Running Head: PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE 1
Countermovement to Constant Surveillance: A Combined Study Examining Acceptance and
Motivation Factors Leading People to Engage in Different Forms of Sousveillance
by
Pola Catherine Moitroux
# 697454
BDM Master Thesis
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Communication and Information Sciences,
Track Business Communication and Digital Media
Thesis Committee:
Dr. Suleman Shahid
Dr. Paul Vogt
Tilburg University
July 2014
2 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Abstract
Sousveillance [inverse surveillance] has become a recurring topic in research and attracted increased media coverage in recent years. This is mainly due to the increase of surveillance cameras as well as citizen’s engagement in monitoring hierarchical authorities and sharing footage of various incidents online. While many studies have focused on specific cases to date no thorough investigation has been undertaken to examine the factors and circumstances leading to acceptance or active engagement in sousveillance. This study incorporates a new construct for acceptance based on Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviour (1991), testing relevant factors through a survey with 156 respondents as well as34 follow-up interviews aimed at gaining more in-depth understanding of acceptance and intention to engage in different forms of sousveillance. The results provide evidence for the impact of attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control on acceptance; supporting the theory of planned behaviour. Additionally, there is evidence that people are more likely to engage in sousveillance of hierarchical authorities than of fellow citizens. Moreover, the study identifies motivational factors that influence engagement in sousveillance and preferred distribution channels. Keywords: surveillance, lateral-, political-, personal-, state sousveillance, theory of planned behaviour
3 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE
Acknowledgement
I would like to show my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Suleman Shahid, who guided and supported me from the initial idea of this thesis until its final level. I also express many thanks to my external supervisor, Ph. D. Saskia Bayerl, for her excellent comments and suggestions. I highly appreciated her voluntary engagement throughout the entire research process. A very special thanks goes to my friend, Dennis Langer, who always encouraged me in achieving this goal and assisted me in numerous ways. Lastly, I want to thank my fellow students, Dorottya Rusz and Jenni Stiffe, for their time reading this thesis.
4 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Table of Contents
Introduction ...... 5 Conceptual Framework ...... 7 Theoretical Background ...... 7 Behavioural motivation...... 8 Contextual factors...... 9 New technologies and sousveillance tools...... 15 Acceptance of sousveillance ...... 17 Intention and Engagement ...... 18 Experimental Design ...... 18 Research Model ...... 18 Design ...... 20 Pre-Test ...... 20 Method Quantitative Study ...... 22 Sample Administration...... 22 Sample Distribution...... 24 Method Qualitative Research Interviews ...... 26 Results Online Survey ...... 28 H1a-c: Predictors of Acceptance for all Scenarios ...... 28 H2a: Differences of Predictors between Scenarios ...... 29 H2b: Different Influence of Acceptance on Intention between Scenarios ...... 32 H3: Predictors of Intention for all Scenarios...... 33 H4: Differences in Engagement in Sousveillance between Scenarios ...... 34 Analysis of Co-Variables ...... 35 Results Interviews ...... 36 Recognition of Scenarios and Acceptance of Publication ...... 39 Own Experiences and Achievements ...... 40 Choice of Distribution Channels ...... 41 Synthesis of Interview Results ...... 42 Discussion ...... 42 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research ...... 47 Implications for Theory ...... 48 Implications for Practice ...... 49 Conclusion ...... 50 References ...... 52 Appendix ...... 55
5 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Introduction
“These days, if you feel like somebody’s watching you, you might be right” (Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 2003).
Since around 1950 more and more technology is used to discover personal information about citizens. Light and heat sensors, biometric access devises, DNA analysis, drug testing, data mining, mapping network analysis, computer monitoring, wearable computing, eye- glasses, mobile phone cameras, audio and video surveillance, social networks represent the new era of technology use (Marx, 2002). These innovations change our everyday lives in terms of privacy, control, liberty, communication, relationships and information access tremendously. Surveillance societies arise and consequently, citizens develop new behavioural patterns and habits, which lead to questioning current systems and institutions. This challenge again is discussed and lived via the above mentioned new technologies. Nowadays, people use social media not only to chat with friends or share pictures, but also to express their displeasure about current affairs and point injustice out to other users. We experience social media to become more and more relevant in all fields of life, but especially in protests and politics there is a tremendous increase. People take advantage of social media in order to spread their word around the world and connect to initiate change. These personal disclosures are distributed quickly and can have a powerful impact on the affected. One person can mobilize thousands of people immediately, who put pressure on institutions and force changes, which would have been impossible without the massive distribution in social media channels. In particular Facebook growth is remarkable: In 2013 Facebook had 1.15 billion monthly active users worldwide (Constine, 2013). What effects does that have on our everyday life? People trust peer opinions and word-of-mouth mainly when it comes to advertising. According to the Nielsen Report on global trust, 92% of consumer trust recommendations from peers and word-of-mouth (Nielsen Company, 2013). In terms of sharing it means that people are likely to see uploaded videos as evidence enough and believe unconditionally in the injustice they see. This can have wide consequences for affected people but leads in general to increased social control and security. Furthermore, it provides insights into lifestyles which could streamline social interactions and lead to increased perception and enhanced memory (Fernback, 2013; Lauer, 2012; Mann et al., 2003). With the NSA scandal some months ago, which revealed a total government surveillance of many electronic devices, citizens feel being watched all the time. After some time without official comment it finally became a mainstream story and authorities could no 6 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE longer deny that all data was collected and stored. This strong political power encourages people to claim more transparency from authorities; nevertheless the issue is played down. In some US states it is even forbidden to film the police, they established a law which sanctions this as illegal eavesdropping (Robinson, 2011). Questions arise: What do they hide? Where does that overall monitoring lead to? Are authorities treated differently than ordinary citizens? To understand the term sousveillance it is important to know its background and classification. Developed as a reaction to the asymmetrical power relation term surveillance, “to watch over” (Albrechtslund, 2008) the term sousveillance is mainly coined by the Canadian professor Steven Mann and used as a background for most sousveillance studies. He defines it as “observation or recording by an entity not in a position of power or authority over the subject of the veillance” (Mann, 2013). This can occur in many different forms, i.e. state sousveillance, lateral sousveillance or peer-to-peer surveillance with the aim to reveal misconduct and injustice and to distribute it via different online channels. It is essential to understand that this concept is not only defined as seeing something but also as mobilizing citizens to take certain actions. Although this new form of civil responsibility (Dennis, 2008) can contribute to a more secure and aware society, constant monitoring as normality and a form of transhumanism, is not assumed to be an ultimate answer to our fundamental societal problems (Lotter, 2014). So far, many researches have investigated cases of surveillance and in the last years more and more recognized the change in society from the old form of surveillance to new forms, namely personal, lateral, political and state sousveillance. The trend to these new forms of monitoring, in particular between citizens themselves and the watching above is striking in the United States, Asia and in the UK. New technologies, as mobile phone cameras, social networks but also wearable computing and critique of Bentham’s panopticon promote a reconstructing of society. Many studies analyse certain known cases, like the police assault on Rodney King (Mann et al., 2003), the death of a young man at Beijing University (Pu & Scanlan, 2012; Zheng & Wu, 2005) or the anti-Tesco riot in Stokes Croft (Reilly, 2013). Some researchers conduct qualitative studies by providing participants with cameras and observe whether and how they engage in monitoring practices (Reponen, Lehikoinen, & Impiö, 2007) or see how people use social media as tool for crisis communication or activism (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2013; Garton, Haythornthwaite, & Wellman, 1997; Penney & Dadas, 2013; Wasko & Faraj, 2005). Still other research focuses on trends and future predictions, analysing the effects of increasing surveillance and sousveillance (Andrejevic, 2006; Dodge & Kitchin, 2007). Even 7 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE though, the topic of sousveillance has become a much researched area, no quantitative study on motivational factors for engagement in sousveillance has been conducted nor have factors leading to acceptance been analysed. Most studies have small samples and focus on single cases in certain countries, which does not provide enough empirical evidence to draw further conclusions in terms of why people decide to engage in sousveillance practices. Our research will close this apparent gap with a quantitative study and follow-up interviews in order to provide a detailed understanding of the intentions and motivation of people monitoring and sharing different forms of misconduct. Therefore, we will investigate people’s behaviour regarding different forms of sousveillance (lateral, political, state and personal sousveillance) to find out under which circumstances which form of sousveillance is likely to occur. First, we aim to find out under which circumstances sousveillance is accepted and which scenarios motivate people to engage in a diffusion of information. An online questionnaire survey will provide the participants with four different scenarios of sousveillance, which reveal different forms of abuse. Second, qualitative interviews will give further insights into the decision process of selected participants. Finally, we will be able to answer the following research question: Under what contextual circumstances is sousveillance accepted and what motivates people to engage in sousveillance?
Conceptual Framework
Theoretical Background In order to successfully provide relevant background for our research question and develop hypotheses we decided to split the theoretical analysis into two parts: behavioural motivation and contextual circumstances. Therefore, the first part of the framework will focus on the engagement of people towards sousveillance, which is the basis for behavioural intentions and actual behaviour. This process is explained by the model of Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behaviour (TPB) and will help to predict people’s general engagement in sousveillance. The second part of our background analysis will analyse surveillance history and its development into sousveillance, giving an overview about its degree of acceptance and showing how new technology and media lead to societal changes. According to Bradshaw (2013) different forms of sousveillance can be distinguished depending on the kind of disaster and its offender. This paper will focus on the following four forms of sousveillance: lateral, personal, political and state. These forms are summarized into two types, sousveillance of 8 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE hierarchical authorities (state, political) and fellow citizens (lateral, personal). Finally, hypotheses will be derived from the two theoretical parts and visualized in a conceptual research model. Behavioural motivation. The theory of planned behaviour (TPB) is a popular concept of human action, explaining why people engage in certain behaviours and how behavioural patterns can be changed and understood. This thesis uses the considerations of the TPB to identify the influencing factors for acceptance and engagement in different types of sousveillance. In general, the model suggests that positive attitude, satisfactory subjective norm and perceived behavioural control lead to a strong intention to perform a behaviour.
Figure 1: Model of theory of planned behaviour
Figure 1, adapted from Ajzen (1991), shows the constructs of the theory of planned behaviour predicting intention and finally leading to certain behaviour. First of all, beliefs guide the direction towards each factor independently. People’s beliefs produce either positive or negative feelings towards an action. Attitude shows how a person evaluates and appraises certain outcome and is determined by attitudinal beliefs. People have beliefs about all kinds of outcomes, due to past experiences, moral and normal approaches and cultural influences. They give value to these outcomes subjectively, which leads to a positive or negative attitude towards a behaviour. A positive evaluation leads to a behavioural intention. On the other hand, subjective norm refers to perceived social pressure or support and follows normative beliefs. The latter are beliefs developed regarding society and its social influences. These social referents can be friends, family or colleagues. The factor perceived behavioural control refers to the ease or difficulty of performing an action and is strongly connected to the power 9 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE of control beliefs in terms of self-efficacy. This construct has a direct influence on behaviour (seen by the dotted line). Ajzen (1991) believes that people unconsciously pass through this process when making a decision. The influence of these variables varies across situations but can in sum account for significant variance in certain behaviour. We try to identify which predictors are strongest for each form of sousveillance. The focus is on the three independent variables (attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control) of the TPB (shown in figure 1) and we expect to find differences in predictive power of each antecedent of behavioural intention to engage in personal, lateral, state and political sousveillance. Contextual factors. Surveillance history. Forms of surveillance have always been present in societies. Nevertheless, over the last decade essential changes have taken place, so we have to distinguish between traditional surveillance and new forms of surveillance (Marwick, 2012; Marx, 2002). Marx (2002) talks in his study about the term new surveillance whereas Marwick (2012) states that these new features of surveillance refer to social surveillance. Both terms refer to today’s surveillance, but have a different focus. Marx (2002) sees surveillance in form of hidden cameras in an ATM machine or the video monitoring in shops to detect potential shoplifters, whereas Marwick (2012) concentrates on social media as trigger that leads to new strategies about content, disclosure and boundaries in contact with others, and the always caring about how others see the own profile (2012). She claims that people “continually investigate digital traces left by the people they are connected to through social media” (Marwick, 2012), whereas Marx outlines surveillance as “the use of technical means to extract or create personal data” (2002). Regarding the reasons why the changes occurred, Marx refers to three views. The first historical view assert that not the kind of situation changed but rather the degree to which people monitor or protect privacy. People always wanted to know what is going on in their lives and the lives of people around them (eavesdropping, etc.) A second response claims that it is the media revolution which implies the extinction of privacy. Another view explains the changes with the force of modernity and trend on balance (Marx, 2002). Table 1 shows the most important differences between traditional and new surveillance among six dimensions identified by Marx (2002). The comparison highlights the process of change from a visible monitoring among known elites to a less visible, continuous and anonymous form of surveillance.
