Poland South Africa | Sweden | United States 6 Strong Support for Democracy and Human Rights Poland Piotr Kościński

Supporting Democracy Abroad: An Assessment of Leading Powers

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction Twenty-five years have passed since communism Since the end of communism, democracy was overthrown and Poland made the transition and human rights have become key values in to democracy. During this period, key actors from Poland’s foreign policy. Although restrained Poland’s struggle to overthrow communism have become involved in efforts to build democratic by its capacity as a mid-sized economy, political systems and independent civil societies Poland has at times played a leadership in countries in Eastern Europe and beyond. Poland’s role in providing support and condemning successful domestic transition has served as a abuses. Poland’s democracy and human powerful context for its democracy and human rights support abroad. rights promotion focuses on the former Soviet republics, especially Belarus, as Another important factor has been Poland’s entrance into the European Union (EU) and the well as multilateral efforts through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Poland’s European Union. integration into key European institutions has Poland’s main activities in this area enhanced economic and social development and are election observation and assistance ensured security, which in turn have facilitated Poland’s active participation in organizations such as for free expression and free association in the European Endowment for Democracy (of which About this project its neighbors to the east. Official statements Poland was a cofounder at the beginning of 2013 This project analyzes regularly express concern at electoral fraud and is the largest contributor). Warsaw also became support by 11 democratic and other abuses. A vocal critic of Russia’s the host to major human rights organizations such powers for democracy as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human and human rights interference in Ukraine in 2014 and a strong Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and during the period proponent of punitive action, Poland lobbied June 2012–May 2014. Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the secretariat its allies for similar defense of democratic of the Community of Democracies. Poland played About the author principles. Poland’s support for the rights of a significant role in the creation of the latter, and Piotr Kościński is Eastern marginalized populations in other countries has demonstrated sustained commitment to its and South Eastern Europe goal of supporting democracy. In 2012, Poland programme coordinator generally aligns with the interests of its established the Warsaw Dialogue for Democracy, at the Polish Institute of domestic constituents. an annual conference bringing together more than International Affairs. 200 prodemocracy activists, policy makers, and analysts from around the world to discuss transition and democracy.

1 www.freedomhouse.org Supporting Democracy Poland Abroad: An Assessment of Leading Powers

For historical and security reasons, Poland focuses Democracy], and that a Polish candidate—Jerzy its foreign policy on its neighbors. This includes Pomianowski—was chosen as its first director. The the former Soviet republics, which have the largest Endowment will promote democracy in the entire democracy and human rights deficits in the region. EU neighborhood.”2 On China, the minister said only Poland also has interests in other parts of the that “we are ready to share our experiences should world, some of which it does not address as fully China one day opt for a system of political pluralism.” as it might. Although the priorities for the promotion of Poland’s support for democracy and human rights democracy remained similar in the 2014 address, has been restrained by its capacity. In 1995, the the minister gave special attention to Ukraine. country’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita He also referred to changes in other countries: was 43 percent of the EU average, moving to just “Today a number of countries, including Egypt, 64 percent in 2011. Thus, the Polish economy Myanmar, and Tunisia, look up to us as a model of continues to lag behind the West. Despite high transition from a totalitarian regime to a free-market GDP growth since 2003, Polish politicians—and democracy.” In contrast, civil rights and liberties Polish society—appear convinced that an expansion were not mentioned in relation to China in 2014.3 of its current level of democracy support is not Thus, democracy is a priority for Poland, but the possible at this time. area of focus consists of the former Soviet republics and other countries in the region. Nevertheless, while Poland could do more to advance democracy and human rights beyond its borders, it has become a respected voice on the Development Assistance and Trade world stage. The promotion of democracy has been integrated into Poland’s development aid since 2012. Accord- ing to the “Long-term development cooperation Foreign Policy Objectives program for 2012–2015,”4 there are only two As in any country, democracy support plays a thematic areas of Polish development cooperation: secondary role to strategic priorities in Poland’s system transformation, and democracy and human foreign policy. In the case of its closest neighbors, rights. A program for 2012 to 2015 presents the however, Poland’s support for democracy can be general principles of Polish aid. The Ministry of quite significant. In Belarus, Poland plays a greater Foreign Affairs conducts planning and coordination role in pressing for democratic change than any of the democratization agenda, while its implemen- other country. Meanwhile, although Polish politi- tation is carried out by other ministries, embassies cians frequently invoke terms such as “democracy” (for small grants), the state aid agency (Solidarity and “human rights,” there is no agreement on what Fund PL, formerly the Polish Know How Foundation these words mean (Poland has no stated definitions for International Development Cooperation), and in its foreign policy) or how they should be achieved. civil society organizations. The minister of foreign affairs presents Poland’s Poland is not at the forefront of development assis- foreign policy priorities annually at a meeting of the tance, and indeed was an aid recipient until recently. lower house of parliament (the Sejm). In May 2014, The Center for Global Development’s Commitment Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski emphasized to Development Index put Poland in last place out that “Poland’s priorities when it comes to expert of 27 rich countries in 2013 in terms of quantity and assistance will continue to be: the promotion of quality of aid to poor countries. The Polish govern- democracy and the rule of law, fighting corruption, ment also gives the lowest net volume of aid as a cooperation of border services, energy coordination, share of GDP among those countries included in the and support for the development of rural regions.”1 index (0.08 percent).5 According to Organisation for In March 2013, Sikorski announced that support for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) the development of civil society in Eastern Europe data, Poland spent $421.06 million on development was a leading priority, with Belarus as a key recipi- assistance in 2012, and $417.5 million in 2011. ent of assistance. He also identified the Arab world A portion of official aid figures includes cancellation as a target area for democracy promotion. Sikorski of other countries’ debt as well as credits granted on added, “We are glad that we were successful in our preferential terms, which are not related to democ- efforts to establish the [European Endowment for racy support. The remaining money is distributed

