'Arc of Instability'? Melanesia In the early 2000s the 2000 coup had been able to exercise over Sogavare and his ministerial colleagues ~d tha~ ~ad contributed in significant ways to the deepening political and econonuc cns1s. The composition of the newly-formed government CONVERGING ON THE ARC OF INSTABILITY? suggeste~ that this was unlikely to happen and subsequent developments have THE FALL OF BARAK SOPE AND THE SPECTRE OF borne this out. There has been a reluctance to take hard decisions and a readiness to follow the path of least resistance. The coercive arm of the state _ A COUP IN VANUATU the police_ force - remains incapacitated and serious crimes, including murder, go u~pumshed. In large parts of rural Guadalcanal, the rule of law has effectively ~ollap~ed and been replaced by brutal family feuds waged between Michael Morgans former ethnic alltes. As funds for wages and services dry up, the arrival of comp~nsation from Taiwan generates a feeding frenzy among claimants (g_enume and bogus) and inevitably leads to further divisions and conflict. The constitutional crisis which erupted in Vanuatu in May 2001 initially Disenchantment with the formal political process has now reached dangerous prompted fears that Vanuatu might follow the examples of the Solomon Islands new levels. and Fiji and descend into social unrest, and possibly violent conflict. The greater danger was that the ailing administration of Barak Tame Sope Mau'utamate would mobilize the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) to consolidate its hold on power.

The crisis was triggered by an attempted motion of no confidence in Prime Minister Barak Sope, authored jointly by the Vanua'aku Pati (VP) and Sope's former coalition partner, the Union of Moderate Parties (UMP). The pressing issue for the Vanua'aku Pati was the country's worsening financial situation, especially in light of a clandestine deal between Sope and Indian Thai businessman Amerendra Nath Ghosh, involving the issue of $US300 million from the Reserve Bank. The UMP had defected to the opposition in the month before the commencement of the parliamentary session. For almost two months during its scheduled first session for 2001 the Vanuatu Parliament was incapacitated because the Speaker, Paul Ren Tari, refused to allow debate on the motion. The Vanuatu Supreme Court upheld the validity of the motion, but Sope claimed that his coalition was the victim of foreign interference and a political conspiracy between the government and the state law offices that culminated in a 'libellous' motion of no confidence. Throughout, Sope and his allies maintained pressure on VP and UMP backbenchers in the hope of inducing defections by marginalized MPs for whom personal allegiance might be considered a tradable commodity. Despite consistent pressure, the government of Edward Natapei emerged victorious from the constitutional crisis and Vanuatu remained peaceful, although the events set in train a year of further political manoeuvring which culminated in the arrest and conviction of Sope on charges of forgery and the intervention of elements of the police and the VMF in national politics.

1 I would like to thank Daniel Oakman, Jenny Brown, Donald Denoon and Ron May for their comments on drafts of this paper.

40 'Arc of lnstab/llty'? Melanesia Jn the early 2000s The fall of Barak Sope and the spectre of a coup In Vanuatu

