An Oral History Account of Oldirch Cerny

Interviewed by Grace Robinson Instructor: Mr. Alex Haight Submitted: Ft^bruary 9*, 2005 Table of Contents

Statement of Purpose Page 3

Biography Page 4

The Fall of the Iron Curtain: the 1989 Changes Page 5

Interview Trmiscript Page 17

Historical Analysis Page 54

Appendix Page 61

Audio Time Log Page 63

Works consulted Page 65

Statement of Purpose

The purpose ofthis Oral History Project is to compare historical documentation of

Czechoslov^ia in 1989 to the testimony of Oldrich Cerny. In order to understand the

context of the period, it is imperative to explore official sources, speeches, and primary

documents providing information to the events leading up, and the actual Velvet

Revolution. After studying historical account, the second purpose is gaining knowledge

from the personal accounts of Mr. Cerny, who was involved in the core resistance group

during the Velvet Revolution, the Civic Forum. The most significant aspect ofthis

project is utilizing the primary documents composed by Oldrich Cerny to humanize and

provide a different angle of understanding of the events during the period. Hopefully, this project will provide insight into the less glorified view of revolutionaries immersed

in the radical changes of the time.

Table of Contents

Statement of Purpose Page 3 Biography Page 4

The Fall of the Iron Curtain the 1989 Changes Page 5

InterviewTranscnpt Page 17

Historical Analysis Page 54

Appendix Page 61

Audio Time Log ,,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^.,^., ,, Page 63

Works consulted . Page 65

Biogri^hy of Oldtich Cerny

Oldnch Cerny wasbommPrague on June 17 ,1946 Livingunderthe communist regime m Czechoslovakia, Mr Cemy was raised and educated m Prague Hewasbmught up by his mother, who w^sa Geimanprofessorat the University of Agriculture outside of Prague She struggled to compenate for the absence ofher husband, who w^s separated from his femily and put into a communist concentration camp for sp eakmg against the govemment In 1956, when

Mr Cemy w^s ten, his fetherdiedm the prison In 1964, Mr Cemy attended Charles University in Prague where he studiedEnglishand took an American and Czech literature course He graduated m 1970, vjasmamed, and served his mandatory service m the Czech aimy from 1971-

72 After his service, m 1972 Mr Cemy to ok the job as an editor of a pubhshmg house for children In 1974,his daughter,Marela, w^sbom In 1977,he vjas fired fromhispubhshmgjob due to pressure firimthe secret pohce In 197S his son, Matij, w^sbom, forcing Mr Cemy to vjoikamynad of jobs, such as translating and dubbing, to support his femily In 19S4 Mr Cemy was employed at the Barrandoe Film studio, where he worked until 1989. In 1989 Mr. Cemy joined the Civic Forum along with his friend Havel, and served as a prominent leader in the 10 day Velvet Revolution, responsible for overthrowing the communist govemment. In 1990, he became an advisor to President Havel in the first Czech Democracy since the communist regime.

In 1993, after the split of the country, he was appointed the first Czech director of intelligence, coordinating national security links between the intelligence services, the military, the police, and the president. In 1998 he left the castle and is currently Executive Director of the Forum 2000

Foundation, which brings together political leaders from around the world to address global issues and search for sustainable solutions.

Table of Contents

Statement of Purpose Page 3

Biography Page 4

The Fall of the Iron Curtain: the 1989 Changes Page 5

Interview Trmiscript Page 17

Historical Analysis Page 54

Appendix Page 61

Audio Time Log Page 63

Works consulted Page 65

The FaU of the Iron Curtam: the 1989 Changes

In December 1989, graffiti appemed throughout Prague proclaiming "Poland, ten years; Hungary, ten months; East Germmiy, ten weeks; Czechoslovakia, ten days" (Feffer

160). In a region where history was frozen for four decades due to harsh communist rule. revolution moved briskly in November 1989. In the words of Vaclav Havel, the leader of the Civic Forum, in then-Czechoslovakia "The moment someone breaks through in one

place, when one person cries out, 'the emperor is n^ed!' - when a single person breaks the rules of the game, thus exposing it was a gmiie - everything suddenly appears in

another light and the whole crust seems then to be made out of tissue on the point of tearing and disintegrating uncontrollably" (Cipkowski 94). The first Eastern bloc country to "throw off the shackles of communism" (Tismanemiu 250) was Poland, who installed

an anti-communist prime minister. Next to shed communism was Hungary, where the

communist party appeared to abolish itself. The third country was East Germany when a torrent of people fleeing to the west breach the Berlin Wall and led is its fall. The last

was Czechoslov^ia, further transforming central Europe with its peaceful revolution. In ten days Czechoslovakia achieved what Poland's Solidarity movement took nearly ten

years to accomplish: a commitment from Communists to abandon their Party's monopoly

on power. An epic achievement, Czech freedom could not have been accomplished

without decades of struggle, beginning at the end of World War II. Following in the

footsteps of other East Europemi up-risings, the Czechoslovakian revolution came to be

known as the "Velvet Revolution" for its relatively smooth, civilized non-violent transition from communism to democracy. Therefore, gaining perspective on this event is

important because it provides a better understanding of the political elite involved in the

revolution.

After Czechoslovakia gained independence after World War I the new national

boundary joined the Czechs mid the Slovaks. Czechoslovakia enjoyed 20 years of an

open, democratic, and libertarian govemment until 1938, when Hitler's armies entered the country during World Wm II. On May 5 , 1945 the people of Prague rose up against the retreating German troops with the aid of the Soviet Union. When the Soviets entered

Prague in 1945, they were met with red flags and overwhelming enthusiasm and support.

After the war, the Czech's and Slovak's worked together to rebuild a democratic

govemment, inviting Edward Benes, the former president of Czechoslovakia before the

war, back to power. Benes' first act upon returning was inviting old political parties back

for free elections. In the 1948 free election, the communist pmty won 40 percent of the

vote, the greatest support the party had ever received. After occupying 8 of the 25 seats

in the new govemment, the communist party quickly strengthened their grip on power.

Under communist rule, controversy arose when the communist Minister of Interior

launched a purge of the police, causing the non-communist minister to resign. Benes

allowed communists to appoint replacements, consolidating their power and causing

democracy to crumble. Occurring at the beginning of the Cold War between U.S.S.R and

America, this aggression of Russia was seen by Americmi's as apart of their plan for

world domination. Russia's swift and irrational actions were caused by their plan to

secure their own sphere of communist influence in areas such as Eastern Germany.

Americans saw this as a great defeat because democracy and freedom were replaced with

communism and totalitarimiism, and many other democracies agreed. In the words of one

Czech writer, "Czechoslovakia abruptly changed from a socialist democracy into a

Stalinist state of horror" (Cipkowski 97).

A loyal Soviet ally, only once did Czechoslovakia boldly move towards freedom,

during "Prague Spring" in 1968. During "Prague Spring" communist pmty leader

Alexander Dubcek promised "socialism with a hummi face" (Ash 115), an idea that would later inspire Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader who instituted glasnost and perestroika in an effort to salvage a rigid mid disintegrating Soviet system. On

August 21, 1968, after many threats, Soviet troops invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia

along with other Warsaw Pact nations like East Germmiy, Poland, Hungary, and

Bulgaria.

After the invasion, Gustav Husak, a respected govemment official that supported

Prague Spring, was made president. Mmiy Czechoslov^s supported Husak, hoping that

he would stmid up to the Soviets, however this never occured. Husak purged Prague

Spring reformers from the communist party, bmiished Dubcek from Prague, and forced

both writers and artists to leave the country. Remaining in power for more than 20 years,

Hus^ finally lost his position as Secretary of the Communist Party in 1987 to Milos

Jakes.

In 1977, a document called Charter 77 was signed by 241 Czechoslovaks marking the beginning of an organized opposition movement. Signers of the documents included

liberals, Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Communists, and reformers. The Charter was a

"loose, informal, and open association of people of various shades of opinion, faith and

profession united by the will to strive individually and collectively for the respect of civil

and human rights" (Cipkowski 98). Vaclav Havel, one of the Charter's first signers and a

wellknown dissident, emerged as a leader and spokesperson of conscience, rather than a

political activist. Havel and the other signers of the Charter focused on the threat posed

by the communist regime to the environment, religious mid ethnic groups, social and

economic norms, and the fundmiiental rights of artists (Tismanemiu 254). Signing the Charter was an act of great courage due to harsh consequences that awaited its signators:

official harassment, loss of jobs, house semches, interrogations by secret police, and

withering pressure on their fmnilies. Although only pmlially successful, the Charter

created the first sparks of defiance, keeping activist spirits alive and encouraging the

individual contributions to a revolution by stating:

Responsibility for the maintenmice of civic rights in our country naturally devolves in the first place on the political and state authorities. Yet, not only on them: everyone bears his share of responsibility for the conditions that prevail and accordingly also for the observance of legally enshrine agreements, binding upon all citizens as well as upon govemment. It is this sense of co-responsibility, our belief in the meaning of voluntary citizens' involvement and the general need to give it new and more effective expression that led us to the idea of creating Charter 77, whose inception we today publicly announce, (www.dwis2.circ.gwu.edu/~jryfa/charter77.htm. October. 1976.)

These themes of individual empowerment in the cause of revolution set the tone for the

slogmis and speeches used to advance independence throughout the Velvet Revolution.

Before November 17 , 1989, activists had proved unable to transform their protests into a

mass movement. They succeeded in their preservation of the moral will to resist,

however they failed at both stimulating protests throughout Czechoslov^ia and engaging the working class. The radical ideas of reform and protest resided solely in the writers,

actors, artists, mid journalists concentrated in Prague. Communists effectively branded

dissidents as "creations of western media and human rights groups" (Feffer 163), mid

sought to demoralize them through intimidation, interrogation, searches, and jail. By the

end of the 1980's, however, independent activism was more pervasive, in part, because of the "domino effect" (Cipowski 94) of other East European uprising and dissents. Widely

circulated petitions called for the release of jailed dissidents and open discussions of the

1968 invasion. Demands grew for underground publications. Religious groups, such as Catholic's, delivered messages with anti-communist undertones, and Dubcek's associates

formed Obrada, a "club for socialists restructuring" (Cipowski 101). Young

people also joined struggle, expressing their frustration with the authorities, as high

school and university students formed over 30 opposition groups. Orgmiizations like the

"Czech Children" joined in demonstrations for political freedom and environmental

protection (Ash 78).

