BRIEFING PAPER Number 06995, 3 December 2015

ISIS/Daesh: the military By Claire Mills Ben Smith response in and Louisa Brooke-Holland

Inside: 1. Background 2. What does the military campaign entail and who are the main players? 3. Duration of the mission 4. Legal basis 5. British military participation 6. Russian actions in Syria 7. Boots on the ground?

www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary Number 06995, 3 December 2015 2

Contents

Summary 4 1. Background 8 2. What does the military campaign entail and who are the main players? 10 2.1 Air strikes 11 Coalition partners conducting operations in Iraq and Syria 11 Operations in Iraq 15 Operations in Syria 16 Other military contributions? 17 2.2 Training and logistical support to local forces 18 Training in Iraq 18 Support to Syrian opposition forces 20 3. Duration of the mission 23 4. Legal basis 24 Iraq 24 Syria 24 5. British military participation 26 5.1 Parliamentary approval 26 5.2 Air strikes in Iraq and Syria 27 Assets, personnel and basing 27 Sorties 29 5.3 Surveillance operations over Syria 31 5.4 Involvement of embedded UK military personnel in Syrian airstrikes 32 5.5 Training 35 Iraq 35 Syrian opposition forces 35 5.6 Sustainability of the UK mission 36 5.7 Costs of the mission 37 5.8 Expansion of air strikes into Syria 38 Growing Momentum for a debate 41 6. Russian actions in Syria 47 6.1 Build-up of Russian military capabilities in Syria 47 6.2 Russian Operations 48 6.3 Russian strategy 51 Problems for the Kremlin 53 Regional impact 53 7. Boots on the ground? 55 7.1 Position of the British Government 56 7.2 Views of Parliamentarians 57 7.3 Views of the former defence chiefs 59 7.4 Views of commentators 60 7.5 Views of the US and other coalition partners 62

Cover page image copyright: Tornado GR4 Aircraft from 31 Squadron RAF Marham by UK Ministry of Defence

3 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

Number 06995, 3 December 2015 4

Summary

A coalition of 65 countries are engaged in international efforts to counter ISIS (also known as Daesh, ISIL or Islamic State). The military campaign in Iraq and Syria is just one aspect of that broader strategy which also includes measures to restrict the flow of foreign fighters, stop foreign financing, provide humanitarian assistance to Iraq and Syria and strategic communications, intended to counter their ideology. In terms of the military campaign (Operation Inherent Resolve), which is the focus of this paper, the United States has led airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria since 8 August 2014 and end of September 2014 respectively. With a view to building the capacity of local forces on the ground, offensive military action has so far been restricted to air operations in support of local forces, providing reconnaissance, surveillance and attack capabilities. Training is also being provided by a number of coalition countries to the Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish in order to bolster their ground capabilities and allow them to take the fight to ISIS. The US had also been leading a programme of training for moderate opposition forces in Syria. However, that programme has been beset with difficulties and on 9 October the US announced that it would pursue a new strategy with respect to supporting opposition forces in Syria. The US has also announced that “less than 50” Special Forces personnel would deploy on the ground in northern Syria to provide logistical and planning assistance to Kurdish and other local forces in the fight against ISIS. Who is in the military coalition? The coalition against ISIS is being led by the United States. Along with the US, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, , Jordan, and Denmark have all conducted air strikes in Iraq, although Belgium and Denmark have recently withdrawn their combat aircraft. The first US- led airstrikes in Syria were assisted by aircraft from five Arab countries: Jordan, the , Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, with Qatar in a supporting role. Since then Turkey, Canada, France and Australia have joined the air campaign in Syria. The UK began offensive air operations in Syria on 3 December 2015 following Parliamentary approval for airstrikes exclusively against ISIS in Syria. The UK had previously restricted itself to conducting surveillance reconnaissance operations over Syria. The new Canadian government has announced its intention to end its combat mission in Iraq and Syria, although the timetable for doing do is currently unclear. At the same time, and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 the French government has also called on its broader coalition partners to support the military campaign against ISIS. The German Government has approved plans to deploy Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, a naval frigate and a 1,200 strong force to the region, although they will not engage in combat.1 The United States, the UK and a number of other coalition countries have also deployed military personnel on the ground in Iraq to train Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. These are not combat troops and are not deployed in an offensive role.

1 Approval was given on 1 December 2015. At the time of writing, the Bundestag is expected to vote on the proposal on 4 December 2015. 5 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

Legal basis Military action in Iraq is being conducted at the request of the Iraqi government, which coalition partners consider provides a firm legal basis for operations. The reluctance of many coalition partners to intervene in Syria has partly been because of concerns over the legality of such military action, given that it is not at the request of the Assad government, and is being conducted in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution specifically authorising such action. The Government’s November 2015 response to the Foreign Affairs Committee report on extending British military action to Syria says that the main legal basis for UK military action in Syria is collective self-defence of Iraq, with the individual self-defence of the UK and collective self-defence of other states (but not Security Council authorisation) as additional legal bases. Duration of the mission It is widely acknowledged that the campaign against ISIS will be longstanding. During the Commons debate in September 2014 David Cameron warned Members of Parliament that “we should not expect this to happen quickly. The hallmarks of this campaign will be patience and persistence, not shock and awe.” In October 2015 the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, suggested that a three-year timeframe was the current expectation of military commanders. The UK’s contribution In September 2014 Parliament voted to support offensive military action in Iraq. However, that vote did not extend to offensive operations in Syria. Parliament approved offensive military action in Syria on 2 December 2015. RAF Tornado GR4 and the Reaper remotely piloted air system (RPAS) are conducting reconnaissance missions and airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq, with support aircraft including the new Voyager tanker/transport aircraft and the Sentinel surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft. The UK is the second largest contributor to the coalition air campaign in Iraq, conducting 8% of airstrikes in Iraq. In October 2014 the Ministry of Defence authorised the conduct of UK surveillance missions over Syria. In December 2015 RAF Tornado aircraft conducted their first offensive operation in Syria. Additional combat aircraft are being deployed to the region to support the extension of operations, including six Typhoon and two additional Tornado aircraft. Since November 2014 the UK has been providing training and military advice to the Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga in the north of the country. In early June 2015 the Government announced that a further 125 British military personnel would deploy to Iraq in order to bolster that training mission. To date the UK has trained over 2,000 Iraqis. The UK also participated in the US-led programme to train moderate Syrian opposition forces which was suspended in October 2015. Approximately 850 British military personnel are involved in operations against ISIS. An estimated two-thirds of those personnel are deployed in the region in support of the air campaign; while the remaining personnel are on the ground in Iraq providing training and military advice. Those personnel are not combat troops. The net additional costs of the military air operation (Tornado, Reaper and air-to-air refuelling) are being met from the Treasury Special Reserve; while the costs of training and Number 06995, 3 December 2015 6

equipping the Iraqi and Kurdish security forces, and the provision of key enablers, are being met from the Deployed Military Activity Pool (DMAP). Extending airstrikes into Syria In early July 2015 the Secretary of State for Defence indicated that the Government could seek further parliamentary approval for extending operations into Syria provided that “there is a sufficient consensus behind it”. Momentum continued to build over the following weeks, in particular in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. On 20 November, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for states to take ‘all necessary measures’ against ISIS. On 26 November, the Prime Minister made a statement to the House of Commons in which he set out the government’s arguments for extending military action to Syria. He outlined the direct threat that ISIS poses to the UK; the niche capabilities that the RAF can bring to the coalition and the risks of failing to act. Parliament approved, by 397 to 223, a Government-tabled motion to begin airstrikes in Syria, exclusively against ISIS, on 2 December 2015 after an all-day debate.2 Russian actions in Syria Since early September 2015 Russia has been forward deploying troops and other military assets to an air base in Latakia province on the Mediterranean coast of Syria. Estimates of the number of deployed Russian military capabilities vary, but what has been established is that the Russian air force has forward deployed a powerful strike group comprising nearly 50 combat aircraft, helicopters and force protection assets. Thus far personnel appear to have been deployed in support of air operations and to provide a base protection capability, although reports suggest that preparations are being made for the potential deployment of significant Russian ground forces. On 30 September Russia launched its first airstrikes in Syria, the first time that Russian forces have undertaken a military operation beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War. Russia was immediately criticised for targeting rebel groups rather than ISIS, including moderate opposition forces supported by the US. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that Russia is targeting ISIS “and other terrorist groups” in Syria at the invitation of the legitimate Syrian government. Russia has also supported counteroffensive operations by Syrian government forces against rebel forces; has violated Turkish airspace on more than one occasion and has launched attacks on targets in Syria from Russian warships based in the Caspian Sea. In recent weeks Russia has stepped up its bombing campaign in Syria, largely in response to the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula on 31 October but also in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris. Some commentators have also suggested that there has been a slight shift in focus, with Russian forces increasingly striking ISIS targets as opposed to moderate rebel groups. The deconfliction of Syrian airspace has become a priority and US and Russian officials have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding to that end. Most analysts concur that the Russian air force’s presence in Syria makes the concept of establishing no-fly or safe zones in Syria almost impossible now to implement.

2 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c323-490 7 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

Boots on the ground? Combat troops have been explicitly ruled out by the UK and other countries involved in the coalition, amid debate about the reliance on air power alone. However, the prolonged nature of this campaign has led many to reignite the debate about whether the Coalition is doing enough and whether ‘boots on the ground’ is the next logical step. The US’ recent move to deploy Special Forces’ personnel to northern Syria in support of local forces has been regarded by many as the first step in this direction. Number 06995, 3 December 2015 8

1. Background

A coalition of 65 countries are engaged in international efforts to counter ISIS (also known as Daesh, ISIL or Islamic State).3 The military campaign in Iraq and Syria is just one aspect of that broader strategy which also includes measures to restrict the flow of foreign fighters, stop foreign financing, provide humanitarian assistance to Iraq and Syria and strategic communications (propaganda, public diplomacy and psychological operations)) intended to counter their ideology.4 As Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, pointed out in the House on 20 July 2015: Our strategy is therefore comprehensive and broader than simply military action. It deals with the ideology and territory that is ISIL’s centre of gravity, and which it is committed to expanding. The military element is, however, essential. The coalition has so far helped halt and hold ISIL after its rapid advance across Iraq last summer. Coalition airpower, including sophisticated UK aircraft, flies daily missions to strike ISIL targets and to gather intelligence. The air campaign is helping to turn the tide and will support ground forces ultimately to defeat ISIL.5 A series of Library briefing papers examines the origins and rise of ISIS, the international reaction to their sudden emergence on the world stage, the initial humanitarian assistance operation and the subsequent military response to events as they have unfolded over the last year: • ISIS/Daesh: one year on, July 2015 • ISIS and the sectarian conflict in the Middle East, RP15/16, March 2015 • Iraq, Syria and ISIS – recent developments, CBP06977, 25 September 2014 • Military and humanitarian assistance to Iraq, CBP06960, 8 September 2014 • UK arms transfers to the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan, 18 August 2014 • Worsening humanitarian crisis in Syria and Iraq, CBP06926, 8 July 2014 • Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and the takeover of , CBP06915, 20 June 2014 • Military options in Iraq, CBP06917, 16 June 2014 In conjunction with this paper the Library has also produced a second series of briefing papers examining recent developments in Iraq and Syria and the legal basis for potentially extending the British air campaign into Syria: • Iraq and Syria: Developments in 2015, CBP7261, 27 November 2015 • Legal basis for UK military action in Syria, CBP7404, 1 December 2015

3 US State Department press release, 19 September 2014 4 See US Department of State: the global coalition to counter ISIL 5 HC Deb 20 July 2015, c1233 9 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

• Seeking a negotiated solution in Syria, CBP7392, 18 November 2015 • France and Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union, CBP7390, 18 November 2015 • UK drone attack in Syria: legal questions, CBP7332, 20 October 2015

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2. What does the military campaign entail and who are the main players?

The United States has led airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq since 8 August 2014. Operations were extended into Syria toward the end of September 2014. With a view to building the capacity of local forces on the ground, offensive military action in Iraq has so far been restricted to air operations in support of Iraqi and Kurdish security forces, providing reconnaissance, surveillance and attack capabilities. Along with the US, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Jordan, Canada and Denmark have all conducted air strikes in Iraq, although Belgium and Denmark have recently withdrawn their combat aircraft. The first US- led airstrikes in Syria were assisted by aircraft from five Arab countries: Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, with Qatar in a supporting role. Since then Turkey, Canada, France and Australia have joined the air campaign in Syria. The UK initially restricted itself conducting surveillance reconnaissance operations over Syria. The UK began offensive operations in Syria on 3 December 2015 following a vote in Parliament.6 The new Canadian government has announced its intention to end its combat mission in Iraq and Syria, although the timetable for doing do is currently unclear. At the same time, and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the French government has increasingly called on its broader coalition partners to support the military campaign against ISIS. The German Government approved plans in early December to deploy Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, a naval frigate and a 1,200 strong force to the region, although they will not engage in combat.7 The other element of the campaign is the training of Iraqi and Kurdish security forces as a means of enabling them to take responsibility for operations against ISIS on the ground. The United States, the UK and a number of other coalition countries have also deployed military personnel on the ground in Iraq to train Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. These are not combat troops and are not deployed in an offensive role. Until recently the US had a programme of training in place for moderate opposition forces in Syria. However, that programme has been beset with difficulties and on 9 October the US announced that it would pursue a new strategy with respect to supporting opposition forces in Syria. The US has also announced that “less than 50” Special Forces

6 “RAF conduct first air strikes in Syria”, Ministry of Defence, 3 December 2015 7 Approval was given on 1 December 2015. At the time of writing, the Bundestag is expected to vote on the proposal on 4 December 2015. 11 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

personnel will deploy on the ground in northern Syria to provide logistical and planning assistance to Kurdish and other local forces in the fight against ISIS.

