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The German Federal Election of 2017: How the Wedge Issue of Refugees and Migration Took the Shine off Chancellor Merkel and Transformed the Party System Dostal, Jörg Michael

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Dostal, J. M. (2017). The German Federal Election of 2017: How the Wedge Issue of Refugees and Migration Took the Shine off Chancellor Merkel and Transformed the Party System. The Political Quarterly, 88(4), 589-602. https://nbn- resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55603-8

Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Free Digital Peer Publishing Licence This document is made available under a Free Digital Peer zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den DiPP-Lizenzen Publishing Licence. For more Information see: finden Sie hier: http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/ http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/ The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4, October–December 2017

The German Federal Election of 2017: How the Wedge Issue of Refugees and Migration Took the Shine off Chancellor Merkel and Transformed the Party System

€ JORG MICHAEL DOSTAL

Abstract The 2017 German federal election delivered dramatic electoral decline of the two traditional main parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), who had governed in a ‘grand coalition’ government since 2013. The main reason for this outcome was the decision by Chancellor to open Germany’s borders for refugees and migrants, an unprecedented policy that abandoned border controls and remained in place between September 2015 and March 2016. This article focuses on how the refugee and migration problem subsequently turned into a wedge issue, splitting most Ger- man political parties and handing a major election victory to the main critics of Merkel’s deci- sion, namely the rightist (AfD) and the right-wing liberals of the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Rather than explaining these developments in isolation, the arti- cle highlights how past welfare state retrenchment and fear over future economic prosperity make significant groups of the electorate, including former supporters of left-of-centre parties, lose confidence in the ability of the political system to deliver stability and social integration. Keywords: Angela Merkel, Germany, German party system, migration policy, refugee policy, social policy, wedge issue

rapid rise in East German unemployment to Introduction: German politics levels that have been high ever since. In since unification order to deal with the social costs of unifica- EXPLAINING THE CURRENT state of German poli- tion, the existing structures of the West Ger- tics requires a short review of the larger pic- man welfare state, such as unemployment ture. Since the country’s reunification in and pension insurance, were used to manage fi the post-unification economic decline in the 1990, three Chancellors have held of ce: fi Christian Democrat until 1998, East. This contributed to the scal crisis of € the German welfare state, undermining the Social Democrat Gerhard Schroder between ’ 1998 and 2005 and Christian Democrat country s social market economy that had, Angela Merkel since 2005. The period until then, been based on a consensus model directly after unification gave rise to a short- that brought employers, trade unions and term economic boom, during which West the state together in decision-making on social protection issues. German companies gained access to 16 mil- fi lion new East German consumers. This A second major development since uni - boom, based on the pent-up demand for cation has been demographic decline. Ger- West German consumer goods in the East, many has become a low fertility society quickly fizzled out. The lasting result of this with birth rates near the very bottom by episode was the near complete disappear- global comparison. Policy efforts to make ance of East German industry followed by a raising children in Germany more attractive have so far had nearly no impact on the low birth rate. All German sources translated by the author.

© The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 589 Post-unification politics has essentially period of economic recovery that was at been characterised by three major pathbreak- least partially based on structural changes, ing decisions, in 2003, 2008 and 2015, respec- such as the lower external value of the euro tively, each significantly changing the that facilitated German exports. Yet some of German polity. The first one was welfare the rapid adaption to the global crisis was state retrenchment during the so-called also due to the rediscovery of nearly forgot- ‘Hartz reforms’ of the red-green (SPD and ten German virtues, such as unions and Green party) government of Chancellor Ger- employers in the car industry coming hard Schroder€ that took place from 2003 and together to save jobs by coordinated cuts in was also supported by the then opposition working hours. Another policy instrument, CDU/CSU. The essential feature of this the so-called Abwrackpr€amie (scrappage allow- retrenchment was radically to cut entitle- ance), brought the state in to facilitate the ments for core workers in the event of unem- purchase of new cars. Yet these developments ployment, by introducing time limits on did not restore earlier neo-corporatist ways of social insurance benefits or by removing decision making; they amounted to the final social insurance altogether in favour of hour of glory of the past system. means-tested welfare payments that were Soon after, Germany’s economic recovery only available after the unemployed had acquired the characteristics of an artificially used up nearly all of their personal savings. engineered boom. At the centre of this boom In parallel, pension levels were also cut— was (and is) the European Central Bank, again based on an agreement between SPD which, under the leadership of Mario Dra- and CDU/CSU. ghi, has turned towards a zero interest rate It is hard to overstate how unpopular policy in order to ‘save’ the euro. In his these reforms were and still are in the con- famous remark on 26 July 2012, Draghi pro- text of German politics. They dramatically mised to do ‘whatever it takes’ to retain the weakened the SPD, which has since lost common currency. This real life macroeco- more than half of its former electorate. nomic experiment in ‘free money’ is the According to one former SPD party chair- main reason for Germany’s current day eco- man, ‘proud ship building workers who paid nomics, namely a rapid rise in real estate all their life contributions to social insurance prices and a stock market boom (no surprise are suddenly, at the advanced age of 56, here from a British perspective). The other turned into welfare recipients and social out- side of the coin is the slow, but steady siders. This they have not forgiven us.’1 Elec- decline in the value of money savings, toral decline of the SPD aside, the political eroded by minimal interest rates that are net result of the Hartz reforms was the rapid kept below the rate of inflation. Overall, expansion of low-wage and non-standard were, pre-euro, used to a stable forms of employment in a deregulated currency—a major difference to the Mediter- labour market, in which the share of the ranean capitalisms and the British model— working poor has grown rapidly. rather than the soft currency policies of the The second major turning point, somehow current period that silently redistribute more difficult to summarise as it is still play- wealth between different asset holders and ing out today, was the reaction of German facilitate speculation in real estate. The net policy-makers to the global financial crisis result of these monetary policies has been a starting in 2007 and escalating in 2008. This split within the bourgeois centre of German crisis questioned the survival of the banking politics, between the supporters of Merkel’s system and even of global capitalism, and muddling through and those who demand a was ‘solved’ by the taxpayer ‘rescuing’ the return to macroeconomic stability in line banks. This move turned the banking crisis with pre-crisis views of what constitutes into a public budget crisis. In the German ‘solid’ economics. context, most people feared that the real Third, Chancellor Merkel’s decision to economy would be negatively affected by open temporarily Germany’s borders to refu- the events in the financial sector and the gees and migrants without any border rapid increase in public deficits. Yet this did checks, on 4 September 2015, was certainly not happen. Instead, Germany entered a the most controversial single step of her