$US 150,000 to the UMP. Although the UMP Jost two MPs during the 9 Since 1988 political stability in Vanuatu has been challenged regularly, but the defection, Sope's parliamentary majority evaporated. country has neither yielded to violent conflict nor suffered an effective coup d'etar, despite the predictions of policy analysts and regional journalists. The motion Nonetheless, since the beginning of 2001 government perfonnance has been undermined by political flux and ongoing disquiet amongst the disciplined The parliament was scheduled to commence its first ordi~ary ses~ ion on 26 forces. Beginning with the constitutional crisis of March-April 2001, this paper March 2001, but it was delayed by a walkout by _Ya~ua aku Pau ~embers , addresses recent unrest in Vanuatu against the backdrop of domestic political ostensibly in protest over the railroading of leg1slat1on ~o expedite voter manoeuvring, poor economic performance, pressure for reform and the spectre registration for the upcoming Municipal Elections for Port Vila. .on 26 Mar~h of a coup. It argues that despite the volatile nature of recent events in Vanuatu, the UMP formally defected and the government "':as forc~d to withdraw ~I its which is seen increasingly as part of the arc of instability, the coalition bills. The defection set in train events that would mcapacitate the first ordinary government of Edward Natapei has successfully countered dissident internal session for 2001 through boycotts, walkouts and court cases. forces. While no government bills were addressed during the sitting, four private The trigger members' bills were put before the house for consideration. Pi:imary amongst these was the motion of no confidence in Prime Minister Sope, signed. by the 27 In the weeks before the first ordinary sitting of parliament for 2001 was VP and UMP MPs. Tari and his deputies were also tar~~ted for motion~ of no scheduled to begin, a split emerged in the coalition government of Barak Sope. confidence, although the standing orders make no provisions for censunng the In early March the government's second largest faction, the UMP, defected to speaker. the opposition. UMP President Serge Vohor claimed that his party had been marginalized by Sope's administration: in particular, the UMP's policies on A motion of no confidence is usually a straightforwar~ affair, simp~y stati~~ that education were being ignored, and Sope had been unable to address the global the majority of members has lost faith in th~ capacity ~f. the pnme ~1ster. drop in copra prices which severely affected the UMP's mainly rural However, the motion in question included details of Sope s mvolveme~t m three constituents. Their concerns about the policies of the coalition leadership major financial scandals during his parliamentary career - two of which would exacerbated the feeling that the UMP was not adequately represented in the have extended Vanuatu's already sizeable external debt and emasc~l~ted ~he Council of Ministers. When Vohor demanded a cabinet reshuffle to rectify this, economy- and asserted an improper relationship between.Sope's admmist.ration Sope refused (Trading Post 28 March 2001 ). The situation was made more and Dinh van Than, the naturalized Vietnamese businessman who ts the galling to the UMP executive because it had agreed not to run candidates against president of the NUP. The speaker of the parliament, NUP MP for. Maewo, Paul their coalition partners in the Santo by-election in February 2001. All member R Tari refused to allow debate on the motion. Observers beheved that ~he parties in the coalition government had agreed to back the National United Party m:ion ~as a tactical blunder, allowing Sope to instigate defarnat1~n (NUP) candidate, Leo Tamata, after the death of the incumbent NUP MP, Anas proceedings against its 27 signatories. However, the Suprem~ Co~rt uph~ld its Tinwako. Having maintained coalition unity to assure representation for the validity, stating that because none of the_c~arges had been atred m pubhc, the NUP, but refused increased representation for his own party, Vohor canvassed motion was protected by parliamentary pnv1lege. his options. When it became clear that he had lost his parliamentary . ma1onty '. Sope In early March, without consulting the UMP (or the attorney general), Sope announced that the Council of Ministers would adv~se the president to d~ssolve signed an agreement with the Italian company, Volani, to develop a cattle parliament. Sope promised to resign if the president r~fused . . ~espite the project on Santo for a reported vt424 million ($US2.9 million). Santo is the expectation amongst the NUP executive - and the Co~nc~l of . Mimster~ - that heartland of the UMP. Vohor was backing the rival Mondragon Group' s bid to President John Bani would vote according to the party s drrect1ves (Bant was a develop the Big Bay area. It has been claimed that Mondragon donated ' Paul Telukluk (Malakula) joined the Grin Pati [Green Party). Irene Bongnaim (Ambrym) joined the Vanuatu Republican Pany of former prime minister Maxime Carlot Korman.

