Issue 33, January 2012

FIELD BULLETIN 2012: Potential risks to peace and development from the field In addition to Weekly Field Bulletins, the RCHCO political issues and to ever-shifting inter- and intra- produces monthly updates that consider emerging party political dynamics. issues impacting on peace and development in At the time of writing this Field Bulletin, two new . These updates draw upon information issues have arisen that could bring additional gathered through a broad field network of complexity to the context. The abolition of the ‘all development, human rights, humanitarian, local party mechanisms’ (which formed the means for government, security, media and civil society actors political consultation in local governance in lieu of by the RCHCO’s Field Coordination Offices.1 Though elected local bodies) may not have any immediate examining many dynamics linked to the effect on ongoing services; however, if no implementation of the Comprehensive Peace alternative mechanisms are introduced, local Agreement (CPA), these updates are not about political party representatives may become ‘tracking the peace process’ as such. Instead, they obstructive in the formulation and implementation are an attempt to ensure that development of next year’s district development plans. partners can keep abreast of the changing context Additionally, the 12 January Cabinet decision to and dynamics in Nepal’s current transition that ‘legalise’ the decisions of the Maoist “people’s present potential risks to the wider peace and government” during the armed conflict (including development landscape from a field perspective. the transfer of seized land) introduced significant Based on this ongoing analysis, this Field Bulletin contention between parties just as they are attempts to look ahead and identify some of the attempting to reach consensus on core CPA key risks from the field to the wider peace and implementation issues. development landscape for 2012. Outside of the immediate political Overview dynamics surrounding implementation of the CPA, Despite the Seven-Point Agreement signed between this Field Bulletin identifies and explores two issues the major parties on 1 November 20112, two critical from the field that present an immediate potential sticking points remain in the immediate CPA risk to the peace and development landscape in the implementation process. Firstly, the negotiations coming six months: • for drafting and approving a new constitution are returning land seized during the conflict; and principally hung-up on agreement over the form of • identity politics and the federalist discourse. government and the details of federal restructuring. This Field Bulletin also identifies and explores three Major breakthroughs will need to be achieved in additional issues from the field that present a the coming weeks in order to meet the 28 May moderate risk to peace and development over the deadline, which was re-enforced by a Supreme next 18 months: Court ruling. Secondly, the parties are close but • protests and disruption by ‘verified minors and have not come to final agreement on the late recruits’; integration, voluntary retirement and • disruption and contention over voter rehabilitation of verified Maoist army personnel. registration and citizenship; and Both issues involve complex negotiations between • contention over the release of the detailed the parties, but are also highly inter-linked to one census results. another, to the resolution of other ‘residual’ This Field Bulletin analyses these five risks from the field, also suggesting ‘potential triggers’ that could 1 The RCHCO Field Coordination Offices are located in Dadeldhura, escalate crisis linked to these dynamics as well as , Bharatpur and . 2 The Seven Point Agreement was signed by the Unified Communist ‘potential mitigating factors’ that could de-escalate Party of Nepal (Marxist), Nepali Congress, Communist of Party of Nepal crisis. (Unified Marxist Leninist) and United Democratic Madhesi Front.