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 © The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 political career and is still contested today. the German, EU and international legal The next section, therefore, discusses the order suggests that refugee status might be major policy issues that have had decisive granted to those facing individual persecu- influence on the outcome of the German tion in their country of origin due to their federal election of 2017, in order of their race, religion, nationality or political beliefs. respective significance. In addition, those fleeing armed conflicts, such as the one in Syria, might be granted temporary protective status (subsidi€arer Main issues in the 2017 German Schutz), but not refugee status, until the end federal election of a conflict allows repatriation. There is no initial expectation that the protective status There exists general agreement in recent will result in permanent residency in Ger- opinion polls that the refugee and migration many. In the latter case of migration, there is issue is by far the most frequently stated sin- the expectation that newcomers will inte- gle concern in people’s minds when thinking grate into German society and the labour about their election choice. One representa- market in a way that benefits both sides. In tive study, allowing multiple responses, sug- practice, the terms have been used without gested that 44 per cent of people interviewed any clear distinction by politicians and the considered the refugee and migration issues media, although critics have stressed that significant, while 20 per cent mentioned such distinctions are crucial in order to social injustice and poverty, 14 per cent edu- provide legitimate and transparent policy- cation and schools, 12 per cent unemploy- making with regard to the question of who ment and labour market issues, and 11 per 2 qualifies for temporary or permanent resi- cent crime levels and law and order. dency in Germany. In order to highlight the Another study, conducted slightly earlier unclear demarcation between the two groups and using a similar methodology, produced of people, the remainder of the article uses almost identical results, namely 56 per cent both terms. expressed concern over migration and inte- The supporters of Merkel argue that her gration issues, 17 per cent highlighted pov- policy of ‘Grenz€offnung fur€ Fluchtlinge€ ’, that erty—often with reference to anxiety over is, the ‘opening of borders for refugees’ (one future lower pension levels—while 16 per should note that the German noun for the cent each mentioned crime and unemploy- opening of borders makes Germans remem- ment, 14 per cent pensions and old-age secu- ber the opening of the intra-German borders rity and, 12 per cent each, the cost of living 3 in 1989), was a humanitarian response to an and education policies. One can sum up emergency situation, triggered by the Hun- these findings, in the sense that economic garian government’s inability to take care of and social issues—promising topics for left- large numbers of refugees congregating in of-centre parties—feature prominently on the the Hungarian capital of Budapest. Accord- public agenda. Nevertheless, all of these ing to some observers, this resulted in the issues are still secondary when compared to ‘spontaneous’ decision on the part of the the refugee and migration problem. refugees to walk to the Austrian and Ger- man borders. This refugee movement, it is Refugees and migration: the ultimate said, could only have been stopped by vio- wedge issue lent means, and Merkel decided under the pressure of events to accept the entry of It is hardly possible to overstate how refugee refugees into Germany without any border and migration issues have, since September controls.4 2015, become the ultimate ‘wedge’ issue of Merkel’s critics suggest, however, that her German politics. Yet what actually happened policy amounted to ‘chaotische und unreg- in terms of the German government’s policy ulierte Masseneinwanderung’ (‘chaotic and choices in September 2015 still remains con- unregulated mass migration’). They consider tested today. This lack of clarity starts with the opening of borders to be an irresponsible the demarcation between the two terms act from the point of view of the native pop- ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’. In the former case, ulation. Even moderate critics, who might

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© The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 accept that Merkel was under pressure at the Significantly, the police and public authori- moment of taking her initial decision, criti- ties’ response to this attack was once again cise her for abusing her executive privilege characterised by delays, poor communication as Chancellor in failing to ask for input from with victims’ families and even the manipu- the German parliament or for consultations lation of police files to cover up shortcom- with other EU member countries. They also ings in police work.7 raise questions about the unclear legal foun- Here is not the space to review these dations of Merkel’s decision.5 Moreover, crit- events further. Decisive in the context of the ics hold that her unwillingness to close the federal elections is that the topic has not lost borders for many months after the initial its relevance due to policy changes on the decision—the borders remained open until part of Chancellor Merkel—changes such as March 2016 when a ‘deal’ with Turkey the German government’s agreement with closed down the so-called ‘Balkan route’— Turkey of March 2016 to stop the further encouraged more and more refugees and entering of refugees and migrants over the migrants to move to Germany. This splitting so-called ‘Balkan route’. (Turkey has since of the EU over refugee and migration issues built a wall on the Turkish–Syrian border to, —that continues today—has triggered high in turn, stop Syrians from entering Turkey). costs for Germany as a host society or per- In fact, the refugee and migration issue manent destination for refugees and continues to split all political camps across migrants who turned out to be mostly (ap- multiple dimensions. In order to understand proximately 70 per cent) young men from better why the topic has turned into the ulti- North Africa, the Middle East and other mate wedge issue, a good point of departure Muslim-majority societies. While Syrians is to realise that the actual policy motivation form the largest refugee group, making up since September 2015 has been inherently around a third of all people applying for ambiguous. On the one hand, it was argued asylum in 2015, the majority of those enter- that we (that is, ‘the Germans’) help refugees ing Germany had no common country of ori- because it is the morally right thing to do. gin or joint cultural reference point. Yet, at the same time, it was also suggested Subsequent events, such as the large-scale that by allowing refugees and migrants into sexual violence against women in public Germany, the Germans were actually help- places in Cologne, Hamburg and some other ing themselves. Was it not the case, many German cities on New Year’s Eve 2015— claimed, that the refugees, being on average crimes that were initially downplayed by the young and at the beginning of their working German police authorities and that ulti- lives, might turn out to be a blessing for the mately, in summer 2016, were declared to German labour market? Were they not have involved around 1,200 female victims bound to be future contributors to the Ger- and around 2,000 foreign perpetrators, at man pension system? From this second utili- least half of them believed to have been tarian point of view, the refugees were recent arrivals—have significantly changed expected to be useful for the host society, at public attitudes towards refugees and least in the medium and long term. Yet the migrants. According to Holger Munch,€ the two points of view were in contradiction head of the German Federal Crime Police with each other. The first one was based on (BKA), ‘there is a connection between the pure ethics and demanded the opening of emergence of this phenomenon and the borders to those who were fleeing unaccept- rapid migration in 2015’.6 One year later, able living conditions. This position sug- the terror attack on the Christmas market in gested that establishing clear distinctions on 19 December 2016 left twelve peo- between ‘political refugees’ and ‘economic ple dead and fifty-six people injured—the migrants’ was difficult or impossible. How- first Islamist attack on this scale in Germany. ever, the second point of view was close to The terrorist in question, who was lethally neoliberal concepts of what one might term shot four days later by police in Italy, was of a ‘breathing labour market’. This second Tunisian origin and had entered Germany in position is in the German context referred to June 2015 after a previous four-year jail as the ‘Canadian model’, that is, the manage- term in Italy for drug-related offences. ment of migration according to a scoring

