The 1992 Consensus: a Review and Assessment of Consultations Between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation

The 1992 Consensus: A Review and Assessment of Consultations Between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation

Xu Shiquan

n July 9, 1999, Lee Teng-hui announced his possible avenues for breaking the current politi- O “two-states theory ,” destroying the foun- cal deadlock between the two sides. dation for the dialogue and consultations authorized by the two sides, causing the planned visit The One-China Principle to Taiwan in the fall of 1999 by Chairman Wang Daohan of the Association for Relations Across Is the Basis for Breaking the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) to be aborted, and once again—as occurred after Lee’s 1995 visit to the Deadlock the United States—stalemating Cross-Strait relations. On March 18, 2000, candidate Chen Shui- The one-China principle is the cornerstone bian of the Democratic Progressive party (DPP) of the Chinese government’s policy toward Tai- was elected the new leader of the ruling regime wan. It is only on the basis of the one-China prin- in Taiwan. Because of the DPP’s stance in favor ciple that any breakthrough in the political dead- of Taiwan independence and Chen’s personal ad- lock between the two sides will be possible. Look- vocacy of Taiwan independence, not only did the ing back at the history of Cross-Strait relations political deadlock intensify but a serious crisis de- since 1949, we can clearly see that most of the veloped in the relationship between the two sides. time, despite a military confrontation and numer- In spite of this, through its study and assessment ous serious clashes between the two sides, both of the environment around Taiwan, its ability, and sides have always maintained a one-China stance; its confidence in its ability to control the overall the struggle revolved around the question of who situation regarding the Taiwan issue, China’s represented China and was in effect the continu- mainland adopted a policy toward Taiwan’s new ation of China’s civil war. Taiwan did not enact a leaders of “listening to their words and watching law stating that China’s sovereignty and territo- their deeds”; it warned the Taiwan independence rial integrity had been split, that Taiwan was no forces against taking any extreme measures, longer part of China, that there existed two Chi- thereby stabilizing the situation in the Straits nas. On this common political ground the region and leaving both time and space for a re- mainland’s Association for Relations Across the versal of the deadlock between the two sides. In Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan’s Straits Ex- adopting this policy, the mainland displayed and change Foundation (SEF) reached a consensus reinforced its consistent stance of trying its ut- in 1992, whereby each side orally expressed the most to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully. With joint understanding that it adhered to the one- the same objective in mind, this article explores China principle. This swept away the major ob-

American Foreign Policy Interests 122 Xu Shiquan stacles that had been encountered since both par- lic opinion in Taiwan forever. Hence through a ties began contacts and discussions, allowed both review and an analysis of how both organizations sides to reach agreements quickly on the Cross- reached a consensus in 1992, this article seeks to Strait use of notarized documents and on the trac- show the necessity of returning to this consen- ing of and compensation for lost Cross-Strait reg- sus and to explore the possibility that both sides istered mail, and paved the way for the historic will do so. talks in 1993 between Chairman Wang Daohan of the ARATS and Chairman Koo Chen-fu of the SEF. A Review of the 1992 Yet as Lee Teng-hui began to implement his secessionist line more openly, the regime in Tai- Consultations Between wan gradually altered and deviated from the 1992 the Two Organizations consensus, unilaterally and simplistically refer- ring to “one China, separately expressed,” hop- The Taiwan Straits Exchange Foundation was ing thereby to compel the mainland to accept an established on November 21, 1992, and on March “open” interpretation of one China and thus al- 9 of the following year, it opened its doors and lowing Lee Teng-hui to play up “legally” and commenced operations. The Taiwan authorities openly his separatist proposals as if both sides established this “nongovernment intermediary were “two equal political entities,” were engaged organization” to deal with many problems that in “a two-China phase,” and subscribed to a “two- were associated with the proliferation of contacts state theory.” Disregarding the facts, the new between the two sides that began when family leaders of Taiwan’s ruling regime publicly denied visits were permitted on November 2, 1987. Be- the 1992 consensus, saying that what had been cause the Taiwan authorities could not immedi- achieved in 1992 was “a consensus without con- ately abandon their “Three No’s Policy” (no consensus.”1 Although the 1992 consensus between tacts, no talks, no compromises), they created this the two organizations was twisted and trans- nongovernmental unit to resolve issues that they formed by Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s new au- could not handle directly in their own name. 2 On thorities into a dispute between the two sides, December 16, 1991, the mainland established the the contribution made by the 1992 consensus to- ARATS, whose mission was to promote ties be- ward promoting the development of Cross-Strait tween the two sides, develop Cross-Strait rela- relations is there for all to see. It did not come tions, and bring about the peaceful reunification easily; it was a compromise acceptable to both of the motherland. The ARATS regarded the reso- sides within the framework of one China reached lution of concrete problems related to Cross-Strait after the ARATS, prompted by an earnest desire ties to be “one of the important tasks it was au- to solve the problem, negotiated with the SEF thorized to engage in.”3 and brought about concessions. As far as the stances on reunification and independence taken by the various parties in Taiwan were concerned, The Beijing Talks apart from the DPP, the 1992 consensus was acceptable to all the major political parties and to Acting out of their common purpose, the two mainstream public opinion as the most realistic organizations held their first functional talks in means to break the political deadlock between Beijing during the latter part of March 1992 and the two sides. The principal obstacle was erected conducted working talks on two topics: the by the Taiwan independence fundamentalists “Cross-Strait use of notarized documents” and within the DPP. It should be remembered, how- the “tracing of and compensation for lost Cross- ever, that they cannot obstruct mainstream pub- Strait registered mail.”