On January 16 , 1989, a small group of peaceful high school students walked to the top of Wenceslas Square in Prague to commemorate the death of Jan Palach, a student

who exactly 20 years earlier had set himself on fire to protest the Soviet invasion. The

students were confronted with water canons and tear gas, turning the square into a battle

field. Vaclav Havel was mrested and put on trial in Februmy for his role in the

demonstration, and was sentenced to 9 months in prison.

After witnessing the Poles overthrow their Communist govemment in June 1989, the Czechoslov^ian freedom movement gained momentum, challenging the communist

authorities more vigorous govemment. On Friday November 17 , 1989 fifty-thousand

students participated in a demonstration mmking the 50 anniversary of the murder of a

Czech student by the Nazis. During the mmch, however, many of the slogans were

directed against those seated in the govemment. Student protestors shouted "Dinosaurs

resign" mid "Communists get out" (Ash 80). Upon reaching the square, the protestors

were cut off by the white helmet riot police and red bereted anti-terrorist squads (Ash 80).

The students made peace offerings of flowers mid candles, shouting "we have bare

hmids" (Cipowski 103), but the police ignored their passive intentions mid beat men,

women, and children with their truncheons (Ash 81). The communist government's decision to use force against peaceful protestors

was a monumental blunder. Milos Jakes had believed that it would frighten the students

and would serve as a deterrent to any popular action against the govemment. However, the chmige in the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Eastern Germany along with the

outrage over in the government's tactics, created a mood confidence a defiance miiong the Czech-Slov^ population. The parallel between the communist regime's violence

against students and that 50 years earlier by the Nazis created a powerful emotional

atmosphere, igniting the spark of resistance and revolution. One student died and mmiy

were left in the hospital. Student leaders decided to join those working in the theater to

organize a general strike. Those involved in the theater (actors, directors, set designers,

and writers) were fmiiiliar with organized strikes, having spent years rallying to the

support of playwright Vaclav Havel.

On Sunday November 19 , Havel called a meeting of all opposition groups in the theater. The Magic Lantern. The meeting included such diverse opposition groups as The

Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS), the Movement for Civic

Freedoms and Obroda (Rebirth), the club of excommunicated communists, and

individual members form both the People's and Socialist Parties (Ash 82). These groups

came together and formed the Obcanski Forum, or Civic Forum. At the creation of Civic

Forum the organizations made four demands: for the immediate resignation of the

communist leaders responsible for preparing the Warsaw Pact intervention in 1968,

starting with the president, Gustav Husak, and pmty leader, Milos Jakes; the immediate

resignation of the Federal Interior Minister mid Prague Secretary; the establishment of a special commission to investigate police actions; and the immediate release of all

prisoners of conscience (Ash 83). The Civic Forum was also split into four commissions,

organizational, technical, informational, and concept ional. As well as voting people onto the commissions, the plenum (like Solidarity before it) selected "crisis staffs." The Civic

Forum, which was seen as the Czechoslovakimi version of East Germmiy's New Forum,

also recognized the contributions of the high school and college activists. Havel stated

"Thanks to the bravery of the students, we are gathered here. The students have finally

cost of the timidity and fear of our people" (Cipkowski 104).

The next day, Monday November 20 , more than two hundred thousand people

protested in Wenceslas Squme. Within that week, a sense of unified opposition emerged throughout Prague, with signs of support reading "truth will prevail!" and "Let the

govemment resign!" covering homes, shop windows, and taxis. However, this state of

euphoria was constantly endmigered by Jakes Milos' threat to "introduce order," having

stationed police throughout the city. Later, Prime Minister Luoislav Adamec met with

members of the Civic Forum for the first time, promising that there would be "no more

martial law" (Ash 83).

On Friday November 24 , Dubcek mrived back in Prague after having been

bmiished for over 20 years. When he delivered a speech overlooking Wenceslas Square

he was welcomed with chants of "Dubcek!" "Dubcek!". On this same day, the

communist party held an emergency meeting. In the meeting J^es faced the dilemma

between declaring mmtial law and crushing the protestor's movement, or giving into

popular will and resigning. Later that night, as Havel discussed the momentum of true freedom in contrast with Dubcek's "socialism with a face", a messenger came to the

Magic Lantern informing Havel that Jakes and the rest of the 13 members of the

politburo were stepping down and Karol Urbanek would replace Jakes as Communist

pmty General Secretary. The Magic Lmitem exploded, Havel embracing Dubcek and

making "V" signs of victory.

On November 25 , more than five-hundred thousmid people gathered in Prague's

Letna Field, located outside of a huge sports stadium. At this Imgest rally in the country's

history, Havel pleaded for continued pressure of the govemment stating "Power once

again passes to the neo-Stalinists. Who is Urbanek? We are not satisfied. We will gather

and protest until we are satisfied" (Tismaneau 270). Havel also revealed the news that

Adamec had allied himself with the Civic Forum and the pursuit of a new government, the crowd exploding in cheers of "Adamec!" "Adamec!" Along with Havel, Dubcek and

other Forum leaders mounted the stage calling for the resignation of the government and the convening of free elections.

The next day, Sunday November 26 , crowds gathered in the same stadium.

Prime Minister Adamec addressed the crowd demmiding discipline, no strikes, and

economic, not political, chmige. The people booed mid jeered him, shaking their keys in

collective protest of his remarks. On Monday, November 27 , the people of Prague

pmticipated in a general strike for two hours. Offices, restaurants, cafes, bookstores,

schools, mid cabs were all shuttered and Czechoslovaks rejoiced in the streets waving their national flag. That evening another huge crowd met in Wenceslas Squme and

witnessed Havel's declaration that if Adamec did not meet the demands of the people, the

people would demand the government's resignation. The next day a meeting was held between Adamec's govemment mid a Civic

Forum delegation. At this session. Prime Minister Adamec promised that by Sunday

rrl

December 3 , there would be a new govemment established based on a "broad

coalition", along with the removal of Marxism-Leninism as the basis of education. Only

10 days before this night the police and the military beaten student protestors. Now

opposition forces were organized and racking up one success after another.

On December 1 , the Czechoslovak communists condemned the very act that

gave then authority, Urbanek stating "We are of the opinion that the entry onto our territory of the five armies of the Warsaw Pact in 1968 was not justified, and the decision to do so was wrong" (Cipkowski 112). On December 5 the Civic Forum was given recognition by Urbmiek as a legitimate negotiating partner. The next day, however,

Adamec announced a new cabinet in which only 5 out of 21 seats were given to the non-

communists. The opposition called for miother mass demonstration and threatened

another strike if the cabinet did not reflect the strength and influence of the opposition.

The day after this threat, December 7 , Adamec stepped down mid the following

Sunday (December 10 ), a new cabinet was installed. On December 29 , the Federal

Assembly elected Vaclav Havel President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic with

Dubcek serving as Chairmmi of the Federal Assembly. Marian Calfca, the new Prime

Minister, quickly resigned from the communist pmty upon being elected. Calfca

promised free democratic elections to be held by the end of June 1990.

With Havel as President, mmiy Forum members were appointed to serve in his

cabinet. The first Deputy Prime Minister of the govemment was Jan Camogursky, a

former member of Public Against Violence, a Slov^ opposition group. The new foreign minister was Jiri Dienstbier, who served time in jail for dissident activities. Petr Miller

became the new Minister of Labor and Social affairs, serving as a representative of the

working class. Regardless of the fact that he was already in power, Havel still promoted the need for citizen's intervention and mi active voice in the govemment. In his speech y4

Contaminated Moral Environment Havel stated:

We had all become used to the totalitarian system and accepted it as mi unchangeable face and thus helped to perpetuate it. In other words, we are all — though naturally to differing extents- responsible for the operation of the totalitarian machinery; none of us is just its victim: we are all also its co creators. Why do I say this? It would be very unreasonable to understmid the sad legacy of the last forty years as something alien, which some distant relative bequeathed us. On the contrmy, we have to accept this legacy as sin we committed against ourselves. If we accept is as such, we will understand that it is up to us all, and up to us only, to do something about it (www.skynet.ie/~debates/speech_library/vaclav_havel.htm. January 1.1990".) Havel encouraged the diverse views of the opposition, regardless of political association.

This new brand of Czechoslovakian unity was also observed by Esther Fien in her New

York Times article entitled Czech Witnesses Stray and an Inquiry Falters when she

wrote, "Those now competing for control of Czechoslov^ia may disagree on theoretical

and political issues facing the country, but they seem to have a united front when it

comes to their responses for meetings and interviews with newsmen" (Fien 8). Political

Pmty's emphasis was the united front, two themes later reflected in the emergence of

political parties that yem.

Despite the immense popularity of the Civic Forum, by late April 46 political

pmties were registered under the new govemment. The serious contenders for

representations in Parliament were the Civic Forum, the Christian Democratic Union, the

Green Party, the Socialist pmty and the Communist Party. After an animated campaign,

when the election was held on June 8 , 1990, the Civic Forum won 48 percent of the vote. In the words of Havel, Czechoslovakia had now entered "mi era of national

rejuvenation" also adding "Now it is up to us alone whether our hopes come to pass, and

whether our civic, national, and political self-confidence reaw^ens in a historically new

way" (Cipkowski 117).