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 © The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 system that selects migrants based on their Those who were critical of the ongoing economic usefulness.8 Needless to say, that events and expressed fear of the entry of reality failed to follow either of these two Islamist networks from the war zones in the paradigms, thereby leaving observers con- Middle East and North Africa, and sought fused about what was going on. controls on what was, according to existing EU and national legislation, ‘illegal migra- tion’, were sometimes accused of being xeno- Four dimensions of the wedge issue phobic or racist, but more often they were Looking further at the wedge issue of refu- just ignored. Yet this singlemindedness on gees and migrants, one might highlight at the part of the legacy media in spreading the least four politically significant dimensions, welcome message was far from being uni- namely, (1) a temporal dimension; (2) a versally shared by the general public. In fact, media discourse dimension; (3) an ideologi- earlier opinion polls deriving from 2014, sug- cal dimension; and (4) a psychological gested that a majority of Germans were con- dimension. The first two dimensions might cerned about migration levels—much lower be described as communication issues and at the time of these earlier polls—while also the latter two as substantive ones. To begin believing that the political class ignored such with, the temporal dimension refers to the concerns.9 In short, there was a split between transition from happiness to fear about the government and elite discourse on the one arrival of refugees. Initially, in late 2015, side, and a large strand of popular opinion there was euphoria about the idea that Ger- on the other. Because of this genuine split in many could and should help refugees. This public attitudes, the online media filled the turned into a pervasive fear that ‘our’ coun- gap in critical reporting which, in turn, try is bound to become the site of major reli- quickly became radicalised. Soon after, off- gious and value conflicts, bringing crime, line and online opinion makers started to large-scale disorder and, perhaps, the disap- blame each other for misleading the public pearance of German culture as we know it. for reasons that were morally repugnant. Thus there was a dramatic overshooting in Perhaps the most significant wedge con- public debate, from a na€ıve ‘welcome cul- cerned political ideology. All political parties ture’ to a deep-seated fear that German soci- from left to right experienced divisions over ety might face existential threats due to its the refugee and migration issue. The most demographic decline when challenged by dramatic split appeared among mainstream large cohorts of young migrants. conservatives, that is, the rank and file of the The temporal overshoot from euphoria to Christian Democrats. In some respects, these depression was to a large extent driven by splits since 2015 are comparable with the the discourse of the legacy media, that is, splits within the SPD electorate back in 2003, state-run TV stations and the print media. which had been produced by the Hartz These media outlets have subsequently been reforms. What has happened is that the blamed for their one-sided framing of the CDU and CSU have lost a large share of events that took off following the decision to their national conservative wings, leaving open Germany’s borders in September 2015. only the market liberal and Christian social Journalists became activists in spreading a wings and thereby narrowing their electoral welcome culture that originated with Mer- appeal significantly. This split within Ger- kel’s grand coalition government and civil man Christian Democracy has occurred in a society associations such as the Christian silent manner and without any explicit col- churches. The strength of this initial welcome lective withdrawal, although several leading culture stemmed from a combination of elite members of the Alternative for Germany discourse and strong moral conviction on (AfD) are sometime CDU members, or draw the part of its advocates. Until the punctur- support from CDU conservatives who have ing of this phenomenon by the Cologne given up their affiliation. For the time being, events, it was very difficult to voice concern the AfD has inherited an entire political over the unregulated movement of people group alienated from one of Germany’s into Germany without being excluded from major parties. Their conviction is that Mer- representation in the mainstream media. kel’s migration policies question the cultural

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© The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 identity of Germany, namely the Judaeo- requests for family reunions for two years, Christian tradition, and open the doors to which can be seen as an attempt to keep the creeping Islamisation. issue off the agenda during the election sea- One of the two current AfD leaders, son. Alexander Gauland, spent his previous polit- Nevertheless, all such efforts at political ical life between 1973 and 2013 in the CDU. triangulation and compromise failed. In par- His long-term friend Erika Steinbach (a retir- ticular, Chancellor Merkel continued to stress ing former CDU Member of the federal her unwillingness to introduce upper numer- parliament, long-term representative of the ical limits on the right to ‘political asylum’ national conservatives in the CDU and now (a right enshrined in the German Constitu- former CDU member), suggested in a speech tion), while not clarifying how this related to addressing an AfD election rally that the large-scale inflow of migrants who were Merkel’s withdrawal from nuclear energy, not suffering from direct political persecu- announced in reaction to the nuclear disaster tion. In the meantime, Schauble€ worked in Fukushima in 2011, ‘puts forward the behind the scenes in order to make Turkey Morgenthau plan’, namely the idea of the cooperate in efforts to close the ‘Balkan route’ then US Secretary of the Treasury Henry for refugees and migrants. In turn, Seehofer Morgenthau, Jr, who had in the final stages stressed his achievement in having the non- of World War II proposed to deindustrialise EU Balkan states—such as Albania, Kosovo Germany in order to turn it into an agricul- and Montenegro—declared ‘safe third states’, tural society. Yet, her main complaint was thereby stopping asylum requests of nation- the ‘Chancellor’s decision for the uncon- als from these states in Germany and, in par- trolled and unlimited acceptance of ticular, in his own federal state of Bavaria. migrants’ and the failure of the public These efforts all failed, however, to reunite authorities to punish those refugees and the Christian Democrats or to satisfy the migrants who had presented falsified pass- national conservatives. In particular, See- ports to the German authorities.10 Without hofer’s repeated attacks on Merkel in this going into further detail, one must stress that context, suggesting that ‘the Chancellor has the split between the national conservatives, according to my conviction decided for the blaming the Chancellor for repeated offences vision of another republic’ and stating that against the legal order, and Merkel’s CDU is ‘the population does not want this country to now too deep to be fixed. become a different one’, underlined that the Chancellor Merkel, the Finance Minister CSU wanted to be seen as the stronghold of Wolfgang Schauble,€ and , the traditionalists of the centre-right.11 Last the leader of the Bavarian sister party of but not least, Seehofer has repeatedly pro- the CDU, the CSU, have all tried to turn the mised Bavarian voters that the CSU will refugee and migration related issues into place upper limits on migration in any agree- ‘normal’ policy-making problems. The open ments over the next coalition government. border policies were ended in March 2016 This underlines that the difference of opinion with the result that the number of refugees between Merkel and the CSU over migration and migrants has declined from its peak in remains on the agenda. the second half of 2015 and early 2016. Nev- These deep divisions have also affected ertheless, overall levels of migration to Ger- the centre-left parties. The SPD has been many have remained high compared to least affected since it has mostly followed previous years. The promise made by the Merkel’s policies, although the former SPD German government in 2015 to allow the leader has argued that ‘there admission of family members of those is a double task of integration concerning granted refugee status, such as Syrians, con- those that have newly joined us; but also tinues to produce anxiety among the Ger- those that have always lived here’.12 In fact, man electorate about a ‘second wave’ of the SPD has not focused on criticising short- newcomers. In order to calm down such con- comings of the integration effort during Mer- cerns, a bundle of legislative initiatives was kel’s last grand coalition government. After passed by the German federal parliament in all, the SPD shared responsibility for these February 2016. This included not accepting policy choices. Within the Left party, the