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Once the two sides had begun contacts and the use of the mainland’s notarized documents discussions about issues that occurred in ex- in Taiwan. Regarding the tracing of and compen- changes, they discovered that, although they were sation for lost Cross-Strait registered mail, the discussing functional questions, an important wording initially used by the SEF was “making matter would have to be clarified before any is- arrangements for tracing and compensating for sue could be resolved smoothly—that is, the ac- indirect registered mail between the two sides,” knowledgment that functional issues between the applying the procedure used for mail between two sides were the domestic issues of one coun- countries and insisting that the movement of try. Hence the one-China principle was involved. Cross-Strait mail was “indirect” and that trac- On April 4, 1991, then Vice Chairman and ing and compensation should be handled by the Secretary General of the SEF Chen Chang-wen SEF and the ARATS rather than directly by the headed the Foundation’s first delegation to visit postal authorities on both sides. Representing the the mainland. On April 29, during a meeting with SEF, Shi Hwei-yow (at the time chief of the Le- Chen Chang-wen, Deputy Director of the State gal Services Department of the SEF) explained Council’s Office of Taiwan Affairs Tang Shubei that the policy of the Taiwan authorities was one was authorized to list five principles that should of “no official contacts” with the mainland and be observed in the handling of concrete issues that “Cross-Straits developments had not yet arising from contacts between the two sides. The reached the stage of direct postal links.”6 It is second of these principles stated, “In dealing with clear that the SEF’s actions and proposals were affairs relating to contacts between the two sides, in violation of the one-China principle. we should adhere to the one-China principle and Tang Shubei, who was then executive vice oppose any form of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, chairman of the ARATS, stated the mainland’ s one Taiwan’ and oppose ‘one country, two gov- position at a press conference on March 30 after ernments’ and other similar proposals or behav- the conclusion of the Beijing talks. He said: ior.” From November 3 through November 7, Chen Chang-wen again led a delegation to Beijing The crux of the difference between the and entered into procedural talks about coopera- two sides lies in the way one China is tion in attacking crimes such as maritime smug- presented. We feel that there are no gling and robbery in the Taiwan Straits. During problems with the usage of documents the talks, Tang Shubei again expressed the hope within a country, nor are there prob- that the SEF would adopt an attitude of adher- lems with tracing registered mail. At ing to the one-China principle and would strive present, because the two sides have not for a consensus. For the first time, both parties been reunified, it is necessary to find discussed adherence to the one-China principle some special solutions for business during functional talks, but a consensus was not matters involving the Cross-Strait use reached.4 of documents and for initiating tracing On March 22, 1992, after the start of talks and compensation for Cross-Strait reg- between the two organizations in Beijing, the SEF istered mail. On this matter we are will- and its supervisory body , the Taiwan Mainland ing to work together positively with the Affairs Council (MAC), insisted that the one- appropriate parties from Taiwan. How- China principle was “unrelated to technical is- ever, because at present the two sides sues” under discussion, such as the use of docu- have not been reunified, we must first ments.5 Moreover, the Taiwan side began to in- make it clear that what we are discuss- sist on using terms such as “the authentication ing or resolving are matters within one of documents,” applying the procedure used be- country. As everyone knows, both the tween countries’ diplomatic missions to deal with Nationalist party and the Communist

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party believe there is only one China; The Beijing talks between the ARATS and the the documents that have been passed SEF were the first formal talks held since the by the Taiwan side relating to reunifi- establishment of the two authorized nonofficial cation also acknowledge that there is organizations. Although no agreement was only one China. Since there is a con- reached, through direct face-to-face communica- sensus on one China on both sides, why tions, each side was better able to understand the can’t both parties resolve concrete other’s position, and consensus was reached on working issues in accordance with this some matters at a time when it was hard to re- principle? The one-China question solve the differences. The essence of the differ- should not become a problem bedevil- ences lay in the issue of the one-China principle. ing the talks between the two sides. Although the Taiwan side said that it adhered to a one-China policy, it emphasized the differences He also pointed out: between the two sides about its meaning and proposed using a formula of “each speaking for it- [W]e do not want to discuss political is- self” to explain the meaning of one China. The sues with the SEF; we just want to af- purpose of the Taiwan side in adopting such a firm one thing, namely , that there is stance was to highlight its “sovereignty” and “ju- only one China. As for the meaning of risdictional authority” and to seek the status of one China, we are not prepared nor do an “equal political entity.” The mainland side, on we plan to discuss that with the SEF . the other hand, insisted on the one-China prin- The two sides have not been reunified, ciple and stated that the functional matters un- but we are one country. We are unyield- der discussion by the two sides were the internal ing on this principle. As for what form affairs of one country, its purpose being the up- should be used to express this principle, holding of national sovereignty and territorial we are willing to enter into discussions. 7 integrity. Yet in light of the differences between Regarding the outcome of the Beijing talks, the two sides on the meaning of one China, and Ma Ying-jeou, then vice chairman of the Taiwan particularly because those differences cannot be MAC, “felt extremely regretful” that the main- resolved quickly , in order to allow the talks to land insisted on the one-China principle and in- achieve progress, the mainland side proposed sisted that document use and matters regarding that, inasmuch as both sides were implementing registered mail were Chinese domestic issues. a one-China policy, they could temporarily not dis- And yet he reaffirmed that “our side has adhered cuss the meaning of one China. Because the Tai- all along to a ‘one-China’ policy,” and he stated wan side insisted on “each speaking for itself,” that “after these discussions, the views of the two the mainland side made clear its unswerving po- sides began gradually to come closer, which is sition on adhering to the one-China principle but helpful to the resolution of the problem.” Regard- affirmed its willingness to discuss the form in ing next steps for the talks, he indicated that they which this principle should be expressed. would be in touch with the ARATS after internal After the Beijing talks, the ARATS summed consultations. 8 For his part, Tang Shubei stated up its position: The concrete issues in Cross- that the working talks “were productive and that Strait ties are the internal affairs of China and both sides had achieved consensus in many ar- should be resolved through discussions in accor- eas. However, because time was relatively short, dance with the one-China principle; in functional there were still some differences in the views of talks, provided that the basic position of the one- both sides on some questions, and this is natu- China principle is stated, the political meaning ral. We look forward to conducting further talks of one China need not be discussed; the ways in at a time convenient to both sides.”9 which it could be expressed are open to full dis-

American Foreign Policy Interests The 1992 Consensus 125 cussion, and the ARATS is willing to listen to the its jurisdiction. Our side feels that “one opinions of the SEF and all sectors in Taiwan. China” should refer to the Republic of This consistent attitude was evident in all the China, which was founded in 1912 and efforts the Association made to resolve this prob- has continued to exist to the present; lem.10 its sovereignty extends to the whole of The Beijing talks were not entirely success- China, but at present its governing ful, but based on the discussions between the two power only extends to Taiwan, the sides, the ARATS revised its draft agreement and Penghu Islands, Quemoy and Matsu. gave the text to the SEF’s representatives in the Taiwan is indeed part of China, but the hope that the other side would submit written mainland is also part of China. 13 revisions or a proposed draft; it had a positive outlook for the achievement of a final agreement. The ARATS subsequentl y responded to the On the other side, in light of the policy objectives Taiwan National Unification Council’s resolution it had for the talks between the organizations, of August 1. A responsible member of the ARATS the Taiwan authorities also hoped that the talks told a reporter from the Xinhua News Agency, could continue and would show progress. As ana- With regard to the meaning of “one lyzed in an article in Lianhebao, to begin by re- China” in the talks between the SEF solving problems of unofficial exchanges was “the and our Association on an agreement core of its (the Taiwan authorities’) mainland over functional matters, relevant par- policy, hence the success or failure of the SEF in ties in Taiwan stated their “conclu- its (Beijing) trip would also indirectly test sions” on August 1 and confirmed that whether or not this construct of a mainland policy “both sides of the Taiwan Straits ad- was effective”; and “(it) was more likely to shake here to the principle of one China.” Our the people’ s confidence in the ‘government.’” 11 Association feels that making this point Therefore, “in keeping with the latest develop- clear has great significance for the ments in the course of Cross-Straits negotia- Cross-Straits talks on functional affairs. tions,” the Taiwan authorities decided to act It demonstrates that adherence to the through the “National Unification Council” and one-China principle in talks on func- “propose a policy interpretation of the concrete tional affairs has now become the con- definition of ‘one China’ in a new and complete sensus on both sides of the Straits. Of way and to use this as the basis for the arguments course, our Association does not agree of the Taiwan representatives at the Cross-Strait with the Taiwan side’s understanding negotiation table.”12 On August 1, 1992, the NUC of the meaning of “one China.” Our po- adopted a “conclusions” document entitled “On sition of favoring “peaceful reunifica- the Meaning of ‘One China.’” In that document tion and one country, two systems” and the meaning of one China was expressed as fol- opposing “two Chinas,” “ one China, one lows: Taiwan” and “two equal political entities” has been consistent. Both sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to the principle of “One China,” but the But this spokesperson also reaffirmed that “in two sides attach different meanings to talks on functional affairs, provided that the ba- this. The Chinese Communist authori- sic attitude of supporting the one-China principle ties regard “one China” to be “The is stated, the meaning of one China need not be People’s Republic of China,” and after discussed.” 14 unification, Taiwan would become a From the positions of the two sides described “Special Administrative Region” under above, we can see that although there were sig-

