'Arc of Instability'? Melanesia in the Early 2000S
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'Arc of Instability'? Melanesia In the early 2000s the 2000 coup had been able to exercise over Sogavare and his ministerial colleagues ~d tha~ ~ad contributed in significant ways to the deepening political and econonuc cns1s. The composition of the newly-formed government CONVERGING ON THE ARC OF INSTABILITY? suggeste~ that this was unlikely to happen and subsequent developments have THE FALL OF BARAK SOPE AND THE SPECTRE OF borne this out. There has been a reluctance to take hard decisions and a readiness to follow the path of least resistance. The coercive arm of the state _ A COUP IN VANUATU the police_ force - remains incapacitated and serious crimes, including murder, go u~pumshed. In large parts of rural Guadalcanal, the rule of law has effectively ~ollap~ed and been replaced by brutal family feuds waged between Michael Morgans former ethnic alltes. As funds for wages and services dry up, the arrival of comp~nsation from Taiwan generates a feeding frenzy among claimants (g_enume and bogus) and inevitably leads to further divisions and conflict. The constitutional crisis which erupted in Vanuatu in May 2001 initially Disenchantment with the formal political process has now reached dangerous prompted fears that Vanuatu might follow the examples of the Solomon Islands new levels. and Fiji and descend into social unrest, and possibly violent conflict. The greater danger was that the ailing administration of Barak Tame Sope Mau'utamate would mobilize the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) to consolidate its hold on power. The crisis was triggered by an attempted motion of no confidence in Prime Minister Barak Sope, authored jointly by the Vanua'aku Pati (VP) and Sope's former coalition partner, the Union of Moderate Parties (UMP). The pressing issue for the Vanua'aku Pati was the country's worsening financial situation, especially in light of a clandestine deal between Sope and Indian Thai businessman Amerendra Nath Ghosh, involving the issue of $US300 million from the Reserve Bank. The UMP had defected to the opposition in the month before the commencement of the parliamentary session. For almost two months during its scheduled first session for 2001 the Vanuatu Parliament was incapacitated because the Speaker, Paul Ren Tari, refused to allow debate on the motion. The Vanuatu Supreme Court upheld the validity of the motion, but Sope claimed that his coalition was the victim of foreign interference and a political conspiracy between the government and the state law offices that culminated in a 'libellous' motion of no confidence. Throughout, Sope and his allies maintained pressure on VP and UMP backbenchers in the hope of inducing defections by marginalized MPs for whom personal allegiance might be considered a tradable commodity. Despite consistent pressure, the government of Edward Natapei emerged victorious from the constitutional crisis and Vanuatu remained peaceful, although the events set in train a year of further political manoeuvring which culminated in the arrest and conviction of Sope on charges of forgery and the intervention of elements of the police and the VMF in national politics. 1 I would like to thank Daniel Oakman, Jenny Brown, Donald Denoon and Ron May for their comments on drafts of this paper. 40 'Arc of lnstab/llty'? Melanesia Jn the early 2000s The fall of Barak Sope and the spectre of a coup In Vanuatu $US 150,000 to the UMP. Although the UMP Jost two MPs during the 9 Since 1988 political stability in Vanuatu has been challenged regularly, but the defection, Sope's parliamentary majority evaporated. country has neither yielded to violent conflict nor suffered an effective coup d'etar, despite the predictions of policy analysts and regional journalists. The motion Nonetheless, since the beginning of 2001 government perfonnance has been undermined by political flux and ongoing disquiet amongst the disciplined The parliament was scheduled to commence its first ordi~ary ses~ ion on 26 forces. Beginning with the constitutional crisis of March-April 2001, this paper March 2001, but it was delayed by a walkout by _Ya~ua aku Pau ~embers , addresses recent unrest in Vanuatu against the backdrop of domestic political ostensibly in protest over the railroading of leg1slat1on ~o expedite voter manoeuvring, poor economic performance, pressure for reform and the spectre registration for the upcoming Municipal Elections for Port Vila. .on 26 Mar~h of a coup. It argues that despite the volatile nature of recent events in Vanuatu, the UMP formally defected and the government "':as forc~d to withdraw ~I its which is seen increasingly as part of the arc of instability, the coalition bills. The defection set in train events that would mcapacitate the first ordinary government of Edward Natapei has successfully countered dissident internal session