nato Ü j'j : L i

SUPHHI-IE HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POl-JERS EUROPE PARIS, FRANCE

m 2070 9 February 1956 STAFF DIRECTIVE NUMBER 95-1 ACE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE NUMBER 95-1

PEACETIME PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICIES APPLICABLE TO FORCES IK ALUSD COMMAND EUROPE

ACS Adrrdnistrative Directive Fo. 95-l> 2 March 1953 and Change 1, IS February 1955; ACE Administrative Directive No, 95-3, 2 August 1955; Staff Directive No. 95-1, 17 Februaiy ,1955 and 95-2, 2 August 1955 are rescinded,

1. PURPOSE AfjD SCOPE, The purpose of this directive is to assist commanders' in Allied Command Europe in the preparation and conduct of their public information programs. NATO military forces are the practical ex- pression of the national policies of the sovereign and independent nations who have .joined together in the Alliance both in their own self interest and in the pursuit e-f .common objectives. The most important of the latter are the maintenance of freedom and peace through the creation of sufficient military strength to deter aggression* NATO.will succeed or fail to the extent that public "pinion in the various countries is informed about and understands the reasons for the Treaty and the military forces created to support it. Military commanders can contribute to such public understanding, with its consequent appreciation and support of the mission of SACEUR and his forces, through a public information program which is defined as any planned undertaking conducive to creating or increasing public understanding, confidence, and support of SACEUR's forces. It includes the continuous dissémination of information and professional opinion, as well as partici- pation in community life and a line of conduct by all of SACEUR's forces so C^j as to contribute to the understanding of the NATO objectives. cE^'

2* APPLICATION. This directive covers the public information activi- ties of all units und3r the command of, assigned to, or earmarked for Allied Command Europe whether acting independently, jointly or in concert with the forces of other NÂTC Commands pv of countries not members of NATO,

3. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a.. Allied Command Europe as a whole is responsible for insuring that unclassified information concerning objectives and activities within the Command is made available to the NATO peoples. This responsibility ex- tends to all echelons and is an* important function of the Command. Com- manders will plan and organize their respective public information activities DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE so that no gaps or overlaps exist in their operations. • "'nato rJ H C L /.Gel V I ?. * b. SHAPE. The Chief of Public Information, acting on behalf of SACEUHj is responsible for the promulgation of a general public information policy applicable.throughout Allied Command Europe and for the coordination of public information matters which involve more than one major subordinate command* He is responsible for the dissemination of pertinent information concerning SHAPE activities and, unless otherwise provided for, is also responsible for coordination on all information activities with the Worth Atlantic Treaty Information Division and with appropriate information officers of other NATO Commands.

. c. Major Subordinatei Commands« Each major subordinate commander directly under SACEUR is responsible for establishing those policies govern- ing the release of information and the establishment 'of a public information program appropriate to his individual Command. Public information activi- ties which involve more than one m£.jor subordinate Commandj or which involve Allied Command Europe as a whole, or which involve questions of security or broad policy, should be referred to SACEUR prior to implementation or public release. The commander 02" each major subordinate command also is responsible for the conduct of public information activities in his area and will be guided by the overall policies promulgated by SACEUR.

d. Public Inforaiation Division (or Section) and Public Information Officer* In all commands, particularly where the forces of several nations are integrated, a separate staff division (or section) is normally estate - lished for the purpose of advising the commander on public information policies and programs. The Chief of this staff division (or section) is the public information officer. However, in the final analysis, the commander rather than the :.staff officer is the primary public information officer/of the. Command, since it, is the commander who must make tho basic decisions relating ti public Information activities and cause the timely preparation of public information programs. Therefore it is desirable that the public information officer have direct access to the commander at all times, and that he be informed of existing and projected plans and policies of the Command so as properly to assist the commander in the formulation of public information policy and programs. 'Duties c-f the public information officer include the following (which are not in any order of priority):

(l) Anticipating actions or situations which might have beneficial or adverse effects on the immediate Command and/or Allied Command Europe, and advising the commander accordingly.

., , (2) Advising othet staff divisions in the headquarters of the public information and community relations' aspects of subjects under consideration and contributing supporting plans and programs when appropriate.

(3) Establishing friendly relations with said receiving properly accredited representatives of information media and assisting them in obtaining and clearing desired material DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE relating to the Command. 2 N A ï O U Ig O L A S S-I F I E D

(4) Arranging press conferences and interviews as vieil as official press releases, photographic ooverage, radio releases and other associated information activities •'•••'>':•. concerning the Command.

(5) Establishing and maintaining liaison with appropriate civilian leaders and groups in order to discuss and disseminate information concerning matters which involve the communities and the Command concerned.

(6) Reviewing material prepared by military and civilian members of the Command if such material involves military policies and/or operations of Allied Commaid Europe or any portion thereof.

(?) Supervising accreditation of correspondents as appropriate.

(6) Making plans to ensure adequate field press censorship, press commûnications, and administration of correspondents in the event of emergency under guidance of overall policy .. promulgated by SHAPE.

e. National Governments. The.official agencies of each national government constitute one of the means for dissemination of information con- cerning respective national forces in Allied Command Europe. The necessity for close liaison and periodic contact with the public information agencies of ea«h NATO nation is therefore authorized and emphasized. However, where matters of broad policy are involved, major subordinate commanders should consult with SACEUR prior to discussing with a national government. -¾ . . ' * 4. BASIC OBJECTIVE. The. cbjective of SACEUR and his subordinate etjomanders is thoroughly ajyJ continually 'to inform the NATO peoples of un- classified activities in Command Europe.

a* The Public. 1The various • segments of the public which will interpret, each in its owr»yay, every action of SHAPE and its subordinate commands can be classifies as follows:

(1) The exfck-nal public.

(a) The peoples of the NATO nat±o»s.

(b) The peoples of those friendly nations not a party to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(c) The peoples of those nations opposed to the North Atlantic Treaty.

• > (d) The peoples of those nations that cannot be classified per (a), (b), '(c) above. .., ' : DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE NATO UNCLAS SIF IED

(2) The internal public. k ,

(a) The militazy personnel constituting the forces of - Allied Cotaaand Europe, .-: •••„• 'V •••••• , (b) The civilian personnel assigned to military forces •• i in Allied Conmand-Europe,

b. Dissemination of Infonnation. The: objective can best .be accomplished by disseminating information through the1 channels indicated -below, : •.'=.;' if s ' * ' »

(1) Press: newspapers, magasines and;...'^Letters to the Editor",

(2) Radio, TV and films for TV, '

(3) Photographs: still and motion'pictures* (4) Community Relations^ to include talks, speeches or briefings before parliamentary, patriotic, military reserve» ölubs, schools and other groups.

(5) Other: Books, pamphlets and speech material,

c» Subject Matter« Consistent with security, the infonnation disseminated should concern:

'(l) The role of the military ferces assigned to SACEUR in the defense of Western Europe,

(2) Need for these military forces.

(3) Objectivés of SACEUR's mission.

(4) Progress made,

(5) Integration and international team workwithin.military f»r«es assigned to Allied Cornmand Europe,

5, BASIC POLICIES.

a* Centralization ofj Activity. It is a fundamental pclicy in Allied Command Euirpe to make available for public dissemination all possible unclassified information. The public information division («r section) of the appropriate headquarters should be responsible for the con- duct of all liaison and contact of that headquarters with news media to include wire services, newspapers, newsreel and broadcasting companies, periodicals, phot« agencies, and all other recognized information services as well as organized community groups or the general public. The public

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE information division (or section) of a headquarters is the only staff agency

4 T+ M -, . , ... — ...... î» .à T O U iï o i. -à t 4^ J- i' -L JJ jj

through which information should be released regardless of the channel of dissemination to the public, Centralization of this activity is essential. .

b. Military matters. Allied Command Europe is a purely military organization. Public information programs therefore will deal only with military matters. All political matters will be referred to the governments concerned or, if a multi-national program, to the North Atlantic Treaty Infomation Divisioni However, it is recognized that even matters of purely military nature may have political connotations. This should not preclude the inclusion of such military matters in public information programs pro- viding the political connotations already have been covered in guidances or statements issued by the North Atlantic Treaty Information Division or by SACEUR, Where doubt exists, it is preferable to refer the program to higher authority and, if this policy is maintained, many problems will be simplified or eliminated.

c. Release of Military Information and Security.

(1) Although dissemination of maximum information to the NATO publics is an objective of Allied Command Europe, there are certain facts which cannot be released for reasons of security. Moreover, neither the whole nor any segment of the public is entitled to NATO classified information or to information which is considered to be classified by one of the member governments of NATO, It is the respon- sibility of the originating staff division or agency in an international headquarters to determine the security classification to be assigned any given piece of infor- mation, VJhere doubt exists as to the classification of any material, the public information staffs should consult the staff agencies responsible for intelligence and se- curity matters for guidance prior to any release of the information. A security review of all classified material should be made at frequent intervals to ascertain the current validity of security classifications and to en- sure that maximum information is being disseminated con- sistent with security.

(2) Regardless of personal opinions or convictions of individu ual members of international staffs concerning the classification of subjects, or of classified subjects of a controversial nature, or of classified information per se, each member Äs obligated by his appointment t,o an inter- national staff to comply with the policies and decisions made by competent NATO authority. All members of inter- national staffs are reminded that they must be especially careful in their social and unofficial contacts to ensure that no classified information is revealed to unauthorized persons. These contacts include not only those made at

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public restaurants, bars, cocktail parties, private residences or elsewhere, but also those made at public places in official institutions.

d. Clearance of Material for Publication. Any unclassified article or speech involving military policies or operations in Allied Command Europe or any portion thereof that is prepared by military and/or civilian members of an international command will be submitted for review to the public information officer of the appropriate international head- quarters in sufficient time so as to permit adequate review and action by the headquarters. Any individual submitting material who receives clearance by an internationalTieadquarters will^be^_adyjsed by ^eJbt&ad.qu.arters_ granting the'clearance tfrat_such~int ernational "clearance doss-nol. relieve the individ- "Uafbf his personal responsibility for obtaining proper national clearance prior to the release ~oT the information. The provisions of this suB^para-" graph will be brought to the attention~~öf all personnel, upon joining an in- ternational command by the chief of the staff division or agency to which the individual is assigned,

e* Press Relations. "

(1) Availability to the press. At SHAPE it'is the policy of SACEUR, subject to the exigencies of the service, to make himself available to the press (through the Public Infor- mation Division) for conferences and individual briefings, and also to delegate authority to his senior staff officers to talk to the press on subjects appropriate to the ap- pointments they hold. It is suggested that a similar policy be adopted by subordinate commanders, subject to their individual discretion and to the local situation. However, it is also suggested that the staff divisions refer all representatives of news media who Htempt to deal directly with them to the public information division (or section) unless prior authority from the Commander concerned authorizes direct dealings with news media representatives by a staff division.

(2) Service to the press. All service will:

(a) Insure the prompt-release of the maximum amount of information consistent with security and thereby * (b) prevent a "news vacuum" which could. Ieact to mystery, gossip, conjecture and/or rumor so' as to result in unwarranted and undesirable public confusion.

(c) This requires speedy and truthful handling of all press inquiries and all dealing with the press.

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¢3) Excluaives. Information will normally be given to all publicity media and not restricted to One or more agencies to the exclusion of others. If, however, a correspondent requests assistance or confirmation of in- formation which he has obtained on his own initiative, the exclusive nature of his story should be respected.

(4) Off the Record. Unofficial discussions of official sub- jects with representatives of news media, on and "off the record," "not for' attribution," or other informsüL;basis, should be avoided unless coordination with the publie information division (or section) has been effected. "Off the record" information should only be given either to explain some part of the "on the record" material which might otherwise be misinterpreted, or to prevent reference to classified information which correspondents might find out without realizing the security implications involved.

Photography.

(1) Cameras (other than those of official photographic services in international headquarters) should not be permitted in those headquarters unless prior arrangements have been made with the appropriate security agencies. At SHAPE, the release for publication or public showing of any official photographic material obtained through interna- tional photographic services of SHAPE is accomplished only through the Public Information Division. It is recommended that a similar policy be adopted in subord- inate headquarters,

(2) Ph»t«graphy at SHAPE by professional photographers is the responsibility of the Public Information Division. It is recommended that a similar policy be adopted by subordinate headquarters,

(3) At SHAPE, amateur photographers on the staff who wish to take photographs at an official headquarters function or occasion will apply in advance to the Public Information Division for a pass. When practicable, such passes will be issued. Holders of such passes must conform strictly to the rules fete1 amateur photographers laid down for the occasion by the Public Information Division, as well as any special orders which may be given on the spot to ensure priority rights for official and professional photographers. It is recommended that a similar policy be adopted by subordinate headquarters.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 7 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER HJSOPE :

OFFICIAL: PIERRE BRISAC Lt Gen, French Army Deputy Chief of Staff Lpgistics arid Administration

WILLIAM H. HARRIS 1 Brig Genj US Amy- Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION "STANDARD"

IS

• „ «» O

/ DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE S MÂm r^ PHT(HN| pm iwpwni »w wipii i PU * wwiww aimwa OBABD ClUABtESE fflOnatAI, JBBS PÜI88AKKS WJXEB X* Paris, TiWBtee

f

I deeply a|ipi«olate yoar ooarteay in fomardlng the ew« of Lieutenant Colorwl Bistrup.

AACXQS hw JWPtiaularly »rted tha proopt action taten Iqr ycru, «a mix «ut your effort» to protect an officer of your m—ami serTln* on an IaUgwatIwiaI a»«1yrmt trvm Alaaipllnaiy action wblch resulted partly Trm hi« accepting an International elearanoe In BACWJR'a opinion, you bava done all that any XASO CownaiiAar ooulft li&vt done uikSsr Utt clrcumtwioM * ,

X bar* ÉtaAlaA this eaat In datall and do aot feel tfe*t Mqr further action here at SfflWS wuld W appropriate. Bawrw, I an baring AtelBlatxmtlTa Plraotlyt So* irtffixi teinatxpe that officer« ax* foraannml that a AtO oo—M clearance tf naftertal for public ralcaaa doaa not constitute Xatloaal clearance.

Again, oar thanks for your mry complete eoverafga of tbla aAttar *

{Signed) C. V. r; ScKuyTIe< r

C. T. II« MSflUR

Uaotamnt Oanartlf US Amy CUaC Odf 8taff

OantMl Sir Sdbart Mawwrgh, ÏC.C.B», K.B.I., Jt.C CoirraaTVlor- Ig-Chlef Allied; Foree«> ltotbem Kurcpe Oalo1Rormy

ec ! OOEPS / DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Froat CXHCRAL SIR KÜBBT MMBEBUH, " COMttHMER-IS-CHIEF, ALLIED FORCES, BQRÏHBRH EUROPE ' ' ' Oslo, Borway.

P E R SO B A I

CS/321 2 Beceaber 195½

Hr dear Cort - X enclose the complete record of the case of Lieutenant Colonel Bistrup, the officer of the Royal Ssuilsh Air Force, who h&s teen dealt with by the Chief of Defense, Denmark, for a breach of security. You vill recall that this young officer published an article in the Borwegiaii Air Force Magazine. The article vas cleared by AIRNCffiTB in Its entirety. It vas also cleared, with the exception of Diagram 3, by the C-In-C Royal Danish Air Force. The charge of breaking security rules rests on the publication, I understand, of Diagram 3, which disclosed the whereabouts of five QCI stations. The Danish contention Is 1Uiat these locations should not have been mentioned. AXRHORTO Headquarters' argument Is that you cannot hide such an establishment, and further that their siting and construction has been publicly discussed fron tine to time and Is available in FEtrllamentary records.

Whatever the pros and cons of the argument, the fact is that Lieutenant Colonel Bistrup accepted his punishment of 15 (lays detention, for the serving of which I granted him 3 weeks leave. He is now in Denmark, presumably locked up.

Ton vill see the correspondence by signal and letter in which I have expressed the hope that the Incident vill be regarded as closed, and that his future will not be jeopardized. I do not know whether he vill be permitted to complete his period of service at AIRHORTH. Hy own opinion is that in view of the complete acceptance of responsibility of the higher Headquarters in this matter, and that Lieutenant Colonel Bistrup vas given an assurance that his article was within our rules, 1Uie action of the Danish authorities is bordering on the unjust,though of course I can see that there is a national aspect. The pity is -Uiat I am not coinpletely certain that the desire to preserve national sovereignty has not somewhat outweighed simple Justice. However, as we have no legal control over national officers, there is nothing more I can do or vill do other than Is expressed in my last signal to the Minister. Tours sincerely, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE /s/ Bob Mansergh Lt. General C.V.R. Schuyler, OSA Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe npv PARIS, FEAR» CONFIDENTIA•.L v.Uirü.i DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE of -iUMUtwl eaoe*mns Cleextaee «T TifliIIn T»* " '"ft*» Mttir

1 Chi«fofÄUff AM, 2ß ro Zt is requested Avtl la eoorAlnatlae Vlth AAltitMaKt frrnml Twfctintw** MTiaipM, jrott provide for the revision «f WFFRTHBG Staff ND JULUM COMMOBA JKTMYA UcwetlTMi (95-1 «nd alallsr publications) to lamnt

^La . HPftifljJnË Af AEnflMfefluKB flatting Wltli military rofc Jacta are «fc- alttad for o3MnnM to an Xntanationd CGNMLI THE ^TITFFHII OOMMBA VHIEH gxasta the eXeerence itUl van the lniivldml that this fliwmw* Aom not VtXUm Ma af persons! VMpOiwiMLlitgr for obtaining proper clearance prior te Ita valaaM •

b» That InAiTiAMla of an Xartar- BltlgBlX iSoaMOft Ma WMft Vt ttlS tlM tb»y Join tbe Cooand that coqpllanoe ifltii Tnt^rr*tfftrwl Aacuritgr Bdjpilftttflra doM «at MXieTtt the Sndividnal of his responsibility of ftcagflytng with his own Batlonal Security Btgolatlcns.

XiavtaiuuKt Aenarml, XJS Asmqt Chlaf of Staff DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 1« I have studied the attached case as veil as researched the legal records available in the SEUFE librazy to determine If azy fur- ther action is possible in this particular case or to determine whether any precedents exist* The result of this research has been negative*

2* I concur with General Hansergh that national pride and sovereignty have their share in the decision taken against the offi- cer* However, I cannot fail to feel that CCMAIRNORTH, In clearing this doc une lit for publication, failed to take the proper action either by asking the officer whether the publication of the article« or the contents thereof» vas within -Uie purview of national regula- tions, or by taking action to secure national clearance prior to releasing the article for publication. I admit that this judgment may be based on an after^the-f&ct review of the case* However, in past experience I have usually asked the officers to be sure they are complying with national regulations*

3« I believe this headquarters should take some action to alert the commands and to take positive steps, to prevent recurrence« I believe the proper action to be a directive to this staff and to sxibordinate headquarters and that it state in substance the following t

a* Vfhen articles or speeches dealing with military sub- jects are submitted to an ACE headquarters for clearance prior to publication in non-military media, the clearing officer will insure that the author has complied with the regulations of his country and that proper security clearance has been granted by the nation or nations involved in the article* b* Carananders will advise all military and civilian personnel of their headquarters that in connection with any addres- es they make or articles which they write, it is the author's re~ sponsibility to insure that appropriate clearances are obtained frcra the author's national authorities and the ACE headquarters con- cerned*

11* 1Hiis docuaent unquestionably represents a policy paper which should receive LDKAH classification* In addition to acknowl- edging receipt of the case and placing it under ItTWUl classification,

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE I feel it should be placed in precedent file in SHAPE Central Records* 5* Attached hereto as Tab B is my proposed draft of your reply« 6» It Is recommended that» a» PID, after coordination with Intelligence Division, take necessary action to amend ACE Directive 95*1 and staff Direc- tive 95-1 to incorporate the substance of paragraph 3 above,

b« Tab £ be approved*

c* This case be classified IUNAR and returned to AG far file.

WILLIAM H. HARRIS Brig Gen, us Arny Adjutant General

/ DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE PARIS, FRANCE

22 Deoeaabor 1954

HBUORAÎÎDW TOR, chief of Staff

SUBJECT , Clearonoee

R J;D Ä ÄÄÄ Sf= S32£ - of klTu "

1 proposed Ji L^rs9U sh0^n 111 Tab «id the

concurs in both Tab "B" and^C". ' °

TT. îr. K.

> DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ROWERS EUROPE TARIS, FRANCE

83 DMeobor 1954

!THtinAITDtJf EOA« Chlof of Staff SUBJECT » Clearances

1» Pursuant to your directive I hûvo temendod Tfcbw Bw and attaohod horafco ao Tab «C» 5V propoood dlroctivo to tho Giiof of Flibllo Informition Division»

The ohoiges shorn In Tab "U* and tho 1 1 proposed directive havo boon coordinated rdth fr Mi ï iVi- i ^¾ V^¾ . Intolligonoo Division ( Colonel lîiohols). vtio ocncura in both Tab »B» and "C*.

IU IU

t DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE MWORAHDCM FOKi Chief Publie Information DlvieicaL

SUBJECT * Clearance

It is requested that you, in coordination with Adjutant General end Intelligwnoe Divisions* provide for the revision of existing Staff and Allied Comiand Europe Dlreotives ( 95-1 and similar publications) to insure* a* When articles or speeohes dealing tdth military aubjoots

are submitted for clearance to an International Comntandl the International CotBmand riiiohgrant s the olearanoe vill >mrn the individual that this clearance does not relievo him of personal responsibility for obtaining proper olearanoe prior to its release*

b* That Individuals of an International Connumd are warned at the time they join the Comand that oappliance -nith International Security Regulations does not relieve the individual of his responsibility of complying vdth his own National Seourlty Regulation«*

TO BE SICMED BY TKB CHIEF OF STAf'? YflffiK KtHALIZEDl

* DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

DRAFT 10 Decmbear 19¾

MSMORAKDtH FORt CMfif of Staff

SUBJECT » Attached Case

1* I have studied the attached case as veil as researched the legal records available in the SrAPE library to determine if aiy fur- ther action is possible in this particular case or to determine whether any precedents exist« Tho result of this research has been negative*

2* I concur with General »iansergh that national pride and sovereignty have their share in the décision taken against the offi- cer* Kowever » I cannot fail to feel that CCKAlRNORTH, in clearing felis docuaont for publication^ faiIod to take the proper action either by asking the officer whether the publication of the article* or the contents thereof, was within the purview of national régula» tionsj or by taking action to secure national clearance prior to releasing the article for publication. I adnit that this Judgment may be based'on an after-the-fact review of the case* However, in past experience I have usually asked the officers to be sure they are complying with national regulations • 3* I believe this headquarters should take some action to alert the cowraands and to take positive steps to prevent recurrence* I believe the prqper action, to be a directive to this staff and to subordinate headquarters and that it state in substance the following»

a» When articles or speeches dealing with military sub- jects are submitted to an ACE headquarters for clearance prior to publication in non-military nedia, the clearing officer will insure that the author has canplied with the regulations of his country and that proper security clearance hss lean granted by the nation or nations involved in the article*

b* Comitanders will advise all military and civilian personnel of their h adquarters that in connection with any aridres- es the/ Eiake or articles which ther write, it is the author's re- sponsibility to insure that* appropriate clearances are obtained-"**" from the author's national authorities and the ACF. headquarters con- cerned* U* This doc ment unquestionably represents a policy paper which should receive LtTSAR classification* Tn addition to acknowl- edging receipt of the case and placing it under LUMlR classification, I feel it should be placed In precedent file in SHAPE Central Records* DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 5* Attaohad hereto as Tab 8 la ay proposed draft of your

reply* « 6« It is recommended thatt

a. PID» after coordination with Intelligence Division» take accessary action to amend ACE Dlrectiva 95-1 and staff Direc- tive 95-1 to Incorporate the substance of paragraph 3 above* b* tab B be approved*

e* This case be c laseified LJJNAR and returned to AO tor file.