In questioning why the revolution happened so rapidly in Czechoslovakia both

Timothy Ash and Peter Cipowski concur that it was because the Czechs came last. Ash

argues "In a real sense, Czechoslovakia was the beneficimy, and what happened to the

culmination of a 10-year long Central European learning process—with Poland being the

first, but paying the heaviest price.. .Politically, Czechoslovakia had what economic

historians call the 'advantage of backwardness'—they could learn from others examples

and from their own mistakes" (Ash 127). Cipowski agrees, stating that the Forum was an

impressive body, reasonably democratic, mid balanced between the political and moral

imperatives based on the example set by East Germany's New Forum. Ash concludes that it is difficult to imagine a better revolution. Similar to Ash, Roberta Hersheson's

article Insider Offers look at Czech Revolt, puts forward a similar perspective on

revolution: "Dr. Havel, speaking at the T.J Watson Research Center of International

Business Machines, called last moth's upheaval in Czechoslovakia 'a revolution with a

happy face.' Except for the 'first day, when riot police interfered with a student

demonstration,' he said the revolution was a 'very enjoyable event'" (Hersheson 8). The

Velvet Revolution was swift, almost entirely non-violent, and joyful. It did not come with the economic crisis that faced both Polmid and Hungmy. Because the trmisition was swift

and endowed with abundant intellectual content, the Czech's had an opportunity to m^e a more seamless transition between dictatorship to democracy and from a plmined to a market economy.

Table of Contents

Statement of Purpose Page 3

Biography Page 4

The Fall of the Iron Curtain: the 1989 Changes Page 5

Interview Trmiscript Page 17

Historical Analysis Page 54

Appendix Page 61

Audio Time Log Page 63

Works consulted Page 65

Interview Transcription

Interviewee/Narrator: Grace Robinson Interviewer: Olda Cemy Location: Caroline Slessinger's apartment. New York City Date: December 5*, 2004

Grace Robinson: What was it like growing up in Czechoslovakia under the communist regime?

Olda Cemy: Now, Grace, this is a complex question. And I can talk about for three, four, five, seven or even more hours about what it was like growing up in the old communist Czechoslovakia, but my life's experience was greatly influenced by the fate of my family. My father was imprisoned in the fifties during the so-called purges, he was sentenced to twenty yems in prison on a variety of drummed-up charges, and he died there in 1956 of complete exhaustion in a communist concentration camp. So that's how

my life was influenced and as a young, 10 year old boy. I was brought up in the

communist school and I, together with all my class mates- despite that my father was

languishing in prison- believed in the system. They had this young pioneers association,

which was a communist youth organization, and I was the only one out of the whole class

who wasn't admitted because my father was a communist enemy. I still remember how I

cried bitterly because my entire class could wear the beautiful red scarves and those cute

uniforms. I was a bad sheep, a rotten apple, and otherwise healthy boy, and so that was

my first experience. One day in class I came up to the teachers table and said that my

father had died. And the teacher grew solemn mid said "children, the father of your

classmate Olda Cemy died mid I think that we should all stand up and keep a minute of

silence" mid so they all stood up and, I was 10 years old, and they began to keep one

minute of silence. And then the teacher came up to me and said "what did he die of?"

and I said very truthfully "I don't know." She sort of looked puzzled and then she said

"Where did he die?" mid I said "in lipulda" which was the nmiie of a very famous

concentration cmiip. And she stopped in her tracks and shouted "SIT DOWN!"(Laughs)

And so this is a story to bring you closer to that atmosphere, otherwise, everything was

very shabby and there were periodical shortages. For some strange, mysterious reason there was a season where we had no toilet paper then there was no tomatoes and so on

and so on, this was the affect of the planned economy. I stopped believing in the regime

when I was about thirteen or fourteen, I had my doubts mid shouting matches with my

classmates that still believed. I don't know if that answers your question on what it was like to grow up in the communist state. You couldn't travel, people lived in a morbid

fear that someone else would pardon them. But on the whole in the beginning of the

fifties society believed in so called communist and socialist ideas, by 1968 that was off

and the whole society kind of grew up out of it and this is why what we call Prague

Spring happened. Prague spring in 1968 was a relatively honest attempt of a socialist

communist regime to reform itself. But you cmi't reform something that is unreformable.

And I think that even if the Russian didn't invade our country that experiment wouldn't

have worked out, despite all the excitement and overall popular support it wouldn't have

worked out. And the Russian, if they didn't come in August 1968 as they did, they would

have come three months later.

GR: The perception in the west is that life under communist rule was oppressive, do you

believe this to be true?

DC: It's all a generalization, it only partly true. There were very serious handicaps as I

mentioned: you couldn't travel, you couldn't speak your mind, in every family there was

someone who was somehow hung by the regime in one way or another. For example I was lucky that the regime relaxed as I grew up or otherwise I wouldn't be allowed to

study. Eventually I was admitted into a secondary school but there were a lot of people

who were not because they came from so-called bad families (?bourgoise roots?) or

In 1977, a document called Charter 77 was signed by 241 Czechoslovaks marking the beginning of an organized opposition movement. Signers included important leaders such as Vaclav Havel. Although only pmtially successful, the Charter created the first sparks of defiance, keeping activist spirits alive and encouraging the individual contributions to a revolution. religious roots. On the other hand people in the warped society people were closer to each

other. This is what they now, fifteen years after communism, complain that people were

more humane to each other before 1989 thmi after 1989. So you can't generalize and say that life was absolutely rotten under the communists. I have bitter memories but I also

have nice memories. I was young, so that contributes to it of course.

GR: Why do you think that people continually supported communism?

DC: A lot of people were influenced by the communist propagmida and a lot of them

accepted this unwritten agreement with the govemment that we provide you with some

shelter and some food and your pretend like you me working we will pretend that we are

paying you, everything will be ok. We will take care of you, we will do all the decisions

for you. Even now there are a lot of people in my country, the Czech Republic, fifteen

years after the chmiges in 1989, who still long for the good old days when black was

black, white was white and there were no shades of other colors and life was very simple.

Because they didn't have to m^e any decisions, the state did all the decisions for them.

Even 15 years after the changes in 1989 the communist path has quite a few appeals for

many people mid this is what explains why the communists have percentages in the

general elections.

GR: Do you believe the level of communist oppression fluctuated between the end of

world war II and the end of the regime with the revolution? DC: Well of course if fluctuated, there were certain dynamics to it because the

communist took over in 1948 and the fifties were the Stalinists years they were the years

of the purges and the years when they persecuted, tried, and hanged people . Between

1950 and 1954 there were 271 politically motivated executions in Czechoslovakia. And

countless people were sent to prison mid concentration cmiips, like my father, where

conditions were extremely hmsh and a lot of people died in these communist prisons. A

lot of people were shot in their attempts to cross the boarders, the boarders were far of

mines and barbed wire and they were heavily guarded and quite a few people lost there

lives trying to cross the boarders. Those were the fifties. Then the degree of oppression

gradually lessened slightly, in a sort of (?reactic?) Way which meant that people were

not hmiged they were sentenced to twenty years in prison, people who used or would

have been sentenced to twenty years in prison were sentenced to five years in prison.

The whole society emancipated mid this is what resulted in Prague spring in 1968 in what

we used to call socialism with a hummi face and then the Russimis came in. The first two- three months after the invasion seemingly nothing happened. People kept together mid

were unified and then in the process of what we call normalization, the progressive

communists were on the top in 1968 were expelled from the party, banished to some

remote post like, for example, Dubcek . First they stripped him of his function of the

general secretary and then made him a spe^er of the federal parliament and then three

months later they sent him to turkey as their ambassador and another six months later they called him back to Prague, stripped him of his membership to the communist pmty

Alexander Dubcek was the communist leader of Prague Spring in 1968. Aiming to reform communism, he promised "socialism with a human face". He was expelled from the party for his involvement and banished, although he still remained a communist. and banished him to his hometown where he spent the next twenty yems in a relative

obesity m^ing his living as a clerk in some forestry authority. It was a slow creeping

process, first the editor and chief seized to be the editor and chief mid people say that he

was soft spoken and people say that he probably deserved it and then somebody else lost their job and then they had this huge screening in the communist party and the key

question was do you approve of the entry of the Warsaw pact countries into

Czechoslov^ia. People that were hesitmit were expelled from the communist party

which memit that their children couldn't study at the communist universities and so those

were drought gray, shabby years and it took twenty years from 1970 to 1989.

GR: How do you believe these past orgmiizations of resistmice, charter 77, Prague Spring the opposition groups created by the student, how do you think these organizations

affected the revolution?

DC: The process in 1968 didn't really affect the so-called velvet revolution in 1989.

Because, as I said, 1968 it was mi attempt for the communists to reform themselves, to

make the regime more hummie and more bearable, and to have democratic features

installed, like end of censorship. 1989 was a different affair, first of all it was affected by

geopolitics mid what was happening in the rest of the world by the right of Gorbachev, by

Regmi's administration and its tough stance on the Soviet Union. It was all these things

combine and people gradually stopped being afraid of the regime mid the regime itself

was old and tired. There was no future for it. It was all these factors combined that led to

1989. But mind you, when viewed from the United States, if you look back on what happened fifteen years ago in central-eastern Europe it seems like the Berlin wall came

down and that was it and all those countries became democratic again. That was not it, it

was a gradual process in every country it went along different dynamics and

Czechoslov^ia used to be Communist and Czechoslovakia was, and if I my quote my

friend Timothy Garton Ash , a country covered by ice. So while there were certain

evolutionary processes in places like Polmid, for example when the Poles had their first

round of round table discussions with representatives of the Polish communist pmty on

one side of the table and representative of the dissident movements like Lech Walesa that happened sometime in Jmiuary 1989 during the same January 1989 in Prague people

wanted to commemorate the 20 miniversmy of a student, Jmi Palach, who set himself on

fire in protest of the Russian invasion and the police dispersed those gathered mound

Wenceslas Square around the St. Wenceslas statue, then police beat them up mid

dispersed them in cold January with ice cold water from the water canons in we now call this "Palach's Day". This was something that happened regularly every day for a week

and that was the last time Vaclav Havel was arrested, because he went to lay a flower

where Jan Palach, the young student, burned himself and the police immediately arrested

him together with about four or five other people and put him mid the rest of them into

custody in Hungary at the smiie time where they had there so-called Gulag communism.

For compmison in mid-June the poles had their first semi-free election filling the upper

Timothy Garton Ash was the author of The Magic Lantern: the revolution of '89 witnessed in Wmsaw, Budapest, Berlin, mid Prague, one of the most well-known documents on the Velvet Revolution.

