.

Wolfinger, N.H., & Wolfinger, R.E. (2008). Family structure and voter turnout. Social Forces 86(4), 1513-1528

Wood, T. (2006). Reflections on the revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 30 (2), 43-56.

World Bank (2016). World development indicators. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/ data-catalog /world-development-indicators

Wyman, M., Miller, B., White, S., & Heywood, P. (1994). The Russian elections of December, 1993. Electoral Studies, 13, 254-271.

Yalch, R.F. (1976). Pre-election interview effects on voter turnout. Public Opinion Quarterly, 40(3), 331-336.

Zaslavsky, V., & Brym, R.J. (1978). The functions of elections in the USSR. Soviet Studies, 30 (3), 362-371.

Zakaria, F. (1997). The Rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76, 22-43.

221

APPENDIX A: Map of Central Asia

222

APPENDIX B: Basic facts about the post-Soviet Central Asian countries

Country Basic Facts Kazakhstan Area: 2,724,900 sq km (slightly less than four times the size of Texas)

Population: 15,399,437 (July 2009 est.)

Ethnic groups: Kazakh 53.4%, Russian 30%, Ukrainian 3.7%, Uzbek 2.5%, German 2.4%, Tatar 1.7%, Uygur 1.4%, other 4.9% (1999 census)

GDP (purchasing power parity): $175.8 billion (2008 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP): $11,500 (2008 est.)

Kyrgyzstan Area: 198,500 sq km (slightly smaller than South Dakota)

Population: 5,356,869 (July 2008 est.)

Ethnic groups: Kyrgyz 64.9%, Uzbek 13.8%, Russian 12.5%, Dungan 1.1%, Ukrainian 1%, Uygur 1%, Others 5.7% (1999 census)

GDP (purchasing power parity): $11.61 billion (2008 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP): $2,200 (2008 est.)

Tajikistan Area: 143,100 sq km (slightly smaller than Wisconsin)

Population: 7,349,145 (July 2009 est.)

Ethnic groups: Tajik 79.9%, Uzbek 15.3%, Russian 1.1%, Kyrgyz 1.1%, other 2.6% (2000 census)

GDP (purchasing power parity): $13.16 billion (2008 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP): $1,800 (2008 est.)

Turkmenistan Area: 488,100 sq km (slightly larger than California)

Population: 4,884,887 (July 2009 est.)

Ethnic groups: Turkmen 85%, Uzbek 5%, Russian 4%, other 6% (2003)

GDP (purchasing power parity): $29.78 billion (2008 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP): $6,200 (2008 est.)

Uzbekistan Area: 447,400 sq km (slightly larger than California)

Population: 27,606,007 (July 2009 est.)

Ethnic groups: Uzbek 80%, Russian 5.5%, Tajik 5%, Kazakh 3%, Karakalpak 2.5%, Tatar 1.5%, other 2.5% (1996 est.)

GDP (purchasing power parity): $71.67 billion (2008 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP): $2,600 (2008 est.)

223

APPENDIX C: Dissertation’s 2011 Kyrgyzstan Survey Questionnaire

Question 1: In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions? (1 - very bad’; 2 - fairly bad; 3 - neither good nor bad’; 4 - fairly good; 5 - very good).

Question 2: How interested are you in politics and government? (0 - not interested’; 2 - somewhat interested; 3- very interested)

Question 3: Do you follow politics in the mass media? (1 – nearly every day; 2 – at least once or twice a weak; 3- less than once a week; 7 – hard to say)

Question 4: How often do you participate in the elections as a voter? (1 – frequently; 2 – occasionally; 3 – rarely; 7 – hard to say)

Question 5: Did you cast a ballot in the presidential election on 23 July 2009? (1 – yes; 2 – no; 7. hard to say)

Question 6: Whom did you vote for?

Question 7.1: On 23 July 2009, there was an election of the President of Kyrgyzstan. Tell me, please, during the presidential election did you talk with other people to persuade them to vote for a particular candidate? (1 – yes; 2 – no; 7. hard to say)

Question 7.2: How often did you do this? Would you say frequently? Occasionally? Rarely? (1 – frequently; 2 – occasionally; 3 – rarely; 7 – hard to say)

Question 8: Do you think of yourself as a supporter (or member) of any political party or civic organization? (yes, no)

Question 9: Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won’t make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, where 1 means that voting won’t make a difference to what happens and 5 means that voting can make a difference, where would you place yourself?

