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Dear Reader,

This paper (7400 words) is based on my fieldwork in Cairo and the Gaza Strip and my reflections on the literature on Hamas since 2006. This is a very first draft and is aimed towards an area-studies journal such as Middle East Critique or Journal of Palestine Studies. An expanded version of this article will also serve as an introductory chapter of my PhD Dissertation. I look forward to your comments,

Sincerely,

Somdeep

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Bringing Back the Palestinian State1: Hamas between Government and Resistance

Somdeep Sen, PhD Student, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

The 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) election victory of Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al- Islamiya or Islamic Resistance Movement) proved momentous for the Palestinian Territories. It symbolized both, the rise to power by an opposition group and the victory of an Islamist entity in democratic elections in the Arab world, “[t]wo firsts in modern Middle East history.”2 Moreover, with this unequivocal triumph, the Islamic Resistance received an official mandate and recognition of its growing clout in Palestinian politics. That said, as Fatah refused to be part of a Hamas-led government and governance institutions, the Islamic Resistance seemingly entered a new phase in its life-cycle in the period following the 2006 elections and the 2007 take-over. Hamas now assumed the sole leadership in governing the Gaza Strip3 and it did so while remaining officially committed to an armed struggle.

The conversation that then emerged on Hamas, now espousing the roles of government and resistance, attempted to both explain the reasons behind the Islamic Resistance’s rise to the helm of Palestinian politics and elaborate the implications of the same. For some Hamas had tread a historical path in which it balanced both its socio-political and military operations. It was then owing to its commitment to resistance activities4 and social service5, that it garnered moral legitimacy among Palestinians and gained political prominence through key victories in student and municipal elections. Hamas’ 2006 PLC election victory was only the final tangible manifestation of its growing importance being recognized within scope of ‘official’ Palestinian politics and its ‘evolutionary’ identity6 as more than simply an armed group. This being the ‘story of Hamas’ until the elections, others explored its

1 The title of this article is a ‘play’ on Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol’s Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 2 Sayigh, Yezid. “Inducing a Failed State in Palestine” Survival 49.3 (August, 2007): 13 3 Owing to Fatah’s boycott 4 The term ‘resistance’ will be used as euphemism for an armed struggle. 5 Hamas’ as a social actor is represented by its social service operations, broadly categorize as educational (kindergarten, schools, enriching group activities, summer camps and universities), medical (clinics and hospitals), religious (mosques and Quran memorizing institutes) and welfare (distributing financial and material aid, especially during economic crises, Muslim holidays and during Ramadan). (see: Pascovich, Eyal. “Social-Civilian Apparatuses of Hamas, Hizballah and Other Activist Islamic Organizations” Digest of Middle East Studies 21.1 (2012): 130) 6 Gunning, Jeroen. Hamas in Politics (London: Hurst & Company, 2007): vi

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implications and the post-2006 trajectory, hinged on the notion of an ‘ever-evolving’ Hamas. For them, the electoral victory was not only an expected outcome but also the subsequent period as indicative of a ‘de-radicalizing’ Hamas. This meant that this Hamas would be one that would engage in more ‘state- building’, less ‘fighting’ and therefore be less radical.

This article takes a divergent approach to the conversation on Hamas that has emerged since 2006. It centers its analytical framework solely on the (new) sort of political practice Hamas finds itself engaging in i.e. it remains officially committed to being the government and the resistance. It recognizes that while Hamas has developed an identity that commits it to sociopolitical and military means of activism, its entrance into government isn’t necessarily the continuation of the same but the creation of a new kind of political practice. Namely, it was now implanted into the realm of official politics i.e. “charity was transformed into a matter of public policy” 7. That said, here the understanding of ‘newness’ isn’t concerned with ‘how much’ governance and ‘how little’ resistance Hamas engages in (as a means of quantifying de-radicalization) owing to the methodological limitations of knowing the reasons behind a recalibration of its operational scope. Instead the ‘new Hamas’ here is one that chooses to do both. Then, working within this framework, the question remains: ‘What is the implication of Hamas now espousing the roles of both government and resistance?’ It is here that the Palestinian state is seen as having utility as the lowest common denominator informing political behavior in the Palestinian territories. Most visibly, the existence of the state as an aspiration lies at the core of the Palestinian liberation struggle. Moreover, the aspiration of a sovereign and territorially inviolable state is frequently and most visibly manifested through an armed struggle. That said, while the conversation on the state emerged in the wake of the Oslo Accords, aside from being an aspiration, it disappeared out of focus with the agreement’s failure to establish an internationally recognized sovereign Palestinian state. Nevertheless, one could claim that the state also exists in the Palestinian territories as an inspiration for political behavior when in power. The Oslo-mandated Palestinian Authority (PA) was established as the first institutional basis for Palestinian self-governance and eventually, a Palestinian state. But even though the sovereign and internationally recognized Palestinian state has thus far failed to come to fruition, the PA has remained as the institution for governing the Palestinian territories. This has meant that for those at the helm of Palestinian politics the