42 43 'Arc of lnstobl/lty'? Meloneslo In the early~ The foll of Borok Sope and the specr,, e o f o coup /n Vanuatu founding member of the NUP), the president refused to dissolve parliament and instead followed the advice of the State Law Office. Sope refused to resign. . and his allies probed the VP and UMP During the turmoil of 2001 Sope urf d that Sope had won back power Immediately, the VP executive requested Chief Justice Vincent Lunapek to backbenches for weaknesses. Rum~u~s ~ i~~~al divisions, had disintegrated. and that the VP, supposedly wrahc e y targeted for bribes. Foster Rakom, a allow parliament to be reconvened to consider the motion of no confidence and l al backbenc ers were f elect a new government (Trading Post 4 April 2001). On Friday 6 April Simultaneous y, sever 1 1 . ed that he had been approached by one.o Lunapek ruled that the speaker had acted improperly and ordered him to recall Francophone VP~ from Me e,hc air;; d vt5 million, a ministerial portfolio, parliament to consider the motion (Supreme Court of Vanuatu 2001). When Dinh Van Than's heutenants w o ~t erehurch house if he would join Sope and the completion of a commurn y c as not expected to be re-elected in parliament reconvened, the speaker delayed the tabling of the motion, pending (Trading Post 30 March .. ; defecting. (Rakom's bid for re- corrections and amendments, despite the fact that his office and the Office of the ~001) Rako~ 2002 and he stood to gam cons1derab Y Y sful ) To avoid confrontation in Clerk had already approved the motion for passage through the house, before its election in the May 2002 elections was ~nsucces te~pted the VP relocated its introduction. Only when it was made clear to Tari that if he went to gaol on Port Vila, and ensure no community' Lelepa. contempt charges he could no longer be a member of parliament did he headquarters to the relatJveth~t safetybackbe~cD o oe~al~e~alpokas'; apologize to the court and agree to recall the house. At 7 p.m. on 13 April, There were no defections. heavily guarded by police, Tari reconvened parliament and, following a government walkout, Edward Natapei, the president of the VP, was voted in as . . nore ressures from their own marginalized prime minister. Nevertheless the VP/UMP did not ig KP Maki the UMP member for Epi, 'd A ·1 1·t appeared that ora • . . members. In rm pn . confidence Maki received significant might defect and support ~ motion ~f n~om Willie jimmy (NUP). (Jimmy was When parliament met again on 7 May, Tari suspended six members of the new funding for his 1998 electton c~a~gnd f . t the NUP in February 2001 ). government, including Prime Minister Natapei and Deputy Prime Minster Serge . h UMP unul his e ect1on o d a faction leader in t e L .Ile MP George Wells (VP) ha Yohor, for breaches of the standing orders and the constitution. The remaining S I ·med that uganv1 . The same week, ope c at b kin his 2002 re-election campaign to twenty-one government MPs walked out in solidarity. The speaker claimed that 4 ~ by taking him to court in April the government MPs had breached standing requested vt8 million ($US 5 ,~)d a~ d ~eo~legation but later that day it was orders and the constitution, but the Supreme Court again overturned his ruling. defect to the MPP. Wells pub!ic \a~m~ecided not to ~re-select Wells as VP Once again he was directed to reconvene parliament, or face charges of revealed that the V~ executive ch 2002 elections. (The party subsequentl ~ contempt and a six-month gaol sentence. Undaunted, on Monday 14 May the candidate fo~ Lug~:1lle for~~:~: okas was installed as speaker, Kora Maki rescinded this dec1S1on). W d G p Wells the second deputy speaker. speaker (who possessed the only key to the parliamentary chamber) failed to became his deputy speaker an eorge appear. Further, Tari made several public comments against the judiciary and the new government, and openly sided with Sope's regime. Despite being . . . d May 2001 remains obscure. His What motivated Tari m April l an f the parliament and of the principle informed of their obligations by the State Law Office, Tari's deputies refused to understanding of the laws and regu at,on: Westminster-style government was help open the chamber. Access to the house was gained when a ladder was ?s lowered from the Public Gallery. of the separation of power~ ~nd~r ~~u~ u ·1 judgement, Chief Justice Lunapek queried throughout the ~sis . n I ~tion is self-evidently ... entrusted That evening Natapei, on the advice of the attorney general, directed the police noted that the 'interpretatton ~f ~e cons: thro~~h the Constitution' (Supreme to arrest the speaker and his two deputies, Irene Bongnaim and Henry Yauko. to the Court by th~. people o J~~~ c:~colm, conceded during the April court They were apprehended early next morning - the speaker at the residence of Court 2001). Tan s lawyer, h ct• ·ssed the motion of no confidence. case that the speaker had erred the courts had no right to bully Barak Sope. Despite strong criticisms from Sope and the opposition, parliament w~n. ~ t~~hat Yet for two after the an him. A week after the trial Tari's elected a new speaker, MP for Efate and former prime minister, Donald mon~s ~~e r~:'ected him because p .th his client, stating, 'our client has Kalpokas Masikevanua. The new government came to power with a majority of parliame~tary p~vlleg~ one (26-25) in the 52-seat parliament. counsel terminated his relau.on~h1p wJin Post 14 April 2001). When the refused to listen to our adv~e ~~ ~barges against the three speakers in Supreme Court heard e sd. d the case ruling that at the time of December 2001,final!~ Jusuce Coventry isrmsse~n '

44 45 'Arc of Instability'? Melanesia In the early 200Js The fall of Barak Sope and the spectre of a coup In Vanuatu