American Foreign Policy Interests 126 Xu Shiquan nificant differences between them on the mean- one-China principle; the ARATS agreed to dis- ing of one China and although each had its own cuss the wording with which the SEF would proposals on how to handle these differences, clearly indicate its adherence to the one-China there was an important convergence and consen- principle. After the talks began, Zhou Ning of the sus on the essential question of adhering to the ARATS presented five written formulas for ex- one-China principle. This laid the foundation for pressing the statement that both sides of the both sides to continue their talks and to reach Straits adhered to the one-China principle: some agreements. On September 17, 1992, Zou Zhekai, then vice chairman and secretary gen- 1. Document usage across the Straits eral of the ARATS, and Secretary General Chen is an internal affair of China. Jung-chie of the SEF had a meeting in Xiamen 2. Document usage across the Straits and unofficially exchanged views on the matter is a Chinese affair. of expressing the one-China principle. Zou Zhekai said to Chen Jung-chie and Shi Hwei-yow, who 3. Document usage across the Straits was also present: is a Chinese affair . In light of the fact that different systems exist on The conclusion of the Taiwan side on both sides of the Straits (or because the one-China principle shows that the country is not yet completely re- there is already a consensus on adher- unified), there are unique aspects ing to the one-China principle in dis- to these functional matters. These cussions of functional matters between can be suitably resolved through the two sides. However, we do not agree consultations on an equal basis be- with the explanation of the meaning of tween the ARATS, the Chinese No- one China by the relevant parties in taries Association, and the SEF. Taiwan; nor can we discuss the meaning of one China with the SEF. 4. As both sides of the Taiwan Straits make efforts toward national unifi- He suggested that the SEF seriously consider cation, they shall adhere to the one- directly using the wording “both sides of the Tai- China principle and shall suitably 15 wan Straits adhere to the one-China principle.” resolve the Cross-Strait usage of Subsequently, both organizations agreed to con- notarized documents (or other func- duct working talks in Hong Kong. The SEF’s lead tional matters). negotiator would be Shi Hwei-yow, and the ARATS’s would be Zhou Ning, deputy director of 5. Based on the consensus that both its Consultation Division. The dates were set for sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere October 28–29, 1992. to the one-China principle, the ARATS, the Chinese Notaries As- The Hong Kong Talks sociation, and the SEF shall, through consultations on an equal basis, suitably resolve the question The actual main subject of the talks was how of the Cross-Strait usage of nota- to eliminate the differences over the one-China rized documents. principle between the two sides in talks on functional affairs. Both sides had been authorized to With formal authorization from the MAC, Shi discuss this issue. 16 It should be said that both Hwei-yow proposed five written formulas and parties displayed a certain degree of flexibility . three oral ones. The five written formulas he pro- The SEF no longer flatly refused to discuss the posed are these:

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1. Both sides shall proceed from the a matter between the Chinese principle of “one China, two equal people on both sides of the Straits. political entities.” 3. Although both sides seek to unify 2. Both sides shall proceed from the the country through their common principle of “seeking a democratic, efforts and adhere to the one-China free, equally wealthy, and unified principle, they acknowledge that China; Cross-Strait affairs are the they differ over the meaning of one affairs of the people of China.” China. In light of steadily increasing unofficial Cross-Strait contacts, 3. Given that both sides of the Straits however, and in order to protect the have been in a prolonged state of interests of the people on both sides separation and in recognition of the of the Straits, the verification of fact that both are seeking to unify documents should be suitably re- the country through their common solved.18 efforts, they feel it necessary to resolve the verification of documents In an exchange of views, although their posi- (or other matters under discussion) tions had drawn closer, the two sides did not reach in a suitable way. any agreement. At the request of the SEF , the ARATS agreed to extend the talks by a half day 4. Both sides shall proceed from the until October 30, but they were still unable to principle of “seeking a peacefully reach agreement. Yet the ARATS gave a positive and democratically unified China.” assessment of the Hong Kong talks by stating that “these working talks have not only made consid- 5. Both sides shall proceed from the erable progress on concrete business matters; principle of “ seeking the peaceful they have also made progress on the expression and democratic unification of the of the one-China principle in talks between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.”17 two sides on functional affairs.”19 Hence the No formula was agreed to after both sides ARATS wrote twice (on October 29 and Novem- proposed their five written formulas. Based on ber 4) to the SEF, suggesting an assessment of authorization from the MAC, the SEF proposed the results of the talks, proposing further talks three oral formulas: on related questions in Beijing or Taiwan, in Xiamen or Quemoy, and suggesting that respon- 1. Given that China is still in a tem- sible persons from the two organizations sign an 20 porary state of division, both sides agreement. On November 1, a representative are seeking to unify the country of the SEF issued a written statement saying that through their common efforts, and regarding the expression of the one-China prin- unofficial Cross-Strait contacts ciple in talks between the two sides on functional have been steadily increasing; in or- affairs, “ we suggest that within a mutually ac- der to protect the interests of the ceptable range, each side state its position orally.” people on both sides of the Straits, The ARATS examined the SEF’s third oral for- the verification of documents mula and said that it expressed the SEF’s atti- should be suitably resolved. tude of seeking unification and adhering to the one-China principle. Although it argued that “it 2. The verification of documents on is acknowledged that they differ” over the mean- both sides of the Taiwan Straits is ing of one China, the ARATS proposed that “in