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 © The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 debate was also kept off the agenda in the conflicts with the ‘aged’ European societies. current election campaign. However, the for- The strength of this argument, delivered at mer party chairman had the ‘meta level’ of a cyclical view of history, earlier, in February 2017, stated that ‘the call should not be underestimated as a potential for open borders is a central demand of influence on popular attitudes to refugees neoliberalism’ pointing out that employers and migrants.14 are ‘for free migration to attract qualified Another line of thinking, located at the workers from developing countries in order level of individuals, is the suggestion that to use increased migration to increase wage the ‘losers’ among the native German popu- competition’. In addition, Lafontaine stressed lation lack the experience of exercising their that the control of migration levels was the own agency: ‘As more people are disap- ‘foundation of state order’, while his wife pointed and depressed, as more they feel and co-chair of the Left party, Sahra Wagen- alienated ... as more radical is their need to knecht, argued that Merkel shared responsi- develop a strategy of building walls. The bility for the Islamist attack in Berlin due to threatening world should be pushed back, her ‘uncontrolled opening of borders’ and the relationship with it should be cut.’15 earlier cuts in the number of police person- Another author claims that ‘the most impor- nel.13 tant political success of the right-wing in Finally, a fourth dimension of the wedge 2016 was to place the movement of refugees issue is the psychological aspect. Many in the everyday reasoning of large sectors of observers of the debate see German attitudes the population as a metaphor for the general with regard to refugees and migrants as loss of political control. This way, the deriving from personal negative experiences demand for closed borders becomes a sym- that came with the loss of control that glob- bol for the restoration of popular sover- alisation has imposed on the sense of histori- eignty’.16 cal continuity in a local cultural context. While this line of psychological reasoning Overall, this line of thinking relates to the reminds one of efforts of Wilhelm Reich in long-standing concern in German sociology his Mass Psychology of Fascism17 to explain with the winners and losers of modernisa- the support for the Nazi movement among tion. According to observers, openness to working class constituencies as being due to other cultures and positive expectations with authoritarian socialisation and sexual repres- regard to multiculturalism will be more sion, one must nevertheless highlight blatant prevalent in periods of relative social peace, shortcomings too. Specifically, it is too easy while own experiences of economic precari- to claim that the right-wing ‘placed’ the ousness and social exclusion—or fear of issue in people’s minds as a ‘symbol’. experiencing them in the future—will make Rather, the loss of political control was very people hostile to further immigration and real, and people were left alone with their turn them into cultural protectionists. fear that open borders and unchecked enter- In addition, the long-standing experience ing of people from many parts of the world of German society with low fertility levels —the condition on Germany’s borders produced in many observers a degree of cul- between September 2015 and March 2016— tural fatalism. Are the Germans not set to were bound to destabilise society to some disappear from the stage of history? One of extent. The symbol for this was, and cur- the prominent thinkers in this context is rently still is, Chancellor Merkel’s refusal to Gunnar Heinsohn, a senior German scholar, place limits on migration. This very refusal who has turned the theoretical concept of must trigger concern in the minds of voters the ‘youth bulge’ (the observation that high who have experienced Merkel over many numbers of unattached young males in high- years as someone who has always been keen fertility societies might trigger a rise in gen- to organise her political agenda by closely eral insecurity and a tendency toward war) following opinion polls. Voters cannot help into a general framework for explaining but notice that Merkel has turned into a per- likely future scenarios for European societies. son of strong principles on the one issue In his thinking, population growth in that, according to all opinion polls, is the ‘young’ African societies must produce lead issue of concern. Why, they ask, has the

