NO. 37 SEPTEMBER 2018 Introduction

Russia-Israel Relationship Transformed by Syria Conflict Political Interests Overshadow Social and Economic Ties Lidia Averbukh and Margarete Klein

Recent months have witnessed a warming of relations between Russia and Israel. One indicator of the trend is the frequency of high-level meetings, culminating in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s participation – as the only Western state guest – in the military parade on Red square on 9 May. Alongside existing social ties and economic cooper- ation, the prospect of a recalibration of Russian policy in Syria to take greater account of Israeli security interests has been another important driver. Nevertheless, the Russian-Israeli relationship remains constrained and volatile. For Moscow it is just one element of a multivectoral Middle East policy.

When Russia emerged from the collapsing now dominated by questions of order and USSR in December 1991 it inherited a security in the Middle East. In this new fraught relationship with Israel. Although situation the long-established twin pillars the Soviet Union had been one of the first of the relationship – social ties and shared countries to recognise Israel in 1948, rela- economic interests – have become second- tions cooled rapidly in the shadow of the ary, and susceptible to instability in the Cold War. While the new state of Israel event of political crisis. leaned heavily towards the United States, Moscow expanded relations with its Arab neighbours. The Kremlin broke diplomatic Primacy of realpolitik ties entirely after the Six-Day War in 1967; they were only restored in October 1991, Russia and Israel share important aspects and subsequently continued by the Russian in their strategic cultures. Both pursue a Federation. Since then the two sides have decidedly interest-led realpolitik. Free of successively deepened their relationship on value-driven concerns, they have no dif- the societal, economic and political levels. ficulty pursuing pragmatic selective co- Russia’s military intervention in the Syria operation where shared interests exist, even conflict in September 2015 marked a new if normative differences persist. Both states phase in Russian-Israeli relations: They are exhibit a siege mentality, and both are

guided by the primacy of security and a take significant – although not equal – primarily military understanding of power. account of Israeli standpoints. While Russia These shared basic tenets mean that each continues to criticise Israel’s actions in Gaza side can accept the other’s core interests. and the West Bank, its tone has softened. Where these do not clash with their own Above all, Moscow no longer clearly takes security needs, Russia and Israel largely the side of the Palestinian leadership. Even refrain from criticising the other’s actions, if individual voices in Russia call for a or at least desist from backing criticism revival of the traditional partnership with with actions. Arab nations, President Vladimir Putin in The shared perception of a threat of particular wishes to avoid side-taking that Islamist terrorism since the beginning of would risk the existing cordial relations the century has promoted a Russian-Israeli with the region’s strongest military power. rapprochement. During the Second Intifada Even more so since the Russian interven- (2000–2005) then Israeli Prime Minister tion in the Syria conflict in September Ariel Sharon not only held back from criti- 2015. Instead the Russian leadership is cising human rights violations by Russian seeking to use its established ties with the forces in the Second Chechen War (1999– Palestinians and improving relations with 2009); in fact he backed the Russian line Israel to position itself as a mediator. That that Chechen separatism was tantamount is a course compatible with the pragmatic, to terrorism and drew parallels to the non-ideological realpolitik Moscow is pur- actions of the Palestinians. Israel’s volatile suing across the Middle East. security situation also explains why Benja- min Netanyahu’s government has ex- pressed no value-based criticism of the Social ties Russian military intervention in Syria. Instead Netanyahu has repeatedly referred When Putin visited Israel in 2005 (as the to the benefits of Russian action against first Russian president to do so) he empha- Islamist terrorism there. In view of the sised the historic and cultural ties between massive US and EU condemnation of Rus- the two nations. Indeed, the development sian over Chechnya and Syria, Israel’s of societal aspects since the resumption of stance is a political gain for Moscow, relations has played a large part in bringing helping to uphold the Kremlin’s narrative Russia and Israel closer together. of leading the fight against international Ever since he assumed office, Putin has terrorism. At the same time Moscow can presented himself as the protector of the exploit its understanding with Israel – as Jewish minority in Russia and in Europe as a Western ally – internally, to brush aside a whole. In so doing, he alludes in particu- the impression that Russia has been iso- lar to the Soviet Union’s struggle against lated by the entire Western community. fascism – as demonstrated by his visits to Avoiding isolation by the West is especially Holocaust memorials and meetings with important for Moscow during the crisis over Russian-Jewish veterans of the Second World Ukraine. Ultimately, Israel declined to par- War. The world’s largest Jewish Museum ticipate in sanctions imposed by the EU and opened in Moscow in 2012. In the course the United States in response to the annexa- of the so-called migration crisis Putin called tion of Crimea and the destabilisation of on Jews living in Western Europe to emi- Donbas. grate to Russia to escape the growing anti- For the sake of Russian coordination over Semitism. The 2016 Russian-Israeli decla- vital security questions, the Israeli leader- ration for the twenty-fifth anniversary of ship is prepared to implicitly recognise core the establishment of diplomatic relations Russian interests in Russia’s post-Soviet also acknowledged the important role neighbourhood. Conversely, since about the played by the Jewish population in Russian turn of the century Moscow has tended to history and culture.