MXLLIA1M H. HARRIS Erlg Gen» US Army Adjutant General DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Kjr deer Bob« I deeply appreciate your courtesy in forwarding the case of Lieutenant Colonel Bistrup» I was particularly pleased with the prompt action taken by you and your efforts to protect an officer of your command serving on an international assignment frem disciplinary action which re- sulted from his accepting an international clearance. In my opin- \ ion, you have done a llthat any !UTO Caiiniander could have done under the circumstances* \ I have studied the case in detail and do not feel that any further action here at S!£APE is feasible* I an having a diroctivo prepared which will require that any article published by an officer of an Unternational ccmand in Europe be cleared both by the international command and the national authorities concerned* Again,ray thank s for . our very ccraplete N^rrerage of this very important case* Sincerely yours»

% '/#<#£7 Jlj DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 10 Itecmber 19¾

HBiORAMJW FOfti Chief of Staff

SOTiJECT s Attached Caa* e

1« I have studied the attachod case as voll as researched the legal records available in the SHAPE library to deterrdne If aiçr fur- ther action is possible in this particular case or to determine whether any precedents exist* The result of this research has been negative«

2* I concur with General that national pride and sovereignty have their share in the décision taken against the offi- cer. Mcwever, I cannot fall to feel that C CKAIPJroRTH, in clearing this decuicnt for publication, failed to take the proper action either by asking the officer whether the publication of the article» or the contents thereof/ was within the purview of national régula» tions, or by taking action to secure national clearance prior to releasing the article for publication* X adr.it that this Judgaent Eiay be based on an after-the-fact review of the case* However, in past experience X have usually asked the officers to be sure they are ccnplylt^ with national regulations* 3. X believe this headquarters should take some action to alert the ccraands and to take positive steps to prevent recurrence* I believe the proper action to he a directive to this staff and to subordinate headquarters and that it state in substance the following« . a* When articles or speeches dealing with military sub- jects are submitted to an ACE headquarters for clearance prior to publication in non-nilitary media, the clearing officer will insure that the author has coop lied with the regulations of his country and that proper security clearance has ^reen granted by the nation or nations involved In the article*

b* Cantttanders will adviee all military and civilian personnel of their headquarters that in connection with any addrge- es the/ make or articles which the*- write, it is the author's re- sponsibility to insure that appropriate clearances are obtained frcra the author's national authorities and tho ACE headquarters con- cerned* U* Thlo document unquestionably represents a policy paper which should receive LUÏÏAF. classification* In addition to acknowl- edging receipt of the case and placing it under L1JtJAH classification,

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Z feel It should be placed in precedent file in SiIAPE Central Records* 5* ' Attached hereto aa Tab B Ifl ny proposed draft of your reply.

6* It is recaamendad thats

a» PIDf after coordination with Intelligence Division« t&ke nececsary action to amend ACE Direetiva 95*1 and Staff Direc- tive 95-1 to incorporate the substance of paragraph 3 above«

b* Tab B bc approved*

* t c* This case be classified LUUftR and returned to AO fear file.

WILLIAM B. IIAHRIS Brlg Gen, US Amy AdjuUnt Qoneral DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Kr dear Cobs

X deeply appreciate your courtesy In forwarding the case of

Ubeutemnt Colonel Bistrup, I wee particularly pleased with the praapt act! Éken by you and your efforts to protect an officer of your c md serving on an International assignaient fron disciplinary açt which suited frcm his accepting ^dnce. in my opta»

Ion1 you have done all th under the circumstances» I havo studied the case do not feel that ary further action hero at SHAcT I an having a directive pre; which will require that any article published by an officer o an international command in

Europe be cleared both by the ional ctsamand and tfe national authorities concerned.

Again, raythank s for yéur Iiis very lmportarrt case* DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

TAB «à» dear Bobt deeply appreciate your courtesy in forwarding the case of Lieutenknt Colonel Blsti X was particularly pleased with the prompt n taken by you and your è^forts protect an officer command serving I on an Internat! assignment fraa discip action which re- suited fraa his acce^ international clearance, Xn my opin-

Ion1 you have done all any NATO C< nder could have done under the circuits tances*

X have studied the case de and do not feel that any further action here at SHWE easible* I am having a direct! prepared which will require that arçy article published by an 'fficer of an "international ccmmand in Europe be cleared the international command and the national authorities conce: Again, my your very complete coverage of this very important c Sincerely yours, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

TAB "B» SUPREME HEADQUARTERS "ALLIED POWERS EUROPE PARIS, FRANCE

SS December 1954

MEMORANDIM FDRr Chief of Staff <

SUBJECT t Clearances

1« Pursuant to your directive I have armended Tab ttBn and attached hereto as Tab mCw iay proposed directive to the Chief of Public Information Division» 2* The changes shown in Tab "B" and the proposed directive have been coordinated -with Intelligence Division (Colonel Nichols), vtfio concurs in both Tab wBw and "C».

W. H. H.

* DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

PARIS. FRANCE DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE IlflP

File Heference: Subject: Ibdividiuil Security Roeponslbilities

No. From To Date Comment

IMT DIV Chief of 1. It is true that" there has been no I Staff issuance of a specific directive warning . members of international staffs that they were responsible to both KATO end their .own National Authorities for ^omplianc* with NATO end national security regulations. It has only oeen implied tin the statement required in the security certificate, kX am sub j ec b to the cons jquencas jihich the law or administrative or executive order of my bountry provides, Ift iither by intent or negligence, I allow it to pass Into unauthorized ha ids." j

2. Witb regard to para 2 of jibe AG note, there is no positive assurance that HQ AIRBQEHH jtully understood the implications of the article as BISTRUP only briefed the pommand$r and Chief of | Staff on his artiole and did not give them the entire artictLe and the iliustratioiis for study. ' I I ' 3. Heretofore ÇHâPE has studiously avoided any actions *feleh might be misinterpreted ns attempt a to become involved in nations! personnel security affairs. Byj NiTO agreement we must acoept national security clearances as final end national] disciplinaryactio n a|i completely within the Jurisdiction of netion- al authoritibs. 4. It lis recommend ejl that: t I s. I PTD and AG, tin coordibation with Intelligence Division, be directed to tslre actijon to amend pertinent fetaff and Administrative Directives to incor- porate the substancajubstance of pera ^birSbfrre (Tab I). I b. j Tab B be ametfed to read substantially as attached Tab II. I

EtREE B. HICHOIS 4' Colonel, US Amy Intelligence Division _— DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

I \ I I J tii, K JRXI SH Form #4 (July 1951) DRAFT

SUBJECT : Individual Security Heaponaibilities

TO : PID AG INTDiv (for information)

1. It is directed that you take action in coordination with the Intelligence Division to amend the Staff and Administrative Directives within your cognizance 00 that members of international staffs in Allied Conmiand Europe will be informed of their responsibilities with regard to securing national and IiATO clearances of articles for public- ation and their responsibilities for compliance with both National and KA.TO security regulations. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE DRAFT

My dear Bob:

I deeply appreciate your courtesy in forwarding the case of

Lieutenant Colonel Bistrup.

I was particularly pleased with the personel interest and prompt

action taken by you to alleviate the National disciplinary action

imposed on an officer of your command. It- is unfortunate that the

officer involved was not fully aware of his responsibilities both to

NATO and his own National Authorities insofar as compliance with the

regulations of both is concerned.

To prevent a recurrence of this nature I am having directives

prepared which will clearly point up these responsibilities not only

with regard to the preparation of articles for publication but also

the observance of National and NiTO security regulations,

I have studied the case in detail and while I am very sympathetic

with tha officer concerned I do not believe that any further action

here at SIiAFB is feasible. We cannot interfere with National procedures

and requirements but can only insure that members of our staffs are

informed that even though on international assignment they are still subject to the laws and regulations of their nations. *

Again, my thanks for your very complete coverage of this very

important case.

Sincerely yours, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE .SOPPSM HEADQIUAREERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE PARIS, FRANCE AG 2263 2 March 1953

ADLTFLNISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE NUMBER ' fr-/ 1 PUBLIC INTOEMATIitt POLICIES FOR SfcGStJR* S EOHCES 1. GENERAI.;

a* SiEBiÂâ* The purpose of this directive is to assist ccmmanders in the conduct of their public information programma and policies. The peoples of the NATO nations can only be informed adequately of SACEUR's forces through the public information supplied to them by NATO and SflAPE official sources. Thus, so far as tue military effort of SACEUR's foroes is concerned, the fourteen allied nations will gain adequate and truthful knowledge of the progress of events only through an intelligent, coordinated and continuing programme of military public information relayed to them through the various media of mass communications. b. Application? This direotive ocvers toe public information activities of all units under eommand of, allocated to, or earmarload for command, whether acting independently, jointly, or in concert with the forces of other NATO commands or of countries outside NATO. c. Definit^gna; ¢1) Public Information; Public information is defined as any undertaking conducive to public understanding, confidence and support through factual interpretation of SACEUR's forces to the public. It includes the continuous dissemination of information and professional opinion to the public, participatito'in, caranunity life and a line of ccnduet by SACEUR's forces which will contribute to publie understanding and consequent appreciation of SACEUR's mission. (2) Public Information Offleert In the final analysis, the commander is the primary publio information offi»er of any activity or ccumand in SACEUR's forces. It is he who must make basic decisions relating to the public information^activities • of his command and cause the tinrely preparation of public

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE information programmes. An important and often overlooked function of the Public Information Officer is to: (a) Anticipate any action or situation which might adversely affect the good name of SACEURtB forces, and (b) Advise the eammandér accordingly. The Public .Information .Officer, therefore, must have direct access to the commander at all times. He must also be informed of existing and projected plans and policies of the command if he is properly to assist tte çqmnBnâer in fornnilating tne public information programme and in representing him to the press.

(3) Public Information Diyisian,;,,(or. Section): In ell commands, particularly where the.forces of several neticoels are integrated, a separate staff division (or'section) for the purpose-of advising on and implementing tne public information policies énd .programmes is normally-established. . • 4 •< -

U) The Public: Tne various segmnts of tue public wnicn will interpret, eac;i in its own way» every action of SHAPE and of its commands, can be classified as follows:

(a) Tile External Public; •

... 1. The peoples of the WATO nations.

...... j^ , The peoples of those friendly nations not a party to tfte North Atlantic Treaty.

^he peoples of those nations opposed to tüe Worth Atlantic .Treaty.

: fb) The Internal Public:

X' The military personnel constituting SACEUK's forces.

- È' The civilian personnel constituting SACEUK'S forces.

(5) Dissemination of Hews; , ......

(a) Press), newspapers, magazines and "Letters to the Editor".

* '• •-• (b) ' Radio, TV and films for TV. ..'..

. . (c) Photographst still and motion pictures. * - {d) Brief^igs : Various parliamentary, patriotic, military

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE reserve, club and other delegations.

(e) Other:, Books, pamphlets, and speech material.

2. OBJECTIVE;

SAC£UR and his forces have an obligation to report fully en their activities to tho public.. In order that the pubîie be tho.rou?:ily and continually informed of these activities and accomplishments, it is essential that, consistent with security, they be given information relating to the: •

-if.-'V.;* -SF1I"' SBCURHrSfi © .«••:• '"Ar, ZcTi-Ik Although dissemination of maxinum information to the press -is a necessity ; t tie re are in every military canmand- certain facts which fear security reasons cannot, be released. So that proper security is maintained, constant and, close liaison ''iVV;' with those agencies responsible for Intelligence and Security matters will be ; \ maintained by all public information staffs. y

A security review of all- material for possible release to the publio will be made at frequent intervals in oM^r tio'ensure that maximum information is disseminated consistent with security. , ' .';" -

Cit KBSPONSIBIIJTIESt • ,

a. Générait Public infomaticm activities will extend throughout -t "r SACEUR'S forces, and commanders will so organise their respective public information, activities that no gaps or overlaps exist in their operations. _ >

; b. SHAPEt The Chiaf of Public Information acting on behalf of SyiCEUR . is responsible for coordination of a general public information policy throughout SACEUR's command, and promulgation of information directives issued by SACECR.

He is responsible for dissemination of all pertinent information of SHAPE activities.

He is also responsible for coordination on all information activities with the North Atlantic Trealy Information Service. * .

. -0.. Subordinate Cqpgnands: Each cocmander is responsible for tne execution of a sound''public' information programme* concerning, his canmand and for ' the implementation of such directives as may be issued: : '

, d. IfotiIonaiI Governmental The official'agencies of each natimal government constitute one-.of the means for dissemination,of Infounatipn concerning respective imticnial forces under canmand.1 The necessity for closé liaison and periodic'contact with th© publie informâtion agencies of èaoh NATO nation is therefore emphasised. (AG 3401 PID) ^ ; . :

. .. •' FOR THE SUPREME-ALLIED CCfc^DER EUROPE: • " ^ • ,:w. '

t .*!• V OIFFIC •JEAN E. VAXLUY'. „ \ Lieutenant General, French Arugr ; • Deputy Chief, of Staff, r' DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

. •'„•» -

sf -»

"''V' Cl': 4 -. ^ a. Hple of SACEUR1a forces in the defence of bestem ~ >•"•' . .. vV-:"..' • 'i - Need for SAGEURtS forces. .* ••..'•••• ..-• '•••• .-:-1. ••-.;-••.•••- : • :- .••:-• .-.-4M»' . •• " - •;.•-. -, 1 - - ~ • .e»- Objectives of SACEUR•s mission. d. Brogress made. •'•"••'•J'.' r'.'fl'ÄJAfcnä .e. Integration end international teamwork witnio SACEURts forces

3* BASIC POLICIES:: 7 ;. ". . : ' ; , , . .. • •'X'- -. -.-,,..-.-,/ • -r .. ., V,,^ ; . €rr Military Matters; SACï&R's coiranand is a purely military organisât! -Th?, py^iö information orogramme.will therefore dçal only with military matter^^ All political.matters.will ]t>e referred to the governments concerned or, if ai multinational programme, to the North Atlantic Treaty Information Service. If this policy; is maintained, many press problems will be simplified or eliminated.^' . h. Preaa Relations; •

. ' (1) Availebilitv to the ^ressi At. SHâPE, it. is the policy of.SAG. ., .: I' . ',. • subject to the exigencies of tue service, both to mai© himself?;1 I. : available to the press for. conferences and individual. briefings'- end also to delegate to tiis senior officers authority to talk , - the press on subjects appropriate . to the apointments tney hold«^'-?i . ,. Witti the ;object of disseminating,the maximum amount of accurate^ ^/infornaticwa.about their commands, it is recommended, that a .¾ similar policy be adopted by subordinate' commanders, subject tjo^V^Pj^ .-,.• their individual discretion end to the local situation. l ^ (2) Service to the Preset All service for the press will: :

• (a) Ensure the prompt. release of the maximum amount of information consistent with security; and thereby• " . j '

, (b) . Prevent a 'news vacuum* -wnièh leads to mystery,; gossip, .•••'-• V ;•; . ,rumoyLr and subsequent conjecture, with.' resulting confusion-.E. tojbhe public., . '-V-V:'"' .-! /.^v-V^^.'-i-i'•.-• DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE PARIS, FRANCE

AG 2072 ' 5 March 1953

STAFF DIRECTIVE " . 1 NUMBER ^LO^^

PUHLIC IWFORMATIOW POLICIES FOR SHAPE

Staff Memorandum Number 26, U February 1952, Is hereby rescinded.

1, It is the fundamental policy of SHAPE to make available for public dissemination all possible unclassified information. The Public Information Division is responsible for the condact of all liaison and contact with news media to'include wire*services, newspapers, newsreel and broadcasting companies, periodicals, photo agencies and all other recognized information services. It is the only staff agency through which information may be released. Centralization of this activity is essential,

2, Accordingly, staff divisions will refer to the Public Information Division all representatives of news media who attempt to deal directly with them,

a. Outside working hours, press enquiries will be referred to the Public Information Duty Officer (whose name and telephone number will be furnished on demand by the SHAPE Staff Duty Officer).

b. Unofficial discussions of official subjects with representatives of news media, on an "off-the-record" or other informal basis, without coordination with the public Irrformation Division, .will be avoidedi

c. The necessity for rigid'observance of the classification of documents in any press discussions, regardless of personal opinion, is self-evident.

. 3* "Whenever necessary, the Public Information Division will call Upon the appropriate staff section for information on.which to base replies te queries. Appointments for members of the press tar interview SHAPE staff members will be coordinated by the Public Information Division. A Public Information Officer will accompany the correspondent to the interview and'will remain throughout, unless otherwise requested by the interviewer. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 4. Material intended by members of SHAPE for public dissemination will be submitted in advance to the Chief of Public Information for approval,

5, All Staff Divisions will keep the Public Information Division informed on current and projected plans and operations with potential news value. Such liaisons and'foreknowledge are essential to -Wie successful prosecution of the mission assigned to that division,

.•"*•*. 6. Cameras (other than those of the SHAPE Photographic Service) are not permitted Inside the headquarters buildings without prior notice to the Security Desk; The Public Information Division is responsible for all photography by professional photographers,

a. Release for publication of all official SHAPE-photographic material will be Accomplished only through ths Public Information Division. ' ;

b, Amateur photographers of SHAPE staff who wish to také photographs at any official function or occasion at this headquarters will apply'in advance to the Public Information Division for a pass. When practicable, such passes will be issued. Holders of such passes must conform strictly to the rules for amateur photographers laid down for the occasion by the Public.Information Division, as well as any special orders which nay be given on the spot to ensure priority rights for official and professional photographers. (AG 3-401).

POR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Colonel, U.S. Army Secretary

DISTRIBUTIOW ffJTT DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE CONFIDENTIAL From:— GENERAL SIR ROBERT MANSERGH, K.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ALLIED FORCES, NORTHERN EUROPE OSLO, NORWAY PegSôïvnl^ cs/321 * 2 December 195½

fA^r

I enclose the complete record of the case of Lieutenant Colonel Bistrup, the officer of the Royal Danish Air Force, who has been dealt with by the Chief of Defense, Denmark, for a breach of security. You will recall that this young officer published an article in the Norwegian Air Force Magazine, The article was cleared by AIRNORTH in its entirety. It was also cleared, with the exception of Diagram 3j by the C-in-C Royal Danish Air Force, The charge of breaking security rules rests on the publication, I understand, of Diagram 3, which disclosed the whereabouts of five GCI stations. The Danish contention is that these locations should not have been mentioned. AIRNORTH Headquarters* argument is that you cannot hide such an estab- lishment, and further that their siting and construction has been publicly discussed from time to time and is available in Parliamentary records. Whatever the pros and cons of the argument, the fact is that Lieutenant Colonel Bistrup accepted his punishment of 15 days detention, for the serving of which I granted him 3 weeks leave. He is now in Denmark, presumably locked up, Xou will see the correspondence by signal and letter in which I have expressed the hope that the incident will be regarded as closed, and that his future will not be jeopard- ized, I do not know whether he will be permitted to complete his period of service at AIRNORTH, My own opinion is that in view of the complete accept- ance of responsibility of ^the higher Headquarters in this- matter, and that Lieutenant Colonel Bistrup was given an assur- ance that his article was within our rules, the action of the Danish authorities is bordering on the unjust, though of course I see that there is a national aspect. The pity is that I am not completely certain that the desire to preserve national sovereignty has not somewhat outweighed simple justice. However, as we have no legal control over national officers, there is nothing more I can do or will do other than is expressed in my DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

CONFIDENTIAL Tab Reference and Date Document "A" - Magazine "Norsk Luftmilitaert Tidsskrift". Article by Lt. Colonel F.W. Bistrup, titled "Samarbeide", Page 197. "B" - Translation of the Article by Lt. Colonel F.W. Bistrup. 11C" - Statement by Lt. Colonel F. W. Bistrup concerning his Article. tfDltf .Signal AFN/49/SOêT Signal General Mansergh to DTG 121007Z Admiral Qvistgaard. November 1954 "E" Letter FCP 112 of Letter Admiral Qvistgaard to 17 November 1954 General Mansergh. »t?« Signal AFN/54/S0S Signal General Mansergh to DTG 17122QZ Minister of Defence Denmark. November 1954 "G" Signal AFN/57/S0S Signal General Moore to DTG 191250Z Admiral Qvistgaard. November 1954 HH" NO.R.7/A.4728 of LBtter from Chief of Defence 20 November 1954 to HQ AFNE. tt Ttf Signal AFN/58/SOS Signal General Mansergh DTG 231620Z to Mr. Pasmus Hansen. ~ November 1954 ' ttK" Signal MODCO 3560 Signal Minister of Defence Denmark DTG 231645A to General Mansergh. November 1954 "Ln Letter dated 24 Letter HQ AFNE to Commander AAFNE. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE November 1954 Tâb Reference and Date Document "M" Signal AFN/59/S0S Signal General Mansergh to Mr. DTG 250858Z Rasmus Hansen. November 1954 "Nn Signal MODCO 3595 Signal Minister of Defence Denmark DTG 261736A to General Mansergh. November 1954.

* DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 5 261736A JfAT O Bov 54

'fi-;So -f«SaSAGE DObS RGtUiRc PARApi-ÄASE. NO^C^fi^ËD RÉPIT EOUIIÎTE if ïûê -DATÉ IiJfii 1¾ Q'UOÏEfi.

PrbflU.. . . . MOT) D FN L'A RK HATO COHFITTHTIAL TO CIKCRORTH MOOCO 3595 INPOii: :î CHOD DENMARK CIHO RMP CO« MRKORTH

Personal from Minister of Defence to OenercA Manaergh«

llato Message*

-I have received your signals AFW/58/SOS and AFH 59/¾OSp As you know, the Chief Of Befenoe brought th« action against Lieutenant Oolonel Bistrup and subsequently made the deoision. As Admiral Qvistgaard at present is in Washington I should like to wait in answering the two requests mentioned in para 2 of your first mentioned signal until after his return*

Howevert at this moment I should like to mention that the decision Atadet and the procedure followed in this case far as the Chief of ßefence is concerned have been baaed upon considerations as regards prevention»

« 261736*

Refï Col Bistrup*

Cist: SOSp TP FILE

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Aott SOJT^

T/P TOR* 2621272 27 November 1954 (Decrypted 2711402) W«V«

IN: 22/26 ^ONFiDENTtAL COiviriDENTim- « 2508502 54

ÏHiS. MESSAGE DOES NOl RECUIRE PARAPHRASE. NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY JF THE DATE TtME GROUP IS QUOTED. ROUTinE BGtfTIHE

FTvCm cnxnoimi

TO HOD DEI ÎÎIAKK . ILMO COIITID^!ITIAL

AFII 59 /BOS IIiPO CIIGD PBirim . CHX; EEftP COmiRTCRTH '

' . • * lïATO tiessogd • .

