Cryptographic Algorithm Analysis and Implementation
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A Quantitative Study of Advanced Encryption Standard Performance
United States Military Academy USMA Digital Commons West Point ETD 12-2018 A Quantitative Study of Advanced Encryption Standard Performance as it Relates to Cryptographic Attack Feasibility Daniel Hawthorne United States Military Academy, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/faculty_etd Part of the Information Security Commons Recommended Citation Hawthorne, Daniel, "A Quantitative Study of Advanced Encryption Standard Performance as it Relates to Cryptographic Attack Feasibility" (2018). West Point ETD. 9. https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/faculty_etd/9 This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by USMA Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Point ETD by an authorized administrator of USMA Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD PERFORMANCE AS IT RELATES TO CRYPTOGRAPHIC ATTACK FEASIBILITY A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Computer Science By Daniel Stephen Hawthorne Colorado Technical University December, 2018 Committee Dr. Richard Livingood, Ph.D., Chair Dr. Kelly Hughes, DCS, Committee Member Dr. James O. Webb, Ph.D., Committee Member December 17, 2018 © Daniel Stephen Hawthorne, 2018 1 Abstract The advanced encryption standard (AES) is the premier symmetric key cryptosystem in use today. Given its prevalence, the security provided by AES is of utmost importance. Technology is advancing at an incredible rate, in both capability and popularity, much faster than its rate of advancement in the late 1990s when AES was selected as the replacement standard for DES. Although the literature surrounding AES is robust, most studies fall into either theoretical or practical yet infeasible. -
New Comparative Study Between DES, 3DES and AES Within Nine Factors
JOURNAL OF COMPUTING, VOLUME 2, ISSUE 3, MARCH 2010, ISSN 2151-9617 152 HTTPS://SITES.GOOGLE.COM/SITE/JOURNALOFCOMPUTING/ New Comparative Study Between DES, 3DES and AES within Nine Factors Hamdan.O.Alanazi, B.B.Zaidan, A.A.Zaidan, Hamid A.Jalab, M.Shabbir and Y. Al-Nabhani ABSTRACT---With the rapid development of various multimedia technologies, more and more multimedia data are generated and transmitted in the medical, also the internet allows for wide distribution of digital media data. It becomes much easier to edit, modify and duplicate digital information .Besides that, digital documents are also easy to copy and distribute, therefore it will be faced by many threats. It is a big security and privacy issue, it become necessary to find appropriate protection because of the significance, accuracy and sensitivity of the information. , which may include some sensitive information which should not be accessed by or can only be partially exposed to the general users. Therefore, security and privacy has become an important. Another problem with digital document and video is that undetectable modifications can be made with very simple and widely available equipment, which put the digital material for evidential purposes under question. Cryptography considers one of the techniques which used to protect the important information. In this paper a three algorithm of multimedia encryption schemes have been proposed in the literature and description. The New Comparative Study between DES, 3DES and AES within Nine Factors achieving an efficiency, flexibility and security, which is a challenge of researchers. Index Terms—Data Encryption Standared, Triple Data Encryption Standared, Advance Encryption Standared. -
The Aes Project Any Lessons For
THE AES PROJECT: Any Lessons for NC3? THOMAS A. BERSON, ANAGRAM LABORATORIES Technology for Global Security | June 23, 2020 THE AES PROJECT: ANY LESSONS FOR NC3? THOMAS A. BERSON JUNE 23, 2020 I. INTRODUCTION In this report, Tom Berson details how lessons from the Advanced Encryption Standard Competition can aid the development of international NC3 components and even be mirrored in the creation of a CATALINK1 community. Tom Berson is a cryptologist and founder of Anagram Laboratories. Contact: [email protected] This paper was prepared for the Antidotes for Emerging NC3 Technical Vulnerabilities, A Scenarios-Based Workshop held October 21-22, 2019 and convened by The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, Technology for Global Security, The Stanley Center for Peace and Security, and hosted by The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) Stanford University. A podcast with Tom Berson and Philip Reiner can be found here. It is published simultaneously here by Technology for Global Security and here by Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here. Acknowledgments: The workshop was funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Maureen Jerrett provided copy editing services. Banner image is by Lauren Hostetter of Heyhoss Design II. TECH4GS SPECIAL REPORT BY TOM BERSON THE AES PROJECT: ANY LESSONS FOR NC3? JUNE 23, 2020 1. THE AES PROJECT From 1997 through 2001, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (US) (NIST) ran an open, transparent, international competition to design and select a standard block cipher called the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)2. -
