Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Islamist and Secular Forces in WP Not a Zero-Sum Game

Mohammed Masbah S

In Morocco, unlike in other Arab countries, Islamists and seculars tend to cooperate in formal as well as informal politics. Political opportunities and pragmatic interests trump ideology most of the time, providing a suitable environment for a broadly in- clusive political order. However, two factors stand in the way of sustained cooperation between Islamist and secular currents: on the one hand, sporadic upsurges of identity politics, and on the other, the strategies of divide and rule traditionally pursued by the “Makhzen” and its close allies. Rather than focusing on a set of partners who appear at first to be compatible with their values, Europeans should promote an inclusive politi- cal process that integrates all actors with significant popular outreach, such as the social movement Jama’at Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and Charity Association, AWI).

Political divisions in Morocco are typically the PJD – three other secular parties: (1) the driven by tactical choices and specific issues, Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), which and much less by ideology. To give but one originated in the communist party and had example: In late October 2014, a coalition a long history of ideological animosity with of labor unions, secular opposition parties, the PJD; (2) the Popular Movement (MP), a and the Islamist social movement AWI non-ideological pro-palace party; and (3) the joined ranks in calling for a general strike secular pro-palace party National Rally of In- against austerity measures adopted by dependents (Rassemblement National des the government, which likewise comprises Indépendants, RNI). secular and Islamist parties. For his part, Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane of the governing moderate Islamist Justice and Islamists and Seculars – Development Party (Parti de la justice et Who Are They? du développement, PJD) rejected attempts In Morocco, as in the rest of the Arab world, to single out his party as the target of the the terms “Islamists” and “seculars” may strike. Rather, he emphasized the cohesive- refer to a wide range of actors. So-called ness and harmony of the governing coa- Islamists are typically actors whose political lition across ideological differences, a and social platforms are based on specific coalition that comprises – in addition to readings of Islamic principles. This category

Mohammed Masbah is a Ph.D. fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the SWP Comments 51 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation November 2014 partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the PhD grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

1 encompasses moderate Islamic parties this goal, it focuses on gradualism and co- striving to participate in democratic pro- operation with all relevant political actors. cesses – such as the Justice and Develop- Thus, the main political difference between ment Party in Turkey, Ennahda in Tunisia, the PJD and AWI is the former’s pragma- or the PJD in Morocco – and reaches to tism. radical and militant formations, such as Seculars, on the other hand, are general- Salafi-Jihadis and al-Qaida affiliates, who ly defined in opposition to Islamists, as Islam reject democracy as such on ideological is not the main ideological driving force grounds. behind their political activities. They are In Morocco, the largest organizations not opposed to local Islamic culture and with Islamist orientation are the moderate values – for this reason, we call them secu- – but not legalized – social movement AWI lars and not secularists – and may, at the and the moderate Islamist party PJD, along- same time, have their own interpretations side a range of Salafi groups of different of Islam, which they conceive of as being orientations. distinct from the approaches of trans- AWI is a social movement with a rigid national political Islam advocated by organi- hierarchical structure. Since its founding in zations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 1987, it has chosen not to engage in formal Similar to other Arab countries, until politics. It is not opposed to formal political recently most Moroccan seculars would not participation per se, but its founder, Abdes- have described themselves as such, not least salam Yassine (who died in 2012), opted to avoid the negative connotation of the against participation due to his opposition term among the wider population, which to the monarchy in its actual form, which tends to conflate it with atheistic or anti- he described as a “compulsory authority.” religious tendencies. Recently, however, Yassine was inspired by both Sufi spiritual there has been a trend to adopt “secular” teachings and the Iranian revolution. This as a self-designation among intellectuals is why AWI has been moderate at the ideo- who wish to take a clear position against logical level but radical at the political level. the advances of Islamists in the political Sufi spirituality provides AWI’s followers mainstream. with qualities of discipline and patience. Historically, Moroccan seculars were At the same time, AWI has succeeded in identified with the political left, although building a strong apparatus aiming to be many veered toward liberalism after the the vanguard of the “critical masses” that collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe would march peacefully to effect radical in the early 1990s. Liberals, on the other change. hand, had been sponsored by the monarchy Organizational strength and ideological since the 1960s to serve as a counterweight indoctrination have provided the move- to the left. However, they are firmly “liberal” ment with strength against the regime’s only on economic issues, such as protection sporadic “soft” repression. The latter has of property rights and private enterprise, aimed at weakening the organization by, whereas their commitments to civil liber- for example, shutting down its offices at ties and democracy find limits in their the local level, but has not attempted to deference to the palace. completely ban its activities and structures. In general, during the 2011 protest move- The PJD, by contrast, is a political party ment, the constitutional reform process, and that shares some ideological affinity with the workings of the current governmental the Muslim Brotherhood. The PJD stands coalition, Islamist-secular cooperation and for a genuine strategic alliance with the contention have been determined much monarchy, as it believes that reform is pos- less by ideology than by concrete interests. sible through formal political participation and non-contentious politics. To achieve