7 Author interview with Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan, Cairo, January, 2013

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PA’s institutions and ministries, while notorious for their limited operational capabilities and lack of sovereignty, have been the basis for performing state-like activities. This was nevertheless done with such state-like behavior being informed by a territorially sovereign and universally recognized Palestinian state. Returning to the case of Hamas, that since 2006/7 has espoused the role of both government and resistance, it could be posited that the Islamic Resistance doesn’t necessarily inhabit a condition of its own creative doing. Instead, it is simply living as a non-exceptional entity within a general Palestinian condition. Its armed operations are reflective of the central role resistance has played as the most audible manifestation of the Palestinian liberation movement’s aspiration for a Palestinian state. In a similar vein, as Hamas performs its role as the government through the PA, like its predecessor, its actions at the helm are also inadvertently shaped and inspired by the state in its (state-like) governance activities, while not being informed by a sovereign Palestinian state. Then, the implication of Hamas, having committed itself to the role of government and resistance since 2006/7, has less to do with a unique path tread by the organization. Instead it provides us with the opportunity to re-calibrate the parameters through which political behavior of Palestinian governing factions (i.e. following electoral success) is understood.

Hamas since 2006: Mapping and Critiquing the Conversation

It is the unexpectedness of the 2006 PLC election results that has shaped the conversation on Hamas since. For some Hamas’ victory signified the end of the exclusivist Palestinian political landscape with Fatah at its helm8 and the “…inclusion [of Hamas] lead[ing] to democratization”9 of the same. Although notions of the democratization of Palestinian politics was rendered irrelevant following Hamas’ complete take-over of the Gaza Strip in lieu of a covert Fatah-led initiative to forcibly remove the Islamic Resistance from power10. Other viewed it politically contradictory that while Hamas was electorally mandated to govern the Palestinian territories, it continued its commitment to an armed struggle while rejecting the basic frameworks of the Oslo Accords, Quartet-led ‘roadmap to peace’ or calls to recognize Israel11. Nevertheless, as Hamas found itself unprepared and isolated in governing

8 Khalil, Shiqaqi. “Sweeping Victory, Uncertain Mandate” Journal of Democracy 17.3 (July 2006): 127 9 Hamzawy, Amr and Nathan J. Brown. “A Boon or a Bane for Democracy” Journal of Democracy 19.3 (July 2008): 50 10 Rose, David. “The Gaza Bombshell” Vanity Fair (April 2008) 11 Sayigh, 13

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the Gaza Strip12, while seemingly contradictory, it was Caridi that rightly deemed it only predictable that it would espouse a ‘dual status’13. This meant that the post-2006 Hamas would remain “…a resistance movement while also exerting [political] power.”14

With Hamas then having settled into its role as government and resistance since 2006/7, what then remained were concerns hinged on the significance of it now having to balance its responsibilities as a government, with those of an armed resistance. Elaborating the ‘story’ leading to Hamas now embodying a ‘dual status’, the works of Gleis and Berti and Gunning insisted on an approach that veered away from reductionist understandings of armed groups (as solely violent figurations)15. Instead they encouraged the development of an understanding that also accounts for an Islamic Resistance as apolitical and social organization16. While Hamas’ religious orientation found resonance among Palestinians as a key Islamic alternative17 in a rapidly Islamizing liberation movement, it was its social- civilian operations that garnered immense moral legitimacy. In addition to meeting the socioeconomic needs of a significant niche of the Palestinian populace18, they were perceived as responsive to the brutality of the occupation and remedying Fatah’s marginalization of Palestine’s “…young-guard nationalist and Islamist forces.”19 Moreover, in doing so, Roy20 saw Hamas as furthering communitarian values and restoring the ‘splintered’ being21 of Palestinian society in wake of “steady deterioration.”22 While values informing ‘social Islam’23 continued to be an undertone of these actions,

12 Hovdenak, Are. “Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions, Democratization” 16.1 (2009): 69 13 Wiegand, Krista E. Bombs and Ballots: Governance by Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2010): 136 14 Caridi, Paola. Hamas: From Resistance to Government (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2012): 36 15 Gleis, Joshua L. and Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012): 3 16 Gunning, 272 17 Haboub, Wael J. “Demystifying the Rise of Hamas” Journal of Developing Societies 28.1 (2012): 75 18 Pascovich, 133 19 Khalil, 127 20 This built on Roy’s earlier works, most prominently, Roy, Sara. ”The Crisis Within: The Struggle for Palestinian Society” Critique 17 (Fall 2000); Roy, Sara. The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995) 21Turki, Fawaz. “Palestinian Self-criticism and Liberation of Palestinian Society” Journal of Palestine Studies 25.2 (Winter 1996): 76 22Roy, Sara. Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011): 15 23 Clark, Janine A. “Islamic Social Welfare Organizations in Cairo: Islamization from Below” Arab Studies Quarterly 17.4 (Fall 1995): 22

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it was often the message of community development that received most prominence24. Then, in the shadows of a failed peace process, Hamas was lauded and electorally rewarded for its “fidelity to the Palestinian dream”25. Its 2006 victory was then seen by Gunning as only an expected manifestation of its steady rise, that since the mid-1990s included significant electoral victories in professional, labor and student union election, with these being “main site[s] of electoral contestation.”26