2.1 Air strikes As of 19 November 2015 Coalition aircraft have flown an estimated 57,301 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria. Of those, 8,289 were airstrikes (Iraq – 5,432 and Syria – 2,857), with approximately 78% conducted by US aircraft.8 According to US Department of Defense assessments, ISIS targets either damaged or destroyed totalled 16,075 as of 13 November 2015. Those assets included 129 tanks, 356 armoured vehicles, 4,942 fighting positions and 260 elements of oil infrastructure.9 The UK Government has also suggested that 30% of the territory that ISIS gained in Iraq after its advance in the summer of 2014, has now been regained.10 US Central Command provides updates on operations. Estimates released by the Department of Defense on 31 October 2015 state that the US has spent $5 billion, or $11 million per day on operations related to ISIS since August 2014. Airstrikes are estimated to make up 51% of those costs, excluding munitions, which account for a further 22% of costs.11 Coalition partners conducting operations in Iraq and Syria The countries currently conducting air strikes in both Iraq and Syria are: • The United States • France • Australia • Jordan • Canada • United Kingdom

The UK military contribution is detailed separately in section 5. United States US Air Force and Navy aircraft, including F-15, F/A-18 aircraft and MQ-1 Predator drones have been conducting air strikes in Iraq since 8 August 2014. Operations were expanded into Syria towards the end of September 2014. US aircraft participating in those sorties have included F-15, F-16, F/A-18, F-2212 fighter aircraft and B-1 bombers. Tomahawk missiles deployed aboard US naval vessels deployed in the Red Sea and North Arabian Gulf were also utilised in the initial stage of offensive operations in Syria. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

8 US Department of Defense, 27 October 2015 9 US Department of Defense, 29 September 2015 10 PQ11279, Islamic State, 20 October 2015 11 US Department of Defense, Weekly Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Cost Report, 15 October 2015 12 The F-22 conducted its first ever combat flight during attacks on ISIS forces in Syria on 22 September 2014. Number 06995, 3 December 2015 12

missions have continued using a mixture of manned and unmanned systems. Until mid-October 2015 the US also had a carrier strike group deployed in the Gulf. The USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group is due to enter theatre towards the end of the year in order to fill that gap. In the intervening period the US has had to rely on US aircraft deployed around the region. In mid-November a number of naval combat aircraft (AV-8B Harriers), deployed as part of the USS Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group, also began combat missions against ISIS targets.13 At the beginning of October 2015 the US deployed aircraft and personnel to Diyarbakir air base in Turkey to provide combat search and rescue capabilities in support of both US and coalition forces operating in Iraq and Syria. US aircraft, including F-15 and A-10 combat aircraft have also recently been deployed to Incirlik air base in Turkey. France France was the first country to join the US in air conducting airstrikes against ISIS targets in Iraq. France initially deployed six fighter jets, an Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft and a refueling plane at its base in the United Arab Emirates as part of Operation Chammal. Operations began on 19 September 2014.14 Over the last year the complement of French fast jet aircraft has increased, to include a mixture of Rafale and Mirage 2000 aircraft based in UAE and Jordan. In February 2015 the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle was also deployed to the Gulf as part of the military campaign against ISIS. The presence of the carrier was intended to reduce the time taken to reach ISIS targets in Iraq by those fast jet aircraft based in UAE. That carrier strike force was withdrawn in April 2015. Initially reluctant to extend air operations into Syria, on 7 September 2015 the French President, Francois Hollande, announced that French aircraft would begin reconnaissance flights over Syria, with a view to informing a decision on launching air strikes at a later date.15 The first French airstrikes in Syria were conducted on 27 September. At the beginning of November, and prior to the terrorist attacks in Paris, the French President, Francois Hollande, announced that the carrier group would be re-deployed to the eastern Mediterranean to participate in coalition operations in both Iraq and Syria. The deployment of that carrier group has tripled France’s strike capacity. France now has deployed: • One carrier group • One frigate • 18 naval Rafale combat aircraft • 6 land-based Rafale combat aircraft • 3 Mirage 2000-D combat aircraft

13 http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=92084 14 French Ministry of Defense, Operational Chammal 15 “Syria war: France to prepare for IS air strikes”, BBC News Online, 7 September 2015 13 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

• 3 Mirage 2000-N combat aircraft • 8 Super Etendard carrier-borne strike aircraft • 2 E2C Hawkeye aircraft • 1 Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft.16 Since the terrorist attacks on 13 November France has intensified its air operations against ISIS targets, particularly in Syria. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks France conducted its largest air offensive, to date, against targets in . In a situation report published on 26 November the French Ministry of Defense indicated that in the preceding ten days French combat aircraft had conducted 20 airstrikes against ISIS positions in Syria.17 In the aftermath of the Paris attacks the US and France have also committed to the greater sharing of information and details relating to operational planning. At a meeting of EU leaders on 17 November 2015, France also invoked Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union, which obliges participating EU Member States to provide “aid and assistance by all the means in their power”.18 France has, however, continued to rule out providing combat troops on the ground. Australia The Australian Government approved airstrikes in Iraq and the deployment of Special Forces to ‘advise and assist’ Iraqi security forces on 3 October 2014 (). Australia had already pre- deployed six F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter aircraft, KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport and airborne early warning aircraft (E-7A Wedgetail) to the region. Australian aircraft commenced armed air combat operations on 5 October and carried out their first airstrike on 8 October 2014 against an ISIS facility in Iraq.19 Following a request from the US government the Australian announced in September 2015 that it would extend its operations into Syria. The first airstrikes by Australian aircraft in the region took place on 14 September 2015.20 Australia has a total of 480 military personnel deployed in the region in support of operations: 400 assigned to the Air Task Group and 80 Special Forces. A further 300 personnel are assigned to the training mission in Iraq (see below). Jordan Jordan participated in the initial airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria at the end of September 2014. Since February 2015, however, and after a Jordanian pilot was captured by ISIS and burned alive, Jordan has significantly increased its role in the

16 Operation Chammal asset list, November 2015 17 French Ministry of Defense, 26 November 2015 18 The implications of invoking Article 42(7) are examined in greater detail in Library briefing paper CBP7390, 18 November 2015 19 Australian Department of Defence 20 “Australia launches first airstrikes inside Syria”, BBC News Online, 16 September 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 14

air campaign over Syria. It has also extended its participation to operations in Iraq. Some commentators have questioned the sustainability of Jordan’s participation given the size (39 aircraft)21 and increasing age of its fast jet fleet. Jordan has also not ruled out deploying ground troops, although domestic support for Jordanian participation at any level is reported to be minimal.22 Canada The Canadian Parliament approved a Government motion on 7 October 2014 to contribute Canadian military assets to the anti-ISIS coalition for a period of up to six months (). Canada subsequently deployed six CF-18 Hornets (fighter-bombers), two CP-140 surveillance aircraft, one aerial tanker and 600 personnel. Aircraft were based in Kuwait and began offensive operations on 30 October 2014. 26 Special Forces were also deployed in northern Iraq. In March 2015 the Canadian government announced its decision to extend and expand Canada’s role in the operation. On 31 March the Canadian Parliament voted by 149 to 129 in favour of extending the mission for a further year, and expanding it to include airstrikes in Syria. Announcing the decision then Prime Minister, , stated: We cannot stand on the sidelines while ISIL continues to promote terrorism in Canada as well as against our allies and partners, nor can we allow ISIL to have a safe haven in Syria.23 Canadian aircraft conducted their first strike sorties against ISIS targets in Syria on 8 April 2015. However, Canada’s newly elected Prime Minister, , has stated that Canada will end its combat mission in both Iraq and Syria, and will focus its contribution upon military training. Yet the timetable for doing so is currently unclear. The Government has not fully set out its intentions; while the Canadian Parliament has called upon the Government to allow the issue to be debated and voted upon in the Canadian House of Commons before any such action is taken. Mission reports have been published on the Canadian Ministry of Defence’s website as recently as 25 November 2015. UK RAF Tornado aircraft conducted the first offensive combat mission in Syria on 3 December 2015. See section 5 of this note - British military participation – for a detailed account.

21 IISS, Military Balance 2015 22 http://www.npr.org/2015/01/28/382218309/jordan-tests-coalition-against-isis-with- offer-to-negotiate 23 “Parliament votes to widen Canada’s mission against ISIS”, National Post, 31 March 2015 15 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

Operations in Iraq In addition to the countries outlined above, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark have also conducted airstrikes in Iraq. However, both Belgium and Denmark have since withdrawn their combat aircraft. UK The UK is the second largest contributor to the air campaign in Iraq. See British military participation below). The Netherlands On 2 October 2014 Parliament approved plans to deploy six F-16 aircraft, plus 2 reserve aircraft, 250 support staff and 130 officials to train local soldiers. The deployment was initially for one year. F-16s from the Netherlands conducted their first active bombing on ISIS targets on 7 October.24 In June 2015 the Dutch government announced that the military mission in Iraq would be extended until October 2016. Denmark On 26 September 2014 the Danish government announced the deployment of seven F-16 combat aircraft (four operational and three reserve), a C-130J transport aircraft, 12 soldiers and 40 support staff to support the effort against ISIS in Iraq for a 12 month period. Troops were based in Kuwait.25 Danish aircraft conducted their first sorties on 16 October but did not expend any munitions. The first airstrikes by Danish aircraft were conducted on 20 October 2014. On 2 October 2015 Danish combat aircraft were withdrawn for a period of planned maintenance, although Denmark continues to provide a ‘capacity building’ contribution in Iraq with up to 120 soldiers, in addition to 20 staff officers deployed with Coalition headquarters. Toward the end of September the Danish government said that it would seek Parliamentary approval for the deployment of a mobile ground- based radar, along with technical and operational support personnel, in order to supplement its military contribution to the fight against ISIS. The Danish Foreign Ministry confirmed that the proposed deployment is in response to a specific need for greater surveillance and control of Iraqi and Syrian airspace that the Coalition has identified.26 The radar will not, however, be used to identify ground targets. That deployment was approved by the Danish Parliament on 10 November 2015. It has also been suggested that the Danish air contingent could be re- deployed in 2016. Belgium On 26 September Belgium’s Parliament approved the deployment of six F-16 fighter aircraft, 120 personnel and a number of C-130 transport aircraft. Belgium aircraft conducted their first airstrikes on 6 October

24 “Dutch F-16s in action for first time”, Dutch News, 9 October 2014 25 The Danish Parliament approved the deployment on 2 October 2014 26 . Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 24 September 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 16

2014.27 They were based in Jordan. Those aircraft were withdrawn on 2 July 2015.28 Operations in Syria The first US- led airstrikes in Syria were assisted by aircraft from five Arab countries: Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, with Qatar in a supporting role. 29 Initial details on the exact nature of their participation were minimal, with many analysts describing it as ‘largely symbolic’. Among the partner nations Saudi and UAE F-16 fast jet aircraft were understood to have undertaken the majority of strike missions in the first few days of operations.30 Since then Turkey, Canada, France and Australia have joined the air campaign in Syria; while the UK is conducting surveillance reconnaissance operations over Syria. The contributions of the US, France, Australia, Jordan and Canada are outlined above. UK In October 2014 the Ministry of Defence authorised the conduct of UK surveillance missions over Syria. In early July 2015 the Secretary of State for Defence indicated that the Government could seek further parliamentary approval for extending operations into Syria provided that “there is a sufficient consensus behind it”.31 However, many commentators accused the government of pre-empting this debate. Firstly, after it emerged in mid-July 2015 that five UK military personnel embedded with US and Canadian forces had already conducted airstrikes in Syria and secondly, after the Prime Minister announced on 7 September that an RAF drone strike had targeted and killed two British ISIS fighters in Syria.32 (See British military participation). The Government has maintained its position on seeking parliamentary approval for extending airstrikes into Syria once it could be confident of securing enough support. On 26 November the Prime Minister set out the Government’s position on this issue. The Government brought forward an 11 point motion on 2 December 2015 to support military action, specifically airstrikes, exclusively against ISIL in Syria. The motion was approved by 397 votes to 223.33

27 “Belgium F-16 launches first strike in Iraq”, AFP, 6 October 2014 28 Dutch Ministry of Defence, 3 July 2015 29 Qatar participated in initial offensive operations but has since ceased its involvement. 30 “US, Arab allies take out IS oil refineries”, Jane’s Defence weekly, 26 September 2014 31 HC Deb 2 July 2015, c1672 32 For more on this see the Commons Briefing Paper Overview of military drones used by the UK armed forces, October 2015 33 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c323-494 17 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

United Arab Emirates In December 2014 UAE suspended its participation in the coalition after expressing concerns over the coalition’s combat search and rescue capabilities following the downing and capture of a Jordanian pilot. However, following his execution by ISIS in February 2015 UAE announced its intention to re-deploy a squadron of F-16 aircraft to Jordan to assist coalition efforts. Turkey On 24 August 2015 the US and Turkey signed an accord allowing US aircraft to launch air strikes against ISIS from Incirlik air force base.34 On 29 August Turkey formally joined the coalition in conducting air strikes against ISIS targets in Syria. Prior to this Turkey’s role had been limited, focusing instead on its campaign against Kurdish PKK separatists. Other military contributions? In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 the French Government has been calling on its allies and partners in the broader anti-ISIS coalition to do more to support the military campaign against ISIS. Specifically France has invoked Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union which obliges participating EU Member States to provide “aid and assistance” by all means in their power. At that meeting of EU Defence Ministers all States expressed their unanimous support for French efforts to defeat ISIS. Several countries have indicated their willingness to do more, among them Germany which has suggested that it could deploy a number of reconnaissance and other aircraft to the region along with 1,200 personnel. Aircraft would not conduct offensive operations but would provide logistical and intelligence support to other countries.35 Any deployment proposals would have to be presented to the German Bundestag for approval which the German government is reported to be seeking by the end of the year. Although the Spanish government have rule out participating in airstrikes the Spanish Interior Minister Jorge Fernández Díaz pledged support in the fight against ISIS in a recent interview with Telecinco on 17 November. Thousands of Spanish citizens took to the streets over the weekend of 28/29 November, however, calling on the Government not to back military participation for fear of reprisals. The Italian government has also pledged support for France in the fight against ISIS but it is unclear, as yet, whether that involves any military commitment. On 26 November Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, suggested that addressing ISIS in Libya was Italy’s priority.36

34 US air force assets had been conducting unarmed surveillance operations from Incirlik prior to this date. 35 “Germany outlines plan to support fight against Islamic State”, Reuters, 29 November 2015 36 “Libya a priority in ISIS fight”, The Local, 26 November 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 18

In an article in The Guardian on 26 November the French Defence Minister, Jean-Yves le Drian also directly appealed to the UK to expand airstrikes into Syria.

2.2 Training and logistical support to local forces Training in Iraq In November 2014 a number of coalition countries announced a package of training and support for Iraqi security, and local, forces in order to assist them in countering ISIS forces and re-taking territory that had fallen under ISIS control. The training programme is being led by the United States and involves a number of other countries, including the UK. Concern over the success of the coalition training programme has been rife however. On 8 June 2015 the US President acknowledged that the US “lacks a complete strategy” for training Iraqi security forces, and that a review of how the coalition can further assist Iraq in training and equipping its security forces was now underway.37 However, he also suggested that more also needed to be done by the Iraqi government to facilitate the training programme, which was reportedly being hampered by a lack of recruits and the poor ability of the Iraqi army to absorb the training being offered.38 In total, 12 Iraqi brigades are expected to be trained: nine from the Iraqi security forces and three from the Kurdish Peshmerga. Military training is currently taking place at four training sites at Al-Asad, Irbil, Besmaya and Taji. Training of Iraqi army recruits began at the end of December 2014 and, to date, over 11,000 Iraqi troops have been trained. A further 3,000 troops are currently in training.39 Contributions The main contributing nations are: • United States – On 7 November 2014 the Department of Defense confirmed the deployment of 1,500 additional military personnel to Iraq, in a non-combat role. Their objective was to expand the US “advise and assist” mission already in place in Iraq (comprising approximately 1,400 US military personnel)40 and to initiate a more comprehensive training package for Iraqi forces.

On 10 June 2015 the US announced the deployment of a further 450 US military personnel to train, advise and assist Iraqi security forces at Taqaddum military base in eastern Anbar province. These

37 See “”Obama: we want to get more Iraqi security forces trained”, BBC News, 8 June 2015 38 “US weighs deploying hundreds more troops to train Iraqi forces against ISIS”, The Guardian, 9 June 2015 39 HC Deb 20 July 2015, c1233 and White House press release, 10 June 2015 40 The “advise and assist” mission provides operational advice to Iraqi brigades and divisions and also staffs Joint Operations Centres in Iraq and Irbil which are designed to share intelligence among US, Iraqi and Kurdish forces. More recently they have also been used to co-ordinate air strikes. 19 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

additional personnel will not be deployed in a combat role and will augment the 3,000 military personnel already deployed in Iraq. The intention is to focus on improving and refining military functions such as logistics, intelligence gathering, force protection and operational planning, thereby complementing the four existing training sites.41

• UK – (see British military participation below).