10 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Table 1
Surveillance Dimensions (adopted from: Marx 2002)
Dimension Traditional surveillance New surveillance Visibility (who does it, where, Visible Less visible or invisible on whose behalf) Data collector Human, animal Machine (wholly or partly automated) Timing Single point or intermittent Continuous (omnipresent) Data availability Frequent time lags Real time availability Availability of technology Disproportionately available More democratized, some for elites forms widely available Identifiability of object of Emphasis on known individuals Emphasis also on anonymous surveillance individuals, masses
Furthermore, table 2 summarizes the main distinctions between traditional and social surveillance made by Marwick (2012). She highlights the differences in terms of power, hierarchy and reciprocity. Her approach focuses mainly on the social aspect and her identified characteristics can be seen as an addition to Marx’ new surveillance. Table 2 Surveillance Distinctions (adopted from: Marwick 2012)
Term Traditional surveillance Social surveillance Power People with power observe Power relationship among general population social networks, in terms of people checking on their perception among their peer by posting etc. or stalking romantic partners
Hierarchy Watching from above Social hierarchy, meaning no one is really equal but on similar level
Reciprocity One-sided Both sides watch each other and are aware of that
Since the digital revolution and in particular in the last decade, new forms of surveillance through sousveillance become more and more popular. Mostly explained by security reasons and precautions against terrorism, governments, institutions as well as private 11 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE organizations increased their visible and invisible forms of observations tremendously (Mann et al., 2003). In the financial district of New York an increase of 40% of cameras is noticed since September 2011 (Mann et al., 2003). Observing became the norm in public as well as private places and technological subtleties enable an almost unnoticeable monitoring of society. This need for control has always been aspirated by government and unequal power relation between authorities and citizens existed in every era, too. In the 19th and 20th century Bentham described this phenomenon as panopticon, “a power metaphor for the distribution of institutional power that works through the fear of being watched” (Mann et al., 2003). The threat of punishment helped to keep mass populations obeying and under control for many years. Recently, with the development of new technologies and media forms, combined with the increasing will of people to observe the people above as well, power dynamics of society change sustainably. The population is now mainly in self-control and responsible for their own security and lifestyle supported by guidelines. This again leads to increasing observations of others due to own safety concerns and the desire to gain information about everything happening around. Marwick compares it with Bentham’s panoptican, in particular claiming to find panoptic effects among social network sites, meaning individuals observe their audience and everyone is aware of being watched (Marwick, 2012). Nowadays, we live in a networked society, where every individual is a node in multiple networks and groups and solely responsible for his information collection (Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, Qiu, & Sey, 2009; Mann et al., 2003). This form of multiple interaction leads to a “self-empowerment” (Mann et al., 2003). Reality TV shows, such as Big Brother, show that people want to observe mainly to gather every piece of information about someone, if partner, neighbour or state and to have verification and avoid all possible risks and uncertainties (Andrejevic, 2006). Andrejevic further claims, that people want to interact constantly and recent technologies enable not only the watching of others but also the possibility to be seen. This technological supported interactivity could in theory lead to a transparent and democratic society, where freedom and privacy melt. However, authorities, as well as for-profit organizations and citizens themselves misuse technologies to see everything. They increase their power situations by justifying every act of observation as interactivity but do not contribute to the information exchange and reciprocity (Andrejevic, 2006). Mann et al. (2003) support this view by highlighting the fact that organization as well as governments are mostly not willing to share their gathered information or let people know what they record and store. Concluding from all mentioned 12 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE papers, we can say that surveillance strengthens an indirect asymmetrical control and power situation since it does not contribute to a free information flow. Sousveillance development and performance. In order to understand and effectively test human’s engagement in sousveillance practices, we need to go into detail with the concept of sousveillance. In the following, we will analyse the most important conducted studies in this field and develop a set of hypotheses, which will help to answer our research question. To base our research on a common definition of sousveillance we take Steven Mann’s explanation into account (Mann et al., 2003). He defines sousveillance as “the use of monitoring and tracking technologies to watch powerful entities. For example, filming police actions using digital video in order to document potential abuses” (Mann et al., 2003). This can take place in form of photos or videos of any person or event aiming to highlight potential abuses, and induces a free diffusion of information all over the world. As in surveillance, no consent is necessary as long as someone’s privacy is not invaded. Mann and Fernback describe sousveillance as an inversed form of surveillance which is not only “shooting back” but offers the population the chance to record when it recognizes misconduct which will finally lead to the disclosure of more misbehaviour than when only authorities are recording (Mann et al., 2003). Journalist James Corbett, known from the Corbett Report, speaks of revolutionizing the media and tries to persuade citizens in his weekly podcast to accuse publicly in order to not let people get away with their deeds (Corbett, 2013). He claims current technologies to be powerful tools, which can have remarkable effects for keeping authorities in line. Ganascia (2010) in his study of generalized sousveillance discussed how it transforms society by introducing the Catopticon, a social arrangement, whose architecture allows communication with everybody without surveyors. It is the opposite of Bentham’s introduction of the panopticon structure, where few people watch and rule over the whole population (Campbell & Carlson, 2002). Ganascia explains the change in society with the new social organization of a Catopticon. He takes the H1N1 flu as an example which illustrates the differences between the two kinds of social organization and shows how in a traditional way authorities failed in information distribution and interpretation and how many groups (pharmacists, doctors, individuals, etc.) tried to convince people of their interests more successfully in a decentralized way. Furthermore, he describes that in general information is gathered “in order to maintain power over others” (2010). The coexistence of sousveillance and surveillance, namely a constant information collection from below and above causes 13 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE “equiveillance”, meaning a weak equilibrium (Mann et al., 2003). They argue that a full revelation of information may lead to total transparency which can even contribute to a new regime with constant monitoring of authorities. Nevertheless, they highlight that a full disclosure of information is not always desirable and can pose to similar social challenges in regard of privacy, access, accuracy, property and anonymity (2003). The important part is the access: Only when all information is freely accessible to everyone this can have balanced justice as positive effect. However, as mentioned in the previous section authorities mostly record and store their data secretly. Ali and Mann (2013) look at sousveillance from an economic and moral perspective and explain on the basis of the model of Humanistic Intelligence how sousveillance with its positive features will spread and be inevitably adopted in the future. They see the act of sousveillance on the basis of transactions and show that many cases of sousveillance lead to the establishment of a trustworthy relationship and transactions, consequently societies should not reject forms of sousveillance. Furthermore, they emphasize that different perspectives and parties, in contrast to the central perspective (panopticon), can solve asymmetrical information or power situation (Ali & Mann, 2013). In terms of bureaucracy, they suggest that sousveillance contributes to an equalisation of information and authority for the sousveiller, since by giving evidence from a first-hand perspective the public can review more interactions. Finally, regarding technology and social trends they claim that the always improving technology and the fact that every mobile phone owner can actively engage in sousveillance, an overall acceptance of sousveillance due to “economic efficiency, personal safety, and accountability” and fairness can be expected (Ali & Mann, 2013). People have different reasons to engage in sousveillance and it highly depends on the form and perceived function of sousveillance. Concluding, we assume people to accept forms of sousveillance mainly due to personal safety concerns and to make people carrying out injustice accountable. Sousveillance forms. First, we want to give a short overview about the general right to record, since we are interested in scenarios that reveal violent misbehaviour of both individuals as well as persons or groups employed in the public-sector. According to Gunn (2013), it is a fundamental right to record current observations in public. Nevertheless, in particular sousveillance directed at hierarchical authorities is a sensitive topic, since the handling and treatment of governmental actors seems to be different than the treatment of fellow citizens. According to existing laws, the prohibition of “torture and other cruel punishments” is forbidden but its interpretation is ambiguous and depends on the case of 14 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE course, meaning when misbehaviour is recorded, people have to decide if it is public humiliation, unconstitutional use of violence or reasonable punishment (Gunn, 2013). Especially regarding police violence the borders are not clear (Gunn, 2013). In America, Government actors—typically police officers—traditionally retain immunity from civil liability for tortious conduct when lawfully discharging their duties. Before video cameras were broadly available these scenes were observed from subjective perspectives and governmental actors’ force was mostly rated as necessary and reasonable in order to keep the system running. Nowadays, we often have different perspectives and most important recorded evidence for what we see. Video cameras help to reduce the bias of a scene which is only recorded by natural recording (human brain) and give a more objective perspective as well as provides more quantity and completeness (Gunn, 2013). Gunn also makes aware of the differences to record on public space versus on private space, highlighting that even though we have the fundamental right to record the legal situation is unclear when we record governmental actors on public space. As already stated this thesis concentrates on four different forms of sousveillance, which will be illustrated in the following. In comparison to state and political sousveillance, known by the famous case of Rodney King and directed at hierarchical state authorities, who abuse their status in political or unequal power situations, people engaging in lateral surveillance do not aim for symmetry or an inverse panopticon structure but rather for an overall transparency and social responsibility. Lateral surveillance is a new way of increasing governmental control by translating ‘‘the goals of political, social, and economic authorities into the choices and commitments of individuals’’ (Andrejevic, 2006). Reeves analyses the campaign by the US Department of Homeland security, which uses the help of its citizens to reveal injustice (2012). By encouraging people to monitor their neighbours and friends peer- to-peer surveillance increases and everyone simultaneously becomes suspect and officer (Andrejevic, 2006). Many other researchers assume that these kinds of projects are not decentralizing responsibility or control but will rather lead to ambiguity and confusion in social structures (Andrejevic, 2006; Dennis, 2008; Reeves, 2012). Personal sousveillance in contrast performs in a similar way with the major distinction that it is mainly conducted for personal reasons and not for the creation of awareness. People are more or less involved in the incident and not neutral observers. Table 3 displays all relevant forms of sousveillance.
15 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Table 3 Different Forms of Sousveillance Type Form Function Examples
Fellow citizens Personal People engaged in activity record Done by wearable sousveillance it and communicate it on social computing, camera media aim to build a community. phones, used to record personal moments Lateral Encouraged by state (campaigns), US Department of sousveillance aim for overall transparency, Homeland Security, citizens should help to reduce seeing people using crime force and distributing its evidence Hierarchical Political This engagement is of political Riots, demonstrations, authorities sousveillance nature and questions the system clearly directed at state and its constitutionality. and its incorrect handling of these issues State The target is usually a single Citizens photographing sousveillance representative of surveillance by police officers, the state, meaning a hierarchical Shoppers higher authority, who misuses the photographing power of his position against shopkeeper, taxicab citizens. passenger recording cab drivers
New technologies and sousveillance tools. When looking at the penetration rate of mobile phone ownership it becomes clear why surveillance and a panopticon structure of society cannot longer remain the only form of environment. As explained in the previous section, sousveillance became so popular with the rapid improvement of mobile technologies since now the access to recording devices is not limited to organizations or institutions anymore. Lauer analyses the cultural impact of 19th century technologies like photography, telephone and phonography as forgotten contributors to the intensification of surveillance today (2012). Portable cameras, available for everyone since 1880, have led to privacy issues and unwanted revelation of secrets. Mass communication and a new information environment contributed further to a loss of privacy because they have brought new forms of evidence, according to Lauer “an emergent evidential paradigm” (Lauer, 2012). Furthermore, he claims that these three technologies have started history of modern surveillance and new media of this era just offers new possibilities to provide evidence and helps reshaping the understanding of privacy and social experience (Lauer, 2012). According to him, there was a direct conjunction between the administrative strategies of capitalism and development of 16 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE nation-states and the rise of tracking and identifying people in populations. Surveillance always had advantages and disadvantages, and its ambiguity is mainly seen “in the popularity of user-generated content on the internet, social networking sites, and entertainment genres such as reality television” (Lauer, 2012). Besides wearable computing, the increased use of social network sites contributes to a change in society and new forms of information collection and distribution (Fernback, 2013; Veil, Buehner, & Palenchar, 2011). First of all, social media shows how users are consumers and contributors of information at the same time. An increased influence of word-of-mouth, nowadays in form of peer interaction online, leads to a constant data exchange, which is widespread via social networks. Veil et al. (2011) claim that in terms of crisis communication people uses social networks for reciprocity. They want dialogue instead of static reporting of crime, activating other users to interact and get involved in situations. The example of the H1N1 virus is again used to show the high acceptance of social media in terms of trustworthy and satisfied crisis communication. With less effort and high visibility interested or affected persons can easily inform themselves and share their experience and opinions which lead to multiple perspectives and finally a more and more balanced and neutral revelation of facts. When looking at Facebook, Fernback claims that Facebook simultaneously enables and criticizes surveillance environments (2013). On the one hand, users on Facebook agree to unclear privacy terms and settings, publish private pictures, state personal data, etc. whereas on the other hand they create “Respect-Privacy”-groups and start petitions like “Facebook: Stop Invading My Privacy” (Fernback, 2013). The border between what is allowed and what needs permission is thin and due to unawareness people accept surveillance and “theft of humanistic property” (2013). According to Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg “public is the new social norm”, -revealing the attitude of Facebook in terms of data disclosure. Nevertheless, privacy is highly valued and necessary because without it no public exists and a blurring of the two spheres can lead to missing boundaries and would take people’s right of privacy and liberty away. People use new media like Facebook for individual empowerment and refuse to accept that monitoring is only possible from above. All in all, many tactics and ways aiming at transparency and equiveillance are possible through today’s technologies. Although for successful resistance and towards a symmetrical power situation people need to base sousveillance on a good foundation and not contribute unknowingly to surveillance practices (Fernback, 2013). We conclude that there is a positive correlation between the use of the new technologies and sousveillance and that Facebook as social network site provides an optimal channel for the distribution of sousveillance data. 17 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Acceptance of sousveillance As explained in the first part of the theoretical background the TPB is used to explain the beliefs and constructs behind peoples’ intention and behaviours. Regarding attitude, we expect that acceptance depends on the attitude towards the behaviour or context portrayed in the scenario. We expect a positive correlation between people’s attitude and peoples’ acceptance to engage in sousveillance, since we think the more negative an action is perceived the more willing people are to do something about it. The person or organization being responsible for the misbehaviour contributes to the overall perception of the scene as well, but is included in the attitude towards the whole scene. Therefore, we hypothesize: H1a: People with a positive attitude towards the act of sousveillance itself are more likely to accept sousveillance.
