Commission on the Public Consultation Response Template

1. Capabilities – In this regard, you may wish to consider future integrated capability development and the planning and delivery requirements to support a joint force approach in terms of new equipment, professional military education and training, maintenance and development of infrastructure, developments in military doctrine, and transformative concepts, including specialist capabilities, that prepare and support the Defence Forces for future operations.

Historical Context and Basis for Capabilities The foundation of Ireland as a modern, independent, and democratic State has its basis in the willingness of Ireland to express her democratic will through force. Such an expression came at a cost to life, and economic activity in the years that followed. However, by almost all national development index measure, the independence that followed has ensured a more prosperous Ireland, higher GDP, better education outcomes, lower rates of absolute and relative poverty, and longer life expectancy. On the international stage, a newly independent Ireland was able to express her democratic values and will in accordance with her desire for multilateralism and the rule of law. As a small nation state, such values helped contribute to Ireland’s own defence and security stability. During the Second World War, an independent Ireland, which had just come out of an economic war with its former colonial occupier, managed to avoid being drawn into another European war. However, had the US not come into the war on the side of the UK, Ireland would have almost certainly been occupied by one or both warring parties. In terms of Ireland’s geostrategic positioning, it has long been understood that our national defence is, in effect, guaranteed by the US, which is the cornerstone of all NATO capabilities. Throughout the Cold War, Ireland sat under the NATO security umbrella without contributing financially or with manpower. Ireland was able to point towards very poor economic capacity and a depleting population for much of the early stages of the Cold War as a reason to avoid defence spending. From the 1970s onwards, Ireland pointed to its internal security threat as its primary security focus. However, following the Good Friday agreement, and the development of an economic model focused on Foreign Direct Investment, Ireland no longer has an excuse to point towards when it reviews its inability to defend the State against even a minor armed aggressor, sub surface threat, airborne threat (including drugs shipments) or meaningful cyber-attack. While each and every member of the Defence Forces is a committed and professional citizen, Ireland’s defence posture is token and reliant on foreign powers. Ireland is not learning the lessons of history and has a defence investment posture which means it is currently ill prepared to deal with significant climate change, and the associated population migration. In addition, the fundamental shifts in global power and trade balances associated with the looming demographic changes in Europe, Russia and China mean that Ireland’s security and defence architecture will require significant investment in the coming decades. Hope is not a defence policy.

In order to address these known challenges, and the large element of unknowns or asymmetric threats, Ireland will need a properly balanced and equipped force capable of significant crisis expansion capacity. This military will need to be capable of significant domestic and overseas service and be able to meaningfully contribute to regional stability as a representative of a wealthy first world nation state. National Defence needs to be realigned with National Wealth and Prosperity. A strong and stable Ireland means a strong and stable economy, which means national prosperity and international influence and standing.

Future Force The Defence Forces is currently structured as an Army with an Army HQ also doubling up as a Defence HQ, with a token Air Arm and Naval Arm. The Reserve forces were sacrificed on the altar of repeated reorganisation and reviews, without ever being respected as the cornerstone of national defence. The Permanent Defence Forces have failed to invest appropriately in either the FCA or in terms of focus or equipment. Inter alia, cyber threats and changing career models mean that any future force must put the Reserve – and Reservists – front and centre in the decades ahead.

Joint Force HQ This requires a balance of representatives from the 3 Services with at least 40% Army, 20% , 20% Navy and 20% Reserve (Tri Service). In addition, any HQ must have a meaningful civilian cohort to avoid churn in key HR appointments. Such civilian appointees should remain under the control of the Chief of Defence.

The Army HQ should be headed by a 2 Star General and be separated entirely from the Joint HQ. 1 Star Army Generals should be responsible for their respective Brigades. The Air Force HQ should be headed by a 2 Star General and have a separate 1 Star General responsible for day-to-day operations. The Navy HQ should also be headed by a 2 Star General and have a separate 1 Star General Officer vis-à-vis the Air Force structure. All three Service Chiefs should report to a single Chief of Defence Staff. Given that the Curragh is categorised as a Defence Forces Training Centre, it should be led by an Officer drawn from the three Services on a rotational basis, with deputies from the other branches as appropriate.

The Joint Force HQ should also house the Cyber Defence capability; the Special Forces; and, Intelligence forces. It should also house the future Defence Forces Inspectorate.