Lech Walesa was responsible for the 1989 Polish 'round table' discussions with communists, leading to the legalization of Solidarity and the reduction of communist power. house of the parliament, which is called Sajm, with dissidents. In June Vaclav Havel was

release from his last prison sentence together with some other people in Hungary they

reburied (?inirenac?), the leader of the so-called Budapest uprising in 1956, they didn't

call it counter revolution anymore they call it revolution. In August people in Prague and

elsewhere were ready to demonstrate against the Russimi invasion that happened in 1968

because that was the anniversary because the invasion happened in Aug 21^ 1968 so

every August 21 there were a few people who demonstrated. Towards the end of the 80's the demonstration were usually quite massive mid the communists usually prepared themselves quite well. They would remove potent ional trouble makers mid it was the

first time I was arrested and I spent two days in mi institution which they call self-

preventive detention. I'm not angry for them doing it to be because I met lots of

interesting people and some of which becmiie my friends but at the smiie time the

communists were getting ready to disperse mid on the august 21 demonstration the

polish and Hungarimi govemment issued mi apology to the Czech govemment for the

role their troops had played in Czechoslovakia in 1968 thus causing huge embarrassment to the Czechoslovak government saying (laughs)"NO, No, No we don't want this

apology!" So everything was crumbling but still there were some fantastic things

happening in Poland, Hungary, East Germmiy, Germany Czechoslovakian communists

were extremely stupid because they tried to hold the reign very tight and until the very

end and when that end came about the whole regime collapsed like a deck of cards. I

remember, I hope I'm not too boring with these memories, that on October 28 there

was a little demonstration not as big as people expected, an anti-communist

demonstration and Vaclav Havel was in the hospital recovering after one of his mmiy battles with pneumonia and I went to see him, I went to visit him. And I still remember

how pessimistic he was about the development in Czechoslovakia and he spoke of

Czechoslov^ia as sort of a (?custor?)_like island in a sea of democracy in central Europe

and then 17 of November came about and a week later the communist party ceased to

exist.

GR: Why do you believe the younger generations were so adamant about revolution as

opposed to the older generations?

DC: I suppose the older generations, people were too tired, too timid, too afraid still. Not

all of them of course, as I said it was a gradual process, people like myself I stopped

being afraid sometime in 1977 mid I paid some price for it- which was ok. But it was the

student who had enough, but the regime pushed them because the fateful demonstration

on the 17 of November was something that was approved by the regime, but the

students were supposed to keep themselves in a restricted area outside of Prague central

and when the speeches were over they decided to go to the center of town. And there the

police brutally beat them up and it was even more ironic because the student's

demonstration on the 17 was supposed to commemorate another student demonstration that happened on November the 17 1939 when Czech and Gestapo brutally beat up the

students mid actually shot one of the dead. So can you imagine how stupid they were,

doing this on the fiftieth miniversary ofthis heinous act that happened in 1939. And this

brutally hmiding of the student's demonstration was this famous proverbial last straw that released the whole bucket. GR: Do you believe if their protest had been delt with a different way there still would have been revolution?

DC: I think that we would have had revolution regmdless, I think that if it hadn't happened the way it had happen the process would have been slower. The opposition probably would have tried to initiate some sort of polish model, round table discussions with the regime, etc. Because it happened they way it happened the revolution was forced upon the revolutionmies(laughs) so to speak so they were always a few hours behind the events, but the communists were 2 days behind, (laughs) This was our advantage, although we were sometimes slow to react to what was happening the communist were even slower.

GR: Why do you think political change in Czechoslov^ia was led by the cultural elite such as yourself and Havel?

DC: Now I suppose that one of the reasons was that there was no one else, there was no other focus group other than people around Havel and people around Chmter 77 and eventually people around the civic forum, the main product of the events of 1989. I remember that Havel had in the beginning this idea that we shall do the revolution in

In 1977, a document called Charter 77 was signed by 241 Czechoslovaks marking the beginning of an organized opposition movement. Signers of the documents included Vaclav Havel. Although only partially successful, the Charter created the first sparks of defiance, keeping activist spirits alive and encouraging the individual contributions to a revolution. quotation marks and then we will hand it over to professionals. One day he woke up and

realized that there were no professional's just communist lackies. So as I said, the

revolution was forced on the revolutionaries and they had to act according, I still

remember the moment it dawned on us that we cant expect some one else to come up

with the program for the coming days, months, and year; that we have to sit down and

write the program-but we had experts on economy and sociology culture in general. But there was for example there was no one who knew anything about market economy, and this is how our current president, Vaclav Klaus, came into the picture because one of us

said "well, alright, we don't have any experts on economy I know this man who is

knowledgeable and has been to the west and he from time to time gives lectures on

economy in closed seminars in flats not in schools, so invite him over and if we like him,

keep him and if we didn't get rid of him". We liked him, and we kept him, and now he is

our president.

GR: Being the cultural elite and the leaders of the revolution, how did you get these ideas

out to areas outside of Prague- to the workers?

DC: Again, it was a gradual process back in 1977 and 1978 in the first day of charter 77 the people that signed the charter, by the way I didn't sign the chmter I was too afraid, I

could have done it- until this day I wondered why I didn't do it then- maybe children

played a small factor in my fearfulness. Even though I dint sign it I was marked, the

pressure from the secret police that got me fired from my publishing house job. People

were so afraid, in those days, if I was walking on the street and someone was walking up near me they would cross the street just so that they weren't seen with me (laughs). But this is something that gradually died down, and people were more assertive but it is true that this didn't apply to the workers. So we had to go after the workers and convince them that we were the right guys to talk to so that the communists were finish.

And it took a few, after November 16, it took 3 or 4 days before the first groups of

workers appemed at the demonstrations on Wenceslas squme mid I still remember the

sheer wave of excitement when we saw this huge wave of workers. But still, we needed

representation amongst the workers, mid that was a struggle.

END OF SIDE ONE, TAPE ONE; BEGIN SIDE TWO, TAPE ONE

GR: Although you said that there were no representatives of the workers, Petr Miller,

according to Timothy Garton Ash, was the leader of the workers. What role do you

believe that Petr Miller played in getting the workers involved in the revolution?

DC: Petr miller really played a crucial role in getting the workers involved in the

beginning- but he wasn't a well known leader to the workers. Petr Miller somehow two

or three days after the civic forum was formed said "look, I am here, I'm a worker" and

he was 6 feet 8, tall, attractive man, with charisma- mid that's how he became the leader

of the workers (laughs). There were no pre-designed leaders, people became leaders

culturally. This is what happened to Petr miller, and then he became the first federal

A member of the Civic Forum, Petr Miller played active role in involving the working class to the revolution. After Havel was elected president, Petr Miller became the Minister of Labor and Social affairs serving as a representative of the working class. leader of social labor in the new non-communist govemment and he wasn't a very good

minister (laughs). He was there, he was at the right place at the right time and he knew

people that were of the same mold and he was- and because of them he played a positive

role in getting worker support

GR: How did your previous carriers affect your politics of the time?

DC: My first job after graduating and serving time in the army was a very flashy job in a

publishing house specializing in publishing books for children- and I loved that job. As I

said, in 19771 was fired because of the pressure of the communist secret police put on the

publishing house. They did it because they tried to recruit me as a police informer, or

agent, and I just refused. In fact, I mad the mistake of not only refusing but laughing at them- they didn't like that(laughs). With the benefit of hind sight, what happened to me

in 1977 is what they British say was a blessing disguised as a catastrophe because I was

out on the street and I had to take care of myself. I was freelancing, I was trmislating, I

was dubbing British and American movies although there were not mmiy. From time to time I ended up in hmbors loading mid unloading crates of apples because I had small

children mid they had to be fed. I spent two years working in the theater as a sort of

(?drmiiatour?) But it didn't really affect my views on politics. Maybe people in the theater were more free minded than people elsewhere but it didn't really affect the way

my thinking developed within those years. As with everything, it was a gradual thing. GR: What did you feel the about the threat posed to you by the communist regime of the time?

DC: The atmosphere of fem was all pervasive, people believed that they were being

eaves dropped upon. It was funny because after 1989 the technical department of the

minister of interior delt with many complaints launched by people who thought there

were devises implmited in their houses. As it turned out, 90% of the people had no

bugging devises which was a blow to their egos. People took it badly to find out that they weren't surveyed (laughs), it really hurt their self-importance. A blow to their ego.

But that overall atmosphere was there and it permeated every layer of society.

GR: How was the opposition of communism formed?

DC: In 1989, as I mentioned before, Havel didn't believe in rapid changes, he was very

pessimistic. Then when the student demonstrations happened on November the 17 1989,

Havel wasn't even in Prague, he was in his place in northern bohemia- he didn't wmit to

come to Prague because he believed that nothing would come ofthis. Then we somehow

managed to get him to Prague (laughs) and then there was this importmit meeting at his

flat on the embankment of the river and this is where the nucleus of the Civic Forum was

formed mid it was official founded in one of the Prague theaters. It wasn't much then, it

was this actors studio where the first public meeting of the civic forum was held. Then,

The Civic Forum, led by the then-dissident Vaclav Havel, demanded the resignation of the Communist govemment, the release of prisoners of conscience, and investigations into the November 17 police actions. It was the leading opposition force throughout the revolution. someone cmiie in and said "if the police wmit to come in here mid disperse us they would

have a very easy time because they can come right form the street—lets try to think about

a better, safer place." This is how the Magic Lantern came about. It was a huge

structure, with many floors, corridors, it was a maze- also, it had one door, so that people

coming in mid leaving could be checked in. You belong, you don't not belong, but still the security measures were very slacking in those days, I still have my civic forum

membership card, which was a piece of paper saying that Olda Cemy is a member of the

Civic Forum and there was this rubber stamp ofthis teddy bem(laughs) from this children

printing press - this was our approval. But this was how the civic forum came about, it

was a totally spontaneous happening.

GR: What role do you think the govemment, adhering to less strict policies, played in the

formation of the civic forum?