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© The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 Chancellor started to be principled on an in the early 2000s, average earners with an issue that might actually hurt her at the average record of contributions to pension ballot box? insurance could count on pension levels that Last, one might also highlight that the were above the means-tested social assis- principle of ‘one citizen–one vote’ does not tance level (the means-tested benefit of last place any limits on the right of depressed resort for poor people). In recent years, this people to participate in elections in compar- is no longer the case. The main structural ison with those who are more happy. Thus, reasons for this development are the decline initial efforts on the part of most of the of collective bargaining arrangements that media to describe the management of refu- used to limit wage inequalities across sec- gee and migration issues as successful and tors, and the parallel growth in low wage to keep silent about crime and disorder—for and temporary employment. These two fear of stigmatising all refugees in the eyes long-term developments, in turn reflecting of the German public—have triggered a the decline of trade unions and the deregula- strong backlash. This has helped the AfD tion of the labour market, have facilitated and, to a lesser extent, the liberal FDP, which outsourcing and fragmentation of the labour has also criticised Merkel’s open border poli- process, resulting in the growth of new cies between September 2015 and March forms of precarious employment.18 The 2016. In effect, these two parties have man- grand coalition government of CDU/CSU aged to fill the gap in political representation and SPD, in office since 2013, has failed to vacated by the other parties. control these developments. Instead, their efforts with regard to pension policies have Beyond the wedge issue: welfare further increased labour market dualism. All recent policy initiatives with regard to pen- and social policies sions have focused on expanding occupa- Moving on from the wedge issue of refugees tional pensions, a system that is not and migration to the other important issues available to workers in small companies and on voters’ minds, one enters a more straight- in low wage and precarious employment, forward terrain. As already sketched above, and on private voluntary insurance (the so- the welfare retrenchment policies of the two called ‘Riester-Rente’, named after a former main parties in the German party system at SPD labour minister, and based on financial the beginning of the twenty-first century— products provided by banks and insurance back then led by the Schroder-SPD€ and companies in which individual contributions backed up by the CDU/CSU—have under- are subsidised by the state). These systems mined the sense of social integration and have failed to make up for parallel cuts in social peace that had previously charac- entitlements in the public pension system. terised the German political model. The Many of today’s workers know that they across-the-board cuts in welfare state sys- have little to expect from the current pension tems in the early 2000s—unemployment system.19 insurance, pension replacement rate, occupa- During the election campaign, Merkel duly tional sickness insurance and others—have experienced criticism of her social policy stripped what used to be referred to as the record. One might have expected her chal- ‘Bismarckian welfare state’ of its earlier con- lenger from the SPD, Martin Schulz, to lead cern with the protection of achieved social the charge. Yet the single TV debate between status. Observing this development, middle Merkel and Schulz on 3 September 2017 was class audiences have started to feel increased generally considered to have been boring. anxiety about what would happen to them One observer summed it up as ‘a duet, in the case of job loss and economic down- rather than a duel’ consisting of ‘lack of turns. actual debate’, ‘polite exchange of policy The clearest example of the relative weak- ideas’ and ‘plenty of nodding of heads’.20 ening of German welfare standards has been Yet this was not the case in two other TV the decline in projected future pension levels debates hosted by the two state TV broad- in comparison with wages (the replacement casters (ARD and ZDF), when the Chancellor rate). Before the cuts in the pension formula faced a live studio audience. These TV

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 © The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 events underlined the decline of deference her muddling through statements. The on the part of the German public. Merkel exchanges—another member of the audience unexpectedly faced two rhetorical ‘duels’: interrupted the Chancellor stating that ‘it is a first with a female cleaner close to retire- joke what you are telling here’—were ment, who is also a member of the Left party quickly watched by hundreds of thousands and a trade union representative; and, sec- of people on the internet. One could not help ond, in the other programme, with a young but think that citizens challenged the Chan- man who is engaged in vocational training cellor in a much more effective manner than to become a hospital nurse. In the former Martin Schulz, her official opponent. case, the cleaner pointed out that she would Other potentially significant topics of the retire after 40 years’ work with a pension election campaign, such as Merkel’s that was below the level of social assistance, announcement that Germany would expand excluding her from any form of future par- its defence expenditure to 2 per cent of GDP ticipation in public life because of old-age in line with NATO plans endorsed by US poverty. She described the German pension President Donald Trump—in effect a dou- system as inadequate when compared with bling of the current level—only made short- the Austrian system in which she would term appearances in the election debates. receive a much higher pension with the Here, SPD candidate Schulz made an effort same employment record. In the latter case, to challenge Merkel because of the unpopu- the nurse in training attacked the poor con- larity of these ideas with the general public. ditions faced by hospital patients as inhu- In fact, most Germans do not aspire to mane owing to extreme levels of defence budgets at the level of France or Bri- understaffing in hospital wards. Based on tain and do not support further German mil- his own experiences, he suggested that basic itary entanglements overseas. Yet, the legacy human rights were ignored in the case of the media did not give him much space on this weak and vulnerable, and that the low topic, and Schulz subsequently failed to take wages paid to hospital care workers would control of this or any other issues that could result in future deterioration due to the have served as a tool to challenge Merkel. unpopularity of a line of work that was trea- Another potentially significant issue, the ted as a pure cost factor that needed to be expansion of the digital economy, was in minimised. the meantime successfully appropriated by In both cases, Merkel was hard pressed to the liberals of the FDP, not least because it issue a response. In the first case, she offered was not contested by the other parties. Other little more than the statement that ‘I can major issues, such as the future of the Euro- understand you well’. In the latter case, she pean Union and/or the euro, were noticeable suggested, probably against her own inten- by their absence from the debate. In the end, tions, that the best way to improve terms Merkel had decided to avoid political com- and conditions of care workers in hospitals mitments of any kind before election day, was collective action. According to Merkel ‘if thereby leaving the voter only a choice of necessary, we might have to take in nurses placing confidence in her personal leadership from European countries, for example, addi- or rejecting her. tionally ... but in the tariff negotiations it must be paid better too’. She suggested that Party campaigning in the 2017 the male nurse should ‘see what your col- leagues who have become mechatronic tech- federal election nicians earn and what you do not earn, then This section briefly sketches the parties’ cam- we get some more pressure into it’. These paign efforts in order of their share of the statements could be read as Merkel’s vote in the 2017 election. To begin with the endorsement of membership in trade unions CDU: the party led a campaign focusing on and a solidaristic wage policy, although they what was held to be a strong economic were probably just issued in the heat of the record, and on Merkel as the Chancellor. The moment. In any case, the two questioners major campaign of the CDU was ‘For gained immediate popularity on the internet a Germany in which we live well and feel for their refusal to let Merkel get away with good’ while another slogan read ‘For a

