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Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party GREgORI GALOFRÉ-VILÀ, CHRISTOPHER M. MEISSNER, MARTIN McKEE, AND DAvID STUckLER We study the link between fiscal austerity and Nazi electoral success. Voting data from a thousand districts and a hundred cities for four elections between 1930 and 1933 show that areas more affected by austerity (spending cuts and tax increases) had relatively higher vote shares for the Nazi Party. We also find that the localities with relatively high austerity experienced relatively high suffering (measured by mortality rates) and these areas’ electorates were more likely to vote for the Nazi Party. Our findings are robust to a range of specifications including an instrumental variable strategy and a border-pair policy discontinuity design. n 1928, the German Nazi Party earned just over 2 percent of the votes in Ithe general federal elections. By mid-1932, it had received 38 percent of votes in the national elections, becoming the largest political party in the Reichstag. How did this shift to the extreme far-right happen so quickly? Economic factors, such as high unemployment associated with the Great Depression, sociocultural issues, and the excessively punitive Treaty of Versailles, are well studied. They undoubtedly played an important role in the rise of the Nazi Party. Still, the rapid growth of support for the Nazi Party well into the Great Depression remains the subject of considerable The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 2021). © The Author(s), [2021]. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. doi: 10.1017/ S0022050720000601. Gregori Galofré-Vilà is Assistant Professor, Universidad Pública de Navarra, Department of Economics, and Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics. E-mail: gregori. [email protected]. Christopher M. Meissner is Professor, Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, and Research Associate at the NBER. E-mail: cmmeissner@ ucdavis.edu. Martin McKee is Professor, Department of Health Services Research and Policy, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. E-mail: [email protected]. David Stuckler is Professor, Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Bocconi. E-mail: [email protected]. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Australian National University, Hitotsubashi University, Humboldt University, the NBER, New York University, New York University– Shanghai, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, UC Berkeley, UC Davis, UC Irvine, UCLA, the University of Groningen, the University of Michigan, and the 2018 World Economic History Congress. We thank Maja Adena, Barbara Biasi, Fabio Braggion, Barry Eichengreen, Ruben Enikolopov, Sanford Jacoby, Harold James, Peter Lindert, Dan Liu, Petra Moser, Maria Petrova, Burkhard Schipper, Nico Voigtländer, Hans-Joachim Voth, and Noam Yuchtman for a series of constructive suggestions. We also thank the editor, Dan Bogart, and four anonymous referees for comments. DS is funded by a Wellcome Trust and European Research Council Investigator Award (ERC HRES 313590). 81 82 Galofré-Vilà, Meissner, McKee, and Stuckler debate (Eichengreen 2018; Ferguson 1996; James 1986; Satayanth et al. 2017; Temin 1990; Voth 2020). In this paper, we investigate the association between the austerity measures implemented by the German government between 1930 and 1932 and voters’ increased support for the Nazi Party. A growing liter- ature studies the interactions between political preferences and fiscal policy with evidence that austerity packages are correlated with rising extremism (Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi 2019; Bor 2017; Eichengreen 2015, 2018; Fetzer 2019; Ponticelli and Voth 2020). It stands to reason that the austerity measures implemented in Germany in the early 1930s played a role. However, we are aware of no direct quantitative assess- ment of this issue for the Weimar Republic. During this period, Heinrich Brüning of the Center Party, and Germany’s chancellor between March 1930 and May 1932, implemented a set of measures via executive decree in order to balance the country’s finances. These austerity measures included real cuts in spending and transfers as well as higher tax rates. Brüning believed that the conse- quent suffering would be highly visible, thereby eliciting international sympathy for the Germans and helping put an end to the unpopular repa- rations imposed at Versailles (Evans 2003). To test the hypothesis that austerity can explain increased Nazi vote share, we use city and district-level election returns for the federal elec- tions of 1930, 1932 (July and November), and 1933. We then link local vote shares to different proxies for city, district, and state-level fiscal policy changes while also controlling for other potential explanations for the rise of the Nazis, such as unemployment, changes in wages, and economic output. Our results are robust to inclusion of a number of different controls and specifications including city-level time trends, state by year fixed effects, and electoral district by year fixed effects. The observational data we use to study austerity and extremism have a number of features that enable us to overcome obvious issues of reverse causality and endogeneity. Brüning’s policies on spending and taxes were not expected. Instead, they became an outcome of the unexpectedly severe economic and financial crisis. They were decided at the Reich level by Brüning and his cabinet with implicit support of the Reichstag. Spending cuts and tax increases were uniformly applied across the nation so that the policy decisions were exogenous to the preferences of specific cities and districts. As noted by Balderston (1993, p. 225), “the progres- sive ‘nationalization’ of taxing and spending decisions, justifies historians in the responsibility they place on the Brüning cabinet and on Brüning personally, for the fiscal balance during the slump.” Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party 83 Limits on spending and on changes to taxes, policy variables often formerly controlled by local authorities, were also imposed. Successive pay cuts to national civil service salaries are an example. Although some expenditure cuts were out of the hands of localities and mandated by the national government, some budget categories were hit harder than others. This fact means that nationally imposed budget cuts might have differential impacts on localities depending on the predetermined patterns of spending and reliance on the national government for transfers to fund different cate- gories of spending. We use city-level variation in the preausterity reliance on Reich transfers and national changes in transfers as a shift-share instru- mental variable for subsequent spending declines. Since states, localities, and the central government were unable to borrow on international capital markets after 1930 (Schuker 1988), localities were forced by markets to traverse the depression with highly disruptive fiscal shocks. As for taxes, a similar logic applies. The Reich maintained control over a number of specific taxes, determining, for example, the statutory marginal rates for income taxes and corporation turnover taxes. Changes to the statutory marginal rates applied equally and evenly to all states and localities, but lower brackets had higher percentage increases in income tax rates (Newcomer 1936). We use variation at the local level in the initial distribution of taxable income across tax brackets and national changes in tax policy to instrument for the austerity-driven tax hikes. To make identification valid, we need to avoid confounding our fiscal shock with an unobservable economic shock correlated with income distribu- tion. On the income distribution, Dell (2007) and Gómez-León and de Jong (2019) show that Gini coefficients and top income shares were fairly constant between 1928 and 1933. Higher Nazi vote share could be because of resentment arising from distributional battles for slices of the fiscal pie in difficult times. There is clearly a distributional component to these changes, the percentage rise in tax rates being much higher for the lower income brackets. Wueller (1933) also discusses that while tax revenue had traditionally been retained where it was collected, intrastate redistribution was increasingly becoming need based during the Depression. We also use a number of different econometric specifications to elimi- nate further concerns about endogeneity. We employ both city/district fixed effects models and long differences to focus on within-locality varia- tion in Nazi support. We are also able to circumscribe the control group by matching districts to neighboring districts just across state borders, as in Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010). While relevant observables were spatially smooth, fiscal policy across the state borders was sharply different because 84 Galofré-Vilà, Meissner, McKee, and Stuckler state policies responded to statewide concerns. With this identification strategy, we are also able to control for common economic shocks corre- lated with the initial characteristics of localities by using period by district- pair fixed effect interaction terms. Even after controlling for local economic
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