Personal fron GonetaX iiansergh to i'jr» Koaous Hanson. \

Reference Colonel Bistrot

Tliaak you for your signal MODCG 3^60« I note your decision. Your signal arrived after I bad despatched my AHi 58/Sos enÄx><3ying ay too requests.

» 2508582

Distribution! SCSt TP9 Pile f DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

MODCO 3500 kjor A.J. Koolford CS

/

NP TO ecu, iDENTfAL QgJ0 6012 90 Headquarters Te1, Copenhagen C. 16128 " Allied Foreest Northern Europe

2*fth Koveafcop 195^*

130¾ '

ÏHE C OI-IKiUfESE , ALLIED ÂIR POiiCBG ÎÎOmiSBï; EtMJPE

mrf&hip mmm>, mm?

The Co^ander-in-CMe? has had dl sessions with SACBtTn and Caxitain ArenSrups the Senior *>?.ni3h fiicer, on thi3 natter but has décidai that ho can îïo further action in tho light of the Minister* s signal 23X6^1, a copy of Vhich v-'is sdrlrssso-j to your nvc, 2. In vievr, howovar, of Colonel ^dstrrtpjO acceptance of tho prmisîraent giv^r to him tr/ fh^ ohte^ o? r^fence.

3. Tiio Oo:.rst»2c3V: n-CI-dof has

P1CR TïtÏÏ

KJU/A ROBERT F- BUItNHAM Cokmel, USAP J.TMu HOOHS

Qfn, 'tajer Oesieral 10 Chiof of Staff DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

Çoptes fr» Captain Arendrup It* Colmiel Bistrup

A - 'Vrj'.. ' 231620¾ 'NATO. Ucrtr. 5^

: CONFiDENTIAL V

V" ' '-V','. TH>S MESSAGE DOES NOT RECUIRE Z1 / V ~ ' J . PARAPHRASE, NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY ' V^, . IF THE DATE. TtME GROUP IS QUOTED. paicnm PBiORm ;

Pifc^ CiOTtnim V ^ ' Tt. ::OD . . V 3TC CUIÎFIDBWTIATI

TJX GIItD d'S tïù.ll > 5G/S0S cciai^rciiEor:*, IÜÄP i .

* . loocaco Personal fron General /ensoreh to T arauo Hanson, -ioforooeo Colonel Hi3trup«

I too rocolvod letter frca CIkD VCSZIM'K stating decisions ttot have toon Given, slcnal 171220<£ to you crossed tills letter, END I OQ thorofore trJrtng no' further action« - a. Iliatever your eventual decision, in view of the responsibility accepted by Dy Subordinate Hoadnuartoro9 I uoiud IiUe to express the hope that tliis case uili have no adverse effect upon future career of the officer concerned, and thorofore would be cratoful if lie could bo remitted to cocgplote his tour at Hvi MFEIE until tea uoptcaber 1955« I-' 3. iîave directed Colonel Bistrup bo clven leave froo duty to allow hin to carry out detention as ordered by c:iuD , DÏSJÎ&IÏE. and assure you have talion such steps as are possible to ensure that there is no repetition of an occurrence of

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE this nature« Distribution* SOS, TP file 23162a;

11 KZ Oen Hoore ' CCG

NATO OONTiDSNTIAi- 23I645A PRIORITY Hov 54. Thieiae^ago dosa"riet r e gui r© paraphra^çV IT« Xmelaosified rep^rit the date time group FROM . MOD DEHMARK is quoted. ' - SO '«,. » Y C J3ÎCH0RTH HArIo COÎIPIDEÎIÎÎAL IHFO V* AIRHORTH MODO*} 5560. CHOD DENMARK CISC RDAF A

ÎÎATO MESSAGE. " PERSONAL EROTI MINISTER OF DEFENSE DMMARK TO CrESTERAXt MAtTSERGH. r ,

Rof: Your AM 54/303, In the case ef LT, COLOHEL BISTRtfJ? I was informed by ADMIRAI. QUIHTGrAAED after the deoisien of diooiplinary . action had been taken. ADtHRAL QTJISTGAARD then nade it clear that he was awarè of the attitude taäen by your HQ iri this oase. • •• As the authority to institute disciplinary sane tien'against .Danirih person el JLnHQ AFHE rests with the Chief Of Defence I an under the cireuiastances of the opinion that v/hilo .1 appreciate your attitude I should net revers the decision already taken.

- * 231645A

Dies SOSs FILE, Act; SOS. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

T/P TORt 2400402 24Hoveuber 1954 EK. -. ' • v

IKs 01/24 FÀ'JY TO ^ONHDENTHtU CHIEF OF DEFENCE C OPY Kastellet, Copenhagen.

Ko. R.7/A, 1+728 20 November 195¼.

TO: HQ AFNE COPY TO: The Air Force Command HQ AFNE j Copenliagen SUBJECT: Decision on Punishment

You are hereby informed that the Chief of Defence has decided on 17 November 195V that Lieut. Colonel F.W. Bistrup be given 15 days' detention as a result of a security violation caused by the publishing of an article in the "Norwegian Air Force Magazine" No. 7/I95V, and that the Lieut. Colonel has accepted the punishment. The punishment will be executed in accordance with the decision by the Chief of Defence and is expect to be initiated on 1 December 195V at the latest.

By order

/ (sgd) P.V. Haraiiershöy Colonel DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Thic KeaiBage dooe net require paraphrase.a« unclassified repl if the date tiaw group ie qu*te PRIORITt

WJOtl CIHCnORTH

TO CHOD DBISmRK

EATC CC IiFIDK TIAL

AFtT 57 ^os

ItATC nessQße.

/

PeraomX for AdolraX Qvlstgoard fron General Hoore.

General Iiansergh In London. Your lotter KiP one one two dated one seven Hovedber received today» You uill have seen General Iiaasereb' s signal to Minister DTG 171220Z despatched previous to receipt your letter* N - - »

* . 1912502

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Distribution! SOSt v.-- ,

iäijor Heyuood cs 390

MAJO CONriDiHirNitlAL Cf^ mo 171220Z PRIOBITY ÜÖU2IIE «•y» 1954»

FHah CïïiCBQHTH

TO « MCO DKEKlABiC IiATO C0IiF3i^HriAL

AFH/ 54 /S 06 WO* AIBirJKEH \ CÎIC2) ISfciHHAJKK CLX KuYAL I?/u3l3Il ABiFOHCE

Minister of Defence Denmai MTO osesace. Personal frca General itansorgh to- Beferenoö case of. CcwLoael Diotrup, ia AF. while in Copenhagen ^vistgaard discussed this occurence uith ae and I concurred ulth his suecestions but on return to uy 1¾ I found that COi;AîKJîw£ll tootî complete blaae for action of Colonel Bistrup ana tiierefore I sent following signal to i^vistcaoxdt» ^iiote • PersonalftaosoriSh t o ^vistgaard. Ueferenco Bistrup. Ca inquiry I find article referred to had caaplote clearance by uy AlflööRTH- Headquarters. uho Oo accept full responsibility for this offieer^s action om/or article» Therefore suggest this officer Should not be held to blane in any way and I would there- fore lifce his retention in his present appointaient. unquote. • -- I have been informed disciplinary action is being contemplated against Colouei Bistrup who is still on ay estnbÜ3lffiient. I repeat that in ray opinion Colonel Bistrup cannot be held to blaae for his action and uould be grateful to be Icept InforsKSd*

Distribution*- BOB File» ® 17122QZ DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

AQ Woolford . " CC m

iîajor

n fiT O CHIEF OF DEFENCE C OPY Kastellet, Copenhagen.

No. FCP 112 VJ November 195½.

My dear General,

Thanlc you for your signal, NATO CONFIDENTIAL AFN H9/S0S, regarding the Bistrup case. I regret to say that the case is not as simple as appears from your signal. VJhen you state that your Head- quarters accepts full responsibility for this officer's action and/or article, this'can only have bearing 011 the KATC aspect of the breach of security. There is, however, another aspect as well, and that is the national one, and the one with which I have to deal in my capacity of Chief of Defence being responsible for. amongst other things, the national military security. In this case the officer in question has offended national regulations for which offence he is liable to a rather severe punishment. I therefore regret that ï have no autho- rity to condone him as furthermore I have to consider the importance of making quite clear to all the personnel under my command the necessity of being very careful as to the military information they give away. Having taken full regard to your views, I have, however, decided to impose* on him a punishment of 1? days detention. Furthermore I have proposed to the Ministry of Defence that he "be recalled from his present appointment by February l?th, 1955» For your information I want to add that the Ministry of Defence is in full agreement with my action in "this case. I have forwarded a copy of this letter to General Sanders who has also written to me on this subject.

Yours very sincerely, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE (sgci) E.J.C. Qvistgaard.

General Sir Robert Mansergh, KCB, KBE, MC, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe. NATO 121007Z CONFIDENTIAL HOT 5*

\ ,

PRIORm

FRCSll CIIJCBOIjTH

TOt CIICD BˮIARK HftTO COnFIDEITTIAL

AFfl/ 49 /SOS

HAÏO ÏSGSACS3 • Personal Monoerek to ^vistgaarä* Refercnco Bistmp « On inquiry I find articlo referred to had cooplote

clearance by ay AXRU0RÎH HoadCiuartorst uho do accept full responsibility ' . * -

for this officer's action, oaû/ar article. Therefore suggest this officer

should not t)G hold to blaoe in any tray ond 1 uould therefore Uke bis

retention in his present appointment,

1210072

* ..."

Dlstrlbiitiont MX Filo DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

IX X AOIEXtfOCD MA/COB 389 Lt. Golonel F.W. Bistrup Hq AIRNORTH 9 Nov 5½

COPY

SUBJECT: Statement Regarding an Article in the Noiiregian Air Force Magazine (Norsk Luftnilitasrt Ticlsskrift).

1. On 10 February 195½ I gave a lecture on the Danish Air. \ Force to the Norwegian Air Force Staff Course at Oslo. I concluded j the lecture "by giving some short personal views on the desirability | and possibilities of extended Danish/Norwegian air force cooperation. 2. After the lecture the Commandant of the Staff Course, Lt. f Col. O.T. Mehn-Andersen, asked me if I would write an article on the subject of cooperation between the two air forces for the Norwegian Air Force Magazine, of which he at that time was the editor. I agreed to this and told him that I would write to hin about it later on. 3. On Karch 195½ 1 sent a letter to Lt. Col. Mehn-Andersen saying that I was about to start the work on the article and that I intended to include the following passages: (a) Introduction, a reference to the lecture at the Staff College and the discussion after the lecture between the officers at the Course and the lecturer. (b) A historical review, i.e. a summary and history of the Royal Danish Air Force. (c) A condensed description of the organisation, etc. of the Royal Danish Air Force. (d) A discussion of the desirability and possibilities of extended cooperation between the Danish and Norwegian Air Forces, and (e) A conclusion, t M-. By the end of March I again discussed the article with Lt. Col. Mehn-Andersen and told him that the article would shortly be ready. He told me that he was in no hurry because - as far as he could see - it would not be possible to have the article printed until sometime later in the year, presumably after the summer vacation. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 5. In the meanwhile I finished writing the article.and after having requested pictures from a staff officer at Iiq RDAF, the article was eventually completed by the end of April 195½. 6. On 5 May 195½ I sent a letter to General Forslev referring to previous verbal discussion about the article, and enclosed in the letter was the full text of the article. However, the pictures - which I had received in only one copy - and 3 diagrams giving the organisational set-up of the Royal Danish Air Force were - as far as I can remember - not included. The reason for not enclosing these 3 charts was - as far as I can remember - that they were not finished at the sane time as the text of the article. 7. Cn 20 May 195¼ I received a letter from General Förslev, dated 17 May 195¼) where he informed me that he was in agreement with the article and that he would like to have the article pub- lished. 8. On 20 May 195¼ I wrote an. ICS to General V/,R. Carter out- lining the history of the article and stating the following:

u^-. Being a Î&T0 officer, I would very much like to ensure that nothing in the article is against or could be understood as being against AAFME's principles. Because the article is written in Danish I would be very grateful if I could have the opportunity of giving you a" short description of the contents of the part about cooperation." A few cls^ys later General Carter sent for me and said that he had asked his Chief of Staff, General C.". Rees, to take further action with respect to the article.

9. On 28 May 195¼ I sent a new ICS to the Chief of Staff in continuation of the ICS to the Commanding General. I attached to this ICS an English version of some of the paragraphs in the article. 10. On 31 May 195¼ I was sent for by General Kees to brief him on the article. At that time the article was complete with the full text, all pictures with their texts, and all charts. I gave the General a description of the contents of the article, showed him the pictures and the" plans and after some discussion the General approved that the article be published. 11. On 31 May 195¼ (the same day) I sent a letter to Lt. Col. Mehn-Andersen enclosing the whole article with pictures and charts and expressed the hope that he could use the article, mentioning" that both General Forslev^and General Hees (on behalf o £--¾ en oral Carter) had approved of the article's being published. 12. Cn 3 June 155¼ Lt. Col. Mehn-Andersen called me on the telephone and told ms that he had received the article and that- it would presumably be issued by September 195¼. 13. On 20 August 195¼ ï received proof sheets of the article including pictures and charts. These were returned on the same date DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE with a few minor corrections.

1¼. Finally? in the beginning of September ï received a copy of the IIorwegianiiir Force Magazine, the September issue, containing the article. 15. By the end of Septeiiiber 195¼ I was sent to a course in Germany, fron which I returned to Copenhagen - where I spent a T T/eev S" vacation - and reported back to Kq^AIRRO IIH on 18 October 195¼. 16. A short time after liaving reported back one of the offi- cers at Hq AIHKCHTH informed me that the Chief Signals Officer at this Headquarters, Gp Capt. A.T. Monks, had been rather surprised at the contents of the article in the Norwegian Air Force Magazine, stating that the information contained on the chart at page 207 certainly was classified. 17. I tried at once to discuss the matter with Gp Capt. Monks but owing to both his and my being very busy with other matters, I did not siicceed until sometime later, presumably about 25 October 195½. Having discussed the problem with him I agreed that as a matter of principle some of the information on page 207 should not have been released in a magazine available for sale ç.nywhere » Consequently, on 29 October 195½ I wrote a letter to General Forslev with a copy of the Air Force Magazine enclosed and informed him of the possibility of a security violation by the printing of page 207 and suggested to General Forslev (who is Commander-in-Chief1of the Hoyal Danish Air Force) that the matter be brought to the attention of the Defence Staff Denmark. 18. On 5 November 195½ I received a copy of operational i Biiedi a te signal from Chief of Defence Deraiark to Hq AHHOH TH info Hq AIRITORTH requesting that headquarters to direct me to report to the Defence Staff in Copenliagen on 8 November 195½ 0^ at the latest on ? November 195½. This signal was received by telephone late in the afternoon on Friday the 5th. 19» On 6 November 195½ T reported to my immediate superior, Colonel H.,C. Baeov. and told hi"n that I had received this signal (which was repeated to me by D/C03 F & O Hq AFHOHT-, Capt. A.E. Arendrup, Danish Havy)3 and requested permission to report to the Defence étaff, Copenhagen. This permission was granted, and it was so arranged that I could report at the Defence Staff in Copen- hagen Monday morning on 8 IrOvember 195½.

20. Colonel Bagby, having granted me permission to report to the Defence Staff, then asked me what it was about. In view of the letter which I had sent to General Forslev and in view of the text of the signal from the Chief of Defence Denmark T told him that it presumably was a case of security violation which the Chief of Defence might want to look into. I then gave him a, condensed des- cription of what so far had happened in this case, as stated in the paragraphs above. 21. The same day (6 November 195½) Colonel Bagby, after having discussed the problem in detail with me, took me to the Commanding General, General H.L. Sanders, and later to the Chief of Staff, Brig. General C.D. Jones, Again, Colonel Bagby and I gave a short des- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE cription of what had happened so far. 22. General Sanders, then, stated that certainly everybody should be very careful in releasing information to magazines for sale everwhere and told me to take care in any similar case not to release any information which might be classified, 23. General Jones discussed the case in more detail requesting me to bring to the attention of the Danish authorities the fact that as the complete article had been presented to the Chief of Staff, Hq AIRNORTH at the end of May, this Headquarters would certainly accept responsibility or share responsibility for the release of any information in the article. He asked me, as Colonel Bagby.had previously done, to keep him informed on what; was happening in the case. 2¼. On 7 November 195¼ at l600 hours I left Oslo by boat for Copenhagen, arrived there on 8 November 195¼ in the morning, reported to the Chief of Defence Staff at 0930 hours and was received by him shortly afterwards. Ke told me that the Judge Advocate General would examine me the same day at 1315 hours and that I might take the boat to Oslo the same afternoon at 1530 hours if the examination was finished. 25. On 8 November 195¼ at 1315 hours I reported to the Judge Advocate General and at his request gave him a statement of the whole affair as described above. He said that I was charged with security violation, that,he would submit his report at the latest on Wednesday 10 November 195¼) and that action thereafter would rest with the Chief of Defence Denmark. I was then permitted to leave and eventually took the boat from Copenhagen and arrived in Oslo on 9 November 195¼ and reported to A/COS Plans, Colonel Bagby. He requested me to make a statement on this matter. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Ttie following is a translation from Danish of an article 11 SAliARBEJDEu (Cooperation) by Lt. Col. F.W. Bistrup, published in Norslc Luftmilitssrt Tidsslcrift (Norwegian Air Force Magazine) No. 7, September 195¼.

Lt. Col. Fritz Willem Bistrup, who was born in 1917, was originally officer of the Danish %vy, where he advanced through the ranks to Commander) and where he served from 1935 till - in 0Ctober 1,95° - he was transferred to the Air Force. From 1939 until he was interned.by the Germans in August 19¾ the Lt.Col mainly served at sea. From October 19*+3 till August 19^5 he took part in the Danish Resistance Movement, i.a. as commander of the Lolland/Falster Region. Then he served as commander group commander, and - in periods - as flotilla commander for mine sweepers until - in April 19¼^ - he started as a student at the Flying School. From October I9V7 until June 1951 the Lt.Col. served in the Naval Air Force in Denmark and in Greenland. Among other positions he served as commander of the Naval Air Base in Copenhagen and as commander of the Naval Air Force during the transition period. After the transfer to the Air Force the Lt.Col. served for some time as Chief of the Personnel Section of the Air Staff. At present he is serving as Chief of Plans Branch I/Plans Division, HQ,AIRNORTH.

—00O00—

INTRODUCTION On the 10 Feb 195¼ I delivered a lecture on the Danish Air Force to the Norwegian Air Force Staff Course. I finished the lecture by setting forth some conclusive and personal views on the desirability and the possibilities of a wide:" direct cooperation

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE between the two Air Forces. The lecture was followed by an interesting discussion with the students^ what especially interested the students was the problems which have been solved,differently in Norway and Denmark. To me the discussion was a valuable experience, and my idea that great advantages might be achieved by both Air Forces through a wider direct cooperation *^as confirmed. In this article I shall present some ideas about such cooperation« It will hardly be possible for Norwegian AErForce Officer to appreciate these Ideas tdthoùfc having some knowledge of the background of the Danish Air Force and without having a comparatively clear picture of its organization, at any rate in outlines« By way of introduction I shall give a few facts of the history of the Air Force from the beginning of World VJar II up till to-day, whereafter I shall give a brief summary of its organization«

HISTORY In 1937 Parliament passed the Defence Act which was in effect at the outbreak of World War II« This Act was not amended during the Occupation, and consequently it was effective when after the Liberation on ? Hay 19^? the country was to rebuild its Defence. Under this Act Denmark's Defence comprised the Army and the Navy belonging under the Ministry for War and the Ministry of Naval Affairs, respectively. There was under this Act no Air Force, and the Danish air force activities were carried out by the Army through the Army Air Force and by' the Navy through the Naval Air- Force . After the Occupation on 9 April 19^0 the working conditions for the Defence became extremely difficult, but both the Army and the ^avy were able to maintain their organization and to a limited extent to continue the training of a personnel with the very important exception, however, that all military air activity was prohibited. After the. events of 29 Aug 19^3 when Government and Parliament were potent df office by the occupation authorities, all Danish military activity ceased. When Denmark was liberated in May 19^5 the country had therefore no military forces of any significance. The problems which appeared at the time of liberation DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE with regard to the build-up of the Danish Defence were therefore considerable. As mentioned above there was a certain continuity in the work within the Army and the Navy and these Services had a rather considerable strength of personnel in the beginning. However, with regard to the build-up of an Air Force there was in reality nothing at all on the basis of which a rational build-up could take place. It is true that there were a few pilots and aircraft mechanics and a limited strength of administrative personnel, but throughout the ? years of occupation this personnel had been unable to keep up their military proficiency in Denmark. In addition personnel was completely missing for the many institutions which according to experience from World War II were necessary for the operation of a modern independent Air Force, such as Aircraft and'Warning System, Signal Service, and other special ground services. The situation as regards materiel was that the German occupation forces had left some permanent installations and some flying materiel of different nature. The permanent installations were at once taken over by the Allied Liberation authorities» and naturally were affected by not being used for their proper purpose. However, as and when the Allied Forces were repatriated, the installations were handed over to the Danish authorities, and of course it has been possible after various repairs and modifi- cations to make advantageous use of these installations. Flying materiel as for instance aircraft, vehicles, classified equipment, weapons, and ammunition etc. was under the Armistice Agreements between the German and Allied Forces either handed over to the latter or destroyed* a minor part was handed over to the Danish Defence, but it was insignificant in the build-up of proper military air forces. Among the resources available for the build-up of the air

forces at the end of the war is,: furthermore, the limited number of personnel having served in allied, mainly Norwegian^ forces, where they had eitber received their training or utilised previous qualifications from service with the Army Air Force or Naval Air Force. Immediately after the Liberation the situation was the following: Apart from the small Danish forces trained before the DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE War, the very limited number of Danes trained in allied forces during the Vfar, and the more or less intact ex-German air bases, there was nothing on the basis of which one could build up an Air Force or re-organize the Army Air Force and Haval Air Force. The Defence Act of 1937 was still in force. It was supplemented by powers to the Mnister of Defence, eog. to spend more money, set up certain units, and use these in a special way* but it was not within the scope of these powers to establish an independent Air Force. The idea of an independent Air Force naturally developed rapidly immediately after the Liberation, but military and political circles did not fully agree on the necessity or the mere desirabili- ty of an independent Air Force. Consequently the decision with regar to the establishment of an independent Air Force was postponed until the time when a decision was tote made on the overall organisation of the Defence. In order to start the work on the build-up of military air forces - which from all sides was recognized to be of vital importance - the Army Air Force and the Naval Air Force were reorganized, and certain activities were commenced. The main tasks possible to solve at this time were the procurement of materiel and the training of personnel, and all authorities agreed that, whatever would be the future of Danish military aviation, it would be advantageous to use common training establishments and common institutions for procurement of materiel. Consequently the Ministry for War and the Ministry of Naval Affairs set up an organisation common to the Army and the Navy for handling such tasks. To illustrate the special Air Force problems a committee was appointed. This committee should among other things submit to the Defence Commission (appointed to prepare the Defence Acts)a report on the establishment of an independent Air Force. The Defence Acts, which were passed in May 1950 and June 1951, provided for the establishment of the Air Force ""as an inde- pendent Service, and the future personnel organization was framed. Simultaneously with the coming into force of the Acts Denmark became a member of NATO and hereby incurred a number of obligations towards this defence community. It must be admitted that the Acts did not constitute the best possible instrument as seen DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE from a NATO point of view, but possibilities of working on the basis provided by the Acts existed. The task now incumbent on the Air Command was to expand the air forces in accordance with the agreements made within NATO and on the basis of the Defence Acts. The Air Force, had thus been created. On 1 October^ the Air Command was established* and at the same time the Army Air Force and the Naval Air Force were abolished» A number of units and installations were transferred to the Air Force and were at the same time given new names. On 8 January 1951 the following "naval air bases" and "army air fields" were thus designated Air Bases (FSN): In Zealand: FSN Copenhagen (with Squadron 721) FSN Vasrlose (with Squadron 722) FSN Avno (with the Flying School)