Question 10: Thinking about how elections in Kyrgyzstan work in practice, how well do elections ensure that the views of various groups of voters are represented in the parliament? (1 – very well; 2 – quite well; 3 – not very well; 4 – not well at all; 5 – hard to say)

224

Question 11: On the whole, are you fully satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or completely dissatisfied with how democracy is developing in Kyrgyzstan?(1 – fully satisfied; 2 – satisfied; 3 – dissatisfied; 4 – completely dissatisfied; 7 – hard to say)

Question 12: Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: “A democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government.” Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with 5 this statement? (1 – agree strongly; 2 – agree; 3 – disagree; 4 – disagree strongly; 7 – hard to say).

Question 13: How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in Kyrgyzstan? (1 -- very widespread, 2 -- quite widespread,3 -- not very widespread, 4 -- it hardly happens at all; 7-- hard to say)

Question 14: Speaking about the people of the community (neighborhood, village, city, country): 1. Do you think you can trust most of them or 2. Do you have to be careful when dealing with them? 7. Don’t know

Question 15: Now, could you tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following institutions (1- a great deal,2- a fair amount, 3 - not much, 4 - none at all): a) The national government (cabinet of ministers) b) The national parliament c) The political parties d) The law and courts e) The electoral institutes and processes f) The police g) The civil service h) Non-governmental (non-for-profit) organizations i) Religious organizations

Question 16: Speaking of the presidential election of July 23, 2009, how fair was this election? Please use a 5-point scale where 1 means that the election was conducted fairly and 5 means that the election was conducted unfairly. (from 1. LAST ELECTION WAS FAIR . . . to 5. LAST ELECTION WAS UNFAIR).

Question 17: In general, how would you characterize the electoral process in Kyrgyzstan? (1. Very good, 2. Good, 3. Bad, 4. Don’t know)

Question 18: What negative sides of the election system in Kyrgyzstan did you notice?

225

Question 19: How much did you pay attention to the following during the campaign: TV, Newspapers, National Radio, Internet? (1-Often; 2_Sometimes; 3_Hardly ever; 4_Never).

Question 20: How well do you think the government is dealing with the following issues? (1 - Very well. 2 - Fairly well, 3 - Not so well, 4 - Not well at all, 5 - Don’t know) a) The economy b) Political corruption c) Human rights d) Unemployment e) Crime f) The quality of public services g) Increase of immigration h) Interethnic relations

Question 21: In general, how would you describe social and economic conditions in Kyrgyzstan? (1 - very bad’; 2 - fairly bad; 3 - neither good nor bad’; 4 - fairly good; 5 - very good).

F1 Please indicate your gender. F2 What is your age. F3 What is the highest level of education you have completed? F4 What is your occupation? F5 What is your ethnicity and religion? F6 Region F7 City size

The question 22 about the “meaning” that citizens attach to elections was adapted from Pammett (1999): Question 22: How important is for you the following nine meanings of the elections?

Importance Meanings of Elections Large Moderate Small Don’t know 1 Choose among particular policies. 2 Hold governments accountable for past actions 3 Advance social class interests 4 Advance ethnic/national/religious interests 5 Gain things for self and family 6 Comment on state of country 7 Keep politicians honest 8 Choose among leaders’ personalities 9 Deceive the people

226

APPENDIX D: Kent State University IRB approval notification

------Forwarded message ------From: Askat Dukenbaev Date: Sat, Jan 28, 2012 at 3:07 PM Subject: Re: IRB Response To: "MCCREARY, KEVIN R" Cc: [email protected]

Dear Kevin, thanks for the good news. All the best, Askat.

On Fri, Jan 27, 2012 at 4:42 PM, MCCREARY, KEVIN R wrote: > Hello Askat, > > Thank you for stopping by the other day to discuss your IRB. After review it > was determined that no further action was required on your part and your > initial approval still stands. > > > Please let me know if you have any questions. > > Thank you, > > Kevin McCreary > > Research Compliance Coordinator > > 222 Cartwright Hall > > 330-672-8058

227