DC: The communists wanted to really crush the forum, but they didn't have the guts

because they no longer enjoined support from the (?civic union?) And that support wasn't

forth coming for quite a few months, they didn't know how to behave. There were

hmdliners, and there were generals who were ready and basically said "give us the order"

and the tanks will stmt rolling to Prague People, militias appemed three days after

November the 17 and they were all over Prague from all comers of Czechoslovakia, but

no one had the guts to give them orders-to disperse them- so after a day of loitering

(laughs) they just went back to their factories. Nobody had the guts to ask the generals to

An old theater that becmiie the location of the Civic Forum opposition movement. send the tanks to Prague The communists were in a state of shock and they were slow to react to what was happening- they reacted two days later thmi they should have reacted.

By the time they reacted things were elsewhere. But to answer your question, yes, if it weren't for people like Gorbachev - they had the people and the means to crush it.

Knowing my fellow Czechs and Slovaks I don't think that it would have caused a lot of bloodshed.

GR: What was your relationship with Havel between Chmter 77 mid the revolution?

DC: My relationship with Havel goes back to the time when I was 16 years old. I was 16 years old, grmiimar students at a school in the very center of Prague and there was this fantastic young playwright with this play which was called Garden Party mid I went to see the play mid fell in love with the play, all of us fell in love with the play. It was something completely new, it was the theater of the absurd. It made fun of the regime. I decided when I was 16 years old-bold and bash- that I wmited to meet the playwright, so I phoned the theater where he was employed he said "oh sure, have a cup of coffee." This was how we met and I expected to meet a dashing figure, judging by the play, and in came someone who was even smaller than I am , timid and unsure of themself. He thanked me and said I'm glad that you like my plays, mid because Prague was so small we just kept bumping into each other. That is how we came to know each other. The

Mikhail Gorbachev was leader of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1991. His attempts at reform led to the end of the Cold Wm, but also inadvertently caused the end of the political supremacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. relationship developed over the years, I still like him, we still like each other- which is

something that is not all that normal in a relationship like this. There were a lot of people

who discovered Havel, fell involved, with him, and then felt like jolted lovers- this jolted

lover syndrome- it happened to the with people I was working with in the castle in the

early nineties in the president office. This is a relationship that is lasting, I haven't seen

him for quite sometime, but the last time I talked to him was a week ago.

GR: Historically, Havel is viewed as the leader of the revolution, do you agree with this?

DC: I do. I mil subjective because of my relationship with Havel, but I thin that there

was no one else who could have done it in those days, who could have structured it like

Havel. He was the key factor that put people together. Then when it was over, people

went their separate ways. Havel and this common hatred of communism together, did the trick.

GR: How did Havel's initial pessimism of the revolution affect people's perception of

his leadership role?

DC: When he came to Prague, the student demonstrations happened on Friday and

Saturday . He immediately assumed this leadership role, because, as I said, there was

non one else of his statue. The opposition movement consisted of many parts of many

groups of various orientations- there were ecologists, former communists- who wanted to

make compromises with the regime. Havel and the few people around him were the ones who stated this policy no compromises with the regime, it was too late for round tables, too late for the Polish model. So we were at a disadvantage compared to the poles but on this one, because they had this evolutionary process of democratic changes going on for a

year. On the other hand, they had to make many comprises during those roundtable

debates that took place throughout the whole of 1989, while we didn't have to make any

compromises. Like I keep repeating, revolution was forced upon us(laughs). We had to

catch up on what was happening based on the popular movement, what was happening in the streets mid react to it-lead it. This is something that Havel grasped soon and he

behaved accordingly. It would have happened without Havel, but it is very difficult to

imagine what compromises it would have led to. Although we made compromises, as you

know we didn't abolish the communist party, it is difficult for us to see what would have

happened without Havel. Unlike Walesa, Havel had this huge handicap, no body knew

him. The majority of the Czechs and Slovaks either had not heard of Havel or only seen

him in terms of Communist propaganda, someone who is sent by the CIA mid stupid stuff

like that. He was known to a handful of people, a few hundred Czechs mid Slovaks. This

completely unknown man, the communists first refused to spe^ with him they said 'send

anyone but don't send Havel' (laughs). Havel was the embodiment of everything they

considered evil about democracy and market economy, it took 1 _ month and he became

president, and then everybody knew him.

GR: Like you mentioned, the communists denounced Havel. One quote by Adamec

called Havel a "zero". Why do you think they did this? DC: Havel's embodiment of everything that the communists hated, disliked, and feared

contributed but at the smiie time no body knew Havel- send someone else, we don't want to talk to Havel, he is a zero. Although they initially didn't want to speak to Havel, their

perception of him changed very quickly.

GR: What was your reaction when the Berlin Wall fell and its potential for causing of

regime change within Czechoslov^ia?

DC: I was ecstatic when the Berlin wall fell, I knew that the communist regime in

Czechoslov^ia was on the way it was only a question of when. In those days the house I

lived in was sandwiched between the Americmi and the West Germmi embassies. There

were all these East German's camping in the garden of the West German embassy who

wanted to flee to the west. There were thousmids of them and the situation was very tense, and some behind the scenes negotiations between West German and East German

govemment went on. I still remember, I was sitting by the window, near the balcony, mid

our garden actually joined the garden of the West German embassy so I saw all these

poor people camping there(laughs), eating, talking. We supplied them with tea coffee

and beer. Then foreign minister of West Germmiy announced to these East Germmis that the negotiations went well and they would be allowed to immigrate into West Germany-

it was evening and I was sitting there mid there was this chanting of "Danka" "Danka". It

was like an angel descended upon them. The next moming there were these streams East

Germany going down our street to board the buses that were waiting at the bottom of my

street. I was there with my son who was then 12 yems old, Matie, looking at it. He looked up and said "daddy is that it?" and I said "yes, that is it" (laughs) It was really a

questions of time- the Berlin wall came down mid then we had our 17 of November . I think it was Tim Ash, who said 10 years Poland, 10 months Hungary, 10 weeks in East

Germany, mid 10 days in Czechoslovakia.

GR: In what ways were subsequent events in East Germany, Hungary, mid Poland

influential in what would happen in Czechoslovakia?

DC: It was part of one big multifaceted process and it was the end of the communist era

in central and eastern Europe. That was it. We were part of the Warsaw Pact and luckily

it cmiie about without bloodshed, unlike Romania, for example, that occurred later on.

GR: As a member of the Civic Forum, how do you regard its purpose during the

Revolution?

DC: As I said, the Civic Forum was a spontaneous thing, it just happened. There were

no grand design on how to do it, how to form it how to divide the roles, how to structure

it. It gradually developed. It is true, there was a lot of improvisation, a lot of

disorganization and it consisted of mmiy different groups of people. There were

ecologists, actors, student, later workers, economist, religious people and all these people

helped many different views but they were all united under their common hatred for the

communist part. The major and most significant role of the Civic Forum was that it

served as a focus point for all Czech society and the Slovaks. This was the historic role. It gradually, after the first non-communist govemment and the first democratic elections,

people wandered away to their own parties. Now people who were closely operating

within the Civic Forum in 1989, and even a few months later are now in the parliament

bitterly opposing themselves (laughs), presenting different political stremiis. But in those

days the revolution would not have happened the way it happened without the Civic

Forum. The Civic Forum and the leaders of the Civic Forum were representatives of the

Czechs mid Slovaks visa- vise communist party.

GR: Timothy Garton Ash describe the Magic Lmitem as "a meeting of old friends and

new faces in a room smelling like cigarette smoke, sweat, damp coats, and revolution."

How did the atmosphere of the Magic Lantern affect you and the Civic Forum during the

Revolution?

DC: It was a great atmosphere, this catacomb like place. I think that Tim Ash describes

it with a bit of a writer's license. I don't remember sweat; I don't remember the

cigarettes, or the damp. It was a huge meeting place of people who thought, for example,

I had this friend who was a protester singer, who after 1968 immigrated to the West, and

all those people who were not allowed to come to Czechoslovakia all of a sudden stmted to come. I remember running into him in one of the corridors of the Magic Lantern mid

we embraced ourselves and said now we have lots of time to talk. I haven't seen him

since (laughs), he died about ten years later, and I am very sorry about it It was this

atmosphere which is very hmd to describe. Elements of fear were still present because if they wanted they could have invaded us, but at the same time it was an atmosphere of revolutionary fervor. It was laden with emotions. All together it is difficult to describe it

because it was so unique.

GR: How did you feel about the overwhelming status of Dubcek, being fully aware that

regmdless of his heroic status because of Prague Spring he still promoted "communism

with a human face"?

DC: The miswer is very simple. In November 1989 nobody knew Havel, but everyone

remembered Dubcek from 1968 so he had this initial tremendous support. But, on the

other hand, Dubcek was a communist and although they expelled him from the pmty he

stayed a communist. In his hemt of hemts he was a communist, and his idea in 1989 was that he would pick up what he was trying to do in 1968 and go on with it- which was

completely unacceptable. We were aiming at something completely different, and his

idea was that the rotten communist system was still reform able ad he was a firm believed

in socialism. He rode on the huge wave of populmity in 1989 and this is why he wanted to be president. I'm glad that his plans didn't work out. Also, he played no party in the

dissent. As I said, he was banished to his hometown somewhere in Slov^ia as a clerk.

He was in charge of acquiring spare party for some heavy forester mechanism which was

an easy job for him because everybody knew him. Spare part, which were hard to come

by, he somehow always managed to buy (laughs). But he played absolutely no part in the

actual dissent, he was not connected to anyone. Dubcek's image was greatly over played. END OF SIDE 2, TAPE ONE; BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2

GR: Was there tension between Havel and Dubcek, knowing that both sought the

presidency?