American Foreign Policy Interests 128 Xu Shiquan discussions of routine affairs, as long as the posi- ganizations on document usage and the tracing tion of adhering to the one-China principle is of and compensation for lost registered mail. On stated, the political meaning of one China (need) November 16 and 30, the ARATS wrote twice to not be discussed.” Therefore, it stated that it was the SEF, giving a written statement of its posi- considering whether a position of adhering to the tion. In its letter of November 16, the ARATS one-China principle together with the SEF and said, using the method in which each would make its own oral statement would be acceptable. The During these working talks, your rep- ARATS hoped that the SEF could confirm that resentative suggested that in the con- 21 this was the official view of the Taiwan side. text of mutual understanding, we use On November 3, the SEF wrote to the ARATS, the format of having each of our orga- formally notifying it that it was “using the for- nizations make an oral statement ex- mat of an oral statement to express” the one- pressing the one-China principle and China principle. That day the Association’s propose specific contents to be ex- deputy secretary general, Sun Yafu, notified the pressed (see the appendixes). This Foundation’s secretary general, Chen Jung-chie, would include making clear that both by telephone that the working talks between the sides of the Taiwan Straits adhere to two organizations conducted in Hong Kong on the one-China principle, and this con- October 28–30 had been concluded. He suggested tent has subsequently appeared in Tai- that further talks on related issues be held in wan publications. Beijing or Taiwan, in Xiamen or Quemoy, and that responsible persons from the two organizations sign an agreement at one of those four sites. Sun The letter formally notified the SEF that the Yafu also notified Chen Jung-chie by telephone key points of the Association’s oral statement that the ARATS fully respected and accepted the would be that “Both sides of the Taiwan Straits SEF’s suggestion of expressing the one-China adhere to the one-China principle and are mak- principle through oral statements. He proposed ing efforts toward national reunification. How- consultations over the specific contents of the oral ever, the political meaning of ‘one China’ will not statements. 22 On November 3, the SEF issued a be involved in the discussions of functional af- press release confirming that the ARATS had in- fairs between the two sides.” The content of the dicated it respected and accepted “the suggestion oral declaration contained in the letter to the SEF previously made by our SEF that both sides each was the third formula for oral declarations pro- express the ‘one-China’ principle through an oral posed by the SEF in Hong Kong on the afternoon statement.” It noted that “ our Foundation has of October 30, that is, “As both sides seek to unify already obtained the consent of our supervisory the country through their common efforts, al- body that it is acceptable for each side to express though they both adhere to the one-China prin- itself through an oral statement. Regarding the ciple, [they acknowledge] that they differ over the 25 specific content of the oral statements, our side meaning of one China.” On December 3, the SEF will express itself on the basis of the ‘National replied to the ARATS letters of November 16 and Unification Guidelines’ and the National Unifi- 30. The letter welcomed the ARATS’s “willing- cation Council’s resolution of last August 1 on ness to show a positive attitude and sign an agree- the meaning of ‘one China.’” 23 ment, which would enable the problem to be fully The Foundation’s letter of November 3 to the resolved.” It also reiterated the SEF’s stance on ARATS and Sun Yafu’s phone call on the same orally expressing the one-China principle that had day to Chen Jung-chie led to a “breakthrough been published in the press release of November development”24 in the talks between the two or- 3, that is, it would be stated on the basis of the

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“August 1 resolution” of the “National Unifica- ing with specific problems that emerged while tion Council” and the “National Unification handling contacts and in talks on functional af- Guidelines.” 26 The ARATS suggested that the two fairs. Provided that both sides came to an under- organizations set a time to release the specific standing and consensus on this matter, other contents of their oral declarations simultaneously. problems could be resolved as they cropped up. Lee Ching-ping, then the Foundation’s deputy For its part, the SEF insisted that “talks between secretary general, said, “This will require further the two sides on functional affairs are unrelated study.” to political topics” and emphasized that “it is ac- From the description given of the talks be- knowledged that they differ” over the political tween the two organizations, we can see that as meaning of one China. Hence during the Beijing a result of more than a year of efforts and engag- talks, the SEF had not yet been authorized to ing in the working talks in Hong Kong, both sides discuss its position on stating the one-China prin- had finally overcome the principal obstacle that ciple, and it therefore adopted a stance of avoid- had emerged in discussions of routine affairs and ance or even rejection. Because of the stalemate were able to affirm through oral declarations that over this fundamental question, when the two they adhered to the one-China principle, and that sides began to discuss specific matters such as differences over the political meaning of one document usage and the tracing of and compen- China would not be raised in discussions of func- sation for lost registered mail, obvious diver- tional affairs. This was the true course of events gences began to emerge in areas ranging from surrounding the 1992 consensus. the choice of words to ways of handling issues. This is illustrated in the chart on page 130. Although it would appear that many of the An Assessment of differences described in the chart are technical in nature, if traced to their roots, they involve the 1992 Consensus adherence to the one-China principle—that is, it must first be affirmed that the issues being dis- The 1992 consensus was the result of serious cussed by the two organizations are internal af- consultations and mutual compromises between fairs of China; otherwise, both sides will go off in the ARATS and SEF, which both earnestly de- different directions and an agreement will be hard sired to resolve problems “in the context of mu- to reach. The mainland cannot make the slight- tual understanding” and for which both had re- est concession in its position on upholding na- ceived full authorization from their respective su- tional sovereignty and territorial integrity. Dur- pervisory bodies. Any distortion and denial of the ing the Hong Kong talks, the SEF was authorized consensus would be a distortion and denial of the to discuss how to express the one-China principle, facts as well as an insult to the efforts made by and it successively proposed eight such formu- both parties. Looking back at how the two orga- las, thereby displaying its spirit of “mutual un- nizations achieved a consensus, we can see that derstanding.” Out of an earnest desire to solve it did not come easily and should be cherished. the problem, the ARATS immediately gave a posi- The matters discussed by the two organiza- tive response and made matching concessions, tions showed that adhering to the one-China prin- agreeing that both sides could express the one- ciple was an unavoidable issue in the talks on China principle through oral declarations and functional affairs between the two sides. From confirming the specific contents of the oral dec- the beginning the ARATS had put its finger on larations through letters. Because the Hong Kong the crux of the problem, pointing out that the talks allowed both sides to achieve a consensus one-China principle could not be ignored either on adherence to the one-China principle and over- in promoting Cross-Strait exchanges or in deal- come the main obstacle in their talks on routine

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Subject Item SEF Position ARATS Position

Title of Use “Agreement on Use “Agreement on Agreement Verification of Cross- Verification (and) Strait Documents.” Usage of Cross-Strait Documents.”

Preamble to Text relating to the The two sides should Agreement “one-China Principle” stress the “one- has no bearing on this China principle” in agreement and should some part of the be excised. compact or sign the agreement on the basis of the principle that they [functional issues] are “internal affairs of China.”