Cryptomathic EMV CA
Cryptomathic EMV CA EMV AND PKI A Regional EMV Solution The EMV standard is designed to provide an interoperability frame- work for payment cards. This covers many transaction types including credit, debit, contactless and mobile. Payment cards have been around for many years in various forms. The latest cards have become more sophisticated and now contain a microchip, which can store a wealth of information, including security information used for authentication and encryption. EMV card authentication is based on PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) but unlike traditional PKI, which is based on a standard called X.509, EMV EMV CA is a standard of its own. Even though EMV is a proprietary standard it The Cryptomathic EMV CA professionally manages all the Issuer's and is widely used across the globe, with billions of EMV smart cards issued Certification Authority’s tasks including: since its initial roll-out. • Lifecycle management of EMV Issuer CA (scheme issuers’) certificates • Issue certificates EMV Certification Authorities are central to the payment card framework, • Export certificates under which issuers and acquirers are certified by the payment schemes, • Revoke certificates acting as a trusted third party. A payment scheme can be a major • Certification authority CRL (Certificate Revocation List) international player such as MasterCard and Visa or it can be regional • Issuer CRL (Certificate Revocation List) or country wide, such as national debit schemes, which are found in many countries all over the world. Each payment scheme requires an Benefits EMV Certification Authority and the Cryptomathic EMV CA provides that Cryptomathic EMV CA offers all the features expected from professional exact functionality. -
Data Encryption Standard
Data Encryption Standard The Data Encryption Standard (DES /ˌdiːˌiːˈɛs, dɛz/) is a Data Encryption Standard symmetric-key algorithm for the encryption of electronic data. Although insecure, it was highly influential in the advancement of modern cryptography. Developed in the early 1970s atIBM and based on an earlier design by Horst Feistel, the algorithm was submitted to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) following the agency's invitation to propose a candidate for the protection of sensitive, unclassified electronic government data. In 1976, after consultation with theNational Security Agency (NSA), the NBS eventually selected a slightly modified version (strengthened against differential cryptanalysis, but weakened against brute-force attacks), which was published as an official Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for the United States in 1977. The publication of an NSA-approved encryption standard simultaneously resulted in its quick international adoption and widespread academic scrutiny. Controversies arose out of classified The Feistel function (F function) of DES design elements, a relatively short key length of the symmetric-key General block cipher design, and the involvement of the NSA, nourishing Designers IBM suspicions about a backdoor. Today it is known that the S-boxes that had raised those suspicions were in fact designed by the NSA to First 1975 (Federal Register) actually remove a backdoor they secretly knew (differential published (standardized in January 1977) cryptanalysis). However, the NSA also ensured that the key size was Derived Lucifer drastically reduced such that they could break it by brute force from [2] attack. The intense academic scrutiny the algorithm received over Successors Triple DES, G-DES, DES-X, time led to the modern understanding of block ciphers and their LOKI89, ICE cryptanalysis. -
Soft Error Resistant Design of the AES Cipher Using SRAM-Based FPGA
Soft Error Resistant Design of the AES Cipher Using SRAM-based FPGA by Solmaz Ghaznavi A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical and Computer Engineering Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2011 ©Solmaz Ghaznavi 2011 AUTHOR'S DECLARATION I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. ii Abstract This thesis presents a new architecture for the reliable implementation of the symmetric-key algorithm Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Since FPGAs are prone to soft errors caused by radiation, and AES is highly sensitive to errors, reliable architectures are of significant concern. Energetic particles hitting a device can flip bits in FPGA SRAM cells controlling all aspects of the implementation. Unlike previous research, heterogeneous error detection techniques based on properties of the circuit and functionality are used to provide adequate reliability at the lowest possible cost. The use of dual ported block memory for SubBytes, duplication for the control circuitry, and a new enhanced parity technique for MixColumns is proposed. Previous parity techniques cover single errors in datapath registers, however, soft errors can occur in the control circuitry as well as in SRAM cells forming the combinational logic and routing. In this research, propagation of single errors is investigated in the routed netlist. Weaknesses of the previous parity techniques are identified. -