In Jutland: FSN Âlborg (later with the squadrons 723-2¼) FSN Karup (later with the squadrons 725-26-27) FSN Skrydstrup (later with the squadrons 728-29-30) FSN TirstrupC for the time being without squadrons) FSN Vandel (for the time being without squadrons) The "air units" of the Army and the "air flotillas" of the Kavy were abolished, and the following squadrons (ESK) were established, also by 8 January 1951:

ESK 721, Catalina, Seaotterj later also Helicopter ESK 722, Oxford, PR-Spitfire, later Firefly ESK 723, Meteor, dayfighter, later nightfighter ESK 72^, Meteor, dayfighter ESK 725, F-8¼) Thunderjet On April 1951 the "Enlisted Aircraft Men's School" was ' established for training of technical personnel. On 1 August 1951 "the Peacetime Organization of the Defence' was laid down'by the Ministry of Defence. The "Sector Commands" and the "Air Materiel Service" got their official destignations, and the Reserve Officers School and the NCOs School were establishes

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE The remaining squadrons were then established in the following order: ESK 726 August 1952 ESK 727 November 1952 ESK 728 May 1953 ESK 729 September 1953 ESK 73O Januar 195¼ all equipped with F-8M- Thunderjets. After having given an account of the establishment and the development through the years of the Air Force I want to show in outline the present organisation of the Danish Air Force»

ORGANIZATION At the establishment of the Air Force in 1950 the Defence Acts provided for an organization, which since then has been in existence unchanged.. Matters of minor importance have, of course, been corrected within the scopes of the Acts» The only organizational problem of any importance which has been raised, is the question of command of the Air Force and the connection with the Allied command elements. This matter has not yet been solved in Denmark. In Norway there is a "Tactical Air Force Headquarters", which in case of war will come under the direct command of COMAIRNORTH. The establishment of a similar "Tactical Air Force Headquarters" in Denmark has been under consideration for a long time, and when and if it is established, it must be assumed that it will be given a status corresponding to that of the Norwegian one. In the present situation (April 195½) the Danish air forces are directed from the Air Command, who is located at Vedbak, approx. 20 km North of Copenhagen. The question of other organisational changes may come up when the Defence Acts are to be revised in the near future. The operational organization of the Air Force is based on the geographical structure of the country. There are tiro "Sector Commands11 comprising the areas East and West of the Great Belt, respectively* They are called "Sector Command East" and "Sector Command West", respectively. Both in operational and administrative matters these Commands are direct subordinate to the Air Command, and in principle all matters concerning the Sector Commands mil be

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE discussed direct between these Commands and the Air Command. For practical reasons some routine administrative matters have been referred to direct discussion between authorities subordinate to th Sector Commandson one side and the Air Command on the other side. The Air Bases are under control of the Sector Command, and the Air Base Commander has the control of the squadrons as well as of other organisational elements of the Air Base. Within the responsibility of the Sector Command is also the Aircraft Control and Warning System in the Sector Comand area. It consists of GCI-stations, early warning stations, and fixer station chains, all attached to a combined SOC/ACC which also comes direct under the Sector Command. The Air Base Commander is responsible for the state of readiness and the training standard of the squadrons, and for the Air Bases being able to render the support necessary during operations, i.e., air traffic control including GCA, linktraining, interpretation of photoes, etc., and guarding, supplies, and technical service etc. The Air Base Commander's immediate assistants are the Operations Officer, who is responsible for flying and for cooperation between the operational elements of the Air Base and the squadrons* the Air Base Officer who supervises the administratio of the base and at same time is responsible to the Air Base Commander for the close defence of the Air Base* the Air Base Technician who is responsible for workshops and depots at the base and controls the technical standard of the squadrons* and finally the Air Base Quartermaster who is.in charge of accounts, pay, provisioning etc. As mentioned above the Operations, Officer directs the training of the squadrons and provides for maintenance of readiness. However, he is closely attached to the base and is not only in charge of the squadrons but also of the operational elements of the base. > The Air Base Officer has at his disposal forces who have received infantry training. He is himself an ar.:iy officer but belongs under the Air Force. He is responsible for the personnel of the entire Air Base having been trained in the use of light wea- pons for local defence, and he is also responsible for mobilization, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE equipment) and employment of the forces assigned to the base in war. The Air Base Technician is responsible for the reserves stocked at the base being sufficient to meet operational require- ments and for the distribution of aircraft for overhaul. He inspects aircraft which are in the base workshop for major overhaul or repair after wreckage and sees that they return to the squadrons fit for use. In addition he is responsible for special equipment such as the armament, photo equipment, radio and radar equipment etc. of the aircraft. The combined SOC/ACC receives reports from the radar stations of air bases and also from certain naval radar stations.

On the basis; of the general situation map provided through these report^ and on the basis of reports received from the air bases ori readiness, weather • conditions, stock levels etc. the Sector Operations Officer will on behalf of the Sector Commander take the necessary steps with regard to the operations to be accomplished, scrambling the aircraft at the bases and ordering GCI-stations to contact and direct these aircraft. The distribution of aircraft to Air Defence and Offensive Support will according to circumstances be carried out by a JOC, where the Sector Commander concerned and his colleagues from the Army and perhaps from the Wavy are represented. Both Offensive Support and Air Defence are directed through the same (static) establishment. Logistic support of the air forces is provided through the depots and workshops of the air bases. These again will be supported by the Air Materiel Service, which is direct subordinate to the Air Command. The Air Materiel Service has at its disposal a central workshop and a central depot within each Sector Command area. The Air Materiel Service is responsible for receipt, handling and distribution of materiel coming from outside. The procurement of personnel for the Air Force is effectuated either through drafting or through employment of voluntary personnel. Th^ training mainly takes place -set The Air Force's own schools. The national service men constitute the main part of the ground defence forces and a considerable part of the other services within the Air Force, for instance depot service, workshop service, messenger service, transport service, and Control and Warning

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE System etc. The voluntary personnel have either civilian status, e.g. clerks and depot personnel etc., or military status, viz., student pilots and students for the technical schools and other special schools of different nature. Finally voluntary personnel is employed from the Women's Auxilary Air Force, which will be mentions below. In addition to the agencies handling matters pertaining to operations, logistics, and training, a few special agencies which I shall briefly mention in the following are attached to the Air Force. The Defence Weather Service is according to the provisions of the Defence Act subordinate to the Air Command. The Weather Service serves the entire Defence. As, however, the Air Force is, of course, the greatest consumer of meteorological information the Weather Service belongs under the Air Force. It is mainly composed of civilian personnel employed by contract (this personnel may some time in the future be given military ranks and uniform). Incidental- ly I want to state that the Air Traffic Control of the Danish Air Force is purely military. The Visual Observer Corps is an organization of volunteers, who undertake visual observations of events within the air territory and who through a number of "centers" report these observations to the SOC/ACC of the two Sector Commands. Only the Commander and a limited administrative personnel are employed on a permanent basis* the rest of the personnel have Home Guard status. Vitally important to the activities of the Air Force is the Institute of Aviation Medicine. According to the Government Orders issued in virtue of the Defence Act the Institute of Aviation Medicine is subordinate to the Medical Corps, which is common to the three Services. The Institute of Aviation Medicine undertakes examination of aspirants and controls the health of the flying personnel and that of a few other groups of personnel.^urt her more, the Institute of Aviati Medicine undertakes research regarding aviation medicine problems. Women's Auxiliary Air Force is a women association, established to support the Air Force in war and in peace. Like the corresponding organisations attached to the Army and the Navy the Women's Auxiliary Air Force has a contract with the Ministry of DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

Defence,;which in the main gives this force the same status as that of the Home Guard. The Women's Auxiliary Air Force is under administrative control of the Home Guard* The WAAF has a special task in that the Air Force may recruit woman personnel for the Control and Warning System through the WAAF. This personnel who must have gone through an elementary training and a special training in control and warning service are attached to the Air Forc on a special contract and are paid by and "belong to the Air Force until expiration of their contracts* however, the personnel concerned must retain their membership of the WAAF. This summary presumably gives sufficient understanding of the Danish Air Force for an appreciation of the following considerations about co-operation«

CO-OPERATION Before discussing the forms of co-operation between the Norwegian and Danish Air Forces the co-operation already taking place and the conditions that may exist for wider co-operation ought to be mentioned* Finally, it seems appropriate to give a brief definition of the purpose of wider direct co-operation» As Norway and Denmark are members of NATO considerable co-ordinating activities are taking place in allied headquarters« Air Force problems for the entire Northern Command area are ccnsideied i AAFNE, and this, of course, also manifests itself in co-ordination, at least to a certain extent« However, the m'ain purpose of this co-ordination is, roughly speaking, to see that the forces and the organisation who in case of war are to be assigned to AAFNE have attained a certain minimum standard« To some extent the allied headquarters render aid and assistance in attaining these minimum targets, but in the nature of things it rests on both Nations and - Air Forces as a national responsibility to Iaave the minimum require- ments complied with. In addition to £he co-operation thus taking plarce through NATO there are other examples of direct co-operation between the Norwegian and Danish Air Forces in other respects. This co-operatior has - apart from combined exercises - constantly been of a sporadic nature, and the purpose has been to study some specific problem, as for instance classification of personnel. However, the co- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE operation has not formed part of any major and more comprehensive plan. This means that a certain co-operation exists, but as long as NATO's direct wishes are complied with, viz., to attain a certaii minimum standard, it cannot be expected that the NATO authorities will take the initiative to further direct co-operation. The question then comes up whether the existing co-operatio: is insufficient» If we comply with the NATO requirements everything seems to "be well, and it should be quite possible for the national authorities to attain the prescribed targets without outside assistance. Of course, it is impossible to give a concrete answer to this question, and it seems to me that there are two essential reasons for extending this co-operation. The first reason is that the two Air Forces, especially the Danish Air Force, meet with rather great difficulties in their efforts to comply with the prescribed minimum requirements* the other reason is that it must seem worth-while for the two Air Forces, in spite of their limited strength, to attain a high standard of ^Eèctavehess;.* We need not go farther than to Sweden to find a good example of the feasibility of reaching such standard. VJe should then consider whether conditions for a wider co-operation otherwise exist. The most conspicuous factor in this connection is, of course, the many points of resemblance offered by the back-grounds for the Norwegian and Danish Air Forces. The two countries have approximately the same number of inhabitants* the political situation as regardsboth home and foreign affairs is very similar* I cannot estimate the financial situation in the two countries, but presumably there is no considerable difference* the military personnel of the two countries speak the same language* they have the same aims and ideals* the training of pilots and other personnel takes place at the same places, and Norwegian and Danish officers work together in the same allied headquarters. Of course, the Horwegian area is larger and quite different from the Danish, and there may also be many other points of difference• The most essential difference between the conditions of the two Air Forces is, however, that after VJorld War II Norway had an Air Force, or at least experience and personnel to enable them quick DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Iy to set up an Air Force. Denmark had not. I thus think that I am able to ascertain that in spite of certain differences the conditions for co-operation exist. When we add to this the strong sympathy for Norvray and the Norwegians found everywhere in Denmark and the unique goodwill whereby Danes are met in Norway we may foresee that co-operation will also be eas; and certainly pleasant. Thus it seems to appear that conditions for co-operation exist, and as outlined the purpose of extended co-operation would then be - to assist each other in every way to attain the minimum standard to which the two countries have obliged themselves towards NATO. - to try to improve this standard, so that in quality the tw< Air Forces reach the same standard as the best allied Air Forces. The next thing to be considered is the way in which to implement the co-operation. To render it fully advantageous it must be as comprehensive as possible, i.e. within every field where after a sound estimate the two Air Forces can appreciate the value of co-operation this should be accomplished. It may, of course, be said that co-operation may be intro- duced in many ways, also on a small scale. Presumably co-operation between the personnel of the two Air Forces may be established without difficulties, e.g. through exchange of ideas in military magazines and otherwise. As lmown Norway has an Air Force Magazine, a similar magazine has not yet been published in Denmark, so that air force ideas and points of view have to be expressed through Army and %vy magazines. However, this should not prevent one's ideas from being published. Another possibility might be an arrangement similar so that of the so-called "Friendship Towns", e.g. so that corresponding air bases in the two countries co-operate on a private basis by collecting Norwegian awl Danish magazines, respectively, and exchange same, etc. It will also be easy to establish contact between the personnel, if somehow the personnel visit the other country. It turns out that it is easier for Danes to get into contact with Norwegians than with persons from any other nation. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE All this, however advantageous it may be, is nothing but a drop in the ocean and suffers from serious restrictions. The contact will be sporadic and not according; to plan, and national security regulations will limit the subjects that may be brought up to matters of a general nature. Furthermore, it will in practice be connected with difficulties to bring documentary material along on visits. So it would be much more desirable if at the highest level a wide and planned co-operation between the two Air Forces could be established. It is obvious that such a wide co-operation cannot take place without approval by the highest authorities of the two countries, because in the first place the matter will involve some financial problems, and secondly - as far as I know - no experience of any value to a co-operation of the nature concerned is available. As far as the financial problems are concerned it may be maintained, however, that the expenses involved in an extended Norwegian/Danish cooperation will quickly be compensated because of increased effectiveness, and because much work now being carried out by the two Air Forces individually may be accomplished on a mutual basis* VJith regard to the other problems it must be admitted that the very fact that we are allied in peace time is something quite new to our countries, and this must or should permit the introductio of new methods. In the following I shall take it that somehow the. responsible authorities in both countries have approved a wider direct cooperation between the two Air Forces, and I shall mention some of the fields where the implementation of co-operation may be desirable• The problem of attaining the desired minimum standard has partly an administrative and partly an operational side* The administrative side will mainly involve procurement of personnel anc training and employment'of same* the operational side "will mainly involve exercises, also combined exercises, but the latter will be accomplished through NATO, and will cause no problems for the time being. There is no doubt that much work now being done in connectic with the solution of administrative problems is similar in the two DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Air Forces. Nor is there any doubt that many problems investigated in our two Air Forces are not dealt with as thoroughly as they ought to, simply because in small organizations like ours it is impossible to handle all problems* but perhaps one Air Force has solved such problems as the other Air Force has not yet set to work on. It might be of interest to set forth some special points: An important problem in Norway and Denmark is training« Some co-operation has taken place, but the very training plans are not co-ordinated. Perhaps this is not possible either, but co-operation might offer many impulses in both countries» A similar problem is the following: An Air Force is always co-responsible for the Army and Navy being given the proper training in ground/air and sea/air co-operation. This requires an approved doctrine and manuals. A co-operation in this field would be an obvious advantage. Operational and administrative directives and regulations form the basis of the activities of an Air Force in peace and war. The method of issue of these directives is important, and of course the contents of the directives are of decisive importance. A co-operation in this field is also of obvious value. Similar considerations might be made in connection with many fields of activity in the two Air Forces. Let us finally consider how co-operation could be accomplish- ed in practice. The forms of co-operation that might be accomplished will - apart from proper' exercises - fall into two main categories, viz., exchange of personnel and exchange of 'information. The exchange of personnel may be advantageously applied to all levels of the two Air Forces. The importance of having personnel from the other country in responsible positions, e.g., commanders of squadrons, radar units, air bases, schools etc. is obvious. However, it will be of special importance if an exchange, between the two Air Coramands of staff personnel for staffs on the highest level might tak^ place, and if instructors and-**Students at staff courses and staff colleges might be "mixed". The exchange of information will also be of importance on almost any level, and a possible complete exchange of operational and administrative directives and of curricula for schools and courses, manuals, handbooks, and pamphlets etc. might prove DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE practical and time saving. The above is of course nothing but examples of possible fields of co-operation. Without a thorough study it is impossible to establish within how many fields a co-operation will be of value, and how to implement a co-operation. However, the decisive factor is that co-operation is started with the definite intention of implementing it in all places where a sober investigation shows that it might be of value. This will require a plan prepared jointly CONCLUSION

Provided that as mentioned above approval has been given to investigate the possibilities of co-operation the first step to be taken would in my opinion be to set up a Norwegian/Danish co-operation committee to prepare further proposals for co-oreratioi and outline the necessary recommendations to the respective ministries* The comit tee should therefore be composed of the best possible experts from the two Air Forces, If such a co-operation committee could become a reality, and if the two Air Forces could be given reasonable powers to under- take the investigation and effectuate the co-operation, I believe that a period of progress for both Air Forces might surely be expected. I have no doubt that in the beginning the Danish Air Force will get most of the advantage from the co-operation. Eut I do not doubt either that nothing is more satisfactory than helping a neighbour who is in difficulties.

Translated by:

A • N0H . 13* CARSTENS CAPT. DA. ' DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE » Digram I to Lt. Col. Bistrup's Article.

The King I Judge Advocate's Corps — Minister of Defence Various Schools, Logistic- Ministry of Defence al Authorities, Advisors, etc. Medical Corps

Quartermaster Corps —1

Chief of Defence Defence Council

Defence Staff

The Army Commanc The Air Command The Naval Command

The Air Force I The Army The Home Guard Greenlanc Command The Navy

Some of the most important organizations of the Danish Defence DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ^Diagram II to Lt* Col, Bistrup's

è

The most important components of the Air Force, and certain other organizations of special interest to the Air Force« DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Diagram III to Lt, Col. Bistrup's Article.

Fixer Station 5 Fixer Station b Fixer Station 3

Air Base Vedbsek Fixer Station 2 E- Fixer Station 1 Air Base Plying [Coast Radar Avnö School Basic Train- ing Center [GC I~MuIt ëb j erg" Air Base '/22 Vsrlöse I Air Base Regiment gcr^use'T Air Base 721 Copenhagen !GC ÎMBornho Ijn Sector Command! East SOC/ACC

A.ir Materiel Air Command , [schools Service

Seetor Command West 723 |GCI SkâgëËf - Air Base r : Alborg 72½ jfLir Base Regimen^ I Karup Coast Radar 'M Basic Train-j {Fixer Station 1 \- -P Air Base 726 ing Center j n.iKaru p frixer Station 2*1" —1727 Fixer Station ^jr- [Fixer Station k]- — 72Ö\ Air Base [Fixer Station 5 |- Skrydstrup 729 pixer Station 6 Lj 730 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Air Base Tirstru3 Air Base Vandel i

Operational elements of the Sector Commands. istffB DIESEL oiacAsSmM MOTORER 3- 1900 HK.

SK IPS WOTORER BAT MOTOPE R STASJOUitRWOTOHEB IwYSAGGREGATER KOMPRESSOR AGGREGATER PU MPEAGG REGATER

POSTBOKS 6S6 - OSLO

FLYP LA SSBE LY SNING

Til en rekko si vi L' og militiciv tl> pkiswi li.tr vi levert oj£ Weror vi : Rullebanelys, innflyvningslys, taxilys og hinderlys.

I. InUAKU Sl I'I KHItl li I!•:» I

Aw innilotdet:

HOLLEliVElEN 4. OSI-O- TIJ". 331> 11Hi Obersttnytnant F. W. Bistrup: Saniar Iwj tie. Obcrsttayf innt O. Julian: VernepliWt — Verving. Eiuri: present h lit i N or^e fur TIiv GfiieiiiI EIfLtric Co. LtiJ- of EiigbnJ Personalia. litteraturanmeldelser. medde leiser fra Fly- vâpncts Oîfisersforening etc. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE IjwiüMilg KjriiIIOIli .VarvfM-ns liiuskkompaiii A/S Pris kr. I.OO P. ERIKSEN MATERIALER, VERKTOY, REKVISITA FOR SKIBSvflOTOR< OC ANNEN M EK. INDUSTRI TELF.: SE NTRA L 90083 - TEL EG R AM AD R. : FAGMANN BERGEN

SHELL AVIATION SERVICE

EGEN GARD: FABRIK KGATEN 7 8- Telegramadresse over kele verden 1153 m1 guMlatc. vel utbytd mtd rtotcr oi krentr (or nsfon«N bchftndling. soricrm j og oppbevirmj a* vaJtn«

Repreientant (or Norge (or; «SHELLAIR» THOS. FIRTH & JOHN BROWN LTD., Sheffield. KuiIstSI og Iegerte stälsorter for ethvert olemed Publlkasjoner med da» over 16 av verkets spesi- alkvaliteter er Iorhinden og kan tilgendes pi an- roodning. Likeledes kan jeg sende Iagerprogram- Iwter over de kvalUeter og dimensjoner jeg forer pi lager I Bergen.

Q FIRTH BROWN TOOLS LTD., Sheffield. Fabrikerer maskinverktey av de fleste sorter, sivel av «SPEEDICUT» H.S. stJl som verktoy med «MITIA» hârdmetalskjer. Kauloger kan sen des. Pi O Iagtr forer jeg over 400 dim. av H.S. spiralbord fra 0,1 mm opptil 3", Slipte gjengetapper av H.S. stil opptil 2" BSW og BSP simt S.L H.S. maskinsag- blader opptil 24* og en rekke sorter av brotcher og fresere, DlmenijonsfortegneUer over Iagerferte sorter kan tendes pi an mod ni ng. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE j\OR$K LUFIMILITJIHT TIDSSKRIFT UTGITT AV FLYVAPNETS OFFISERSFOR ENING

REDAKSJON : TILSYNSKOM1TE: Redaktor: 0(wM(/«vfiiain O. T. MEHN-ANDERSEN. H F. MOTZEELDT. formann,

Annonses)ci: ^'.iWt-ui A. ENEl&LD TZfSiVir Attij1H V. ALLERS NILSEK F"[ I etui n^st": Ldyinutit L1 HE'LGESEN. Kamein 0. HASSELKNIPPE.