SWP Comment 37 September 2018

2 Outside the political elites, a growth in to simply as “the Russians”. These individu- positive attitudes towards Israel can also als were politically and culturally socialised be observed in Russian society. Despite pro- in the USSR or the new Russia. They re- nounced everyday anti-Semitism, a Levada main, despite being comparatively highly survey in 2017 found that 57 percent of qualified, largely segregated from the rest Russians had a positive or very positive of the Israeli population in geographical as attitude towards Israel; for the European well as socio-economic terms. This is the Union and the United States the figures group Putin is talking about when he refers were 39 and 37 percent. Whereas anti- to “our compatriots” with “our mentality”. Semitism in European societies is often It is distinct from another set of recent closely bound up with anti-Israel stances, immigrants who moved to Israel after the this is not true of Russia, and the boycott annexation of Crimea for political or eco- movement (BDS), which is gaining influ- nomic reasons. For many – especially the ence in the Western world, is a non-issue. young and well-educated – Israel is merely One reason is the sympathy for Israel as a staging post en route to another Western a militarily and economically highly destination. Others, with an eye to Western advanced nation – a picture presented by sanctions and political uncertainty, seek media and the political leadership. Another dual citizenship. An Israeli passport offers is the role played by growing private con- visa-free entry to 105 states (compared to tacts and informal exchange between the 79 with a Russian passport) and years of tax two societies. Israel has become a popular breaks following naturalisation. Israel’s destination for Russian holidaymakers economic benefit from this type of immi- and medical tourists. Visa-free travel, the gration explains why it waives the usual prevalence of the Russian language and qualification periods and residency require- the decline in travel to traditional holiday ments in certain cases, such as the oligarch centres in Turkey and Egypt are among Roman Abramovich. the reasons why 331,500 Russian citizens In view of the “compatriots” policy visited Israel in 2017; a 26 percent increase eagerly pursued by the Kremlin, fears have compared to 2016. Visits by Russian Ortho- been expressed in Israeli media that Mos- dox pilgrims have also increased since cow could use Israel’s Russian-speaking 2008, when Sergei’s Courtyard – as part population for its own political ends. Even of the Russian Compound in Jerusalem – if Russia has had some successes with this was returned to the Moscow Patriarch. strategy in certain post-Soviet states, the Social and cultural ties between Russia prospects of its replication in Israel are and Israel have also been boosted by Jewish remote. Russian-speaking Israelis represent emigration to Israel. Aggregated migration 15 percent of the Israeli electorate, and from Tsarist Russia, the USSR and its suc- have the potential to determine the fate cessor states accounts for 15 percent of of 18 of the 120 Knesset seats (which can Israel’s population – and 25 percent of its easily be decisive in a coalition system). Jewish population. So it should be no sur- They tend to vote for Israel our Home, prise if this immigration has shaped Israel the clientele party of the Russian speaking both culturally and politically. The family immigrants. The group, however, had roots of most Israeli prime ministers to date developed a strong Israeli identity. Also lie within the territory of the former Rus- their diverse background mitigate against sian Empire. the possibility of being used by Moscow. The consolidation of social ties between Although their roots in the former Soviet Russia and Israel in recent decades is attrib- Union define the space they occupy within utable in particular to the immigration of Israeli society, they see themselves first as approximately one million Jews who moved Israeli citizens. One relevant piece of evi- to Israel from the collapsing Soviet Union dence is the low rate of participation in in the 1990s – and are commonly referred Russian elections by the 50,000 Israelis who