1. AES Seems Weak. 2. Linear Time Secure Cryptography
Smith typeset 19:27 8 Jun 2007 AES bust 1. AES seems weak. 2. Linear time secure cryptography Warren D. Smith∗ [email protected] June 8, 2007 Abstract — We describe a new simple but more power- ciphertext pair. It would run almost instantaneously.) Any ful form of linear cryptanalysis. It appears to break AES secret key cipher with a K-bit key can be cracked by exhaus- (and undoubtably other cryptosystems too, e.g. SKIP- tive key search by performing 2K encryptions. It is a usual JACK). The break is “nonconstructive,” i.e. we make it design aim to try to make the≈ security level attain this 2K plausible (e.g. prove it in certain approximate probabilis- upper bound. tic models) that a small algorithm for quickly determining AES-256 keys from plaintext-ciphertext pairs exists – but without constructing the algorithm. The attack’s runtime is comparable to performing 64w encryptions where w is 1 DES and AES, their demise, and the (unknown) minimum Hamming weight in certain bi- the demise of privacy generally nary linear error-correcting codes (BLECCs) associated with AES-256. If w < 43 then our attack is faster than ex- DES and its successor AES were the product of cryptosystem- haustive key search; probably w < 10. (Also there should design competitions (1974, 2001) sponsored and judged by the be ciphertext-only attacks if the plaintext is natural En- US Government and as such are the two most famous cryp- glish.) tosystems. Even if this break breaks due to the underlying models in- DES’s obvious weakness was its short (56 bit) secret-key adequately approximating the real world, we explain how AES still could contain “trapdoors” which would make length. -
DES Cracker" Machine
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) About the Electronic Frontier Foundation's "DES Cracker" Machine Table of Contents Introduction What are cryptography, encryption and cryptanalysis? What is DES? Who uses DES? What claims have been made about DES? What is the 'EFF DES Cracker' and how does it work? Who built the EFF DES Cracker? Does the EFF DES Cracker really work? How much did the EFF DES Cracker cost to build? Why was the EFF DES Cracker built? What should those who depend on DES do now that we are clear on its insecurity? How long should cipher keys be to avoid these attacks? How long does the EFF DES Cracker take to crack DES? How does this affect cryptographic algorithms other than DES? What standards are replacing DES? How does this relate to the movie "Sneakers?" Is the EFF DES Cracker practical or a laboratory curiosity? What has been the impact of export controls on cryptography? Have other groups studied the implications of controls over the research and application of cryptography? What is the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)? Sources Introduction The Electronic Frontier Foundation began its investigation into DES cracking in 1997 to determine just how easily and cheaply a hardware-based DES Cracker could be constructed. EFF set out to design and build a DES Cracker to counter the claim made by U.S. government officials that American industry or foreign governments cannot decrypt information when protected by DES or weaker encryption, or that it would take multimillion-dollar networks or computers months to decrypt one message. Less than one year later and for well under US $250,000, EFF's DES Cracker entered and won the RSA DES Challenge II-2 competition in less than 3 days, proving that DES is not secure and that such a machine is inexpensive to design and build. -
Cryptanalysis of Selected Block Ciphers
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Sep 24, 2021 Cryptanalysis of Selected Block Ciphers Alkhzaimi, Hoda A. Publication date: 2016 Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link back to DTU Orbit Citation (APA): Alkhzaimi, H. A. (2016). Cryptanalysis of Selected Block Ciphers. Technical University of Denmark. DTU Compute PHD-2015 No. 360 General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Cryptanalysis of Selected Block Ciphers Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science-COMPUTE in The Technical University of Denmark by Hoda A.Alkhzaimi December 2014 To my Sanctuary in life Bladi, Baba Zayed and My family with love Title of Thesis Cryptanalysis of Selected Block Ciphers PhD Project Supervisor Professor Lars R. Knudsen(DTU Compute, Denmark) PhD Student Hoda A.Alkhzaimi Assessment Committee Associate Professor Christian Rechberger (DTU Compute, Denmark) Professor Thomas Johansson (Lund University, Sweden) Professor Bart Preneel (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium) Abstract The focus of this dissertation is to present cryptanalytic results on selected block ci- phers. -
Cryptomathic Signer V 1.0