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by other ministries, with an intention to promote Elections human rights and democracy. A large portion of the Polish politicians have emphasized repeatedly that funds goes to the EU for joint projects, over which democracy in neighboring countries is in Poland’s Poland has little influence. In 2013, the foreign national interest. Hence, Poland pays close attention ministry planned to give €72 million ($94 million) to to elections in those countries where democracy is the European Development Fund, and in 2014 the severely repressed—as in the case of Belarus—or figure was €87.5 million ($114.5 million).6 where it is fragile, as in Ukraine.

The reason for low aid figures appears to be a lack of Poland’s principal democracy agency (formerly the public interest in development assistance. Although Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now Solidarity Fund PL) the standard of living of the Polish population is still regularly sends large numbers of observers to moni- lower than among its Western neighbors, in 2013 tor elections in Belarus, most recently for the House Poland became a member of the Development of Representatives elections in September 2012. Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, which After the elections, the Polish foreign ministry stated brings together donor countries. that it was “deeply disappointed” that the elections fell well short of international standards. The The foreign ministry and Solidarity Fund PL have ministry also expressed concern over the detention organized competitions for nongovernmental organ- of human rights defenders, political opponents, and izations (NGOs) aimed at promoting development journalists during the campaign period.10 assistance and supporting democracy. In 2014, the ministry gave grants aimed at democratization, Poland did not acknowledge the results of these system transformation, education, and to a lesser elections (nor did the European Parliament). As a extent humanitarian aid for the following: 6 projects result, there is no possibility of cooperation between targeting Belarus, 10 for Georgia, 8 for Moldova, 16 the Polish Sejm and the Belarusian House of Repre- for Ukraine, 9 for East Africa, 5 for Central Asia, and sentatives. Poland also supported the exclusion of 2 for the Palestinian Authority. The total sum was Belarusian parliamentarians from Euronest, which rather small, at $8.7 million. The recipients of grants brings together members of the European Parlia- were varied, and the projects were related to the ment with representatives of parliaments from promotion of democracy, local communities, and the EU’s Eastern Partnership countries to promote marginalized groups. Members of the EU’s Eastern political association and economic integration.11 Partnership7—mainly Belarus and Ukraine—received In the October 2012 parliamentary elections in more than half of the funds, of which 70 percent was Ukraine, Poland sent 212 representatives, the largest aimed at democratization and transformation. East group of observers in the country.12 The Ministry Africa, North Africa, and Central Asia received 40 of Foreign Affairs was restrained in its response to percent of Poland’s development aid. Other major the findings: “The Foreign Ministry [. . .] notes that recipients were Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, during the elections many infringements took place, the Palestinian Authority. In 2014, Solidarity Fund PL relating, among other things, to the use of adminis- initiated projects aimed at the former Soviet repub- trative pressure, lack of transparency with regard to lics as well as Tunisia ($1.4 million in total).8 the financing of political parties, and the restriction of media access for opposition and independent Human rights and democracy play a minor role in candidates. Thus, the electoral process was not fully Poland’s trade policies. However, Poland has sup- consistent with democratic standards.”13 Despite the ported the limited economic sanctions imposed on concerns, Poland endorsed the results. Belarus in recent years. Furthermore, in 2014 War- saw strongly supported the imposition of sanctions For the high-profile Ukrainian presidential election on Russia in response to the invasion of Crimea in May 2014, Poland sent more than 100 observers. and the de facto military deployment in the east of This time the vote was judged more positively. The Ukraine, both for security reasons and in defense of foreign ministry stated that “Poland looks on the democracy. Minister Sikorski said, “These sanctions organization of the presidential elections in Ukraine should convince President Putin that the West as a with satisfaction.”14 Other Polish officials took a community of values does exist, and is able to unite similar position. when the elementary principles of international law Large numbers of observers were sent to the Octo- are violated.”9 ber 2012 parliamentary elections and the October