t d a 250 per cent profit on their issue. their arrest they were covered by Article 27 of the constitution because Peter Swanson. Swanson had gu~an e~nister Korman annulled the deal and parliament was still in session, but he cautioned them against abusing their 10 On advice from Scotland yard, Prime l d after three months by presidential privileges. In his judgement, Coventry noted that parliamentary privilege had Swanson arrested (Swanson was re eas~ atu National Provident Fund to 'does not mean that a person can do what they like ...without people having pardon). Also in 1996 he had forced the h an: . bane-based Cybank Internet recourse to the court' (Trading Post l December 2001). transfer vt27 million ($US 180,000) to t e ns banking company' none of which was recovered. Financial crisis Committee on Investigations had In March 2001 a report to t~e US ~ermaalnemno\ey-laundering centre. While The VP predicated the ouster of Sope on the latter's involvement in clandestine named Vanuatu as an mternauon I . f Vanuatu's economy, Natapet · financial schemes, in particular the agreement with Amerendra Nath Ghosh. international focus was on the re~ au~~d ~s an economic manager. During Ghosh had arrived in Port Vqa in February 2000 with what was described as mounted an atta~~ on Sope'.s perso~et~:n 1996 and 1997, Sope had failed to 'possibly the world's largest ruby', which he intended to 'donate' to the people his tenure as numster of Fmance al b d t While Sope claimed to have of Vanuatu. He promised to initiate a project to seal the road around Efate, provide a development budget or ans anb_lnli~ ($uUgSel ?o million) much of the debt 1 build a walled complex for the Council of Ministers, and negotiate with foreign reduced his· country ' s debt by vt2 . on f the agreement' by the Chi nese consortia to build a new international airport (Nasara 14 April 2001). Ghosh reduction actually came about becausein~luding that which had paid for the reputedly was awarded an honorary consulship for Laos and the ambassadorship government to write-off several loansv~80 million ($US2.7 million) soft lo!in. in Thailand (Radio Vanuatu 19 April 2001). He also claimed to have been given arliament house - and grant a new ai· . took office in 1999 there was P . . d h h n Sope's co itton . petroleum and mineral exploration and fishing rights, royalty free. In return for Natape1 claune t at w . e. million) in reserve. The Natape1 the ruby, it was reported that Ghosh was to receive $US300 million in bearer approximately vt200 nulhon . ($US·~h4 a monthly overdraft of vt400 million bonds from the Reserve Bank. This was equal to 140 per cent of Vanuatu's government is currently_ working. ':"1 Joe Carlo revealed that the government gross domestic product, and had Sope issued the bonds, Vanuatu's external debt ($US2.8 million). VP Finance M1~1ster maintain the cash flow until the end of would have quadrupled (Australian Financial Review 26 February 2001). would be looking for other alternatives to t reform the Vanuatu taxation 2001. The former government h~d take~ stepthse ogovemment's revenue base, . h . t tion of improving . Id Sope· claimed that revenue generated by the government's joint ventures with system with t e m en amblin bill, which was calculated to y1e Ghosh would be used to settle outstanding debts with the police and VMF and particularly by the approval of a. g. g th. to date no revenue has fully compensate people for losses incurred during the Santo Rebellion in 1980. over vt240 million ($US1.6 nulhon) per mon , In October 2000 he made the first payment to the police, reputedly from these eventuated (Radio Vanuatu 21May2001). earnings. At the time, the acting police commissioner, Arthur Caulton, averred as onl partially to blame for Vanuatu's that this marked a turning point in relations between the police and the Sope' s maverick manage~ent style w h fl y problems that Natapei highlighted . · ·1 tton The cas - ow . · I government, but great uncertainty remained (Trading Post 8 September 2001). precanous econonuc s1 ua ". . venue and lack of econonuc sttmu us, Natapei now claims that the payment was made from savings in the recurrent resulted primarily from dec_hnmg re . educed confidence. Lack of police budget of 1999, accrued under the Kalpokas administration (March 1998- although Sope's overspending und~mably rt rpn'ses entrenched political . · with pnvate en e • . November 1999). Both the police and VMF maintain that the government's overnment coord mat1on . and poor global pnces for g . . and taxation revenues, debt to them is yet to be fully acquitted. instability, dechmng customs 1 "b ted to the weakening of the economy. Vanuatu's cash crops, have al c?ntn u nue base - which relies heavily The Ghosh affair refocused attention on Sope's involvement in a succession of Donors have highlighted Vanuatu.s narr~w reveas an area for immediate reform. potentially disastrous financial deals. Sope was centrally involved in the 1996 on tounsm.. agnc . ul ture and financial services - nu'c review undertaken m. 2001 • Swanson deal, when as Finance minister he had approved the issue of . . h ADB • most recent econo • . The emphasis m t e ~ . . 1 d fisheries . . . promote foreign promissory notes for tens of millions of dollars to an Australian businessman, was to. "quickly co~erc1ahse ag~cu ::~ : boost· economic growth' and investment in plantation forestry ~ o tions for mining (ADB 2001: 3). 10 It slates: 'No member of Parliament may be arrested, detained. prosecuted or proceeded against in respect of consider the possibility of explonng op opinions given or votes cast by him in Parliament in lhe exercise of his office' (Constitution, Art.27, Sect.I).