5. ARCANG SEPTEMBER 1954 NUMMER 7

INN HOLD

Artikler: Skh

d Obcvstlpijtnant F. W. Bistrup: Samaibejde 197

Oberstloytnant O. Julton: Verneplikt — Verving 213

Fjerde kuil fra Flyvapiiets stabsskole 221

Inferiorer fra Flyvapnets stabsskole 223

Personalia 225

Det var engang -¾ 228

LitteraturanmeIdeIser 229

MeddeIelser fra Flyvàpiiet? Offisersforening 231

JAS NA I BR UK AV fi. >1. f. iL^a'or HenrY Aagaards légat 232

VICKERS valiant — ETTERTRYKK UTEN A ANOI KILUE ER FORBUDT — 4 (tOUS-ROVCE AVON WOTOKfR Tidsskriftet utkomnier 10 ganger I iiet. Lossalgspris kr. 1.00. Lossalg gjennom Narvescns KiosW- kompani A/S. Arsabonnement: Innenlands kr. 10,00; i Uanmark og Sverige kr. 11,00: utlandet ellers kr. 12,00. Innenlands abonnement legnes Og betales over postgiro 150 51. Utenlands abon- nement kan tegnes ved Iienvendelse ill mermeste boklianüel. Adressetorandring — husk it oppgi VICKCeS-AKMSTKOHGS LTD. • AIRCRAFT DIVISION-WEYiIlIDGB-SUMFY • fNGlAWO ganunel adresse — ties meldt Ekspedfsjonscentralen. Rjidliusgt, S. Oslo, eller Forrelningsforeren, Açenttr: VAtDlMAIt KAtlFVIG S CO. TOlIflODG T\ 27, OSIO Norsk LufImlIitiErt-Tidsskrift, adresse Jagervn. 10, Holmen.

Sverre Uatil

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE iv AV QBERSTL0YTNANT F. W. BISTRUP

«• is- omers*/oyfrta/it Fktz Willem Bistrup, som er fe>dt i 1917. vac opp- rinnelig offtser i den danske marine, h vor han avanserte til orlogskaptein THE og hvor han tjenestcgjorde fra 1935 til hart — i oktober 1950 — ble overfort dl flyvapnet. Fra 1939 til han ble internert av tyskerne i august 1943 utforte ROLLS-ROYCE oberstloytnanten hovedsakelig sjßtjeneste. Fra oktober 1943 til august 1945 deltok hart i den danske motstandsbevegelse, blant annet som sjef for styrkene pà Lotland/F'alster. Deretter tjemstegjorde han som sjef. AVON gruppesjef og — i periodic — som f IotUjesjef for minesneipere, inn til \\han — ( april 1946 •— begynte sont eleu ved flygeskolen. is in world demand Fra oktober 1947 til juni 1951 gjorde oberstloytnanten tjeneste i marine ns flyvàpen i Danmark og pa Grönland, og innehadde blant annet s tilling en som sjef for marinens flystasjon i Kobenhavn og st'tllingen som sjef for marinens flyvàpen under annklingen. Etter overforingen til flyvapnet tsar oberstloytnanten blant annet sjef for fly sta be ns personell seksjon. For tiden tjenestegjor han som sjef for planlegg'tngsavdelingen i planleggingsstaben til hovedkvarteret for De allierte Iuftstridskrefter i Europa.

Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation, Australia; & «

Fabrique Nationale, Belgium; Hispano-Suiza, France; ^ INDLEDNING Wfcen 10, februar 1954 holdt jeg et foredrag pâ det norske flyvevâbens stabskursus om det danske flyvevâben. Jeg sluttede foredraget med and Svenska Flygmotor A/B, Sweden; nogle ganske summariske og personlige betragtninger om onskeligheden af og mulighederne for et udvidet direkte samarbejde mellem de to flyve- in addition to the ROLLS-ROYCE and vâben. Efter foredraget fulgte en interessant diskussion med eleverne; det other factories in Great Britain If a r saerlig problemer, der er löst forskelligt i Norge og Dan mark, der var genstand for elevernes interesse. For mig selv blev diskussionen en vaerdifuld oplevelse, og jeg blev bestvrket i min optattelse af, at man are all making it. ville kunne opnâ store fordele for begge flyvevâben ved et udvidet direkte samarbejde mellem dem. I denne artikel skal jeg derfor fremfore nogle tanker ved rore Jide et sädant samarbejde. Det vi] vel naeppe vœre muligt for norske flyver- officercr at vurdere disse tanker uden kendskab til det danske flyve- vabens forudsaîtninger og et forholdsvis klart billede af dets organisa- JOin-JCirCE LIMITED. DERBY. ENGLAND tion. i Jivert fald i hovedtrsekkene. Jeg skal derfor mdleitningsvis ridse f lyvevâbnets historié op fra begyndelsen af den anden verdenskrig og til dato, og derefter ganske summarisk gennemgâ dets organisation. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE HISTORIE I 1937 blev den forsvarslov vedtaget, som var gaeldende ved ud' bruddet af den 2. verdenskrig; denne Iov blev jkke aendret under be- saettelsen og var folgelig gaeldende, da landet efter befrielsen den 5. mai 1945 skulle genopbygge sit fors var. I henhold til denne Iov omfattede Danmarks forsvar haeren og so- vaernet under henholdsvis krigsministeriet og marineministeriet. Der var efter Ioven ikke noget flyvevâben, men haeren drev gennem « Hacrens Flyver trop per» og sovaernet gennem « Sovsernets Flyvevaesen» den dan- ske luftmilitaere virksomhed. Efter besaettelsen den 9. april 1940 blev arbejdsvilkarene for for- svaret yderst vanskelige, men det var dog sâledes, at sâvel hœren soin sovaernet kunne vedligeholde deres organisation og i begraenset omfang fortsaette uddannelsen af personel, dog med den vigtige undtagelse, at al militaer flyve virksomhed blev forbudt. Efter begivenhederne den 29. august 1943, da regering og rigsdag blev sat ud af spület af besaettelsesmyndighederne, ophorte al dansk Hans MajQifxt Konyen, i Flyvevàbncts gem: rahitm form, inspi'ccrcr cen af Fltjvcvabncts militaer virksomhed; ved befrielsen i maj 1945 stod Danmark derfor i enheder IoJsaget af Chefer. [or Flyceuûbnct, Ccncralloitnant C. C. F. Forsten. .alt vaesentligt uden militœre styrker. De problemer, der rejste sig ved befrielsen med hensyn til opbyg- danske forsvar, men det var uden vœsentlig betydning for opbygningen ningen af det danske forsvar, var derfor betydelige. For haerens og af egentlige militaere luftstyrker. sovaernets vedkommende var der som naevnt en vis kontinuitet i arbejdet Til de resourcer, der iovrigt var til râdighed ved krigens ophor for og en ikke ubetydelig personelstyrke at starte med; hvad imidlertid op- bygningen af et flyvevâben angik, var Situationen den, at der i realiteten opbygningen af flyvestyrkerne, horer endvidere det ganske vist meget ikke eksisterede noget, hvorpâ der rationelt kunne bygges videre. fâtallige personel, der havde tjenstgjort i de allierede, fortrinsvis norske. Der var ganske vist nogle fâ flyvere og flyvemekanikere samt et styrker, hvor de enten havde modtaget deres uddannelse eller havde beskedent administrative personel; men dette havde igennem de 5 âr, udnyttet kvalifikationeOde i forvejen havde fâet ved tjenstgoring i besaettelsen varede, ikke haft mulighed for at holde sine militaere faer- haerens flyvertropper eller sovaernets flyvevaesen. digheder vedlige i Danmark. Situationen straks efter befrielsen var altsâ, at bortset fra de smâ Endvidere manglede fuldstaendigt personel til de mange organer, danske styrker, der var uddannet for krigen, og det ganske lille antal som den anden verdenskrig havde vist var nodvendige for anvendelsen danske. der var uddannet under krigen i de allierede styrker, samt de af et moderne, selvstaendigt flyvevâben, sâsom kontrol- og varslings- mere eller mindre intakte efterladte tyske flyvestationer var der ikke tjeneste, signaltjeneste og andre spedelle jordt jenes ter. ^flöget, hvorpâ man kunne opbygge et flyvevâben eller genopbygge Hvad angâr materiellet var Situationen den, at de tyske besäetteisest; ^Kaerens flyvertropper og sovaernets flyvevaesen. styrker havde efterladt en del faste anlaeg og en del flyvemateriel ar forskellig art. De faste anlœg blev straks overtaget af de allierede be- L Forsvarsloven af 1937 var fortsat gaeldende. Den blev imidlertid frrelsesniyndigheder og matte naturligvis Iide en del under ikke at blive suppleret med bemyndigelser til forsvarsministeren, f. eks, til at bruge anvendt efter deres oprindelige hensigt. Anlaeggene blev imidlertid, efter- flere penge, opstille visse enheder, anvende disse pâ saerlig mâde, men hânden som de allierede styrker blev trukket hjem, afleveret til de danske det lâ ikke indenfor bemyndigelsernes rammer at oprette et selvstaendigt myndigheder, og disse anlaeg har naturligvis, med forskellige repara- flyvevâben. tioner og modifikationer, kunnet anvendes med godt utbytte. Hvad der- Tanken om et selvstaendigt flyvevâben tog naturligvis fart straks eftcr imod angâr fIyvemateriellet sâsom luftfartöjer, karetojer, s pecia ludrust- befrielsen, men der var iovrigt ikke, i militaere og politiske kredse, fuld- ning, vâben og ammunition m. v., blev alt dette i oveiensstemmelse med stœndig enighed om, at et "selvstaendigt flyvevâben var nodvendigt eller vâbenstilstandsaftalerne mellem de tyske og de allierede styrker enten blot onskeligt. Derfor blev afgorelsen af, om der skulle oprettes et sä- afleveret til disse eller destrueret; en mindre del blev afleveret til det DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE dant selvstaendigt flyvevâben, udskudt, til afgorelsen om forsvarets ord- ning i det fiele skulle traeffes. For imidlertid at komme i gang med opbygningen af militaere flyve- styrker — soni alle erkendte var en bydende nodvendighed .— blev haerens flyvertropper og sovaernets flyvevaesen igen organiseret, og en vis virksomhed tog sin begyndelse. De hovedopgaver, der pâ dette tidspunkt forelâ mulighed for at lose, var anskaffelsen af materiel og uddannelsen af personel, og der var i alle kredse enighed om, at hvordan dansk militaer flyvnings frem- tid end ville komme til at forme sig, ville man formentlig med fordet kunne udnytte faelles uddannelsesorganer og faelles materielfremskaffende institutioner. Der blev derfor af krigsministeriet og marineministeriet i faeIIesskab oprettet et organ faelles for haeren og s0vaernet til varetagelse af disse opgaver. Til belysning af de saerlige luftmilitaere problemer blev der end- videre nedsat et udvalg, som blandt andet skulle fremkomme med en udtalelse overfor forsvarskommissionen (der var blevet nedsat for at udarbejde lovene om forsvarets ordning) om oprettelsen af et selvstaen- dig flyvevâben. Ved forsvarslovene, der blev vedtaget i maj 1950 og ;uni 1951, blev flyvevâbnet sâ oprettet som selvstaendig va ben, og der blev lagt de nodvendige rammer for en personelordning. Samtidig med lovenes ikrafttraeden blev Danmark medlem af NATO og indgik herved pâ en raekke forpligtelser overfor dette f ors va rs faelles- skab: det mà erkendes, at lovene ikke var det bedst egnede instrument, nâr dansk forsvar skulle ses under NATO-synsvinkel, men mulighederne for at arbejde pâ det grundlag, som lovene giver, var til stede. Den opgave, der herefter var lagt pâ flyverkommandoen, var at udbygge flyvestyrkerne i overensstemmelse med de aftaler, der var truffet indenfor NATO og pâ grundlag af de vedtagne forsvarslove. Flyvevâbnet var sâledes skabt. Den 1. oktober 1950 blev flyverkommandoen oprettet, og samtidig blev haerens flyvertropper og marinens flyvevaesen nedlagt. En raekke enheder og anlaeg overgik til flyvevâbnet og fik sam- tidig nye navne. Sâledes blev pr. 8. januar 1951 folgende «iuftmarinel stationer» og «flyvepladser» benaevnt flyvestationer (FSN):

Pâ Sjaelland: FSN Kobenhavn (med eskadrille 721) FSN Vaerlose (med eskadrille 722) FSN Avno (med flyveskolen)

I Jylla nd: FSN Alborg (senere med eskadrillerne 723—24) FSN Karup (senere med eskadrillerne 725 — 26 — 27) FSN Skrydstrup (senere med eskadrillerne 728 — 29 — 30) DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE PERSONNEL PARACHUTE the P7-B * and P9-B'

Tit* Pi»n»*r Parachute Company ha» elwof» f»ar«t*d »ken* lo tho world only after C he [en for Flyvcvàbnct o g en def af Fiyvcrkommandocn !> ar kontorer m. c. her; rigid letting and proven porformanco. emdrc kontorcr er i cfcr u;/ lKimkker i luvrhe'lcn,

FSN Tirstrup (forelobig uden eskadriller) FSN VandeI (forelsbig uden eskadriller)

Haîrens «flyveafdelinger» og marinens «luftflotiller» blev nedlagt eg folgende eskadriller blev oprettet ogsâ pr. 8. januar 1951: ESK 721, Catalina, Seaotter. senere endvidere Helikopter ESK 722, Oxford, PR-Spitfire, senere Firefly ESK 723, Meteor, dayfighter, senere nightfighter ESK 724. Meteor, dayfighter ESK 725, F-Sl Thunderjet De n 1. april 1951 blev «Flyvevâbnets Mathskole» oprettet. Her ^^iddannes teknisk personel. Den 1. august 1951 blev «forsvarets inddeling i fredstid^ fastsat af forsvarsministeriet, herved fik «Flyvebasiskommandoeme» og «Flyve- 4 materieltjenesten» deres officielle beneevnelser, og reserveofficersskolen og sergent- og korporalskolen blev oprettet. De resterende eskadrilier blev derefter oprettet som folger: ESK 726 August 1952 »a ESK 727 November 1952 ESK 728 Maj 1953 REPR. FOR NORWAY: WIDER0E'S FLYVES E LS KAP ESK 729 September 1953 06 POIARFLY A/S ESK 730 Januar 1954 alle med F-84 Thunderjets. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Efter at vi nu har set, hvordan flyvevâbnet er blevet til og er vokset gennem ârene, skal jeg i ho ved t raekke ne beskrive det danske flyvevâbens nuvaerende organisation.

Auijiiodorpift F C iva r smi ni Jiere n Div ikcIfr, fagltge myndigheder. ORGANISATION F oi^varsjm n i ît er ie ; l pri&niutiooer'. konsule'Uer. m,v Ved flyvevâbnets oprettelse i 1950 blev der ved forsvarslovene fast- L jpgekgr p^t lagt en organisation, som siden da har bestâet uaendret; mindre vafsent-

Iige ting er naturligvis blevet korrigeret indenfor de rammer, som Iovcn Iniendaot ufkorp^et — fastlaegger. Det eneste virkeligt vigtige problem vedrorende Organisationen, der har vaeret rejst, er sporgsmâlet om flyvevâbnets overledelse og tilknyt- ning til de allierede kommandoorganer. Dette sporgsmâl er endnii ikke lost î Danmark. I Norge findes et «taktisk flyverhovedkvarter^, som i For Vvaft he (en forsvarsstyrelsen ti Jfadde af krig stilles under direkte kommando af Comairnorth. Op- rettelse af et tilsvarende «taktisk flyverhovedkvarter» i Danmark har kenge vaeret o verve jet, og nâr og hvis det bliver oprettet, mâ man an tage. fgrjvafsatabeo at det fâr en tilsvarende stilling som det norske. Situationen idag (april 1954) er altsâ forelobig den, at ledelsen af det danske flyvevâbens •styrker foregâr fra flyverkommandoen, hvis bygninger Jigger i Vedbaek ca. 20 km nord for Kobenhavn. Andre organisatoriske aendringer vil mâske blive aktuelle, nâr forsvarslovene skal revideres, hvilket efter H^rkor^rr-andoer» Fl ^verVommandoerf S6v«rrtîkooimiridoef» loven skal finde sted i naer fremtid. Flyvevâbnets operative organisation er baseret pâ landets geografiske Flyvevâbnet struktur. Der er to « f lyvebasiskom ma ndoer» omfattende arealerne hen- Grenlandt

holdsvis GSt og vest for Store Baelt og. benaevnt henholdsvis «0stre H^emrnçv«rnet Kommando Sövfctt>et Flyvebasiskommando» og «Vestre Flyvebasiskommando». Disse kom- mandoer er direkte underlagt flyverkommandoen sâvel operativ! som Nogie af dansk försvars vigiigste organer. administrativt og i princippet behandles alle sager vedrorende basis- kommandoerne direkte mellem disse og flyverkommandoen: af praktiske gründe har mail dog ladet en del rutinemaessige administrationssager Flyvestationschefens naermeste medhjaelper er operationsofficeren, overga til direkte behandling mellem myndigheder underlagt basiskom- der har ansvaret for flyvningen og for samarbejdet mellem flyvestatio- mandoerne pâ den ene side og flyverkommandoen pâ den anden side. nens operative led og eskadrillerne; stationsofficeren, der forer det over- Direkte under hver basiskommando sorterer flyvestationerne, og un- .ordnede tilsyn med stationens administration, og som samtidig overfor der flyvestationschefen sorterer sâvel eskadrillerne som flyvestationenal # 'stationschefen har ansvaret for fIyvestationens naerforsvar; stationstek- ovrige organisatoriske led. nikeren, der har ansvaret for vaerksteder og depoter pâ Stationen, og som Under basiskommandoen sorterer endvidere kontrol- og varslings- har tilsyn med den tekniske standard i eskadrillerne; og endelig stations- tjenesten i det pâgaeldende omrâde bestâende af GCI-stationer, «early intendanten, som sorger for pengeregnskab, lonninger, kostforplejning o. 1. warning» stationer og fixerstationskaeder, som alle er knyttet til et Operationsofficeren leder som naevnt eskadrillernes uddannelse og kombineret SOC/ACC, der ligeledes sorterer direkte under basiskom- sorger for beredskabets opretholdelse; han er dog noje tilknyttet Statio- mandoerne. nen og er, som det vil forstâs ikke alene leder af eskadrillerne, men ogsâ Flyvestationschefen har ansvaret for eskadrillernes beredskab og ud- af stationens operative organer, dannelsesstandard, samt for at flyvestationerne kan yde den statte, som Stationsofficeren har in/anteriuddannede styrker til sin râdighed og er ngdvendig under operationer, d.v.s. flyvekontrol, herunder GCA, link- er selv uddannet i haeren, men tilhorer flyvevâbnet, Han har ansvaret training, fototydning o.s.v. samt bevogtning, forsyntng, teknisk tjeneste for, at hele flyvestationens mandskab er uddannet i brugen af lette vâben m. v. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE tj] lokalforsvar, og han er ogsâ ansvarlig for mobilisering, udrustning og anvendelse af de styrker, der stilles til râdighed (or Stationen i krig. Stationsteknikeren har ansvaret for, at Iagrene pâ Stationen er til- straekkelige til at mpde de stillede operative krav, og for fordeling af luftfartojer til eftersyn; han overvâger luftfartojer, der er pâ stations- va:rkstedet til s terre eftersyn eller til reparation efter havarier, og sarg er for, at de vender tilbage til eskadrillerne i brugbar stand. Han har herunder ogsâ ansvaret for saerligt udstyr, sâsom luftfartojers bevaeb- ning, fotoudstyr, radio- og radarudstyr m. v. Det kombinerede SOC/ACC modtager meldinger fra basiskomman- doernes radarstationer og iovrigt ogsâ fra nogle af sovaernets radar- stationer. Pa basis af den «general situation map», der opstilles pà grundlag af disse meldinger, og pâ grundlag af meldinger fra flyve- stationerne ved r o rende beredskab, vejrforhold, «stock levels», o. s. v., foretager sektoroperationsofficeren pâ flyvebasiskommandochefens vegne de nedvendige dispositioner vedrorende de operationer, der skal ud fores, idet han «schrambler» luftfartojer pâ stationerne og beordrer GCI-sta- tioner til at kontakte og Iede disse luftfartojer. Fordelingen af luftfartojer til henholdsvis «Air Defence» og «Offen- sive Support» foretages çfter omstaendighederne af et JOC, hvori den pâgaeldende flyvebasiskommandochef og hans kolleger fra hœreri og eventuelt sovaernet er reprœsenteret. Bâde «Offensive Support» og «Air Defence» dirigeres gennem det samme (statiske) anlaeg. Forsyningen af flyvestyrkerne foretages gennem flyvestationernes Iagre og vaerksteder. Disse bliver igen forsynet af «Elyvematerieltjene- sten», der er direkte underlagt flyverkommandoen. Flyvematerieltjene- sten râder over et centralvaerksted og et centraldepot i hver flyvebasis- kommandos omrâde. Flyvematerieltjenesten har ansvaret for modtagelse. behandling og fordeling af materiel, der kommer udefra. Fremskaffelsen af personel til flyvevâbnet foretages enten gennem indkaldelse af vaernepligtige eller ved antagelse af frivilligt personel. Uddannelsen sker hovedsageligt ved flyvevâbnets egne skoler. Det vaernepligtige personel bemander hovedparten af jordforsvars- styrkerne og en vaesentlig del af de avrige tjenester i flyvevâbnet, f. eks.j depottjenesten, vaerkstedstjenesten, ordonnans- og korselstjenesten, kon- Flyvevâbnets vitftigste led samf noyle andre oryaner af s ter Iiy intéresse trol- og varslingstjenesten m. v. for flyi'äbnet. Det frivillige personel er enten civilt, f. eks, kontorpersonel, depot- personel o. 1., eller militasrt, nemlig flyveelever og elever til de tekniske skoler og andre specialskoler af forskellig art. Endelig antages frivilligt turligvis er den storste forbruger af meteorologiske oplysninger. hö- personel fra «Kvindeligt Flyvekorps». der vil büve omtalt nedenfor. herer den altsâ under flyvevâbnet. Den bemandes i alt vaesenüig af Udover de operative, forsyningsmaessige og uddannelsesmaessige or- civilt kontraktantaget personel (som muligvis engang i fremtiden vil fâ ganer findes der knyttet til flyvevâbnet nogle saerlige organer, som jeg tiff ag t militer grad og uniform). Det bema^rkes indskudsvis, at flyvc- kort skal omtale. kontroltjenesten i det danskç flyvevâben er ren militœr. «Forsvarets vejrtjeneste» er i henhold til loven underlagt flyverkom- « Luftmeldet jenesten» er en organisation af friviîlige, der foretager mandoen. Vejrtjenesten betjener hele forsvaret, men da flyvevâbnet na- visuelle observationer af begivenheder i luftrummet. og som gennem et DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE antal «centraler» meider disse observationer til de to basiskommandoers SOC/ACC. Kun chefen og et beskedent administrativ! personel er fast Fiierviation ^ , ansät; det ovrige personel har hjemmevaernsstatus. Af vital interesse for flyvevâbnets virksomhed er «Flyvemedicinck f ixeritatiOft 4 Institut». I henhold til de ministerielle bestemmelser i tilknytning til loven er flyvemedicinsk institut underlagt «Laegekorpset», der er faelles for de Flxeritdlion J tre vaern. Flyvemedicinsk institut foretager undersogelser af flyveaspi- ranter og forer tilsyn med det flyvende personel og enkelte andre per- Fmerstaiiori 2 sonelgruppers fysiske tilstand. Endvidere foretager flyvemedicinsk in- stitut forskningsarbejde vedrorende ffyvemedicinske problemer. FSN Vçdb«k FixerrtatiOA 1 «Kvindeligt Flyvekorps» er en forening af kvinder, der er oprettet for at stette fiyvevâbnet i krig og i fred. I lighed med tilsvarende orga- FSN Avpnq — FI pvcsk olçr nisationer knyttet til haeren og sovaernet har KvindeIigt Flyvekorps en Rei ryï kontrakt med forsvarsministeriet, der i alt vaesentligt giver korpset sam- Skolt CCI MuItebierg — me vilkâr som hjemmevsernet; administrativt er korpset da ogsâ under- FSN V*rlose — 17) lagt dette. Korpset har en sœrlig opgave derved, at fiyvevâbnet kan Flyvet^su CCl Skovhuse rekrutere kvindeligt personel til kontrol- og varslingstjenesten gennem fte|prnent FSN KQberihavft — 7J1 korpset. Dette personel, der niâ have gennemgâet en elementaer uddan- GCI Borr>holm nelse samt en speciel uddannelse i kontrol- og varslingstjeneste, knyttes ÖF6K * til fiyvevâbnet pâ saerlig kontrakt og aflonnes af og tilhorer fiyvevâbnet SOC/ACC indtil kontraktens udlob; de pâgaeldende skaï dog stadig vaere medlem- mer af korpset. F ^vemateritfl c p. t Iyverk ümiTi^ndoe n Disse summariske oplysninger giver formentlig tilstraekkelig for- stâelse af det danske flyvevâben til, at de efterfolgende betragtninger om samarbejde kan vurderes. SOCMCC