Equipping and Manning the future Defence Forces

Army The Army needs to be agile and responsive to on-island and off-island threats, including a much greater degree of Joint Operational Capabilities. Further Barrack closures are not warranted and the Reserve Army footprint will have to refocus on the rural and periphery locations, which bore the brunt of the last closures, where town and city dominance was very apparent. In effect this means opening new and permanently manned Reserve Force locations in towns (and cities) around Ireland in order to capture key skills and capabilities within each region. This will also act as an entrance gateway into the Army / military as well as an exit path for experienced personnel in specialist domains to remain engaged with the military.

The size of the Army, possibly through highly trained Reservists or former members, needs to be capable of expansion towards 15,000 at relatively short notice. For a nation of 5,000,000 people, this is still a very small force. Given the very large churn rate within the Defence Forces, this number is achievable once the training is rewarding, and specialisms and advancement are possible and encouraged. Reservists should be properly paid with appropriate legislative supports for military service. Training camps should be realistic with access to the latest weapons and aircraft / ships as required. High fidelity training is a key retention enabler within this cohort.

The overall military approach to cyber, space and intelligence operations is not in line with technological development and trends. There is no doubt that those that currently serve in these areas are world class, there just is not enough of them and they are not appropriately resourced.

These branches need to move to the Joint Force HQ and have direct access to ring fenced budgets and recruitment lines through universities and the wider public service if required.

The Army needs to develop Marine and Airborne Battalion / Company capabilities and co-locate such specialist units with the Navy or Air Force. As an island nation, it is somewhat incredulous to think that Ireland has no Marine force element.

The Defence Forces Training Centre requires radical overhaul. It is set up for Cold War and Internal Security operations. Cultural norms which have evolved over decades need to be made coherent with the rest of the Defence Forces, particularly the operationally focused components. Moving part of the higher education element of the DFTC to Cathal Brugha Bks or Casement where they can avail of the proximity to industry and the State’s leading higher education institutions is something that should be pursued with vigour. Cross training with other branches of the public service will only benefit the Defence Forces’ standing and open up access to decision makers on a much more regular basis.

Air Force

The Irish Air Force needs significant investment and base development. Given that Ireland sits under some of the busiest air routes in the world and is dependent on air routes for both tourism and FDI access, a strong and agile Air Force is an appropriate priority for future defence spending. Ireland has no primary , no fast jet capability, no large capability, no military airlift capability and has not realistically invested in air defence since the 1950s. It is possible to fly over Ireland at 1000 feet from Mizen Head to Malin Head and for the Irish authorities to have no knowledge of who you are or what you are doing. As a drugs / weapons importation method, it guarantees access without legal consequence.

Senior Irish Civil Servants recognised this gap post 9/11 and entered into an agreement with the UK MoD for their armed right of access to sovereign Irish air space without the knowledge of the Irish force mandated by law to carry out such a function. This agreement set up a situation where Commissioned Irish military Officers were not aware of foreign military’s armed right of access to Ireland. In effect, this meant that Estonian and Norwegian NATO Officers (who acted as NATO air traffic controllers) were/are being briefed on this agreement, but Senior Air Corps Officers are not. It is the equivalent of heavily armed PSNI Officers being allowed hot pursuit rights as far South as Cork, but for the GardaÍ to be explicitly excluded from the agreement. It is difficult to see how trust is established in such an environment.

The Irish Air Corps is recognised as being a highly professional service capable of delivering capabilities that similar size or larger air arms cannot e.g. deploy special forces onto vessels at sea at night. However, it requires equipment and personnel appropriate to the population size, territorial importance and future trans-national threats.

As a priority, the Air Force must procure a minimum of three primary radars, which feed into a military air traffic and defence centre. In order to deal with such information and provide a coherent deterrence, the Air Force will need 8-10 intercept aircraft, based from Shannon airport or another West Coast base. Popular press reports have erroneously reported costs of such aircraft. Modern aircraft with a Mach 1.5 capability supported by modern maintenance contracts can be procured for a conservative annualised cost of c. €30-35m per annum. These do not have a large manning cohorts and the Irish Air Corps has extensive immediate notice roster manning experience having operated the Garda aircraft on such a basis for the past 21 years.