• Denmark – Is providing 120 military trainers as part of the additional support packages announced at the beginning of November 2014.42

• Italy – An Italian contingent of approximately 280 military personnel is helping train Kurdish forces near Irbil. In March 2015 the government also announced that a small team of security specialists would begin training Iraqi police forces, with a focus on those towns and cities that had been recaptured from ISIS.

• Australia – In March 2015 the government announced the deployment of 300 personnel as part of a joint training mission with New Zealand. 110 personnel are deployed as part of the New Zealand contingent. Troops are based at the Taji military complex northwest of . The mission became fully operational in May 2015 and is expected to last for two years.

• France – Has provided military equipment to Kurdish fighters and approximately 40 military advisers to train them.

• Spain – Has 300 military personnel deployed as part of the training effort. The Spanish government has made clear that it will not commit ground forces and it will not take part in any operations in Syria.

• Norway – Approximately 50 military personnel are training Kurdish forces in the north of the country. A small number of instructors are also reported to have been deployed to Baghdad in an advisory capacity.

• The Netherlands – Has deployed 130 officials to train local soldiers. The deployment is for one year.

• Although Germany has ruled out participating in air strikes against ISIS in either Iraq or Syria, the country is providing arms to Kurdish fighters, along with 40 soldiers to train them.43

41 Department of Defense, “Iraq troop increase part of broader Coalition strategy”, 12 June 2015 42 Department of Defense briefing, 7 November 2014 43 “Steinmeier: ‘no question’ of airstrikes against IS”, DW, 22 September 2014 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 20

Support to Syrian opposition forces Training In 2014 a $500 million US-led programme was put in place to train moderate Syrian opposition forces.44 This programme aimed to train and equip thousands (approximately 3- 5,000 per year) of screened members of the opposition over the next three years at a number of regional training centres outside of Syria. Trained forces would initially focus on defending Syrian communities, specifically against ISIS, but would subsequently go on the offensive against ISIS. The intention was that, in the longer term, they would also help to promote the conditions for a political settlement to the conflict in Syria.45 Specifically the training programme would focus on a “range of critical combat skills including marksmanship, casualty care, land navigation, communications, leadership, the law of armed conflict and human rights principles”.46 For operational security and force protection reasons the Pentagon refused to provide specific details on the location of training, and the size and length of courses. However, US officials revealed that the first training course began in Jordan on 7 May 2015.47 A second training course was understood to have been launched in Turkey at the end of May.48 Future training courses were also expected to be launched in Saudi and Qatar. At the time the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, cautioned that recruiting, vetting and training enough fighters to form a new moderate Syrian opposition force is “going to be a challenge and may take longer than we think”. Indeed, as of the beginning of July 2015, the programme was reported to have only processed 60 people.49 By mid-September General Lloyd Austin, Head of US Central Command, acknowledged that only “four or five” Syrian fighters remained from the US train and equip programme.50 It has been widely reported that a large number of initial Syrian recruits had to be disqualified during the vetting process either for health or age reasons, or because of suspected links to extremist groups.51 According to US media reports many of the initial graduates

44 This training programme is separate from a previous US-led training programme based in Jordan in 2013. See “West training Syrian rebels in Jordan”, The Guardian, 8 March 2013 45 Iraq update and training the Syrian moderate opposition: written statement HCWS501, 26 March 2015 46 US Central Command press release, 7 May 2015 47 “US begins training Syrian rebels in Jordan to become anti-ISIS force”, New York Times, 7 May 2015 48 “US training of Syria rebel fighters expands to Turkey: source”, Reuters, 28 May 2015 49 “US admits it has trained only 60 Syrians to fight ISIL”, Al Jazeera, 8 July 2015 50 “US Syiran rebel training fields only ‘4 or 5’ fighters”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 September 2015 51 “US faces challenges in building up Syrian training program”, The Washington Post, 3 June 2015 21 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

of the programme had also been attacked and had turned over their equipment to the Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliated group.52 The UK had contributed 75 military personnel to the initial training programme (see British military participation below).

Change of US Strategy Given the extent of the difficulties faced by the “train and equip” programme since its inception, the Department of Defense announced on 9 October 2015 that it would pursue a new strategy with respect to supporting opposition forces in Syria. Instead of recruiting for a training programme based in neighbouring countries, the focus will now be on “equipping and enabling” selected groups of vetted leaders and their units so that over time they can make a concerted push into territory still controlled by ISIL”. The US will provide equipment packages and weapons, and provide air support as and when necessary. Information on the identity of recipient groups has so far been limited, although the Syrian Arab coalition has been named as one such recipient.53 The intention is to make it easier to provide military supplies or airstrikes in support of specific opposition groups as they take the fight to ISIS. However, in order to address concerns over the flow of US weapons into Syria, and the potential for them to end up in the hands of extremist groups, the Pentagon has stated that weaponry will be “more basic”.54 It has also confirmed that it will: continue to evaluate this program and… make refinements and adjustments over time as appropriate. As we have said from the beginning, the fight against ISIL will take time. Working with local partners to win back territory taken by ISIL will continue to be a long and arduous process.55 Support to local forces on the ground On 30 October 2015 the US administration announced that “less than 50” US Special Forces’ personnel would deploy to Kurdish-controlled territory in northern Syria in order to provide logistical and planning assistance to Kurdish and other local forces in their fight against ISIS. The deployment has been described as part of the longer term strategy of building the capacity of local forces on the ground and the US Government has sought to emphasise that these personnel will not have a combat role. However, the lack of a coherent strategy for Syria has once again been questioned. Responding to the announcement the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Paul Ryan said that he hoped this latest

52 See “US revamping rebel force fighting ISIS in Syria”, New York Times, 6 September 2015; “After setbacks, US military looks for ways to recalibrate new Syrian force”, the Washington Post, 12 August 2015 53 Statement on the US military strategy in the Middle East and the counter-ISIL campaign, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 27 October 2015 54 “DoD lowers vetting standards for Syrian rebel training program”, The Military Times, 9 October 2015 55 US Department of Defense, Statement on Syria, 9 October 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 22

deployment would be the start of a strategy for US involvement in the Syrian conflict. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry, acknowledged that "A more serious effort against ISIS in Syria is long overdue," although he also questioned whether this deployment goes far enough; a view shared by Senator John McCain. 56 Critics have regarded it, however, as the “first boots on the ground” and a significant escalation of US military involvement in Syria.

56 “Lawmakers rap Obama on Syria escalation”, Defense News, 30 October 2015 23 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

3. Duration of the mission

David Cameron warned Members of Parliament during the debate in September 2014 that “we should not expect this to happen quickly. The hallmarks of this campaign will be patience and persistence, not shock and awe.”57 On 16 July 2015 the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, reiterated: In military terms, we have always recognised that the campaign would be a long one.58 The US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, told Senators in mid-September “this won't look like a shock-and-awe campaign, because that's simply not how ISIS is organized, but it will be a persistent and sustainable campaign."59 The then Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott also warned “this deployment in Iraq could be quite lengthy”, when he announced cabinet approval for airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq on 3 October 2014. He added “certainly months rather than weeks. I want to reassure the Australian people that it will be as long as it needs to be but as short as it possibly can be.” He added the measure of success would be “when ISIS are in retreat, not in advance. We will know that we are succeeding when the Iraqi government is restoring a modicum of control over its own cities and towns.”60 In October 2015 the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, suggested that a three-year timeframe was the current expectation of military commanders. He commented: We always said, at the beginning of the intervention last summer that it would probably take three years to defeat ISIL militarily. I spoke to General John Allen, the US President’s special envoy on this subject, just a few weeks ago. His view is that that remains correct, and we still have another two years to go to a military solution in Iraq.61

57 HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1264 58 HC Deb 16 July 2015, c32WS 59 “U.S. says won't unleash 'shock and awe' air campaign in Syria”, Reuters, 16 September 2014 60 “Cabinet approves Australian airstrikes in Iraq”, The Australian, 3 October 2014 61 HC Deb 20 October 2015, c812 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 24

4. Legal basis Iraq Military action in Iraq is being conducted at the request of the Iraqi government, which coalition partners consider provides a firm legal basis for operations. A summary of the British Government’s legal position on military action against ISIS in Iraq states: International law is clear that the use of force in international relations is prohibited, subject to limited exceptions. However, international law is equally clear that this prohibition does not apply to the use of military force by one State on the territory of another if the territorial State so requests or consents. It is clear in this case that Iraq has consented to the use of military force to defend itself against ISIL in Iraq […] [In September 2014] the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq sought additional international support and assistance for the specific purpose of fighting ISIL. Setting out the background of the threat posed by ISIL, its gratitude for international help provided so far and the need to respect Iraqi sovereignty, Iraq made a request for further military action in the following terms: It is for these reasons that we, in accordance with international law and the relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements, and with due regard for complete national sovereignty and the Constitution, have requested the United States of America to lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds, with our express consent. The aim of such strikes is to end the constant threat to Iraq, protect Iraq’s citizens and, ultimately, arm Iraqi forces and enable them to regain control of Iraq’s borders. The government is satisfied that the consent of Iraq in these terms provides a clear and unequivocal legal basis for the deployment of UK forces and military assets to take military action to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds in Iraq. Syria The reluctance of many coalition partners to intervene in Syria has partly been because of concerns over the legality of such military action, given that it is not at the request of the Assad government,62 and is being conducted in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution specifically authorising such action. The Government’s November 2015 response to the Foreign Affairs Committee report on extending British military action to Syria says that the main legal basis for UK military action in Syria is collective self- defence of Iraq, with the individual self-defence of the UK and collective self-defence of other states (but not Security Council authorisation) as additional legal bases.

62 Although President Assad has said that he is willing to cooperate with the US in the fight against terrorism in Syria, (‘Syria's President Speaks: A Conversation With Bashar al-Assad’, Foreign Affairs, March-April 2015) 25 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

It is on this premise that the Government presented its proposals to Parliament on expanding British airstrikes into Syria. Library Briefing Paper CBP7404, Legal basis for UK military action in Syria, 1 December 2015 examines these issues in greater detail.

Number 06995, 3 December 2015 26

5. British military participation

Summary In September 2014 Parliament voted to support offensive military action in Iraq. However, that vote did not extend to offensive operations in Syria. In July 2015 the Secretary of State for Defence indicated that the Government could seek further approval from Parliament to extend air strikes into Syria provided that “there is a sufficient consensus behind it”. The Government received that approval by Parliament on 2 December 2015 to begin air strikes in Syria exclusively against ISIL. Since September 2014 RAF Tornado GR4 and the Reaper remotely piloted air system (RPAS) have conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. The UK is the second largest contributor to the coalition air campaign, conducting 8% of airstrikes in Iraq. Nearly 60% of the intelligence gathered in Iraq is provided by British Tornado aircraft; while Reaper and Airseeker aircraft, which have been authorised to fly surveillance missions over Syria, are providing up to 30% of the intelligence effort. In early December 2015 two additional Tornado aircraft and six Typhoon aircraft have been deployed to the region following the extension of offensive military action in Syria. In early September 2015 it emerged that two British ISIS fighters had been targeted and killed in an RAF drone strike in Syria. The Government justified the action on the basis of self- defence and suggested that it was not part of coalition military action against ISIS in Syria. Since November 2014 the UK has been providing training and military advice to the Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga. In early June 2015 the Government announced that a further 125 British military personnel would deploy to Iraq in order to bolster that training mission. Approximately 850 British military personnel are involved in operations against ISIS. Around two thirds of those personnel are deployed in the region in support of the air campaign; while the remaining personnel are on the ground in Iraq providing training and military advice. Those personnel on the ground are not combat troops.

5.1 Parliamentary approval Parliament voted in favour participating in air strikes against ISIS targets in Iraq in September 2014. The motion recognised the request from the Government of Iraq for military support, noted the broad coalition contributing to military support including countries throughout the Middle East, noted the legal basis for action in Iraq and endorsed UK air strikes against ISIS in Iraq. The motion explicitly ruled out deploying UK troops in ground combat operations and did not endorse UK air strikes in Syria, which the Government indicated would be subject to a separate vote in Parliament, should it become necessary.63 The House of Commons voted 524 to 43 in favour of the Government’s motion.

63 House of Commons Order of Business, 26 September 2014 27 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

The Prime Minister told the House “we want to see ISIS degraded and then destroyed as a serious terrorist force.”64 It is worth making the distinction between the vote in September 2014 and the vote on Syria in August 2013 which was on the principle of taking military action against the Assad regime for the alleged use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians.65 The August 2013 vote was not taken specifically in relation to ISIS. Michael Fallon reiterated this point during debate in the House on 20 July 2015: The debate in August 2013 was on a motion that would have authorised the Government to take action against the Assad regime and its potential use of chemical weapons. It was not a debate about ISIL. It is since August 2013 that we have seen the rise of ISIL and its capture of a huge swathe of Syrian and Iraqi territory. We have seen terrorist outrages, promoted by ISIL, in western Europe and on our own streets. We have now had 30 of our citizens murdered in an attack inspired by ISIL. All those things have happened since that debate on a different issue—chemical weapons in Syria—in the previous Parliament.66 Parliament voted in favour of airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria on 2 December 2015. The eleven-point motion explicitly rules out the deployment of UK troops in ground combat operations, pledged to provide quarterly progress reports to Parliament, and approve military action, specifically airstrikes, exclusively against ISIL in Syria. The House of Commons voted 397 to 223 in favour of the Government’s motion.67

5.2 Air strikes in Iraq and Syria Until 2 December the UK contribution to offensive US-led military action against ISIS had been limited to airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq (). RAF Tornado aircraft conducted the first offensive operation in Syria on 3 December. The UK is the second largest contributor to the air campaign, and has conducted 8% of coalition air strikes in Iraq so far.68 Assets, personnel and basing The RAF is the primary service in this operation and has deployed a mixture of combat, surveillance, reconnaissance, and refuelling/transport aircraft, specifically: • Tornado GR4 fast jet aircraft • Typhoon combat aircraft (from 2 December 2015) • Reaper Remotely Piloted Air Systems

64 HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1264 65 That motion was defeated on division by a vote of 272 to 285 (Division No.70, 2013-14 Session) 66 HC Deb 20 July 2015, c1247 67 The motion also noted UNSCR 2249 and noted the legal basis for action; that military action is one part of a broader strategy to bring peace and stability to Syria; noted the Vienna talks, humanitarian support for Syrian refugees; planning for post- conflict stabilisation and reconstruction in Syria; and noted the requests from France, the US and regional allies for UK military assistance. HC Deb 2 December 2015 c323-494 68 Michael Fallon, “Britain is bringing quality, not quantity, to the fight against Islamic State”, The Spectator Blog, 16 November 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 28