Regarding subjective norm, the second construct of Ajzen’s theory (1991), we assume that perceived social pressure has an impact on acceptance. People feeling a great amount of social pressure to perform, will be more likely to engage in distributing of sousveillance scenarios. They pay more attention what their peers think about them and are consequently more concerned about their reputation (Wasko & Faraj, 2005). H1b: People with strong subjective norms, meaning they put strong emphasis on desirable societal norms, are more likely to accept sousveillance.
Perceived behavioural control means people experience the required action as easy and under their own control. In our case, participants, who feel a high degree of behavioural control by sharing the certain scenarios, are expected to be prone to accept sousveillance.
H1c: People with high perceived behavioural control, are more likely to accept sousveillance.
After looking at the general predictors of acceptance we expand our predictions by adding contextual circumstances. We expect the two types of sousveillance to be predicted by different compositions of the TPB constructs and sousveillance of fellow citizens to be less accepted than sousveillance of hierarchical authorities.
H2a: Attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control have different influence on acceptance for sousveillance of fellow citizens in comparison to sousveillance of hierarchical authorities. H2b: Acceptance towards engagement in lateral or personal sousveillance will be less favourable than acceptance towards engagement in state or political sousveillance.
18 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Intention and Engagement Regarding perceived behavioural control we follow the TPB and expect a high perception of control leading to more acceptance. Furthermore, we anticipate behavioural control to have the strongest influence of all three factors on intention to engage in sousveillance since people’s beliefs are influenced by many factors and Ajzen describes perceived behavioural control as a direct determinant of behaviour (1985). We expect that the easier people believe a performance of behaviour is, the more likely they are to accept it and concluding we assume that this factor will affect acceptance stronger than subjective norm or attitude. Nevertheless, we expect all three predictors to influence acceptance significantly.
H3: Behavioural control is the strongest predictor of behavioural intention to engage in sousveillance.
As described in the section on sousveillance forms, treatment of authorities in comparison with fellow citizens seems to be different. Traditionally, neither observing police officers nor fellow citizen was accepted (Gunn, 2013). Especially police officers had the right to observe but not be questioned. People trust authorities and see them as role models who are there to prevent misbehavior and injustice and not to be part of it. Nevertheless, we assume that this belief has changed in the last years and people are in particular more critical towards authorities nowadays. On the account that police officers have to be role models and fulfill certain requirements people observe every little action very carefully. Hence, we suggest that even though the risk of punishment and censorship is lower when recording fellow citizens compared to hierarchical authorities, people are more likely to engage in sousveillance of authorities. Monitoring against the state and in particular police officers shows the same injustice degrees and in addition a misuse of power and authority (Mann et al., 2003) and needs to be spread.
H4: People are more likely to engage in sousveillance of hierarchical authorities than in sousveillance of fellow citizens.
Experimental Design
Research Model Our research hypotheses aim to explain the relationship between different motivational factors and behavioural intentions to engage in different sousveillance forms. 19 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE
Figure 2: Our research model including hypotheses
This extended research model derived from Ajzen (1991) displays our hypotheses and expected path relationships. It was developed through a thorough analysis of previous literature should yield interesting insights into people’s action and acceptance (TPB) towards different forms of sousveillance. As previously outlined, the foundation of the proposed research model, the TPB by Ajzen (1991), focused on three predictors of behavioral intention (attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control). This model is used for all four forms of sousveillance with different expectations of predictors’ impact. In addition, we expect a different willingness to share injustice of authorities compared with fellow citizens’ misbehavior. As shown in table 3, lateral and personal sousveillance are used as examples of fellow citizens’ sousveillance whereas state and political sousveillance represent forms of hierarchical authorities’ sousveillance. All four forms are compared with each other individually, but we expect a significant difference between the two main types in regard to willingness to accept and share. Seven research hypotheses are included in this model. The established relationships of the original model by Ajzen (1991) will be tested alongside the sousveillance forms with the intermediate step of acceptance. After the research model was built as a tool to investigate the research hypotheses, appropriate scales to measure the latent variables had to be identified. Since there are wide arrays of research and different conceptualizations for most constructs, we rely on pre- validated scales in line with our construct definitions wherever possible, in order to ensure construct validity. Furthermore, as the research model is built on the TPB we utilize scales that resemble the scales used in the original model as closely as possible. In regard to 20 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE acceptance we developed own questions, since no pre-validated scales fit with our sample and topic.
Design As mentioned above the study consisted of a sequential mixed-method design. First, a quantitative study with 157 students was conducted in form of an online survey. The design was within-subject design because it has greater statistical power due to the smaller error variance and the difference scores are more likely to reveal any small effect regarding different behaviour for the respective scenario (Greenwald, 1976). Therefore, four different scenarios were shown, presenting different contextual circumstances of sousveillance (lateral, political, state and personal) aiming to test participants’ acceptance and motivation to engage in their distribution. In the next round a qualitative follow-up study on the experiment in form of face-to-face interviews was conducted.
Pre-Test To test the scenarios for weaknesses and inconsistencies, a pre-test was conducted before making the questionnaire publicly available to a broader sample of recipients (see appendix A1). In order to guarantee that the scenarios are not emotionally influencing in different ways, we tested all chosen pictures on violence degree and emotional disturbances. The images were retrieved form the google image database but were blurred and used in an intended context. To avoid further biases we made sure that no age or gender differences occurred. Furthermore, we asked a question regarding the type of sousveillance occurring in the scenario to ensure that people can identify whether the described scenario is sousveillance happening among citizens or is directed at authorities. These two things were the major point of interest because they are considered as prerequisites for a successful testing of our hypotheses. On the basis of a 7-point Likert scale participants rated each scenario regarding emotional disturbance, emotional violence, and recognition of misbehaviour.
21 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE
Figure 3: Example from the pre-test questionnaire
This figure shows one of the four scenarios with the questions from the pre-test. The respondents were composed of students as well as working professionals and evenly split between genders to ensure representativeness of the results. 20 invitations for the pre-test were distributed and yielded twelve valid data sets. Table 4 shows the results from the pre-test which revealed no major differences in regards to emotion and violence perception. Table 4 Results from the Pre-Test
Scenario Emotion Evaluation Recognition rate
M (SD) Percentage (%)
Political sousveillance 6.2 (1.0) 91.67%
Lateral sousveillance 6.0 (1.0) 100%
State sousveillance 6.0 (1.2) 75%
Personal sousveillance 5.7 (1.3) 100%
22 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE The biggest difference lasted between political sousveillance and personal sousveillance but was still small (.25). The recognition rate of the type of sousveillance lay between 75-100%. Personal sousveillance had the lowest emotion score (5.7), whereby state sousveillance was assigned in 75% of the cases to sousveillance of hierarchical authorities (lowest recognition score). Moreover, a repeated measure ANOVA confirmed that there was no significant main effect for emotion (F(1.67, 15.18) =1.62, p >.05). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption sphericity was violated (χ² (5) = .14, p <.05). The degrees of freedom were therefore corrected with the Huynh-Feldt estimates for sphericity (ɛ =.56). These results suggested that no scenario was significantly more or less violent than the others. We concluded that the expected differences in acceptance and intention to engage towards the different cases of sousveillance in the main survey would be the result of the different sousveillance forms and not occurring due to emotional biases or misunderstandings regarding the type of sousveillance. All results can be found in appendix A2.
Method Quantitative Study Sample Administration. To build a questionnaire for data collection and consequent testing of hypothesized differences between scenarios and predictors, soscisurvey.de was chosen as a platform, primarily due of its high degree of flexibility with regard to question type and settings as well as its ease of use. Conducting a study online was especially suited for our research since regular use of online services is a prerequisite for sharing or uploading sousveillance videos or pictures online. Furthermore, the study was mainly promoted on Facebook, facilitating to address potential respondents who use social networks. The study was conducted in English because we expected all students participating to be fluent in English, even though not many participants were native speakers. The study consisted of a six pages online questionnaire divided into five main parts: introduction, scenarios, ranking, demographic aspects and ending. First, an introduction was given to welcome the participants and explain the topic and tasks (see appendix A3). Then, the four different scenarios were presented on separate pages. Every scenario included a picture and a short text, explaining the situation. Therefore, google images were used but in an anonymised version. 23 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE
Figure 4: Example scenario from the questionnaire
Figure 4 shows exemplary how the scenarios were presented in the online questionnaire. After the description ten questions regarding acceptance and the three TPB predictors were asked to every scenario. First, people had to state if they in general would record, share and/or distribute the presented situation and if yes among whom. This action element was included to reveal whether people are active leaders in engaging against injustice, namely recording and sharing, or whether they just distribute other people’s post for reputation or reciprocity reasons. The questions regarding intention, attitude, behavioural control and subjective norm (each two) were developed according to pre valid scales of Ajzen (1991). By using these valid questions we could test which constructs predict which kind of behaviour for each sousveillance form, how strong the predictors are and how they differ in regard to the various scenarios. In the case of acceptance we developed own constructs since no previous scale was applicable for our study. The questions for the different dependent variables were presented in randomized order, to prevent common methods of bias in the form of recipients’ efforts to answer similar questions in a desirable way. According to Ajzen, in case of attitude it is important to include an instrumental component (harmful-beneficial) and a good-bad scale for an overall evaluation.
24 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE
Figure 5: Bipolar adjective scale for attitude from the questionnaire
Figure 5 represents the bipolar adjective scale we used to test attitude, adopted from Ajzen (2002). The four scenarios were randomly ordered as well. Each scenario got exactly the same questions. They were each presented on a separate page to the participants to test what people do when they are confronted with each situation. The scenarios have been tested in a pre-test as well and have proven to not be biased. Finally, demographics were asked. These questions were to control for other influences on different constructs and especially on willingness to share and to identify correlations and dependencies. Respondents were asked to state their gender and age as well as their profession (student, working professional, etc.), in order to be able to show dependencies based on educational background. Furthermore, control variables with specific relevance for the research questions were employed to indicate internet use and use of mobile phone cameras. In particular, the use of social networks sites, like Facebook, and the use of YouTube as the main distribution channel can have an influence on the willingness to engage in sousveillance and people taken photos or videos on a high rate are probably more likely to record the presented scenarios. All items of the final questionnaire can be found in appendix A3. Concluding, the online questionnaire was conducted in order to answer our hypotheses. Therefore, we developed different questions which tested the different factors influencing the behavioural intentions to engage in sousveillance under the different circumstances. Sample Distribution. The link to the final questionnaire was distributed through a Facebook event taking place from May 7th to May 17th 2014, to which 620 Facebook users were invited. In addition to the event, the link was shared in posts and comments, thus leading to a snowball sample reaching an even broader and more diverse audience through viral effects. Additionally, it was distributed via email to Tilburg and Rotterdam University students. The survey was closed on the 16th of June. In total the questionnaire was accessed 482 times though this included 280 abortions 25 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE on either the introductory page or in the process of answering the questionnaire, resulting in 202 complete data sets. Respondents who did not answer every question to the scenarios were also excluded because for the comparison it was essential to have an equal distribution of answers. Furthermore, the time each respondent took to fill out the pages of the questionnaire was recorded and assessed but did not lead to any further exclusions, so that a final sample of exact 156 data sets could be used for the subsequent analysis. To clearly report information about the respondents of the survey, several previously introduced control variables were employed. These were, firstly, two questions regarding offensiveness and problematic of each single scenario, as well as demographic questions. The control questions revealed that scenario three with the security guard was perceived as less offensive. To make sure that this did not affect our results we determined the correlations between offensiveness and our two dependent variables. Between acceptance and the control variables we found a significant correlation, (r(153) = .45, p<.001) which represented a medium effect. Offensiveness can account for 20% of the variance in acceptance scores. Intention and offensiveness were significantly correlated as well (r(153)= .217, p<.05). This represented a small effect and offensiveness can be accountable for 4% of the variance in intention scores. Nevertheless, we did not expect that the found correlations affect our results essentially, since the relationships were not strong. Regarding our demographics, as the survey was mainly distributed via Facebook, we were expecting a sample representative of all Facebook users with a tendency toward a student population, but equally split between genders. The actual spread between genders had a slight tendency toward female respondents, contributing 53.8 % (84) of data sets compared to 46.2 % male responses (72). Furthermore, more than half of the participants were Germans (56.4%), followed by Greeks (7.7%) and Dutch people (6.4%). The results showed an average age of 26.3 (median: 25, modus: 24), the youngest respondent being 19, the oldest 54 years old. While this indicated a wide diversity in general, it has to be noted that 75 % of respondents were younger than 28 years, making the sample rather student-centric. This was furthermore accentuated by the occupation statistics, indicating that 64% of the sample was university students. The average number of hours online was 5.48, 5 being the median. Less than 25% of respondents spent fewer than 3 hours online, accentuating a high degree of internet usage. The average number of photos taken per week was 9.32; nevertheless the standard deviation was relatively high compared to other attributes (14.27). 26 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE The questionnaire contained two questions as control on how offensive and problematic the behaviour in the scenarios was perceived. To make sure no major differences were perceived there we compared all scenarios with each other regarding their problematic and offensiveness by using a repeated measure ANOVA. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ² (5) = .789, p < .001, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ɛ = .89). The results showed that the perceived offensiveness/ problematic of the scenarios was significantly different, t(2,415.06) =12.99, p <.001. Contrasts revealed that scenario three (security guard attacking shoplifter) (M = 5.74, SD =1.3) was evaluated significantly lower than scenario two (M =6.25, SD =1.1), F (1,155) =24.6, p <.001, r =.14, and four (M =6.25, SD =1.2), F(1,155) =28.78, p <.001, r =.16. Post hoc tests using Bonferroni correction confirmed that the third scenario was perceived significantly different from the three others, p <.001. The mean difference showed a significantly lower problematic and offensive perception for scenario three. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, we found no strong correlations between the dependent variables and the perception of the scenarios, so we still expect the scenarios as equally problematic and only controlled for these factors with a Repeated Measures ANOVA for hypotheses 2b and 4. Method Qualitative Research Interviews In order to get a clearer picture of the thoughts behind the decision to engage in sousveillance we furthermore decided to conduct qualitative interviews. We were interested in opinions and gathered reflections to add deeper insights into the decision-making process for different forms of actions regarding the different sousveillance forms which should help us to answer our research question. We asked all participants weather they were willing to participate in a follow-up interview. 39 agreed on an interview by providing us with their email address at the end of the survey. We performed a median-split on basis of the acceptance items of the questionnaire to divide the 39 people into two equal groups aiming to compare people high in acceptance with people low in acceptance. In the following, we developed an interview guide, following our research question. The interviews were composed of open-ended and pre-established questions, which were divided into six categories; follow-up questions to each issue were allowed (see interview guide appendix A5). Each interviewee was contacted personally via email and the interviews were all recorded (for transcript contact author).. We conducted eight face-to-face and seven Skype interviews (with video camera). Due to the given timeframe more personal interviews were not possible, but 19 email 27 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE interviews completed the sample, aiming to provide additional data supporting and explaining our face-to-face data and fill possible gaps which can exist due to the small sample of face-to- face interviews. The interview participants were chosen based on theoretical criteria, e.g., seven of them were highly accepting sousveillance, the other eight answered very critical about sousveillance, so we could compare reasoning between the two groups from the online survey. Moreover, we aimed for a mixture of nationalities and occupations. Finally, each group (High in Acceptance and Low in Acceptance) had an equal number of 17 participants. All participants were asked the same questions, with the exceptions that follow-up questions during the spoken interview were allowed (all transcripts can be found in appendix A6). The sample consisted of 23 female and 11 male participants. Most of them came from Germany (13); all in all, 13 different nationalities were represented. The majority were students (20). This is in accordance with the sample distribution of our quantitative study and means therefore a good representation of the whole sample. The spoken interviews took on average 8 minutes and were throughout conducted in English. After the data was logged and focused we can draw the following conclusion. Skype and face-to-face revealed the best results, since follow-up questions could be asked and irritating questions could be explained if necessary. Furthermore, in some cases discussions aroused from the interviews and the information could be used for the discussion part as well. As explained before, we coded the data roughly by sorting it into categories that organize it to certain topics and render it meaningful. The codes were established from the questions and topics from our interview guide and from the overall research question. We focused on what the persons were saying (topic relevant keywords) and how they perceived these incidents in general. The final classification can be found in Appendix A7. Therefore, the interview questions, building on the survey questions, were previously divided into six main blocks, so the data was logged and focused into these main categories. The questions aimed to help answering our hypotheses and were only asked in a different way than in the survey. The first category concerned the types of sousveillance of our four scenarios, in order to find out if people recognize the difference between sousveillance of fellow citizens and of hierarchical authorities, which is a requirement for answering our research question. Furthermore, we asked if participants saw a difference in acceptance to publicize the four different cases. The second part of the questionnaire involved questions about acceptance of others, who are posting these incidents, whereas the third category dealt with own experiences and possible postings in the future. The forth category contained answers about the personal goals of sousveillance engagement. The last three categories 28 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE contained data about their general opinion about the medium and audience of their posts and summarized their main reasons for using Facebook. These categories aimed to give an overview about the use of social media in relation to sousveillance as a serious act of posting.