Cross-Strait Liaising bodies Proposes that the two The bodies on both Document parties to the agreementsides, using nota- Usage be the liaising bodies or rized documents, that the mainland side could engage each could designate an other directly or agency to engage in through the assis- working contacts with tance of the SEF. the SEF.

Scope of activitiesAll types of documents Only those docu- should be handled compre- ments that are nota- hensively. rized are authorized for handling.

Items verified by Besides the three types ofIn principle, copies of providing mutualnotarized documents pro- notarized certificates copies posed by the other side, of marriage, inherit- school records, personal ance, and adoption identity papers, birth cer- should be provided tificates, and tax papers jointly to facilitate should be included in verification by the accordance with custom. bodies using them, which should be willing to discuss additional items.

Verification time In principle, thirty days In principle, thirty limit days

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Subject Item SEF Position ARATS Position

Verification fees Need not be charged. Should be charged.

Tracing of and Does not approve of direct Tracing of and com- compensation for working contacts betweenpensation for lost lost Cross-Strait postal departments of mail is not the work registered mail the two sides. Formal of the two organiza- compensation and tracingtions and should be as well as standards for dealt with by the computing postal chargespostal departments remain to be discussed. on both sides as part of their professional duties. Based on Zhongguo Shibao [China Times], October 29, 1992.

affairs, Association Executive Vice Chairman China principle, the third oral formula proposed Tang Shubei and SEF Vice Chairman Chiu Jinyi by the SEF on October 30, 1992, and the resolu- held preliminary discussions in Beijing from April tion of August 1, 1992, on the one-China ques- 4 through April 10, 1993, about a meeting be- tion by the National Unification Council and the tween Wang (Daohan) and Koo (Chenfu). They National Unification Guidelines; it distorted the also reached consensus on eight issues regarding 1992 consensus as “each speaking for itself” and the meeting, including time, location, partici- misled people into believing that the Taiwan re- pants, topics, and other related questions. From gime could make an “open” interpretation of the April 27 through April 29 of that year, the Wang– one-China principle, thereby creating a basis for Koo meeting was held in Singapore, and four its advocacy of dividing the country. Thereafter, agreements were signed: “ Agreement on a Sys- Lee Teng-hui’s “expressions” of one-China began tem of Contacts and Talks Between the Two Or- to deviate more and more brazenly from the one- ganizations,” “Agreement on Verification of China principle. Cross-Strait Notarized Documents,” “ Agreement On November 20, 1993, someone from the on Tracing of and Compensation for [Lost] Cross- Taiwan regime attending the APEC conference Strait Registered Mail,” and “Joint Agreement in Seattle put forth a “Two-Chinas-Phase Policy.” of the Wang–Koo Meeting.” On July 5, 1994, the Taiwan regime made public The regrettable thing is that, at a time when its “Statement on Relations Across the Taiwan people on both sides of the Straits were hoping Straits,” saying that “ ‘one China’ refers to the that Cross-Strait relations would continue to historical, geographical, cultural and genealogi- move toward the prospects opened up by the cal China,” thereby overtly abandoning the ad- Wang–Koo meeting, Lee Teng-hui, leader of the vocacy of one China in the legal sense. The state- Taiwan regime, moved in the opposite direction ment gave these explanations of the Taiwan and stepped up the pace of dividing the country. regime’s claim that the two sides are “equal po- The Taiwan regime unilaterally summed up the litical entities”: “The meaning of a so-called ‘po- 1992 consensus as “one China, separately ex- litical entity’ is fairly broad. It might refer to a pressed by each side”; it avoided mentioning that country, a government or a political organiza- it had confirmed the oral declaration of the one- tion”; “ in dealing with Cross-Straits relations, the

American Foreign Policy Interests 132 Xu Shiquan relation between the two sides is not one between ARATS and SEF never engaged in discussions of countries, and it also differs from the usual simple the political meaning of one China, to say noth- domestic affairs.” Lee Teng-hui’s “special state- ing of reaching a consensus that the political to-state relations” was by this time almost vis- meaning of one China would be “separately ex- ible on paper. On April 8, 1995, in his speech at pressed by each side.” In other words, the con- the “National Unification Council” (so-cal led sensus was that each of the two sides would use Lee’s Six Points), Lee Teng-hui said that since the format of an oral declaration to show its po- 1949, “Taiwan and the mainland have been gov- sition of adhering to the one-China principle, and erned by two political entities, neither of which because the meaning of one China was not dis- is subservient to the other , thus resulting in a cussed by the two sides, there was never any con- situation whereby the two sides of the Straits are sensus on it. 27 A unilateral misinterpretation of separated and separately governed.” In July 1996, the 1992 consensus will inevitably damage Cross- the brief entitled “Participation of the Republic Strait relations. of China in the United Nations,” published by It must be pointed out that some people in Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even more Taiwan, particularly the leaders of the new re- revealingly stated that “China is a neutral his- gime, stubbornly deny that in 1992 both sides torical, cultural and geographical term,” and expressed a position of adherence to one China. “only after the two sides are unified will there Such a contention disregards the facts. By look- truly be ‘One China.’” In February 1997, the ing at reports in the Taiwan newspapers on the Press Office of the Executive Yuan of Taiwan pub- talks between the two organizations, one can lished a brief entitled “ Looking at the Issue of readily understand that a responsible person rep- ‘One China’” in which it began to use “a divided resenting the MAC and the SEF’s representatives China” instead of one China. The brief stated, in the negotiations indicated many times that “Rather than say ‘One China,’ we should say ‘one “our side has always adhered to a ‘one-China’ divided China,’ such as Korea now and Germany policy.”28 On December 3, 1992, in issuing its or Vietnam in the past.” On July 9, 1999, Lee statement on the Nationalist party’s version of Teng-hui expressed the “Theory of Two States,” the meaning of one China, the Standing Com- arguing that “Since the revision of the constitu- mittee of the party’s Central Committee said, tion in 1991, the Cross-Strait relationship has “Taiwan independence or ‘one China, one Tai- been established as one between states or at least wan’ are paths which will not work; they are as a special state-to-state relationship.” paths which will bring about self-destruct ion.” The facts demonstrate that under the guise An editorial in the Zhongguo Shibao (China of “separately expressed by each side,” Lee Teng- Times) of October 29, 1992, also stated, “It must hui abandoned the 1992 consensus, gradually be said that on the position of ‘one China,’ there moved away from a one-China policy, destroyed is no divergence between the two sides.” Another the basis for Cross-Strait dialogue and consulta- fact that must be pointed out is that, before the tions, created tremendous difficulties for Cross- ARATS and SEF reached their consensus on one Strait relations, and brought about the Straits China, there was a case in Taiwan in which the crisis of 1995–1996 and the Cross-Straits crisis Nationalist party punished a member of the Leg- and deadlock that have existed since July 1999. islative Council who was a KMT member for vio- This is precisely why the mainland cannot agree lating the one-China principle. In the latter part to describe the 1992 consensus as “one China of September, many members of the Legislative separately expressed by each side” or even “the Council, who were also members of the “Meet- meaning of one China separately expressed by ing of Minds” ( jisihui, a second-level organiza- each side.” Such a description both distorts the tion of the Nationalist party) in Taiwan’s Legis- facts and harms Cross-Straits relations. The lative Yuan, questioned the one-China policy dur-