FSN Albori — CCi Skalen Fiyveba^ii Aejiment SAMARBEJDE 7 GCl KarMp For jeg kommer ind pâ en diskussion af formerne for et samarbejde -F I mellem det norske og det danske flyvevâben, bor vi lige se pâ, hvilket Rekrut Kyltradar FSN Karyp Stole samarbejde der allerede finder sted, og om forudsaetningerne for et ED udvidet samarbejde iovrigt er til stede. Endelig vil det sikkert vaere pâ F irritation 1 — sin plads kort at prœcisere formâlet med et udvidet direkte samarbejde, 43 Fixeritacion 2 — Da Norge og Danmark er medlemmer af NATO, finder der et be- tydeligt koordinerende arbejde sted i allierede stabe. I AAFNE behand- rED Ies luftmilitœre problemer for hele nordregionen, og dette giver sig na- FSN Skryditrup — ED turligvis ogsâ udtryk i en koordinering, i hvert fald i et vist omfang. Flverttalion 4 — Formâlet hermed er imidlertid, hvis man vil udtrykke det groft, for- FSN T speside — at hjaelpe hinan- konstruert av Dunlop for de nyeste jet- og nen pâ enhver trykkluftsy temer turbinily. Mir ni trykklufîsystemet mâde med at nâ manovrert ved hjelp av trykkluft beholdere den minimums- pä 3000 p,$.î> Trykkluft egner seg standard, de to SpesieU for gässturbin ' start og lande har for- pligtet sig til som er konstruert Jâkett-utskytning> over for NATO. En fulJstcmiijï oversikt over Dunlop- — at söge at delec for manovrerint! ÜV alle sla££ forbedre denne Hy-utstyr st• arbejdet kunne ivaerksaettes. Skal det give fuldt udbytte, tror jeg, at det mâ vaere sa omfattende som muligt; det vil sige, indenfor ethvert omrâde. hvor de to flyvevâben efter en nogtem vurdering kan konstatere vaerdien af et samarbejde, bor dette kunne bringes til udforelse. Man kan naturligvis sige, at samarbejde kan udfgres pâ mange mä- Matk I - 3 trims ~~ Ider. ogsâ i det smâ. Man vil formentlig uden videre kunne etablere et botnpressor sorti iïtustrasionen,1 i 'der bare Of 5 kg, IeteirCT Z Jt tut. fol Iuft l'f. min. % samarbejde mellem de to vaerns personel, f. eks. gennem udveksling af Aluri // er konstruert for tanker i militaere tidsskrifter og pâ anden made. Norge har jo et Iuft- slorre fly OÊ beh&vtr bare 20 ihf.i. for h&y kempresjott militaert tidsskrift; et tilsvarende er endnu ikke etableret i Danmark. og har stvrre Ooydfrytelse, luftmilitaere tanker og synspunkter mâ komme til udtryk gennem tids- skrifter, der er knyttet til haeren og sovaernet: dette er dog naeppe en uoverstigelig hindring for rundkastning af sine ideer. Man kunne mâske ogsâ taenke sig et arrangement i lighed med de sâkaldte venskabsbyer, f. eks. sâledes at korresponderende fIyvestationer i de to lande samarbejdede pâ privat basis, bl. a. ved at indsamle hen- DUNLOP RUBBER COMPANY LIMITED (AVIATtBH DIVISJON) FOLESHILL COVENTRY • ENGLAND holdsvis norske og danske tidsskrifter og udveksle disse. DEPOTER OVER HELE VERDEN Ogsâ personelkontakter vil jo iiemt kunne etableres, sâfremt perso- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE nellet under en eller anden form rejser til det andet land; og det viser sig i praksis, at danskere nemmere fär kontakt med naermaend end med folk fra nogen anden nation. Alt dette, hvor gavnligt det end kan vaere, er imidlertid kun drâber i havet og lider under alvorlige restriktioner. Kontakten vil blive spo- radisk og ikke planmaessig, og nationale sikkerhedsbestemmelser vil be- graense emnerne, der kan droftes, til meget generelle ting. Endvidere vit der vœre store praktiske vanskeligheder ved at bringe dokumentarisk materiale med pâ eventuelle besog. Det var derfor langt mere onskeligt, om man pâ hojeste niveau kunne etablere et udstrakt og planlagt samarbejde mellem de to flyvevâben. Det er indlysende, at et sâ udstrakt samarbejde ikke kan finde sted uden godkennelse fra de to landes hojeste instanser; for det forste vil der vœre en del okonomiske problemer i sagen, og for det andet findes der — mig bekendt — ikke nogen erfaringer af vaerdi for et samarbejde af den art, der her er tale om. Hvad- det okonomiske angâr, kan det imidlertid vel nok haevdes, at de udgifter, der vil medgâ ved et udvidet norsk/dansk samarbejde, hurtigt vil vaere' indtjent i form af foroget effektivitet, og fordi meget arbejde, der nu ud fores af de to flyvevâben hver for sig, ville kunne gores pâ en faelles basis. Hvad de ovrige problemer angâr, mâ man erkende, at selve det at vaere allieret i fred er noget nyt for vore lande, og dette mâ eller bor kunne tillade nye metoder. I det folgende vil jeg gâ ud fra, at man pâ en eller anden mâde fra de ansvarlige myndigheder i begge lande har opnäet godkendelse af et udvidet direkte samarbejde mellem de to flyvevâben, og jeg skal prove at nsvne nogle af de omrâder, hvor man da kunne onske sig samarbejdet ivaerksat. projektiler At nâ den enskede minimumsstandard er delvis et administrativt og fra delvis et operativt problem. Det administrative drejer sig isaer om frem- skaffelse af personel og om uddannelse og anvendelse af dette; det Armstrong operative drejer sig isaer om ovelser, ogsâ faellesovelser, men denne side af sagen loses gennem NATO og giver ingen problemer for tiden. Whitworth Der er vel ingen tvivl om, at meget af det arbejde, der laegges i Ios- ningen af de administrative problemer, er ens i de to flyvevâben. Der er vel heller ingen tvivl om, at mange af de problem er, der undersoges i vore to flyvevâben, ikke far en sä grundig behandling, som de skulle, WHitworth aircraft ltd,, ganske simpelt fordi det er umuligt i sâ smâ organisationer at tage fat BAGINTQK^COVENTRY. jENGLAND pâ alle problemer; men mâske har det ene flyvevâben netop lost sâ- Medlem «qHawket-Skldeley Gruppen. Banebrytende of ledende i verden* luftfart, danne problemer, som det andet ikke har taget fat pâ endnu. Det ville mâske vaere af interesse at fremdrage nogle specielle punkter: Et vigtigt problem i Norge og i Danmark er uddannelse. Noget DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE samarbejde har fun- net sted; men man samarbejder ikke selve uddannelses- planerne. Dette er mâske heller ikke muîigt; men man ville sikkert kunne fâ mange impulser i begge lande ved samarbejde. Et lignende pro- blem er folgende; Et flyvevâben har vel altid et med- HVILKET ANNET ansvar for, at hœ- TILG JENGELIG ren og marinen far den rette opplaertng FRE M KO M STMIDDEL i samarbejde med kan ta 10 mann med füllt ut- flyvestyrker. Dette styr, transporters dem over kraever en godkendt 80 kilometer terreng, util- doktrin og Iserebo- ger. Et samarbejde gjeiLgelig for all hjultran- her ville vaere en sport, og sette dem ned pâ îndlysende fordel. en fjelltopp eller en âpning Operative og ad- i skogen pâ 50 gaDger 50 ministrative direkti- meter, i Jepet av 35 min ut- ver og bestemmel- ser er det grundlag, ter? — hvorpâ et fIyveva- Vliwe bens virksomhed i fred og krig byg- ger. Metoden hvor- pâ disse direktiver udgives, er vigtig, STLAND og indholdet af di- rektiverne er natur- Obscr var ions post. ligvis af afgorende Eet af Iuftmeldetjcnestens «tàrne konstmcret af Flyi'evàbncf- betydning. Et sam- f/COPTERS arbejde her er Iige- ledes af indlysende fzAH 01 svarei vaerdi. Tilsvarende betragtninger vil kunne gores vedrorende mange om- WESTLAND AIRCRAFT LTD • YEOVIL - ENGLAND râder i de to flyvevâben." Agentur : AIR SERVICES, Llllt Cteustgt. S vu, Oll«, not Lad os da til sidst se pâ, hvorledes samarbejdet i praksis kunne ROLF VON BAHR ESQ., e/o Htlicopttr - Flye. A, 8. TflrttensorugBttn 12, Stockholm, Svttijt. udfores. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE De former for samarbejde, som man kunne taenke sig bragt til ud- forelse, falder, bortset fra egentlige ovelser, i to hovedkategorier, nemlig udveksling af personel og udveksling af oplysninger. Udveksling af personel kunne sikkert med stor fordel foregâ pâ alle niveauer i de to flyvevâben. Betydningen af at have personel fra det andet land i ansvarlige stillinger, f. eks. chefer i eskadriller, radar- enheder, flyvestationer, skoler o.s.v. er indlysende. Af saerlig betydning vil det dog vaere, om en udveksling af stabspersonel til de hojeste stabe mellem de to « Hyverkom m a ndoer» kunne finne sted, og om man kunne «blande» laerere og elever pâ stabskursus og -skoler, Udveksling af oplysninger vil ligeledes have betydning pâ naesten ethvert niveau, og det ville sikkert vaere bade praktisk og tids be sparen de, om man kunne gennemfore en fuldstaendig udveksling af operative og administrative direktiver og af skole- og kursusplaner, 1» re boger, hând- boger, «pamphlets» o.s.v. Ait dette er naturligvis kun eksempler pâ mulige samarbejdsomrâder. Det er umuligt uden et grundig Studium at fastslâ, indenfor hvor mange

felter et samarbejde ville have vaerdi, og hvorledes det kunne ivaerk- l-U«lrer Hunirr er »liunn«|ii| «fKrhpftt saettes. Afgorende vil det imidlertid vaere, om man starter samarbejdet Ktm »«Hem b**ct Iafvra Den» MOW haitighti, mnf« bevepnn* at pitoofik med den besternte tanke at ivaerksœtte det alle steder, hvor som tidligere n»ft9vi(tvn( o«r àef til «t Ufei viktij naevnt en nog tern undersogelse viser, at det ville have vaerdi. Dette vil btdraf ni Jet fnt Vouent militer* kraeve en plan udarbejdet i faellesskab. Ityrktr L«v*ran»r til R-A-F- nan dollirordrti for NATO h*r iàu i«<»Kprtont«i.

KONKLUSION HAWK fHUNT Under forudsaetning af, at man som naevnt ovenfor har en god- kendelse til at undersoge mulighederne for et samarbejde, ville det forste skridt, der skulle tages, efter min mening vaere at nedsaette et norsk/dansk samarbejdsudvalg, som skulle udarbejde de videre forslag til samarbejde og skitsere de nodvendige indstillinger til de respektive ministerier. Udvalget mâtte derfor bestâ af den hojst mulige sagkund- skab i de to flyvevâben. Kunne man virkelig realisere et sâdant samarbejdsudvalg og give de to flyvevâben rimelige befojelser til at foretage undersogelsen og bringe samarbejdet til udforelse, tror jeg, at man med stor sikkerhed kunne vente sig en opgangsperiode for begge flyvevâben. # Jeg er ikke i tvivl om, at det danske flyvevâben i forste omgang vil HAWKER A !RCRAFT LTD Ktn^JtQJt • on - Thames and Blackpool hoste de fleste fordele af samarbejdet. Men jeg er heller ikke i tvivl om, at intet vel er mere til fredsstillen de end at hjaelpe en fraende, der er î H£ r>L EM AV HAtt'KER *lO0£LE V GKU f CiN B AN EBH VT£ % L>£ LEDCS bE. I VE ft D È N i LCFT va ns ke Ii g heder. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Sandstrand—Flybase VGRiVEPLIKT - VERVIjV« Av OBERSTLOYTNANT 0. JULTON

M^orlengelsen av forstegangsopplaeringen i Haeren fra 12 til 16 mâneder er nâ vel i havn ejt.ter behandlingen av saken i Stortinget den 18/3 d. â., hvor forslaget ble vedtatt med stört flertall. Det var imidlertid regjeringens opprinnelige hensikt â fremme for- slag om 18 mâneders tjeneste ogsâ for Haeren. En mà derfor ha Iov tri! â gâ ut fra at det var av hensyn til opposisjonen mot forlengelsen at regjeringen ikke tok skrittet füllt ut med en gang. Ordskiftet i presse, foreninger og organisasjoner og sist i Stortinget, har vist at det er en forholdsvis sterk opposisjon mot forlenget tjenestetid. Det er jo ogsâ forstâelig, sett pâ bakgrunn av folkets tidligere primaere innstilling tii det militœre, og at enhver forlengelse av tjenestetiden er en oket belastning for den vernepliktige ungdom, Losningen med 16 mâneders forstegangsopplaering i Haeren tilfreds- stiller ikke det militœre krav til den feltmessige standard rekruttene bor .ït ha for overforing til brigaden. Sporsmâlet om en ytterligere forlengelse til mâneders tjeneste kan derfor komme opp senere og medfore de 1 samme meningsytringer, SIike diskusjoner utnyttes mest av Forsvarets Ettkfl tikrtt Itft trtltikthnl'f Acj. motstandere og gjor at en storre del av rekruttene moter til sin militaer- Imrfht rritd Ittnrytt Hl fürShvtttiftfIuitwtr ittttvt* tjeneste med en motvillig innstilling, hvilket gâr ut over den alminnelige liflfttrbrtk ag itrbfiitfkrtjft.i Senmei f er et robust fly for ubätjakt î ArtaklttHt ftnntltr sir Ietiall slags vier. I lullen pâ kort banc fra en moral blant soldatene. til ttltf i'ilttle deter*hvilke n som helst tilfetdig fcltllyplass; ja, Det stâende beredskap som mâlsettingen for vârt forsvar forutsetter, sci v en sands lia tief kan her vœrc mâ vi regne med mâ bli â opprettholde i en ârrekke framover. Fer spors- lilsliekkelig, Scamcw kan ved bjelp av mâlet om en eventuell ytterligere forlengelse av forstegangstjenesten tas radar Icde sök etter ubâter til liavs, og kan ba;rc mange slags vépen til senkning opp, bor det derfor vurderes inngâende om det ikke kan vaere andre av mindrc fart oyer. Dels glîmrcndc losninger til â opprettholde et bra beredskap. manövringsevnci lave minstchastighct og I diskusjonen om tjenestetiden har en savnet radikale forslag til alter- faste, stötdempende und erstell gjör det nativer for â kunne oppnâ det fastsatte mâl for forsvarsberedskapet. Det mulig â lande sikkert under vnforlioid eneste alternativ som har vaert sœrlig berort er sâledes 12 mâneders HjaSme pd SF.AAlIiW inn som andre anti-ubätfly ikke kan grçic. Ittt Uj/i.t HI drn dinttnsjttn tjeneste med forlengede repetisjonsovinger. Et alternativ som toser spors- Jfliij best jnny fwitttidtnt pâ flyptassen. mâlet om stâende forsvarsstyrker ved hjelp av frivillig verving av m en ige mannskaper har sâvidt jeg har fulgt med i pressen kun vaert loselig an- The Short answer tydet i et par aviser. Seamete Hensikten med den artikkel er om mulig â fâ reist interessen for is the sporsmâlet om mulighetene for en endret vernepliktsordning, slik at saken Dttt tacrdfUi iatx miiutthat- kan bli grundig utredet. Tanken pâ dette sporsmâl er for mitt vedkom- tigfat og //j tîdinffihâi tightt skylJis for tu rior

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Xllt 213 soldater bare for à holde fredsstyrken ved like. Utskrivningskvoten er c Iikevel ikke stor nok til at en fâr tilstrekkelig kvaütativt utvalg for den FOKKER S. 14 W ack'^rain&r tekniske spesialutdannelse som er nodvendig i Flyvâpnet. Sporsm âlet om â forlate vernepliktsystemet har tidligere vaere be- handlet av bl. a. militœrskribenten Liddel Hart. Han mener at med den forsvarsberedskap nasjonene nâ mâ holde, og den form en eventuell fram- tidig krig vil bryte ut pâ, er det ikke lenger rasjonelt med verneplikt- systemet i den nâvœrende form. For Norges vedkommende kan det imidlertid ikke bli tale om â forlate vernepliktssystemet i den forstand. Det som vi event uelt vil kunne gjore er â basere det stâende beredskap pâ frivillig vervede forsvars- styrker og bygge ut et sterkt Heimevern (og Lokalvern) med vernepliktige mannskaper. Selv om jeg er klar over at det kan reises vektige innvendinger mot eventuelle endringer (saerlig for Haerens vedkommende), mener jeg at saken i til feile mâ utredes under hensyn til alle forsvar s grener. Jeg vil derfor i det folgende naermest med legmannsbetraktninger forsoke â framstille de argumenter som kan tale for â endre vâr nâ vae- re n de tjenestepliktsordning i alle forsvarsgrener. ' Landets stâende beredskap er som kjent forutsatt opprettholdt ved de 2 stâende brigader i Hasren samt garnisonerende styrker i Marinen og Flyvâpnet. For a holde dette beredskap med vel ovde mannskaper kreves det, Ia oss si, 18 mâneders forstegangstjeneste i alle vâpen. Til Heime- vernet som i og for seg skulle vaere vel egnet til â dekke en st or re del av kuppberedskapet, blir det kun utskrevet mannskaper utenfor verne- pliktig alder, frivillige og ârsklassene 1940—45. I denne forbindelse kan nevnes at enkelte offiserer i Haeren ut fra rent taktiske vurderinger har reist spersmalet om en styrkning av Heime- vernet ved â sla det sammen med Lokalvernet. Et kuppforsvar mâ dekke hele landet til enhver tid. Slik som vâre forsvarsstyrker er utgangsdisponert i fred, mâ det bli Heimevernet og Lokalvernet som ma stâ for det «indre» kuppforsvar landet over. De stâende forsvarsstyrker mâ nyttes til â slâ til mot de steder de rene militaere angrep er rettet. Sporsmâlet er da om det ikke mâ satses noe mere pâ Heimevernet og Lokalforsvaret ved â oke dette forsvars mann- skapsstyrker bade kvantitativt og kvalitativt. The "Derwent" or "Nene"-powered "Mach-Trainer" is Ved â sla sammen HV og Lokalvernet til en forsvarsorganisasjon og over fore verneplikten til denne organisasjon samt bemanne Haerens the ideal link in the training programme, between the brigader og Flyvâpnets og Marinens avdelinger med vervede mann- advanced trainer and the fast jet fightet. skaper vil en oppnâ et sterkt Heimevern for kuppberedskap samt ha It has already been adopted by the Netherlands and stâende forsvarsstyrker mot militaere overfallsstyrker, Brazilian Airi'orces. Nar det i det etterfolgende nevnes Heimevernet, er det da under forutsetning av at en slik sammenslâing blir gjennomfert. Hvor lang tjeneste en i tilfelle skulle pâlegge de vernepliktige i HV mâ jo utredes sœrskilt, men som diskusjonsgrunnlag kan folgende an- ROYAL NETHERLANDS AIRCRAFT FACTORIES tydes: 4 mâneders f0rstegangstjeneste (rekruttskole) i det forste verne- SCHtPHOL - ZUID * AMSTERDAM