Page 1 of 8 2012: Potential risks to peace and development from the field Returning land seized during the Secondly, although land return can only be driven conflict forward by agreements at the highest political levels, land ownership at the local level is often Re-iterating the provisions of the CPA3, the Seven- contested and complicated by a mix of local politics, Point Agreement stated that all conflict-era seized interests and informal arrangements. The 5 land would be returned to rightful owners by 23 destruction of cadastral maps and land records November 2011. Despite the Agreement, during the conflict is a major complicating factor government instructions and a UCPN-M circular, that provokes disputes over landownership and 6 this commitment was not met.4 As of mid-January, land rights. There will be difficulty in arriving at only two completed land returns have been uniform solutions and the process will likely require reported; two senior Nepali Congress (NC) leaders, case-by-case mediation. Binaya Dhoj Chand and Kali Bahadur Sahakari, were Thirdly, there is an intrinsic link between land able to reclaim some of the land they lost to the return and wider expectations surrounding land UCPN-M during the conflict. A seized parcel of land reform as agreed in the CPA.7 Landlessness and announced as returned in during insecurity of tenure are major causes of rural November is, in fact, still occupied (see below). A poverty, social injustice, food insecurity and local few further and emblematic ‘political’ land return conflict in Nepal, as well as being linked to issues of cases might be resolved in the coming months. social status, social inclusion, employment creation Chief District Officers (CDOs) have been instructed and inclusive growth. Land is a highly emotive issue to form land-return committees and many have and of central importance as agriculture remains a begun dialogue with political parties. However, livelihood mainstay for many, particularly in rural sources in District Administration Offices (DAOs) in areas. Many other groups and peoples, such as some Tarai districts revealed that they were some freed Kamaiyas, also have claims to land and instructed to only collect applications of land have received ‘captured’ land. It will be difficult to return. In Banke, the DAO has undertaken an separate the return of seized property from the initiative to update the status of seized land in the expectations surrounding wider land reform. district. Lastly, the return of seized land under the terms of Though it is a critical component of the CPA and the Seven-Point Agreement is significantly opposed necessary for moving CPA implementation forward, by the Baidya-faction of UCPN-M. There have been the return of land seized during the conflict could numerous public statements since the Agreement significantly raise local tensions and even instigate by local Baidya-faction cadres that they will ‘defend’ local conflict. In particular, forceful evictions have the land occupiers unless comprehensive the potential to escalate into violence. Returning compensation or settlement options are extended the remaining areas of seized land will be a complex to evicted occupiers.8 The Baidya-faction organized and potential volatile process for a number of torch rallies against the Agreement in Kanchanpur reasons. Firstly, much of the land is no longer in the and Kailali districts during November. The All Nepal direct possession and control of the UCPN-M; in Peasants’ Association Revolutionary (ANPA-R) held many cases, it has been ‘re-distributed’ to the press conferences in Bharatpur and Nepalgunj in ‘landless’,‘tillers’ and ‘conflict victims’ particularly the same month stating their opposition to the affiliated with the UCPN-M or allegedly sold to third process and in Banke, Bardiya and Dang they are parties. It may be outside of the UCPN-M’s power to return all seized land.

5 A cadastral map is a map that shows the boundaries and ownership of 3 Signatories to the CPA agreed to “keep records and return land parcels. immediately the government, public and private buildings, land and 6 For example, land disputes were the subject of 40 percent of court other property seized, locked up or forbidden for use during the armed cases in Nepal in 2007 (Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Year conflict” (Article 5.1.8), and the return of property also took centre Book of Nepal 2007, Kathmandu, 2008). stage in the nine-point agreement of November 2008 between the 7 Signatories to the CPA agreed to the formulation of a land reform Nepali Congress and the UCPN-M. policy to end ‘feudalistic landownership practice’ (Article 3.7). 4 It is important to note that, as of 2010, much of that land had 8 In an interview with media in September, the UCPN-M apparently already been returned – see: “Land Commitments in Nepal’s leader noted that cadres are prepared to engage in violent resistance if Peace Process: What Has Been Achieved to Date”, Carter Center (June the government forces them to vacate seized land without providing 2010). For further reference on seized land and returns, see UN RCHCO alternative opportunities. The Bardiya District UCPN-M leader stated in field Bulletins: Issue 26-Land Seizure in three Mid Western Tarai the media that, “We would not accept the Prime Minister’s Districts (Nov 2011) and Issue 20-Status of land seizures in Kailali (Sep announcement because the Maoist party does not control any land, it is 2011) (both available at: http://www.un.org.np/resources/field- the peasants who holds it. We are ready to support and protect the bulletins). peasants if government forces them to return their land.”