Building on the notion of an evolving Hamas that is historically conditioned to be a socio-political and military actor, others then explored the implications of an Islamic Resistance now encompassing the role of a resistance and the government. It was apparent for many that Hamas now had to align its short-term responsibilities and long-term aspirations.27 Specifically, this meant that it had two possible ahead of it: one marked by “politics, pragmatism, and moderation” and the other by “a return to arms and opposition…to any possibility of negotiations.”28 Confronted with these choices and being firmly committed to the perception of an ever-evolving Hamas, for most the Islamic Resistance has followed a distinct path of de-radicalization since 2006 i.e. it has engaged in more state building, less fighting. Almost reminiscent of a human life cycle, they insinuated a ‘new’ Hamas that had traversed the recklessness of youth as a resistance movement, and had now come upon the maturity of old age, as the government. Firmly embedded within this perspective, Jensen saw indications of Hamas’ turn to pragmatism were imbued in its decision to participate29 in the 2006 elections30, while others saw moderation reflected in its political rhetoric in the lead-up to the elections. Lybarger noted, de- radicalization was demonstrated when the group changed its initial aspiration of establishing an Islamic state within historical Palestine to one that proposed long-term truce with “with provisional borders between the yet-to-be-established Palestinian state and present-day Israel as delimited by the 1948

24 Roy, 15 25 Tamimi, Azzam. Hamas: A History From Within (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2007): 220 26Gunning, 144 27 Milton-Edwards, Beverly. “The Ascendance of Political Islam: Hamas and consolidation in the Gaza Strip” Third World Quarterly 29.8 (2008): 1591 28 Caridi, 336 29 In the lead up to the first PLC elections in 1996 and despite HAMAS vehemently opposing the Oslo Accords, its iconic founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Hassan Yassin in a letter from prison in October 1993 initially urged members to participate in the electoral process (Chenab, Zaki. Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies (London: I.B. Taurus, 2007): 107). This had immense impact of HAMAS’ cadre with Ismail Abu Shanab and Ismail Haniyeh deciding to contest in the elections on the basis of “…a wide support base, which enabled them to take political risks.”(Gunning, 110) Nevertheless, in the face of a lack of unanimous support within the group both withdrew their candidacy ensuring the Islamic Resistance presented a unified front in opposing the PLC elections (Gunning, 111) 30 Jensen, Michael Irving. The Political Ideology of Hamas. A Grassroots Perspective (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009): 147

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armistice lines.”31 Hroub also posited a similar trajectory of change through the group’s documents released during the 2006 PLC election campaign. For him, as Hamas displayed religion less prominently in its election rhetoric, it demonstrated an Islamic Resistance eager “…to present itself as a moderate Islamist movement worthy of trust by secular as well as religious Palestinians.”32 Furthermore, with little visible opposition from within the organization to its “relaxed and semi- secular” approach to Palestinian politics, the group’s documents, while political by intent, for Hroub still reflected a real and substantial change within the organization.33 In Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide the author further allayed skepticism over a ‘New Hamas’ citing Islamic Resistance’s post-election document, ‘Government platform’ that according to him demonstrated practicality, pragmatism and an eagerness to ally with other Palestinian political factions.34 While Hovdenak’s perspective on a ‘de- radicalizing’ Hamas also recognized changes in its political rhetoric35, he saw transformation most prominently evidenced in the group’s limited use of violence. While the Islamic Resistance, led by its military wing, the Izzedin al-Qassam Brigade, has been known for its suicide operations against Israeli civilians in the 1990s, the author witnessed de-escalation (and de-radicalization) in the form of ceasefires since 2003.36 Long then further confirmed a Hamas now de-emphasizing its violence agenda, demonstrated by its political wing distancing itself from the al-Qassam brigade37. He claimed that ‘martyrdom operations’ subsequently dipped and Hamas became a ‘limited spoiler’38, as seemingly prompted by “Palestinian public opinion and Israeli pressure”39.

The works cited above, while not exhaustive, demonstrate the intellectual impulse of the literature on Hamas since its 2006 election victory. They explored ‘where Hamas came from’ and speculated ‘where it was headed’. In explaining why Hamas won these works built on the works of Levitt40, Knudsen41,

31Lybarger, Loren D. Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle Between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007): 3 32 Hroub, Khaled. “A ‘New Hamas’ through its New Documents” Journal of Palestine Studies 35.4 (Summer 2006): 26-27 33 Hroub, 27 34 Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide (London: Pluto Press, 2006): 140 35 Hovdenak discussed the vastly different political stance during the 2006 elections when compared to Hamas’ 1988 Charter. 36 Hovdenak, Are. “Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions” Democratization 16.1 (2009): 62 37 Long, Baudouin. “The Hamas Agenda: How Has It Changed?” Middle East Policy Vol. XVII No. 4 (Winter, 2010): 133 38 Long, 138-139 39 Long, 140 40 Levitt, Matthew. “Hamas from Cradle to Grave” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2004) 41 Knudsen, Are. “Crescent and Sword: the Hamas enigma” Third World Quarterly 26.8 (2005)