Results Online Survey
Descriptive statistics (M, SD, α) for all dependent variables can be found in table 8. As mentioned before, a pre-test was conducted in order to test the chosen scenarios in terms of emotion and degree of violence. It revealed no significant differences, meaning no improvements in terms of the scenarios had to be implemented. The reliability of the different scales was assessed with Cronbach’s alpha. It clearly exceeded the threshold of .70 for all scales and no adjustment had to be performed. We also determined the correlations between the distinct variables. A table with all correlations is enclosed in appendix A4. Table 8 Descriptive Statistics for All Variables Regarding Sousveillance Forms and Types
Variable All Hierarchi- Fellow Political Lateral State Personal scenarios cal citizens sous- sous- sous- sous- authorities veillance veillance veillance veillance M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
α Attitude 4.68 (1.1) 4.03 (.49) 4.03 4.0 (.78) 4.0 (.56) 4.0 (.58) 4.9 (1.4) α =.946 (.52) Subjective 3.69 (1.3) 3.78 (1.3) 3.61 4 (1.4) 3.6 (1.5) 3.5 (1.5) 3.6 (1.5) Norm α =.903 (1.4) Perceived 5.33 (1.3) 5.35 (1.4) 5.32 5.2 (1.5) 5.4 (1.5) 5.5 (1.4) 5.3 (1.6) behavioural α =.892 (1.4) control Acceptance 4.96 (1.1) 4.98 (1.1) 4.94 5.3 (1.2) 5 (1.3) 4.7 (1.4) 4.9 (1.4) α =.896 (1.2) Intention 3.56 (1.4) 3.68 (1.5) 3.44 3.97 (1.6) 3.38 (1.6) 3.39 (1.6) 3.49 α =.939 (1.5) (1.6) Control 6.1 (.94) 5.94 (1.1) 6.25 6.1(1.2) 6.2 (1.1) 5.7 (1.3) 6.3 (1.2) Variables α =.878 (.93)
H1a-c: Predictors of Acceptance for all Scenarios In the next sections, all analysed constructs are reported in order to be able to reject or accept the hypothesized relationships. We used confidence intervals of 95% (95% CI) and p- values <.05 to show significance. 29 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE To investigate the first set of hypotheses (1a-c), separate linear regression analysis was used for every predictor. The first regression revealed a significant main effect for attitude (b =.672, t =11.26, p <.001). Attitude explains a significant proportion of variance in acceptance scores (R2 =.45, F(1,155) =126.82, p <.001). The regression model supported the hypothesis that participants with a more positive attitude also have higher scores on the acceptance index. We also found a significant main effect for subjective norm (b =.715, t =12.69, p <.001). Subjective norm explained a significant proportion of variance in acceptance scores, (R2 = .511, F(1,155) =161.02, p <.001. This result supported the hypothesis that there would be a positive relationship between subjective norm and acceptance of sousveillance. Regarding our third predictor, perceived behavioural control, there was a significant main effect, too (b = .204, t = 2.59, p <.05). However, perceived behavioural control explained only 4% of proportion of variance in acceptance scores (R2 = .042, F(1,155) =6.7, p <.05). It is important to note that perceived behavioural control had a very small variance in general (no normal distribution), meaning people saw themselves to always be in control. In all scenarios, almost 1/3 of respondents answered the questions about the construct of control with high scores. Table 9 represents the main results of the separate regressions on acceptance for all variables. Table 9 Standard Regression Results for Sousveillance Acceptance Variable B SE B Beta t Sig. (p)
Attitude .68 .06 .67 11.26 .000
Subjective norm .59 .05 .72 12.69 .000
Perceived behavioural control .16 .06 .20 2.59 .011
2 2 2 Note. R Attitude = .45; R Subjective norm = .51; R Perceived behavioural control = .04
All in all, hypotheses 1 a-c are supported meaning that the assumptions of the theory of planned behaviour are confirmed by our model. H2a: Differences of Predictors between Scenarios To investigate hypothesis 2a, supposing that the TPB predictors differ in terms of sousveillance type we conducted multiple regression tests aiming to prove that the three predictors attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control have different influences depending on the respective type of sousveillance. 30 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Table 10a shows all correlations between the variables in the hierarchical sousveillance scenarios.
Table 10a
Correlations of the Variables in the Analysis of Hierarchical Authorities
Variable 2 3 4
1. Acceptance .42* .68* .21*
2. Attitude - .31* -.07
3. Subjective norm - .02
4. Perceived behavioural control -
Note. *p < .001.
The overall regression model was a good fit of the data and statistically significant, (F (3,152) = 62.69, p <.001), and explained approximately 55% of the variance of acceptance. It was found that higher levels of subjective norm primarily predicted acceptance of sousveillance of hierarchical authorities (b=.59, p <.001), as did higher levels of attitude, (b =.25, p <.001) and behavioural control, (b = .21, p <.05), though to a lesser extent. The variance in acceptance uniquely explained by attitude was approximately 5% (sr2 = .05) and by subjective norm 32% (sr2 = .32). Both scenarios identified subjective norm as the strongest predictor of acceptance. Table 10b shows the raw and standardized regression coefficients of the predictors together with their correlations of acceptance and their squared semipartial correlations.
Table 10b Standard Regression Results for Hierarchical Sousveillance Acceptance
Model B SE B Beta p sr2
Constant -.24 .58 .68
Attitude .58 .13 .25 .000 .05
Subjective norm .51 .05 .59 .000 .32
Perceived behavioural control .18 .04 .21 .000 .06
Note. The dependent variable was Acceptance, R2 =.55, Adjusted R2 = .54.
31 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE In case of sousveillance of fellow citizens, all correlations of the variables are shown in table 11a. Table 11a
Correlations of the Variables in the Analysis of Fellow Citizens
Variable 2 3 4
1. Acceptance .46* .71* .20*
2. Attitude - .36* -.03
3. Subjective norm - .06
4. Perceived behavioural control -
Note. *p < .001.
The results of this analysis indicated that subjective norm, attitude and perceived behavioural control accounted for a significant amount of the acceptance variability (R2 =.58, F(3,152) =71.17, p <.001), emphasizing that people with more positive attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control tended to have higher scores on the overall acceptance index. Subjective norm significantly predicted acceptance scores of fellow citizens (b =.62, p <.001) as did attitude, (b=.24, p <.001) and behavioural control, (b =.16, p <.05), though to a lesser extent. Subjective norm uniquely explained 33% of the variance in acceptance, attitude approximately 5% and perceived behavioural control 3%. The raw and standardized regression coefficients of the predictors together with their correlations of acceptance and their squared semi-partial correlations are shown in table 11b.
Table 11b Standard Regression Results for Fellow Citizens Sousveillance Acceptance
Model b SE B Beta p sr2
Constant .29 .52 .59
Attitude .53 .12 .24 .000 .05
Subjective norm .50 .05 .61 .000 .33
Perceived behavioural control .13 .04 .17 .002 .03
Note. The dependent variable was Acceptance, R2 =.58, Adjusted R2 = .58.
32 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Concluding, our hypothesis expecting different predictors of acceptance for the different scenarios was not supported. No difference between the two types of sousveillance could be identified; for both, subjective norm was the strongest predictor, followed by attitude and perceived behavioural control. Nonetheless, since we determined a difference with respect to offensiveness between the two hierarchical authority cases (scenario one and three) we additionally performed a multiple regression for each of the four scenarios to have a closer look at the single differences. The regressions for each sousveillance form mostly confirmed our previous findings. Only in the case of the first scenario (state sousveillance) we found a slightly different order in importance of independent variables, with perceived behavioural control as the second strongest predictor, but since we conducted the single regression analyses only to secure that scenario three would not influence our results, we did not need to take this difference into account. A detailed analysis of all regression can be found in appendix A5.
H2b: Different Influence of Acceptance on Intention between Scenarios We investigated hypothesis 2b with a paired sample t-test. To control for the third scenario, we also decided to conduct a comparison of the four scenarios against each other using the Repeated Measures ANOVA. The average scores showed that sousveillance of fellow citizens, i.e., scenario two and four, were similarly accepted and can be found in table 8 at the beginning of the result section. In terms of hierarchies, political sousveillance was accepted the most, whereas state sousveillance was accepted the least, which suggested that state and political sousveillance could be analysed separately. Two reasons are possible here, either the form made the difference or disparities in offensiveness levels made the difference (see the previously determined difference regarding offensiveness in scenario three). Nevertheless, since the type comparison still revealed a tendency towards sousveillance of hierarchical authorities and our current design concentrates on comparing types of sousveillance, these anomalies had to be neglected. The paired sample t-test revealed no significant difference between acceptance of sousveillance of hierarchical authorities (state and political sousveillance) and acceptance of fellow citizens. On average, participants rather accepted sousveillance of hierarchical authorities (M =4.98, SD =1.1) than of fellow citizens (M =4.94, SD =1.2). Nevertheless, this difference of -.036, (95% CI [-.084, .156]) was not significant (t(155) =.596, p > .05), leading to rejection of the hypothesis that acceptance of lateral or personal sousveillance is less favourable than acceptance of state or political sousveillance. 33 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE To control for further differences (between all scenarios individually), we additionally conducted the Repeated Measures ANOVA. The Mauchly’s test indicated no violation of sphericity (χ²(5) =.958, p >.05). The results showed that the acceptance of sousveillance was significantly different for all scenarios (F(2,465) =11.93, p <.001). Contrasts revealed that scenario one (M =5.26, SD =1.2) was evaluated higher than scenario two (M =4.97, SD =1.3). This difference was also significant (F(1,155) =10.34, p <.05, r =.06). This showed that the first scenario (police officers at the demonstration) was more likely to be accepted than the second one, where the girl gang beat up a classmate. Scenarios two compared to three (M =4.7, SD =1.4), showed a significant difference as well (F(1,155) =7.78, p <.05, r =.05). However, this revealed a higher acceptance for publicizing the girl gang than compared to the security guard. The final contrast between the third and fourth scenario (M =4.92, SD =1.4) was also significant (F(1,155) =6.37, p <.05) and showed higher acceptance for scenario four (violence at work) than for scenario three. This test suggested differences between each scenario, masking of differences in the grouped categories but they are not relevant for our type comparison. H3: Predictors of Intention for all Scenarios Regarding our third hypothesis, we performed a multiple regression analysis in order to find out which TPB construct was the strongest predictor of behavioural intention to engage in sousveillance. Therefore, we used attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control as predictors and intention as the dependent variable. Table 12a shows the correlations of the variables.