SWP Comment 37 September 2018

3 also possess a Russian passport. Only 8 per- example with a trade agreement (1994) and cent of them voted in the Russian presiden- an agreement on cooperation in science tial election in March 2018. and technology (1994). In the past decade The attitude of Russian-speaking Israelis the two states have increased their coopera- towards the Russian leadership is also very tion in specific sectors, as reflected in agree- ambivalent. This is partly attributable to ments on space research (2011), nuclear the experience of the Jewish minority in technology (2013) and nano-technology the Soviet Union – which was for decades (2016). Since 2016 negotiations have also permitted neither to practice their religion been under way on a free trade agreement nor to emigrate. Another relevant aspect is between the Eurasian Economic Union – that many of these individuals originate not the Russian-led economic integration proj- from Russia itself, but from the territory of ect with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia what is now Ukraine and other states linked and Belarus – and Israel. to the former USSR. Russia’s military Trade has grown enormously since the actions in 2008 in Georgia and since 2014 restoration of relations, reaching a volume in Ukraine have further widened the con- of $2.5 billion in 2017 – with Israel over- tradictions within this group. Many immi- taking Iran ($1.7 billion); but Israel’s share grants from the territory of the former of Russia’s foreign trade is still just 0.4 per- Soviet Union do use Russian-language cent – and far behind Russia’s most im- media as a source of information, but in portant Middle Eastern partner Turkey Israel these represent a broader political ($20.9 billion). spectrum. In other words, merely using While Russia largely exports resources Russian-language media is not automatically to Israel (40 percent oil, 32 percent precious an indicator of openness to Kremlin influ- metals), its main imports are agricultural ence. products (36 percent), machines (28 percent) These deep societal connections have and chemicals (22 percent). The figures helped the Russian and Israeli leaderships indicate that Israel has been profiting in- to advance their – primarily politically directly from Russian counter-sanctions motivated – rapprochement process. But on European agricultural products. they are not the main driver of the relation- The main potential for Russian-Israeli ship. The connections are stronger on the trade relations achieving strategic signifi- Israeli side, but their political effect is lim- cance lies in energy and high-tech. Since ited by ambivalences within the group of the discovery of the Leviathan gas field off Russian-speaking Israelis. On the Russian the Israeli coast in 2010, Russian firms have side in turn, societal factors generally play been seeking to participate in the explora- no role in the formulation of foreign policy. tion rights. Russia wants to secure a share Instead, references to shared history and of the Israeli energy market and influence culture by Russia’s leadership serve its rep- the EU’s energy diversification efforts in the resentation as a friend of Israel. Seen from eastern Mediterranean. that perspective, the social ties between Russia eyes Israel as a potential moderni- Russia and Israel would not be strong sation partner in the field of high-tech. Co- enough to soften a crisis in political rela- operation agreements have been established tions. between Israeli firms and research insti- tutes and the Russian state nano-technology institute Rosnano (2012) and the Russian Economic interests innovation centre Skolkovo (2016). Israel’s start-up scene makes it an attractive partner The resumption of diplomatic relations for Russian economic modernisation, espe- between Russia and Israel laid the founda- cially in view of the impact of sanctions tions for economic cooperation. At first the on exchange with other Western countries. question was simply to get trade started, for But for cooperation to take place the