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Mishal and Sela42, Roy43 and Hatina44 and disentangled Hamas’ history shaped identity that compels it to espouse a social, political and military role in Palestinian politics45 and was subsequently critical to its victory. Similarly embedding Hamas’ victory and its propensity to be a socio-political and military actor within the trajectory of a historically evolving organization, Hamas was also seen as now embarking on a path of de-radicalization. This was most critically evidenced through its pre-election political rhetoric and fewer military campaigns against Israel. That said, in articulating the foundational implication of Hamas now adopting the role of government and resistance, the post-2006 literature on Hamas could also be seen as having had limited success. While it would be credible to claim that Hamas is not only historically experienced in, but also conditioned to, being a sociopolitical and military actor, its inception into the government isn’t necessarily a continuation of the same evolutionary trend. With the 2006 PLC, Hamas’ operations were now incorporated into the realm of ‘official’ politics converting ‘social service’ into ‘public policy’. Furthermore, this meant that its (especially political and social) operational scope was implanted into and limited by the “firm structure[s]” of official politics (and the Palestinian Authority). This then signified a qualitative shift from its historical identity as a movement signified by “continuous action, free of rigid organization, because it is the movement of a people not a movement of a [political group].”46 That said, being burdened by the responsibilities (and limitations) of official politics it would seem predictable that a de-emphasis of Hamas’ military operations would ensue. Furthermore, with state building instinctively associate with ‘order’ while violence with disorder (thus seemingly incompatible), it would seem an obvious that Hamas as the government would overshadow Hamas as a resistance. While this trajectory of change and supposed ‘de-radicalization’ has been evidenced by Hamas’ de-emphasis on violence, in rhetoric and practice, criticisms could be levied on this perspective of an Islamic Resistance re- calibrating its operational priorities. With obvious evidence demonstrating Hamas engaging fewer military campaigns, how is one to articulate the reasons behind this change? At the very onset, with

42 Mishal, Shaul and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) 43 Roy, Sara. ”The Crisis Within: The Struggle for Palestinian Society” Critique 17 (Fall 2000) 44 Hatina, Meir. “Hamas and the Oslo Accords: Religious Dogma in a Changing Political Reality” Mediterranean Politics 4.3 (Autumn, 1999) 45 This tendency was further emphasized when, during the 1990s, the Islamic Resistance established separate social, political and military wings. (Wiegand, 137) 46 Sayigh, Yezid. “Armed Struggle and State Formation” Journal of Palestine Studies (Summer 1997): 24 (Originally cited in: al-Usbu’ al-Arabu, 22 January 1968. Text in Palestinian Arab Documents 1968 (Beirut: IPS, 1970): 27)

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limited or no access to Hamas’ internal decision-making processes it is difficult to codify why Hamas chose to change its operational scope. While the group, like the ANC and IRA, has shown the capability to transition from an “…armed struggle to negotiated settlement,”47 couldn’t its change in tactics be simply an attempt to meet the requirements of a new political reality? It is also true that over the years Hamas’ military engagement with Israel has not only been infrequent but also “far more reactive [to Israeli military actions], than proactive.”48 But Hamas has maintained its official commitment to the resistance through popular culture49, the al-Qassam Brigades50 and hostilities with Israel in 2006, 2008/2009 and 2012. Most recently Mousa Abu Marzouk once again insisted on Hamas’ resistance credentials when he declared “The Gaza Strip is not a swamp of terrorism nor a source of extremism, but a base of resistance, a thorn in the face of the occupation, the abode of national pride and a project of liberation and for the refugees’ return.”51 Here the arbitrariness of the notion of ‘de- radicalization’ emerges as it is difficult to articulate how much or how little resistance would signify a change in Hamas’ identity. Finally, centering the notion of de-radicalization on the reduced emphasis on resistance in the group’s charters and manifestoes has its own limitation with regards to articulating the reasons behind such actions. While the likes of Hroub perceive such a shift as signifying a changing Hamas, Gunning asserts,

One of the reasons Hamas focused its electoral programme on its (non-violent) domestic programme was that it did not need to emphasise its resistance record. It was on display during numerous victory rallies staged to celebrate the withdrawal of Israeli troops and settlers from the Gaza Strip in summer 2005, complete with marching militia-men in military fatigues and rocket launchers…It was implied in countless posters of Hamas’ martyrs which adorned streets as well as election rallies.52

Bringing Back the Palestinian State

During an interview in Cairo, Egyptian-American Sociologist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim noted:

Before we can analyze Hamas’ civil and military operations it is important to understand the character of conflict Palestinians and Hamas are involved in. It is not a normal fight for liberation.

