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1 Introduction Notes 1 INTRODUCTION 1. Chechens and the closely related Ingush together call themselves the Vainakh or Vaynakh people. 2. John B. Henriksen (2001) states, “The question of whether the right of self-determination has been recognized under international law outside the context of traditional de-colonization is still a very controversial matter. However, the United Nations process on the rights of indigenous peoples indicates that understanding of the scope of the right of self-determination may be evolving further” (p. 7). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (WGIA; undated) states, “What is most widely implied in the term self-determination is the right to participate in the democratic process of governance and to influence one’s future—politically, socially and cultur- ally. Self-determination embodies the right for all peoples to determine their own economic, social and cultural development. Self-determination has thus been defined by the International Court of Justice . as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples” (“Self-determination,” undated, accessed February 29, 2013, http://www.iwgia.org/human- rights/self-determination). (Emphasis in the original.) 3. See “History,” (no author or date indicated) at the Chechen website Vaynakh Online, http://www.waynakh.com/eng/chechnya/history/. See also Mairbek Vatchagaev’s (undated) informative description of Islam in Chechnya, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_ news%5D=2875#.U5EFavldUlw. 4. The actual number cited in the census is 1,268,989. There are some disputes regarding census statistics, however: see Valery Dzutsev’s 2010 article on the Jamestown Foundation’s website, at http://www. jamestown .org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37171# .U44K0XL6HD4. 5. The 2010 Russian Federation census lists the number of Ingush in the Republic of Ingushetia as 412,529. 178 Notes 6. Dzutsev references this quote from source: http://north-osetia.kavkaz- uzel.ru/articles/205997/. 7. Council of Europe (2010) report titled “Legal Remedies for Human R ights Violations in the North-Caucasus Region,” retrieved from http:// www.assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2010/20100531_caucasus_e .pdf. 8. Time spent in Kabardino-Balkaria involved private capacity building sup- port for local humanitarian organizations. 9. In the Russian language, the word “Negro” is often used to refer to black- skinned people, rather than the Russian word “black.” Chechens similarly utilize this phrase for all black-skinned people, including those in the United States and Europe. 2 LIVING IN TALES 1. Musa Akhmadov, 1999, utilizes the Chechen word nokhchalla to refer to “Chechen-ness” (p. 12). 2. The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was the name given by Chechens to the first independent Chechen state, beginning in 1991 with the rule of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the first president after independence. 3. Current insurgent forces, led by Doku Umarov, dissolved the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and proclaimed a “Caucasus Emirate” in 2007. 4. In August 1999, Chechen military commander Shamil Basayev led a group of fighters into Dagestan. There are varied alleged rationales for the incursion, including goals of supporting Dagestani fighters there, to further the unification of Chechnya-Dagestan; a plot to remove Aslan Maskhadov from power as president of Ichkeria; and, among others, sim- ply to provide justification to Russia to reinvade Chechnya and regain control in the region. Russian forces repelled the Dagestani incursion, and after a series of Moscow apartment building bombings in early September (Chechen insurgency, including Basayev, denied involvement in these bombings), Russian military reinvaded Chechnya at the end of September 1999. 5. As a March 14, 2011 article, “The Genocide of Chechen People in 1944,” on the Vaynakh Online website describes, “February 23, 1944 is the most tragic date in the history of the Waynakh people”; accessed from http://www.waynakh.com/eng/2011/03/the-genocide-of-chechen- people-in-1944-archive-documents/. Akhmad Zakayev, in a February 18, 2014 “Statement” condemning the dismantling of a Grozny memorial to the Deportation, calls the memorial, “one of the most revered shrines of our people,” accessed from http://www.waynakh.com/eng/2014/02/ Notes 179 statement-from-zakayev-on-the-dismantling-of-the-deportation- memorial-in-grozny/comment-page-1/. 