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© The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 strong economy with safe jobs’. This was decision to have the unpopular former Chan- criticised for its lack of substance, but in fact cellor Schroder€ give a speech at the SPD did not differ much from earlier CDU cam- election conference immediately raised the paigns that had also been short on specific question of whether Schulz differed substan- policies in order to put forward a ‘catch-all’ tially from this predecessor. Schulz failed to message. As in the past, the CDU made attack Merkel in any sustained manner. efforts at grassroots mobilisation by organis- When facing her during their single joint TV ing street rallies with the Chancellor. But debate, he suggested that Germany should these efforts backfired: the number of CDU exercise more pressure to have eastern Euro- party supporters in the streets was modest, pean states accept more refugees, instead of while they attracted large crowds of protes- highlighting the shortcomings in the man- ters, especially in East Germany. They were agement of migration in Germany and of the in effect turned into informal counter rallies many unsolved social problems related to it. of AfD supporters chanting that Merkel Moreover, he called voters of the AfD ‘a should ‘get lost’. Merkel tried to stick it out, shame for our country’ which came across as perhaps wishing for solidarity with her as a arrogant, especially as former SPD voters person among the broader electorate, which turned out to be the third largest group failed to materialise. among new AfD voters in 2017. The CSU had earlier disagreed with the Overall, the SPD is today little more than CDU regarding Merkel’s position on refu- a party of ‘professional politicians’.Itno gees and migrants, demanding an official longer enjoys the support of any particular upper limit for annual migration in order to sociological category of people, with the par- avoid the appearance of ‘parallel societies’ in tial exception of public sector employees and Germany. This demand was put forward in pensioners. The party has little life left in it, a ‘Bavaria Plan’, an alternative party mani- and there is no Corbyn-like figure waiting in festo of the CSU that differed from the one the wings either. All SPD candidates for issued by the CDU, which underlined that chancellor in recent times (Frank Steinmeier the CSU feared losing voters to the AfD. in 2009, Peer Steinbruck€ in 2013 and now When Merkel appeared at the final campaign Schulz) belong to the right-wing of the party, rally of the CSU on the Friday before elec- while the left-wing has either dissolved or tion day in Bavaria’s capital Munich, she entered the Left party. When Schulz faced two kinds of crowds, namely the party announced in the night after the election his faithful placed in a gated-off section of the firm decision to have the SPD enter the meeting space that was only partially filled, opposition benches rather than accepting the while the rest of the space further away from offer of talks with Merkel to form another her was filled with protesters, many of them grand coalition, he did so out of desperation AfD supporters, trying to drown her out about the lowest ever SPD election result in with whistles. In this situation, one could the history of post-war Germany. not help wondering whether the CSU leader- As for the AfD, the party consists essen- ship felt that Merkel was receiving the nega- tially of two wings: the national conserva- tive feedback she deserved. tives led by Alexander Gauland and the The SPD election campaign was a full- neoliberals led by Alice Weidel, the two co- scale failure, as was Martin Schulz as a can- chairs. Gauland was a representative of the didate. While Schulz had initially created a right wing of the CDU for four decades wave of enthusiasm within the party and in before joining the AfD in 2013, while Weidel, the media due to his talk of social justice an economist, has a political past as member and solidarity at the beginning of 2017, this of the Friedrich A. von Hayek Society, a excitement disappeared in the months before cadre group of market radicals in which she the election. Schulz’s major mistake was to used to rub shoulders with the current FDP avoid any clear positioning. In particular, he leader and various business representa- failed to clarify what his agenda of social tives.21 Both AfD wings have come together justice was supposed to be based on and to based on their criticism of the refugee and state clearly what he wanted to do. His cam- migration policies of the Merkel government. paign moved from mistake to mistake. The The conservative wing places its emphasis

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 © The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 on protecting German cultural identity, The Left party consists of two wings with while the neoliberals suggest that refugees regard to the refugee and migration issue. and migrants are mostly an economic bur- The first one could be termed ‘radical cos- den placed on the German tax payer. mopolitan’ and the second one ‘welfare-state The AfD has focused on the wedge issue realist’. The former group is made up of sup- of refugees and migrants in order to target a porters of ‘world socialism in a single coun- number of different social groups with con- try’, since they reject drawing distinctions tradictory social interests. These target between ‘political’ refugees and ‘economic groups are, according to an internal party migrants’ because of humanitarian concerns document, as follows: (1) those opposing the implied in the demand for ‘open borders’. ‘rescue of the euro’ and the ‘European super The latter group of ‘state socialists’, on the state’; (2) bourgeois voters with liberal and other hand, stresses that open borders pro- conservative orientations opposing further duce increased competition for limited migration; (3) voters in general and resources of the German welfare state and those opposed to ‘political correctness’; (4) are therefore utopian. The two wings of the former non-voters; (5) the socially disadvan- party agreed to disagree on these points, taged and those in declining urban areas that putting forward their positions at the begin- support ‘order, safety and patriotism’ and ning of 2017 and then dropping the issue feel themselves to be ‘losers of globalisation’, until election day in order to allow the party including ‘workers and the unemployed’.22 to unify in a campaign that focused almost One can conclude from the 2017 election exclusively on welfare policy issues. result that the AfD has managed successfully The election results for the Left party were to appeal to each of these groups—and in mixed. While the party gained additional particular to former non-voters and socially votes across the former West Germany, it disadvantaged groups. In East Germany, the suffered major losses in former East Ger- AfD has become the second strongest party many, where the AfD overtook the Left in and in the eastern federal state of Saxony, all federal states, leaving them in the third the party overtook the CDU to become the place behind CDU and AfD. Among the strongest party. Thus, the AfD has turned unemployed and blue collar employees, elec- itself in the eastern parts of Germany into toral support for the Left fell from 23 and 12 what one might describe as a ‘people’s per cent in 2013 to 11 and 10 per cent respec- party’ in the sense in which this word has tively in 2017. Writing after the election, been used in German political science, Lafontaine suggested that it was wrong to namely it has gained votes from all sections place the burdens of migration such as ‘in- of society. creased competition in the low wage sector, Turning to the pro-business liberals of the rising rents ... growing difficulties in schools FDP, the party focused in its campaign on with a rising share of pupils lacking German three things, namely: its young and ‘charis- language skills on those that are already matic’ party leader ; the losers with regard to income and wealth’. criticism of Merkel’s immigration policies as He also stressed that ‘experience in Europe economically dangerous and possibly illegal; teaches: once those people feel no longer and on ‘digitalisation’ as a topic defining represented by left or social democratic par- the economic future of Germany. The FDP ties, they increasingly vote for right-wing applied similar rhetoric to the AfD as parties’.23 regards the ‘failed’ migration policies of Last, the Green party has over the years Merkel. Yet as a market-liberal party, the turned into a new middle class party of the FDP still stressed that migration into the economically well-off with a ‘post-material- German labour market could be a good ist’ approach to policy-making. The party thing if regulated by a ‘modern’ migration has mostly rejected placing upper limits on law. This implies the ‘Canadian model’ of migration. Instead, the focus of the election selecting migrants according to a scoring campaign was placed on climate change and system governed by their relative economic efforts to turn away from a carbon economy. utility as judged from the point of view of Since the other parties had largely vacated employers. environmental issues, the Greens managed