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2 The 2011 Protest Movement petition that, according to them, put a During the protests in 2011, Islamists were ceiling on the “aspirations of the people.” found on both sides. Ideology was of sec- For AWI, the M20F provided an oppor- ondary importance; what mattered instead tunity to acquire a greater presence in the was the position vis-à-vis the ruling regime public sphere after a period of hibernation – the monarchy and its entourage in the that started in 2007, in which the authori- state administration and the business com- ties suppressed most of its activities, and munity, locally referred to as the “Makhzen.” thus its visibility decreased. For this reason, The decisions about whether or not to sup- AWI joined the protest movement at an port the protest movement were based on early stage to advance its claims and griev- political calculations, and more specifically ances. Due to its long history and numeri- the balance between the moderates and cal strength, it provided the movement radicals in both camps. with an organizational backbone and social This became clear in the responses to the resonance. regime’s initiatives to absorb popular anger At the tactical level, AWI agreed to grant in 2011. Both AWI and the radical left, led a greater share of representation to com- by the An-Nahj ad-Dimuqrati (Democratic paratively small secular parties in the move- Path, Nahj) party, rejected the king’s speech ment’s organizational structure, meaning of March 9, 2011, describing his call for that AWI’s share of representatives in M20F’s “deep political reforms” as a “trick” to give national support bureau – and hence its the regime a new lease of life. Thus, the visibility in the media – remained far below palace’s top-down reform approach unified its share in the movement itself. Instead, the radical opposition and led to an im- young secular activists attracted much of plicit agreement between AWI and the the attention. These tactical moves were radical left to cooperate under the banner adopted to avoid regime repression and to of what was to become known as the Feb- build confidence with secular actors, there- ruary 20 Movement (Mouvement 20 Février, by allowing AWI to be perceived as coopera- M20F). Both AWI and Nahj are pursuing a tive rather than hegemonic. However, AWI maximalist approach and seeking radical had a strong presence at the local level, and reform that would give “people the right to its members were very active in the local choose” the political system of the country committees of the movement. through a constitutional assembly, includ- Although the M20F provided an oppor- ing the option to abolish the monarchy tunity for a rapprochement between Islam- through a democratic vote. They believe ist and secular forces, it also demonstrated that only radical regime change can im- the limits of alliances between ideological prove the current situation, be it through rivals. For AWI, participation in the M20F the voluntary abdication of the king and a did not come without concessions. It was transfer of his authority to an elected con- obliged to accept the secular nature of stitutional assembly, or through popular the movement, and hence it had to avoid uprisings and campaigns for civil disobedi- religious slogans. This was a contentious ence. point in summer 2011, as secular activists Consequently, in March 2011 members refused any kind of religious rhetoric and of both groups refused to support a petition sometimes showed little respect for reli- for political reform, including a transition gious participants. For instance, during toward constitutional monarchy. The peti- Ramadan, protests started during tion had been signed by 166 Moroccan evening prayers, which are of special im- intellectuals and politicians – four of them portance for observant Muslims. For some members of the PJD who later became members of AWI, such a lack of considera- ministers – under the title “the change we tion amounted to deliberate slights, which want.” AWI and Nahj declined to sign the contributed to the ultimate dissolution of

