Peace Without the PLO Author(S): Martin Indyk Source: Foreign Policy, No

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Peace without the PLO Author(s): Martin Indyk Source: Foreign Policy, No. 83 (Summer, 1991), pp. 30-38 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148715 Accessed: 09/09/2009 09:32

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http://www.jstor.org PEACE WITHOUT THE PLO by Martin Indyk

Saddam Hussein's devastatingdefeat in the Gulf war has left in its wake a sense of Amer- ica's obligation to help resolve some of the Middle East's long-standingproblems. One problemhigh on PresidentGeorge Bush'slist of prioritiesis the Arab-Israeliconflict. As he told a joint session of Congresson March 6, 1991, "the time has come to put an end to [the]Arab-Israeli conflict." Nonetheless, the Gulf war was fought to liberate Kuwait, not to solve the Palestinian problem. Although Iraq repeatedly attacked Israelwith Scud missiles,Israel was not a bel- ligerent in this war-at Americaninsistence. Moreover, Hussein's threatsto destroyIsrael and his attackson the Jewish state were fully supportedby the PalestineLiberation Orga- nization(PLO) and Palestiniansin the occupied territories.This underminedwhat little trust had remainedbetween Israelis and Palestinians. Nor has the war produceda new leadershipon either side of the conflictcapable of transform- ing the constituency-ledpolitics of the past decade into the heroic politics of Anwar el- Sadatand MenachemBegin. It is therefore not clear that this war has madethe Arab-Israeliconflict any more amena- ble to solution. The opportunitiesfor peace must be definedbefore new ideasfor advancing the processcan be developed. First, the defeat of SaddamHussein repre- sents the defeat of his world view. He had promotedthe visionof a Hussein-led,pan-Arab superpowerto counterAmerican dominance of the post-ColdWar world.He triedto give new credibilityto the pre-Sadatmethod of settling the Arab-Israeliconflict-by threateningto destroyIsrael. The warhad the importantside- benefitof discreditingthis approach.

MARTININDYK is executivedirector of the Washington Institutefor Near EastPolicy.

30. Indyk

The war also shiftedthe balanceof powerin the Arabworld decisivelyin favorof the Egyp- tian-Saudicoalition that fought alongsidethe United States.Egypt and SaudiArabia not only emerged from the crisis as winners,but also solidified their bilateralrelations with a new bargain whereby Egyptian troops will help provide securityfor the Gulf Arabsin return for money to stabilizethe Egyptianeconomy. The devastatingblow dealtradical Arab for- ces has left Syria,for the time being,with little alternativeto stayingwith the winning coalition. The end of the Cold War cost Damascus its superpowerpatron: The Soviet Union has only been preparedto supplyweapons for "de- fensive sufficiency," and President Mikhail Gorbachevhas lecturedSyrian leader Hafez al- Asad on the need to make peace with Israel, warningthat Moscow would not supportany Syrianmilitary efforts to resolvethe conflict.At the same time, the Gulf crisis has solidified U.S.-Israeli strategic ties, enhancing Israel's deterrentposture toward Syria. The defeat of Hussein also destroyed,for now, any Damascenedream of an eastern-front coalition (Iraq,Jordan, and Syria)capable of challengingIsrael on the battlefield.As long as Egypt remainsat peace with Israeland Iraq's offense is not rebuilt,Syria cannot contemplate waginga war on its own. The battlefieldvicto- ry of Westerntechnology over Sovietweaponry should also give al-Asadpause as he calculates the Syrian-Israelimilitary balance. Stepped-up American-Israeliefforts to upgradethe Patriot antimissilesystem and the Arrow anti-tactical ballisticmissile should deflateSyrian hopes of holding Israel'scivilian population hostage to staveoff a battlefielddefeat. On the other hand,joining the coalitionhas alreadypaid Syria dividendsin the form of a free hand in Lebanonand Saudifinancial aid. By enabling the coalition to engage in the peace process, Damascus can ensure that it be- comes the focus of American diplomacy. Indeed al-Asad's assessment of the United States as the dominant power in the Middle East requires him to approach the Bush administrationwith new flexibility.But the United Statesalso needs Syriancooperation on postwarsecurity arrange- ments and for a meaningfulpeace process.