Table 12a
Correlations of the Variables in the Analysis of Sousveillance Engagement
Variable 2 3 4
Intention .64* .84* .11*
Attitude - .58* .04
Subjective norm - .05
Perceived behavioural control -
Note. *p < .001.
The regression model was statistically significant (F(3,152) =141.329, p <.001) and accounted for approximately 73% of the variance of intention. It was found that higher levels of subjective norm primarily predicted intention to engage in sousveillance (b =.76, p <.001) 34 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE as did higher levels of attitude, though to a lesser extent (b =.31, p <.001). Perceived behavioural control had no significant influence on intention (b =.06, p >.05). The variance in acceptance uniquely explained by subjective norm was approximately 35% (sr2 =.035) and identified subjective norm as the strongest predictor of intention to engage in sousveillance. The raw and standardized regression coefficients of the predictors together with their correlations of intention and their squared semipartial correlations are shown in table 12b.
Table 12b Standard Regression Results for Sousveillance Engagement Model b SE B Beta p sr2
Constant -1.03 .35 .003
Attitude .31 .07 .23 .000 .035
Subjective norm .76 .06 .70 .000 .327
Perceived behavioural control .06 .04 .06 .154 .004
Note. The dependent variable was intention, R2 =.76, Adjusted R2 = .73.
Concluding, our hypothesis expecting perceived behavioural control to be the strongest predictor was not supported.
H4: Differences in Engagement in Sousveillance between Scenarios We investigated our fourth hypothesis, claiming that engagement in sousveillance of hierarchical authorities is more likely than engagement in sousveillance of fellow citizens with a paired sample t-test. In addition, we analysed the ranking exercise, where the participants dragged and dropped the four scenarios in an order showing which scenario they would share most likely, second likely, third likely and least likely, providing us with further insights into the intention of people to engage in the different forms of sousveillance. As control for the third scenario, we also decided to conduct a comparison of the four scenarios against each other using Repeated Measures ANOVA. The sample paired t-test for engagement showed a coefficient of -.24 (95% CI [.07, .41]) between sousveillance of hierarchical authorities (M =3.68, SD =1.5) and fellow citizens (M =3.44, SD =1.5). This difference was significant (t(155) =2.85, p <.05), meaning that on average participants rather intended to engage in sousveillance of hierarchical authorities than in sousveillance of fellow citizens. In view of the ranking exercise, table 13 shows that the scenarios of political and state sousveillance were much more likely to be shared (high ranking on first and second place). 35 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Concluding, this exercise supported our hypothesis that hierarchical sousveillance cases are more likely to be shared. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the third scenario was ranked first by 5% of the people, showing its ambiguousness. Table 13 Ranking Results of All Scenarios
Rank Political Lateral State Personal Sousveillance Sousveillance Sousveillance Sousveillance
Rank 1 66.4% 17.0% 5.3% 11.6%
Rank 2 15.0% 25.9% 40.7% 18.8%
Rank 3 10.6% 33.0% 30.1% 26.8%
Rank 4 8.0% 24.1% 23.9% 42.9%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Furthermore, we conducted a Repeated Measures ANOVA for all four scenarios. Mauchly’s test indicated violation of sphericity (χ²(5) =.858, p <.001). The degrees of freedom were therefore corrected with the Huynh-Feldt estimates for sphericity (ɛ =.93). The results showed that the intention to engage in the four scenarios was significantly different (F(2.76, 424.78) =13.81, p <.001). However, in terms of scenario three the pairwise comparisons revealed only a significant difference with scenario one (-.574, p <.001), thus, no contradicting findings were found and our hypothesis was supported. Analysis of Co-Variables We conducted independent t-tests to control for the previous mentioned control variables with regard to our dependent variables acceptance and intention to engage. For gender, we found a significant effect regarding acceptance. Male participants (M =4.7, SD =1.1) were less likely to accept sousveillance than female participants (M =5.2, SD =.97). This difference of -0.5, was significant (t(154) =-2.98, p <.001) and represented a small effect (r =.05). We found a main effect for profession in all scenarios. We compared the two biggest groups with each other (working professionals and students). On average, working professionals were less likely to accept sousveillance (M =4.66, SD =1.2) than students (M =5.11, SD =1.1). This difference of -0.45 (95% CI [-.82, -.07]) was significant (t(154) =-2.37, p <.05) and represented a small effect (r =.04). We found a similar significant effect for intention to engage in sousveillance. Working professionals (M =3.19, SD =1.5) were also 36 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE less likely to engage in sousveillance than students (M =3.7, SD =1.4). This difference of -.05, 95% CI [-1.0, -0.01] was significant (t(144) =-2.01, p <.05) and represented a small effect (r =.03). To control for a possible influence of nationality on our dependent variables we conducted an independent t-test and compared Germans, who represented the biggest group, with all other nationalities. We found that German participants were less likely to accept sousveillance (M =4.71, SD =1.1) as well as to engage in it (M =3.16, SD =1.4) than participants from other countries (M Acceptance =5.29, SD =1.3; M Intention =4.07, SD =1.6). With regard to acceptance, this difference (- .57, 95% CI [-.9, -.24]) was significant (t(154) =-3.43, p <.001) and represented a medium-effect (r =.26). In terms of intention to engage, the difference was even bigger (-.91, 95% CI [-1.3, -.49]) and significant as well (t(154) =-4.22, p <.001). This also represented a medium-effect (r =.32). For age, internet use and photos taken, we conducted a post-hoc median-split and categorized the participants into two groups, comparing people high in internet use, in age and in pictures taken with the people below the median value. For the amount of photos taken per week as well as for age, no significant differences were detected. For internet use, we found significant differences between the low and high groups in terms of acceptance and intention. People spending more hours online than the sample average were more likely to accept sousveillance (M =5.21, SD =1.0) than people spending less time online (M =4.77, SD =1.1). This difference (-.46, 95% CI [-.79, -.13]) was significant (t(154) =2.73, p <.05) and represents a small effect (r =.05). These people were also more likely to engage in sousveillance (M =3.82, SD =1.4), compared to the low group (M =3.34, SD =1.4). This difference of -.5 (95% CI [-.94,-.05]) was significant (t(154) =-2.22, p = <.05) and also represented a small effect (r =.03). This leads to the conclusion that internet use had an influence on acceptance and engagement.
Results Interviews
Based on our interview guide and the interview transcripts, we separated five answer categories, which we will further investigate in this result section in order to give an overview about the interview data. Table 18 gives representative quotes about the respective categories from both the group high in acceptance of sousveillance and from the group low in acceptance, in order to allow a clear and easy comparison between the two groups afterwards. Additionally, two detailed tables, one representing the results of the group high in acceptance, 37 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE and one of the lower group can be found in appendix A7 (transcription is available on request). 38 PEOPLE ACCEPTING AND ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE Table 14
Results of Both Interview Groups (Nr. of Interviewee)
Issue/ Differences in scenario and in acceptance Acceptance of Experiences Goals With whom Best Medium and group of publicizing others Facebook Use
High “Ordinary people abuse each other” vs “appreciate it” (9) “too easily “awareness” “Friends” (2) “Facebook” (15) “authorities abuse average people” (3) “depends on how interpretable”(1) (1) “everyone” (3) “Twitter”(4) “authorities vs people” (1) they do it” (1) “riot really sensitive topic” ”attention “must be “newspaper”(11) “really public” vs. “more private” (6) “depends on what (5) and trustable”(6) “social media” (5) “police acting” vs. “private people” (7) the people want to “extremely careful” (11) prevention” “general “press” (14) “the person who is abusing is different” achieve”(8) “not very active on social (2) public” (17) (14) “yes it is good” media (..) have never faced “change the “contact” (3) (14) such situations” (12) government” “information” (3) “first scenario most important one to “always appreciate “several photos, videos and (6) “private” (12) share for me” (16) it” (16) information about police “condemn “1-3 are okay to be published” (17) brutality” (16) violence”(8) Low “authorized people” vs “normal people “depends on “never seen anything like “awareness” “all my “social media (18) situation (19) this happening” (19) (18) friends”(23) because it is “kind of authorities” vs “ordinary people” “Ï have to “never done” (20) “meaningles “public”(26) unbiased” (24) (21) appreciate it” (18) “there is nothing like that I s and will “prefer the press” “how a person with a formal status “only in some would ever post in social not lead to (21) attacking someone who is inferior in the cases” (20) media”(21) anything” “Facebook, situation” (30) “would appreciate “have never shared such (20) Instagram, Twitter” the police violence things and will probably “discussion” (30) “the case where authorities use violence type never do it” (29) (24) is more accepted to be shared online” definitely”(23) “attention” “contact” (19) (18) Ï am very (25) “connect with my “the first scenario with the police should ambivalent about “giving international be publicized but I’m not sure about three this” (29) proof” (28) friends” (18) others” (20) “depends on issue” “information” (20) “less common to publicize would be the (34) workplace one”(23) PEOPLE ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE
Recognition of Scenarios and Acceptance of Publication For the first group of people (high in acceptance), we found that twelve out of 17 recognized a difference between the scenarios, in which people in power positions (authorities) used violence against ordinary/private people and when the violence occurred between ‘equal’ people. One participant understood it in the following way: “The difference is that theoretically, the security guard and the police officer have the authority to act in such a way, they are given weapons and are expected to protect” (12). This opinion indicates that authorities are still seen as people whose profession it is, if necessary, to use violence. Even in cases where the victim is peaceful (scenario one), this person did not realize any misbehaviour from authorities. Two others did not recognize any differences between the scenarios and only described them as equally violent. The acceptance to share all these cases online was high, nevertheless no clear statement that the hierarchical cases (scenarios one and three) would be shared more was made. We recognized that people often agreed on the fact that cases of work violence should not be publicized since they could easily ruin a company and expose the victim. . Moreover, the security case was seen in a different way than the police case, because the shoplifter started with illegal behaviour. Most participants did not see any reason to share this, whereas the police case was mentioned to be shared most likely a few times. 15 participants stated that they appreciate these posts of others when the intention is clearly to raise awareness and show bad things, whereas they do not appreciate it when it is only to make fun or to disturb. One said: “I do not necessarily appreciate it, since it is something disturbing that comes on your normally nice, simple, newsfeed, however again I think that it is important to be aware of this” (12). This statement showed that the participant sees the need to make aware of these incidents but does not want to get annoyed by it on his private [Facebook] news feed. For the second group, the people who were below the median of acceptance in the whole sample, different findings can be presented. In this group, the majority (13) determined the anticipated difference between violence used by authorities or official people and individual people/fellow citizens. Eight interviewees confirmed that they would most likely post the public cases, in particular the police case. The work case was seen as the case least likely to be accepted when published. Four participants stated that they do not appreciate sharing of these incidents at all, while all others said that it depends on the issue, the form of sousveillance and the goals.
I am very ambivalent about this. On the one hand these people probably feel that they are doing a good thing by sharing and giving this attention. I however think that it will 39
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only cause more harm by publicly shaming these people. If you really want to do something you will have to go to the authorities instead of the general public. (29)
This participant described the conflicting nature of this problem but concluded that sharing misbehaviour with the public would not lead to changes and though people try to do something good, this is not the right way to achieve something. Another one stated his disapproval of people who only share in order to place themselves in the focus: “I think that it is good to sensitize people about violence, but I do not like people that are trying to get attention on themselves using that scene or event” (31). In general, we found a stronger rejection of sharing of these incidents in the group low in acceptance. Furthermore, the work case was accepted the least whereas the police case was accepted the most. These findings confirmed our second hypothesis that sousveillance of hierarchical authorities, in particular political sousveillance, is more accepted than sousveillance of fellow citizens (personal sousveillance). Own Experiences and Achievements From the first group only three people experienced one of these scenes themselves or shared similar cases in the past. Nevertheless, almost half of the participants claimed that they could imagine sharing similar incidents, when they are sure about context and truth and that the victim would also appreciate an action. One participant explained his experiences in the following way and highlighted the advantages of social media:
Last year during the demonstrations in Turkey I shared several photos, videos and information about police brutality to make at least my environment more aware of the fact. The biggest reason is the attitude of the mainstream media, which is censored by government. In that situation I prefer to be a part of the alternative media on behalf of my country and democracy. (16)
Almost everyone mentioned awareness as a main goal, whereby some also noted that change and prevention could be achieved by these posts. No one said that these posts in general are not worth to be shared or that they see no reasons to do it. 14 people referred to Facebook as the best outlet for publicising such pictures or videos, and some mentioned YouTube and Twitter as further possibilities. Only one person referred to the press as the only good medium, whereby some preferred a combination of both, social media and press. Finally, the participants were asked to name their main reason for being on Facebook. Here, eleven persons stated contacts and communication with friends, whereby five also mentioned they get information on Facebook.
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The people low in acceptance admitted that they had never posted a similar case themselves. The majority also would not do so in the future, whereas some people suggested different ways (direct interference, denounce it to the police) and some would only do it if the situation was clear and not open to interpretation. Four people did not come up with any possible reason why to post these things, while twelve also mentioned awareness and attention. None of the participants in both groups was willing to share any form of fellow citizens’ sousveillance. When they agreed to share something, they only mentioned similar cases as the one at the demonstration, where the police, as an entitled representative, used violence against citizens. These results supported our fourth hypothesis, claiming that people are more likely to engage in sousveillance of hierarchical authorities than of fellow citizens.