Page 2 of 8 2012: Potential risks to peace and development from the field reportedly seeking support for their cause amongst likely and future clashes cannot be ruled out. people living on seized land. Occupiers of seized land have reportedly formed ‘retaliation committees’ in some areas of Kailali In an attempt to kick-start the land return process, District to mount opposition against forced the UCPN-M Chairman and senior NC and UML evictions. In some parts of Western and Central leaders visited Bardiya on 17 November. During the regions, groups of Sukumbasi who seized land visit, the Chairman instructed his cadres to return during the conflict have united with Baidya-faction all seized land and requested that a “Land Return supporters and threatened not to return land unless Facilitation Task Force” be formed in Bardiya. wider land reform is put in place. Notably, the visit was accompanied by minor clashes between local UCPN-M establishment and Progress on land return may also be severely Baidya-faction cadres, leaving one person injured. complicated by the 12 January Cabinet decision to As coordinator, the CDO formed the Task Force with ‘legalise’ all decisions made by the Maoist “people’s UCPN-M, NC and UML members and on 25 government” during the armed conflict, including November announced the return of a particular the transfer and sale of seized land. There have piece of land. However, cadres affiliated to the been some statements by the UCPN-M and the Baidya-faction re-occupied the land later the same Prime Minister to suggest that this decision will be night.9 There is a general perception amongst local withdrawn; however, after a number of meetings actors that the issue could further escalate into between the parties to resolve contention on the open conflict (as evidenced by the intra-UCPN-M issues, the situation remains inconclusive. At the cadre clashes on 17 November). On 8 December, time of writing, it is difficult to assess what impact the Bardiya ‘Peasants Struggle Committee’ this dynamic will have on land return. If the decision (affiliated to the Baidya-faction) also staged a is withdrawn, the scenario described above remains demonstration against the return process. relevant. However, if the Cabinet decision stands, grievances will remain outstanding and the There are reports of new land captures (and potential for local conflict remains a reality as the ‘recaptures’) in different areas of Nepal. In decision will not resolve the claims of those whose , cadres of the UCPN-M land was seized. It will also likely create severe establishment-faction are alleged to have political tensions between Government and recaptured land in Kawasoti VDC protesting that the opposition parties. landowner sold it without providing alternative solutions to the farmers on the land. Baidya-faction Potential crisis triggers: leaders announced that they recaptured land in  Land return, driven by central political and CPA Baglung, Bara and Dhanusa districts during implementation demands, proceeds on an ad December. On 18 December the All Nepal Peasants hoc basis and through forced evictions Association-Revolutionary (ANPA-R) organized a  The Cabinet decision to legalise Maoist press conference in and announced “people’s government” decisions during the that the historical Galkot Durbar and around 80 armed conflict (including land transfers) is ropani of land in the district had been recaptured. maintained by government, but contested by Overall, districts that could present the most opposition parties problems include: Kailali, Bardiya, Dang, Chitwan,  Clashes occur at disputed land sites, such as Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, Sankhuwasabha, Dhankuta, between ‘tillers’ and security forces or between Siraha, Morang and Ilam. cadres of opposing UCPN-M factions The complexity of land return necessitates that it is Potential mitigating factors: addressed at many levels by multiple stakeholders. Any future process will need to put in place  Political consensus (both between parties and comprehensive responses and transparent within the UCPN-M) on the establishment of a mechanisms to ensure it is effective and land return process with agreed mechanisms accountable. It could also serve as the means for for: jump-starting the wider process of land reform o a neutral and independent inventory of envisioned in the CPA. However, if the current seized property; process is pushed forward, increased tensions seem o transparent complaints-handling, including means for community-based dispute resolution that are sensitive to social 9 As of mid-January, land that was announced as returned by the inclusion and gender); Bardiya Task Force in November 2011 remained occupied.