The Air Force needs to procure a Squadron of large all-weather . With a population in excess of 5 million people, the current Irish Air Corps fleet of just 6 x AW139 civilian helicopters is a token capability that cannot deploy onto Navy ships or overseas where any type of threat is expected. These aircraft will be able to move a company of military personnel in one lift as well as ensure that ARW Units can be deployed on island or into the littoral with all their equipment and transport needs. From a climate change perspective these helicopters provide appropriate levels of national response resilience and will be able to provide emergency aid airlift or evacuation overseas. Chinook helicopters cost circa €35m each, with a 25+ year life expectancy, this national capability will cost c. €15m annually and guarantee Ireland can reach citizens at home or overseas when needed. The State spent €650,000,000 on four leased SAR helicopters and crews over the past decade. Which rises to €1,300,000,000 when looked at over a 20-year horizon. Investing these funds into the Defence Forces will aid national resilience, increase capacity and save on duplicate expenditure.

The Air Force needs to procure a Squadron of Medium/Super Medium maritime helicopters to work from the new Navy multi role vessels as well as provide national SAR services from 2 bases initially, with a follow on objective of all helicopter SAR operations by 2033. These bases should be Baldonnel, Haulbowline, Shannon Airport and Finner Air Station. Aircraft such as the Airbus 725, Sea Hawk or NH90 represent the capability and maritime resilience required.

The Air Force will need to augment its CASA 295 aircraft with a robust military airlift platform such as C130J type aircraft or A400M. At least 3 C130J type aircraft will guarantee Ireland’s ability to support overseas personnel as well as support Irish Aid and NEO operations. With appropriate tri service coordination and training the Defence Forces could also use these aircraft in conjunction with Navy assets to drop rescue personnel beyond helicopter rescue range to stabilise casualties until airlift or naval transfer is possible. Given the excellent value in the second-hand narrow body jet market the State should immediately procure a national air bridge platform to replace its small business jet, which is now at end of life. As an island, it is imperative that Ireland has a Government airlift capability that can reach North America and Central Africa without the need to refuel. The COVID19 pandemic has repeatedly demonstrated the weaknesses of relying on commercial air traffic routes for nationally important operations.

The Air Force should progressively develop RPAS and MALE and Nano Satellite technologies. While there are exciting developments in unmanned airborne platforms, the current support requirements for larger persistent maritime surveillance drones is akin to manned platforms. Basing such aircraft from Finner Air Station and/or Shannon Airport means direct access to our Western sea board without the need to pass through busy air space etc. The cost of Satellite surveillance is a fraction of what it was a mere 15 years ago. Civilian launch capacity now means that relatively modest investment will give Ireland a satellite surveillance capacity to monitor our large maritime area of interest. While there are some significant limitations to smaller satellites, these can be mitigated by mixing in other surveillance platforms. Given the intelligence value associated with this capability, it should be pursued on a Joint basis with the Air Force in the lead, as is the case in all NATO countries.

The Air Force will have access to an enormous data stream through its proposed platforms and capabilities; therefore, a highly energised and innovative approached to data collation, analysis and dissemination should be pursued in conjunction with an appropriate third level institution. Security clearance concerns can be addressed through appropriate vetting and enlistment into the future Reserve force.

The Air Force will require a second permanent base in Shannon airport, which should house at least 400-500 of the overall force size to ensure service resilience. It is likely that the future Air Force will rise in size to just 1,800. While very small, the addition of a large Reserve Air Force component and contractor maintenance support etc will ensure that it is a capable force. In addition, the co-location of a dedicated Air Mobile Company, as well as Air Mobile elements of the Marine Battlalion in Finner or Shannon, will mean that Air Force will have an operational size of over 2,000.

Navy

As an island nation, Ireland needs a large and capable Navy backed up by Air Force helicopters and as well as a Marine Battalion, which should initially be drawn from the Army. The Navy needs a large Reserve force and should be have elements co-located with the Air Force in either Shannon, Finner Air Station or Baldonnel.

Climatic changes will result in greater risks at sea and in the air. Old Naval ships need to be disposed of as soon as possible. They need to be replaced with a fleet of 15 newer and larger naval ships over the coming 15 years. These new ships should all be capable of winter operations in the North Atlantic with a significant sub surface detection capability. This will allow for a minimum of 8 ships at sea at all times and 1 to 2 on international or peace enforcement duties. Such ships will include at least 2 large multi role vessels, which will each be able of housing 1 x NH90 size helicopter and should be able to handle 2 embarked helicopters for a limited period to support NEO type operations or SAR operations.