6. This section does not contain substantial tales of Shamil Basayev or Ruslan Khamzat Gelayev, as this author did not have access to significant conversations about either. Both Basayev and Gelayev played pivotal roles as military commanders in the Chechen insurgency. Gelayev was killed in 2004 inside of Dagestan, and Basayev died in an explosion in 2006, in Ingushetia. Their legacy among Chechens is polarizing: depending on who tells the tales, both were either brutal “killers, criminals” who blighted the reputation of the Chechen nation, or were “brave fighters,” now “martyrs,” who died for the Chechen people. Citing Gelayev him- self, the latter would claim, “Yes, he was a killer, but what about the tens of thousands of Chechens who have been killed. Why doesn’t anyone care about those deaths?” Those who abhor Basayev and Gelayev label them extrem- ists, and point to their implication in kidnapping, hostage-taking, and killing of civilians; Basayev in particular is blamed for a host of atrocities against civilians, including the North Ossetia school hostage-taking that caused the deaths of nearly 300 innocent civilians. This event damned Chechens in the eyes of the world, and would be supporters of indepen- dent Chechnya dropped away en masse following this travesty. Basayev is also blamed for leading Chechen forces into Dagestan, which gave ratio- nale for Russia to reinvade Chechnya in 1999, thus ending Chechnya’s brief independence. 7. Shamil was permitted to undertake his Hadj pilgrimage; he thereafter travelled to Medina and died there in 1871. 8. KGB, “Committee for State Security,” was the top state security appa- ratus under the Soviet Union; FSB, “Federal Security Services” is the current state security apparatus in the Russian Federation. GRU, “Main Intelligence Directorate, is security services, under the military. 9. Maskhadov was the third president of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. He fought in the 1994–1996 war and was elected president in 1997. He led resistance forces in the second war, from 1999, and was killed in Chechnya in March 2005. 10. Zakayev served as Foreign Minister under Maskhadov, and is current leader of the exiled government of Ichkeria. 11. Chechen website Kavkaz Center reported Doku Umarov’s death in an obituary on March 18, 2014, but without detail, confirmation, and cause of death. Russian authorities did not confirm the death. On July 20, 2014, Kavkaz Center published a second article claiming that Umarov’s death, by poison, occurred on September 7, 2013. Caucasus Emirate leadership subsequently approved Ali Abu-Mukhammad, a Dagestani cleric, to be Umarov’s successor. 180 Notes “Caucasus Emirate’s Emir Dokku Abu Usman martyred, Insha’Allah. Obituary,” Kavkaz Center, March 18, 2014. Accessed October 29, 2014, http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/ content/2014/03/18/19017.shtml. “On martyrdom of Dokku Abu Usman, Emir of Caucasus Emirate,” Kavkaz Center, July 20, 2014. Accessed October 29, 2014, http://www. kavkazcenter.com/eng/ content/2014/07/20/19359.shtml. 12. A June 3, 2009 Freedom House report included Chechnya among “eight countries judged to have the worst human rights records.” “Within these entities, state control over daily life is pervasive and wide-ranging, inde- pendent organizations and political opposition are banned or suppressed, and fear of retribution for independent thought and action is part of daily life.”(p. 1), accessed from http://www.refworld.org/docid/49bf59e20 .html. 13. Akhmad Kadyrov was chief Mufti of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria during the brief period of independence there, but later allied himself with the Russian Federation. Russian president Vladimir Putin appointed him as head of government in Chechnya, in July 2000, soon after Russian forces regained control in the republic. The October 2003 presidential elections gave Kadyrov an overwhelming majority, but this figure of “80 percent” is widely contested—international observers did not par- ticipate in the elections and inside of Chechnya, there were allegations of widespread voter intimidation. Kadyrov was assassinated in Grozny in May 2004. Alu Alkhanov was elected to office after Kadyrov’s assas- sination but resigned (many Chechens claimed he was forced to resign) in February 2007. Ramzan Kadyrov, Akhmad’s son, was immediately appointed by Putin to take Alkhanov’s place. 14. Chechens claim polls show these high ratings, but it is doubtful whether the conduct of these polls was independent from the Kadyrov regime. 15. An (undated, no author indicated) article on “religion” on the Chechen website Vaynakh Online, describes both of these suppositions, that is, that foreign sources support fundamentalism in Chechnya, and that Russian officials both backed and use it: “It is not unlikely that Wahhabism was used by the KGB in the early nineties to counter the revival of popular Islam. During the Chechen wars Wahhabism has above all been promoted by donations and volunteers from Saudi Arabia.” Accessed from http:// www.waynakh.com/eng/chechens/religion/. 16. In September 2004, a group of Islamic militants seized a public school in the town of Beslan, North Ossetia,
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