DC: There was a bit of a tension. We wmited Havel to become president and Dubcek thought that it was this divine right to become the next Czechoslov^ president. There

was also a difference in Havel and Dubcek. In the beginning, Havel didn't seek the

presidency. Dubcek sought it right fro the very beginning, believed that it was what he

deserved after being expelled and treated harshly after 1968 Russian invasion of

Czechoslov^ia. Tension arose when Havel decided to seek the presidency, when Havel

was proposed as a president. It seemed absurd to some of his closest friends, that this

virtually unknown mmi would become president of the country. For lots of people in the

Civic Forum Dubcek was a far more preferable candidate. But we wanted Havel to

become president mid our Slovak friends called us from Bratislava mid said 'don't let

Dubcek become president', he is a communist! Czechoslov^ia became a federation of two-republics, there was a certain pattern that had to be followed like if the president was

Czech then the prime minister would have to be Slovak. It was also a slightly difficult

equation to fulfill. I still remember Dubcek emerging from the meeting with Havel, when

Havel told him that the Civic Forum would not support Dubcek for president and he

cried. Poor old man(laughs)! If he becmiie president, he would have been a weak

president. Havelput us onthe map. GR: What do you think would have happened if Dubcek was elected president?

DC: It is difficult to envision what would have happened to Czechoslovakia if Dubcek had been elected president. I think that the communist would have played a more major role than they did after 1990. I don't think that it would have influenced the spilt of the country, however. The country would have split into two countries anyway, be it Dubcek or Havel or any other president. Dubcek would have never acquired the same popularity in the West as Havel. Havel was a symbol. But when people would get to know Dubcek at closer range they would find out that he was an old, vein, weak man.. ..and a communist on top of it (laughs).

GR: During the demonstrations on Letna field, how did you feel amongst all those crowds of people?

DC: The whole week, the first demonstrations followed immediately after- it was disorganized mid was said to be Saturday. People stopped being fearful of the communist field and there were 20,000 people on November 18 , with Havel still at his place in

Northern Bohemia(laughs). The whole nation gradually mobilized against the communists and this huge demonstration at Letna field was one of the highest points. It was emotionally laden experience for me. We all cried (laughs). It was absolutely fantastic. There were one million people behaving in a very civilized way. There were also funny moments when-for exmiiple- two editors of underground papers who were arrested before November 1989 were freed on the day of the Letna field demonstrations took place and they were brought right from prison to the podium. One of them said 'this

moming when I had breakfast' and then people simultaneously chanted 'what did you

have for breakfast?! '(Laughs). Can you imagine a million people asking this former

prisoner what he had for breakfast? There were moments like this that were extremely

humane.

GR: When Adamec made his speech demanding no strike, discipline, and economic

change the protestors responded by shaking their keys in unison. How did you feel when they reacted this way?

DC: As I said, the communists were lagging behind. They underestimated the situation-

Adamec addressed this mmiy people at Letna. They didn't whistle at him in the

beginning because they were willing to listen to him, but when he started this old

communist talk about 'we wmit to have peace and quiet and get on with work' they had

enough- It was a huge letdown for him and a boost for the Civic Forum.

GR: The ringing of the keys has emerged to symbolize the unity during the revolution.

Why do you think it cmiie to represent this as opposed to other events of unity?

DC: It must have happened in a spontaneous way, it happens in times of revolution. It

spread. Ringing the keys meant 'give us the keys to your offices, you communists' and

leave it, shut the door, give us the keys(laugh). Bye-bye. GR: How did you feel on November 24 when Milos Jakes, along with his 13 person

politburo, made his decision to leave office?

DC: I remember that moment clearly. I was at home, mid it was just after the first T.V

news at 8 o'clock in the evening. The Czech T.V , it was a week after the start of the

revolution-a week from Friday, decided to air the 5 min of recording describing the

demonstration including the police brutality of the last Friday, which had been heard

everywhere else in the world but not until then in Czechoslovakia and my 12 yem old son

Mate heard this mid began to cry. I stuffed him in the cm and we went to the Wenceslas

square and people were dancing and in high spirits and it looked like they were

celebrating Milos J^es and the rest of the gang-well, the resignation of the whole

communist party politbeaura. My sons mood perked up, a little bit (laughs).

GR: Throughout the revolution there were descriptions of the conflict between the moral

imperative of democracy mid the political imperative of swift action. This description

was not only used to describe specific decisions made by the forum but Havel's emphasis

on morality versus politics. How did the battle between "moral" politics and "political"

politics affect the revolution and the outcome?

DC: This is a difficult question, because it was not how we felt it. People were guided by their instincts; Havel's instinct was moral politics. There were other people, for example

Klaus, who said this is the time of big changes so lets forget about morals mid let be more pragmatic. I think this is how the schism of morals was artificially created but I didn't

feel anything like this in the later half of November 1989 and the months that followed.

GR: Timothy Ash and other historians believe the reason that the Czech revolution was

so swift was because it followed all other Eastern European nations, benefiting form their

examples and mistakes. Do you agree with this?

DC: By all means, yes. As I said the regime was old, tired mid the state of erosion was

so high. It sometimes seems to me that the communist were just waiting to hand over the

keys of their offices to us. The resistance was very small after the first initial approaches.

The censorship first said 'don't give them mi inch' and with mounting pressure this, they, just crumbled away.

GR: How do you think Czechoslovakia's policies and strides compared mid differed to those taken by other Eastern European countries?

DC: In every other central eastern European country it was a different process because it

change was based on the recent past of those respective countries like Poland, Hungary,

East Germmiy, and Czechoslovakia. As I said, there were certain evolutionary processes

going on in Polmid, Hungmy during or even before 1989, while the Czechs and Slov^s

were covered by ice. We had links with our polish and Hungarimi friends but it wasn't

anything that would be coordinated or that we would feed off the poles and they would

feed off the Hungarians. GR: Looking back, what mistakes, if any, do you think were made during and in the

wake of the revolution?

DC: I'm not sure I can answer this question in a responsible way. We still call it

revolution or velvet revolution but it wasn't really a revolution, it was a coup d'etait-it

was a change. I prefer to call it the 1989 changes. I think the term 'velvet revolution' is

a nice term, but it is slightly over-played. Things were happening at a terrific pace so I think that we had the benefit of hindsight. The biggest mistake we could have made was

having Dubcek become president, but that didn't happen. I mil sure that we made many

mistakes after we so-to-speak took power and some of which I feel personally

responsible for. I can't say for this period of the first three weeks what I would have

changed.

GR: How did the velvet revolution affect the type of democracy that was formed in

Czechoslov^ia?

DC: Since there was no bloodshed, since no one shot at each other like in Romania for

example, the resentment against the communist wasn't so strong as maybe elsewhere

such as Poland and Hungary. Therefore we didn't abolish the communist party but at the

same time Czechoslovak communists, unlike their Hungarian mid polish counterpmts,

remained Stalinists, not even changing their names. This is, according to some people,

attributed to the velvet corrector- no retributions, no trials for those responsible for the suffering of other people with a few exceptions. A few secret police were put on trial mid

sentenced to measly, light sentences. The communist pmty secretmy of Prague was

sentenced to two years in prison for his role in the Palach sweep- he broke even the

communist laws. The velvet corrector of revolution probably caused a continuation of the judicial system, which I believe was the biggest mistake, with the benefit of hind

sight that we made.

GR: What roles were you asked to play by president Havel to dismantle the communist

burocracy mid securing the Czech freedom during the new democracy?

DC: When 1989 came about I was working in the film industry. I had a nice job

supervision dubbing, translations, and dialog. I worked with the director on choosing the

actors to deliver the voices so when it was over and Havel was elected president I went

back to my job working at the dubbing studio. I was offered to work in the president

office but I said 'its over, I am going back to my job in the dubbing studio'. Gradually I

found that I was spending more time in the president's office than in my job. Eventually

I accepted the offer mid started to work in the president office it was spring of 1990.

Shortly after I came to the presidents office I becmiie President Havel's advisor on

security, but I was no Mrs. Rice . I was a messengers link between Havel mid the

military intelligence and law enforcement authorities. After November 1989 we had a

big problem: communist secret police. The communist secret police was divided

Condoleezza Rice became United States National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush on January 22" , 2001. She is the second African Americmi and the first female, to become National Security Advisor. She will soon become the Secretary of the State. between two branches secret intelligence and intelligence. There were lots of them,

17,000 of them, we didn't know what to do with them. They didn't care, they just

happily reported to work each day (laughs) and shredding machines were going at full tilt

with files and compromising information. In our first post-communist govemment the

chair of the minister of the interior remained strangely vacmit mid I think that it was done

but the revolutionaries underestimating their negotiating position and they were still

afraid of a backlash. When Havel became president, his first presidential act was to name

a minister of interior, giving him one single but very important task: to dismmitle the

communist secret police. Eventually, after a long and complicated process where a lot of

mistakes were made, we succeeded in dismmitling the mmy of secret police men, but we

didn't have anything to replace them with. We had a security vacuum. This is where I

come in. We decided to ask for help, to go to the British, Americans, Germans and say

look 'we made a clean break from the past, we fire all those nasty people- we need help'.

This was my role and this is what I did, I sort of helped to bring western expertise on

which to build our new intelligence services.

GR: What country do you believe played the most prominent role in aiding

Czechoslov^ia after the revolution?

DC: I was one of those blasted advisors that took blame for everything that went wrong

(laughs) in terms of the developments of the country. It was a necessary role. I was

unlike others and unlike my friends, I was not visible because my work was secret. I think that in my work, I was greatly helped first off by the British and later by the Americans and other countries- but those were the biggest helpers in this special line of

work. On the whole, I don't know.

GR: What kind of things did these countries do to help you?

DC: They contributed by expertise by sending their experts to Czechoslovakia, by giving

grants to Czechs mid Slovaks and opening their business schools to them. On a security

level-for exmiiple- the British organized well prepared course for our new democratic

spokesmen. The help consisted mostly of know-how expertise. When it came to

economical devises we didn't take them up and paid dearly for it in the later years to

come. There was this huge excitement here in Western Europe, in the new democratic

countries. I'm sorry, I am not comprehensive on this one (laughs) but I was so immersed

on what I was doing in those days that I just didn't have time to notice anything else.

Speaking with the benefit of hind sight, in those day Czech economists bragged that they

over took the lawyers which was the biggest mistake we could have made(laughs) mid

we're still paying dearly for it because there were those huge revitalization processes

started to happened before the control mechanisms were in place. Czechoslovakia was

not the only country that suffered from this mist^e.