Choice of Distribution Channels Regarding audience and distribution channels, the majority from group one mentioned social media as the best outlet for publicising such incidents. Facebook in particular was named most often, followed by Twitter and YouTube. However, some people claimed a combination of social media and traditional press to be most successful. They emphasized that Facebook was an easy, cheap and effective way of spreading news but does not replace newspapers and articles written by journalists; furthermore, it cannot replace active intervention. As one participant formulated:
I also think that Facebook can be a useful way to hear about events that just happened, however I would not like it if my Facebook feed became my outlet for news. When I want to inform myself on current events I will go to a news website, CNN, Yahoo, BBC, etc. and inform myself there, or watch the news on TV. (12) Another participant presented a similar point of view and stated that sharing online is not comparable to active support and can neither replace newspapers nor court work:
Violence needs to be reported and a court should decide what should happen to the attacker. In all the cases people need to be made responsible but not by internet users, who take it out of context, but by people whose job it is to find an appropriate punishment. Unfortunately, in the internet things become independent in such a strong way that you lose control about the things you share, which can have negative consequences for victims and offenders. (8) This response highlighted the results described in the previous sections. Especially by posting online, many incidents are taken out of context and internet users are not the right
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PEOPLE ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE people to judge single individuals. They emphasized that they mainly use Facebook for private reasons like chatting. From group two, six people did not answer the audience questions since they admitted that they would never share anything. The others mainly mentioned their friends as preferred audience of their posts; only one person thought about the public as the perfect audience for sharing. Ten people declared themselves in favour of social media, in particular of Facebook as the perfect outlet for publicizing these incidents. Five considered the press to be at least a good medium as well. Eleven participants said they use Facebook for socializing reasons, like chatting and keeping contact, whereby only two persons considered the information content as essential.
Synthesis of Interview Results All in all, the group high in acceptance mainly recognized the two different types of sousveillance and appreciated sharing these incidents, although not many people experienced these incidents themselves. In general, they were uncertain and ambiguous about their own willingness to post. Although they still saw Facebook mostly as a private chatting opportunity, they considered it as the right medium to make aware of these events. People from the low acceptance group did not differ so much from the first group in respect of acceptance. Moreover, they also stated that they would most likely post the police case and least likely the work violence. However, regarding own experiences and desired achievements, many differences were found. The participants were less likely to share these incidents in the future and did not come up with many desired achievements. Some people could not imagine any advantages reaped by sharing. Furthermore, no one experienced any similar case him- or herself. Since these respondents did not claim to have a high willingness to share, they also did not distinguish between audiences as much as group one. They mainly stated that if they shared, which would not likely be the case, they would share incidents with everyone.
Discussion
Since our analyses and the qualitative interviews yielded significant insights into acceptance of and engagement in sousveillance, we will now draw conclusions and discuss the results with regard to our research question: Under what contextual circumstances is sousveillance accepted and what motivates people to engage in sousveillance? In the light of existing work and theories, we will first discuss all results and reflect on them regarding behavioral motivation (predictors of TPB), before we have a closer look at the contextual 42
PEOPLE ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE circumstances (sousveillance types). The following table summarizes the findings of this study in relation to each of our research hypotheses.
Table 15
Evaluation of Research Hypotheses
Hypotheses Results Section
H1a: [+] attitude Supported [+] acceptance
H1b: [+] subjective norm Supported Acceptance – TPB [+] acceptance constructs
H1c: [+] perceived behavioral control Supported [+] acceptance
H2a: TPB predictors different for scenarios Not supported Acceptance Prediction
H2b: [+] acceptance for sousveillance of authorities Not supported Sousveillance Type I
H3: behavioral control strongest predictor Not supported Intention Prediction
H4: [+] engagement for sousveillance of authorities Supported Sousveillance Type II
The expectations that positive attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control would lead to acceptance and ultimately predict intention to engage in sousveillance (H1a-c) were confirmed by our study (H1a-c). This result lends support to the theory of planned behavior as a model of human action (Ajzen, 1991) and suggests that if wanted people’s behavior can systematically be changed by persuasion and information, influencing the beliefs of people. The interviewees also revealed that people increasingly search for information online and peer’s opinions and posts are mostly appreciated. Regarding our second hypothesis (H2a), no statistical support was detected. By comparing the influences of the three predictors for the two types of sousveillance we found no remarkable differences. A possible explanation is that people did not primarily focus on the differences in the scenarios as we predicted, because the concept of sousveillance seemed unknown to many, but stated their general attitude towards sousveillance. This finding was confirmed in the interviewees and will be explained in the next paragraph with regard to hypotheses 2b. Contrary to our expectation that perceived behavioral control would be the most influential factor (H3), subjective norm turned out to be the outstanding predictor in all cases. 43
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People seemed to be more influenced by social pressure, created by society and its influences, when making a decision than by the beliefs about the easiness of performing a behavior or the attitude towards it. This contradicts previous findings, where attitude and perceived behavioral control mainly explained the variance in intention (Krueger & Carsud, 2010; Conner & McMillan, 1999), but can have various reasons. First of all, whereas the scores on perceived behavioral control were high its variance was low, which can be explained by the overall online environment. In particular internet and social media provide high level of control over own behavior. In this type of environment other predictors, not part of the theory of planned behavior may thus play a role. Furthermore, it can be explained by the peer pressure online, in particular among young people. People want to belong to communities and be accepted among their friends; they aim for a “collective identity” (Castells et al., 2007). It can therefore be concluded that for young people, sharing incidents in social networks mainly depends on a person’s social environment because they fear low control or privacy loss in the online environment. Most interviewees affirmed that in case they decide to post they share it with the public and in case they are sure that it is expected of them to share an incident, they are willing to overlook impediments. The findings about acceptance and engagement (H2b and H4) are especially noteworthy since they revealed unexpected differences. Participants did not show a difference in acceptance between the two types of sousveillance, but in terms of their potential engagement. A possible explanation for this is that people were generally low in acceptance of any form of sousveillance and did therefore not distinguish much between the scenarios. Furthermore, accepting is a more passive act than engaging and could be answered in a more neutral way. The interviews provided further insights that could explain this difference. The question on acceptance was the first one in the interviews and some interviewees seemed to be slightly nervous and ambiguous about the scenarios, which could explain a random evaluation of the scenarios. Statements like, “it should be more acceptable (if this can be rated) to publish 1 and 3” (27) or “in my personal opinion, violence is not acceptable at all and publicizing using the right media channels is always a good thing” (31) highlight the impression that people did not clearly distinguish between the scenarios and were unconsciously encouraged to equally reject all violent incidents. Moreover, the question regarding acceptance was explicitly about the four scenarios whereby the question about participants’ willingness to post incidents was more hypothetical, since not many interviewees experienced these forms of misbehaviour and could therefore easily say yes without taking further actions. “If I imagine myself seeing the police doing
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PEOPLE ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE something like that I would post that it but it is kind of unimaginable for me because I do not expect these things happening to me right now in Germany.”(19). Even though the statistical difference regarding engagement was significant, it is worth discussing the results for the two types in general, considering the fact that the scenario with the security guard was evaluated differently in terms of offensiveness. Therefore, we expect the main reason for the overall small differences between the two types to be caused by scenario three. Scenarios two and four (cases of sousveillance of fellow citizens) are ranked similarly for acceptance, engagement and offensiveness, meaning these two scenarios can easily be referred to as fellow citizen sousveillance. People did not see the two types of hierarchical and fellow citizen sousveillance as the same. Therefore, a different approach needs to be used in case of hierarchical sousveillance, since the numbers differ tremendously for all dependent variables. Tests showed that the mean difference between the two cases was significant for acceptance and for intention (p <.001). This observation can be attributed to different reasons. The security guard was not always perceived as an authority or state officer, since it happened in a private shop. In addition, people gave the shoplifter partial responsibility for the incident, since she behaved illegally in the first place. In comparison to this, the woman in the first scenario was clearly identified as a victim, who demonstrated peacefully and was attacked by several officers without reason. Furthermore, the profession of a security guard in contrast to a police officer seems to be perceived as less authoritarian and hierarchical. In addition, our analysis revealed that people indicated their preference to engage in sousveillance of scenario two (girl gang) rather than in scenario three (security guard). This confirmed our declaration that people are critical of the security case and would consequently be more likely to engage in other forms of sousveillance, even sousveillance of fellow citizens. The interviews confirmed the perception of distinct varieties between the first and the third scenario. Many participants, from both the low acceptance and the high acceptance group, said that they mostly accept the riot scenario to be publicized. They would most likely share this scenario as well. As explained before, the security case was often mentioned as the scenario that did not warrant public attention. We obtained a similar result for the work case, where people were concerned about the reputation of the company. One participant said: “I think scenario 4 is not acceptable to publish because you can ruin a whole company which maybe has only one bad employee.” (26). Regarding the victims, concern was expressed too: “It is said that victims of violence often feel ashamed for being a victim, so it is questionable to me whether posting such events is to be appreciated or not.”(15).
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All results show that most people perceived every scenario individually and did not always recognize the difference in authority or power level of the attacker; instead, they rather focused on credibility, context, and degree of violence. They stated explicitly that everything they would possibly share needed to be ethically and morally unobjectionable, put into context and should achieve clearly formulated goals. Another explanation for the low scores in acceptance and engagement lies within the fact that mostly Germans (56.4%) participated in our study. As reported before, a comparison between Germans and all other nationalities showed that German participants were less likely to accept sousveillance as well as to engage in it than people from other countries. Our interview sample confirmed these findings. German participants were more reserved regarding sousveillance, both in terms of accepting others to post, as well as in stating their own willingness to share. First, we can explain these differences with the general political and economic situations in the respective countries. Since Germany is a democratic and well- organized state with less violence and riots in the last years then countries like Greece, Turkey or Russia, the Germans are less likely to be witnesses of these incidents and consequently not as attached to the scenarios. Second, there are possibly also differences in the general acceptance of authority across countries as well as in privacy attitudes. Germans interviews did not see the footage as evidence for truth or context and did not interpret them as real danger situations. Non-German interviewees had more experience with these incidents. “Last year during the demonstrations in Turkey I shared several photos, videos and information about police brutality to make at least my environment more aware of the fact.”(16). Furthermore, they gave a clear opinion either against or in favor of sousveillance, as one Korean participant stated: “Regarding these extreme cases I haven’t posted anything like that yet but if there’s something serious going on in my society I will post it for sure!” (18). Regarding the use of new media, we also gained some new information from this study. Most of our interviewees had a strong opinion: They preferred to post positive things (articles, vacation pictures) and used Facebook mainly for private activities. However, there is a recognizable tendency to get information and use Facebook for more serious things, since it provides a unique, fast, easy and large community for communication. One interviewee phrased that he used Facebook “for private use, like chatting with friends and getting informed about stuff in my country.” (20). Another interviewee referred to the mentioned information trend:
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The main reason for me to be on Facebook is to keep in touch with people but I really noticed a shift that I discover more and more interesting articles in my timeline so that it is becoming a mixture of information and contact. (22)
Ali & Mann’s expectations that people would mostly engage in sousveillance due to safety reasons could not be supported (2013). In general, people seem to be concerned about consequences and their social perception. They examined the issue, its credibility and context thoroughly before they were willing to share something on their private pages. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research The results obtained through this study are subject to some limitations. First of all, the theory of planned behavior, on which we based our research, has some limitations, as it focuses only on a few variables. Future research should speculate which other predictors may play a role, given the nature of sousveillance and social media. In particular, environmental and cultural factors should be taken into account, due to the differences found between different nationalities and sousveillance form. Furthermore, the scenarios were not perceived as totally equal and could have led to preferences. Our pre-test already revealed slight differences in the emotional perception of the scenarios which were found again in the main survey. In terms of the control questions, participants showed a bias towards the first scenario (presenting violent police officers at a riot) and the third scenario (a security guard attacking a shoplifter). In terms of the first scenario, it is possible that this was due to the action shown in the image being perceived as more offensive and problematic, since many men attacked an individual woman, or because police officers against one woman in public lead to stronger emotions in general. In general, women are more frequent victims than men. While all victims shown in this study were female, future researchers can build upon our results through comparison of different victim gender and other demographic types. Regarding the third scenario, the security guard was not always seen as a hierarchical authority, since he worked in a private shop and also the victim was perceived guilty for stealing. Our current design could not differentiate between these two and even though Repeated Measures ANOVAS were used to investigate differences, future research should use a research design focusing on every form individually. Other limitations of the study are directly connected with the target group. First, our survey sample consists mostly of students, who use the internet for entertainment and social reasons and post mostly positive things (party pictures, songs, etc.), meaning they may not be interested in violent or serious issues when they use Facebook or other social networks. Replication of the study with a more representative sample (working professionals) could 47