• Airseeker surveillance aircraft69 • Voyager air-to-air refuelling aircraft • C17 and C130 transport aircraft. • E3-D sentry aircraft • Sentinel surveillance aircraft. Tornado and Voyager aircraft are currently operating out of RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, but the RAF also has Al-Minhad airbase in the United Arab Emirates (south of Dubai) which is the home base of 906 Expeditionary Air Wing. It primarily provides support to air transport links between the UK and operations in Afghanistan, and logistic support to deployed forces, but also supports RAF aircraft conducting joint exercises in the region. Coalition personnel, including the RAF, also have access to al- Udeid air base in Qatar. The extension of offensive operations to Syria has triggered the deployment of two additional Tornado aircraft and six Typhoon aircraft. On 23 November 2015 the Government confirmed that the use of RAF Akrotiri had also been offered to France. The airbase will not be used to launch offensive operations by French aircraft but will be available in support of operations by the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle as an emergency diversion airfield if required.70 The Type 45 HMS Defender will also provide air defence support to the Charles de Gaulle whilst she is deployed in the Mediterranean.71 Approximately 850 UK personnel are supporting Operation Shader in Iraq and across the surrounding region.72 As a result of Iraqi air operations, the withdrawal from service of one of the three currently available Tornado squadrons has now been delayed until March 2017. 2 (AC) squadron had been expected to disband in March 2015 and reform as a Typhoon squadron in April 2015. At the onset of the Iraq operation, however, the MOD announced that 2 (AC) squadron would continue as a Tornado squadron until April 2016, due to the operational demands being placed on the Tornado squadrons.73 Plans to stand up a fifth Typhoon squadron in April 2015 remained unchanged, however, and therefore the badge name 2 (AC) Squadron has now transferred to what is now the fifth Typhoon squadron based at RAF Lossiemouth. As a result the Tornado squadron formerly known as 2 (AC) Squadron was renamed 12 (B) Squadron. During a visit to Iraq in August 2015, Michael Fallon announced a further year’s extension for the squadron, to March 2017.74 The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir , said: The decision to retain the third Tornado GR4 squadron for a further year is welcome news. It is clear that the requirement for fast jet precision strike and intelligence gathering shows no sign

69 Also known as Rivet Joint, the aircraft entered service in early 2014 70 MOD press release, 23 November 2015 71 MOD press release, 18 November 2015 72 PQ15165, Middle East: Military intervention, 10 November 2015 73 A letter to Angus Robertson MP, dated 2 October 2014, explains this decision in more detail. 74 Defence Secretary announces Tornado extension, MOD News, 4 August 2015 29 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

of diminishing; extending the life of Number 12 (Bomber) Squadron will allow the to continue to provide a unique and hugely valuable contribution to the coalition fight against Da’esh. I offer my sincere thanks to all the men and women of the RAF who operate and support this vital capability and for the part they have, and will continue to, play in the campaign.75 Sorties Six Tornado aircraft were initially deployed to RAF Akrotiri on 12 August 2014 and began flying reconnaissance missions over Iraq.76 Parliament’s vote on 26 September 2014 triggered the deployment of Tornado aircraft on armed reconnaissance operations and on 30 September Tornado aircraft carried out their first airstrikes on ISIS targets. On 2 December 2015 Tornado aircraft carried out their first airstrikes on ISIS targets in Syria. In October 2014 the Prime Minister announced that the Tornado contingent would be supplemented by two further aircraft, bringing the total number of Tornado aircraft committed to the Iraq operation to eight. The Defence Secretary announced that, following the extension of operations to Syria on 2 December 2015, two further Tornado aircraft and six Typhoon aircraft are to be deployed to the region. Voyager aircraft have provided an air-to-air refuelling capability; while C17 and C130 aircraft have delivered supplies and equipment to local forces. Two C130 aircraft have also remained on standby for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, should it once again become necessary. E3-D Sentry aircraft have enhanced the coalition’s capacity to provide airborne command and control. The Airseeker/Rivet Joint aircraft began surveillance operations over Iraq on 9 August 2014 and was supplemented in theatre in October with the re-deployment of two Reaper RPAS from Afghanistan to the Middle East in order to provide both surveillance support and situational awareness, and add to the strike capability provided by Tornado aircraft.77 Reaper conducted its first airstrike against ISIS targets on 9 November 2014.78 Further Reaper aircraft were expected to be deployed to the Middle East following their withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. However, for operational security reasons the MOD has refused to disclose the final number of Reaper RPAS operating in the Middle East.79 Reaper pilots are bound by the same UK rules of engagement as apply to manned aircraft. In a written statement on 26 March 2015 Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon confirmed that two Sentinel aircraft would also be deployed to the Iraqi theatre in order to provide additional intelligence, surveillance

75 MOD Press Release, 4 August 2015 76 MOD press release, 12 August 2014 77 This was the first operational use of the UK Reaper capability outside of support to operations in Afghanistan. 78 MOD Press Release, 10 November 2014 79 Islamic State, PQ213744, 6 November 2014 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 30

and reconnaissance support.80 The deployment of those aircraft has since been extended until 2016. Sortie Rates As of 26 September 2015 the UK had conducted over 1,300 sorties, including 300 strikes against ISIS targets.81 Nearly 60% of the intelligence gathered in Iraq is provided by British Tornado aircraft; while Reaper and Airseeker aircraft are providing up to 30% of the intelligence effort in Syria.82 Since July 2015 the MOD has adopted the Coalition’s methodology for calculating strike numbers, which has resulted in changes to previously announced figures. In a statement the Defence Secretary outlined: As the campaign has progressed, we have had better visibility and understanding of the method used by the coalition to calculate total strike numbers which differs from the method used by the UK. I have concluded that it would be preferable in future to use coalition produced numbers for UK strikes. For transparency, the table below shows the number of strikes carried out to date by both methods. This will result in an apparent reduction in the total number of UK strikes but does not represent a material change in the substantial contribution that the UK has, and continues to make to the counter-ISIL global coalition air campaign.83 In that statement the MOD provided a summary of UK airstrikes over Iraq, between September 2014 and June 2015, using both UK and Coalition methodologies: Op Shader: UK Strike Numbers

Monthly Cumulative Monthly Cumulative Strikes—UK Total—UK Strikes— Total—Coalition Method Method Coalition Method Method

September 2 2 2 2 2014

October 15 17 8 10 2014

November 40 57 26 36 2014

December 33 90 26 62 2014

80 HCWS501, 26 March 2015 81 MOD Press Release, 26 September 2015. The MOD do not routinely publish figures on sortie/strike rates. 82 HC Deb 26 November 2015, c1489 83 HC Deb 16 July 2015, c32-33WS. An explanation of the difference in methodology was provided in response to an FOI request on 2 September 2015 31 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

January 46 136 28 90 2015

February 24 136 28 90 2015

March 2015 42 202 29 138

April 2015 34 236 26 164

May 2015 37 273 34 198

June 2015 30 308 28 226

The number of airstrikes conducted by individual platform (Reaper and Tornado) for the period March-June 2015 was published in response to a Freedom of Information Request on 4 August:

Number of UK air strikes by RAF Tornado GR-4 and RAF MQ-9 Reaper RPAS in Iraq Tornado GR-4 MQ-9 Reaper RPAS 2015 Mar 17 12 Apr 13 13 May 14 20 Jun 18 10

Updates on MOD operations are available at: Air Strikes in Iraq

5.3 Surveillance operations over Syria The MOD announced on 21 October 2014 that Reaper and Airseeker/Rivet Joint surveillance aircraft had been authorised to begin conducting surveillance flights over Syria. In a Written Statement the MOD said: Further to the update I provided to the House on 16 October on UK operations against ISIL, Official Report, column 35WS, I can confirm that Reaper remotely piloted aircraft are due to begin operations very shortly. As well as their operations over Iraq, both Reapers and Rivet Joint surveillance aircraft will be authorised to fly surveillance missions over Syria to gather intelligence as part of our efforts to protect our national security from the terrorist threat emanating from there. Reapers are not authorised to use weapons in Syria; that would require further permission. The legal basis for this authorisation is as set out to Parliament in the debate on 26 September. Number 06995, 3 December 2015 32

I will continue to provide updates to the House on our military activity.84 Those aircraft were not deployed in an offensive capacity. On 21 August 2015 an RAF Reaper killed two British nationals, Reyaad Khan, the target of the strike, Ruhul Amin, and a third individual, in a targeted strike in Syria. The Prime Minister said the strike was lawful and authorised on the basis of self-defence, a reference to Article 51 of the UN charter. The Prime Minister said the strike was not as not part of coalition military action against ISIL in Syria but a target strike “to deal with a clear, credible and specific terrorist threat to our country at home.”85

5.4 Involvement of embedded UK military personnel in Syrian airstrikes Various UK media outlets published reports on 17 July 2015 stating that, despite the lack of a parliamentary mandate, some UK military personnel had taken part in airstrikes over Syria while embedded with coalition allies. The Daily Telegraph said it had confirmed that three Royal Navy pilots were involved in air strikes in Syria and were flying F- 18 Super Hornets from the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson. The reports were based on a June 2015 response given to a Freedom of Information Request submitted by Reprieve. That request asked the following questions: Have any UK military personnel conducted air strikes in Syria or Iraq using non-UK equipment? If so, how many, where and using whose equipment? Have any UK military personnel carried out ISR sorties in Syria and Iraq using non-UK equipment? If so, how many, where and using whose equipment? Please state whether any UK military personnel are or have been embedded with partner nations during coalition operations in Iraq and Syria and if so, with which partner nations?86 While acknowledging that UK military forces embedded with US, French and have been authorised to deploy with their units to participate in operations against ISIS, the MOD’s response to that FOI request itself did not explicitly say that UK personnel have conducted air strikes in Syria: UK military personnel embedded with the USA, French and Canadian armed forces have been authorised to deploy with their units to participate in coalition operations against ISIL. UK Embeds operate as if they were the host nation’s personnel, under that nation’s chain of command. These personnel include pilots flying ISR and Strike missions against ISIL targets using the equipment of those units. Of these three nations only the USA and Canada are operating in Syrian airspace.

84 HC Deb 21 October 2014, c63WS 85 HC Deb 7 September 2015 c25-26 86 FOI2015-03225, 03226 and 03227, 15 June 2015 33 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

The UK does not hold information on the specific location or number of air strikes/ISR sorties conducted by embedded personnel. Overall Coalition air strike information can be found at: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/87 However, in response to the media coverage the MOD issued a statement on 17 July which outlined: The UK is contributing to the anti-Isil coalition air campaign against Isil targets in Syria through the provision of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Isil poses a direct threat to the UK and to countries around the world. The UK itself is not conducting air strikes in Syria. But we do have a long-standing embed programme with allies, where small numbers of UK personnel act under the command of host nations. That has been the case in Syria, although there are currently no pilots operating in this region. When embedded, UK personnel are effectively operating as foreign troops.88 The Defence Secretary Michael Fallon subsequently made a statement to the House on 20 July 2015 clarifying the position of embedded UK military forces. He acknowledged that on previous occasions a small number of UK personnel had conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Syria. However, he also stated that those personnel operate as members of their Host nation’s military, the implication being that the participation of embedded personnel in Syrian airstrikes does not undermine the Government’s commitment to return to Parliament if the UK proposes to take offensive military action in Syria at some point in the future:

UK Embedded Forces UK Armed Forces regularly have embeds in the forces of our close partners. Embedded UK personnel operate as if they were the host nation’s personnel, under that nation’s chain of command, but remain subject to UK domestic, international and Host Nation law. Our partners likewise have personnel operating under UK command. Embeds allow the UK military personnel to gain direct experience of key capabilities and equipment; make a positive contribution to our defence relationship with our closest allies; and can directly contribute to enhancing the UK’s military capability. Embeds aboard the US Carriers have ranged from aircraft handlers to pilots; they have been crucial to developing our own Queen Elizabeth class carriers, and the handling of F35B aircraft. UK personnel have embedded with other nations’ air forces since the 1950s. In recent years, UK personnel embedded with US air forces have participated in operations in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq, and with the French and Dutch in Mali. The UK currently has over 250 exchange personnel in the armed forces of allies including the US, Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Italy, France and Germany. Ministerial approval is required for UK embeds deployed with allied forces on operations. Since the international Coalition commenced military operations against ISIL last year, up to 80 UK

87 FOI2015-03225, 03226 and 03227, 15 June 2015 88 Ministry of Defence, Defence in the Media, 17 July 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 34

personnel have been embedded with US, Canadian and French forces. They have undertaken a range of roles including planning, training and flying and supporting combat and surveillance missions. A small number of embedded UK pilots have carried out airstrikes in Syria against ISIL targets: none are currently involved in airstrikes. The convention that before troops are committed to military operations the House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate the matter, except in the event of an emergency, applies to the deployment of UK forces. UK personnel embedded within other nations’ armed forces operate as members of that military.89 The issue of rules of engagement for embedded military personnel is one that has arisen many times within the context of previous operations. In February 2014 the Government said that, in the context of personnel embedded with the US Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, embedded personnel within a US military headquarters “come under the command and control of the US armed forces, but remain subject to UK law, policy and military jurisdiction.”90 With regard to UK personnel embedded with US Air Force personnel operating US Remotely Piloted Aircraft the Government stated in 2014 that “UK aircrew are subject to UK Rules of Engagement for all weapons releases.”91 Mark Francois, then Defence Minister, made a similar comment when asked about operations in Afghanistan in 2014. He said: “RAF personnel are subject to UK rules of engagement for all weapon releases when operating a UK or a US platform.”92 The previous Labour Government explained how this works in practice in response to a written question in 2006: Lord Garden asked Her Majesty's Government: Whether the United Kingdom Armed Forces personnel operating the Predator armed drone under operational conditions operate under United Kingdom or United States rules of engagement. [HL6103] Lord Drayson: UK military personnel embedded with US forces remain subject to UK law and service law. They are authorised only to be involved in the planning or execution of operations that comply with British domestic and international legal obligations, including the principles of the laws of armed conflict and the use of force in self-defence. This means that they are bound by the UK's determination of the ambit of the armed conflict, including the determination of which armed groups constitute legitimate targets. Within those constraints, UK embedded personnel act within US rules of engagement may use US collateral damage methodology and work to US delegated authorities.93 However, a common call among critics has been for greater transparency by the Ministry of Defence about the rules under which embedded personnel operate.94

89 HCWS 149, 20 July 2015 90 HC Deb 4 February 2014 c169W 91 Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – current and future use: Government response, 22 July 2014, HC 611 2013-14, para 5 92 HC Deb 24 February 2014 c62W 93 HL Deb 19 June 2006 cWA54. 94 The rules of engagement as they apply to RPAS operations has been the subject of a study by the Birmingham Policy Commission, chaired by Sir David Omand, in 35 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