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© The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 to achieve election results that surpassed immigration platform and have suggested expectations. The Greens are now in a strong founding a ‘super ministry’ for integration position to enter a future government, policies. There appears to be plenty of reason although without any clear policy-making for the four parties to think twice about join- agenda. ing a ‘Jamaica’ coalition government if the price would be to disappoint their respective Conclusion: the crisis behind the core constituencies. This is particularly the case for the Bavarian CSU, which faces crisis of the party system regional elections in 2018 and has already The result of the German federal election of stated that the party will not join a new gov- 2017 raised many questions about the future ernment without clear agreements on future of German politics. This conclusion briefly migration limits. reviews the election results and speculates Moving on from these mostly managerial how the broader picture of neoliberal capital- issues to the larger picture, one needs to ism and European and global crisis might stress that refugee and migration issues affect the future behaviour of the party- dominated the 2017 federal elections for two political actors in Germany. The right-wing main reasons. First, the entire episode of AfD is the big winner of the 2017 election. Germany’s ‘open borders’ between Septem- The party managed to gain around 1.2 mil- ber 2015 and March 2016 was unprecedented lion votes from former non-voters and 1 mil- in its scope and surprised the political actors. lion from former CDU/CSU voters, but also Second, the refugee and migration crisis 470,000 and 400,000 from former SPD and occurred at a moment in time when there Left party voters, respectively. The FDP as were already other unprecedented problems the second winner of this election gained crowding the agenda, namely, that neoliberal nearly 1.4 million votes from the CDU/CSU capitalism has, since the global crisis in 2008, and served as the party-political option for run on a policy of zero interest rates. Such those who wanted to put pressure on Merkel experimental macroeconomic policies have without voting for the AfD.24 The overall made the rich richer while those who placed picture is the transition to a more polarised their trust in a welfare state that continues to party system with AfD and FDP as newcom- experience permanent austerity have lost ers in parliament. out. Who is ultimately going to pay the price The formation of a coalition government for these policies is still unclear, and people might be very difficult to achieve. The two have good reason to worry about limited traditional major parties, CDU/CSU and resources. SPD, jointly received only 53.4 per cent of Thus, the forming of the next German the overall vote, their lowest ever result in government will have to be pursued in a dif- German federal elections. Although the cur- ficult environment. The elections have rent grand coalition government would tech- demonstrated that Germany is divided nically hold just enough votes in parliament across multiple dimensions: social and regio- to keep going, this option appears a self- nal divisions have spilled over into the polit- defeating strategy, especially for the SPD. At ical system. In particular, the cuts in welfare time of writing (2 October 2017), the most state entitlements and standards in the early likely option is assumed to be a so-called twenty-first century have created a precari- ‘Jamaica coalition’ of CDU/CSU, FDP and ous class of working poor that is perma- Greens. (The respective party colours black, nently excluded from participating in the yellow and green make up the Jamaican economic prosperity elsewhere. Moreover, flag.) The major problem of forming a social and cultural divisions between West ‘Jamaica coalition’ is that the leaders of the and East continue to be significant nearly four necessary party-political components three decades after unification. The 2017 advance opposing views with regard to the election has highlighted the fact that the wedge issue of refugees and migrants. The party system is now increasingly regionally CSU and the FDP have both been highly structured. While the Christian Democrats critical of Merkel’s migration policies, while have maintained some nation-wide threshold the Greens are mostly committed to a pro- of support, the Social Democrats have