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2013 presidential elections in Georgia, which were is violating the rules of international coexistence assessed favorably.15 Having limited personal and and exporting terrorism, and that Poland condemns financial capabilities, Poland has sent smaller num- the annexation of the peninsula.19 Authorities bers of observers to other countries. In these cases, in Warsaw did not recognize the March 2014 the positions held by international organizations referendum in Crimea that led to the formal such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, or the EU attachment of the peninsula to Russia. have guided Polish authorities in their assessments. Warsaw has also adopted a negative stance to- Sometimes Polish authorities are silent, even in the ward Russian interference in eastern Ukraine, not face of election law violations in Eastern Partner- recognizing the referendums on the creation of ship countries. For example, Poland did not criticize the so-called People’s Republics in Donetsk and fraudulent elections in 2013 in Azerbaijan. Nor did Luhansk. Meanwhile, Poland supported Ukraine’s Poland call for the release of Anar Mammadli, pres- presidential election held on May 25. Recognizing ident of the Azerbaijan-based Election Monitoring that the demonstrations had driven out an elected and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS), after a Baku government, Komorowski said on May 23, court sentenced him to five and a half years’ impris- “The elections will give legitimacy to the new onment; this lack of response provoked criticism authorities and bring stability.”20 from Polish human rights organizations.16 Beyond Ukraine, the authorities in Warsaw have Disruptions of Democratic Processes tended to react cautiously to disruptions of dem- The events in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 ocratic processes. While Polish media and human were regarded as important in Poland. As the rights organizations have criticized the ruling party’s opposition protestors survived brutal attempts to tightening of control in Hungary, Polish authorities disperse them, leading Polish politicians, as well have not. “I’ll be at the disposal of Prime Minister as Polish society generally, supported the protest Viktor Orbán, if I could come in handy where opin- movement. At first, official Polish statements were ions on Hungary are exaggerated or unfair. And I feel 21 careful to avoid the appearance of interfering in the that part of the reaction is exaggerated,” concluded affairs of a foreign state. As events continued, how- Prime Minister Donald Tusk in 2012. A stronger offi- ever, the Polish government has been intensively cial statement was made in response to Hungarian engaged with the Ukrainian crisis. prime minister Orbán’s reluctance in March 2014 to support Ukraine (he demanded autonomy for ethnic During the violent clashes in Kiev in February 2014, Hungarians there): Prime Minister Tusk declared Polish president Bronislaw Komorowski met with Hungary’s hesitation “unfortunate” and de facto Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and called support for pro-Russian separatists.22 for the immediate cessation of the use of force and a return to negotiations with the opposition.17 Polish Poland reacts in an especially careful manner to foreign minister Sikorski took on mediation efforts, cases outside its region. After the coup in Thailand, with the participation of the foreign ministries of the foreign ministry statement on May 22, 2014, France and Germany. declared that “Poland is concerned about the development of the conflict in Thailand and the seizure After Yanukovych fled to Russia at the end of of power by the military. Invariably, we stand on the February and an interim government was estab- side of democracy, rule of law, and civil liberties.”23 lished in Ukraine, the Polish leadership assured Kiev They adopted much the same position after the of its support. Komorowski indicated that Poland coup in Guinea-Bissau in 2012. In most cases, might share with Ukraine its positive experience of Poland’s stance is similar to those presented by building a system to combat corruption, reform local the EU and other international organizations. government, and support the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises.18 Poland was also Gross Human Rights Violations a key player in forging the EU consensus for active Poland promotes respect for fundamental human engagement in Ukraine and the eventual signing of rights according to its capabilities, mainly through the Association Agreement (which had been the its presence in international organizations that original impetus for the demonstrations). address these matters. Poland is an active member Warsaw has taken a critical view of Russia’s occupa- of the Council of Europe, and representative tion of Crimea. Sikorski has emphasized that Russia Wojciech Sawicki is the secretary general of the