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3 the cooperation with secular forces by ment between Islamists and seculars in December 2011. Morocco and again confirmed the split Yet, the main motivation for AWI to between moderates and radicals within eventually leave the movement was politi- both camps noted earlier. cal. An evaluation by its leadership of the For the radical opposition, both AWI actual political benefits reaped from its and Nahj categorically rejected the process participation in the M20F led AWI to the of constitutional amendments initiated by conclusion that it had, in fact, facilitated the palace and boycotted the whole process, the victory of the PJD in the November i.e., participation in public discussions, 2011 elections, without getting anything meetings with the drafting committee, and in return. In terms of costs and benefits, the referendum on the constitution. They AWI thus found itself with a non-produc- saw the constitutional process as being com- tive investment. Its position vis-à-vis the pletely dominated by the palace, with the regime was not strengthened, nor did it king delineating the narrow confines of gain acceptance in the secular milieu. amendments, appointing the committee AWI thus expressed its frustration with its members charged with writing the new con- secular allies and accused them of being stitution, and marginalizing the parliament exclusive. Another reason for AWI’s with- and government in the process. It was thus drawal was the fear of harsh repression considered nothing more than a renewal from the regime, or – as a leader of the of allegiance to the monarchy. AWI labeled movement put it in July 2014 – that “con- the drafting process for the new constitu- tinuing the protests in the street [in 2011] tion a “comedy,” as it granted the king “ab- would have meant confrontation” with the solute power” and lacked a response to “the regime. minimum of expectations of the people.” To date, attempts to reactivate the co- Instead of a committee appointed by the operation have been unsuccessful. Thus, king, it called for a democratic constitution since December 2011, M20F has been an drafted by an elected constituent assembly. empty shell. On its part, since that time, Nahj reiterated AWI’s arguments and de- AWI has kept a low profile and been wait- scribed the constitution as a “limited con- ing for an opportunity to become engaged cession to absorb popular anger and abort again. But at the same time, it seems that M20F.” Yet, in contrast to AWI, Nahj pub- its leaders have adapted their discourse lished a memorandum advocating for a somewhat and begun assuming a more constitution that contains provisions for a conciliatory tone toward other political “secular and democratic state that guar- and social actors. This might be due to antees freedoms of belief, and prohibits the what happened in Egypt, where the Muslim utilization of religion for political ends.” Brotherhood isolated itself from other forces Although the drafting of the new consti- and thus became an easy target for the tution was indeed controlled by the palace, crackdown by the regime. In any case, AWI ideological clashes still erupted between clearly showed its fascination with the those involved in the process. During the Tunisian approach of cooperation between public debates over the new constitution Islamists and seculars. Still, it is hard to between March and mid-June 2011, Islamist predict how AWI would behave with regard and secular actors fought over issues of iden- to cooperation if it participated in politics. tity and the nature of the state. Ironically, all parties represented in parliament – secu- lars and Islamists alike – called to preserve a Constitutional Reform stipulation that asserts the religious author- The constitutional amendment process ity of the king as “commander of the faith- initiated by the monarchy in 2011 likewise ful” and to keep the ministry of endow- revealed shortcomings in the rapproche- ments and religious affairs under the con-

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4 trol of the monarchy. In this, both sides Indeed, some members of the constitu- used mirror-images of each other’s reason- tional committee with a secular background ing: Islamists came out for the religious expressed their misgivings when several authority of the king to prevent Morocco secular and leftist parties and members of from becoming a secular state that pays the committee called to award “absolute little respect to Islam, whereas seculars saw powers” to the monarchy, which was inter- the monarchy’s tolerant version of Islam preted as an indication of their lack of trust as a guarantee against a radical transfor- in political parties and the wider popula- mation of Morocco into a theocratic state, tion. Such antagonism likely stems from even if Islamists were to attain power. fear of an Islamist tide. Major secular parties Yet, conflicts surfaced over questions prefer an executive monarchy and an related to individual liberties and the authoritarian regime to an elected Islamist role of religion in politics. The PJD and its government. This also explains why the support base in civil society pushed for secular left, in 1997 and 2002, accepted to strengthening Islamic references in the become part of a weak coalition govern- new constitution and for a guarantee that ment without any real power or guarantees legislation would not violate the provisions of a democratic transition. To substitute of Islam. In mid-June 2011, the PJD even for the lack of a strong social base, they hinted that it might abstain from voting have preferred instead to align with the on the new constitution in case it con- monarchy and promote themselves as a tained provisions against Islam. By contrast, safe alternative to Islamists. The ultimate secular parties represented in the parlia- nightmare for seculars would be a con- ment expressed their support for individual servative coalition between the monarchy liberties, such as access to abortion or the and Islamists that leaves them marginal- principle that sexual orientation as well as ized. Yet, their adopted elitist positions religious beliefs and practices – including have only succeeded in alienating them fasting during Ramadan – should be con- even more from the wider population. sidered private matters that are of no concern to the state. They also argued for international treaties to take precedence Government Coalition over national laws, including issues that, Moroccan Islamists have displayed readi- according to Moroccan law, fall under the ness for pragmatic concessions. After its jurisdiction of Islamic Sharia law, such as success in the November 2011 parliamen- inheritance and family law. tary elections, the PJD established a govern- In contrast to their enthusiasm for indi- ment coalition with three secular parties: vidual liberties, secular parties turned out the conservative Istiqlal Party (PI), the PPS, to be far more conservative when it came to and the MP. The USFP declined an invita- preserving the king’s religious and political tion to join the government as a result of prerogatives, which they perceive as a guar- internal conflicts over the modest results it antee to hedge against possible electoral achieved in the elections and the question advances by the Islamists. For instance, of whether participation would weaken or whereas the PJD proposed that the execu- strengthen the party. In October 2012, the tive powers of the ministerial council (which secular pro-palace party RNI joined the makes strategic decisions and is headed coalition to substitute for the PI, which had by the king) should be transferred to the withdrawn half a year earlier (for details, government council (which is headed by see Mohammed Masbah, Morocco’s Slow Motion the elected head of government, i.e., the Reform Process, January 2014, SWP Com- prime minister), the Socialist Union of ments 6/2014). Popular Forces (USFP) opted to preserve the Since the PJD has no majority of its own, former body’s prerogatives. and since no other Islamist parties are rep-