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 © The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 declined to a North West German party with extent of the New Year’s Eve assaults in much lower levels of support elsewhere. Germany to be known’, Washington Post, 11 July Conversely, the AfD has gained strong sup- 2016; https://www.washingtonpost.com/ne port in East Germany and the South while ws/worldviews/wp/2016/07/11/why-it-took- the two smaller parties that would be signifi- half-a-year-for-the-full-extent-of-the-new-years- ‘ ’ eve-assaults-in-germany-to-be-known/?tid=a_in cant to form a Jamaica coalition , namely l&utm_term=.ae1ef594e0eb (accessed 2 October the FDP and the Greens, are strong in the 2017). former West Germany and weak in the for- 7 ‘Terror am Breitscheidplatz. Wie planlos mer East Germany. In summary, the inability agierte die Polizei nach dem Anschlag?’, Ber- of the political system to deliver stability liner Zeitung, 15 September 2017; http:// and social integration is reflected in the sheer www.berliner-zeitung.de/berlin/terror-am-bre difficulty of forming a government. In this itscheidplatz-wie-planlos-agierte-die-polizei-na – environment, the wedge issue of refugees ch-dem-anschlag 28419362 (accessed 2 October and migrants could always re-enter the 2017). agenda, questioning the stability of any 8 A clear statement of market-liberal principles in the context of migration is put forward by future coalition government. R. Springer, Spurwechsel. Wie Fluchtlingspolitik€ wirklich gelingt,Munchen,€ Finanzbuchverlag, 2017. Based on his participant observation as Notes civil society assistant to refugees, Springer con- 1 B. Engholm interview, ‘Heute fehlt es an vincingly describes the shortcomings of the Visionaren€ ’, Heilbronner Stimme, 11 August current German asylum bureaucracy. Yet his 2017; http://www.stimme.de/themen/wahle suggested solution, namely a new administra- n/btw17/texte/Heute-fehlt-es-an-Visionaeren; tive system that would exclude refugees from art140673,3895167 (accessed 2 October 2017). access to the German welfare state and instead 2 ARD-DeutschlandTREND, ‘Wichtigste politische would introduce ‘integration credits’ demand- Probleme in Deutschland’, July 2017; https:// ing migrants to quickly enter employment to www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/ settle their ‘debt’ with the German state, bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2017/juli/ appears to amount to a kind of ‘refugee work- (accessed 2 October 2017). fare’. Implicitly, the author wishes to limit 3 ‘Pressemitteilung: Zuwanderung verliert fur€ migration to Germany to the able-bodied, Deutsche an Brisanz. Ergebnisse der “Chal- therefore coming out firmly in favour of the lenges of Nations 2017” des GfK Vereins’, utilitarian side of the argument. Nuremberg: Gesellschaft fur€ Konsum-, Markt- 9 M. Haller, Die ‘Fluchtlingskrise€ ’ in den Medien. und Absatzforschung, 25 August 2017; http:// Tagesaktueller Journalismus zwischen Meinung www.gfk-verein.org/presse/zuwanderung-ve und Information, am Main, Otto Bren- rliert-fuer-deutsche-brisanz (accessed 2 October ner Stiftung, 9 June 2017; https://www.otto- 2017). brenner-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_data/stiftu 4 G. Blume et al., ‘Grenzoffnung€ fur€ Fluchtlinge:€ ng/Aktuelles/AH93/AH_93_Haller_Web.pdf Was geschah wirklich?’, , 22 August (accessed 2 October 2017). 2016; http://www.zeit.de/2016/35/grenzo 10 ‘Merkel-CDU fuhrt€ Morgenthauplan durch— effnung-fluechtlinge-september-2015-wochenen Grandiose Rede von Erika Steinbach’, Youtube de-angela-merkel-ungarn-oesterreich/komplet portal titled ‘Freie ’, 14 September tansicht (accessed 2 October 2017). 2017; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6r 5 For legal issues, see in particular Deutscher ly1IvmmSY (accessed 2 October 2017). In her , Wissenschaftliche Dienste, ‘Ausar- speech, Steinbach frequently quotes older CDU beitung Einreiseverweigerung und Einreiseges- election on the need to control tattung nach § 18 Asylgesetz’, WD3-3000-109/ migration as evidence for Merkel’s offence 17, 24 May 2017, pp. 7, 9–11; https://www.b against basic values of the ‘old’ CDU. undestag.de/blob/514854/0bdb98e0e61680672e 11 See R. Alexander, Die Getriebenen. Merkel und 965faad3498e93/wd-3-109-17-pdf-data.pdf (ac- die Fluchtlingspolitik:€ Report aus dem Inneren der cessed 2 October 2017). Macht, 2nd ed., Berlin, Siedler, 2017, pp. 141, 6 G. Mascolo, B. von der Heide, ‘1200 Frauen wur- 150, 159, 163. den Opfer von Silvester-Gewalt’, Suddeutsche€ Zei- 12 ‘Gabriel attackiert die Union: “Niemand soll tung, 10 July 2016; http://www.sueddeutsc wegen der Fluchtlinge€ vergessen werden”’, he.de/politik/uebergriffe-in-koeln-frauen-wurde Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 September n-opfer-von-silvester-gewalt-1.3072064. See also 2017; http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/bun R. Noack, ‘Why it took half a year for the full destagswahl/sigmar-gabriel-attackiert-union-we

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© The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 gen-fluechtlingskrise-15204371.html (accessed 2 09/armutsproduktion-mit-system/ (accessed 2 October 2017). October 2017). 13 ‘Die Linke: Oskar Lafontaine fordert konse- 20 C. F. Schuetze, ‘Why a challenger to Merkel quentere Abschiebungen’, Zeit Online, 8 Febru- faltered after a strong start’, New York Times, ary 2017; http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutsc 23–24 September 2017, p. 4. See also S. Winter- hland/2017-02/oskar-lafontaine-linke-abschieb bauer, ‘Mutti, Martin und die Mutlosen: ungen-fluechtlinge-afd (accessed 2 October Warum die Sender schuld an der Langeweile 2017). For Wagenknecht, compare further des TV-Duells sind’, 4 September 2017; http:// online references available in the stated source. www.absatzwirtschaft.de/mutti-martin-und-die- 14 Heinsohn sums up his thinking, linking high mutlosen-warum-die-sender-schuld-an-der-la birth rates and armed conflict in a ‘war index’, ngeweile-des-tv-duells-sind-113679/ (accessed in a lecture titled ‘Menschliches Mab fur€ die 2 October 2017). Kriegsbereitschaft’, which was delivered on the 21 K. Riedel and S. Pittelkow, ‘Die Hayek- occasion of the 70th birthday of philosopher Gesellschaft—Mistbeet der AfD’?’, Suddeutsche€ Peter Sloterdijk on 26 June 2017 at the Karl- Zeitung, 14 July 2017; http://www.sueddeutsc sruhe-based ‘Zentrum fur€ Kunst und Medien’; he.de/wirtschaft/hayek-gesellschaft-mistbeet-de http://zkm.de/media/video/gunnar-heinsohn- r-afd-1.3589049 (accessed 2 October 2017). von-morgenroeten-die-noch-nicht-geleuchtet-hab 22 AfD-Manifest 2017. Die Strategie der AfD fur€ en (accessed 2 October 2017). das Wahljahr 2017, 22 December 2016; 15 H. Rosa, ‘Anverwandlung statt Versteinerung. https://www.scribd.com/document/338294054/ Zwei Antworten auf die “Fluchtlingskrise€ ”’, AfD-Strategie-2017 (accessed 2 October 2017). Mittelweg 36, vol. 26, no. 2, 2017, pp. 27–37. 23 O. Lafontaine, ‘Die Linke und die soziale Ger- 16 B. Opratko, ‘Rechtspopulismus als Krisenbear- echtigkeit’, 26 September 2017, Facebook page beitung. Anmerkungen zum Aufstieg von AfD @oskarlafontaine; https://www.facebook.com/ € und FPO’, Prokla, vol. 47, no. 186, 2017, pp. 123–36. oskarlafontaine/posts/1552437538151041 (ac- 17 W. Reich, Mass Psychology of Fascism, New cessed 2 October 2017). York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1933. 24 T. Steppat, ‘Merkel und die Koalition der 18 J. Boewe, ‘Stupid Work 2.0’, 20 December 2014, Zufriedenen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Lunapark21: Zeitschrift zur Kritik der politischen 25 September 2017; http://www.faz.net/ak € Okonomie, Heft 28; http://www.lunapark21.ne tuell/politik/bundestagswahl/f-a-z-wahlanaly t/stupid-work-2-0/ (accessed 2 October 2017). se-merkel-und-die-koalition-der-zufriedenen-15 19 H. Reiners, ‘Armutsproduktion mit System’,15 206260.html (accessed 2 October 2017). September 2017; https://makroskop.eu/2017/

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 4 © The Author 2017. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2017