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Parliamentary Assembly. Poland was elected to a reliable and important partner committed to build- the UN Human Rights Council for the years 2010 ing a secure international environment.”26 to 2016; in 2013, Polish representative Remigiusz Henczel headed this body. Other organizations in Civil Liberties which Poland participates include the European Polish authorities recognize the problems surround- Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and ing freedom of association, assembly, and expres- the European Committee for the Prevention of sion in other countries, but not always consistently. Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Poland’s most constant support is for human rights or Punishment. forces in Belarus. Many independent or opposition The Polish stance on the fighting in Syria has been Belarusian centers exist in Poland, acting with the generally analogous to that presented by the EU, support of the Polish authorities. The most impor- whose member states largely recognized the Syrian tant are Belarusian House in Warsaw, the Internet opposition as the representative of the Syrian portal Charter97, and the Solidarity with Belarus people in November 2012. However, in July 2012, Information Office. Poland was one of the last states to close its embas- However, the most significant achievement of Polish sy in Syria. The embassy remains closed today for assistance has been the creation and support of security reasons, but the Syrian embassy in Warsaw Belsat TV. The channel was established under an is functioning normally. Thus, Poland has not taken a agreement signed by the Polish foreign ministry strong stance against the Assad regime. and Polish Television (TVP SA) in 2007; today, Belsat 27 In August 2013, after receiving information about continues to be funded by both. Belsat is the only the use of chemical weapons by Syrian government independent Belarusian television channel, with forces, Prime Minister Donald Tusk declared that programming created by Belarusians. Based in Poland would not participate in any intervention in Warsaw, the channel is transmitted by satellite and Syria: “We have experience in this part of the world, over the Internet. According to research conducted which shows that military intervention, even from in April 2014, its audience includes 7 percent of the 28 the most obvious and noble motives, rarely produc- adult population of Belarus. Belsat’s impact is es the desired effect.”24 According to media reports, limited, however, as most Belarusians watch TV 29 it was Foreign Minister Sikorski who initiated the from Russia. solution to the problem of Syria’s chemical weapons In addition, two radio stations broadcast to Belarus arsenal without the use of force, a strategy that was from Polish territory. The audience for the Belarusian 25 later adopted by the United States and Russia. channel, Radio Ratsya, was estimated at 1.5 million When bloody clashes between government forces people in 2013, but due to the closed environment and demonstrators occurred in Turkey in May and in Belarus it is difficult to determine the actual num- June 2013, Polish authorities avoided taking a posi- ber of listeners. The second is the European Radio tion on the events. The Polish foreign ministry issued for Belarus, whose programs are broadcast on Polish a warning for tourists, assuring them that Turkish Radio, as well as private radio in Ukraine and Lithua- coastal resorts were still safe. Poland has respond- nia. In 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated 30 ed similarly to events in other countries, alerting $1.2 million to these radio stations, although the tourists about expected riots in 2012 in Venezuela current impact of these stations is not significant. and Egypt. To a much lesser extent, Poland supports the media In contrast, in South Sudan, Poland has provided as- in Ukraine. Various NGOs, using Polish government sistance to victims, particularly through NGOs such money, organize trainings for Ukrainian journalists. as the Polish Humanitarian Organisation. Poland Polish NGOs also actively support civil society was also engaged in the EU peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. (EUFOR RCA) in the Central African Republic. As Poland maintains a cautious stance on human emphasized by representatives of the Polish author- rights in China. In mid-2013, controversy and crit- ities, participation in this mission was in part related icism, especially from human rights organizations to improving relations with France, which led the and the media, was triggered by a delegation from operation. According to a Polish defense ministry the Polish parliament to Beijing on the anniversary official, that mission “reinforces the Polish image as of the massacre in Tiananmen Square. In defending