American Foreign Policy Interests The 1992 Consensus 133 ing a general question session. Chen Zhe-nan to become turbulent and filled with crises. Since advocated “one China, one Taiwan.” Hau Pei- the DPP, which advocates Taiwan independence, tsun, who was then head of the Executive Yuan, assumed control of power, the Cross-Strait rela- “rebutted him in stern tones,” stressing that “a tionship has been mired in an even more danger- two-Chinas policy will lead Taiwan to a dead end.” ous deadlock. In spite of this, the mainland has “If a two-Chinas policy were adopted today, it been making the greatest possible efforts to re- would bring instant disaster to Taiwan.” “ One solve the deadlock peacefully so that the relation- China, one Taiwan is Taiwan independence,” and ship can take a turn for the better and move in a “if you don’t identify with one China, then don’t positive direction. Looking at the situation across be a member of the Chinese Nationalist party.” the Strait, this writer thinks that the 1992 con- Nationalist party spokesman Chu Chi-ying indi- sensus is still the closest point of convergence that cated that the party adhered to a one-China policy can revive dialogue and consultations between the and opposed “one China, one Taiwan.” James two sides. It must be admitted that the key lies Soong (Soong Chu-yu), the party’s secretary gen- in the acceptance of the one-China principle. The eral, emphasized that the one-China policy of the objective existence of one China cannot be party in power was very explicit. The Nationalist changed. In the world today, of the 180-plus mem- party’s Discipline Committee decided in that case ber countries of the United Nations, more than to chastise party members who violated the one- 160 have a one-China policy, and this situation China position with a serious warning. 29 From will develop further. There is no future for Tai- the facts presented in this article there should be wan independence, which can only bring disas- no question that in 1992 both sides and both or- ter to our brethren in Taiwan. It is definitely not ganizations acknowledged adherence to a one- mainstream public opinion in Taiwan and is re- China position. At the time, preoccupied with con- pugnant to the hopes of Chinese abroad. As the solidating his own power, Lee Teng-hui still opening sentence of the “National Unification needed to stabilize Cross-Strait relations and had Guidelines” explicitly states, in seeking to build neither the time nor the ability to challenge the a strong, prosperous country and [promote] long- one-China principle. term developme nt for the people, the Chinese both at home and abroad share the common hope that China will be unified. In light of the broad Conclusion trends in world development today and as the overall strength of the mainland continues to The consensus in which both sides of the grow, how will our brethren in Taiwan deal with Straits stated their adherence to the one-China the opportunities and challenges of the twenty- principle was reached by the ARATS and SEF in first century? It goes without saying that the join- 1992 as a result of authorization and mutual ef- ing of the two sides would be advantageous to forts. That was the basis, acceptable to both sides, both. During the past 50 years, Taiwan has, on for dialogue and consultations. Without this con- the whole, carried out a one-China policy. What sensus, the nearly 20 rounds of talks between the harm has that done to our brethren there? On two organizations would not have been possible, May 15, 2000, Mr. Hau Pei-tsun wrote a piece in and the Wang–Koo meeting in Singapore and the Lianhebao in which he stated, “Over the past 50- four agreements would have been even less pos- odd years, because we advocated one China, we sible. After the Wang–Koo meeting, Lee Teng-hui survived, developed, flourished and grew. Why was awed by the momentum that characterized should we abandon that?” It is Taiwan indepen- the rapid development of Cross-Straits relations. dence, not the one-China principle, that prevents He deliberately distorted and destroyed the 1992 our brethren in Taiwan from being masters of consensus, causing the Cross-Strait relationship their own house, threatens the security of Tai-

American Foreign Policy Interests 134 Xu Shiquan wan, and shrinks “Taiwan’s international sur- torial integrity cannot be divided, and vival space!” Taiwan’s political status should be dis- “The wise man is the one who understands cussed in the context of one China. the times.” It would not hurt the leadership of —From Chairman Wang Daohan’s the Taiwan regime to look from a higher vantage conversation with Mr. Koo Chen-fu in point, to take the present and long-term inter- Shanghai on October 14, 1998 ests of our brethren in Taiwan to heart, and to respect and return to the 1992 consensus. If that were to happen, we could look forward to the re- Regarding Cross-Strait relations, the sumption of dialogue and consultations between one-China principle that we propose the two sides, which in turn would lead to the states: There is only one China in the peaceful and stable development of Cross-Strait world, the mainland and Taiwan both relations. That would be a blessing for the people belong to one China, and China’s sov- of both sides. ereignty and territorial integrity may not be divided. Appendix 1 —From Vice Premier Qian Quichen’s remarks of August 25, 2000, during a meeting with a visiting delegation On the One-China Principle from the Lianhebao Group of Taiwan

Before reunification, in handling Cross- Strait affairs and particularly in Cross- Appendix 2 Strait negotiations, adhering to the one- China principle means maintaining “The National Unification Guidelines” that there is only one China in the world, that Taiwan is part of China, and (Excerpts) that China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be divided. 1. Preface: In seeking to build a —From Vice Premier Qian Quichen’s strong, prosperous country and speech of January 26, 1998, [promote] long-term development at a symposium commemorating the for the people, the unification of third anniversary of President Jiang China is the common hope of Chi- Zemin’s major speech “Continue to nese both at home and abroad. In a Fight to Complete the Great Endeavor rational, peaceful, equal, and mutu- of Promoting Our ally beneficial context, both sides of Homeland’s Unification” the Taiwan Strait, after a suitable period of earnest exchanges, coop- eration, and consultation, should There is only one China in the world, develop a consensus on democracy, and Taiwan is part of China; at present freedom, and joint prosperity and (China) is not yet unified; both sides together rebuild a unified China. should make joint efforts on the basis of the one-China principle to negotiate 3. Principles: (1) The mainland and on equal footing and discuss reunifica- Taiwan are both Chinese territory, tion. A country’s sovereignty and terri- and promoting national unification