46 47 'Arc of lnstabll/ty'? Melanesia In the early 20CXJs The fall of Barak Sope and the spectre of a coup In Vanuatu

Statistics for the first half of 2002 confirmed a decline in agricultural production the 'authentic' voice of grassroots Vanuatu, but Natapei guaranteed that his and exports as well as a decline in tourist arrivals, compounding the negative administration's reformist policies (which are consistent with the CRP) would economic growth in 2001 (DFAT 2002). The challenge to investor confidence not compromise Vanuatu's autonomy and would ensure that bogus deals such as which Sope's leadership style entailed obscured how deeply rooted Vanuatu's the one Sope had entered into with Ghosh will not jeopardize Vanuatu's weak economic woes were, but the vigour of national political manoeuvring distracted economy in the future. from long-term policy considerations. The spectre of a coup Sope's political rhetoric was loaded with references to the damage that the Comprehensive Reform Progranune (CRP) (the structural adjustment While events in Vanuatu's fractious political history (starting with the Santo programme sponsored by the Asian Development Bank), was doing to Vanuatu. rebellion in 1980) have often generated muted bemusement in the region, At its inception in 1997, Sope had stated that the CRP would cause suffering to Vanuatu is haunted by the spectres of a coup and/or ethnic disintegration. 11 The the people of Vanuatu (Trading Post 17 September 1997), although in office he tragic outbreak of ethnic violence which occasioned the collapse of the state in was forced to grant the project tacit support. By May 2001 Sope had distilled the Solomon Islands in 1998-2000, continuing social unrest in Papua New his sentiments further. The CRP, he stated, 'only serves the interests of Guinea, and the ethnically-motivated coups in Fiji in 1987 and 2000 have Australia and New Zealand. Over 70 foreign advisers are here under the CRP inspired observers to place Vanuatu on a shared trajectory of social and they are all paid by the Vanuatu government under the ADB loan ... it is disintegration with its Melanesian neighbours (see Reilly 2000; Maher 2000). ridiculous' (Trading Post 19 May 2001). Apprehension that Vanuatu's sovereignty might have been jeopardized by the CRP has been fuelled by The Trading Post reported that on 13 April 2001 - the night that the motion of sketchy reports of the negative impact of the structural adjustment programme in no confidence was finally debated - Sope and Internal Affairs Minister Papua New Guinea, and has been an enduring theme in political rhetoric in Bamabus Tabi (NUP, Pentecost) had approached the acting police Vanuatu since 1997. Although Natapei has vowed to adhere to the CRP in view commissioner, Arthur Caulton, requesting him to enact emergency powers in the of the poor financial position of the country, comments from senior members of light of the political turmoil and constitutional crisis, and to declare martial law his administration about the dominant role of foreign advisers in the programme until further notice (Trading Post 18 April 2001). Acting Commissioner have become more pronounced. Minister for Foreign Affairs Jean Alain Mahe Caulton refused the request because the political situation did not warrant a state (UMP) noted that Vanuatu's financial difficulties are compounded by the of emergency and no critical law and order problem was apparent. Sope's 'policy of austerity translated by the implementation of the CRP mainly advised attempt to use the police to entrench his position raised fears that a coup was by Australian consultants' (Trading Post 25 August 2001). imminent. Despite strong links between Sope's Melanesian Progressive Party deputy, Sato Kilman12 and the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF), the VMF and Despite his reaffirmation of support for the CRP, Natapei has proposed a much police remained neutral. In part, this might be traced to the circumstances shorter list of achievable reforms and has posited a much greater emphasis on surrounding the abduction of President Jean Marie Leye Lenelcau by VMF grassroots people. There is a growing criticism of the effects of Westminster officers in 1996. After striking for several weeks without success, VMF officers democracy in Vanuatu, which may affect the CRP's implementation, despite had flown the president to Malekula to meet Sope, who was then the Finance transparent domestic support for reform. The call for more home grown aumster. The VMF was at the time claiming $US980,000 in outstanding strategies and systems to be adopted has been fuelled by the perceived failures allowances. Sope promised both an amnesty for the leaders of the 'industrial of the democratic state. For example, the director of the Pacific Resources coup' and the payment of outstanding allowances, but his failure to fully Concerns Centre in Suva, Hilda Lini (a former national parliamentarian), has called on Melanesian women to renounce the 'western response to the Melanesian state of conflict' and design a new philosophy to guide the people of 11 Barak Sopc first attempted to seize power in 1988 when he was sworn in as interim prime minister by then President Ali George Sokomanu (Sopc's uncle) after Sokomanu had dissolved parliament. Sokomanu, Sopc and Vanuatu. Democracy, she stated, 'will continue to corrupt Melanesia resulting their co-conspirators were arrested on charges of mutiny and seditious conspiracy, although the charges were in the continuous uncontrolled crime, violence and poverty' (Port Vila Presse 20 overturned on the grounds of misuial and insufficient evidence. A similar unsuccessful attempt at political coup October 2001). Fuelling these sentiments, Sope attempted to position himself as d'etat was mounted in 1995 by Fr Walter Lini and Serge Vohor (see Ambrose 1996). 12 Kilman is a former commanding officer of the VMF. In the aftcnnath of the constitutional crisis in May, Kilman (MP for Malekula) broke away to form the People's Progressive Pany.