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the decision, Speaker of the Sejm Ewa Kopacz said tians in Syria and Egypt.” Foreign Minister Radoslaw that she would discuss human rights during a meet- Sikorski supported the resolution, although no ing with the chairman of the National People’s Con- strong action was taken.36 gress of China on the anniversary of the violence.31 Poland has not taken a position in other cases of Separately, in June 2013, Foreign Minister Radoslaw persecution of marginalized groups. One example is Sikorski met with Chinese bloggers known for their abuses against the LGBT community in Russia, for criticism of the authorities.32 which Poland has had no response. In March 2014, while visiting Iran, Sikorski criticized

censorship and restrictions on freedom of the me- ENDNOTES dia. As a result, his speech was censored in Iranian 1. Radoslaw Sikorski, “Address by the Minister of 33 state media. Foreign Affairs on Foreign Policy in 2014,” Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Republic of Poland, May 8, 2014, http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE/news/address_ Marginalized Communities by_the_minister_of_foreign_affairs_on_the_goals_of_ With respect to marginalized communities, Poland polish_foreign_policy_in_2014. is primarily interested in challenges faced by ethnic 2. Radoslaw Sikorski, “Address by the Minister of Foreign Poles in Belarus and Lithuania. Belarusian offi- Affairs on the Goals of Polish Foreign Policy in 2013,” cial data shows 294,000 ethnic Poles living in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, March 20, 2013, http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/address_by_the_ country. In 2005, Belarusian authorities canceled minister_of_foreign_affairs_on_the_goals_of_polish_ democratic elections in the biggest Polish organiza- foreign_policy_in2013_?printMode=true. tion, the Union of Poles in Belarus (ZPB), and created 3. Sikorski, May 8, 2014. their own union with an obedient leadership. As 4. “Wieloletni Program Współpracy Rozwojowej: Na Lata a result, ZPB still has two leadership factions. The 2012–2015” (“Long-term Development Cooperation democratically elected but illegal leadership is to Program for 2012–2015”), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, adopted by the government on March some extent tolerated, though its members are of- 20, 2012, https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/files/inne%20 ten discriminated against and persecuted. However, dokumenty%20PDF/Pomoc%20zagraniczna%202011/ opportunities for diplomatic intervention are limited. PWieloletni.pdf. Poland primarily supports ZPB financially, including 5. “The Commitment to Development Index,” Center for helping with the issuance of its publications. Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/ commitment-development-index/index. There are 213,000 ethnic Poles in Lithuania, repre- 6. “Plan współpracy rozwojowej w 2014 r” (“Development senting up to 80 percent of the population in some Cooperation Plan for 2014”), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regions. Poland has repeatedly intervened in cases Republic of Poland, 2014, https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/files/ such as when Poles are not allowed to write their Dokumenty_i_Publikacje/Plan_wspolpracy_2014/ names in their own language, or when the Polish Plan%20wspolpracy%20rozwjowowej%202% language cannot be used on road signs. “I hope that 20modyfikacja2014.pdf. in the end there will be a majority in the Lithuanian 7. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic parliament which will respect the obvious rights of of Moldova, and Ukraine. minorities,” said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk 8. “MSZ rozstrzygnęło konkurs “Polska pomoc rozwojowa 2014’” (“Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided on ‘Polish in February 2014.34 Development Assistance in 2014’ contest”), Polska Other support for marginalized communities Pomoc, January 30, 2014, https://www.polskapomoc.gov. pl/MSZ,rozstrzygnelo,konkurs,Polska,pomoc, includes the MFA-initiated Lech Walesa Solidarity rozwojowa,2014,1969.html. Prize, which was awarded to Crimean Tatar leader 9. Rozmawiała Renata Grochal, “Minister Radosław Mustafa Dzhemilev in May 2014. Sikorski: Te sankcje powinny już dać kierownictwu Rosji do myślenia” (“Minister Radoslaw Sikorski: These In Muslim countries, Poland has advocated for the Sanctions Should Already Make the Leadership of rights of Christians. In March 2013, Minister Sikorski Russia Think”), Gazeta Wyborcza, July 29, 2014, said, “Poland is one of those countries that is not http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,16398508,Minister_Radoslaw_ afraid to say that Christians are the most persecuted Sikorski__Te_sankcje_powinny_juz.html. religion today in the world. We will defend the rights of Christians as much as we can.”35 In October 2013, the Sejm called for “bold action in defense of Chris-