for 2001 through boycotts, walkouts and court cases. forces. While no government bills were addressed during the sitting, four private The trigger members' bills were put before the house for consideration. Pi:imary amongst these was the motion of no confidence in Prime Minister Sope, signed. by the 27 In the weeks before the first ordinary sitting of parliament for 2001 was VP and UMP MPs. Tari and his deputies were also tar~~ted for motion~ of no scheduled to begin, a split emerged in the coalition government of Barak Sope. confidence, although the standing orders make no provisions for censunng the In early March the government's second largest faction, the UMP, defected to speaker. the opposition. UMP President Serge Vohor claimed that his party had been marginalized by Sope's administration: in particular, the UMP's policies on A motion of no confidence is usually a straightforwar~ affair, simp~y stati~~ that education were being ignored, and Sope had been unable to address the global the majority of members has lost faith in th~ capacity ~f. the pnme ~1ster. drop in copra prices which severely affected the UMP's mainly rural However, the motion in question included details of Sope s mvolveme~t m three constituents. Their concerns about the policies of the coalition leadership major financial scandals during his parliamentary career - two of which would exacerbated the feeling that the UMP was not adequately represented in the have extended Vanuatu's already sizeable external debt and emasc~l~ted ~he Council of Ministers. When Vohor demanded a cabinet reshuffle to rectify this, economy- and asserted an improper relationship between.Sope's admmist.ration Sope refused (Trading Post 28 March 2001 ). The situation was made more and Dinh van Than, the naturalized Vietnamese businessman who ts the galling to the UMP executive because it had agreed not to run candidates against president of the NUP. The speaker of the parliament, NUP MP for. Maewo, Paul their coalition partners in the Santo by-election in February 2001. All member R Tari refused to allow debate on the motion. Observers beheved that ~he parties in the coalition government had agreed to back the National United Party m:ion ~as a tactical blunder, allowing Sope to instigate defarnat1~n (NUP) candidate, Leo Tamata, after the death of the incumbent NUP MP, Anas proceedings against its 27 signatories. However, the Suprem~ Co~rt uph~ld its Tinwako. Having maintained coalition unity to assure representation for the validity, stating that because none of the_c~arges had been atred m pubhc, the NUP, but refused increased representation for his own party, Vohor canvassed motion was protected by parliamentary pnv1lege. his options. When it became clear that he had lost his parliamentary . ma1onty '. Sope In early March, without consulting the UMP (or the attorney general), Sope announced that the Council of Ministers would adv~se the president to d~ssolve signed an agreement with the Italian company, Volani, to develop a cattle parliament. Sope promised to resign if the president r~fused . ~espite the project on Santo for a reported vt424 million ($US2.9 million). Santo is the expectation amongst the NUP executive - and the Co~nc~l of . Mimster~ - that heartland of the UMP. Vohor was backing the rival Mondragon Group' s bid to President John Bani would vote according to the party s drrect1ves (Bant was a develop the Big Bay area. It has been claimed that Mondragon donated ' Paul Telukluk (Malakula) joined the Grin Pati [Green Party). Irene Bongnaim (Ambrym) joined the Vanuatu Republican Pany of former prime minister Maxime Carlot Korman. 42 43 'Arc of lnstobl/lty'? Meloneslo In the early~ The foll of Borok Sope and the specr,, e o f o coup /n Vanuatu founding member of the NUP), the president refused to dissolve parliament and instead followed the advice of the State Law Office. Sope refused to resign. and his allies probed the VP and UMP During the turmoil of 2001 Sope urf d that Sope had won back power Immediately, the VP executive requested Chief Justice Vincent Lunapek to backbenches for weaknesses. Rum~u~s ~ i~~~al divisions, had disintegrated. and that the VP, supposedly wrahc e y targeted for bribes. Foster Rakom, a allow parliament to be reconvened to consider the motion of no confidence and l al backbenc ers were f elect a new government (Trading Post 4 April 2001). On Friday 6 April Simultaneous y, sever 1 1 . ed that he had been approached by one.o Lunapek ruled that the speaker had acted improperly and ordered him to recall Francophone VP~ from Me e,hc air;; d vt5 million, a ministerial portfolio, parliament to consider the motion (Supreme Court of Vanuatu 2001). When Dinh Van Than's heutenants w o ~t erehurch house if he would join Sope and the completion of a commurn y c as not expected to be re-elected in parliament reconvened, the speaker delayed the tabling of the motion, pending (Trading Post 30 March .