31. FOREIGN POLICY

Syrianopposition to Americanefforts in either arena could complicatepolicy, providingal- Asad with some leveragein buildingthe rela- tionshiphe now seekswith Washington. These trendssuggest that inter-Arabpolitics is likely to be dominatedfor the foreseeable futureby the new axis of Egypt, SaudiArabia, and Syria-the largest, the richest, and the most nationalisticArab states, respectively. This is an unassailablecoalition should it decide to settle with Israel.However, whether this is in fact a dominantaxis, ratherthan a triangleof tension, remains unclear. Saudi Arabiahas a very modest conceptionof the Egyptianand Syrian roles in Gulf arrangementswith the United States.For their part, Egypt and Syria are competitorsfor Americanattention and in their roles in the peaceprocess. Cairo may feel it necessaryto rehabilitatePLO Chairman Yasir Arafat;Damascus wants to remove him from PLOleadership. And whether the capacityof these three Arab powers to make peace is matchedby a willingnessto come to termswith the Jewishstate remainsto be tested. PostwarOpportunities Still, there are some new reasonsfor cautious optimism.First, Iraq's invasion of Kuwaitdem- onstratedto the Gulf Arabstates that they had more to fear from regional radicalismthan fromIsrael. Second, Israel's unexpected exercise of restraintin the face of Iraqi provocation demonstratedto the Gulf statesthat the Likud governmentis capableof actingrationally and, some aver,even wisely.Third, Egypt and Saudi Arabiashould have a strong incentiveto show the Arab world that they are better able to secure Palestinianrights through peace with Israel than Saddam Hussein could with his threats of destruction.And finally,Israel and Kuwaitnow sharean antipathyfor the Palestin- ians in generaland the PLO in particularand, havingrecently regained their country, Kuwaitis are less inhibitedabout breaking taboos. It is doubtfulthat the Palestiniansshare this same sense of realismand sharedinterests with Israel.Most Palestiniansare bitterand frustrat- ed with their mistakendependence on yet an- other failedpan-Arab "hero." Arafat is respon- sible for committing the PLO to the Iraqi camp

32. Indyk

before Iraq'sinvasion of Kuwait,but his move was stronglyendorsed by the Palestinianpeo- ple. They were led astray,but they willingly followed. The Gulf Arabs do not sympathize with the Palestinians'choice. Gulf aid will not be restoredsoon andlarge numbers of Palestin- ian workersmay be forced to leave the Gulf and returnto Jordanand the West Bank.The Palestiniannational movement will probablybe in disarrayfor the foreseeablefuture amid score-settlingand challengesto leadership. The most significantrepercussion for Arab- Israelidiplomacy is that the leadingArab states no longer insist on PLO representationin the peace process. Since the beginning of 1991, Egypt,Syria, and the Gulf stateshave pointedly omitted any referenceto the PLOin theirjoint communiqu6s.Arab state insistence on PLO involvementin the peace process and Israel's refusal to deal with the PLOhave created a majorroadblock to progressover the last decade. This sea change in Arab state attitudes offers potentialfor a breakthroughon the issue of Palestinianrepresentation. This PLO setback may combine with the impact of the intifadato shift decisivelythe balance of power in the Palestiniannational movementfrom the headquartersin Tunis to a local leadershipin the territoriesthat would be more responsiveto the local population.The decisionof the local leadershipto meet Secre- tary of State James Bakerin April 1991 and breaktheir own boycotton contactswith U.S. officialsis the first manifestationof this poten- tial. But if it is to be successfullydeveloped, it will requirethe full cooperationof the Arab states.Those in the Gulf seem preparedto lend their support to the process, and Egypt and Syria are also willing to give the local leadership their backingfor the moment. King Hussein views the resuscitation of the PLO as a vehicle for Jordan's reentry into the peace process. That reentry has become a pri- ority for Amman in its quest for rehabilitation in Arab and American eyes. But King Hussein is too weak and dependent on Palestinian senti- ment to replace the PLO as spokesman for the Palestinians. Instead, he is likely to take advan- tage of the PLO'sweakness to bolster his own efforts at reengagement.