Page 3 of 8 2012: Potential risks to peace and development from the field o monitoring of the returns process; and While some are directly opposed to the federalist o development and implementation of a agenda and others strongly support some form of strategy for assisting all affected persons, federalism or decentralization, all are opposed to linked to eventual wider polices for land restructuring along identity lines as demanded by reform and reparations Janajati groups.  Strengthened public security to ensure that Significant fault lines also exist between Janajati property owners feel secure enough to return to and other identity groups. Many have opposing their land objectives and overlapping geographic claims, such  Provision of international experience on the 12 13 as those between the Tharu , Madheshi, Limbu design and implementation of property returns and Khambuwan14 communities. The main areas of processes potential contestation are in the East (in Jhapa,  Initial actions commence to begin addressing Sunsari and Morang districts, which are claimed by the wider and structural issues of land reform. both Madheshis and Limbus, as well being claimed Identity politics and the federalist by some Tharu activists in the greatest extent of a discourse Tharuhat state), Mid-West (between competing Tharu and Madheshi claims) and in the Far West The discourse surrounding the terms of Nepal’s (between competing Tharu and Madheshi claims). federal state restructuring is highly contested. Dialogue is ongoing amongst these groups in Although a reinvigorated constitutional process is attempts to form ‘cross-identity’ alliances, but little welcomed for progress on CPA implementation, it is concrete progress has yet been achieved. The likely to trigger significant tensions across the capacity and leverage of many Janajati and identity country and risks potentially escalating localized communities to achieve their competing objectives conflicts in many areas. are also undermined by frequent internal leadership disputes and intra-group fragmentation. Some groups are vehemently opposed to any form of federalism. However, the most significant fault Underlying much of the tension over the federalist line is between the different groups and discourse and identity demands is a fundamental communities that support federalism—many have struggle about status and access to resources. The fundamentally opposed objectives about the shape terms of federalist restructuring are contested of and terms for any eventual federal restructuring because the process poses both a threat and an of Nepal. Some of these argue that federalism opportunity to the social, economic, political and should be based upon geographic or other cultural status of many communities and groups; ‘scientific’ criteria, while others demand that many groups are taking actions to maintain their federalism is based on ethnicity or other identity- existing status and access to resources, while many based criteria. For instance, a number of Far are seeking to increase their status and maximize Western unity activist groups have emerged in 2011 access to new resources. 10 demanding a united Far Western Province. This demand is in direct opposition to demands by Tharu opposed to identity-based federalism) and the Hindu Suraska Bahnini is demanding the re-instatement of Nepal as a Hindu nation. and Madheshi communities that the Tarai districts 12 Tharu activist groups include the Tharuhat Autonomous State of Kailali and Kanchanpur become part of their own Council, Tharuhat Tarai Party Nepal and the Tharuhat Joint Struggle proposed identity-based provinces. In the Mid- Committee. All demand an autonomous Tharu state that would include Kanchanpur and Kailali districts, putting them in opposition with claims West, there is significant opposition to current for a united Far Western Province and those for ‘Madhesh’ provinces. propositions that the region will be divided across Other Tharu activist organizations to note are the Tharu Welfare three provinces, including the break-up of the Society, Tharu Indigenous NGO Federation, Tharu-Dalit-Muslim Students Association and Tharu Barghar Mahasangh. Karnali zone into different provinces. More 13 Key Limbu groups include the Limbuwan Prantiya Parishad, Federal generally across all of Nepal, a number of Brahmin Limbuwan State Council (Lingden), Federal Limbuwan State Council and activist groups have also emerged.11 (Palangba) and Limbuwan Volunteers (linked to the FLSC). These groups have the most organisational capacity in Ilam, Panchthar, Jhapa, Sunsari, and Taplejung districts. Limbus claim all of the districts east of the Arun River, overlapping with the geographic claims of Madheshi, 10 These include the: Far West Awareness Forum, Far West Uplift Tharu, Dhimal, Koch and others. Society, Far West Unity Society and the Far West Parivesh. All demand 14 Key Khambuwan groups include the Khambuwan State Council improved development for the region and a unified Province. They have (affiliated with the Federal Democratic National Party), Khambuwan been the most active of activist groups since May 2011, calling National Party and Khambuwan Mukti Morcha-United (which has conferences, issuing manifestos and expanding local networks in the claimed responsibility for a number of bombs in and Damak region. districts). Their demands for a separate Khambuwan state (including 11 The Khas Chhetri Ekata Samaj and Chhetri Samaj Nepal are part of eastern hills and Tarai and parts of central hills and Tarai) demanding Chhetri development and rights (all three groups are overlap with Madheshi and Limbu claims.