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5 resented in parliament, the PJD has had no One little-known Salafi even accused the other option but to partner with secular authors of apostasy, amounting to an im- parties. In the process, it has learned that it plicit call for violence against them. The has to avoid ideological struggles if it wants PJD, for its part, kept calm and blamed to keep the government coalition coherent. both sides for creating useless tensions. Since taking over the government in early 2012, it has moved in the direction of moderation and pragmatism. Significantly, Islamists’ Pragmatism during its seventh national party conference To understand Islamists’ pragmatism, one in July 2012, “freedom of belief” was includ- has to look at the cost-benefit calculations ed in the program. The program also argues they follow and the actual options they for a functional relationship between reli- possess. Moderate Islamists feel rooted in gion and politics, whereby religion should Moroccan society; they are active in pro- function as a set of guiding principles viding social services to the unprivileged and values, without “sacralizing” human through a large network of NGOs that simi- activity. The PJD has also made remarkable larly share a religiously inflected identity; progress on issues of individual liberties, they are active in mosques; and their mes- indicated by its endorsement of a United sages resonate among young urban middle Nations resolution on religious freedoms classes. Moreover, the flexible nature of the in March 2014. “enlightened” or “competitive” authoritar- As a result of this ideological adaptation, ianism applied by the Moroccan regime the PJD has been successful in avoiding ideo- has given political actors some room for logical conflicts with its secular coalition maneuver. Islamists have benefited from partners and has been able to focus mainly this margin and turned it into political on socioeconomic issues. Even when it opportunities, using the resources men- comes to issues related to ideology, the PJD tioned above to mobilize the population, and its ideological ally, the NGO al-Tawhid predominantly around social grievances. wa-l-Islah (Unity and Reform Movement), At the same time, the threat of repres- have shown much greater flexibility than sion and pressure from the regime has also in the past. For example, while still in forced them to make concessions and dis- opposition, the PJD had been critical of the play pragmatism. For instance, in the after- “corrupting” influence of state-sponsored math of the Egyptian coup in July 2013, music festivals, in particular the annual the PJD voluntarily handed over several key MAWAZINE event in , which is offi- ministerial positions to pro-palace parties cially under the patronage of the king, or technocrats. Similarly, AWI did not push and the association organizing the event for an escalation on the streets, so as to is headed by his personal secretary. Since avoid a violent reaction from the regime assuming power, such displays of concern against the backdrop of repression against for public morals have largely ceased. the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The void thus left by the PJD has in- In addition, the PJD and its allies have creasingly been filled by Salafis, who have built well-organized structures with a com- achieved more visibility on questions of paratively young leadership – especially identity and values. For instance, Salafi when measured against secular parties – sheikhs publicly condemned demands to and a culture of internal transparency and secularize the inheritance law – which, in dialogue, which allows them to compete Morocco, as in most predominantly Muslim with seculars on their own turf, e.g., with countries, is regulated by Sharia law – and regard to internal democracy, freedom of calls by secular intellectuals to reform reli- expression, and the role of women. PJD gious education in primary schools, con- leaders are clearly practicing a more demo- sidering such calls a “war against Islam.” cratic and transparent style of leadership,