5.5 Training Iraq Since October 2014 the UK has been providing training to Kurdish Peshmerga forces and military advice to the Iraqi security forces. Specifically, the UK is co-ordinating the coalition’s counter-IED training programme. In a written statement on 13 October 2014 the Ministry of Defence confirmed that it had sent what it described as a “training team” to northern Iraq to instruct Peshmerga soldiers on the operation of 40 UK- gifted heavy machine guns. Other training teams would also be sent to provide soldiering skills, medical and counter-explosive devise knowledge.95 In a separate statement, the MOD said they were a “small specialist team of non-combat Army trainers.”96 On 5 November the MOD announced that additional military assistance would be provided to Iraqi forces. Advisory personnel would be deployed to Iraqi headquarters; while additional training would be provided to Peshmerga fighters, to include infantry skills such as sharp- shooting and first aid. Further equipment would also be provided.97 That training contingent was supplemented in June 2015 by an additional 125 army personnel. The majority of those additional forces (100 personnel) will focus on counter-IED training across the four main training sites in Iraq. Up until this point UK military training assistance has been focused solely on Kurdish forces in the north of the country.98 The remaining 25 personnel will provide training in other critical skills including medical training, equipment maintenance, manoeuvre support for bridging and crossing trenches, and information operations. Following these deployments, the total UK training contingent based in Iraq will comprise 275 personnel.99 To date the UK has trained over 2,000 personnel.100 Syrian opposition forces While the UK is not currently participating in air strikes in Syria, the government has acknowledged that defeating ISIS in Syria is an important part of the overall strategy, and reiterated the belief that “defeating ISIL ultimately lies with local forces”.101

October 2014. That study called on the Government to do more “by way of reassurance to explain the safeguards that are in place to ensure that embedded personnel remain compliant with international humanitarian law”. Chapter 3 of the Commission’s report The security impact of drones: challenges and opportunities for the UK, examines this issue in greater detail. 95 HC Deb 13 October 2014 c10WS 96 “MOD confirms that British troops are in Iraq”, BFBS, 13 October 2014 97 “UK to provide further support to forces fighting ISIL”, MOD Press Release, 5 November 2014 98 HC Deb 8 June 2015, c890 99 HC Deb 8 June 2015, c900-901 100 MOD press release, 26 September 2015 101 Ministry of Defence press release, 26 March 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 36

On that basis, in October 2014 the Foreign Secretary indicated that work was underway, with coalition partners, to examine how the UK could support the US-led programme to train the moderate Syrian opposition, in order to “create effective ground forces in Syria, as well as Iraq, so they can take the fight to ISIL”.102 Following on from that work, in a written statement on 26 March 2015 the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, confirmed that the UK would contribute approximately 75 military trainers and headquarters staff. Those training personnel would provide instruction in the use of small arms, infantry tactics and medical skills. Headquarters staff would coordinate and develop the programme. As outlined above the US announced on 9 October 2015 that the focus of the US’ programme of support for Syrian opposition groups would now change to one of “equipping and enabling” selected groups. In response to that change the MOD has stated: The UK remains committed to a range of wider programmes to support the moderate opposition. We are providing a range of civilian support to help save lives, bolster civil society, counter extremism, promote human rights and accountability, and lay the foundations for a more peaceful and democratic future. To this end, we have committed £55m this year.103

5.6 Sustainability of the UK mission There has been some concern about the sustainability of the UK’s contribution given that the emphasis on air strikes places the onus of this operation on the Royal Air Force. The potential for expanding the air operation into Syria has also raised questions regarding the capacity of the RAF to meet this commitment. It is expected that, while the Typhoon has some multi-role capability, and indeed was deployed in the Libya campaign in 2011 in a ground attack capacity, it’s primary role as the Quick Reaction Alert aircraft for the UK and its deployment in the Falklands and the Baltics would mean that any enhancements to the UK’s air campaign in Iraq, and potentially Syria, would primarily have to be drawn from the remaining Tornado force. There are currently three Tornado squadrons, of which eight aircraft are already deployed on Iraq operations. The MOD announced two additional Tornado aircraft and six Typhoon aircraft would deploy to the region following the vote in Parliament on 2 December 2015 to extend airstrikes in Syria. The Typhoon aircraft flew from RAF Lossiemouth. Prior to the Syria vote the capacity, or even appetite to commit more forces has been questioned. One former head of the RAF has said the RAF is at “rock bottom” after years of cuts and sustaining this operation would be “quite a stretch.”

102 HC Deb 16 October 2014, c470 and Ministry of Defence press release, 26 March 2015 103 MOD, Defence in the media, 10 October 2015 37 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

Air Chief Marshall Sir Michael Graydon added “the lack of combat air craft is a major weakness in our make-up. This has been raised time and time again and basically ignored. We really are at rock bottom.” The Daily Telegraph also quoted Air Commodore Andrew Lambert: I think it’s doable, but we are really scraping the bottom of the barrel. There’s nothing more there, so let’s hope Ukraine doesn’t bubble up into something nasty. Weapons stocks are parlous and when you chuck this all together, it’s a pretty poor position. We have too few aircraft, too few pilots and too much tasking.104 General Lord Richards, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, has expressed concern about the impacts of cuts to the RAF, asking “I’m not sure how long we can sustain this.”105 A sign of the Government’s concern was considered evident in the announcement by the Prime Minister that one of the three front-line Tornado GR4 squadrons would not now be disbanded, as planned, in March 2015, but would be extended until April 2016. The further extension of that squadron in service until 2017 prompted The Financial Times to suggest that “the extension of the squadron of Tornado ground attack aircraft conducting air strikes against ISIL underlines that the Royal Air Force is stretched after years of Defence savings”.106 Amid debate on the extension of air operations into Syria in early July 2015, The Financial Times also suggested that, even if approval were given, the Government would not deploy additional combat aircraft to the operation. It suggested that “the RAF would struggle to muster much extra firepower”.107 In response the MOD stated: The RAF is fully resourced to meet any future operational demands – as shown by the expansion of the Typhoon fleet and a £135 million investment which has doubled the number of Reaper aircraft.108

5.7 Costs of the mission The net additional costs of military operations are usually funded through the Treasury Special Reserve.109 Additional costs include the costs of fuel and munitions; extra maintenance requirements; spares; the deployment and recovery of equipment and personnel from theatre including accommodation; operational allowances (if applicable) and theatre-specific training. It does not include the costs of the base

104 “‘Bare bones’ RAF will struggle to mount Iraq operation”, Daily Telegraph, 25 September 2014 105 “We won’t beat them with airstrikes”, Sunday Times, 28 September 2014 106 MOD, Defence in the Media, 5 August 2015 107 “RAF faces struggle to find extra firepower after cuts”, The Financial Times, 2 July 2015 108 MOD, Defence in the Media, 3 July 2015 109 This was established in 2002 specifically for the Iraq conflict and has since been used to finance the additional costs arising from military operations, including urgent operational requirements. Number 06995, 3 December 2015 38

salaries of the service personnel involved or the base level of equipment usage.110 In March 2015 the MOD confirmed that the net additional costs of the military air operation111 would be met from the Treasury Special Reserve; while the costs of training and equipping the Iraqi and Kurdish security forces, and the provision of key enablers, would be met from the MOD’s Deployed Military Activity Pool (DMAP). In answer to a PQ on 6 November 2015 the MOD set out the costs of the operation so far: The net additional cost of Operation SHADER, the name for countering ISIL activity in Iraq and Syria, from the start of operations in August 2014 to the end of the financial year in March 2015 was around £80 million (£35 million of which was allocated for the replenishment cost of munitions to be purchased in 2015-16). For the current financial year, running from April 2015 to March 2016, at Main Estimates the MOD has initially requested a further £45 million.112 In October 2015 the MOD stated that the net additional costs of Reaper operations over Iraq and Syria alone, to the end of September 2015, was £43 million.113 The net additional costs of the military support provided to the humanitarian mission in Iraq in August and September 2014 were £3.5 million, the majority of which has been recovered from the Department for International Development.114 The Government has not provided an overall estimate of the potential cost of the mission. Malcolm Chalmers, a defence economist at RUSI, had suggested that the cost could be in the ballpark of the 2011 Libyan operation, assuming only air power is used and the campaign lasts for a couple of years. The net additional cost of the seven month Operation Ellamy in Libya in 2011 was £199 million.115 Further information about the financing of international military operations is available in House of Commons Library Briefing Paper The Cost of international military operations, SN03139.

5.8 Expansion of air strikes into Syria The nature of the problem in Syria has changed dramatically in the last two years, particularly after the in Iraq to ISIS and widespread pledges of allegiance to ISIS across the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere. Following the ISIS-linked terrorist attacks in Tunisia at the end of June 2015, which killed 30 British nationals the Prime Minister, speaking on

110 HC Deb 13 December 2012 c419W 111 The Tornado GR4, Reaper RPAS and Voyager air-to-air refuelling aircraft 112 PQ14576, Iraq: military intervention, 6 November 2015 113 PQ12980, Syria: military intervention, 27 October 2015 114 Iraq, PQ224989, 2 March 2015 115 HC Deb 26 November 2012 cc12; previously, the MOD had reported in December 2011 the estimated cost to £212 million. This constituted £145m of operating costs and a £67m on the cost of replenishing munitions [HC Deb 8 December 2011 c41WS] 39 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

the Today programme, called for “a full spectrum response” to ISIS in both Iraq and Syria.116 During a debate in the House on 2 July 2015 the Defence Secretary subsequently indicated that the Government could seek further approval from Parliament to extend air strikes into Syria provided that “there is a sufficient consensus behind it”.117 He stated: We know that ISIL is organised and directed from northern Syria. That is why the Prime Minister said during last September’s debate on taking military action in Iraq that “there is a strong case for us to do more in Syria”.—[Official Report, 26 September 2014; Vol. 585, c. 1259.] However, he recognised the reservations that some Members had, and we will not bring a motion to the House on which there is not some consensus. However, this is a new Parliament and it is for all Members to consider carefully how best to tackle ISIL, an evil caliphate that does not respect state boundaries […] The exception, as the House knows, is if a critical British national interest was at stake, or if there was the need to act to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. We are also clear that any action we take must not provide any succour to Assad or his regime.118 However, many commentators have accused the government of pre- empting this debate. Firstly, after it emerged in mid-July 2015 that five UK military personnel embedded with US and Canadian forces had already conducted airstrikes in Syria (See: Involvement of embedded UK military personnel in Syrian airstrikes) and secondly, after the Prime Minister announced on 7 September 2015 that an RAF drone strike had targeted and killed two British ISIS fighters in Syria.119 The Government justified this action, however, on the basis of self-defence and suggested that it was not part of coalition military action against ISIS in Syria, for which the Government would seek approval from the House. The Prime Minister stated: I want to be clear that the strike was not part of coalition military action against ISIL in Syria; it was a targeted strike to deal with a clear, credible and specific terrorist threat to our country at home. The position with regard to the wider conflict with ISIL in Syria has not changed. As the House knows, I believe there is a strong case for the UK taking part in airstrikes as part of the international coalition to target ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq, and I believe that that case only grows stronger with the growing number of terrorist plots being directed or inspired by ISIL’s poor leadership in Raqqa. However, I have been absolutely clear that the Government will return to the House for a separate vote if we propose to join coalition strikes in Syria.120 In response to the Prime Minister’s statement, then acting Leader of the Opposition, Harriet Harman, commented: The Prime Minister said in his statement that if he proposed joining coalition strikes in Syria, he would return to the House for

116 Today programme, 29 June 2015 117 HC Deb 2 July 2015, c1672 118 HC Deb 2 July 2015, c1671-2 119 HC Deb 7 September 2015, c25-27 120 Ibid Number 06995, 3 December 2015 40

a vote of authorisation. May I reiterate the position as set out by the shadow Defence Secretary and me on 2 July? ISIL brutalises people, it murders people, and it is horrifically oppressive. We will carefully consider any proposals that the Government present in relation to military action in Syria, but we all need to be clear about what difference any action would make to our objective of defeating ISIL, and about the nature of such action, its objectives, and the legal basis. Potential action must command the support of other nations in the region, including Iraq and the coalition that is already taking action in Syria.121 Julian Lewis, chairman of the Commons Defence Select Committee, has said that taking military action in Syria would entail helping either the Assad government or ISIS: In 2013, the Government wanted to remove Assad without helping al-Qaeda or similar groups that later became Daesh. Now we apparently want to remove Daesh but without helping Assad. Those two things are incompatible. It is a choice of two evils. Which does my right hon. Friend think is the lesser of those two evils?122 Dr Lewis also commented on Radio 4’s The World this Weekend on 19 July 2015 that the outcome of a vote would depend upon whether the Government “presents parliament with an integrated strategy, approved jointly by the heads of the Armed Forces, as something that could produce a decisive result”. The Foreign Affairs Committee examined the possibility of expanding airstrikes to Syria in its 3 November 2015 report. The Committee concluded that, while defeating ISIS is a key national interest for the UK, “there should be no extension of British military action into Syria unless there is a coherent international strategy that has a realistic chance of defeating ISIL and of ending the civil war in Syria”. Specifically the report set out a number of questions that the committee thought should be answered before Parliament could support UK military action in Syria.123 a) On an international strategy: i) How the proposal would improve the chances of success of the international coalition’s campaign against ISIL; ii) How the proposed action would contribute to the formation and agreement of a transition plan for Syria; iii) In the absence of a UN Security Council Resolution, how the Government would address the political, legal, and military risks arising from not having such a resolution; iv) Whether the proposed action has the agreement of the key regional players (Turkey; Iran; Saudi Arabia; Iraq); if not, whether the Government will seek this before any intervention; v) Which ground forces will take, hold, and administer territories captured from ISIL in Syria.

121 HC Deb 7 September 2015, c29 122 HC Deb 2 July 2015, c1671 123 The extension of offensive British military operations to Syria, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report, HC 457, 2015–16 41 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

b) On the military imperative: i) What the overall objective is of the military campaign; whether it expects that it will be a “war-winning” campaign; if so, who would provide war-winning capabilities for the forces; and what the Government expects will be the result of extending airstrikes to Syria. ii) What extra capacity the UK would contribute to the Coalition’s actions in Syria. Growing momentum for a debate In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 pressure for greater UK and international action in defeating ISIS has increased. On 20 November, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for states to take ‘all necessary measures’ against ISIS.124 The resolution, a compromise between differing positions from Security Council members, was ambiguous, in that it was not taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the mandatory action provision, and, although it used the UN code for military action (‘all necessary measures’) it did not use the word ‘authorise’.125 On 26 November, the Prime Minister made a statement to the House of Commons in which he set out the government’s arguments for extending military action to Syria and its answers to the questions in the select committee’s report.126 A memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee was also released.127 The Prime Minister stated: He said: First, why? The reason for acting is the very direct threat that ISIL poses to our country and to our way of life… I am in no doubt that it is in our national interest for action to be taken to stop it— and stopping it means taking action in Syria, because Raqqa is its headquarters. But why us? My first responsibility as Prime Minister—and our first job in this House—is to keep the British people safe. We have the assets to do that and we can significantly extend the capabilities of the international coalition forces. That is one reason why members of the international coalition, including President Obama and President Hollande, have made it clear to me that they want Britain to stand with them in joining in air strikes in Syria, as well as Iraq. These are our closest allies, and they want our help […] …why now? The first answer to that is, of course, because of the grave danger that ISIL poses to our security—a danger that has clearly intensified in recent weeks—but there are additional reasons why action now is so important. Just look at what has changed—not just the attack in Paris, but the fact that the world has come together and agreed a UN Security Council resolution. There is a real political process under way […]

124 Security Council resolution 2249 (2015), 20 November 2015 125 For more on the legal implications of the November resolution, see the Commons Briefing Paper 7404, Legal basis for UK military action in Syria, 1 December 2015 126 HC Deb 26 November 2015, cc1489-1537 127 Memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee: Prime Minister’s Response to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015-16: The Extension of Offensive British Military Operations to Syria, November 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 42

Another reason for action now is that the success in Iraq in squeezing the so-called caliphate is put at risk by our failure to act in Syria. This border is not recognised by ISIL, and we seriously hamper our efforts if we stop acting when we reach the Syrian border, so when we come to the question, “Why now?”, we have to ask ourselves whether the risks of inaction are greater than the risks of taking action. On the issue of legality, the Prime Minister referred to the memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee, which contained a summary of the legal advice, and added: It is founded on the right of self-defence as recognised in article 51 of the United Nations charter. The right of self-defence may be exercised individually where it is necessary to the UK’s own defence, and of course collectively in the defence of our friends and allies. The main basis of the global coalition’s actions against ISIL in Syria is the collective self-defence of Iraq. He said this legal basis was “underscored” by the new Security Council resolution. On the question of ground troops he said that the Syrian situation was complex, but that there were non-extremist Syrian fighters and to be relied on: However, as the report I am publishing today shows, we believe that there are around 70,000 Syrian opposition fighters, principally of the Free Syrian Army, who do not belong to extremist groups, and with whom we can co-ordinate attacks on ISIL. In addition, Kurdish armed groups have shown themselves capable of taking territory, holding it and administering it, and, crucially, of relieving the suffering that the civilian population had endured under ISIL control. He then turned to the question of overall strategy, describing the four pillars of the strategy: a comprehensive plan to prevent and foil plots at home support for the diplomatic and political process military action immediate humanitarian support and, even more crucially, longer- term stabilisation.128 He concluded by stating that: any motion we bring before this House will explicitly recognise that military action is not the whole answer. Proud as I am of our incredible servicemen and women, I will not pretend or overstate the significance of our potential contribution. I will not understate the complexity of this issue, nor the risks that are inevitably involved in any military action, but we do face a fundamental threat to our security. We cannot wait for a political transition. We have to hit these terrorists in their heartlands right now: and we must not shirk our responsibility for security, or hand it to others.