American Foreign Policy Interests The 1992 Consensus 135

is the common duty of Chinese people. Appendix 4

4. Course: (4) Both sides should put Responsible Member of the aside hostile stances and, under the ARATS Suggests Continuing one-China principle, solve all dis- Talks with Responsible Members putes through peaceful means. of the SEF —Passed at the third meeting of Taiwan’s National Unification Council on February 23, 1991, A Xinhua reporter learned from the and at meeting #2223 of the ARATS that on November 3, its Deputy Executive Yuan on March 14, 1991 Secretary General Sun Yafu notified SEF Secretary General Chen Jung- chie that the working discussions Appendix 3 between the two organizations on “Cross-Strait Usage of Notarized Documents,” which had been held in On the Meaning of “One China” Hong Kong October 28–30, had con- (Excerpts) cluded. He suggested that further talks on related issues be conducted in Beijing or Taiwan, in Xiamen or (1) Both sides of the Strait adhere to Quemoy and that responsible members the principle of “one China,” but of the two organizations sign a related each side attaches a different mean- agreement in one of the aforementioned ing to it. The Chinese Communist locations. regime regards “one China” to be “The People’ s Republic of China” It is believed that these working talks and [holds that] after unification, in Hong Kong achieved great progress. Taiwan would become a “Special During the two working discussions Administrative Region” under its on “Cross-Strait Usage of Notarized jurisdiction. Our side feels that “one Documents” and the “Tracing of and China” should mean the R epublic Compensation for Lost Cross-Straits of China, which has existed from its Registered Mail,” which took place founding in 1912 to the present day; in Beijing during March of this its sovereignty extends to the whole year [2000], the Taiwan side deliber- of China, but its present governing ately distorted the ARATS adherence power only extends to Taiwan, the to the one-China principle in function- Penghu Islands, Quemoy, and al discussions and [in] its definition Matsu. Taiwan is indeed part of of problems arising from Cross-Strait China, but the mainland is also part contacts as Chinese matters rather than of China.” international matters, saying that these were “adding political topics”; sub- —Passed at the eighth meeting sequently the SEF unilaterally termi- of Taiwan’s National Unification nated the discussions. Since the work- Council on August 1, 1992 ing talks in March ended, responsible

American Foreign Policy Interests 136 Xu Shiquan

members of the State Council’s Office changes or a draft as soon as possible, of Taiwan Affairs and the ARATS have but the SEF did not do so. However, indicated on numerous occasions that during this round of talks, the SEF the one-China principle should be raised new requirements regarding expressed in Cross-Strait discussions the mailing of copies of documents. of functional issues but that for now The ARATS determined that this the political meaning of “one China” would take time for study and assess- need not be raised and the means ment as well as for consultations with of expression could be fully discussed; relevant agencies; this (position) was this in fact meant that the means of eminently reasonable. Yet the SEF in- expression could be either written or sisted on reaching an agreement in oral. During these working talks in Hong Kong, which was clearly imprac- Hong Kong, representatives of the SEF tical. proposed a format in which each side would make its own oral declaration As early as September 30 and October of the one-China principle; on Novem- 16, the ARATS had written to the SEF, ber 3, the SEF again wrote to the explicitly stating that it would enter ARATS, formally notifying it that “each into a round of working talks with the side would express itself through an SEF in Hong Kong on October 28–29. oral declaration.” The ARATS fully re- At the repeated requests of the SEF, the spected and accepted the Founda-tion’s ARATS agreed to extend this by a half proposal, and Deputy Secretary Gen- day to continue discussions of related eral Sun Yafu telephoned Secretary issues. During the talks, the ARATS General Chen Jung-chie and suggested recognized that great progress had been entering into discussions on the specific achieved by the Hong Kong talks but contents of the oral declarations. This that solutions were still needed for some reflects the Association’s consistent at- outstanding and some new problems. titude of seeking mutual respect and Therefore, it wrote again to the SEF on truth from facts and not forcing its October 29, suggesting that after as- views on others as well as its sincerity sessing the outcome of the talks, fur- in seeking to reach an accord on the ther discussions take place in Beijing Cross-Strait use of notarized docu- or Taiwan, in Xiamen or Quemoy and ments. that responsible members of the two organizations sign an agreement. It Our correspondent has learned from appears that whether or not such talks sources in the ARATS that when the take place soon will be the key to working meetings in Beijing ended in whether or not there will be complete March, the ARATS promptly presented success on Cross-Strait usage of nota- the Foundation’s representatives with rized documents, and this bears close a draft agreement that had been revised watching. in accordance with the discussions between the two sides. Prior to the re- —Xinhua News Agency, November 4 sumption of working talks in Hong Kong, the ARATS wrote to the SEF on September 30 in hopes that (the SEF) would provide written suggestions for

American Foreign Policy Interests The 1992 Consensus 137

as possible and will continue and Appendix 5 finish the talks on the above two practical issues with our staff who Press Release from the Straits Exchange are waiting there. Foundation, Legal Person (November 3, 3. This evening (November 3), we in- 1992) structed Department Director Shi Hwei-yow and others to remain in Hong Kong for one or two days and A responsible member of the Chinese to prepare for the resumption of Communist ARATS indicated today talks. We hope the ARATS will (November 3) through the Xinhua make a decision as soon as possible News Agency that they [ARATS] are and will inform us before noon on willing to “respect and accept” ou r November 5. Foundation’s earlier proposal in which each organization is to express the “one-China” principle through an oral Appendix 6 declaration, but their Association also indicated that “the specific contents of the oral declarations will be separately Correspondence from the Talks on the discussed.” Cross-Strait Authentication of

Our Foundation thinks that Documents

1. The talks on practical issues regard- To the Straits Exchange Foundation: ing “Document Authentication” and the “ Tracing of and Compen- On October 28–30, our Association and sation for Lost Cross-Strait Regis- representatives from the Chinese No- tered Mail” do not involve political taries Association and from your Foun- subjects. It was only because the dation conducted working talks on the ARATS repeatedly insisted during Cross-Strait use of notarized docu- these talks in Hong Kong that there ments; at the same time, they ex- be some “expression” of the “one- changed views on the tracing of and China” principle that we obtained compensation for lost Cross-Strait reg- the consent of our supervisory body istered mail. In addition to making con- and will accept [the proposition] siderable progress on specific business that each side express itself through matters, these working talks also made an oral declaration. As for the spe- progress on the question of expressing cific content of the oral declaration, the one-China principle in Cross-Strait our side’s expression will be based talks on functional issues. This is the on the “National Unification Guide- result of joint efforts made by all the lines” and the resolution passed by parties involved. the National Unification Council on August 1 of this year. At the conclusion of the working talks in Beijing in March, we again indicated 2. We hope that the Association’s staff that specific issues in Cross-Strait con- will return to Hong Kong as soon tacts are Chinese affairs and should be