Given the importance of our sea lines of communication to everything from farming to aviation fuel importation, the State must have a Navy that ensure freedom of access to our ports and protects our underwater cable network as well as fishery industry. Ireland lacks any type of submarine detection capability, which is incredulous for an island that sits between the UK and US and which has had numerous instances of foreign submarine activity in and around our territorial seas. Future Navy ships should have underwater threat detection as well as the ability to use helicopters to support underwater threats or targets. In addition, close coordination with the Air Force should also ensure it has real time access to MALE and Manned Platform surveillance feeds.

The threat of drug importation via sea routes is well known. With significant investment in airborne surveillance, a newly equipped Navy will be an even more potent force.

The development of Haulbowline should include a helicopter base, which will support all Air Force naval helicopter operations into the future including SAR and MRV operations and maintenance. Similar to the Air Force an enlarged Navy must have a second permanently manned base for resilience as well as recruitment and retention.

The future Navy will grow to over 2,000 personnel when Reserve elements are factored in. When the Marine Battalion is considered it will grow to almost 3,000 personnel.

In many ways the future of the Navy should be the simplest to project. We are an island. We need a strong and resilient Navy. The longer we wait to develop it the more costly it becomes.

2. Structures – In this regard, you may wish to consider the most effective high-level Command and Control (C2) structures within the Defence Forces to ensure an agile and balanced approach that can function across all domains at home and overseas.

Additionally, you may wish to address appropriate future force structures for the Army (including its brigade structure), the Air Corps, and the Naval Service, individually as component services and collectively as part of an integrated joint force approach.

Furthermore, you may wish to address the changing nature of reservists, which presents an opportunity for the Reserve Defence Force to further integrate and support the Permanent Defence Force through the provision of enhanced collective and specialist capability across all domains.

Answered within Question 1 response. However, for clarity, the use of Reservists should become the cornerstone of future Defence capacity, particularly in cyber, medical, intelligence, aviation, naval and media operations. Appropriate pay and access pathways are critically important.

3. Staffing – In this regard you may wish to consider the HR policies that support the requirement for an agile and adaptive modern military force. You may wish to consider issues such as recruitment and retention, organisational culture and values, gender and diversity, career progression, and industrial relations machinery.

The key element of any future Defence Forces must be HR coherence. Structural stability for family location decisions is a must when we consider Ireland has no defence housing whatsoever. The UK MoD have c. 50,000 houses for its forces personnel. The continued practice of moving Officers all over the State every 2 or 3 years is incoherent with any type of balanced HR planning framework. It is also extremely cost ineffective as there is no cognisance of replacement cost in respect of personnel who retire prematurely due to poor HR planning. The NCO cohort need to be allowed to remain in their specialist stream and still have career development options.

The Defence Forces must reflect Irish society as much as possible; therefore, we need to recruit a larger female cohort and use the Reserve Force as a conduit to bring that greater balance and representation into the Services.

4. Any other comments you may wish to make in relation to the Defence Forces having regard to the Commission’s Terms of Reference

Thank you for your efforts and work at rejuvenating the Irish Defence Forces. It is an institution populated by those that espouse country and community before self and are willing to accept unlimited liability in the course of their duties.

This is a golden opportunity to remodel the Defence Forces into an agile and responsive force for the next 20+ years. Recommendations without implementation timelines will be seen as a further waste of military loyalty and abuse of trust. This Commission is the final review in a series of disjointed and incoherent reviews going back to the 1980’s. While this Commission has Army and Navy representatives it has no Air Force / Naval Air experience within the group. Perhaps it is an indication of how much work has yet to be done.

The recommendations should not be handed over to the Defence Forces and Department of Defence to implement. An independent Defence Force Inspectorate will need to be set up to independently report to the Dáil on the implementation of Commission recommendations. Recent Project Delivery efforts within the Defence Organisation have been recognised as unwieldly and disjointed.

It is the earnest hope of this author that the Commission will recommend lasting and positive change and that such change will reflect the truly disruptive nature of the Irish Volunteers and those women and men that fought for Irish independence 100 years ago. Protecting our sovereignty is about protecting our values, our culture and our heritage. The lessons of Irish history were costly indeed so it is imperative that we heed the lessons of preparedness, foresight and a clear understanding that the only future certainty is uncertainty.