Page 4 of 8 2012: Potential risks to peace and development from the field While there was a significant surge of protests and Limbuwan groups increased their political activity disruptive activities by activist groups surrounding across the East. At a public meeting in Biratnagar on the 28 May 2011 extension of the constitution 26 November, Federal Limbuwan State Council deadline, this declined in the months leading up to (FLSC) Lingden-faction declared that they will November (except for Far Western unity groups, launch street protests to put pressure on which have increased their organizational Constituent Assembly (CA) members and the main development and advocacy). However, this lull can political parties to ensure the formation of a be largely attributed to that fact that the Limbuwan province consisting of the nine districts constitution remained unresolved and there was no east of the Arun River. Though the organizers had locus around which protests could coalesce. The announced that 100,000 people would be attending one major period of risk came in the wake of former the meeting, independent observers estimated the Defence Minister Sarat Singh Bhandari’s statement number of participants to be 5-7,000. Fearing a in September regarding possible secession of the clash between Madheshis and Limbuwan groups, a Madhesh/Tarai, which generated strong Madheshi- large number of police was deployed. Another FLSC Pahadi tensions and local protests in the Tarai that faction (Sanjuhang) organized a meeting in were accentuated by inter- and intra-party political Birtamod and announced that they too will prepare dynamics. The use of rhetoric, particularly that re- for street protests if demands for a Limbuwan enforcing Madheshi-Pahadi fault lines, by political province are not considered by the Commission; it actors and the media and the threat of street also organized a bandh from 11 December which protests by all sides created potential openings for lasted four days during which markets remained violence. The capacity for central level political and closed, transport was halted and some schools peace process dynamics to catalyze political and remained closed in the nine districts east of the communal tensions in the central and eastern Tarai Arun river. On 20 November, the Nepal Limbu remains high. In a more recent and less overtly Sangh (affiliated to the NC) held their general political example of tensions, a Cabinet decision to convention in and demanded the formation relocate a government Internal Revenue Office of a Limbuwan province. They noted that, although (IRO) from Janakpur (Dhanusa District) to Bardibas many NC leaders may not be in favour of the () sparked identity-based local creation of a Limbuwan province, the party should protests. Industrialists and local political parties pay attention to the sentiment of the . jointly padlocked the IRO in Janakpur and enforced The group stated that they will go to “any extent” to a bandha for several days in early January to protest pressure their party leadership to accept their the decision. When the Government withdrew its demands. On 11-14 December, the FLSC Palungwa- decision after the Janakpur protests, industrialists faction organized a general strike in nine eastern and entrepreneurs from Bardibas enforced a districts demanding to be represented in the bandha from 15 January onwards. While protestors Commission (as per an agreement signed by the from both locations accused the Government of Government in March 2008). While the strike was depriving them of accessible government services, called off after the group was invited for talks with protestors from Janakpur termed the decision as the Government on 14 December, the FLSC- “anti-Madheshi” (Bardibas lies on the northern Palungwa reports that it is preparing further protest ‘non-Madhesh’ side of the east-west highway). They programmes in early 2012 if the talks do not lead to argue that the removal of a key office was a move a positive outcome. The Limbuwan Liberation Front to weaken a future Madhesh province. (LLF) marked the 25th anniversary of its establishment on 20 December by making public its However, the formation of the State Restructuring strategy to launch an armed movement if a Commission in November triggered a dramatic Limbuwan autonomous state is not achieved increase of activities amongst identity and activist through peaceful means.16 Eastern hills remain groups in many parts of Nepal, some making potentially volatile as Limbu groups have strong aggressive demands and threatening to launch 15 public support. armed struggles.