128 HC Deb 26 November 2015, c1492 43 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

Throughout our history, the United Kingdom has stood up to defend our values and our way of life. We can, and we must, do so again. New Labour Leader, Jeremy Corbyn, is a longstanding opponent of military involvement in Iraq and Syria and more recently, at the 2015 Labour Party Conference, called for a UN Security Council resolution and a fresh diplomatic push to resolve the conflict in Syria.129 After the debate on 26 November he also sent a letter to Labour MPs saying that he was not convinced of the case for extending action to Syria.130 In contrast it has been reported that up to half of the Shadow cabinet would support airstrikes, with suggestions that a number of the shadow frontbench would resign if forced to vote with the Labour leadership.131 Indeed, following a meeting with the Shadow Cabinet on 30 November it was subsequently announced that Labour MPs would be allowed a free vote on the issue. An opinion poll conducted for The Independent on 30 July 2015 suggested that 67% of the British public supports extending airstrikes into Syria.132 A similar response was received to a poll conducted by Sky News in September 2015. 66% of respondents supported bombing targets in Syria as part of a wide-scale campaign to defeat ISIS; while 46% of that same audience supported putting British ‘boots on the ground’ in Syria, with 31% opposed.133 A separate YouGov poll, also conducted at the end of September suggested that 60% of the public would support airstrikes in Syria. When questioned about committing ground troops back into Iraq, 40% of those asked supported such a move, while 39% were opposed.134 The debate and vote The Government tabled an eleven point motion to be discussed in an all-day debate on 2 December 2015. The motion explicitly ruled out the deployment of UK troops in ground combat operations and supported military operations, specifically airstrikes, exclusively against ISIS in Syria. The House of Commons voted in favour of the motion by 397 votes to 233. The full text of the motion: That this House notes that ISIL poses a direct threat to the United Kingdom; welcomes United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249 which determines that ISIL constitutes an ‘unprecedented threat to international peace and security’ and calls on states to take ‘all necessary measures’ to prevent terrorist acts by ISIL and to ‘eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria’; further notes the clear legal basis to defend the UK and our allies in accordance with the UN Charter; notes that military action against ISIL is only one component of a

129 Speech by Jeremy Corbyn to the Labour Party Annual Conference, 2015 130 ‘Jeremy Corbyn 'cannot support UK air strikes in Syria', BBC News Online, 26 November 2015 131 “Corbyn under pressure to reconsider Labour’s policy on Syria airstrikes”, The Guardian, 20 September 2015 132 “British airstrikes on Syria”, The Independent, 30 July 2015 133 Sky News, 26 September 2015 134 YouGov Survey, 29-30 September 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 44

broader strategy to bring peace and stability to Syria; welcomes the renewed impetus behind the Vienna talks on a ceasefire and political settlement; welcomes the Government’s continuing commitment to providing humanitarian support to Syrian refugees; underlines the importance of planning for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction in Syria; welcomes the Government’s continued determination to cut ISIL’s sources of finance, fighters and weapons; notes the requests from France, the US and regional allies for UK military assistance; acknowledges the importance of seeking to avoid civilian casualties, using the UK’s particular capabilities; notes the Government will not deploy UK troops in ground combat operations; welcomes the Government’s commitment to provide quarterly progress reports to the House; and accordingly supports Her Majesty’s Government in taking military action, specifically airstrikes, exclusively against ISIL in Syria; and offers its wholehearted support to Her Majesty’s Armed Forces.135 The debate ran for ten hours. An amendment tabled by John Baron that would prevent military action in Syria was rejected by 390 votes to 211. Opening the debate, the Prime Minister said: In moving this motion, I am not pretending that the answers are simple. The situation in Syria is incredibly complex. I am not overstating the contribution our incredible servicemen and women can make; nor am I ignoring the risks of military action or pretending that military action is any more than one part of the answer. I am absolutely clear that we must pursue a comprehensive strategy that also includes political, diplomatic and humanitarian action, and I know that the long-term solution in Syria—as in Iraq—must ultimately be a Government that represents all of its people and one that can work with us to defeat the evil organisation of ISIL for good. […] Notwithstanding all of that, there is a simple question at the heart of the debate today. We face a fundamental threat to our security…The question is this: do we work with our allies to degrade and destroy this threat, and do we go after these terrorists in their heartlands, from where they are plotting to kill British people, or do we sit back and wait for them to attack us?136 He concluded: Let us be clear: inaction does not amount to a strategy for our security or that of the Syrian people, but inaction is a choice. I believe that it is the wrong choice. We face a clear threat. We have listened to our allies. We have taken legal advice. We have a unanimous United Nations resolution. We have discussed our proposed actions extensively at meetings of the National Security Council and the Cabinet. I have responded personally to the detailed report of the Foreign Affairs Committee. We have a proper motion before the House and we are having a 10 and a half hour debate today.137 Jeremy Corbyn, the Leader of the Opposition, spoke against the motion:

135 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c323 136 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c323 137 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c339 45 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

For all Members, taking a decision that will put British servicemen and women in harm’s way, and almost inevitably lead to the deaths of innocents, is a heavy responsibility. It must be treated with the utmost seriousness, with respect given to those who make a different judgment about the right course of action to take.138 He continued: It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Prime Minister understands that public opinion is moving increasingly against what I believe to be an ill-thought-out rush to war. He wants to hold this vote before opinion against it grows even further. Whether it is a lack of strategy worth the name, the absence of credible ground troops, the missing diplomatic plan for a Syrian settlement, the failure to address the impact of the terrorist threat or the refugee crisis and civilian casualties, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Prime Minister’s proposals for military action simply do not stack up.139 Angus Robertson, the SNP’s Westminster leader, explained why the SNP would vote against the motion: I appeal to colleagues on all sides to make sure that we do not ignore the lessons of Afghanistan, ignore the lessons of Iraq, ignore the lessons of Libya. Let's not repeat the mistakes of the past, let's not give the green light to military action without a comprehensive and credible plan to win the peace.140 Nigel Dodds, the DUP’s Westminster Leader, explained why the DUP was supporting the Government: Terrorism must be fought, and fought with all means realistically at our disposal. We have not sought this conflict; terrorists have inflicted it on us, and we must now respond.141 Tim Farron, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, voted in favour of the motion. Explaining that while his instincts are always to be anti-war and anti-conflict, this has been one of the toughest decisions he has had to take in his Parliamentary career, adding: If we had just been asked to bomb Syria, I would be voting no…This is not, however, a case of just bombing; this is standing with the United Nations and the international community to do what is right by people who are the most beleaguered of all.142 Crispin Blunt, the chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, voted with the Government. Looking back to Iraq, he said “I am satisfied that our military effort in Iraq over the past year has been to the enormous credit of our armed forces and has stabilised Iraq in the face of a rapidly advancing threat from ISIL. It wholly justified the strong majority that this House then gave for that intervention.”143 He continued: Whether we like it or not, the reality is that ISIL is at war with us... This is not about a threat to the citizens of a country from their own Government, but about people at war with us, our values

138 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c340 139 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c341 140 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c357 141 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c378 142 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c381 143 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c360 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 46

and our society. This is not a war of choice. I have not spoken to anyone who demurs from the proposition that ISIL must be denied the territory that it currently controls. Although the defeat of ISIL and its ideology will be the work of many years, even decades, the retaking of that territory is an urgent and immediate requirement.144 Julian Lewis, the chair of the Defence Committee, voted against the motion: I shall vote against air strikes in the absence of credible ground forces, as ineffective and potentially dangerous, just as I voted against the proposal to bomb Assad in 2013. Indeed, the fact that the British government wanted to bomb first one side and then the other in the same civil war, in such a short space of time, illustrates to my mind a vacuum at the heart of our strategy.145 Hilary Benn, the shadow International Development Secretary, closed the debate in what has been described as one of the greatest speeches in the House of Commons. Hilary Benn spoke in support of the motion saying: “We must now confront this evil. It is now time for us to do our bit in Syria. And that is why I ask my colleagues to vote for this motion tonight.”146 The full debate is on Hansard. Various media outlets collated extracts from Members speeches including the BBC and the Spectator.

Box 1: Suggested reading • Prime Minister’s Response to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015-16: The Extension of Offensive British Military Operations to Syria, November 2015 • Foreign Affairs Committee, The extension of offensive British military operations to Syria, HC 457, 3 November 2015 • Michael Fallon, “Britain is bringing quality, not quantity, to the fight against Islamic State”, The Spectator Blog, 16 November 2015 • Inherently unresolved, RUSI Occasional Paper, 2015 • Peter Ford and Julian Lewis, “The arguments against bombing Syria are compelling”, The Guardian, 21 October 2015

144 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c360 145 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c369 146 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c486 47 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

6. Russian actions in Syria 6.1 Build-up of Russian military capabilities in Syria Since early September 2015 Russia has been forward-deploying troops and other military assets to an air base in Latakia province on the Mediterranean coast. Syria is already home to Russia’s only other military base outside of the former Soviet Union, at the naval port of Tartus. Estimates of the number of deployed Russian military capabilities vary, but what has been established is that the Russian air force has forward deployed a powerful strike group in Syria. Initially that strike group comprised 24 Su-24 and Su-25 ground attack aircraft, six Su-34 strike aircraft and four Su-30SM multi-role aircraft, which are likely to be providing an air defence capability for the base. In addition, Russia deployed a large number of utility (Mi-8) and attack (Mi-24) helicopters to Latakia, along with seven T-90 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery units and 12 D-30 howitzers. On 20 November the Russian news agency TASS reported that an additional 8 Su-34 strike aircraft and a flight of Su-27SM3 aircraft had also been deployed to the country bringing the total of Russian combat aircraft deployed at Latakia to around 50. The air contingent is a mixture of old Soviet-era aircraft and the more advanced Su-34 which have never before been deployed militarily. According to various analyses, the majority of ordnance deployed is unguided, as opposed to precision guided munitions.147 The Russian air force’s lack of precision weaponry and sophisticated targeting systems is a longstanding issue for the air force and a problem that was highlighted during the 2008 conflict in Georgia.148 However, the tactical intelligence support provided by the Syrian army on the ground is likely to make up for the lack of any sophisticated targeting systems. Thus far personnel appear to have been deployed in support of air operations and to provide a base protection capability. However, media reports have also widely suggested that two further Syrian bases are being prepared to receive potentially thousands of additional Russian troops.149 In early November Russian officials inadvertently confirmed that a number of attack helicopters and an artillery unit had also been re-deployed to other Syrian bases, allegedly in support of government forces.150 On 2 October the Russian Ministry of Defence also announced the deployment of a navy cruiser equipped with S-300 surface-to-air

147 “Syria: what can Russia’s military do?”, BBC News Online, 7 October 2015 148 An assessment of the campaign in Georgia is available in Library briefing Russia’s Military Posture, April 2009 149 “Syria conflict: diplomatic goals behind Putin’s military build-up”, BBC News Online, 25 September 2015 150 “Russia confirms forward deployments in Syria”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 November 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 48

missiles, to the Eastern Mediterranean Following the shooting down of a Russian Su-24 aircraft by Turkish forces on 24 November, after it reportedly violated Turkish airspace, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that it would re-deploy that cruiser closer to Latakia and deploy the advanced S-400 anti-aircraft missile system to its base in the country, prompting fears of a military escalation in the conflict.

6.2 Russian Operations On 30 September Russia launched its first airstrikes in Syria, the first time that Russian forces have undertaken a military operation beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War. Russia was immediately criticised for targeting rebel groups rather than ISIS, including moderate opposition forces supported by the US. According to a RUSI analysis in early October, approximately 80% of airstrikes by that point had targeted armed opposition groups fighting the Assad regime.151 In a Joint Statement issued on 2 October, the Governments of France, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the US and the UK criticised Russian actions: [We] Express our deep concern with regard to the Russian military build-up in Syria and especially the attacks by the Russian air force on Hama, Homs, and Idlib which led to civilian casualties and did not target Da-esh. These military actions constitute a further escalation and will only fuel more extremism and radicalization. We call on the Russian Federation to immediately cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians and to focus its efforts on fighting ISIL.152 The continuation of Russian airstrikes and the incursion by Russian combat aircraft into Turkish airspace also prompted a statement from the NATO North Atlantic Council on 5 October: Russian military actions have reached a more dangerous level with the recent violations of Turkish airspace on 3 October and 4 October by Russian Air Force SU-30 and SU-24 aircraft in the Hatay region. The aircraft in question entered Turkish airspace despite Turkish authorities’ clear, timely and repeated warnings. In accordance with NATO practice, Turkish fighter aircraft responded to these incursions by closing to identify the intruder, after which the Russian planes departed Turkish airspace. Allies strongly protest these violations of Turkish sovereign airspace, and condemn these incursions into and violations of NATO airspace. Allies also note the extreme danger of such irresponsible behaviour. They call on the Russian Federation to cease and desist, and immediately explain these violations. Allies call on the Russian side to take all necessary measures to ensure that such violations do not take place in the future.