47 Milton-Edwards, Beverley and Alastair Crooke. “Elusive Ingredient: Hamas and the Peace Process” Journal of Palestine Studies 33.4 (Summer 2004): 50 48 Author Interview with Hamas-affiliated Al-Aqsa TV journalist, Gaza City, May 2013 49 This is manifested in TV programming, murals and posters of the martyred in the Gaza Strip. This observation was made during a fieldwork trip to the Gaza Strip from May—June 2013. 50 Hamas’ armed wing. 51 Al-Ghoul, Asmaa. “Hamas Emphasizes Resistance” Al-Monitor (September 12, 2013) 52 Gunning, 177

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Aside for being a liberation, it is also a cultural battle and social struggle. Therefore, any movement fighting for a Palestinian state has to perform all these functions. The usual proposition for liberation is an armed struggle. This is what you call as the backbone. But because the battle in Palestine is a total societal battle, it is a different story.53

While Ibrahim was accurate in categorizing the brand of conflict that Hamas was engaged in and the impact the Palestinian liberation struggle has had on its identity, like the works cited above, the core paradox of being both in government and a resistance organization remained unaccounted for. It was then Caridi that noted that Hamas’ entrance into the Palestine’s national authority meant tragically being part of “…an authority that is not a state, and…a state that has neither recognized borders nor a monopoly on the use of force.”54 The dilemma that Hamas currently faced was also evident in conversations with its leadership and affiliates. When asked why the organization chooses to take the responsibility of the daunting task of governing and resisting the ‘occupation’, Hamas PLC member Atef Adwan claimed that despite challenges, it was “…an obligation [to do both] and therefore didn’t give up…”55 For Hamas Spokesperson, Fawzi Barhoum in the post-2006 period the Islamic resistance committed to a ‘dual status’ because “ the occupation has not subsided. It has not stopped its aggression against Gaza. Therefore we must do both. It is for this reason that the Palestinian people understand and believe in it.”56 Finally, Wesam Afifa, Director General of (Hamas-Affiliated) Al-Resalah Media Institution noted, “The question is what comes first, building a state or liberation. Today we have a government but it’s a government without a state and this is the principle problem of Oslo…Some in the Hamas movement justify being in government saying that it strengthens the liberation movement. The government becomes a cover for the liberation movement. It’s a sort of political protection.”57 But, whether the ‘dual status’ is strategic, one that Hamas finds itself obliged to embody or something that emerges as necessary in lieu of the Gaza Strip particular socioeconomic and political predicament, political frustration of doing the same was apparent. Accordingly Ghazi Hamad, Hamas’ Deputy Foreign Minister noted, “The Oslo Accords were a mistake. In the beginning it was sold as the first step for the Palestinians to create a state. But we can see that it was false hope and painted a rosy picture.

53 Author Interview, Cairo, January 2013 54 Caridi, 36 55 Author Interview, Gaza City, May, 2013 56 Author Interview, Gaza City, June 2013 57 Author Interview, Gaza City, June 2013

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They deceived us by giving us false hope. It was a big illusion...It was not there to create a state but there to decrease the cost of the occupation.”58

Nevertheless, since 2006/7 Hamas has created a stable system.59 Irrespective of the challenges of doing both i.e. governance and resistance, or the paradoxical nature of governing Palestine while simultaneously engaged in a liberation struggle it has firmly established itself as the sole governing entity in the Gaza Strip, while officially maintaining its commitment to a resistance. It is for this reason that this article veers from the approach of the post-2006 Hamas literature so far. Irrespective of ‘how much’ governance or ‘how little’ resistance Hamas is engaged in, here it is seen prudent to adopt a static frame of analysis. This means that Hamas is understood simply on the basis of the roles it now embodies i.e. it is both a government and a resistance. Such a perspective recognizes that the organization is historically conditioned to being a social, political and military actor. But also asserts that when in government it entered a new brand of political practice. It acknowledges that Hamas has reprioritized its operational scope since 2006. It also posits that it would be difficult to articulate as to whether change in Hamas operational priorities is owed to it accommodating a new political reality or it embarking on a qualitative shift in its own identity, namely, de-radicalizing. It is here then, without being over-burdened by Hamas historical identity or driven to speculate where the Islamic Resistance was headed, within this static reality of what Hamas is today, that this article begins its deliberation on what it espousing a ‘dual-status’ means.

That said, the question of balancing governance and state building with resistance isn’t particularly a new conversation in the Palestinian context. It was in the wake of the Oslo Accords that such concerns first emerged. On September 13, 1993, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements declared that,

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement.60

58 Author Interview, Gaza City, May 2013 59Sayigh, Yezid. “Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On” Middle East Brief No. 41 (March 2010): 1 60 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1682727.stm