Signer Case Study – LuxTrust CENTRAL SIGNING SERVICE Residents in Luxembourg are now able to securely access a variety of web applications such as eBanking and public services, as well as digitally sign legally binding transactions and official documents from an online PC or mobile device, anywhere in the world. With just one LuxTrust certificate, users can remotely access and sign multiple online forms from any organisation connected to the service, whether they are registering their new home or applying for a loan. This highly innovative and flexible authentication and digital signature service has been imple- mented by LuxTrust, using Cryptomathic’s solutions. LUXTRUST LuxTrust approached Cryptomathic to solve the challenging issue of establishing legal value by way of high security (using PKI and 2FA) As Luxembourg’s primary provider of digital identity and electronic without costs escalating and destroying the business case. Today, most data security services, LuxTrust provides various IT services, aimed at Luxembourg based institutions, including eGovernment and eBanking, delivering and enforcing digital trust between parties, including certifi- utilise the benefits delivered by LuxTrust’s SSC – a mutual security infra- cate issuance, strong authentication, digital signatures, time stamping, structure service. The SSC combines this high level of security in the and long term storage to enable secure electronic commerce and most convenient and portable service, allowing users to authenticate to meet the future security requirements -
CNS Lecture 6
In the news CNS Lecture 6 • Microsoft IE Active X remote code execution • Microsoft powerpoint remote code execution (0-day) Block ciphers -- AES (Rijndael) • MAX OS X multiple vulnerabilities Stream ciphers • OpenSSL ASN.1 remote buffer overflow Key management • gzip, firefox, Adobe flash player, … review assignment 5 A assignment 6 CNS Lecture 6 - 2 Block cipher modes You are here … Attacks & Defenses Cryptography Applied crypto • ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR • Risk assessment •Random numbers •SSH • applies to all block ciphers • Viruses • •Hash functions •PGP Padding, chaining and IV’s • Unix security • hide repeated plaintext MD5, SHA,RIPEMD •S/Mime • authentication • different error/attack properties • Network security •Classical + stego •SSL Firewalls,vpn,IPsec,IDS •Number theory •Kerberos •Symmetric key •IPsec encryption does not guarantee message integrity! DES, Rijndael, RC5 •Public key RSA, DSA, D-H,ECC CNS Lecture 6 - 3 CNS Lecture 6 - 4 Padding, IV’s, and key generation in OpenSSL Block ciphers • Encryption will pad to block size of cipher (DES: 8 bytes, AES 16) Feistel substitution and permutation – E.g., 3 bytes in 8 encrypted bytes out, 21 in 24 out – May want to pre-pad with random “salt” to obscure same message • DES •performance (time/space) vs strength • OpenSSL standard API encryption pads with bytes of IV • Lucifer •large keys – EVP methods pads with byte count (PKCS 5) •strong subkey generation and pre-pends 8-byte magic “Salted__” and 8 byte random salt • blowfish •large blocks – openssl des-cbc: 7 bytes in 24 encrypted -
Cryptomathic Signer SAM V. 5.0 Security Target for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5
Cryptomathic Signer SAM v. 5.0 Security Target for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5 Document Version: 5.0 Document ID: ASE_ST_UTIMACO Date: September 19, 2019 Cryptomathic Signer Security Target for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5 ASE_ST_UTIMACO 5.0 September 19, 2019Error! Unknown document property name. Document Identification Document Title: Cryptomathic Signer Security Target for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5 Document ID: ASE_ST_UTIMACO Document Version: 5.0 Date of version: September 19, 2019 Origin: Cryptomathic Author: Lone Asferg Laursen, Thomas Brochmann Pedersen TOE Reference: Cryptomathic Signer SAM v 5.0 for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5 Product Type: QSCD 2 Cryptomathic Signer Security Target for Utimaco Cryptoserver CP5 ASE_ST_UTIMACO 5.0 September 19, 2019Error! Unknown document property name. Terms Term Meaning CA Certification Authority. CM Cryptographic Module. Recides within the HSM. Cryptographic Module Cryptographic Module certified according to [EN 419 221-5]. Utimaco CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 CP5, version 5.1.0.0. DTBS/R Data To Be Signed Representation. A hash value of the document to be signed. HSM Hardware Security Module. IdP Identity Provider. Privileged User The users who administrate the TOE and the signer users. This is the Common Criteria term for administrator users. Administrator The Signer SAM term for a privileged user. QSCD Qualified Electronic Signature (or Electronic Seal) Creation Device as defined in [eIDAS]. RA Registration Authority. SAD Signature Activation Data SAM Signature Activation Module SAP Signature Activation Protocol. Protocol use to perform the signature operation. SCA Signature Creation Application. Application responsible for creating the document to be signed. SIC Signer Interaction Component. Signer User End user who can sign documents. Signing key A cryptographic key used for signing under the sole control of a signer.