would be willing to unite with the Baidya-faction is it split from the 15 Thought not an ‘identity group’, it should be noted that the UCPN-M. The CPN-U has two members in the CA Communist Party of Nepal-Unified (CPN-U)–which has two members in 16 The LLF published a 24-point programme on how a Limbuwan state the CA––threatened to launch an “armed people-centred revolution to would be run as well as a 25-point concept paper highlighting the bring drastic change in the country” at a press conference in Dharan on Limbuwan’s historical background and the logic behind their claim for 20 December. The CPN-U General Secretary stated that the CPN-U an autonomous state.

Page 5 of 8 2012: Potential risks to peace and development from the field Tharu groups also intensified their protests during  The findings and recommendations of the State November, with the Tharuhat Tarai Party Nepal Restructuring Commission, whose report is (TTPN)17 and six smaller ethnic parties/groups expected at the end of January holding an indefinite nationwide bandh. Although  Production of a final draft constitution that the bandh was not successfully imposed across the contains a proposed federalist structure—this country and a number of senior TTPN members will be opposed by groups against federalism were arrested in the lead-up to the bandh, it was but also contested by groups with opposing effective in parts of the Tarai for four days (with perspectives on the approach to federalism some TTPN cadres reportedly resorting to violence  Production of a final draft constitution that is and burning vehicles in some parts of the Mid- silent on eventual federal state restructuring— Western Tarai). this will be opposed vigorously by Janajati and other identity groups The Chhetri Samaj stepped up its level of activities  Failure to implement a national consultation in the Far West during December, organizing a mass process on the final draft constitution meeting in Kanchanpur on 23 December and a  Opposing groups hold simultaneous protests in district meeting the following day. A Chhetri Samaj the same areas—e.g. Tharu protests occurring representative noted that district committees have at the same time and in the same districts as been formed in all nine districts of the Far-West and those of Far Western unity or Chhetri groups that they are extending their presence through these committees. The Chhetri Samaj is demanding Potential mitigating factors: that be listed as an indigenous caste group.  Demonstration by the leaders of the three major In November, the Government formed a nine- political parties that they are consulting broadly member task force to suggest responses to these on state restructuring, including with Madheshi, demands within two months. A Chhetri Samaj Janajati and other new emerging groups representative noted that they are participating in  Substantive dialogue on federalism between all the task force, but will intensify protests if their identity and political groups at all levels that demands are not addressed. generates better understanding between groups There is significant potential for disruption as the of their various objectives and worries constitution process continues towards conclusion  Greater public awareness and information and the outlines for eventual federal state efforts to promote understanding of what restructuring become clear. It has been noted by federalism actually means and can deliver, as local observers that groups with weak or no well as its limitations and challenges representation in the CA or in Government are  The findings of the State Restructuring taking more aggressive stands as a way of seeking Commission establishes a basic common attention, rather than as a genuine threat of understanding on federalism amongst widespread violence. However, such threats cannot contending groups, with buy-in from all major be totally dismissed. Moreover, due to the groups on its final recommendations significantly emotive ‘identity’ content of these  Sensitive implementation of a comprehensive tensions (and the underlying powerful political and national consultation on the draft constitution economic interests that could take advantage of  The new constitution contains provisions for a identity grievances), there is potential for what are moderate and flexible approach to federalism now still political confrontations to transform into that can reconcile contending visions. communal confrontations. In this light, it is important to observe for any increases in regional Protests and disruption by ‘verified and identity-based disruptions and whether what is minors and late recruits’ still a contentious political discourse over federalism does not instigate localized communal On 16 December 2009, the Government, UCPN-M tensions or clashes between opposing groups and and UN signed an Action Plan for the discharge of communities. 4,008 personnel in the Maoist army cantonments that were registered by the UN as ‘verified minors Potential crisis triggers: and late recruits’ (VMLRs).18 The VMLRs were

17 The Tharuhat Tarai Party-Nepal was established in August,2011. The 18 Under the terms of the AMMAA, the UN verified the personnel of party demands a Tharuhat province including the Nawalpur area, the the Maoist army in 2007 into two categories: a) those verified as dissolution of the CA and new election as well as the formation of a regular members of the Maoist army (a total of 19,602 individuals); and ‘citizens’ government’. b) those to be discharged (a total of 4,008 individuals) on the grounds