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4 private sector in Russia would have to get De-conflicting on board the currently state-driven projects. The dearth of private sector commitment Russia’s intervention in Syria created a to date is reflected in low levels of direct need on both sides to avoid unintentional investment between the two states: in 2017 military clashes by establishing functioning just $570 million in Israel and $480 million communication channels and dependable in Russia. arrangements. To this end the two armed At the same time Russia and Israel are forces set up a de-conflicting mechanism in rivals in the global arms markets. Moscow autumn 2015. It is embedded in a format traditionally supplies Israel’s Arab neigh- of frequent high-level discussions between bours and Iran. Israel has in recent years the Russian president and the Israeli prime exported increasing amounts of arms and minister, as well as between the defence matériel to post-Soviet states, especially ministers and intelligence service chiefs. Azerbaijan. Technological cooperation The mechanism permitted Israel to conduct between the Russian and Israeli defence air strikes on Hezbollah positions and con- sectors has been very limited to date: the voys without interference by Russian air production of Israeli drones for the Russian defence. The Israeli leadership’s assurance armed forces was terminated in the course that it was interested only in the threat of the Ukraine crisis. This demonstrates the from pro-Iranian forces – and not in top- narrow limits that still apply to cooperation pling Assad – was crucial for Moscow’s in the sensitive field of security, especially consent to the arrangement. Unlike the in light of Israel’s close and deep security Russian-Turkish relationship, which was partnership with the United States. plunged into deep crisis by the shooting Even if the two states have expanded down of a Russian warplane in November their bilateral trade, the economic pillar 2015, Russian-Israeli relations long re- of the relationship is without strategic mained unproblematic even as both oper- significance. Development potential does ated militarily in Syria. But as the conflict exist within several branches, and if fully progressed the de-conflicting mechanism utilised could make Israel a partner for came under pressure. Israel’s threat per- Russia’s modernisation. But such a scenario ception and strategy changed after Assad is hindered by obstacles on the Russian and his allies recaptured large parts of side: weakness of innovation, lack of legal Syria. Netanyahu’s government is now con- certainty, strong dependency on the state. cerned that Tehran is establishing a perma- For its part, Israel has security concerns, nent military presence in Syria, especially above all in the energy and defence sectors. along the border to Israel. In order to pre- vent this, Israel seems to have shifted from a policy of containing pro-Iranian forces The Syria conflict as stress test through isolated air strikes to one of driving its forces out of Syria by military means, Military intervention in Syria in September and greatly expanded its air strikes on Syrian 2015 opened a new phase in Russia’s Middle territory from February 2018. In the process East policy in general and Moscow’s rela- Israeli also targeted positions of significance tions with Israel in particular. Relations for Russia’s military operation: In February with Israel now require greater coordina- 2018, following a drone attack attributed to tion and are characterised by greater fra- pro-Iranian forces and the downing of an gility. The conflict dynamic in Syria and the Israeli warplane by the Syrian air force, the associated questions of regional order and Israeli air force struck a base in Syria (T4), security represent a stress test for the Rus- where Russian military advisors were also sian-Israeli relationship. present. This plunged the hitherto informal arrangement with Russia into crisis. The Russian military leadership sharply criti-

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5 cised Israel’s actions, and floated the idea The Iran factor of responding by supplying the S-300 anti- aircraft system to the Syrian armed forces. Russia’s tacit acceptance of Israeli air strikes That would have meant Russia abandoning in Syria and its change in rhetoric towards its long-standing line of observing vital the Iranian military presence reflect a con- Israeli interests in its arms supplies to Syria. cern that Washington might abandon the It took a face-to-face meeting between restraint it has shown if the Israeli-Iranian Putin and Netanyahu in May 2018 in Mos- conflict were to escalate in Syria. A serious cow to defuse the crisis. Russia not only US military intervention could gravely withdrew its threat to supply Syria with endanger the military and political gains S-300 batteries; even more importantly Mos- Russia has achieved to date. cow now tolerates Israel’s tougher strategy The outward convergence with Israel also against pro-Iranian forces in Syria. Putin reflects a growing rivalry between Russia and Netanyahu appear to have agreed that and Iran in Syria. The more Assad regains Moscow will accept Israeli air strikes against his grip on power, the more pressing the pro-Iranian combatants not only along question of Syria’s future political and eco- Syria’s southern border but also in its inte- nomic order. Moscow and Tehran are set rior. So the Kremlin refrained from criti- under this scenario to compete over eco- cising Israeli air strikes on Syrian territory nomic advantage and political influence. the day after Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow, At the same time the two countries remain which were the largest since 1973. And in militarily dependent on one another in return Israel raised no objections to the Syria. The Russian military intervention is Syrian army’s military offensive with Rus- largely restricted to its air force with limited sian air support in the southern deescala- participation by ground forces (special tion zone. Putin also expressed understand- forces, military police (in particular from ing for Israeli’s demand for the withdrawal Chechnya) and mercenaries), any stabilisa- of Iranian forces from Syria. Whereas in tion of Assad’s rule will require the assis- November 2017 Foreign Minister Sergei tance of the pro-Iranian forces present in Lavrov was still describing the presence of Syria. The state of the Syrian army offers Iranian fighters in Syria as legitimate, at a little grounds to believe that it could soon meeting with Assad on 17 May 2018 Putin take over the military tasks hitherto under- called for the withdrawal of all foreign taken by pro-Iranian forces. A meaningful forces from Syria after “the launch of an weakening of the groups supported by Teh- active phase of a political process” – with ran would therefore automatically demand the exception of Russia which is there at greater military engagement by Russia – the invitation of the Syrian regime. Both which President Putin would be keen to developments suggest a partial recalibra- avoid for domestic political reasons. tion of Russia’s policy on Syria, with greater Moscow has no immediate interest in willingness to take account of Israeli secu- massively weakening Iran in Syria, nor rity interests. This reflects the priority would it be in any position to do so. How- placed by the Russian leadership on safe- ever Russia appears willing to exert a mod- guarding its own armed forces in Syria: In erating influence on Tehran and Hezbollah the event of an escalation Israel would be and establish a buffer zone in southern capable of significantly complicating the Syria, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov military situation for Russia. Moscow also declaring in July 2018 that only the Syrian expects Israel’s cooperation when it comes army should be operating in regions border- to shaping a new Syrian political order. ing Israel and Jordan. According to media reports Lavrov offered Israel support for a withdrawal of Iranian and pro-Iranian forces to at least one hundred kilometres from the Israeli border. It is unclear whether