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10. “Polskie MSZ rozczarowane standardami wyborów na 21. “‘Przywódcy Polski i Litwy podjęli obronę Węgier. Białorusi” (“Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs disappointed Dziękujemy’” (“‘The Polish and Lithuanian Leaders Defend- by election standards in Belarus”), Ministry of Foreign ed Hungary. Thank You.’”), Gazeta Wiadomości, February Affairs, Republic of Poland, September 24, 2012, 13, 2012, http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/ http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/msz_w_mediach/ wiadomosci/1,114873,11138134,_Przywodcy_Polski_i_ polskie_msz_rozczarowane_standardami_wyborow_na_ Litwy_podjeli_obrone_Wegier__Dziekujemy__.html. bialorusi__depesza_pap_24_09_2012_?printMode=true. 22. “Tusk ostro o Orbanie. ‘To niefortunna wypowiedź’” 11. Interview with Robert Tyszkiewicz, member of Parliament, (“Tusk Sharp on Orban. ‘This Is an Unfortunate deputy head of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Statement’”), Polskie Radio, May 13, 2014, 12. “Official Observers from Foreign States and International http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1123532,Tusk- Organizations” [in Polish], Central Election Commission of ostro-o-Orbanie-To-niefortunna-wypowiedz. Ukraine, October 28, 2012, 23. “Zamach stanu w Tajlandii, władzę przejęła armia” http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2012/wp041?PT001F01=900. (“Coup in Thailand, Army Seized Power”), RMF 24, May 22, 13. “Oświadczenie MSZ w sprawie wyborów na Ukrainie” 2014, http://m.rmf24.pl/fakty/swiat/news,nId,1430125. (“Statement of the MFA on the Elections in Ukraine”), 24. “Poland Will Not Join Strikes on Syria,” Polskie Radio, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, October 29, August 28, 2013, http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/ 2012, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/ Artykul/145573,Poland-will-not-join-strikes-on-Syria. oswiadczenie_msz_w_sprawie_wyborow_na_ukrainie. 25. Matthew Day and Damien McElroy, “Syria: Polish 14. “Oświadczenie MSZ po wyborach prezydenckich na Foreign Minister Takes Credit for Chemical Weapons Plan,” Ukrainie” (“Statement by the Foreign Ministry after the The Telegraph, September 11, 2013, Presidential Elections in Ukraine”), Ministry of Foreign http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ Affairs, Republic of Poland, May 26, 2014, syria/10301640/Syria-Polish-foreign-minister-takes- http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/ credit-for-chemical-weapons-plan.html. oswiadczenie_msz_po_wyborach_prezydenckich_ 26. “Wylot na afrykańską misję” (“Depart on African Mission”), na_ukrainie. Altair, January 30, 2014, 15. “MSZ ws. wyborów parlamentarnych w Gruzji” (“MFA on http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=12599. Parliamentary Elections in Georgia”), October 3, 2012, 27. “About Us,” Belsat TV, http://belsat.eu/en/o_nas/. http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/msz-ws-wyborow-par- 28. Interview with Agnieszka Romaszewska, director, lamentarnych-w-gruzji-komunikat; Krzysztof Nieczypor, Belsat TV. “Szefowie dyplomacji Polski i Szwecji chwalą kampanię wyborczą w Gruzji” (“Polish and Swedish Foreign Ministers 29. Interview with Valery Karbalevich, independent Praise the Campaign in Georgia”), EastBook.eu, October Belarussian political scientist. 23, 2013, http://eastbook.eu/2013/10/country/georgia/ 30. “What is Euroradio?” Euroradio FM, szefowie-dyplomacji-polski-i-szwecji-chwal%C4%85- http://euroradio.fm/en/node/3975. kampani%C4%99-wyborcz%C4%85-w-gruzji-wideo/. 