GR: One of the products of the revolution was the split of Czechoslovakia, what do you think about this outcome of the revolution? DC: It was the product of free society, because there were some nationalistic sentiments.

First of all Czechoslovakia was an mtificial state, it was mtificially created after the fall

of the Austro-Hungarian empire. It somehow clanked together with the exception of

World War II when the Slovaks declared their independent Slovak state mid became

Hitler's allied. There was nationalistic sentiment brewing on all sides-most times of the

Slovaks felt neglected and looked down on by the Czechs as the younger, impulsive

brothers. When the lid was off in early 1990 it was clear to quite a few people that the

country was heading for a separation if nothing was being done and we didn't do

anything. I remember in spring of 1990 I went to Bratislava and I visited lots of

politicians there and when I came back I wrote a one page report to Havel in which I

expressed my fem that the country was heading for a split if there was not something

done. One of my recommendations, and I know there were several but I don't remember them all over the years, was 'look, you are president of Czechs and Slov^s they have their castle mid a Czechoslovak presidents residence there- so how about spending three

days in Prague mid two days in Bratislava. I realize that it was naive recommendation

and I wasn't taken up on it but maybe the process leading to the split would have been

more productive. Those anti-Czech sentiments of the Slovak side mid those anti-Slovak

sentiments were played up by the politicians and used as a political card. The split was

given by the results of the 1990 elections, the national party and ODS, which was Klaus'

pmty, both won the elections by a landslide in the Czech countries. The political and

economical programs of each state went against each other. If you get federation by

force we wouldn't be able to get on with necessary economic reforms- so political and

economic life in the country would come to a standstill. This is what led to the first talks leading to the separation and creation of the two countries began. The negotiations

leading to the actual psychical separation of the two countries were done in a civilized

way, they were not rushed. Everything was formulated: the message of the split, the

division of the properties- was all worked out in the minutest detail. Misunderstandings that could eventually lead to something more nasty was prevented by this. In some cases

it was a bit tricky, for example the mmy. How do you divide the mmy? We agreed on a

ratio for service based on the number of people living in the Czech Republic mid

Slovakia. We decided on 2-1 because there were 10 million Czechs mid 5 million

Slovaks.

END OF SIDE 1, TAPE 2; BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2

When it cmiie to the army, and I was then sitting on a cumbersome body called Council

for the Defense of the state and this body consisted of the president of the country, three

prime ministers: minister of defense, minister of finance, mid minister of the interior.

Havel hated to go there so he sent me instead, so here I was sitting with prime ministers

(laughs) as Havel's representative and I still remember that when it came to dividing the

army the generals were invited to the session and said 'please keep the army in tact, it is the most federal institution of them all. It was built as a federal institution right from

scratch after 1918'. Klaus and the other prime ministers shouted at the generals and the

generals, after making this passionate plea, calmly reached down and took out of their

attache cases some detailed plans on splitting the army (laughs) down to the last crew.

That being one of the funny situations in this process, but there were many tricky issues given the logistic of the Wmsaw pact countries for examples of the compact troops on

Czech soil, or that the storage facilities mid armor manufacturers were on the Slovak soil.

Then we had to split our air force, Czech-Slovak super fighters had to be partly

dismantled, loaded on a plane, and ferried to Slovakia this way because there was no

airfield in Slovakia that was big enough to accommodate those planes. To m^e matters

more complicated the only schools for training pilots for these planes was in Eastern-

Slovakia and taught by Czech instructors. This process was orderly and the relations in the first yems after the split tensed a bit because of the different nature of the political

regime. But now, we are best friends . It eventually worked out, I had my premonitions

and I was against the split like the majority of the Czech and Slovaks. The benefit of

hind-sight can say it worked out fabulously.

GR: What was the most significant memory you have of the regime change?

DC: I don't have a single most distinguished memory. I already mentioned how I

watched with my 12 years old son those East Germany streaming down our street to

board the buses for West Germmiy and my son asking me 'dad is that it' and I said 'yes,

that is if (laughs). So this is what standout out in my mind, this moment when I saw that

it was it. People were walking on their feet, as it had happened in Poland mid Hungary

and now it was Czechoslovakia's turn. Of course all those moments, those days mid

weeks, were laden with emotions. It was the most emotional period of my life and I think that I speak for most of my compatriots. It was intense, you were filled with intense

positive emotions but at the same time there was this fear at the back of your head there was still this fear that maybe this wont work out the way we wanted it to work out,

maybe there will be a backlash. I have a funny memory. I remember the time that

someone said 'Havel for president' and silence ensued. Then Olga Havel said 'Vaclav, if

you t^e them up on this I am going to divorce you! '(Laughs) and he said 'don't worry

Olga'. There were mmiy moments like this, but they were sort of antidotes- not

formative. That moming, the East German's going down our street, and Mate asked 'dad

is that it' 'yes that is it' (laughs).

GR: Now the communists have bounced back in their support in the Czech Republic,

how do you feel about this?

DC: I cmi't say that our biggest mistake was not abolishing the communist party; I memi

how you abolish a political party. If you do it, it will bounce back because it is action

and counter action. I don't think that they are as much of a threat as they are presented in the Czech media but at the same time I think we coarsely underestimated them in the

beginning of the 1990 and I still remember how we in the president's office were visited

by mmiy politicimis from the west American congressmen etc. They came to have a look

of us, but we roamed the castled on scooters(laughs)-something different for them.

Always one of the first questions was 'how do you asses the future of the communist

pmty in Czechoslov^ia' mid we thought in those days that the communist party would

have divided into various factions and that they would spend the majority of their time

fighting each other and somehow evaporate from the parliament. That did not happen. they have 20%, but I don't think that they are a stark threat and we have to fear a reversal

because the democratic govemment is more established.

GR: Today, you still work on involving the youth politically, is this because of the role that the youth played in the Czechoslovakian revolution?

DC: After spending 8 years in the govemment first as mi advisory to Vaclav Havel,

filling in for him at some various strange places, after heading Czech intelligence for

another six years I feel that it's a great privilege to be surrounded and to work with you

people. They me in a way a source of hope mid inspiration to me, they are a new

generation of new Czechs that unlike us me not timid, they speak languages, they know the world, they have been abroad, they are self-confident in a present way. Hopefully,

we somehow inspire each other so maybe I can give them some advice or let them be their own judged of my experiences. I benefit more from working with these young

people than they do working with me.

GR: How do you feel about the existence of communism within countries today like

China, Cuba, and North Korea?

DC: Every country you nmiied I believe there is a slightly different issue I think that

communism in Cuba will fade away after Castro dies, I don't know what is going to

replace it. It will be a difficult time, maybe there will be bloodshed, and it's all based on

Castro's personality cult. In Vietnam they are closer to market economy mid planned economy. North Korea is a huge if. China is on the move mid it is a bigger threat than anything else, than Czech communist, even bigger that the threat of international terrorists because this is something that can't be contained. What I am most afraid of when it comes to china, its biggest threat to democracy me communists turned nationalists. This is where we have to be afraid when it comes to china, and I hope I am wrong and hopefully all those who advocate the theory that changes in the U.S involvement in their mmkets will lead to political changes are right.

GR: How does NATO provide security to the Czech Republic?

DC: First of all, I don't see NATO as a military organization only; I think the political pmt ofthis organization is bigger and stronger than militmily. When it comes to psychical safety, it says that if one country is invaded it is like the three musketeers "one of all, all for one' that all the rest of NATO has to come to help this country and viseOversa which creates a bond of togetherness. I know there are many discrepancies and differing view on what is happening in Iraq for example, but still it somehow works because it has to.

GR: Many define the Velvet Revolution as 'smooth mid short', to you was it a truly velvet revolution?

DC: No it was not. I think the velvet revolution was created. What is it? What is velvet revolution? It was smooth, the transition of power happened in an orderly way, there were only a few hitches but I wouldn't even call it revolution- it was part of the big changes that were happening else where in that pmt of the world.

GR: Is there anything that I forgot to ask you that would better help me understand your experience in the changes of the Czech Republic?

DC: You forgot to ask me if I am happy with all that has happened in the past 15 years!

(Laughs) But yes, on the whole, I mil happy. As I said there were mistakes, for some of which I take responsibility, but on the whole I'm here sitting in New York. I think we're better off-YES!

Table of Contents

Statement of Purpose Page 3

Biography Page 4

The Fall of the Iron Curtain: the 1989 Changes Page 5

Interview Trmiscript Page 17

Historical Analysis Page 54

Appendix Page 61

Audio Time Log Page 63

Works consulted Page 65

Interview Analysis

As Cmr argues, history mid historical recordings are the product of their times. A similm dispute in "History as a Weapon," presents two approaches to history: its justification of victims of power, known as exculpatory history, or its exaggeration of

past glories and purposes, known as compensatory history. Oral history is useful in

further investigating exculpatory history, recording personal accounts of events of

historical influence through a series of interview questions. It transforms the interviewee

into a historimi attempting to assess the validity of their primary document in comparison to other historical sources by "weaving them together to create a narrative that makes

sense of all conflicting evidence" (Richie 36). Oral historian Donald Richie also states that "other sources can usually provide the who, what, when, and where of history, but

interviews can offer better insight into the how and why" (Richie 36). Oral History is a

valuable exploration of historical events through witnesses' actions and reactions,

encompassing both the "purposeful" and "accidental" effects of past actions (Richie 37).

Oral history applies to the broad spectrum of individuals involved or witnessing past

historical events such as cultural movements, wars, mid revolutions. The oral history of

Oldrich Cemy provides historical insight to the experiences of revolutionaries involved in the core resistance assembly in the 1989 changes. While reinforcing historians

conclusions of the lack of cultural change under communism and Havel's pivotal role in

leading the revolution, Mr. Cemy establishes a differing view of communist society, of the effects of Prague Spring on the revolution, of Havel's initial role, mid of the changes that came to be known as revolution. Through these similarities and differences, the

record of Mr. Cemy gains significant historical perspective of an individual involved in the nuclear resistance group in 1989.