PEOPLE ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE increase the explanatory power of our factor relationships. Second, almost no native speaker participated in the English study, which could have led to misunderstandings regarding the relatively unknown topic of sousveillance. Third, we did not distinguish between ‘normal citizens’ and political activists, some of whom engage in sousveillance on ideological grounds. A comparison between these two groups could yield interesting results as well as an investigation about what drives ‘non-political’ persons to sousveillance. Implications for Theory There are a number of ways this thesis can contribute to research on sousveillance. First, based on a structured literature review, we identified a gap in research regarding the acceptance of sousveillance in general, and people’s intention to engage in different forms of sousveillance in particular. According to our knowledge, prior to this study no quantitative studies had been conducted that examined contextual circumstances and motivational behavior of sousveillance engagement. We found that previous research focused mainly on observation of single incidents (Rodney King, etc.) or on historical society changes (Bentham’s panopticon, etc.) and did not investigate people’s personal attitude towards sousveillance. The findings of our research help to fill this gap by providing quantitative data from an international sample regarding people’s acceptance and engagement in different forms of sousveillance. Since acceptance is essential for any kind of behavior, we acknowledged the need for a more profound theoretical investigation of human action regarding different sousveillance types. Therefore, we developed a research model, combining the model of TPB with acceptance. We hypothesized that a positive rating of the three TPB predictors leads to high acceptance. The latter was incorporated as a latent variable into an extended conceptual model, where statistical measures confirmed reliability. This finding is useful for future research due to the confirmed positive influence of the TPB constructs on acceptance and can consequently be adapted to different fields of research. Third, we combined Mann’s sousveillance approach (Mann et al., 2003) with similar studies about surveillance (Andrejevic, 2006; Campbell, 2002; Dennis, 2008; etc.) and could finally develop our own approach distinguishing contextual circumstances and forms of sousveillance. We identified four sousveillance forms (lateral, personal, political and state) and categorized them into two main types (fellow citizens and hierarchical authorities). Participants recognized the declared classification and confirmed their understanding in a pre- test, as well as during qualitative interviews. This contributes directly to the current research
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PEOPLE ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE field of sousveillance and surveillance by providing proven evidence for a certain identifiable assignment of scenarios, which improves comparisons among each other. Fourth, the lack of support for hypotheses 2a and b and 3, where no significant relationships were found, provides important insights, improving theoretical understanding. These results suggest that single sousveillance forms may be better evaluated individually, since in regard of acceptance too many biases can occur due to victim type, description, act of violence, offender, etc. Finally, by conducting our research with an international sample we were able to find many interesting differences between the European and worldwide cultures. Within Europe, especially between Germany and the other countries, we found indications that Germans are less used to violent protests and riots and seem to be less concerned about sousveillance in general. Our results suggest that many interpretations are possible; implicating that theories and approaches may differ from country to country. This culture difference should be a research incentive for future work, in particular investigating what creates the differences between high and low accepting groups. Implications for Practice Monitoring and sharing of footage of incidents online is an increasingly common practice, gaining more and more media coverage. As we could see in our model attitude, subjective norm (as the strongest predictor) and perceived behavioral control significantly predict sousveillance acceptance and engagement. Video activists, private persons or governments who want to encourage sousveillance for various reasons, need to be aware of the fact that people base their behavioral intention significantly on opinions of friends and peer groups. Individuals are generally only willing to engage in sousveillance themselves when they value sharing of an incident because they consider it to be of high importance. As an implication, groups and individuals who want to raise awareness for a certain issue should aim to persuade peer groups by eliciting their normative beliefs and focusing an intervention on negative beliefs. Furthermore, concerning the distribution channel and role of new media, implications exist for platform providers and users. Facebook’s features (speed, ease of use and efficiency) are the main attributes to which people attach importance in connection with sousveillance posts. Nevertheless, Facebook is still used primarily for private and entertainment purposes and some people claim they have been disturbed by posts about violence and do not see Facebook as the ideal network for achieving change and prevention of misbehavior. A potential reaction could be to offer a similar networking possibility, which provides more 49
PEOPLE ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE serious information and current issues, so people would be able to separate private and public information sources. In addition, background information and context need to be provided with any uploaded footage since people are highly concerned about the trustworthiness of the footage and are only motivated to share when they are sure no victims will be offended, nor is ambiguous information spread. Finally, based on our study we can provide some guidelines authorities can follow. As the results indicated, authorities and government representatives need to be aware of the new opportunities and risks provided by new technologies. These technologies provide authorities as well as private citizens with the possibility to record and share almost every observation. In particular, people with professions that empower them, such as police officers and security guards, are watched carefully by citizens, since they are supposed to fulfill certain roles adequately. Authorities have to keep in mind that every action can be taken out of context and lead to negative consequences. With reference to the reasons people gave for conducting sousveillance (creating awareness, justice, change), authorities should use the new technologies as well and communicate their actions openly and honestly to the public. By enhancing transparency about own misbehavior they can prevent that people hear about incidents in wrong context and without explanation in social networks. If possible, police actions need to be implemented in consultation with citizens, so everyone realizes that the institution police works in accordance with its citizens aiming for justice and right behavior. In particular in case of riots and demonstrations the police should communicate clearly that they aim for a peaceful solution and only use appropriate force when the protest gets out of hand. In addition, public statements can minder reputational risks and should be made immediately after an incident has happened. Single officers who misuse their power and become violent should be openly discussed but treated as exceptional cases.
Conclusion
The objective of our study was to analyze the acceptance factors and circumstances leading to engagement in sousveillance. Based upon a structured review of previous literature, we identified subjective norm as the strongest predictor of acceptance of sousveillance and found that sousveillance of authoritarian hierarchies is not significantly more accepted than sousveillance of fellow citizens, but the engagement in sousveillance of authoritarian hierarchies is significantly more likely. We developed our model as an extension to the theory of planned behavior by Ajzen (1991) by creating a new construct to measure respondents’ 50
PEOPLE ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE acceptance of sousveillance. Moreover, we applied the model to four previously distinguished forms of sousveillance in order to find out under which circumstances sousveillance is most accepted and which encourages the most engagement. The online survey and follow-up interviews provided valuable data to address our research question. The results of the study show that the predictors of the theory of planned behavior also predict acceptance as well as the intention to engage in sousveillance behavior, supporting our first three sub-hypotheses. Even though only one of our two main hypotheses was supported, namely that engagement in sousveillance of hierarchical authorities is more likely than sousveillance of fellow citizens, these results yield some interesting contributions. The survey as well as the interviews revealed that political sousveillance, represented by the police officers attacking a peaceful protester, is the most accepted and most likely case to be shared. In contrast, state sousveillance, as the second form of sousveillance of hierarchical authorities, portrayed by the security guard holding down violently a shop lifter, is seen ambivalently and needs to be investigated further in order to draw conclusions. Sousveillance of fellow citizens is on average less accepted but we could not always reveal significant differences, since the biased third scenario influenced the tests to a certain degree. Furthermore, nationality of the respondent was shown to exert significant influence, which indicates that in order to fully explain acceptance and engagement, additional factors need to be considered. Sousveillance of hierarchical authorities is a new technological and societal development we face all over the world. We found out that when sousveillence contributes to the solving of crimes and the identification of offenders, it is seen as desirable by most people. Consequently, empowered public figures need to be aware of the constant risk of being monitored. Likewise, every individual faces the risk of observation by the government and by fellow citizens. If the latter leads to “equalization” as Mann et al. (2003) predicted or to improved societal awareness with less crime in the long run cannot be predicted at this point. In conclusion, our research offers insights for both theory and practice, as well as promising avenues for further investigation.
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References
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Appendix
A1 Pre-test questionnaire
Scenario description and pictures:
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Questions (for each scenario):
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A2 Results Pre-Test
CASE A101_01A101_02A101_03A105_01A105_02A105_03A106_01A106_02A106_03A107_01A107_02A107_03A112 A114 A115 A116 TIME_SUM Interview numberIntro: HowIntro: (ongoing) emotionally HowIntro: emotionally DoIntro: you disturbing How recognizeIntro: violent emotionally How Intro:do ayou doemotionally strong Does Intro: youevaluate disturbing evaluatetheform HowIntro: scene theviolentof emotionally misbehaviour?How Intro:thescenario?do show you scenario?doemotionally Does Intro: youaevaluate strong disturbing evaluatethe HowIntro: scenetype theviolent emotionally How Intro:theofscenario?do show misbehaviour? you scenario?doemotionally Does fc youaevaluate strong disturbing evaluatethe scenetype theviolentfc theofscenario?do show misbehaviour? you fcscenario?do youaevaluate strongfc evaluate type theTime theofscenario? spentmisbehaviour? scenario? overall (except outliers) 85 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 2 1 1 184 86 6 6 7 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 6 5 2 2 1 1 260 88 5 6 7 6 6 7 6 6 7 5 6 7 2 1 1 1 268 89 5 6 4 6 6 7 5 5 3 4 5 2 2 1 1 1 341 91 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 2 1 1 221 92 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 2 1 1 196 93 7 5 6 6 5 6 6 5 6 6 5 6 2 2 1 1 221 94 5 3 6 5 3 6 4 4 5 5 3 5 1 1 1 1 156 95 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 2 1 1 305 96 7 7 -1 6 6 7 5 4 6 7 7 7 2 2 1 1 354 97 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 2 1 1 304 99 5 5 6 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 1 1 258 Results 6,25 6,083 5,833 6,083 5,917 6,417 5,833 5,667 5,917 6 6 6 91.67% 75% 100% 100% 255,667
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A3 Online questionnaire
Introduction: Dear Participant,
Welcome to my study about acceptance and engagement in sousveillance. Sousveillance is a recent development initiated by citizens against the constant (video) surveillance from governmental actors. Since recording technologies are available for everyone nowadays, more and more people record what happens around them, both misbehavior and injustice of fellow citizens or hierarchical authorities and share it online. The following questionnaire involves four scenarios and takes about 10 minutes. Please take your time and really imagine yourself in the described situation. There is no right or wrong answer and all answers are saved anonymously. To receive valid results I depend on your careful reading and honest answers!
Be aware that the following scenarios contain graphical pictures, some you might find disturbing. The pictures are real but used in invented context.
Thank you very much for taking the time to help me conduct this research for my master thesis!
Best regards, Pola Moitroux
Scenario description and pictures:
1.
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2.
3.
4.
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Example Questions (randomized for each scenario):
1a
1b
1c
1d
1e 1f 1g 1h
1i
1j
1k
1l
2a 2b Ranking2c exercise:
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Demographics:
Measured concepts (items): Attitude (2a-e), subjective norm (1b, g), perceived behavioral control (1a, c), acceptance (1e, i, l), intention to engage (1d, f, j), offensiveness and problematic of scenario (1h, k)
Source of scales:
Ajzen &Fisherbein’s scale (1991) for attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, intention to engage
Self-developed scale for acceptance and control variables (offensiveness & problematic)
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Reliabilities of the scales:
Measured construct (items) Cronbach`s alpha
Control variables (8) α =.878
Attitude (20) [3&5 recoded] α =.946
Subjective norm (8) α =.903
Perceived behavioural control (8) α =.892
Dependent variable: Intention (12) α =.939
Dependent variable: Acceptance (12) α =.896
Anchors used for scales:
1a-l: fully disagree (1) – fully agree (7), 7-point Likert scale
1a-e: bipolar adjective scale (semantic differential), 7-point Likert scale
Gender (male/female), Age & country of origin (open category), occupation (working professional, recent graduate, university student, high school student, unemployed, other)
Lead -ins:
Please indicate in how far you support the following statements (1a-l). To you, sharing of this incident online would be (2a-e). After individually evaluating all four incidents I finally ask you to put them in a certain order (ranking exercise). Please give some information about yourself (gender, age, country of origin, current occupation). Furthermore, please give an estimate on the following use cases. First, please estimate how many photos you take with your mobile phone in an average week. Second, please estimate how many hours a day you are using the Internet, including mobile Internet. Please provide your email address if you want to receive the results of this study and to offer me the opportunity of contacting you for a brief face-to-face follow-up interview.
A4 Inter-Correlation Table
Correlations between latent variables
Attitude Subjective Norm Perceived Acceptance Intention behavioural control Attitude Subjective Norm .539** Perceived .036 .027 behavioural control Acceptance .704** .673** .155 Intention .603** .810** .081 .719** Control Variables .262** .221** .131 .448** .217** Note. **. Correlation is significant at the .01 level.
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A5 Interview Guide
“My name is Pola Moitroux and you participated in my online survey on the issue of sousveillance in the last weeks. I am contacting you as you agreed on a brief follow-up interview. Thank you very much for your time and interest. In the next minutes I will ask you some questions which will be based on the online survey you participated in. Do you remember what it was about or do you want me to give you a quick reminder? [You were asked 12 questions on four different scenarios, regarding your opinion about sharing the various incidents online, accepting other’s sharing and general attitude towards sousveillance. Finally, you were asked to rank the four scenarios by your likelihood to share them and give some personal information.] “I will ask you some questions about why you would record and post such scenes, since I am interested in the reasons and rationales behind your decisions. Everything will be recorded but not made publicly.” 1. CONTENT/TYPE: Please remember the four scenarios [explain]. Did you notice any general differences in the scenarios? Do you think some of them may be more acceptable to publicize than other [state agencies (hierarchical) versus fellow citizens (personal) sousveillance]? 2. OTHERS/ACCEPTANCE: What do you think about other people publicizing such scenes/events? (Do you appreciate it? Why yes or no?) 3. EXPERIENCE/ATTITUDE: Tell me please about your own posting behavior. (Have you done it already? If so, why [or why not?] What were your experiences? If not, would you do it? Why yes or no / in which situations yes or no?) 4. ACHIEVEMENT: Tell me, what would you try to achieve in publicizing such incidents? 5. WHOM/AUDIENCE: Who would you (not) post to and why? 6. WHERE/FACEBOOK: What is the best outlet for publicizing such pictures or videos (press or social media?) For what do you use Facebook? Do you think it is the best medium to make aware of these kind of incidents? (Why yes or no?) “Thank you very much for answering all questions. Please send the word document back to [email protected]. Best regards, Pola Moitroux” Text Email (English version):
Dear …, I approach you as you agreed on taking part in my brief follow-up interview on the issue of sousveillance. First of all, thank you very much for that opportunity! You would help me a lot by answering the few questions in the attached word document. I can imagine you are quite busy yourself but please take a few minutes and send me the word document back by the end of the week. If you have any further questions, do not hesitate to contact me via email. Thank you very much! Best regards, Pola Moitroux
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A6 Regressions
For the case of lateral sousveillance, all correlations of the variables are shown in table 1a.