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LOOK T O LOCKHEED FOR LEADERSHIP DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE pliktsâret, deretter 4 repetisjonsovinger à 15 dager, som avtjenes med 1 repetisjonsoving hvert annet âr i forbindelse med manovrer og feiles- Rasjonalisering av tekking med to lag takpapp ovinger. Den totale plikttjeneste i fredstid blir sâledes i tilfelle 6 mâneder. De viktigste fordeler ved et blandet system med verneplikt og vervet forsvarsstvrke kan anses som folgende: ICOPAL-HERKULES-METODEN a Liten vernepliktsbelastning î fredstid pâ storsteparten av den opp- Icopal /Uhm underlagspapp i samme rull! voksende ungdom. " b) Et lite men effektivt stâende forsvar og et bedre kuppforsvar landet over ved hjelp av styrket Heimevern. c) Den ungdom som Iar seg verve kan gis anledning til utstrakt sivil utdannelse i vervingstiden. d) En del av de vervede som etterhvert dimiterer fra de stâende bri- gades mâ forutsettes à ha sâ god militaer utdannelse og praksis at de kan nyttes som befal i Haerens og Heimevernets mob.-oppsettinger. Pâ den annen side kan det anfores folgende mangier: a) Driftsutgiftene vil bli noe storre. b) Gjennomforingen er avhengig av frivillig rekruttering til Flyvâpnet, Marinen og Haerens brigader. c) Ordningen vil begrense mob.-oppsettingen i antall av vel utdannede f embrigader for Haeren. Til ovennevnte fordeler og mangier kan det bl. a. knyttes folgende lCOPAL'HERKULES'JO IETT" kommentarer: a) Ved â redusere fredstjenesten til 180 dager for den utskrevne verne- InneWrer for be J ret D0BBELTEKK1 NG i en arbeidsupcrasjotu pliktsmasse, mâ en ha Iov til â gâ ut fra at innstillingen til Forsvaret 1 en rull à IOO cm. Lrcddc bestir den ikke vil svekkes hos ungdommen. En alminnelig tjenesteplikt i HV cue Iiitlvpjrt a v original I CO P AL, mens skulle ogsâ passe godt for norsk lynne. den aimcn bat v par» beslar av Herkules ujitlcrljgspapp. Deriiv navnet ICOPAL- b) Dersom det blir Jagten en storstilet mulighet for utdannelse for de HERKULES • „TO 1 ETT". Denne vervede i de stâende forsvarsstyrker, vil en kunne sette vervings- koniliinerle rull pâlegges vanligvis vertikal t tiden til 6—8 âr. At de stâende forsvarsstyrker derved blir vel ©vet pâ uket og fois-kyves h ver gang en halv og betinger en utmerket beredskap, skulle vaere innlysende. ruIltbreddc som Iegningen viser. Hele om- Iegget blir klebe I med var m «stall. c) Ved et slikt system vil landet fâ en enestâende sjanse til â gi ube- ICOPAL- midlet ungdom en utdannelse, og den samme ungdom gis anledning HERKULES- 1. Tiktekkine i to lug Icopal A. ht!f omlfgçrl Mir fcjrta, til â yte staten noe i gjengjeld ved tjeneste i Forsvaret. METODEN blir Icrdig med en gang. 3. Jevnere Og pen ere 5. Lette» hindterlog Med andre ord, staten vil kunne legge en stor del av de forskjellige „TO I En» Î. Man Wr et ittrkerc lak. Det blir mer Iiv i av rullene. vekt ca. 28 fe • JB statsskoler til Forsvaret og slâ 2 fluer i en smekk. De typer skoler Aom kan an vende a eg IioIdLarcrc tak, UA- Iakei pi grvnn av de kg, pt. 10 m*. vet pi If«* iom pi bepappe* n i Kelt rulltfn- to smalere eynli- papp- og utdannelser som kan legges til Brigadene, Flyvâpnet eller louglai. byr pi fol*lnrtuklaitc s kvulitei bredder. Det gii vaolig 10-ârt Marinen skulle i forste rekke kunne bli folgende: Laererskoler, Iands- ÇCDtle ford viel ; »v (itler sont for vanlift 4. EkKra soliditel, da garanti. il gymnas, statsrealskoler, handelsskoler, 2-ârige tekniske skoler, Sper dtrhr titer ICOPAt - „TO I ETT". landbruksskoler, fiskerfagskole, sosialskoler, styrmannsskoler. ma- Fatnttrei i (ri. red Og Sr»tw farw. skinistskoler samt kokk- og stuertskole. I tillegg til disse rent teo- retiske skoler vil det ogsâ med letthet kunne organiseres laerlinge- skoler og yrkesskoler med etterfolgende praktisk laeretid i hândverker- fag eller andre spesialfag, eksempelvis boktrykkerutdannelse. Ledelsen og driften av de sivile skoler som «overfores» til Forsvaret bor fortsatt skje ved sivile skolebestyrere og laerere. En slik ordning vil svekke eventuelle argumenter mot vervingssystemet om at de ver- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE vede blir «utsatt» for en ensidig militer pavirkniiig gjennom flere ar. d) Ved en forutsatt vervingstid pâ 6—8 är kan en regne med at den effektive militaere tjenestetid vil bli 3—5 àr. En del av denne tid bor nyttes til â gi de vervede utdannelse som troppsbefal, slik at de senere kan disponeres i mob.-oppgjoret til feltoppsettingene i Haeren eller Heimevernet. T T TiI ovennevnte mangier kan i store trekk knyttes folgende kom- TlT mentarer: a) Det budsjettmessige utsiag blir ikke sä stort som en ved forste reak- sjon skulle tro. Merkostnaden kan selvfolgelig kun utregnes etter noye beregninger i henhold til eksakte forutsetninger for oppsetnin- genes storrelse og utrustning, men et visst bilde kan gis ved neden- nevnte anslagsvise beregning. De vervede mâ selvsagt gis en storre daglonn enn de utskrevne sol- dater har i dag, dertil mâ de gis en bonus ved dimisjon etter endt vervingsperiode. La oss anta at oket daglonn og bonus vil utgjore tilsammen kr. 20.~ pr. dag pr. soldat, I den anslagsvise kostnadsberegning for de 2 systemer kan en forut- sette at utgifter til befalsorganisasjonen, materiell, anlegg, utbyggings- arbeider, re petisjon saving er m. v. stort sett vil bli like store ved begge ordninger. Som beregningsgrunnlag kan da nyttes den administrative gjennomsnittsutgift pr. tjenestegjorende dag, hvori inngâr: Daglonn, kost, klser, kvarterutgifter, reiseutgifter osv. Denne dagskostnad kan eksempelvis settes til kr, 20.— pr, tjenestegjorende dag. For beregningen kan eksempelvis forutsettes folgende vervede styrker: Hœren, 2 brigader à 4000 — 8000 mann DOUGLAS reservedeler Garden + andre enheter i Haeren — 1500 » for 0yeblikkelig leverittg over hele verden! Flyvâpnet .,., = 2000 » Marinen — 1500 » Tilsammen 13000 mann DOUGLAS fremstillec fremdeles komplette sett flydeler for DC-3 og DC-4 sâvelsom for DC-6. Ordres Utskrivningsstyrken pr, âr kan forutsettes til 16 000. Dette utgjor vil altid ha var storste oppmerksomhet 24 000 tj.gj. soldater âret igjennom ved IS mndrs. tjenestetid i alle for- o£ cffcktticrcs llliIfij; over t;ind, svarsgrener. Av utskrivningsstyrken kan beregnes at 3000 hvert är vil sjo- og luftvcien, alt ccter k Lindens Oepcnrf on la seg verve til de stâende styrker, Beregningen blir da: onske. Millioner reservedeler for DOUGi a) For kombinert vernepliktssystem og vervet styrke: de ovenfor nevnte fly typer has pâ y For vervet styrke: lager. Deres iUustrerte DOUGLAS- Genuine 13000 X (20,— + 20.— ) X 360 — kr. 187,200,000,— katalag over de 1er og priser, vil hjelpe Spare Pnrfx Dem ved bestillingen av Deres ordre«. For Heimevernet: 13000 X 20,— X 120..— — » 31,200,000,—

Tilsammen kr. 218,400,000,— DOUGLAS' avdeling for reservedeler, Douglas Aircraft Company Inc., TeIeJramadresse: DOUGLASAIR, Santa Monica, California, U.S.A. b) Vernepliktsystemet 18 mndrs. tjenestetid: 24000 X 20 X 360— » 172.800.000,- Merkostnad kr. 45,600,000,— pr. Ir DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Med et arlig forsvarsbudsjett pâ JOOO mill, kroner skulle ikke oven- nevnte merkostnad vaere av avskrekkende betydning. I overnevnte beregnmg er ikke tatt med utgiftene til den sivile opp- laering. Hertil kan bemerkes at en mâ kunne forutsette at staten i tilfelle vil kunne innspare noe opp til det tilsvarende belop pâ det nâvaerende sivile skolebudsjett. Det ejtstraordinaere anleggsbudsjett som en eventuell overgang til et slikt system." vil betinge, mâ enn videre anses som engangs- utgifter. Det vil vesentlig omfatte bygging av skolelokaler for den sivile opplaering. I den forbindelse kan en igjen forutsette at de statsskoler Vi IevereT : som ligger naermest de militaere etablissementer for de garnisonerende Flymateriell, fly og flymotorer styrker knyttes til Forsvaret, hvorfor behovet for bygging av skole- etabÜssementer skulle kunne vesentlig innskrenkes. Flyplassbelysning Stasjonsutstyr Rekruttering. Brannalarmanlegg Pâ bakgrunn av den nâvaerende erfaring forsvarsgrenene har ved- Tyverialarmanlegg r or en de frivillig rekruttering til Forsvarets befalsskoler og spesialutdan- nelse, kan det sikkert reises sterk tvil om det i det hele tatt kan bli mulig A â rekruttere sâ store frivillige styrker. /s AERO-ELECTRIC Med den nâvaerende situasjon pâ arbeidsmarkedet vil nok ogsâ re- krutteringen bli det storste problem for en eventuell gjennom faring. TIDEMANNSGT, 31, OSLO - TELEFON 44 69 84 Landet har vel imidlertid ikke hâp om a kunne opprettholde den syssel- setting som det har i dag. Under et eventuelt strammere arbeidsmarked vif en sâledes kunne regne med storre frivillig sokning til militaertjeneste og utdannelse. Det viktigste middel til â trekke ungdommen til frivillig militaertje- neste mä allikevel i alle til^lle liage i de utdannelsesmugheter som kan bys. Ved â satse pâ en storstilet utdannelse i Forsvarets regi som oven- for foreslâtt, mâ en sâledes ha Iov til a regne med tifstrekkelig tilgang, Selv om det er blitt lettere for ubemidlet ungdom â skaffe seg skole- utdannelse i den senere tid, er det ennâ mange evnerike som ikke slipper til p. g. a. bosteds- og okonomiske forhold. I denne forbindelse er det naturlig â minne om den store betydning Haglammunisjon - Rifleammunisjon de tidligere underoffisersskolene i sin tid hadde for landet. Der fikk jevnerik Iandsungdom en god bâde sivil og militaer utdannelse som senere Festfyrverkeri kom landet til gode bade Î Forsvaret og det sivile naeringsliv, Utdan- nelsesordntngen skapte en samhorighet med Forsvaret hos folket. En tilsvarende samhorighet kan i enda storre utstrekning skapes ved â Rokammunisjon - Signalammunisjon gjennom fore en utdannelsesordning som her er foreslâtt. Ved over fori ng av endel statsskoler for bade almen og EagIig ut- dannelse til Forsvaret for vervet personell, vil en kunne regne med â RAUFOSS AMMUNISJONSFABRIKKER trekke et tilsvarende antall elever til vervet tjeneste i Forsvaret. Som en belysning av mulighetene for rekruttering kan fra statistiske Poitadresie: «Raufoiss — Telegramadreiie: «Pabrikkene» oversikter nevnes folgende elevantall (mannlige elever) ved statens hoy ere almenskoler og fagskoler i de siste ar: Laererskolene: 900, stats- drevne gymnas: 3000, landsgymnas: 1000, statsrealskoler: 400, Iandbruks- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE skoler: ca. 2000. 2-ârig tekn. skoler (Bergen, Trondheim og Horten): 930, de tekniske fagskoler ( Skiensf jorden, Sorlandet og Bergen): 450, ele- mentaertekniske skoler < Stavanger og Oslo): 275. handelsgymnas: 1800, statsstottede sjomannsskoler: 1100, statsstottede maskinistskoler: 1800.

Mobiliseringsoppsettingen av feltbrigader i Haeren. Den st ors te mangel ved et vervingssystem for fredsoppsetting av Haerens brigader ville i tilfelle bli den begrensede mulighet ordningen vil gi for oppsetting av feltbrigader ved mobilisering. De mannskaper som har gjennomfort sin tjeneste i Heimevernet vil i tilfelle kun vaere egnet for oppsetting av Iett bevaepnede infanterienheter. Forsvaret mot vaepnet angrep mâ derfor i tilfelle legges om til s tor re taktisk bruk av Heimevernet oppsatt som lettbevegelige enheter for geriljakrigforing. Noen annen losning pâ dette problem kan vel neppe gis.

Orduingens gjennoinforing. Generelt. En eventuell gjennomforing av den foreslâtte ordning kan og bor skje skrittvis, f. eks. ved en forsvarsgren ad gangen. Den bor i tilfelle forst (jjen nom fores i Flyvâpnet, derpâ i Marinen og til slutt ved Haerens brigader. Nâr systemet eventuelt er opptatt ved aile forsvarsgren er, bor mann- skaper som vil la seg verve kunne fa velge forsvarsgren og den si vil - utdannelse de vil ha. Type av tjeneste antar en derimot av praktiske grunner ofte mâ bli â bestemme av vedkommende forsvarsgren. 50 •/. MODERASJON Alle som Jar seg verve bor gis den generelle rekruttutdannelse sam- men med den ordinaere utskrivningsstyrke i Heimevernet, hvoretter de irmrommes pâ Dtdenrievnte billeltpriser for milil sere pâ permisjon: Oslo - Vestfold v.v. kr. 25. Vestfuld- fordeles til sine vâpen. Stavanger v.v, kr. 85. OsIo-Stavaoger v.v, kr. 95. Vervingstiden antas â kunne settes generelt til sivil utdannelsestid Oslo-Trondheim v.v. kr. 130, Oslo-Bergen v.v, pluss 3—4 âr. Endel sivile skoleetablissementer bor kunne overfores til kr. 120 (î samfl. med VLS). Forutsetningen er at man .Forsvaret og inngâ i vedkommende militaere etablissementsomrâde. Det ikke fortrenger füllt betalende passasjerer, Billettbe- mâ ellers vaere forutsetningen at soldatene i skoleperiodene fortsatt er stillinger og opplysninger hos reisebyrâene eller hos mîlitaert innkvartert hos vedkommende vâpenenhet. Etter endt vervingstid pâlegges personellet repetisjonsovinger som ordinaere vernepliktige i den utstrekning myndighetene til enhver tid bestemmer. De skoler som overfores til Forsvaret mâ gis full eksamensrett. Annullering av vervingskontrakt bor kun skje under meget strenge forutsetninger.

For Flyvâpnet. Flyvâpnet er den forsvarsgren hvor vervingssystemet vil passe best BRMTHENS S H F B FR. NANSENS PLASS 7 — OSLO — SBNTRALBOftn îî î) Wl og hvor det er enklest â organisere. Bare for â holde fredsstyrken av mekanikere og tilsvarende vedlike er det ved den nâvaerende ordning nodvendig â utdanne ca. 80 r/c av den ârlige utskrivningskvote ved Fly- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE väpnets skoler og kurser. Ved verving av dette personell vil en for det forste fà vel kvalifisert rekruttering til spesialist- (yrkesbefal) stillingene. og dornest unngâ den overproduksjon som vâpnet i dag har av mekaniker- utdannet personell. Den praktiske ordning for Flyvâpnet kan antydes som folger: TiI den tekniske utd^pnelse bor knyttes sivil utdannelse ved real- skole og/eller 2-arig teknisk skole. Til den operative tjeneste bor knyttes sivil utdannelse ved hoy ere almenskoier og Isererskole. Til den administrative tjeneste bor knyttes sivil utdannelse ved hoyere almenskoier og handelsutdannelse. Vervingstiden for de som velger teknisk utdannelse antas â passe med 6 är og kan eksempelvis oppdeles slik:

Teknisk forskole 4 mâneder RekruttskoIe 4 » Mekanikerkurs 4 » Praksis ved avd 12 » Spesialistkurs 4 » Praksis ved avd 8 » WlNGE & COs REISEBUREAU 2-ârig tekn. skole 24 » Befalskurs 4 » OSLO Tjeneste som befal ved avd 8 »

Tiden melJom semestrene pâ vedkommende skoler nyttes til ferie og tjenestegjoring ved avdeling under luftforsvarsovinger m. v, I skoletiden forlegges elevene pâ den stasjon som ligger normest vedkommende skole. Eksempelvis kan antydes at 2-ârig teknisk skole i Stavanger, Kristiansand, Trondheim og Bode knyttes til Flyvâpnet. hvorved de flystasjoner som er beliggende ved disse byer kan nyttes til forlegningssted for elevene. En tilsvarende utdannelses- og tjenestefordeling organiseres for ver- vet personell i den administrative og operative tjeneste. De nâvaerende utskrevne soldater i hjelpetjenesten kan for Flyvâpnet Jett erstattes med engasjement av sivile, bade kvinner og menn, eiler det Aer 'n9en ^nS i veien for ogsâ â verve endel for hjelpetjeneste mot sivil KVA LITETS MER K ET ™skoleutdannelse. FOR SVEISEVERKT0Y II For Marinen. Gjennomforingen i Marinen antar en vil kunne skje like enkelt som i Flyvâpnet. N.A.GASACCUMULATOR De sivile skoler som blir aktuelle â knytte til Marinen blir i forste rekke styrmannsskoler, skipperskoler, m a skin is ts koler, kokk- og stuert- Kr. Aujusttjt 7 b - OSLO - Sentr4Ibortj 3Ï 53 7J skoler, fiskerfagskole samt hoyere almenskoier og enkelte andre fag- skoler. Vervingstiden fastsettes under hensyn til den sivile utdannelses varig- het. Det fastsettes en tilsvarende tjeneste- og utd an ne Isespl an som oven- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE for antydet for Flyvâpnet. En antar at det ville vaere naturlig â knytte sivile skoler i Kristiansand, Horten, Bergen og Trondheim til Marinen,

For Ilairen. Moktßfl De vervede fordeles til vâpen i storst mulig utstrekning etter eget onske, men dersom ikke vedkommende vâpen har établissement er hvor det drives den onskede sivilutdannelse, ma fordelingen skje etter bri- gadens bestemmelse. Det forste âr, eventuelt mere, avsettes til ren mili- taer utdannelse, eventuelt med innlagt undervisning i almenfag og sam- funnskunnskap. Soldatene over fore s deretter til « be red ska pskom panier» SLIPE- og POLERMASKINER eller tilsvarende enheter. Tjenesten her organiseres slik at soldatene til- 7?ied boyelig ahsel naermet fâr det antall skoleuker i âret som ved tilsvarende sivile skoler. Det drives sivil skole kun 5 dager i uken. Den 6. dag nyttes til militaer- ovinger og stell av materieflet. Det nyttes 1 mäned om vinteren og 1—2 Elektrisk drift for mâneder om sommeren til militaerovinger. 1 eller 3 fase strom De typer av sivile skoler og utdannelser som knyttes til Hseren bor i forste rekke bli: Hoyere almenskoler, laererskoler, landbruksskoler, skog- STÂLB0 RSTER bruksskoler, 2-ârige tekniske skoler samt yrkesskoler og handverkerut- dannelse. SLIPESKIVER De statsskoler i ovennevnte utdannelser som er beliggende i nœr- FILTSKIVER heten av et brigadeetablissement kan naturlig inngâ i etablissements- FRESER omrâdet. For Haerens vedkommende antar en det mâ bli nodvendig med endel bygging av skoleetablissementer i forlegningsonirâdene. FILER Eventuell be fa lsopplaering som troppsbefal bor skje i den siste periode ETC. a v vervingstiden etterat den sivile utdannelse er avsluttet.

Leveres ogsâ med 2 For Heimevernet. HK motor med 6000 Heimevernets (Lokalvernets) organisasjon mâ utvides til a kunne og 7500 omdr. pr. overta hele den del av utskrivningsstyrken som ikke Iar seg verve. En min. for tekstilbund- antar at de nâvaerende infanteriregimenter vil kunne ta denne oppgave. ne skiver. Ovelsesplassene (rekruttutdannelsen) for Heimevernet bor ligge i umiddelbar naerhet av de kuppforsvarsobjekter som skal vaere forsvart i Be om brosjyrer og fred. Flyplassene ma i denne henseende vaere de primaere oppgaver. | For à kunne nytte rekruttkompanier til vakthold pâ flyplassene bor nxrmere opplysninger. sâledes rekruttutdannelsen Tor en stor del av utskrivningsstyrken hen- legges til de stars te flyplassene. Model! M 136 Levering fra lager! Med 4 mâneders rekruttutdannelse mâ en kunne nytte rekruttene til vakttjeneste etter en 2 mâneders periode. Under denne forutsetning mâ en sâledes holde 2 rekruttkompanier i tjeneste til enhver tid pâ Flyvapnets hovedflystasjoner og storre flyplasser. Etter endt forstegangstjeneste ( rekruttopplasring ) organiseres Heime- Maskin^Klunds Co. vernssoldatene i mob. oppsatte enheter som innkalles til repetisjonsovin- OSlO ger i samsvar med sine oppgaver for kuppforsvar og mobilisering. ffortsettes nederst pâ side 221) DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE FJERDE KULL FRA FLYVÂPNETS STABSSKOLE

Alltid de siste nyheter i dame- og herrestoffer. immmimmminitiiiimiimtimwi Leverandor i uniformstoffer, IMllltlllllllllllllllllMtlllllllllllllllllllll P/H Forsaker Pan American SoLplawen 1 -OaIa-Df, 41OSS0 Verdens inest dC-s^emé srfarne flyielskap. G run lagt. 1857 ' Varemerlte. Pan Amertean World Airways Inc. OSLO

Ucn 9. april i Är uteksaininertt Flyvapiiets stabsskole sttt fjeriie clcvkull. Pâ iotograiiet sees i (orreste rekke Ira venstte: Maj»r Erling Ulleberg, kaptein T. Notland (studicleder), Group JERNVARER Captein D. H. Lee, DFC, HAF (britisk (SJsiver), o tie rstlny Inant 0. T, Mehn-Antlerscti (skolc- sjeO, major H. E. Bjornestad (stuoletedei), major B. Hasle. Bakerste rekke fia venstre:

Major G. A. Berg, kaptein 0, Huus1 kaptein O. Christiansen, kaptein J. Bjornland, kaptein V E R K T 0 Y Th. Larssen, kaptein S. Stolt, kaptein A. Tennfjord, major Knut IH. Haugtand, major P. O. K. Lausund, major Finn B. Mostad1 major H. R. Anonsen, oberstifiytnani E. Erla. KJ 0 K K E N- FLYRADI O (VERNEPLIKT ETC, — fortsatt fra side 220) Sakens videre utredning. UTSTY R SENDEKE Den tekniske utvikling i Forsvaret, den politiske utvikling og den M OTTAKERE Aalminiielige forsvarsinteresse kan innen fâ âr gâ i den retning at der mâ SPORT K V.H.F, RADIOTELEFON ^finnes andre losninger for tjenesteordningen i Forsvaret. Med oven- nevnte skisserte ordning skulle en etter min mening kunne bringe folket MÂLE INSTRU MENTER i en positiv kontakt med Forsvaret som aldri tidligere. «Folk og For- svar» vil da bli en realitet. bah Dersom vâr nâvœ rende vernepliktsbelastning kan ansees â vaere en tens fare for en sterkere opinion mot Forsvaret, bor myndighetene snarest mu- NORSK Iig foranledige sporsmâlet om innforing av et vervingssystem for det stâende kuppforsvar utredet av en kommisjon sammensatt av bâde sivile YOUNGSTORGET — OSLO MARCONIKOM PAN I ¾ og militaere fagmenn, # # # DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

XX iv 221 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

* KONSTITliSJONEK OG TILSETTINGER

FLYG ERBHANSJEN ; Kst. oberst loytnant i Flyvfipnot Leif Feiring konstituert som oberst fra I. juli 1954.