American Foreign Policy Interests 138 Xu Shiquan

resolved through discussions in accor- “one China” is not involved in the Cross- dance with the one-China principle; in Strait functional talks. Acting in this functional talks, as long as both sides spirit, the Cross-Strait use of notarized demonstrate a basic position of adher- documents (or other issues under dis- ing to the one-China principle, the po- cussion) should be suitably resolved. litical meaning of “one China” need not be discussed, the format for expressing We suggest that after we agree on a time the one-China principle in functional to make our oral declarations simulta- talks can be fully discussed, and we are neously, we continue to discuss, in willing to listen to the views of your Beijing or Taiwan, in Xiamen or Foundation and of all sectors in Taiwan. Quemoy, some specific business matters relating to a draft agreement about During these working talks, in the con- which there are differences of opinion text of mutual understanding, your and have the agreement signed by re- representative adopted the format of sponsible members of our two organi- having each of our organizations ex- zations. press the one-China principle through (Signed) The Association for an oral declaration and suggested the Relations Across the Taiwan Straits specific contents to be expressed (see November 16, 1992 attachment); this included making it clear that both sides of the Strait ad- Attachment: the formula for an oral here to the one-China principle, and declaration that you proposed on the this content subsequently appeared in afternoon of October 30: various publications in Taiwan. We noted that on November 1, Mr. Shi “As both sides of the Strait make efforts Hwei-yow released a written statement toward national unification , although expressing a position that is consistent they both adhere to a one-China prin- with the above suggestion. On Novem- ciple, it is understood that there are dif- ber 3, you wrote to notify us formally ferences about the meaning of one that you have already obtained the con- China. In light of the increasing fre- sent of relevant parties in Taiwan for quency of nonofficial contacts and in “each side to express itself through an order to protect the rights of people on oral declaration.” We fully respect and both sides of the Strait, the authenti- accept your proposal and informed Mr. cation of documents should be suitably Chen Jung-chie of this by telephone on resolved.” November 3.

In order for the talks on the Cross- Appendix 7 Strait use of notarized documents to come to fruition as soon as possible, we will now inform you of the key points Letter from the SEF to the ARATS we intend to include in our oral statement: Both sides of the Strait adhere to To the Association for Relations Across the one-China principle and are mak- the Taiwan Straits: ing efforts toward national reunification. However, the political meaning of We have received your letters of Novem-

American Foreign Policy Interests The 1992 Consensus 139

ber 16 and 30 about the talks on “Cross- liminary consensus reached in the Hong Strait Document Authentication.” Kong talks and taking your views fully into account, we have prepared a draft Regarding “Cross-Strait Documenta- agreement and delivered it in person to tion” and the “Tracing of and Compen- your representatives at the Hong Kong sation for Lost Cross-Strait Registered talks. If you find that there are still Mail” being issues between Chinese on “differences that have been omitted” in both sides of the Strait, this question the two drafts on “Cross-Strait Docu- has been unsettled for a long time. It mentation” and the “Tracing of and has not only affected the rights of Compensation for Lost Cross-Strait people on both sides; it has also caused Registered Mail,” please write to us as people to begin to question exchanges, soon as possible so that we can study which is truly regrettable. We very the matter. much welcome receiving the two aforementioned letters from you indicating We attach the greatest importance to that (you) “are willing to sign an agree- the meeting in Singapore between ment in a positive spirit” “ to enable the Chairman Koo and Chairman Wang. As matter to be fully resolved.” for ancillary matters related to the meeting, we will inform you by mail We have always felt that the functional after giving this careful study. talks between the two sides should not be related to any political topics, [for] With best wishes, there are differences in how the two sides understand the meaning of “one (Signed) The Straits Exchange China.” In seeking to find a solution to Foundation, Legal Person the problem, we proposed that each side December 3 make an oral declaration. As for the specific content of the oral declarations, we have already indicated in our press About the Author release of November 3 that we will express ourselves in accordance with the Xu Shiquan, a member of the National meaning of “one China” in the “Na- Committee’s Roundtable on U.S.–China Policy tional Unification Guidelines” and in and Cross-Strait Relations, is a journalist whose the resolution passed by the National career has included assignments as a correspon- Unification Council on August 1 of this dent for the New China News Agency, Dar es year. We have on many occasions stated Salaam; bureau chief, Guangming Daily, Beirut; and explained our position on this sub- bureau chief, Guangming Daily, London; direc- ject, and there has been extensive cov- tor of the International Department, The People’s erage by the media in the territories of Daily; bureau chief, The People’ s Daily, United Hong Kong, the mainland, and Taiwan Nations; and president, Institute of Taiwan Stud- on the positions and explanations of ies. His article “ The One-China Principle: The both sides. Positions of the Communist Party of China (CCP), the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Democratic Pro- The most pressing issue at present gressive Party (DPP)” appeared in the Decem- should be resolving actual problems of ber 2000 issue of American Foreign Policy Inter- a functional nature. Based on the pre- ests.

American Foreign Policy Interests 140 Xu Shiquan

Notes 12 Wang Mingyi, “ The Cross-Straits Peace Talks” (Liang’an hetan), p. 120. 13 See Appendix 3. 1 Chen Shui-bian’s press conference of June 14 Statement by a responsible person from 20, 2000. See Zhongguo Shibao (China Times), the ARATS on the publication by the Taiwan re- June 21, 2000. gime of a document on the meaning of “one 2 See Ouyang Sheng’en, “ Farewell, White China” in the Cross-Straits talks on functional Gloves—2000 Days of the Straits Exchange Foun- affairs. Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, August 27, dation,” p. 17. 1992. 3 ARATS Executiv e Vice Chairman Tang 15 See note 4. Shubei’s speech at the panel discussion on the 16 Wang Mingyi, “ The Cross-Straits Peace occasion of the first anniversary of the Talks” (Liang’ an hetan), p. 122. Association’s founding. See “The Association for 17 Ibid, pp. 124–125. Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: Compilation 18 Ibid, pp. 126–127. of Major Documents of 1992.” 19 Xinhua News Agency, November 4, 1992: 4 Liu Mo, Shao Zhiguang, “Leaving a Fair “Talks Continue Between R esponsible Persons Footnote to History,” in Cross-Straits Relations, from the ARATS and the SEF.” no. 27 (September 1999). 20 See note 19. 5 See Lianhebao (United Press Daily ), 21 See note 4. March 24, 1992. 22 See Appendix 4. 6 See Lianhebao, March 25, 1992. 23 See Appendix 5. 7 Remarks by ARATS Executive Vice Chair- 24 See Lianhebao, November 4, 1992. man Tang Shubei at a press conference. See 25 See Appendix 6. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily; overseas edition), 26 SEF, Haiwenlu (fa) Document # 81– April 1, 1992. 1045F; see Appendix 7. 8 See Lianhebao, March 28, 1992. 27 See note 4. 9 See note 6. 28 See Lianhebao, March 24, 1992. 10 See note 4. 29 See Zhongguo Shibao (China Times), 11 See Lianhebao, March 22, 1992. November 6, 1992.

American Foreign Policy Interests