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Then with the ‘Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority’ representing the beginning of the statist agenda, questions arose as to its impact on a liberation movement often characterized by an armed struggle. Shain and Sussman declared that while the Oslo Accords stimulated the process of state- building in the Palestinian territories questions still remained as to the implications of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) transforming itself from being a liberation movement in exile to being the sole Palestinian governing entity.61 The anticipation of the establishment of a Palestinian state also weren’t devoid of its own concerns, in that as state-building was seemingly underway, it was still problematic that “[t]he terms of Palestinian sovereignty, particularly the scope of statehood and territorial boundaries, are far from resolved in the minds of Israelis and Palestinians.”62 Sayigh also explored the implications of state-building on PLO’s armed struggle. Accordingly, the author noted that at that time while the Palestinian state’s territorial aspirations were yet to be fulfilled “…the statist ambition…clearly dominated the political agenda”63 which manifested itself in the form of “the establishment of quasi-governmental services providing medical care and social welfare to the mass constituency.”64 Nevertheless, many were concerned with the impact of pursuing ‘state-building’ in conjunction with an armed struggle, a historical facet of the Palestinian liberation movement. What these conversations thus illuminated is the perpetual question that confronts Palestinian political factions when entering the PA as a governing entity: ‘How should one perform Palestinian self- authority while also continuing on the path of a liberation struggle?’ Owing to the failures of the PA in establishing a Palestinian state has meant that Palestinian factions have officially remained committed to a Palestinian liberation movement and with it, an armed struggle. But, with PA remaining as the only institutional means of governing, Palestinian factions have also performed (albeit disingenuously) Palestinian self-authority without a sovereign and international recognized Palestinian state in the background. Then, Hamas as the new entrant into the realm of ‘official politics’ and now governing the Gaza Strip through the PA, it too found itself engaging in ‘state-like’ behavior while fighting for a sovereign and territorially inviolable Palestinian state. It is for this reason that Milton-Edwards and Crooke claimed (albeit before 2006) that the group’s departure from its 1988 charter through the

61 Shain, Yossi and Gary Sussman. “From Occupation to State-building: Palestinian Political Society Meets Palestinian Civil Society” Government and Opposition 33.3 (July, 1998): 275 62 Shain and Sussman, 275 63 Sayigh, 26 64 Sayigh, 21

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proposed “…mechanism for recognizing Israel, based on the concept of long-term cease-fore, is analogous to the political evolution that occurred at an earlier stage within Fatah.”65 Then Hamas today can be perceived as another non-exceptional Palestinian faction maneuvering the dilemma of governing a Palestinian territory. Hamas as a government and resistance isn’t necessarily embodying a new kind of political practice of its on creative doing66. Instead it is simple one among a long line of Palestinian actors, thrust into the role of governing Palestinian Territories and simply ‘living’67 within the boundaries of a Palestinian vernacular condition68. It’s a condition specific to the way politics has been done since the Oslo Accords in Palestine which compels Palestinian factions in government to be institutionally mandated to perform Palestinian state and self-authority, while, in the absence of real sovereignty, being embedded in a liberation movement, often as an armed struggle. This of course doesn’t mean that the pressures of doing both at the helm of Palestinian politics hasn’t led Palestinian factions change their operational priorities. For example, Fatah having headed the PA for years (unequivocally until 2006) has in effect forfeited the armed struggle. Nevertheless, Hamas represents another non-exceptional case of the dilemma Palestinian factions face while in government and encourages us to recognize the existence of a Palestinian vernacular condition in which the ‘dilemma’ is embedded.

Hamas, then compelled to live this condition as a governing entity in the Palestinian territories, the question emerges as to ‘what determines its behaviour while living this condition?’ It is here that the Palestinian state is brought back in and considered critical in shaping political conduct as both an aspiration and inspiration. The existence of the Palestinian state as an aspiration can be considered as what perennially informs the Palestinian liberation movement and its adherents’ identities. In his first address to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1974, Yasser Arafat insisted on the PLO’s right “…to establish an independent national State on all liberated Palestinian territory.”69 In a similar vein the 1988 Palestinian National Council’s Declaration of Independence, declared “…the rise of the Palestinian state in our Palestinian land, the natural climax of a daring and tenacious popular struggle

65 Milton-Edwards and Crooke, 49 66 As often claimed by the group’s leaders 67 Abu-Lughod, Lila. “Writing Against Culture” in Richard G. Fox ed. Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1991): 475 68 Jean and John Comaroff. “The Struggle Between the Constitution and ‘Things African’” Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 7.3 (2005): 300 69 http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/arafat_gun_and_olive_branch.htm

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that started more than seventy years ago and was baptized in the immense sacrifices offered by our people in our homeland, along its borders, and in the camp and other sites of our Diaspora.”70 With the struggle and aspiration for a state marking the broad parameters of the Palestinian liberation struggle, its most audible manifestation has been an armed struggle. From a Fanonian perspective an armed rebellion in the Palestinian context is often perceived as a foundational tactic geared as attacking a “regime of oppression”71 and reversing the effects of the same as it perpetually aims at “the destruction of the indigenous social fabric, and demolished unchecked the systems of reference of the country’s economy, lifestyles, and modes of dress”72. In that way, the turn to an armed rebellion within a liberation struggle mimics similar trends witnessed by the Anushilan Samity and RSS in India or the eventual turn to violence by South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC)73. But in fighting the ‘regime of oppression’ the use of armed tactics has also become a performance of the Palestinian-ness that would anchor and inform the eventual sovereign and recognized Palestinian state. As a young Palestinian in Cairo once said to me “Just like Palestine is part of me, fighting is also part of me.”74 Then as Hage noted with regards to Palestinian suicide bombers, the use of armed tactics becomes deeply intertwined with what it means to be Palestinian. Each bombing is not only representative of “a form of symbolic anticolonial capital”75 but also an embodiment of the “survival of a Palestinian will”76. With an armed struggle often deeply intertwined with the Palestinian identity, it also finds resonance as critical to achieving the ultimate manifestation and aspiration of Palestinian-ness i.e. the Palestinian state. To that effect, Sayigh noted that it was the armed struggle that despite its limitations contributed to “…demarcating the Palestinians as a distinct actor in regional politics with a not insignificant degree of autonomy.”77 Moreover, the armed struggle played critical role in collating the Palestinian nation (as a precursor to the state) by evoking the existence of a Palestinian people, providing (through the PLO) an “institutional embodiment” of Palestinian-ness, creating a space for