Table 1a Correlations of the Variables in the Analysis Lateral Sousveillance Variable 2 3 4
1. Acceptance .45 .64 .16
2. Attitude - .32 -.05
3. Subjective norm - .04
4. Perceived behavioural control -
Note. All correlations, except the two between perceived behavioural control and attitude and perceived behavioural control and subjective norm, were statistically significant (p <.001).
The overall regression model was a good fit of the data and statistically significant, F(3,152) = 51.38, p <.001, and accounted for approximately 50% of the variance of acceptance (R2 =.503, Adjusted R2 =.494). All three independent variables added statistically significant to the dependent variable, p <.05. It was found that higher levels of subjective norm primarily predicted acceptance of lateral sousveillance (b =.28, p <.001) as did higher levels of attitude (b =.55, p <.001). Behavioural control explained it to a lesser extent (b =.16, p <.05). The unique variance explained by attitude was approximately 7% (sr2 =.072) and by subjective norm 26% (sr2 =.265). Both identify subjective norm as the strongest predictor of acceptance. The raw and standardized regression coefficients of the predictors together with their correlations of acceptance and their squared semipartial correlations are shown in Table 1b.
Table 1b Standard Regression Results in the Analysis of Lateral Sousveillance
Model b SE B Beta p sr2
Constant .12 .59 .83
Attitude .63 .16 .28 .000 .072
Subjective norm .45 .05 .55 .000 .265
Perceived behavioural .13 .05 .16 .007 .024 control Note. The dependent variable was Acceptance, R2 =.503, Adjusted R2 = .49.
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In case of political sousveillance, all correlations of the variables are shown in table 2a.
Table 2a Correlations of the Variables in the Analysis Political Sousveillance
Variable 2 3 4
1. Acceptance .22 .56 .29
2. Attitude - .21 -.04
3. Subjective norm - .02
4. Perceived behavioural control -
Note. All correlations, except the two between perceived behavioural control and attitude and perceived behavioural control and subjective norm, were statistically significant (p <.001).
The overall regression model was a good fit of the data and statistically significant, F(3,152) = 34.58, p <.001, and accounted for approximately 40% of the variance of acceptance (R2 =.406, Adjusted R2 =.394). It was found that higher levels of subjective norm primarily predicted acceptance of political sousveillance (b =.53, p <.001) as did higher levels of behavioural control (b =.29, p <.001) to a smaller extent. Attitude did not contribute significantly (b =.11, p <.05). The unique variance explained by subjective norm was approximately 27% (sr2 =.27) and by behavioural control 8% (sr2 =.08). Both results identify subjective norm as the strongest predictor of acceptance of political sousveillance. The raw and standardized regression coefficients of the predictors together with their correlations of acceptance and their squared semipartial correlations are shown in Table 2b.
Table 2a Standard Regression Results in the Analysis of Political Sousveillance
Model b SE B Beta p sr2
Constant 1.24 .61 .044
Attitude .25 .13 .11 .068 .01
Subjective norm .45 .06 .53 .000 .27
Perceived behavioural .23 .05 .29 .000 .08 control Note. The dependent variable was Acceptance, R2 =.503, Adjusted R2 = .49.
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In case of state sousveillance, all correlations of the variables are shown in table 3a.
Table 3a Correlations of the Variables in the Analysis of State Sousveillance Variable 2 3 4
1. Acceptance .51 .66 .11
2. Attitude - .32 -.005
3. Subjective norm - .02
4. Perceived behavioural control -
Note. All correlations, except the two between perceived behavioural control and attitude and perceived behavioural control and subjective norm, were statistically significant (p <.001).
The overall regression model was a good fit of the data and statistically significant, F(3,152) =62.01, p <.001, and accounted for approximately 55% of the variance of acceptance (R2 =.55, Adjusted R2 =.54). Only attitude and subjective norm added statistically significantly to the prediction, p < .05, the influence of behavioural control (b =.09, p >.05) was not significant. It was found that higher levels of subjective norm primarily predicted acceptance of political sousveillance (b =.56, p<.001) as did higher levels of attitude, (b =.33, p <.001). The unique variance explained by attitude was approximately 9% (sr2 =.097) and by subjective norm 27% (sr2 =.27).We identified subjective norm as the strongest predictor of acceptance of state sousveillance. The raw and standardized regression coefficients of the predictors together with their correlations of acceptance and their squared semipartial correlations are shown in Table 3b.
Table 3b Standard Regression Results Model b SE B Beta p sr2
Constant -.74 .59 .21
Attitude .77 .13 .33 .000 .097
Subjective norm .51 .05 .56 .000 .27
Perceived behavioural .09 .05 .10 .067 .01 control Note. The dependent variable was Acceptance, R2 =.55, Adjusted R2 = .54.
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In case of personal sousveillance, all correlations are shown in table 4a.
Table 4a Correlations of the Variables in the Analysis Personal Sousveillance
Variable 2 3 4
1. Acceptance .39 .67 .19
2. Attitude - .29 -.035
3. Subjective norm - .076
4. Perceived behavioural control -
Note. All correlations, except the two between perceived behavioural control and attitude and perceived behavioural control and subjective norm, were statistically significant (p <.001).
The overall regression model was a good fit of the data and statistically significant, F(3,152) = 53, p <.001, and accounted for approximately 51% of the variance of acceptance (R2 =.511, Adjusted R2 =.502). All three variables added statistically significant to the prediction, p < .05. It was found that higher levels of subjective norm primarily predicted acceptance of personal sousveillance (b =.59, p <.001) as did higher levels of attitude, (b =.27, p <.001). Behavioural control explained it to a lesser extent (b =.16, p <.05). The unique variance explained by attitude was approximately 4% (sr2 =.046), by subjective norm 26% (sr2= .266) and by perceived behavioural control 2%, (sr2 =.023).We identified subjective norm again as the strongest predictor of acceptance. The raw and standardized regression coefficients of the predictors together with their correlations of acceptance and their squared semipartial correlations are shown in Table 4b.
Table 4b Standard Regression Results in the Analysis of Personal Sousveillance
Model b SE B Beta p sr2
Constant .33 .57 .56
Attitude .49 .13 .23 .000 .046
Subjective norm .52 .05 .59 .000 .266
Perceived behavioural .13 .05 .16 .007 .023 control Note. The dependent variable was Acceptance, R2 =.511, Adjusted R2 = .502.
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A7 Interview Coding Table
Results Group High in Acceptance
Nr Mean Differences Acceptance Experience Goals People Best Own main Accep- of others Medium Facebook use tance (OS)
1 6 Authorities Depends (fun None, too easily awareness Focus on Facebook information (F) vs. people, vs. serious interpretable, target no difference concern but would do it group for sharing i.e. protests in own country 2 6.5 How likely Not None, more Attention, No Facebook, Contact, violence is to appreciating positive sharing, prevention children, fast & positive posts happen, no and gets not too much, open to efficient difference attention would be all friends for sharing disturbed 3 6 Ordinary Too far, no None, would 80% want If, to Facebook Information & people vs. connection to not do it, to shock, everyone contact authorities, any of this negative 20% on SM no difference expectations awareness for sharing about sharing & change 4 6.3 How Appreciates Yes, Ukraine Awareness everyone Facebook, Private violence it, important, example, riots & maybe activities started, most Ukraine as prevention Twitter likely share example riot, less likely security 5 6.3 Authority Appreciates Never, but Awareness Everyone Facebook Socialize & abuse vs. it, would if sure & changes & information people, less information what exactly YouTube, likely is important happened, free, security sensitive with riot case and bullying
6 5.5 Public vs. Appreciates Never, would Change Friends, Facebook - (S) private it, important, not do it, too government, have to be in particular risky to not be fight for trusted in countries understood, rights without better police or democracy lawyer 7 6.3 Official vs. Good reason Never, but Punishment, friends Facebook friends private, or something would if really notification & Twitter, misbehaviour really bad touched anonymous of authorities okay, but has & not more to be taken in official accepted to context share
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8 6.3 Provoked Depends on Never, rather Expose Not at all, Reported to Not much, professionals aims positive things offender, if only to court, not rather annoyed vs. private (gimmickry and when condemn few in the by it people vs. real testimonial violence people internet concern) rather on (out of conventional context) way
9 6.7 No Appreciates Never, but justice Not to Facebook, Chat with (E) differences it, can would in all young YouTube friends and function as cases, except people or sharing evidence police to afraid politicians vacation pics 10 6.1 People with Appreciate it Never, but awareness - Press or Communication power vs. when in would if Facebook, with friends normal context testimonial fast people, share power abuse 11 6.1 No Depends Victim herself, Shame & Not at all Newspaper - differences (expose careful blame on criminal vs. perpetrators enjoying violence) 12 5.4 Authorities Can be Never, social To inform All Facebook contact who try to disturbing on media to keep in friends useful but protect vs. news feet but touch with not outlet people being necessary family & for news abuse friends without reason, publish all 13 6.3 Security Depends Never, posting Justice, People Social Communication force vs. (public needs to be awareness, involved media, with friends private, humiliation productive prevention in wrong YouTube, publish all vs. justice behaviour Facebook &awareness to promote 14 6 Different Appreciates Never, doesn’t Attention, To Press Friends, family persons it like posting awereness nobody 15 5.6 Violence at Depends Never, Awareness If on wall Facebook entertainment work less (address uncertain to friends as start, not likely certain because of whole story problems vs. victim’s shame denigrate offenders) 16 5.3 Police case If aim is to Shared police Attention - Not enough - related to stop case in Turkey, to change democracy, brutality, against attitude but useful this violence appreciates it of mainstream to inform most media and important to encourage share acting 17 7 Law vs. Appreciates Never, but Awareness Public Social Private stuff & personal it, except would if reliable & support media information problems, violence at and context true freedom of publish all work information except work
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Results Group Low in Acceptance
Nr. Mean Differences Acceptance Experience Goals People Best Own main Accep- of others Medium Facebook use tance
1 3.6 Authorities Appreciates Never, but Awareness & Friends, Facebook Connect with (F) vs. Normal it because it would if prevention depend on friends people, is necessary serious social status qualified things in own people more country accepted to be shared because worse 2 4.9 Authoritarian Depends Never, would Awareness, First close Facebook Contact with misbehaviour (private stuff but cannot discussion friends & friends vs. normal vs. riots) imagine YouTube people, most seeing these likely these, things work case no 3 4.7 Private vs Depends Never, no Meaningless, Depends on Social Chatting & official, (police yes, testimonial sees no incident media getting official more private things so far, but reasons information likely meaningless would police and security guard, since general issues 4 4.2 Ordinary Depends Never and Sees no - Prefers Contact with people vs (making fun would never reasons/goals press, friends authorities, vs. raising do it internet no opinion attention) too complex 5 3.9 Involved vs Depends Never, but Spread Filtered Facebook Contact & not involved, (bad fashion rather facts knowledge, friend list & Twitter articles hierarchical vs. making than educating authorities vs aware of emotional mission normal general pictures people, issues) authorities more likely 6 5.3 Public vs Depends Never, but Awareness, All friends Facebook contact private (police yes, would post held people & Twitter locations, bullying authorities accountable work maybe not) misbehaviour violence least common 7 4.1 Government Depends Never, but Punish All friends Social Connection (S) vs individual (annoying vs. would police agressors, media with friends violence, up to date) pfficers discussion, (unbiased), least misbehaviour awareness Facebook, company YouTube violence & twitter 8 5.3 Shoplifter Appreciates Would post attention - Social -- (E) breaking the it but victims anonymously media & law, others have to press accepted approve 71
PEOPLE ENGAGING IN SOUSVEILLANCE
9 4.8 Violence at Does not Never, would Show Public None - work not appreciates it never, lose misbehaviour accepted control 10 2.6 No clear Depends (not Similar Attention & Friends Facebook - differences, too often) things rarely awareness official cases more likely 11 5.1 Public vs Appreciates Normally not Awareness & Friends Press & Messaging, private it (victims, no proof Facebook watching testimonial) or Twitter things (private) 12 4.3 Public Depends, Never, would No reasons - - - figures vs. more in not normal favour of citizens, other ways public more acceptable 13 5.2 Formal Depends No posts, attention Friends Facebook, Only private people vs. (overflow vs. prefers Instagram contact same attention) discussion in & Twitter position, person police most 14 5.1 No Depends Not yet but Sensitize - Facebook - difference, (sensitize would people, & Twitter all people vs. awareness publishable trying to get attention)
15 4.3 Individual Doesn`t Never, rarely Inform Never to a press Not often vs. (public) appreciates posts in friends political employee it, worthless general party 16 4.7 Private vs. Doesn`t Never, only No reasons, - Traditional Friends, public, police appreciate it, when context alternative media entertainment most likely consequences is clear solution 17 5.3 Person with Depends on Was never in Helping - Both Stay in touch power vs. issue situation, victim with friends private would rather person, help than power more film acceptable, police most, work least To every participant a number was assigned (first column), which will be referred to in the evaluation part, the letter in brackets shows how the interview was conducted (F=face-to-face, S=Skype, E=Email).
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