31. Tomasz Sajewicz, “Kopacz w Chinach: Wspomnę o 16. Krzysztof Bobiński and Dominika Bychawska-Siniarska, prawach człowieka” (“Kopacz in China: the Mention of “Polska powinna upomnieć się o Mammadlego” (“Poland Human Rights”), Gazeta Wyborcza, June 5, 2013, Should Stand up for Mammadli”), Gazeta Wyborcza, http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,14038458,Kopacz_w_ January 21, 2014, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75968,15306068, Chinach__Wspomne_o_prawach_czlowieka.html. Polska_powinna_upomniec_sie_o_Mammadlego.html. 32. “Minister Sikorski i blogerzy o nowych mediach w 17. “Apel do prezydenta Ukrainy o natychmiastowe wstrzy- społeczeństwie chińskim” (“Minister Sikorski and New manie użycia siły” (“Appeal to the President of Ukraine Media Bloggers in China”), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Immediately Stop the Use of Force”), Official Website Republic of Poland, June 13, 2013, of the President of the Republic of Poland, February 19, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz_pl/aktualnosci/ 2014, http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/ wiadomosci/minister_sikorski_i_blogerzy_o_nowych_ art,2810,apel-do-prezydenta-ukrainy-o-natychmias- mediach_w_spoleczenstwie_chinskim. towe-wstrzymanie-uzycia-sily.html. 33. “Sikorski mówił o cenzurze, to go... ocenzurowali. W Iranie” 18. “President and National Security Council Discuss (“Sikorski Spoke of Censorship, Is It... Censored in Iran”), Ukrainian Crisis’ Impact,” Official Website of the President Gazeta Wiadomości, March 7, 2014, http://wiadomosci. of the Republic of Poland, February 26, 2014, gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114871,15582705, Sikorski_ http://www.president.pl/en/news/news/art,569, mowil_o_cenzurze__to_go____ocenzurowali_.html. president-and-national-security-council-discuss- 34. “Donald Tusk o sytuacji polskiej mniejszości na Litwie: ukrainian-crisis-impact.html. chcemy takich standardów, aby prawa mniejszości były 19. “Sikorski: Rosja eksportuje terroryzm. Ale będziemy z nią podobne jak w Polsce” (“Donald Tusk on the Situation of rozmawiać” (“Sikorski: Russia Exports Terrorism. But We’ll the Polish Minority in Lithuania: We Want the Standards Talk to Her”), Rzeczpospolita, June 6, 2014, for Minority Rights to Be Similar to Those in Poland”), http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1115852.html. Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, February 20. “President Hopes for Stability in Ukraine after Elections,” 18, 2014, https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/ Official Website of the President of the Republic of aktualnosci/donald-tusk-o-sytuacji-polskiej- Poland, May 23, 2014, http://www.president.pl/en/news/ mniejszosci-na-litwie-chcemy-takich.html. news/art,624,president-hopes-for-stability-in-ukraine- after-elections.html.

7 www.freedomhouse.org Supporting Democracy Poland Abroad: An Assessment of Leading Powers

35. “Sikorski: Chrześcijanie są prześladowani, a Polska będzie ich bronić. Ale władza musi być świecka” (“Sikorski: Christians Are Persecuted, and Poland Will Defend Them. But the Government Must Be Secular”), Interia.pl, March 20, 2013, http://fakty.interia.pl/polska/ news-sikorski-chrzescijanie-sa-przesladowani-a- polska-bedzie-ich-,nId,944734. 36. “Sejm wzywa do działań w obronie chrześcijan w Syrii i Egipcie” (“Parliament Calls for Action in Defense of the Christians in Syria and Egypt”), Wiadomości, October 11, 2013, http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/sejm-wzywa- do-dzialan-w-obronie-chrzescijan-w-syrii-i-egipcie/jj3s3.

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