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6 its youth section has more freedom to criti- name “Alliance for Democracy” (also known cize the leadership, and women are more as G8) to create a broad front against the visible in party organs, including the upper PJD. In this fashion, the palace hoped to hit echelon, than with most of their secular two birds with one stone: to deliver on the competitors. For example, the PJD has the promise to allow electoral fairness and trans- highest percentage of women among its parency on the one hand, and to keep tabs members of parliament of all the parties on the election results on the other. The represented in parliament. Also, the NGO worst-case scenario for the palace would Unity and Reform Movement recently elect- have been a landslide victory for the PJD, ed a woman as vice-president, the highest which could have enabled the party to position a woman has ever reached within establish undisputed control over the legis- an Islamic movement. lative branch and then challenge the pre- rogatives of the monarchy on the basis of a clear popular mandate. The secular alliance Divisive Rule failed, however, to perform as expected, Alliances between secular and Islamist leading the palace to suspend its support political forces have been marred by a long for PAM. Yet, some circles in the palace still history of mutual animosity and mistrust, entertain the idea that the party could be and by disagreements between moderates built up into an alternative to the PJD if the and radicals within each camp about the current cooperation between the regime merits of such strategies. But they have also and the Islamists were to collapse. faltered as a result of the divisive rule prac- The regime also exploits the Islamist- ticed by the regime. The palace has a long secular divide by adopting a neutral and tradition of applying strategies of divide passive position when violence between the and rule and of exploiting existing animos- two sides breaks out. For instance, in April ities to nurture the division between Islam- 2014 left-wing students at Fes University ists and seculars. Playing actors off one attacked a roundtable meeting organized another is one of the palace’s traditional by the PJD-affiliated organization Al-Tajdid strategies to retain power. al-Tullabi (Student Renewal) that aimed Before the 2011 protests, the regime used to discuss possibilities of rapprochement to create and prop up secular parties to con- between Islamists and seculars in Morocco, front the Islamists. This was obvious in the leading to the death of a student leader of case of the Authenticity and Modernity Party this organization. The far-left wing within (PAM), which was established in 2008 by a PAM vociferously defended the attackers, close adviser of the king as a result of a tacit placing responsibility on the minister of agreement between circles within the palace higher education, who happens to be a and the secular far left, which constituted PJD member. Although the regime has the backbone of the new party. Ideological- no qualms about acting with an iron fist ly disposed against the Islamists, they were against radical Islamists, the authorities more than ready to confront the PJD and have been slow in responding to such in- received positions in state institutions and stances of violence by leftists against Islam- the parliament in return. Since the creation ists. The most plausible explanations for of PAM, ideological quarrels between the such differential treatment are, first, the two parties (then both in the opposition) state’s security-oriented approach, which have been a constant, mainly over issues of focuses on maintaining a balance in which individual liberties and the role of religion Islamists and secular forces keep each other in public life. in check, and second, to systematically pre- In October 2011, a few weeks before the vent any rapprochement between the two elections, PAM initiated a collaboration camps by consciously exacerbating ideologi- with seven other secular parties under the cal conflicts.

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7 Conclusion and Recommendations tions and behavior the same way they In Morocco, Islamists and seculars – be they would Islamists in order to assess the moderate or radical – have been prepared practical quality of their commitment to make concessions and to form alliances to democracy. with each other based on cost-benefit calcu- lations rather than ideology. Thus, they are not viewing politics as a zero-sum game, which has led to much less polarization and tension in Morocco than in other coun- tries of the region. In this context, moderate Islamists have scaled back ideology and pro- ceeded toward moderation while internal- izing values of tolerance and acceptance of others. This tendency should be appreciated

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und and enhanced. Both secular and Islamist Politik, 2014 forces need to build trust through frank All rights reserved and in-depth dialogue. They also have to These Comments reflect craft sustainable structures and mecha- solely the author’s views. nisms of cooperation that allow them to SWP manage ideological differences and focus Stiftung Wissenschaft und on shared interests. Politik German Institute for A genuine transition toward democracy International and in Morocco will only be successful if all Security Affairs relevant political forces are integrated in Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 the formal political process, including AWI. 10719 Berlin For this reason, Europeans should encour- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 age the palace and the elected government www.swp-berlin.org to start a genuine dialogue with AWI, allow [email protected] it to create a legal political party, and con- ISSN 1861-1761 vince AWI to be part of the formal political structure. In addition, Europeans should press the palace to deepen political reforms that would restore confidence in the political process by: ceasing to interfere in internal party affairs, guaranteeing free and fair elections, and replacing the supervision of elections by the ministry of the interior with a truly independent commission. More generally, Europeans should treat Islamist parties that comply with demo- cratic standards as functional equivalents to conservative parties in Europe and in- clude them in international networks of conservative political parties, such as the International Democrat Union. At the same time, they should not accept at face value parties that claim “liberal” or “progressive” platforms only because they are secular. Rather, they should scrutinize their posi-

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