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There is reasonto expectnew Israeliflexibili- ty in the peace processas well. PrimeMinister Yitzhak Shamir has emerged from the crisis with his leadershipstrengthened and his rela- tionship with George Bush reestablished.He apparentlysees a goldenopportunity to engage the Arab states in a peace processwhile the PLOis weakand Israelenjoys new popularityin the United States and Europe.Moreover, the desireof the U.S.-led coalitionto move on the peace process puts Shamirin the catbirdseat since there can be no progresswithout Israel's cooperation.This becameapparent soon after the Gulf war,when proposalsfor a U.N.-spon- sored internationalconference were dropped becauseof Shamir'sopposition. With the pressingpriority of raisingsome $35 billion to absorb about a million Soviet Jewish immigrants,Shamir has good reasonto cultivate the United States and its Western allies. The near completedestruction of Iraq's offensive capabilitieshas also providedIsrael with some breathingspace in the militaryarena and an opportunityto preventa new roundof the armsrace that it can no longer afford. All these factorsought to renewIsraeli inter- est in starting negotiations.But the war did nothing to shift Israeliattitudes on substantive issues.A publicopinion poll takenafter the war revealedan Israelipolity still deeplyand evenly divided on territorial compromise. And a Likud-ledcoalition governmentof right-wing and religiousparties is certainlyno more willing to relinquishthe West Bank.Israeli flexibility, therefore,will dependon an offer of genu- ine peace and acceptanceof the Jewishstate by the Arab states; such an offer would bolster Israel's sense of security within the region, thereby encouragingIsrael to make a serious offer to the Palestinians.A key bearing the PLO's name could not open any Israeli door-all have been sealed shut by PLO en- dorsement of Saddam Hussein's threats against Israel. Rather, Arab states will need to support Palestinian interlocutors in the territoriesfor an Israeli-Palestiniannegotiation. How the United States exploits this opportu- nity will be crucial to achieving a breakthrough. America has emerged from the Gulf war as the dominant power in the Middle East. All the

34. Indyk

powers in the region and all the interested partiesoutside the regionare lookingto Wash- ington for leadership.The ArabGulf states,in particular,will likely be responsiveto U.S. peace process requirements.Egypt wants to play the role of strategicpartner in the region. Syriais alsokeen to buildrelations with what it regardsas the only superpower.And Israel seekscoordination with Washington to crafta processthat meets its requirements. In these circumstances,the United States now has a strongerhand in influencingthe peaceprocess than at anytime since the disen- gagementagreements of the 1970s.And this influenceis enhancedby Bush'stremendous authority,following what is seenin the region as his personalvictory over Saddam Hussein. But expectationsof the UnitedStates are as high as its new reputation.In particular,the Arabstates have come to believethat if the UnitedStates can liberate Kuwait in suchshort order,it is equallycapable of liberatingArab landsoccupied by Israel.And Israel's restraint duringthe Gulf war is generallyviewed by Arabsas the resultof Americanpressure rather than as Israeliforbearance. The president's March6 speechto Congress,with its emphasis on "territoryfor peace"and its assertionthat "in the modemage, geography cannot guaran- tee security,"was welcomed in the Arabworld as an indicationthat the UnitedStates was now preparingto deliverIsrael. The president's91 per cent popularityrating in March1991 is citedas evidencethat he is no longerbeholden to domesticpolitical constraints. In short,the Arabstates are temptedto sit backand wait while Washington orders Israel out of the territories.And thereis a similar urgeto returnto businessas usual in inter-Arab politicsas eachpower seeks to carveout new areas of influence in the Gulf and the PLO. Meanwhile,in the West Bank and Gaza, the cycleof Palestinian-Israeliviolence could quick- ly sour the atmospherebetween Israel and its Arabneighbors. In the absenceof clearleader- ship fromWashington, the windowof opportu- nity will probablyclose rapidly.Conversely, if the United Statestakes the lead,it cannothope to impose a solution unilaterally,but it may well be able to get the processof negotiations

35. FOREIGN POLICY started. But they will need strong encourage- ment from Washingtonto takethese steps. The key to progresslies in quickexploitation of the opportunitythat exists.The Gulf crisis has not moved the partiesto narrowtheir dif- ferences on the substantiveissues. The Arab states still demandcomplete Israeli withdrawal from the territoriesand the Palestiniansde- mand an independentstate. Israel demands secureborders, rejects an independentPalestin- ian state, and will not make a commitmentto withdrawalbefore negotiations begin.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait demonstrat- ed to the Gulf Arab states that they had more to fear from regional radi- calism than from Israel.