70 http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6EB54A389E2DA6C6852560DE0070E392 71 Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963): 3 72 Fanon, 6 73 Young, Robert J.C. “Fanon and the turn to armed struggle in Africa” Wasafiri 20.44 (2005): 34 74 Author Interview, Cairo, January 2013 75 Hage, Ghassan. “Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm: Understanding Palestinian Suicide Bombers in Time of Exigophobia” Public Culture 15.1 (Winter 2003): 70 76 Hage, 74 77 Sayigh, Yezid. Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement: 1949 – 1993 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997): 8

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“mass participation in national politics” and finally becoming a framework through which the statist agenda was pursued primarily through the bureaucratization of guerrilla groups.78

Born and socialized within the Palestinian vernacular condition, within which state exists as a goal, Hamas too finds itself embodying the aspiration for a sovereign Palestinian state. During a conversation with Ahmed Yousef, advisor to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh he simply declared, “We simply need to have a Palestinian state…It is not easy but we have to build our own country slowly”79. To this effect and reflecting the general Palestinian impulse that sees an armed struggle critical to the efforts to attain a Palestinian state, Hamas too frequently utilizes its resistance wing as the most visible and audible manifestation of the aspiration for a Palestinian state. Resistance has featured prominently in Hamas’ 1988 Charter and remained evident in its manifesto released on the eve of the Legislative elections in January 2006. The very participation of Hamas in the elections under the ‘Change and Reform List’ is categorized as “…an act of support for the program of resistance and Intifada.”80 Enshrined in their ‘Domestic Policy’ then is the goal of “[p]rotecting the resistance and vitalizing its role in resisting the occupation and accomplishing the mission of liberation.”81 In a similar vein resistance central to efforts of liberating Palestine, Hamas’ Qassam Brigade claims it on its official webpage that it is “…part of the resistance movement against the Zionist occupation of Palestinian lands, which has been ongoing since the British occupation.” Furthermore it claims to work to “Evoke the spirit of Jihad (resistance) amongst Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims; Defend Palestinians and their land against the Zionist occupation and its aggression; Liberate Palestinians and the land usurped by the Zionist occupation forces and settlers.”82 Furthermore, reflecting the strategic importance of resistance in Hamas’ efforts to secure a Palestinian state, Salama Maroof, General Manager of (Hamas) Government Media Office noted, “The strength of Hamas’ resistance wing is clear. Within two months of being in power, it succeeded in capturing Gilad Shalit and forced the occupation to release more than a 1000 prisoners.”83 In a similar vein Adwan claimed, “Seven years since the elections one can say that Hamas’ resistance activities have demonstrated that it can bring Israel to make compromises. When the

78 Sayigh (”Armed Struggle and State Formation”), 20-21 79 Author Interview, Gaza City, June 2013. 80 Tamimi, 275 81 Tamimi, 277 82 http://www.qassam.ps/aboutus.html 83 Author Interview, Gaza City, June 2013

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resistance is strong, Israel tends to retreat.”84 It is owing to this critical significance of resistance in Hamas’ bid for a Palestinian state that Ghazi Hamad sees the continued relevance of resistance. Accordingly he explained, “We have kept resistance alive in our values, cultural outlook and made sure that resistance is mentioned in every Hamas document. Even though it is not easy we have continuously talked about resistance while being in government. In 2009 and 2012 they reacted to Hamas being power and yet we survived because of our resistance wing.”85

Hamas then, not least through its armed wing, reflected and embodied the vernacular Palestinian condition that anchors political behaviour as driven by the aspiration for the Palestinian state. That said with political sentiments and intellectual impulses centred on the question of Palestine driven by the aspiration of the state, its failure to come to fruition through the Oslo Accords meant that while the vision remained, the question of a tangible and sovereign Palestinian state disappeared out of focus. Nevertheless, as the 2006 PLC election Hamas assumed the role of the sole governing entity in Gaza, performed state-like activities as the government through the PA, despite its institutions limited sovereignty and capabilities, the question of the state was brought back into the question. Of course, the state as the lowest common denominator exists as informing ‘life as resistance’. But Hamas as government also reminds as that the Palestinian state also exists as an inspiration for political behaviour when in power i.e. it informs ‘life as a government’. For that matter, as mandated by the Oslo Accords, the PA dresses very much like a state. It encompasses ministries, administrative departments and bureaucracies. It maintains foreign relations and embassies, while having the ability to extract taxes on resident Palestinians’ income and imported goods. It administers a robust police force and internal security corps that polices the population within its territorial mandate, while monitoring and controlling the movement of people in and out of the Palestinian territories. It legislates through the Palestinian legislative council and aims to administer justice through its judicial system. For that matter the Palestinian state, as embodied by the PA, exists in a manner reminiscent of Skocpol’s perspective. It is one that is able “influence meaning and methods of politics for all groups and classes in society”86 and, as a PA-led institutional semblance of a state able to “…affect political and social processes