During the interview, Mr. Cemy provided considerable insight into the

communist way of life and the disillusionment caused by the communist environment. Mr. Cerny alluded to the atrocities committed by the communist party through his

recollection of his father's imprisonment. He later commented that "in every family there

was someone who was somehow hung by the regime in one way or another" (Robinson

2). However, he later comments that despite the injustices committed against his father,

he still wanted to be apart of the communist youth foUowings, emphasizing the lack of

resistance and overall acceptance of the communist way of life. As he became older and

more vehement in expressing his anti-communist ideals, the communists increased their

aggression towards him. Commenting on organizations such as the secret police, Mr.

Cemy explained that "the atmosphere of fear was all pervasive" (Robinson 12),

concurring with popular images of life behind the iron curtain. Mr. Cemy portrayed the

extensive communist power when he explained how the secret police's pressure on his

employer led him to be fired from his job at a publishing house. Mr. Cemy later

explained his connections to the Civic Forum and to leaders such as Havel. When

discussing Havel's role in the revolution, he commented on the eventual sepmation of

Havel and many of those who had supported him during the revolution. He explained that revolutionaries 'Tell in love with him", and then later didn't support his decisions as

president. He contrasted the joined support among different opposition groups during the

revolution with the role of those groups in parliament today to emphasize the united front

against the communists in 1989. Mr. Cemy's personal accounts also provided insight into the overwhelming emotional aspect of the changes, highlighting the magnitude of the

swift changes. On watching the Eastern Germans board the buses to West Germmiy nem the West German embassy in Prague; Mr. Cemy epitomized the revolutionary changes that occurred in the lives of Eastern Europemis by describing the Eastern Germans as having an "migle descend upon them" (Robinson 17). Mr. Cerny also commented on the

affects after the revolution through his involvement with the presidential offices. Overall,

Mr. Cerny explored the communist rule and the struggle presented during mid after the

revolution, providing mi emotional perspective of the significance of the changes on those affected. Through his resistance against the government, Mr. Cemy illustrated the

obstacles faced by those directly involved with the main opposition movement by

challenging and agreeing with conventional historians that documented the events of

1989.

Similar to historian Timothy Garton Ash and Peter Cipkowski, Mr. Cemy agreed

with historical perspective about the unchanging conditions under communist rule mid of

Havel's indispensable role as the leader of the revolutionaries. According to historimi

Peter Cipkowski, before 1989 Czechoslovakia was a "region where history was frozen

for four decades" (Cipkowski 94). During the period from WWII to 1989,

Czechoslov^ia was faced with the Purges, often drought conditions, mid constant

submission to the over-arching communist regime. Mr. Cemy concurred with historian's

portrayal of life under communism by stating "to quote my friend Timothy Garton Ash,

Czechoslov^ia was a country covered by ice" (Robinson 16). Although Prague Spring

and Charter 77 both attempted to chmige the regime, Mr. Cemy, along with historians,

described the "frozen decades" to emphasize the "all-pervasive" (Robinson 12)

communist rule in Czechoslovakia, thus providing mi accurate description of the

environment. In describing Havel's role in the revolution, historimi Timothy Gmton Ash

comments, "It was extraordinary the degree to which everything ultimately revolved

around this one man" (Ash 89). From his involvement in Chmter 77 to his instantaneous assumption of the leadership role in the Civic Forum, historimis concur that Havel was the ultimate leader of the revolution. Similarly, when asked if Havel was the only person that could lead the resistance, Mr. Cemy agreed, saying "I do. I am subjective because of

my relationship with Havel, but I think that there was no one else who could have done it

in those days, who could have structured it like Havel. He was the key factor that put

people together" (Robinson 16). This opinion, as commented on by Mr. Cemy himself, is

greatly influenced by Mr. Cemy's personal ties to Havel and his dislike of the communist

leader, Dubcek. Both his view of communist society mid Havel's leadership illustrate the

similm opinion of revolutionaries mid historians and the significance of Mr. Cerny's testimony because of its reinforcement of historical consensus.

In his interview, Mr. Cemy counters historimis by establishing views of a less

hmsh communist society, of Prague Springs insignificant effect on 1989, of Havel's

initial role as being pessimistic, mid of his disagreement in the term "revolution" in

describing 1989. Peter Cipkowski's description of life under communism as "a Stalinist

state of horror" (Cipkowski 97) contributes to the common historical belief that life under

communism was oppressive. The regimes purges, restriction of personal liberties, and

constant enforcement of propaganda all contribute to this notion of life under

communism and the iron fist. However, in describing life under the communist rule, Mr.

Cemy explained that while harsh "people were closer to each other" stating that "people

now complain that people used to be more humane to each other" (Robinson 4).

Although Mr. Cemy's view is shared by many, it was, to some extent, affected by the

multitudes of communist propaganda. Regardless, it provides a less extreme perspective

of the conditions of communism. In dealing with Havel's involvement in the revolution. historians such as Timothy Garton Ash failed to even question Havel's dedication to the

Revolution, saying that from the beginning Havel was "the one person who could

somehow balance the very different tendencies and interest in the movement"

(Cipkowski 90). With Havel's involvement beginning with Charter 77 and his emergence

as the leader of the revolution, the enthusiasm that he brought to the revolution was

assumed to have been present throughout the revolution. Mr. Cemy's close relationship

with Havel presented new information unrecorded by historians. Mr. Cemy recalls that

upon hearing about the November 17 demonstrations, Havel "didn't believe in rapid

changes" going on to further say that "he was very pessimistic" and "didn't think

anything would come of it" (Robinson 12). Later in the interview, Mr. Cemy describes the

effort to motivate Havel to become involved, however he states that once he became

involved Havel was the immediate leader. There is little information, if miy at all,

describing the possibility of Havel's involvement. Another difference in opinion is in

historians such as Cipkowski's argument that Prague Spring was Czechoslovakia's "bold

move towards freedom" (Cipkowski 98). Prague Spring was viewed as radical because it

was the first collective movement to alter the communist society. . In his interview, Mr.

Cemy shared his belief that Prague spring had no affect on the happenings of 1989,

stating that one "cmi't reform a society(communist) that is un-reformable"(Robinson 2).

Although Prague Spring and the Velvet Revolution obtained different goals, the

emergence of leaders such as Dubcek played a significant role in 1989. On reflecting on the events of 1989, modem historians have adopted the use of the term "Velvet

Revolution" to describe the events that occurred, describing them as part of the "domino

affect" of other European uprisings as dissents (Cipkowski 94). Mr. Cemy disagrees with the use ofthis term, saying "I wouldn't call it a Velvet Revolution—it was part of the big change that was happening around the world" (Cerny 32). Throughout his interview, Mr. Cemy stated that so-called revolution was thrust upon the revolutionaries, thus contradicting the basis of revolution. This stand-point, however, was potentially affected by Mr. Cemy's role in the main opposition group. What seemed to him to be the escalation of events, to other Czechoslovak's could have been viewed as rapid change.

Emerging from a conservative communist party, the radicalism of ideas presented in the revolution could attest to the term "revolution" being used to describe 1989. Mr. Cerny's interview serves as a primary document that provided both new information and contradictory opinions contrasting with historical information, proving significant in comparing with historimi's accounts.

The Oral History process emphasizes the importance of assessing one's own views of history. The entire process is a selection of facts, in hopes to compare arguments and create one's own opinion of past historical events. The project itself emphasizes that history is not solely defined by well-known leaders and decisions, but by the people affected by changes. In order to better understand a period, historians must explore all aspects of mi argument or period. For example, in order to understmid

Mr. Cemy's view of the revolution, it might be importmit to understand what a communist might believe about 1989. Throughout the creation and reflection of history, rhetoric is used, proving that there is no objective approach to history. This project has emphasized that in order to understmid past events, you must explore the extent of its affects on all aspects mid people in society.

Table of Contents Statement of Purpose Page 3

Biography Page 4

The Fall of the Iron Curtain: the 1989 Changes Page 5

Interview Transcript Page 17

Historical Analysis Page 54

Appendix Page 61

Audio Time Log Page 63

Works consulted Page 65

Appendix I

http://www.bagism.com/library/lennonwall-timeline.html

Demonstrators in Prague's Wenceslas Square(1989) http //www3 ocn ne jp/—europe-e/prague 1989-12 htm

Appendix n HAVEL NAH RAD Aposter displayed in IPSPsiqiportJiig Havel and the revoludonanes http //www czeckitout com/president htm

CardinalTomasek, Prague 5.11.1989 http //wwwgaUery cz/cgi- bm/hynekol/aps sh'?VSS_SERV=gobraz&galpre=2306&language=en Table of Contents

Statement of Purpose Page 3

Biography Page 4 The Fall of the Iron Curtain: the 1989 Changes Page 5

Interview Trmiscript Page 17

Historical Analysis Page 54

Appendix Page 61

Audio Time Log Page 63

Works consulted Page 65

Works Consulted

"Chmter 77 Decimation" www.dwis2.circ.gwu.edu/~jryfa/charter77.htm. October, 1976. GWU-Education.

Cipkowski, Peter. Revolutions in Eastern Europe: Understanding the Collapse of Communism in Poland, Hungary, Eastern Germmiy, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Soviet Union. New York: Junn Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1991.

Feffer, John. Shock Waves: Eastern Europe after the Revolutions. Boston: South End Press, 1992.

Fein, Esther. "Czech Witnesses Stray And an Inquiry Falters." New York Times Dec 2, 1989: pg 8.

Garton Ash, Timothy. The Magic Lantern: the revolution of '89 witnessed in Wmsaw. Budapest Berlin, and Prague. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.

Hershenson, Roberta. "Insider Offers Look at Czech Revolt" New York Times Jan 21, 1990:pgWC8.

Tismmieanu, Vladimir. Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel. New York: The Free Press, 1992.

"Vaclav Havel's 'A Contaminated Moral Enviomment' www.skynet.ie/~debates/speech_library/vaclav_havel.htm. Jmiuary 1,1990". NSW HSC Online-Speeches.