Page 6 of 8 2012: Potential risks to peace and development from the field discharged from the cantonments in early 2010 and term ‘disqualified’; the timely drafting of a “pro- were offered a number of rehabilitation options people constitution”; the ending of unemployment through the UN Interagency Rehabilitation in the country; the assurance of proper Programme (UNIRP).19 From the outset, however, management of Maoist army fighters who were VMLRs have protested to the UN, the UCPN-M and injured or disabled during the conflict; and making the Government that their rehabilitation packages public the status of disappeared PLA fighters and have not been adequate and are far below that of provision of relief package to their families. The the expected voluntary retirement and VMLRs organized bandhs in all five regions from 29 rehabilitation packages that will be offered to the December to 2 January, with the bandh in the Far- 19,602 verified members of the Maoist army. West turning violent as protesters vandalized some VMLRs have also protested against their status as public vehicles in and a bus in being ‘disqualified’ from the Maoist army. Over the . A partially effective national bandh course of 2010 and early 2011, VMLRs protested at on 5 January was called off part-way through the UNIRP offices (on some occasions obstructing those day after the Government committed to dialogue offices and threatening UN staff). In July and with the Central Struggle Committee. August, VMLRs held protests outside of UCPN-M VMLR’s grievances are mostly targeted at the headquarters, although those were called off on 10 Government and their own party leadership; August after the then Minister of Peace and government and UCPN-M offices are the most likely Reconstruction met with VMLR leaders. VMLR targets of future protests. However, it cannot be protest activity had generally declined over the last ruled out that VMLRs may protest against the UN six months, particularly that targeting the UN. As and other development partners (who are larger numbers of VMLRs pass through the UNIRP sometime seen as having provided them with more are seeing the direct benefits of their inadequate rehabilitation packages and having rehabilitation packages and are finding new labeled them as ‘disqualified’) if their demands are opportunities to settle back into communities.20 not met. Protests may target UNIRP field offices in However, as the final details of the retirement and , Nepalgunj, Bharatpur, Biratnagar and rehabilitation packages for the Maoist army are Kathmandu and activists could pressure participants now largely determined, there is the risk that in the UNIRP to leave the rehabilitation programme. VMLRs may react negatively as they feel that they Potential triggers: have been dispossessed in comparison. In October and November, VMLR activist groups carried out  Announcement of final agreed details for sporadic protests to press their concerns while the Maoist army voluntary retirement and Special Committee for the Supervision, Integration rehabilitation packages and Rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel was  Commencement of retirement payments to non- discussing these packages. The situation will be integrated Maoist army personnel further complicated as VMLR grievances become  VMLR grievances instrumentalized by factions ‘politicised’ as part of internal UCPN-M factional within UCPN-M intra-party dispute disputes. VMLRs have increased their capacities to Potential mitigating factors: mobilize with the establishment of a Central Struggle Committee of the “Discharged People’s  Further dialogue by the UCPN-M and Liberation Army”, which set forth a series of Government with VMLRs demands during December: the removal of the Disruption and contention over voter registration and citizenship of being ‘minors’ (those born after 25 May 1988) or ‘late recruits’ (those who joined the Maoist army after the ceasefire of 25 May 2006). A national voter registration process that began in The terms of the AMMAA (Section 4.1.3) declared that verified minors 2010 has been completed in all districts and and late recruits were respectively not “eligible for cantonment” and were to be “honourably and automatically discharged” – i.e. they were ‘continuous voter registration’ is ongoing at all ‘disqualified’ from the Maoist army. district headquarters. Obstructions of this process 19 The UNIRP is implemented by UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and ILO, had taken place in numerous districts, including funded as the “Support to the Rehabilitation of Verified Minors and Late Recruits” project by the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (project number Rupandehi, Nawalparasi, Banke, Kapilvastu, Jhapa, UNPFN/A-7). Sunsari, Morang and Sankhuwasabha, but these 20 As of December 2011, 2,149 VMLRs have joined the UNIRP were all largely resolved and allowed to proceed by programme. Some 60 percent of those who have graduated from the programme are known to have become employed or to have mid-2011. Extended obstruction of voter established their own business.