48 49 'Arc of lnstabll/ty'? Melanesia In the early 2000s The fall of Barak Sope and the spectre of a coup In Vanuatu

account for his earlier promises has undermined any residual allegiances he three years in jail on two convictions for forging bogus bank guarantees worth might have had with VMF officers. 13 $US23 million - a $US5 million bank guarantee for the Vanuatu Invesnnent Corporation Limited and a $US 18 million guarantee for Dynamic Growth Throughout the constitutional crisis, Sope attempted to position himself as the Projects Pty Ltd (Port Vila Presse 19 July 2002). Although Sope' s supporters authentic voice of grassroots niVanuatu. He claimed that he had been ousted by attempted to mount demonstrations for his release in August 2002, they could a political conspiracy implicating foreign diplomatic missions and senior rouse little public support because the chief of Ifua, Mantoi Kalsakau III, argued VP/UMP coalition ministers. His deputy, Willy Jimmy, drew attention to the against the demonstrations. The island of Ifua - Sope's core constituency - has fact that the public prosecutor, who had issued the warrant for the arrest of the shifted its allegiance behind UMP MP for Efate Rural, Stephen Kalsakau. speaker and his deputies, is married to Natapei's minister of Health, Clement Despite initial fears that it would foment civil dissent and make him a martyr, L~o (T~ading Post 19 May 2001). When Sope's supporters suggested forcibly Sope's imprisonment has been met with indifference. remstatmg the speaker and his deputies, Sope had counselled them to remain caln:1- though he implored them to 'take to the streets' to force out interfering While the government had its attention focussed on defeating Sope, the foreigners shoul~ the need arise (Trading Post 21 April 2001). In late April appointment of Mae! Apisai as Commissioner of Police provoked the most ~001 ~ope. clanned ~at the .Austr~an High Commission was directly serious challenge to the government's legitimacy since it had taken office. On 4 mterfenng m Vanuatu s domestic pohtJ.cs because Australian Federal Police August 2002 police officers acting under direction from a troika of senior (AFP) had tapped the phones of government MPs. Jn fact, the AFP were officers - Eric Pakoa, superintendent of police for the Southern Islands, the head inve~tigati~g a_ ~ons~gnment of hero~ supposedly missing in Vanuatu, following of the VMF, Lieutenant Colonel Api Jack Marikembo, and the acting a seizure m F1J1, with the cooperation of the Vanuatu Police. Commissioner commissioner of police, Holi Simon - arrested the fifteen members of the Police Bon~ stated that their presence had been kept secret to avoid any tip-offs, and Services Commission (PSC) on charges of 'seditious conspiracy' arising from was m no way related to the political turmoil. procedural irregularities in Apisai's appointment. Following Apisai's appointment, senior staff, including Marikembo (an unsuccessful applicant for In September 2001 Natapei stated his intention to investigate allegations against the position of commissioner of police) refused to carry out orders issued by Sope of contempt of court and misappropriation of public funds (Vanuatu Apisai. Arguably, Apisai was appointed to purge anti-government elements Weekly/Hebdomadaire 1 September 2001), but when police tried to carry out a from within the police and VMF, but his subordinates forcibly pre-empted their search warrant against Sope they were deterred by Sope's Ifiran supporters who censure. At the time of his arrest, the new commissioner had prepared, but not were armed with knives and axes. While Sope eventually accepted a court issued, disciplinary procedures against Marikembo and other insubordinate s.ummons on charges arising from the issue of bank guarantees, it appeared officers. likely that he would mobilize grass-roots support in the event of his political career be~ng undermined by criminal prosecution. In the early hours of 4 August 2002, a group of Vanuatu Mobile Force troops, using the operational title 'Operation Procedure 2002', arrested Apisai and the Sope h~ thrived. in the arena of ~ational politics, and broadened his support base entire PSC, including the attorney general, the secretary to the president, and the from his home island of lfua, m Port Vila harbour, to the entire Rural Efate ombudsman. Despite the support of the majority of the VMF, members of the electo~ate. Sope i ~ ac~o~ledged as an astute leader whose leadership skills police force had met Apisai's appointment with great scepticism because the saw him elected pnme numster although his party held only four seats in the 52- PSC had not scrutinized his application. Vanuatu's disciplined forces had been seat parliament. ~et ~upport in If~a ~as waned since the late 1990s, specifically without an official commander since the retirement of Commissioner Peter Bong because the negative tmpacts of his mvolvement in scandals such as the Ghosh in 2001. Jenny Ligo, commission member and president of the Vanuatu Council deal. ~ad ~een consistently and convincingly highlighted by the Natapei of Women, stated that the chair of the PSC, Michael Taun, had bowed to admimstratJ.on. In July 2002 the Supreme Court of Vanuatu sentenced Sope to political influence from within the government, but not from Minister of Internal Affairs Joe Natuman, which sparked fears of an internal struggle within the VP. (Deputy Prime Minister Serge Vohor (UMP, Santo) later took charge of the i; Key office~ have been paid settlements, but the periodic refusal of ministers to approve payments. the Jaclc o f funds to acqwt such payments, the lack of records of what is o wed, and claims by officers who are not entitled to allowances, have all delayed the settlement of the issue.