84 Author Interview, Gaza City, May, 2013 85 Author Interview, Gaza City, May 2013 86 Skocpol, Theda. “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 28

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through their policies and their patterned relationships with social groups.”87 From this understanding of the state, the Palestinian state here can be claimed as being in existence as more than an aspiration. It is able to influence and shape political behaviour when manifested through the PA and is therefore able to inspire politics at the helm of the Palestinian political landscape. In that way all the “symbolic languages of authority” are apparent: there exists legal premise and discourse emphasizing the existence of a state-like authority; there exists symbols and rituals in the form of physical governmental structures and signs; and there exists an attempt to ‘map’ a national territory informed by a common identity and culture88. Of course, this seemingly linear story hinting at the existence of the central facets of the state faces the problematique that the Palestinian Authority’s state-like behaviour isn’t necessarily informed by or based on a sovereign and internationally recognized Palestinian state. It is able to inspire political behaviour but isn’t necessarily anchored in a territorially distinct entity. Then this Palestinian state is a ‘de-naturalized’89 entity. It speaks like a state90 and is continuously reproduced91 and rendered permanent92 through the (state-like) behaviour it inspires among its adherents in the Palestinian governing political factions. It may not have a tangible manifestation that is universally recognized but it nevertheless persists through a symbolic existence93. It is the Oslo Accords that mandated this ‘brand’ of a Palestinian state and led subsequent Palestinian governing entities to exercise power at the helm through the PA. In doing so it ensured that the state as an inspiration for political behaviour became a central facet of the Palestinian vernacular condition. It is for this reason that Hamas since 2006, treading a path already taken by Fatah, has utilized the PA and its institutions to establish its authority as the government in Gaza while performed state-like tasks. While maintaining its credentials as resistance, Hamas continually emphasizes the ‘lack’ of a Palestinian state as a territorially sovereign and tangible manifestation. That said, being in government and performing state-like functions through the PA, it has also underscored the existence of a Palestinian state that exists as an inspiration for political behaviour for Palestinian governing entities.

87 Skocpol, 3 88 Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat. States of Imagination. Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001). “Introduction: States of Imagination”: 8 89 Hansen and Stepputat, 2 90 Hansen and Stepputat, 5 91 Hansen and Stepputat, 6 92 Hansen and Stepputat, 23 93 Hansen and Stepputat, 7

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While studies on Palestine have centred on the lack of a Palestinian state, Hamas as a government and resistance encourages us to explore that ‘political practice’94 that informs the same. Then, embedded in and reflective of a Palestinian condition, Hamas’ elevation to helm of Palestinian politics has demonstrated that the Palestinian state exists as an aspiration and an inspiration for political behaviour for governing entities. Then, instead of studying the Palestinian state as having failed to come to fruition, the post-2006 era has opened up the opportunity of studying it as something rendered permanent, not in its existence but in its performance through the political behaviour it inspires. The explicit Palestinian state may not still exist, but the implicit does. And it is then this implicit being that has then been able to be a qualifier95 of politics in the Palestinian territory, irrespective of who is at the helm: Fatah or Hamas.

Post-Script:

In response to ‘what Hamas as a government and resistance means?’ this article raises the politics of the Palestinian Territories up the prophetic index96. In doing so it recognizes that Hamas in government and as a resistance has entered, in its life cycle, a new political reality marked by a different kind of political behavior. Nevertheless, within the context of Palestinian history, Hamas also emerges as non- exceptional in its conduct at the helm of Palestinian politics. In its dual role it inhabits an Oslo Accord- mandated condition, already lived by preceding Palestinian factions. Furthermore, in living this condition it sheds light on the existence of a Palestinian state that, in the post-Oslo period, that has existed as an aspiration and inspired political behavior when in power. Hamas in power since 2006 is less that it is a ‘transforming’ organization now embodying a dual role, but more that it illuminates the existence of a general condition that drives political actors to face similar dilemmas and behave in a similar manner. With this assertion in place, it further encourages us to reassess our understanding of Palestinian factions’ behavior as specific and unique in their individual ideological and historically shaped being when in positions of authority. Instead, being driven and shaped by certain pre-existing

94 Abrams, Philip. “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)” Journal of Historical Sociology 1.1 (March 1988): 82 95 Lund, Christian. “Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics” Development and Change 37.4 (2006): 689 96 Collins, John. Global Palestine (London: Hurst and Company, 2011): 2

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implicit conditions for political behavior, the Palestine state is ‘brought back in’ as more than simply a territorial construct, but a cite of a particular variety of political practice.

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