Kst. majorer i Flyvâpnet Haakon Mathiesenr Emil Michael Dons Erla. Stig Stigset 09 Nils Magne Jorgensen konstituiert som oborstloytnanter fra 1. juni 1954. Midi, majorer i Flyvâpnet Sverre Oskar Kiiudsen og Bjorn Johansen konstituert som majorer fra 1. juli 1954. Kst. kaptein i Flyvâpnet Hans Gerhard Stub Knudsen konstituert major fra 1. juni 1954. Kst. kapteiner i Flyvâpnet Hans Wergeland. Kjell Bjorge Hansen, Bjarne Meyer. Ivar Blikom og Svcn Aage Hauge konstituert majorer fra 15, juli 1954. Midi, kaptein i Flyvapnet Kristian Adolf Tangen konstituert kaptein fra I. juni 1954. Kadettfenriker i Flyvâpnet Jan Andersen. Nils Christian Astrup, Reidar Kjell Efraim- sen. Sverre Hasvold. Harald HiCrcid. Tor Björn Kirkvaag. Arne Klette, Mague Sorensen og Rolf Tokerud tilsatt som loytnaiiter fra 1, juli 1954.

TEKNISK BRANSJE : Kst. kaptein i Flyvapnet Thor Smaaland konstituert major fra I. april 1954.

ADM. BRANSJE: Kst. kaptein i Haeren Knut Magne Haugland konstituert major i Flyvapnet fra 1, mars 1954. Kst. kaptein i Flyvapnet Finn Bjorge Mostad konstituert major fra I. juni 1954. Fasti. Ioytnanter i Flyvâpnet Odd Bergan og Sigurd Opland konstituert kapteiner (UV) fra I. mai 1954. Midi, kaptein Olav Trygvason Stansberg og loytnant Amund Vehus, begge i Fly- vâpnet. konstituert kapteiner fra 1, juli 1954. Âremâl Ieytnanter Knut Solstad og Olav Torekoven samt âremâl fenriker Asbjorn Jack Nilsen og Roald Bjorli. aile i Flyvâpnet, tilsatt som Ioytnanter fra 1. mars 1954. * Âremâl loytnant i Flyvâpnet, Peder Overland, tilsatt sont loytnant fra 1. april 1954. Eng. Ioytnanter Christian Georg Christensen og Andreas Fossland, utskr, Ioytnanter Mathias Ravn Nilsen og Asbjorn Wilhelm Halvorsen, fasti, fenrik Albert Hau- gen, eng. fenriker Per Mostad, Gunnar Wiik og Eivind Heide, utskr. fenrik Ivar Wersen, âremâl sersjant Anton Schou, tjpl. sersjant Einar Johannes Jacob- sen samt utskr. sersjant Sigmund Nicolai Hansen, alle i Flyvâpnet, tilsatt som Ioytnanter (UVj fra I. mai 1954. Eng. Ioytnanter Thorolf Wilhelm Berger, Frithjof Hanborg Olsen, Hans Skoglund og Per Johan Ekeland, midi, loytnant Lars Herrcm, fasti, fenriker Rolf Cecil Swang. Per Roy Johansen og Einar Stamnes. eng. fenriker Anders Fjellberg og Arve Sem Henriksen samt âremâl sersjant Sverre Sorensen, alle i Flyvapnet. tilsatt som Ioytnanter fra 1, juni 1954. Midi, loytnaiiter Haus Johan Wiktor Johansson og Bjorn Kristian Halvorsen, âre- mâl loytnanter Rudolf Robertsen. Harald Martin Brot. Arne Basken, Arne Helge Jensveen og Kjell Ingvar Michaisen. eng. fenriker Rolf Hansen og Arne Johan Telnes, fenrikene 0ivind Martinsen. Willy Ragnvald Hansen. Ivar Strom, Geir Brynjulfson, Ingvald Kvcllo, Storm Thomas Kjuul Martinsen og Sigmund Pollen, vingsersjantene Ragnar Otto Olsen. Gunnar Thornquist og Johan Hermansen samt vpl. sersjant Per Nävik, alle fra Flyvâpnet, tilsatt som loytnanter fra 1. juli 1954. V'JU). loytniuit Astijorn Thon. eng. fenrik Leif Cail Bniuthen. iiieniftl fenrik HiiralJ Olav Mellum, vingsersjant Lars Arthur Henriksoe. äremal vingsersjant Johnny Hilding Unger, äremäl sersjant Gudmund Svensrud, alle i Flyvâpnet, samt vpl. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE fenriker Ole Gabriel Ucland (IR 7), Egil Johnsen (IR 1). Asbjorn Magnus Kapteincne Olav Trygvason Stansberg og Amund Vehus samt Ioytnantcne Thorolf Trygvasoii

Hasvold, Harald Haereid, Tor Bjorn Kirkvaag1 Arne Klette. Magne Sorensen og Rolf Tokerud stilles til râdighet for Sjefen for Flyvâpnet. AVSKJED Loytnantene Sigmund Nicolai Hansen og Anton Schou etter soknad lost fra til- TEKNISK BRA NSJE : sewing fra 1. mai 1954, Major Thor Smaaland beordret som tjenestegjorende offiser ved Flyväpnets for- syningskommando, Horten flyfabrikk.

ADM. BRANSJE: Majorene Knut Magne Haugland og Finn Bjorge Mostad, kaptein Oyvind Bjarne Kalland samt Ioytnantene Hans Wiktor Johansen, Rudolf Robertsen, Harald Martin Brox, Rolf Hansen, Ragnar Otto Olsen, Gunnar Thornquist og Asbjorn Thon beordret til tjeneste ved Flyväpnets overkommando. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Benytti-film

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Filmapparatene «H.H.K.U» ieveres av HANS H. KNUTSEN & CO. KONGENSGT. 15 - OSLO — TELEFONER 41 51 33 - 41 14 63

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228 XXV LiI TT E B AT C R AN M E LtD ELSER*) Die Ersten und die Letzten. Av Adolf Galland. 392 sider, kr. 28,50. (Franî Schneekluth, Darmstadt.) TiIscndt fra J. W. Cappelens feokhandel. Adolf Galland var en av de fremste flyvere i Luftwaffe. Hans flyinteresse begynt? allerede i guttedagene. og sä tidlig som i 1928 satte han flere rekorder som seilflyver. Senere var han blant de meget fä som ble tatt opp pä LuIthansas flyveskole for trafikk- flyvere. Pâ dette tidspunkt begynte allerede forberedeUene til Luftwaffe, og det gikk sä som sä med trafikkflyverutdannelsen, — til gjengjeld fikk Galland en utmerket utdannelse som militœrflyver. Ifolge Versailles-traktaten var all militaerflyvning for- budt i Tyskland, virksoinheten ble derfor kamuflert som rekruttering til Lufthansa. Forberedeisene foregikk ogsâ i utlandet, i 1933 var Gaîland forkledt i italiensk uniform og fikk spesta I utdannelse i det italienske flyväpen. Etter hjemkomsten til Tyskland fikk han full offisersutdannelse i infants riet. Noen Infanterist ble det aldri av Galland, og - han var IykkeIIg da han kunne vende Ulbake til flyvningen og fortsette sine oppvis- ^Jninger i kunstflyvning. — Etter et par havarier ble han pä grunn av en oyenskade " kjent udyktig som flyver; han klarte imidlertid senere ä Iure legekommisjonen. Pâ denne tid var den spanske borgerkrig i gang, og Galland og hans samtidige ble i stor utstrekning sendt som «frivillige: til «Legion Condor» — den tyske flykontingent hos Franco,— Galland floy som skvadronssjef mot de rode, og med mer enn tre hundrede tokter bak seg, var han da verdenskrigen begynte alt en erfaren krigsflyger. Den spanske borgerkrig ga utmerkede utdannelsesmuligheter for Luftwaffes unge og upravdi' KO\Si:\TltASJO\ krefter. Da Galland kom tilbake fra Spania. var krigsforberedelsene i full gang i Tysk- land, og det varte da heller ikke lenge for han ig|en var i krigstjeneste, — denne gang over Polen. Etter «Sitz-K rie gen» var han med pâ felttoget i Frankrike og slaget om OM Storbritannia. Galland ble kreditert med et utall av luftseire, og han var utvilsomt en fremragende leder. Stjerner og dekorasjoner drysset da ogsâ pâ ham, — han fikk ÜTVUiUiXCi bâde Eichenlaub, Schwertern og Brillianten til sitt jernkors. og i slutten av 1941 ble han «General der Jagdflieger»^— Med sine 30 är var han den yngste general i det Mange âr er gâtt si den den tyske forsvar. Det sier seg selv at med sin enestâende innsats var GaJland bâde Görings tid da bunkringsutstyr var og Hitlers kjeledegge. han var til stadighet ut og inn hos disse to herrer. Resten av krigen kjempet Galland hovedsakelig bak skrivebordet — bâde mot fiend en og mot en lastebil med bensiukanner. Flyeoe bar utviklet seg til foreren. Til slutt — i 1945 — ble hans uoverensstemmelser med ledelsen sâ store at en grad hvor bunkringen krever presisjonsutstyr. Hurtig- han fikk avskjed og gikk tilbake som flyvende sjef for en spesialavdeling utstyrt med Me 262. Galland begynte krigen som «Oberleutnant» og skvadronssjef og sluttet den fylling av mikrofiltrert drivstoff i m en g der pâ flere tonn som generalloytnant og skvadronssjef! har hoynet kravene. Illustrasjonen viser hvordan det gjores Under hele sin karriere var Galland jagerflyger, og det var ogsâ som forkjemper i dag. Dyktighet kombinert med noyaktighet gjor BP flyservice for jagervâpnet han hadde sine rivninger med ledelsen. Luftwaffe var influert av i stand til à mote de krav den moderne flymdustri krever. ^jâpouhet's teorier; ifolge disse danner botnberne kjernen. I begynnelsen forte da ogsâ de SKyske jagere en tiIbaketrukket tilvœrelse, — de var nesten overflodige helt til slaget om Storbritannia, — her klarte de ikke sin oppgave og kom i miskreditt, Angrep og ikke forsvar var Hitlers valgsprâk, istedenfor â styrke jag era vdelin gene satte han dem « inn som jagcrbombere. Jagernes betydning ble i det hele undervurdert. Selv etter de NORSK B R/E N D S E L O L J E A/S forste storangrep pâ Hamburg forlangte Hitler bare gjengjeldelsesraid, mens han bürde ha byggct opp Tysklands jagerforsvar. Galland mâtte kjempe mot en utrolig optimisme bâde hos Goring og Hitler, beruset av sine scire i Russland ville de ikke se den stadig voksende allierte bombefare i oynene. Endelig, etter uhorte anstrengelser, steg den n tyske flyproduksjon i 1944 til krigens maksimum, ârsproduksjonen var da hele 40 593 V AVIATION fily SERVICE ^ Ily. Dette tall ble nâdd til tross for at den tyske flyindustri hadde 1. prioritet som

*) Dersom no en av vâre lesere onsker ä snakaffe seg publikasjoner anmeldt I TitIssk riftêt, vil redaksjonen med RleJe besorge lilveiebringetsen av angjeUlende publik as j on. Henvendelser MJLGARDEN — OSLO bes adressert til: Redaktoren, «Nçrsk LuftmiIitaift Tidsskrfftfc, Myntgt. 2, Oslo. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE XXVl 229 alliert bombemâl. Selv om Galland bare fikk en relativt liten andel av denne pro- duksjonen til sine jageravdelinger, sä hadde han nu mere à rutte med enn noensinne for. Hele denne okningen ble midier tid til Gallands fortvilelse kästet bort i Ardenner- offensiven og i det s lore jagerbombeangrepet mot de allierte flyplasser nyttârsdag 1945. Gjennom lengre tid var flygerne Irene t opp til avskjaeringsoppdrag. og til tross for pcrsonellmangel, bombing og bensinmangel hadde Galland og bans folk bygget opp et noenlunde rim el ig bolverk mot de allierte bombere. Men Hitler ga ordre om jagei- MEDDELELSER bomber operasjoner. Imidlertid hadde svaert fä erfaring fra dette felt, og resultatet ble en enorm ^relating av det fra for sâ svake Luftwaffe. Mange av de aîtfor fà erfarne \, FRA flygerne satte Iivet til eller havnet i alliert fangenskap. Ifelge Galland ga Hitlers ordre indirekte dodsstotet til Luftwaffe. FLYVAPNETS OFFISERSFORENING Ogsâ nâr det gjaldt jetflyene var Hitlers innflytelse katastrofal. Allerede i 1939 PnstsirokontQ 13426 floy lyskerne sitt ferste jet fly, men Hitler ga aldri jetflyene gode vekstmuligheter. Formann : Oberst B. FRASER, MyntSt. 2, Oslo. Da de endelig nâdde et noenlunde rimelig utviklingstrinn, insisterte han pâ at de skulle Sektctœn Kaptein À. EEK. Myntet. 2, Oslo. brukes som bombere og ikke som jagere. Galland og hele Luftwaffes ledelse kjempet Kasscrer: Lstytnant L. HELGESEN. Jagervn. 10. Holmen. en fort vil et kamp for at Me 262 skulle fâ priorité t og bli satt inn i forsvaret av Tysk- land, men Hitler fikk nKrmest kolerisk anfall nâr sporsmâlet ble brakt pâ bane. Hau forbod at Me 262 ble omtalt som annet enn «Blitz-BomberK — Toppen av alt var at Ad. Metldelelser frit Flyvâpnets nffisersforening-. Göring matte sende ut en ordre med uttrykkellg forbud mot at Luftwaffes offiscrer Meddeiclsenc fra Flyvâpnets oftisersforening har hittil Jnlitt satt inn i Norsk Luft- diskuterte muligheten av at Me 262 kunne nytles som jagerfly! Da Me 262 endelig ble miIitaert Tidsskrift mânedlig. Fra flere medlemmer har en fâtt anmodning om at en mâ satt inn i forsvaret, var det for sent og antallet for lite. finne fram til en mâte â spre disse meddelelser fra foreningen til medlemmene (og ikke medlemmer) slik at disse meddelelser blir «ferskere» og slik at de kan komme Boken gir et interessant innblikk i Luftwaffes korte, men hektiske tilvserelse. For- medlemmene i hende öftere. Ved stensiUrt oppslag i alle befalsmesser etc. i Flyvâpnet fatteren tegner et IivfuIIt bilde av splittelsen og rivningene innen ledelsen, og han hâper foreningen nâ â kunne spre sine meddelelser til medlemmene pâ en rask og kommentarer pâ det strategiske og taktiske omrade gjor boken til verdi full fa g I it ter a tur. effektiv mâte. En vil imidlertid fortsatt sette inn meddelelsene i Norsk Luftmilitaert Tids- FremstiJIingen er krydret med personlige opplevelser. sâ helhetsbildet blir fargerikt, ja skrift for dem som ikke mâtte se nevnte oppslag. til dels spenncnde. Det er vanskelig ä bedomme riktigheten av Gallands forskjellige pâstander og meningcr. Fremstillingen er subjektiv og ensidig, men generelt sett virker h a ns pâstander kloke uten â vaere utilborlig etterpâkloke. Ad. Uravstemning i Flyvâpnets offisersforening om nytt Iennsregiilati v. Ved uravstemningen i Flyvâpnets offisersforening om nytt lennsregulativ 1954, har W. Christie. 94 (nittifire) stemt /or forslaget og 88 (âttiâtte) stemt mot forslaget. Orienteringen om avstemningen ble utsendt til i alt 336 fast Ion te medlemmer, hvorav Klar til kamp. 182 har sendt inn «avsteninitigsstippens innen den fastsatte frist. Det vil si at 5-4 % Av Helge Storm-Bje rke. av de sCemnieberettigede ga uttrykk for hva de mente. Bürde ikke denne prosentsats 192 sider. vart hoyere? (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1953.) For Embetsmennenes Landstgrbund som helhet ble forslaget godkjent ved at 45 foreninger innen forbundet stemte for forslaget og 6 (mindre) foreninger mot. Storm-Bjerke har vel hverken hatt den «publisUys bak seg eller den hjelp til fin- pussing av sin bok som for eksempel enkelte utenlandske bestseller for fa Itere i samme Oppnevning a.v et arbeidsutvalg for à utrede sparsmâlet om foreniitgens gaten slkkert har hatt. Noen bestseller er derfor boken heller ikke blitt, til tross for at organisasjon og arbeidsorüninç. innhold og emne er like fengslende som i noen roman. Sporsmâlet om foreningens organisasjon og arbeidsordning har i en tid vaert under Flyvâpnets egne karer fra krigens dager pâ Shetland, Island og längs norske- diskusjon i styret. Hensikten med dette er â fâ aktivisert foreningen spesielt nâr det kysten fikk nok fol in g med og respekt for de norske MTB-karene, men de fleste av gjelder foreningsarbeidet utenfor Oslo-ororâdet. oss har meget bedre kjennskap til Flyvâpnets egen innsats under krigen enn akkurat Styret har nâ oppnevnt et arbeidsutvalg bestâende av: til hva den mest aktive avdeling av Marinen har utrettet i denne hàrde og krevendc. Oberstloytnant Thurmann Nielsen (formann), tjeneste, I major Lovesta d, De fortjener i sannhet en stor honnor. U red de, dristige og fantasirike som de var, kaptein Richter (varamann) utrettet de bragder som langt oversteg de einstigste forventninger, og oppnâddc résul- med feigende mandat: ta ter som raget meget hoy C blant de sa m Iede allierte sjostridskrefters innsats under «Utvalget skal drofte, belyse og eventuelt komme med forslag til revisjon krigen. En innsats som mâ vekke den storste beundring. av foreningens organisasjon og arbeidsordning. Herunder vil en spesielt Skulle jeg pâpeke noe ved boken, mâtte det ferst og fremst vaere at den ville anmode om at folgende spersmâl blir droftet; vunnet meget om forfatteren hadde sloyfet encfel av de mindre viktige hendelser, oq — Opprettelse av et storstyre og forretningsutvalg. heller utdypet de virkelig store bragder i sterre utstrekning erm tilfellet er. Som det — Faste arbeidsutvalg for behandling av saker. nâ er virker boken til dels som om det pâ Iiv og dod gjelder â fâ med hvert enkelt tokt, — DistriktsutvaIgene og aktivisering av disse. hvilket uvegerlig skaper enkelte dodpunkter inniblant. Utvalget er for evrlg stillet fritt i behandlingen av denne sak. Bortsett fra dette gir boken et utmerket bilde av denne sererike cpoke i Marinens krigshistorie, og mâ vel kunne sies â vaere en av de mest interessante beretninger oni Redusert flygetlmetillegg under krigs tjeneste 1/1-44 til 8/5-45 for enkelte denne, ut fra en Iegmanns synspunkt. kategorier Iu ft personell. O. A. Ho!the. Som meddelt i NLT nr. 6/54 har denne sak nâ va:rt oppe til behandling i Stor- tinget. Stortingets militaerkomîtê fant som kjent i likhet med departementet â mâtte râ DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2012)0008 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY - DÉCLASSIFIÉ MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE til at soknaden ikke ble imotekoinmet. Dcnnc innstiiling ble sä vedtatt av Stortinget 31/5-54 uten merknad. Det er mcget beklagelig at det ikke har lykkes foreningen a fâ en positiv avgjorelse i denne sak. En mâ imidlertid nâ anse saken som avsluttet fra Ragnar Horn Per Skouen foreningens side. O.r. Kikfitrer O.r.sakforer Medteiiimer av Dni Tiorsltc StikiererIoreninA Tlldel in £ av innbutidae eksemplarer av NL.T til foreningens » resmedlemmer. Grensen 10. Oslo, tlf. s.b. 33 63 94 Til orientering for foreningens medlemmer kan opplyses at foreningens tre Eeres- m edle mm er, nemlig HKH Prins Harald, generalmajor Riiser Larsen og oberst Balchen er tilsendt hvert sitt innbudne eksemplar av NLT for 1953. 1. Medlemsmeter i Oslo. — Matcsesongen 1954/55. Stoler - Bord - Skap Foreningen har for motesesongen 1954/55 fâtt reservert disse dager i Oslo Militaere MOSS STOL & M0BËLFABRIKK Sam fund: Stor kapasitet Br*dr. Watl*nbarf Tlf. 1393 Torsdag 23. September 1954 » 21, oktober 1954 » 25. november 1954 » 20. januar 1955 » 24. februar 1955 » 24. mars 1955 » 21. april 1955 Noter opp dagene og met fram til motene! Nsermere beskjed om metene vil som vanlig bli meddelt hver enkelt. Sotvmedaljt for brodeling Jubileumsârct 1914 ag LandsutstiIlingen Beesen 193S .jNye medlemmer, A. Fenrik Rolf Horn, FOK. F. Loytnant Kjell Husmo, LKN, Bodo. F. Loytnant Peder Robertsen, FVSBS, Â. Fenrik 0yvind Ringen, LKN1 Bodo. Lutvatn. F. Kaptein Reidar Skappel, FOK. UNIFORMSREKVISITA F. Fenrik Erling Fjelstad, Vse mes. F. Loytnant Odd Simensen. FVTS, for milîtœre og sivile in sti tu sj oner. Knapper, me tall emblemer, Kje vik. F. Loytnant Ragnar Amundsen, MovIk. F. Loytnant Knut Aamli, FVTS, Kjevik. F. Loytnant Arne Dragsnes, FVTS, bandolaerspenner og roetallarbeide m. v. F. Leytnant Hans Gunnar Langseth, Kjevik. Emblemer i gull og solvbtodering, Alt fra eget verksted. FVTS, Kjevik. F. Loytnant Oddvar Andreassen, LKO, Uniformseresser fra et av Frankrikes eldste og stabilesre F. Loytnant Karstein Osthus, FVTS, Rygge- firma. Lang erfaring og beste service. Kjevik. F. Loytnant Gunnar Thornquist, FOK. F. Major Leif Lov es tad, Forsvarsstaben. F. Loytnant Kjetl Andersen. FVBS, F. Ob.ltn. Finn Spirdal, LKN Bodo. Lutvatn. 1 CORNELIUSSEN & OLSEN Ä Knappe og Etnblemfabrikk — Kongensgate 16, Oslo MAJOR HENKY AARG AARDS LEGAT. Tlf.: Butiklc 415441 - Brodctiavd. 41 5441 - Verksted of! kontor 42 56 03 En premie, stor kr. 2250,—, viJ bli utdelt for den beste oppgavebesva- relse (betenkning) som firmes verdig til premiering. Ifolge statutteneg paragraf 2 skal oppgaven ved rare vâr befalsutdannelse, be fa IssporsmaF i väre vaepnede styrker eller andre militaere sporsmal som til enhver tid mâtte vaere av betydning for det norske forsvar â fâ utredet. Oppgaven sendes til Oslo Militaere Samfunds direksjon innen 31/12 1954 i forseglet konvolutt pafort motto ledsaget av navneseddel i Iuk- m ket konvolutt pâfort samme motto. Nadvendige andre opplysninger fâes ved henvendelse til Samfundets intendant, Myntgaten I, Oslo.

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