"'' 51 'Arc of lnstablllty' ? Melanesia In the early 20XJs The fall of Barak Sope and the spectre of a coup In Vanuatu

policeNMF portfolio from Natuman under direction from Prime Minister reconciliation ceremony will be meaningless; if the government concedes to Natapei, who was attending the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Fiji). their demands it would create a dangerous precedent, especially in the light of recent statements by Prime Minister Natapei that law and order would be ~n 8 August Justice Roger Coventry overturned Apisai's appointment and enforced fairly and uniformly (Trading Post 31 August 2002). The president directed. the PSC to se~e on an acting commissioner as soon as possible in has disbanded the PSC under Michael Taun and replaced it with one under the preparation for the appointment of a commissioner once the PSC had considered chair of the director general of the Office of the Prime Minister, Jean Sese. a .fres~ round ?f applicants. Coventry's decision was arguably oriented towards diffusing tens10n between the government and the troika of dissident officers. Conclusion The PSC's guidelines for selecting the police commissioner are vague, the apparent , politi.cal interference in the selection process notwithstanding. Scepticism over the long-term prospects for peace in Vanuatu is based on three Coventry s rulmg allayed government fears of further action during the interrelated issues: economic stagnation, regional trends, and fractious national Melanesian Arts Festival and Fes Napuan (18-28 August), but when the politics. For over a decade, Vanuatu's parliament has been effectively neutered g~vemment launched a procedural counter-strike fears of civil strife were again by factional infighting and constitutional crises. The fragmentation of the VP in raised. !he arrest of Holi Simon and Api Jack Marikembo on 26 August 2002 1991 undermined the only party capable of forming government in its own right. was earned out after the public prosecutor laid charges of mutiny and incitement Since then, provision of services to the islands has become negligible as the to mutiny against nineteen senior VMF and police officers arising from the relllllant parties engage in 'horse-trading' to form coalitions. This situation has initial arrest of the PSC. shifted attention from long-term policy considerations to the immediate pragmatic concerns of brokering alliances. Whereas these forces have The arrests inspired reports that Natapei had gone into hiding, while heated contributed to the breakdown of social and political order elsewhere in the exchanges erupted between 'rival groups of police' (Sydney Morning Herald 27 Pacific - notably in the Solomon Islands (Kabutaulaka 2001: 1-3) - Vanuatu has August 2002). The factionalism between the police and the VMF which remained peaceful, at least in part because of grass-roots indifference to such emerg~d during acute political instability in 1996 stirred anxiety amongst donor political spectacles. countnes that party rivalry might escalate to organized violence between factions of the disciplined forces. Increased donor support for law and order and Throughout the 1990s the focus of politicians has shifted to internal forces as the policing projects, including the establishment of the Joint Police Operations major challenges to stability. The endemic problem of regime instability in Co~n~ (JP?C), was informed by the need to break this perceived Vanuatu has undermined durable policy formation and implementation, organizational nvalry. . Although the success of these initiatives remains to be especially with relation to macro-economic policy, with visible impact on the proven, until 2002 there had been no serious breakdown in relations between the viability of Vanuatu's economy. Recent events have shifted the focus from police and the VMF. ethnic unrest as a possible source of instability to the role of the disciplined forces. The acquittal of monies owed to the police and VMF has been an The Sydney Morning Herald story elicited an angry response from government enduring problem for the Vanuatu government, and has created subsidiary spokesman Daniel Bangtor, who decried the media's inaccurate reporting and problems in its wake. moved. ~e governm~nt to lodge a complaint with the Australian High C~mm1s~1~n: ~t the t~me of the arrests Natapei was chairing a meeting of the The continued survival of the VP/UMP government has brought respite from the pnme mmtster s Special Advisory Group in the heart of Port Vila (Pon Vila political instability of the 1990s, but key obstacles remain. Its prospects were Presse ~I ~ugust . 2002). The officers were released on bail on 9 September significantly strengthened by' the conviction of Barak Sope. Despite Sope's 2002: Junior pobce officers will carry out the investigation into 'Operation preparedness to invoke a narrow vision of Vanuatu's national interest in 2001, Procedure 2002'. The police and VMF officers who were suspended by the PSC his eventual arrest and conviction did not translate into civil unrest By his have attached two caveats to any reconciliation process: they have demanded actions in this, Natapei signalled his intention to stamp out the sort of maverick that ~eir case against the PSC be reopened and that their suspension be dropped leadership which Sope embodied, and hopefully lessen the potential for the (Tradmg Post 31 August 2002). Without their imprimatur the proposed economic mismanagement and corruption which Vanuatu has witnessed over