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6 Moscow could guarantee such a buffer of a buffer zone fails and Israel decides to zone, and anyway Israel had rejected the strike massively at pro-Iranian forces across proposal as inadequate. It should be noted Syria – potentially accompanied by a sig- that Russia does not share Israel’s interest nificant US military engagement – the in driving Tehran completely out of Syria Russian-Israeli relationship could quickly and massively weakening Iranian influence cool. Such a development would threaten in the Middle East as a whole. Moscow’s Russian’s core interest in the region: to pre- return to the region is predicated above serve the military and political successes all on its ability to maintain good relations achieved to date in Syria and in the Middle with all parties, especially those that are East more broadly. hostile to one another. Being courted by all Options for Germany and the EU exist but © Stiftung Wissenschaft sides is what could potentially make Russia are limited. On the one hand, they do share und Politik, 2018 the region’s most important “go-to-power”. interests with Russia. Both sides would like All rights reserved For that to occur it requires leverage in all to avoid a military escalation on the Israeli- This Comment reflects directions. It is this realpolitik that would Iranian front. Russia is currently the actor the authors’ views. deter Moscow from siding firmly with Israel. best able to avert escalation, on account of its military presence on the ground and its The online version of established communication channels both this publication contains Selective cooperation with to the Israeli leadership and to Hezbollah functioning links to other clear limits and Tehran. On the other hand, in view of SWP texts and other relevant sources. the damage to overall trust caused by the Russia’s rapprochement with Israel is still crisis over Ukraine and diverging interests SWP Comments are subject far from a strategic partnership based on in relation to the future order for Syria, to internal peer review, fact- shared goals and mutual trust. The relation- Germany and the EU face serious obstacles checking and copy-editing. ship between the two countries remain in achieving any coordinated action with For further information on our quality control pro- highly pragmatic, interest-driven and marked Russia. Besides, Germany and the EU would cedures, please visit the SWP by selective cooperation. The relationship is not be Russia’s preferred key partner. As website: https://www.swp- currently driven by the Syria conflict and revealed at the Helsinki summit between berlin.org/en/about-swp/ other developments in the Middle East, Putin and Trump in July 2018, Moscow quality-management-for- while specific social and economic ties are would prefer to use its special position in swp-publications/ less decisive. In the event of a security con- Syria and the Middle East and its direct line SWP flict – for example over Syria or Iran – to Israel for a possible rapprochement with Stiftung Wissenschaft und Russia and Israel might not be able to pre- the Trump administration. Politik vent a deterioration of ties. German Institute for The limits of Russian overtures to Israel International and are clearly visible. They lie in the unpredict- Security Affairs able conflict dynamic in Syria and the Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 diverging interests concerning the roles of 10719 Berlin Iran and the United States in the region. If Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Moscow succeeds in satisfying Israeli secu- Fax +49 30 880 07-100 rity needs by keeping pro-Iranian forces out www.swp-berlin.org of southern Syria this would foster trust on [email protected] the Israeli side. At the same time it would ISSN 1861-1761 be conceivable for that scenario to lead to a – very limited – improvement in the Translation by Meredith Dale Russian-American relationship. If the idea (English version of SWP-Aktuell 45/2018) Lidia Averbukh is Research Associate for the project »Israel and its regional and global conflicts: Domestic developments, security issues and foreign affairs«. The project is located within SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division and is funded by the German Foreign Office. Dr. Margarete Klein is Deputy Head of the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division.

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