151 “Russia’s war plan in Syria”, RUSI Analysis, 2 October 2015 152 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2 October 2015 49 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

The security of the Alliance is indivisible, and Allies stand in strong solidarity with Turkey. We will continue to follow the developments on the South-Eastern borders of NATO very closely.153 In a move which has been widely regarded as an escalation of Russia’s involvement in the Syria conflict, on 7 October the Syrian army and allied militia also conducted a ground offensive against rebel forces, backed up by Russian airstrikes. Those allied militia are thought to include several thousand Iranian fighters. Russia has also launched attacks on targets in Syria from Russian warships based in the Caspian Sea. In early October Russia’s Ministry of Defence confirmed that four warships had fired 26 land attack cruise missiles on 11 targets in Syria. The use of land attack missiles, as opposed to air strikes, in this instance has been questioned by a number of analysts. Jonathan Marcus, defence correspondent with BBC News suggested that: Sea-launched cruise missile have long been a favourite US weapon of choice in interventions overseas, so there may be an element of Russia demonstrating that it has the full military panoply of any other “superpower”.154 However, western analysts have also questioned the success of the strikes after it was suggested that four of those missiles had failed to reach their targets and hit Iran, an allegation which both Moscow and Tehran have disputed. Since then further cruise missile launches have been conducted from the Caspian Sea, the most recent on 20 November when 18 cruise missiles struck 7 targets in Raqqa, Idlib and Aleppo provinces.155 In recent weeks Russia has stepped up its bombing campaign in Syria, largely in response to the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula on 31 October but also in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris. Some commentators have also suggested that there has been a slight shift in focus, with Russian forces increasingly striking ISIS targets as opposed to moderate rebel groups.156 According to the Russian Ministry of Defence aircraft sorties are averaging between 40 and 80 per day: On November 23-26, aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces performed 134 combat sorties engaging 449 objects in the Aleppo, Damascus, Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Homs, Raqqah and Deir- ez-Zor provinces. Between the 21 and 23 November: Aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces have performed 141 combat sorties engaging 472 terrorist objects in the Aleppo, Damascus, Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Homs, Raqqah, and Deir ez-Zor provinces.

153 This statement was also mirrored in a press release following a meeting of the Council of the European Union on 12 October 2015. 154 “Syria: what can Russia’s military do?”, BBC News Online, 7 October 2015 155 Russian Ministry of Defense website, November 2015 156 “Russia targets ISIS in Syria”, The Military Times, 17 November 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 50

Issues Deconfliction One of the biggest problems for US and coalition forces operating in and around Syria is the conduct of safe air operations in what is becoming an increasingly congested environment. At a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers on 8 October, US Defense Secretary, Ash Carter, commented: We have not and will not agree to cooperate with Russia so long as they continue to pursue this misguided strategy. We've seen increasingly unprofessional behavior from Russian forces. They violated Turkish airspace, which as all of us here made clear earlier this week, and strongly affirmed today here in Brussels, is NATO airspace.

They've shot cruise missiles from a ship in the Caspian Sea without warning. They've come within just a few miles of one of our unmanned aerial vehicles. They have initiated a joint ground offensive with the Syrian regime, shattering the facade that they're there to fight ISIL. The deconfliction of Syrian airspace has therefore been a priority and US and Russian officials have engaged in a series of discussions to that end. The US reportedly put forward proposals including ensuring air crews follow international rules for safety of flight; ensuring navigation through professional airmanship, including the use of appropriate and active communications; and avoiding any actions that could cause unnecessary confrontation. On 20 October US and Russian officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding safety over Syrian airspace. A working group has also been established to discuss any implementation issues. The MOU does not, however, establish zones of cooperation, or involve intelligence sharing or any sharing of targeting information in Syria. The US government has made clear that the signing of this MOU does not constitute US cooperation or support for Russian policy or actions in Syria.157 The launch of Russian cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea has also prompted international aviation safety agencies to issue a safety alert to airlines operating in the region. In its bulletin the European Aviation Safety Agency stated “Before reaching Syria, such missiles are necessarily crossing the airspace above Caspian Sea, Iran and Iraq, below flight routes which are used by commercial transport aeroplanes”. No-Fly/Safe Zones Most analysts concur that Russia’s presence in Syria now makes the concept of establishing no-fly or safe zones in Syria almost impossible to implement. Justin Bronk at RUSI has said:

157 Pentagon Statement on Memorandum of Understanding with Russia regarding air safety over Syrian air space, 20 October 2015 51 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

The Russian forces now in place make it very, very obvious that any kind of no-fly zone on the Libyan model imposed by the US and allies is now impossible, unless the coalition is actually willing to shoot down Russian aircraft”.158 On 20 October the Foreign Secretary set out the position of the British Government with respect to the establishment of safe zones in Syria: Mr Hammond: As the right hon. Gentleman will know, there have been extensive discussions about safe zones, which were originally a Turkish idea, over many months. At the moment, we judge the creation of safe zones to be impractical and impossible to enforce. We are acutely conscious that if we create something called a safe zone, it must be safe. There must be someone who is willing to enforce the safety of that zone. We judge that that means boots on the ground, and we and the United States are certainly not prepared to put boots on the ground in northern Syria. Hilary Benn: I take the point that the Foreign Secretary makes, but that does not mean that we should not try. The boots could be those of neighbouring countries […] Mr Hammond: In response to the right hon. Gentleman’s response to my comments, I say that it is easy to volunteer others to put boots on the ground, but it is pretty difficult to tell people to do what we are not prepared to do ourselves. UN Security Council resolutions are already in place and we will continue to test the appetite of the permanent five for going further, but the Russian intervention in Syria complicates matters not only on the ground, but in the Security Council.159

Box 2: Suggested reading • Tim Eaton, “Syria safe zones, another stalled debate”, Chatham House Expert Commentary, 13 October 2015 • US Congressional Research Service, No-fly zones, strategic, operational and legal considerations for Congress, May 2013

6.3 Russian strategy Russia presents the action as a counter-terrorist action to protect religious minorities and to protect the secular government. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says that it is targeting ISIS “and other terrorist groups” in Syria at the invitation of the legitimate Syrian government.160 Asked whether Russia had targeted groups supported by the US and its allies, he repeated that Russia had targeted ISIS. The increasing

158 “Moscow scuppers US coalition plans for no-fly zone in Syria”, The Financial Times, 4 October 2015 159 HC Deb 20 October 2015, c808-809 160 ‘Russian Foreign Minister Defends Airstrikes in Syria’, New York Times, 1 October 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 52

ambivalence in the West and elsewhere, given the rise of ISIS, about pushing for Assad’s fall has made Russian intervention in favour of the Syrian government far more palatable to international opinion. Russia’s longer-term strategy aims to lend effective support to the Assad regime, which has been coming under increasing pressure in recent months. Russia denies, however, that Bashar al-Assad himself must remain in power (and it is reported that Russia offered in 2012 at the UN to provide for Bashar to step down in 2012 – an offer which Western powers ‘ignored’).161 But Moscow wants to maintain its relationship with whatever Syrian government eventually emerges from the conflict there – Syria is one of the last states in the region that is clearly friendly to Russia. Syria’s pro- Russian alignment is one of the reasons, along with a perfectly reasonable objective to have a secular government in Syria, why it is so important for Russia to avoid the arrival in power of a Sunni Islamist regime in Damascus. Russia also wants to keep its military bases on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. It could be useful, especially with the Assad government increasingly under threat, for Russia to build up a significant military presence as soon as possible so that a more decisive intervention is possible in the event of imminent government collapse. Moscow is also eyeing increased trade and economic opportunities with Syria after the conflict, particularly in energy.162 Many commentators see more negative reasons for the dramatic intervention, however. Russia is widely reported to have attacked the ‘moderate’ rebel groups that are the basis for Western hopes for a political solution. One source says that only 20% of Russian attacks have been against ISIS.163 Russia may also be interested in: • Supporting the Syrian government’s strategy of making the rebellion more terrorist in nature, bolstering its claim to be fighting terrorism rather than resisting democracy • Spoiling any potential Western-backed solution, underlining the weakness of the US and the West in the region. • The Kremlin may even be happy to see the conflict worsen so that the West remains distracted from other rivalries with Moscow; deeper intervention by outside powers is likely to prolong the conflict and cost more Syrian lives. Nevertheless, given its problems with jihadi violence at home, Russia does have a genuine interest in preventing the establishment of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

161 ‘West 'ignored Russian offer in 2012 to have Syria's Assad step aside'’, Guardian, 162 Salam al-Saadi, ‘Russia’s Long-Term Aims in Syria’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 October 2015 163 Igor Sutyagin, ‘Russia's War Plan in Syria’, Royal United Services Institute, 2 October 2015 53 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

Problems for the Kremlin Russian influence in Damascus is not that strong. Russian attempts to broker some sort of deal involving ‘constructive’ elements of the opposition were obstructed by the Syrian government; the present action is in part designed to ensure that the Assad government is more dependent on Russian protection (perhaps relative to the growing Iranian help that Damascus has been getting, especially in view of potential rapprochement between Iran and the West). Syria is outside Russia’s self-declared ‘privileged sphere of interest’. Russian and Soviet leaders have avoided taking such ‘out of area’ action in recent history, preferring to concentrate resources on countries bordering Russia or the Soviet Union. Close involvement in Syria risks diluting Russian influence closer to home. A long-term military presence on the ground is inherently risky. Firstly, it may be difficult to secure the goals that Russia has set itself – to prevent the Assad government from falling. Once committed, Russian forces may be drawn deeper into the conflict and it would be difficult to hide the costs in human lives and money from the Russian people. The USSR’s Afghan entanglement was an important factor in its collapse. As an article in Jane’s Defence Weekly has noted: In the apparent absence of a political endgame, Russia has made an open-ended commitment to a complicated conflict that could ultimately undermine rather than enhance its standing on the international stage.164 Regional impact Russia aims to maintain its influence with Damascus, but supporting the Assad government may undermine Russian influence with Sunni governments, most notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Sunnis are in a majority in most Muslim countries in the region. Reports suggest that Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar are likely to increase their support for rebel groups in the face of the Russian intervention. One Saudi analyst said: Since the beginning of the uprising in Syria, the view in Riyadh has been that Bashar al-Assad must go. There is no indication whatsoever that Riyadh will change this position. What is clear to Riyadh and its regional allies is that the recent Russian and Iranian escalation will only create a more unstable region and spill more blood.165 In a sign of the strength of reaction in Saudi Arabia, 55 Wahhabi Saudi clerics signed a document calling for jihad against Russia for its military intervention in Syria.166 The document also attacked the West for failing to support the anti-Assad rebels.

164 “Analysis: Russia’s unguided intervention”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 October 2015 165 ‘Gulf states plan military response as Putin raises the stakes in Syria’, Observer, 4 October 2015 166 ‘Saudi opposition clerics make sectarian call to jihad in Syria’, Reuters, 5 October 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 54

Russia does not seem to be shy of provoking the Sunni powers. Incursions by Russian warplanes into Turkish airspace were widely seen as intentional.167 Allegiances in the region are shifting, however, and the situation is complicated. Other states have not been as hostile to Russia as might be expected. Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomed Vladimir Putin to Cairo in 2015 and has taken a different line from the Gulf States and Turkey to a Syrian solution. Binyamin Netanyahu visited Moscow in September.

Box 3: Suggested reading • “Putin’s gamble in Syria”, Chatham House Commentary, 6 October 2015 • “Russia’s long term aims in Syria”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 October 2015 • “Russia steps into Syria”, The World Today, October/November 2015 • Dr Igor Sutyagin, “Russia’s war plan in Syria”, RUSI Analysis, 2 October 2015 • David Gordon, “Putin’s involvement in Syria – and how Obama can leverage it”, Foreign Affairs, 30 September 2015 • Sarah Lain, “How bolstering military support for Assad helps Russia in Syria and Ukraine”, RUSI Analysis, 18 September 2015

167 ‘Syria conflict: Russia violation of Turkish airspace 'no accident'’, BBC News Online, 6 October 2015 55 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

7. Boots on the ground?

The US-led military operation against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria has so far been confined to airstrikes and the training and support of local security forces and there appears to be no appetite by America or any of the countries currently contributing to the campaign to place combat troops in either country. President Obama has repeatedly ruled out ‘boots on the ground’, telling soldiers “I will not commit you and the rest of our armed forces to fighting another ground war in Iraq.”168 The UK, France and Australia have all similarly ruled out sending combat troops; while the Iraqi Prime Minister has also ruled out any interest in foreign troops to return to Iraq, telling reporters in September 2014 that “the only contribution the American forces or the international coalition is going to help us with is from the sky.”169 However, the speed at which ISIS has adapted its tactics in response to coalition airstrikes and its success in capturing and retaining ground has raised questions over the effectiveness and reliability of the Iraqi security forces and the utility of a strategy focused entirely on air power and empowering local forces. As an article in The Financial Times on 9 June questioned: Despite months of US-led coalition air strikes the Islamist group appears stronger than ever after claiming more territory in Iraq and Syria. So what can be done to halt its bloody progress?170 The option of putting combat ‘boots on the ground’ is one which many commentators have increasingly argued needs to be considered. Indeed, the US’ recent move to permanently deploy Special Forces’ personnel to northern Syria in support of local forces has been regarded by many as the first step in this direction.

168 “Obama, Kerry: No U.S. troops will be sent into combat against ISIS in Iraq, Syria”, CNN, 17 September 2014 169 “Obama, Kerry: No U.S. troops will be sent into combat against ISIS in Iraq, Syria”, CNN, 17 September 2014 170 “A long campaign ahead”, The Financial Times, 9 June 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 56

7.1 Position of the British Government At the outset of the campaign the Government made clear that it was not contemplating putting combat troops on the ground in Iraq. Indeed, Michael Fallon: the motion that Parliament voted for in September 2014 specifically I am clear that were stated “Her Majesty’s Government will not deploy UK troops in ground we to intervene on 171 combat operations”. David Cameron added “we are not deploying the ground with British combat troops, but we are providing air power in support of local combat troops, we forces on the ground. No British or western troops will occupy Iraq.”172 could well help He went on to state: further to radicalise I am not contemplating the use of British combat forces because I opinion in Western think it would be the wrong thing to do. The lesson to learn from Europe and previous conflicts is that we should play the most appropriate role encourage more for us. It is for the Iraqi Government and for the Iraqi army to support. That is defeat ISIS in Iraq.173 exactly why the Prime Minister of Iraq Amidst growing criticisms of the perceived failure of the air campaign, for and the training effort in halting the advance of ISIS, the Government has sought to make clear that “defeating ISIL will take time and one has made it very clear that he does not patience”. want foreign troops An MOD spokesman said on 24 May 2015 that: on the ground and that this fight has to Iraqi Security Forces have retaken large areas from ISIL proving that the terrorist organisation are under increasing pressure and be a fight of the Iraqi are losing both territory and fighters. With a 60-nation coalition army, which has to backing the Iraqis we’re confident they will retain this momentum win back the support but British combat forces will not be on the ground fighting: Iraqi of the local troops will lead the fight as they have done before.174 population. There is therefore no question In an interview with Andrew Marr on 7 June 2015 the Foreign Secretary of our supplying reiterated this point. He stated: combat troops on the ANDREW MARR: ground in Iraq

Now we’ve been talking a lot about ISIS this morning and the appalling things going on inside Iraq and Syria. The truth of the (HC Deb 20 July 2015, matter, as Tom Holland said, is that we are losing there. ISIS are c1243) winning, aren’t they? PHILIP HAMMOND: Well I don’t accept that. I think that if you think back, it’s a question of timescale. Last spring ISIL were advancing across Iraq at an alarming rate of knots. The coalition came together, started using air power to stop that advance, and it has stopped it. Now the battle goes on, the ebb and flow of the battle goes on. They’ve lost territory in the north to the Kurds, they’ve made some gains to the west of Baghdad, but they are not making the advances that they were making last year. In fact they’re about 25 per cent down in terms of territory controlled from the peak that they controlled late last year and now it’s about rebuilding the Iraqi security forces in order to slowly retake that ground and hold it sustainably. It’s not going to happen overnight. ANDREW MARR:

171 HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1256 172 HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1264 173 HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1266 174 Ministry of Defence, Defence in the media, 24 May 2015 57 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

They’re very close to Baghdad at the moment. The real question, I suppose, is whether air power alone can atone for the fact that for instance in the Iraqi army on the ground just turned around and ran away? PHILIP HAMMOND: Air power alone will not do the job, we know that. Air power … ANDREW MARR: So are you going to help them with other things? PHILIP HAMMOND: … air power can hold ISIL in check while the Iraqi security forces rebuild their capability. And that process is now happening. We’re delivering technical support, we’re delivering training – particularly counter-IED, which is the big and urgent need that the Iraqis have.175 The motion approved by Parliament to extend military operations to Syria explicitly rules out the deployment of UK troops in ground operations.176

7.2 Views of Parliamentarians A number of Parliamentarians raised concerns about the limits of air Defence Select Committee: power along during the debate in both Houses on 26 September 2014.