52 53 'Arc of lnstob//Jty'? Me/ones/a In the early 20(X)s

the past decade. Whether he will pursue his convictions within his own government is yet to be seen, but considering the precarious majority his g~vemment ~olds it. is perhaps unlikely. While UMP spokespeople have reiterated therr allegiance to the Vanua'aku Pati and publicly supported its p~li~y imperatives, key government members, including the deputy prime IN SPITE OF MR SPEIGHT? numster, have been targeted for investigation (Trading Post 19 May 2001). FIJI'S ROAD TO THE GENERAL ELECTIONS The relative calm of Natapei's term in office has been shadowed by the recurrent fear that each political event will trigger greater conflict. Over the past OF 200114 decade Vanuatu has managed to resolve its crises peacefully. However, events in Solomon Islands, Fiji and Papua New Guinea have encouraged the view of social breakdown in Vanuatu as inevitable. Senior government officials have Brij V. Lal consistently distanced Vanuatu from the social and political disintegration in neighbouring Melanesian countries and criticized regional media for their exaggerated and inaccurate reporting. Arthur Caulton reiterated these points when he accepted the mantel of acting police commissioner: 'Alphabetically, George Speight's seizure of the Fiji parliament on 19 May 2000 now seems like Vanuatu comes last, at the bottom of the group but this is not a disadvantage a bad, nightmarish dream. Contrary to all provocations and incentives to since we have taken our time over the last 22 years to learn from the mistakes of violence, Fiji managed, but only just, to retrieve itself from the precipice of our .n~igh~our countries' (Trading Post 31 August 2002). The Natapei national disintegration. A year later, Speight was tried for treason, and is a~rustr~on has demonstrated its willingness to take on difficult targets and currently serving a seven-year sentence, though moves are afoot to have him possibly nsk unrest to fulfil its core political aims. Whether Caulton 's pardoned. In August 2001 the country went to the polls, returning Laisenia statements were pure rhetoric, intended to support these aims, or provide Qarase's newly-formed Soqosoqo Duavata ni Levenivanua to government with grounds for believing that Vanuatu will not become part of the so-called 'arc of thirty-two seats. The Labour Party, his main rival, won twenty-seven. The instability', remains to be seen. holding of the election was an important development, but instead of resolving the country's many deep-seated problems it compounded them. Qarase Epilogue breached the constitution under which he was elected by refusing to have Chaudhry in a multi-party cabinet. The constitution provides that any political In. national elections in May 2002, the Vanua'aku Pati was initially returned party with more than 10 per cent of seats in parliament is constitutionally with 14 seats, but attracted 3 independent candidates, giving it numerical entitled to be invited into cabinet. Under a formula provided for in the Korolevu superiority in the House over its coalition partner the UMP, which won 15 seats. Declaration, Qarase would have twelve cabinet positions and Chaudhry eight. The governing coalition thus has a majority of 32 of the 52 seats, and the VP Labour challenged the government's decision. The Fiji Court of Appeal ruled in retained the prime ministership. Labour's favour, but the matter will be settled finally by the Supreme Court in early 2003. Meanwhile, Fiji remains marooned in the shallows. Whether the Paul . Ren Tari was not re-elected to the seat of Maewo in the May 2002 people of Fiji will accept the verdict of the court, whatever it might be, remains elections: . he was defeated by Philip Boedoro (VP). He is currently seeking to be seen. compensation for the charges brought against him by the Natapei government. The early days following the hijacking of the Fijian parliament were a time of great confusion and apprehension for the people of Fiji. After fifty-seven days,

"For background to the coup sec Lal (2000a, 2000b). This paper draws from my personal archives on political developments in Fiji, which can be consulted at the Cenlre for the Contemporary Pacific at the Aus1ralian National University.

54