Nevertheless, the war has generatedsome new flexibilityon both sides on procedural issues. First, the Arab states appearwilling to accept the propositionthat they, too, have to make peace with Israelthrough direct negotiations; an Israeli-Palestiniannegotiation alone will not suffice.The willingnessof SaudiArabia and Kuwaitto demonstratetheir acceptanceof Israelthrough confidence-building steps such as ending the secondaryboycott, renouncing the U.N. "Zionism is Racism" resolution, and joining Israel at the negotiatingtable could help get the processstarted. Second, Israelhas indicateda willingnessto attend a regional conferenceunder the joint auspicesof the United States and the Soviet Union as an opening for direct negotiations. This proposalcomes very close to the Arab insistence on reconveningthe 1973 Geneva conference. It might provide enough of the flavorof a multilateralconference to be accept- able to the Arabstates and yet remainenough of a directnegotiation to appealto Israel. Third, the perennialproblem of Palestinian representationmight be more solvablein the post-Gulf war environment.Previously, Israel would not sit with the PLO,and the Palestin- ians would not come to the tablewithout PLO authorization.The Arabstates also insistedon a PLOpresence in the negotiations.Now, with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, and

36. Indyk

Syria no longer designatingthe PLO as the "solelegitimate representative of the Palestinian people"and with the severingof financialsup- port for the PLO,a consensusmight emerge for Arabstate-backed Palestinian interlocutors from the West Bankand Gaza. This is a potentiallydecisive development. The Arab states createdthe PLO in 1964. A decade later at the Rabatsummit they denied Jordanianclaims to representthe Palestinians. From that time on, Arabstate support has gone to the PLO and has been crucialfor securing internationallegitimacy for thatorganization. If they are now preparedto back an alternative leadershipin the territoriesand act as its custo- dian in negotiationswith Israel,it may be possible to cut the Gordianknot on the Palestinian representationissue. Further, the Palestiniansin the territories seem willingto takeup this leadershiprole and the Israeligovernment has encouragedthem by lifting some repressivemeasures in the territories and allowing indigenousPalestinian eco- nomic initiatives.This processof empowering a Palestinianleadership in the territoriescan develop quicklyif it enjoysthe backingof the Arab states and the disengagementof Israel. The ground is fertile in the West Bank and Gaza because of the PLO'sfailure to advance Palestinianinterests through its positionon the Gulf crisis, its loss of Arab and international support, and the worsening Palestinianeco- nomic situationwith 70,000newly unemployed who lost workin Israelor the Gulf. This process will increasinglypressure the PLOto choose betweenblocking or retroactive- ly authorizinglocal Palestinianpolitical and economicinitiatives. If the largerpeace process betweenIsrael and the Arabstates gets under- way, the PLOwill be hard-pressedto prevent local Palestinian engagement and will be more likely to repeat its recent practice of blessing a process it no longer controls. The essential ingredient in this new recipe for Palestinian representation, however, is American leadership.Without a clear indication that Washington favors local representatives and is not interestedin insertingthe PLOinto the local process,the Arab states are likely to pursuetheir own PLOagendas. But if the Unit-

37. FOREIGNPOLICY ed States continuesto reject unambiguouslya PLOrole, Arab anger with the PLOcombined with desire to please the United States will likely lead to support for this alternative process. Egypt, Saudi Arabia,and even Syria are tending in this direction already. King Hussein of Jordan,having no love for the PLO, has more interestin participatingin the process than in insistingon PLOengagement. This combination of American influence, Arabstate engagement,Israeli procedural flexibility,and the potentialempowerment of Pales- tinian leadershipin the territoriessuggests that the time is auspiciousfor negotiations.Natu- rally,the negotiatingroad will be arduous.It is, nevertheless,possible to envisage an interim arrangementbetween Israel and a Palestinian delegation for Palestinianself-government in the territories.But, inevitably,there will be efforts,especially by Palestinianrejectionists, to subvertthe processwith terrorism. Findingcommon groundbetween Israel and Syriaon the Golan Heights will also be difficult, but progressmay be possiblein southern Lebanoninstead. King Hussein of Jordanhas an interestin the peaceprocess if only to prove his value to the United States,but the current anti-Americanand continuedanti-Israeli senti- ments of his own people will make it difficult for him to move. The demandsof the right- wing coalition will limit the Israeli government's negotiating position. And inter-Arab politicsis likely to bedevilany effortto concert an Arab-stateapproach. In short, negotiationsmay very well come to naught.But everynow and againin the history of the Arab-Israeliconflict a momentof oppor- tunity ariseswhen the concernsof the parties overlap, if only slightly. The Gulf war has createdsuch a moment.With Americanleader- ship, skill, and determination, a negotiating process can begin. It may be one small step, but in the Middle East it would constitute a major breakthrough.

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