Page 7 of 8 2012: Potential risks to peace and development from the field registration by the United Madheshi Democratic areas or where significant numbers of citizens Front (UMDF) continued in Banke District until 18 are lacking citizenship certificates21 December, when district UMDF leaders agreed to endorse the voter registration process. Contention over the release of the detailed 2011 census results Though the obstruction of voter registration has now been resolved across the country, fundamental There were no significant protests against the 2011 outstanding grievances about the requirement for census enumeration process and little reaction citizenship certificates to register for voting are not. when the preliminary results were released. More widespread and significant contention may be However, the final detailed results (including results triggered if the constitution nears completion and for caste and ethnicity) may disappoint some an election time table begins to become a reality or, identity groups and become a source of grievance equally, if local elections are scheduled as a means amongst those who feel they were not adequately of replacing the abolished all party mechanisms. reflected. Reactions could be amplified if the The real prospect of an election could potentially eventual federal restructuring process, including the incite protests by those actors who feel they have determination of boundaries and resources been excluded from voter registration due to the allocations for new provinces and structures, is lack of possessing citizenship certificates. In order linked to the census results. to gain political leverage, parties could take Potential crisis triggers: advantage of the challenges confronting the voter registration process to call the registry itself into  Release of the detailed 2011 census results, question. In Tarai districts, protest could emerge particularly if they are used to guide the federal from non-Madheshi citizens who feel they were state restructuring process, design of provinces denied the opportunity to register as voters due to and allocation of resources previous obstruction—in Banke, this could mean Potential mitigating factors: tensions between Madheshi and Muslim communities.  Conflict sensitive approach is taken in the release of the detailed 2011 census results, Potential crisis triggers: including a pre-release analysis/study of  Finalization and adoption of the new potential conflict and mitigating factors constitution, paving the way for the scheduling of new elections Disclaimer: This field bulletin is prepared following a  Announcement of local elections as a resolution brief field study and also uses secondary data. The to the abolition of the all party mechanisms information presented in this field bulletin does not  Opposition in the Legislature-Parliament to the imply official endorsement or acceptance by the bill to amend the Citizenship Act (2006) agreed United Nations. Although the RCHCO aims to confirm by the Madhesi parties and the UCPN-M all information independently, occasional factual inaccuracies can occur. Potential mitigating factors:

 Continued dialogue between the Election United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Commission of Nepal and all political parties to Coordinator’s Office (RCHCO) clarify the voter registration process and resolve GPO Box: 107, UN House, Pulchowk, Kathmandu potential concerns Email: [email protected]  Implementation of an effective, well publicized Phone: +977 1 5523200 | Fax: +977 1 5523991 and transparent complaints and objections Visit the UN Nepal Information Platform at period enabling all people and parties to http://www.un.org.np scrutinize the new voter registration list  Establish an inventory of citizenship certificate distribution in order to track this across the country and identify ‘gap areas’ where further efforts for certificate distribution are needed  Special efforts to ensure full access to and distribution of citizenship certificates in remote 21 This could be guided by data collected during voter registration by the Election Commission of Nepal about citizenship certificate possession.

Page 8 of 8