John Baron raised the risk that air strikes could become counter- “We believe that the productive “if civilian casualties mount and ISIS spins the story that it UK Government is has withstood the might of the west and held its ground, which it has capable of providing much greater support to the Iraqi Government and for the Kurdish Regional Government than it has done to date…

There is no demand from the Iraqi Government for combat troops; nor any question of the UK deploying such troops. But Iraqi forces continue to have significant requirements for air support and training in IED awareness and disposal”.

(HC 690, February 2015)

175 The Andrew Marr Show, 7 June 2015 s 176 HC Deb 2 December 2015 c323 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 58

so far managed to do.”177 Former Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox suggested “close air support will be required if there is to be a successful counter-offensive by any ground forces in the conflict. We need to understand the risks that that will pose to our forces.”178 Lord Jay of Ewelme questioned whether airstrikes will be enough and whether the Iraqi and Kurdish fighters will be able to defeat ISIS on the ground. He wondered if military trainers “may edge ever closer to a combat role.”179 In a report published in February 2015, the Defence Select Committee did not support the argument for committing ground troops, but it did call for greater support than the UK has provided to date: we believe that the UK Government is capable of providing much greater support to the Iraqi Government and for the Kurdish Regional Government than it has done to date. The level of that support should increase exponentially in terms of both gifting and sale of equipment and the number of UK troops provided for training, particularly in the area of command and control. There is no demand from the Iraqi Government for combat troops; nor any question of the UK deploying such troops. But Iraqi forces continue to have significant requirements for air support and training in IED awareness and disposal. Such activities would require only the deployment of a few hundred personnel, the cost would be relatively modest, and it would not entail the risks inherent in deploying UK troops in combat roles. These roles are also consistent with the scale of the £38 billion Defence budget, commensurate with its global presence, the expectations of Iraq and the Kurdistan region of Iraq, its status as a P5 member of the Security Council, and its traditionally close relationship to the United States. We are not calling for combat troops, still less for an attempt to repeat the counter-insurgency and state-building agendas of Iraq in 2007. Any contemporary intervention must be far more focused and incremental. But this is not a reason for the UK to lurch from over-intervention to complete isolation.180 However, the committee went on to caution that: At the very least any training of the Iraqi Security Forces should be related to institutional reform. The Iraqi Security Forces have already been trained and equipped extravagantly and repeatedly in the past decade. To do so again, without first addressing the structural issues, would be a total waste of time and money.181 The Government rejected many of the assertions made in the Committee’s report, suggesting that it was based on “out of date or

177 HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1259 178 HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1288 179 HL Deb 26 September 2014 c1689 180 Defence Select Committee, The situation in Iraq and Syria, HC 690, Session 2014- 15, conclusions and recommendations 181 Defence Select Committee, The situation in Iraq and Syria, HC 690, Session 2014- 15, conclusions and recommendations 59 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

inaccurate information” and did not “recognise the major role the UK Government has played since the beginning of operations”.182

7.3 Views of the former defence chiefs At the beginning of the air campaign varying opinions were expressed Lord Dannatt: by the former defence chiefs on the utility of airstrikes alone, and the decision not to extend air operations into Syria. “We have now reached a point when General Lord Richards argued that air power alone wouldn’t achieve the we must think the strategic goal, and ultimately a land army would be required: previously unthinkable the only way to defeat Isis is to take back land they are occupying and consider that which means a conventional military operation. The only way to British troops, acting as do it effectively is to use western armies but I understand the part of an international political resistance.183 coalition, may be required to mount a Former Chief of the General Staff, Lord Dannatt, while backing military ground campaign in action against ISIS, also made the point that “attacking ISIS from the air Iraq and Syria”. solely above Iraq is dealing with half a problem not all of it” and applauded the American decision to attack ISIS in Syria. He likewise said (Mail on Sunday, 24 ISIS must be defeated on the ground. Without British or US ground May 2015) combat units, he suggests fully supporting those who are already fighting on the ground – the Iraqi Army, the Peshmerga and the Free Syrian Army.184 The outgoing Chief of the General staff, General Sir Peter Wall, warned, however, against “rushing into a war against ISIS”, suggesting that the Government “must be cautious because it has little idea of the capabilities and strengths of the terrorist organisation”. However, he went on to comment that Britain could not ignore the threat posed by the group.185 In light of recent gains made by ISIS, more recently Lord Dannatt argued in a piece in The Mail on Sunday on 24 May that: "In light of this terrifying scenario, how much longer can Britain and the US continue to show such a lack of commitment to defeating IS militarily? Their default option of air strikes and limited assistance to indigenous forces has failed thus far. "We have now reached a point when we must think the previously unthinkable and consider that British troops, acting as part of an international coalition, may be required to mount a ground campaign in Iraq and Syria. I am no gung-ho general who says 'just send the boys in and don't worry about the body bags', far from it, but faced with such a lethal and uncompromising enemy as IS - and with the lack of political and diplomatic

182 Ministry of Defence press release, 25 March 2015. A copy of the Government’s response to the Defence Committee report is available at: Twelfth Special Report: The response to Iraq and Syria 183 “Boehner says US might 'have no choice' but to send combat troops to fight against ISIS”, Daily Mail, 29 September 2014 184 “Hitting ISIS solely from above Iraq is dealing with only half the problem”, Daily Telegraph, 27 September 2014 185 “Army chief: don’t rush into war against ISIS”, The Daily Telegraph, 8 September 2014 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 60

solutions at our disposal - we can no longer rule out 'boots on the ground'.186 This position has also been supported by retired Major General Tim Cross who has argued that “Britain should consider putting boots on the ground in the Middle East because it could take a generation for the Iraqi army to be capable of defeating Islamic State”.187 Former Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mike Jackson has also suggested that the UK should go further and consider deploying forces into Syria: How long is Britain and the West prepared to stand back and allow IS to carry on? Britain certainly cannot unilaterally send a brigade to Syria but I don’t think we should just sit back and watch as IS commits the horrors it is committing. If there was a fresh coalition with the right mandate and clearly laid out objectives, I for one would back it.188 Speaking on the Andrew Marr Show on 19 July Lord Richards once again expressed his view that: if you’re objective is to get rid of Isis, we now need to look again at the strategy… the current strategy won’t work in the time I think we’ve got available. The current strategy is essentially one of equipping and training others to do the hard stuff for us. I think that could work, but the scale of effort going into it is woefully insufficient […] If we really want to get rid of them… we need to effectively get on a war footing.

7.4 Views of commentators In September 2014 former Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that the future use of combat troops “if absolutely necessary” should not be ruled out. He argued “you cannot uproot this extremism unless you go to where it originates and fight it.”189 Afzal Ashraf, a former RAF officer, also argued in favour of deploying airmobile forces – including 6 Air Assault Brigade –for specific tasks and handover to Iraqi forces as soon as they’ve achieved their objective. He argued that foreign airmobile forces could be a “battle-winning combination”, suggesting that “if used to quickly seize ISIS held objectives, for the Iraqis to hold and then surge, airmobile forces could dramatically cut the time required to reduce ISIS territorial control and degrade its capabilities.”190 Professor Gareth Stansfield, an expert on Iraq, explored the question of “who would be wearing these boots, and where they will be” in an analysis for RUSI. He noted that Syria is the key theatre for ISIS but engaging ISIS in Syria on the ground is “currently a fool’s errand.” He suggested that Iraq is important to ISIS and is where the “process of

186 “Dannatt: send UK troops to fight IS”, Mail on Sunday, 24 May 2015 187 “Britain should consider putting boots on the ground”, The Daily Mail, 25 May 2015 188 “We’re coming to get you UK special forces launch cyber war against ISIS networks”, Sunday Express, 31 May 2015 189 “The way ahead”, Tony Blair Faith Foundation, 22 September 2014 190 “Dealing With ISIS Through ‘Boots with Wings’”, RUSI analysis, 30 September 2014 61 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

unravelling ISIS can begin.” He argued that if there are to be combat troops in Iraq “they almost certainly need to be worn by Sunni Arabs.” He warned that the involvement of Kurdish Peshmerga and Shia militias (including the Iraqi Security Forces) would “generate further legitimacy for ISIS the more they push south and north respectively.”191 In an examination of the UK’s role in the campaign in February 2015 Richard Barrett, an Associate Fellow at RUSI, argued for the continuation of a policy of ‘military containment’ as opposed to a broader military campaign. He commented: Even for a non-expert, it would seem that one thing the region does not need is another military campaign. Certainly Daesh should be contained, but there should be great care not to empower Shia militia or Kurdish forces as a result […] The conclusion then should be that the UK continues to support a policy of military containment of Daesh, which may not require much more effort than it currently expends, while bringing whatever pressure it can to bear on the regional powers to agree what to do about Syria. At the same time, Abadi must be supported in his effort to reform the Iraqi government sufficiently to win the confidence of the Sunni tribes. But how to achieve this, over what time frame, and with what monitoring mechanisms, is not something that anyone has been able to articulate, anywhere, and understandably so.192 In contrast, Archbishop Bashar Warda of Irbil has called for ‘boots on the ground’ in order to halt “the genocide of the country’s Christians and other minorities at the hands of Islamist terrorists”. He acknowledged that “It is hard for a Catholic bishop to say that we have to advocate a military action but we have to go for that. There is no other option”.193 In a more recent RUSI assessment of the military campaign against ISIS, Elizabeth Quintana suggested: Ultimately, the coalition’s military objectives – to degrade and destroy ISIS as a militarily capable force – can only be achieved by ground forces. Air power may create the conditions for effective ground-force operations but it cannot substitute for them. However, the rebuilding of the ISF will be a long-term project, and Kurdish forces are now stretched and risk the wrath of their Turkish neighbour and of local Arab populations if they continue to take ground. Absent a new Sunni Awakening, there are insufficient numbers of effective ground forces to reclaim the territory currently held by ISIS and there is, so far, no appetite at all in Western countries once again to deploy combat troops in the region.194

191 “What it Will Take to Degrade ISIS?”,RUSI analysis, 192 “Dealing with Daesh: the UK’s role in the coalition”, RUSI Analysis, 11 February 2015 193 “Iraqi Archbishop calls for British boots on the ground to fight ISIS”, The Catholic Herald, 10 February 2015 194 Elizabeth Quintana, “Introduction: countering ISIS”, Inherently unresolved: the military operation against ISIS, RUSI Occasional Paper, October 2015 Number 06995, 3 December 2015 62

7.5 Views of the US and other coalition partners In mid-May 2015 the US Chief of Staff of the Combined Joint Task Force stated that “the coalition and Iraqi security forces strategy to defeat and dismantle the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant extremist group is clear and on track”. On 11 June the US Combined Forces Air Component commander, Air Force Lt. Gen. John Hesterman III, suggested that: Coalition air power has helped ground forces regain territory, removed significant numbers of fighters from the battlefield, and eliminated the majority of ISIL oil refining capability Not only has air power been effective, but it has enabled virtually every victory on the battlefield and given the ground forces time to regroup and get their forces in order. It’s also given all our coalition nations the space and time to execute the international lines of effort for countering flow of foreign fighters; countering [ISIL] financing; providing humanitarian assistance; countering [ISIL's] messaging; and stabilizing liberated areas, all of which will be necessary to finish [ISIL].195 A Pentagon assessment of operations, one year on, also concluded: Airstrikes have gone a long way to degrade ISIL's ability to mount large offensive attacks, as well as reducing their ability to openly control towns and cities, where they so often inflict terror on those civilian populations.196 Despite these assessments, several prominent US figures have continued to call for the deployment of ground troops. Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John McCain, has accused the US government of having no “coherent strategy” for ISIS and that “American boots on the ground are necessary to defeat [ISIS] in Iraq and Syria”. Specifically he has suggested that more US Special Forces personnel should be embedded as advisers with Iraqi forces on the ground.197 This is a view shared by former US Army Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, who commented in mid-August 2015 that “if we find in the next several months that we are not making the progress that we have, we should probably, absolutely [try] embedding some soldiers with them and see if that would make a difference”.198 Michael O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution has also supported this view, suggesting that the US’ commitment to Iraq should be trebled: If Iraqi forces backed up by U.S. and allied airpower can only gradually expand and intensify their operations, ISIS will learn tactical lessons and redress some of its vulnerabilities—such as

195 “ISIL fears coalition air power”, DoD news, 11 June 2015 196 Department of Defense press release, 6 August 2015 197 “McCain: more boots on ground in Iraq, Syria”, Defense News, 26 January 2015 198 “Odierno, US should embed with Iraqis if no headway made against IS”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 August 2015 63 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria

where to hide their headquarters and leaders within cities they currently control. While “shock and awe” has a bad name in Iraq, it is an undeniable military reality that hitting hard keeps an enemy off balance and creates opportunities to exploit. In fact, this is one reason why I favor going beyond the usual recommendations for added American forces in Iraq—more trainers, forward air controllers, forward-stationed advisors—and advocate as well the temporary (and unannounced) deployment of direct action special forces. They could team with Iraqi Special Forces in a vigorous raiding campaign against ISIS, once the necessary battlefield preparations have been made (perhaps later this year or early next). Mr. Obama’s basic strategy in Iraq is not unsound. But poor and tepid implementation of even a good strategy can spell defeat. We need to do more than the minimal incrementalism, and step up our game in Iraq twofold or threefold in the coming months.199 Even the announcement of the deployment of US Special Forces into northern Syria to assist local forces has been criticised as not going far enough. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry, acknowledged that "A more serious effort against ISIS in Syria is long overdue," although he also questioned whether the recent announcement would be sufficient to make any difference to the campaign; a view shared by Senator John McCain. 200

Box 4: Suggested reading • Inherently unresolved: the military operation against ISIS, RUSI Occasional Paper, October 2015

199 “To defeat ISIS in Iraq Obama must treble our forces”, Newsweek, 16 June 2015 200 “Lawmakers rap Obama on Syria escalation”, Defense News, 30 October 2015

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