CEU eTD Collection THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND COALITION-BUILDING IN THEPOST- COALITION-BUILDING AND OPPOSITION THE POLITICAL COMMUNIST REGION:POST-REVOLUTIONARYPOLITICALDYNAMICS COMMUNIST In partial fulfillmentof requirementsthe for degreeof Supervisor: Professor Matteo Fumagalli Department of Political Science Political of Department Central Central University European Joldon Kutmanaliev Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Masters of Arts of Masters Submitted to Submitted 2009 By CEU eTD Collection and united coalition by the time an electoral revolution starts. by revolution time an electoral coalition the and united competitive authoritarian regime is if possible political opposition has managed tobuild astrong during an suggests electoral revolution. Thedemocraticthat research also in breakthrough a from modeelectoral of changeis isdeterminedregime by politicalin that the opposition place regime the typeresulting that suggest thesis of findings Themain this “democratic” outcomes. understand why electoral revolutions in post-communistthe spaceproduced different electoral revolutions. By using the comparative method and the process tracing the thesis seeks to instudy of the approach anactor-centric proposes research present region, the communist Based ontheoreticalby model forMcFaul proposed explaining inthe change regime post- cases. across outcomes different they yet, produced conditions, socio-economic similar relatively in with countries the occurred revolutions electoral the Despite wave” of democratization. “fourth “Colored revolutions”. These electoral revolutions became apart of what Michael McFaul calls At the crossroads of XXI century post-communist region witnessed series of so-called of series witnessed region post-communist century of XXI crossroads the At ABSTRACT ii CEU eTD Collection have been possible. been have myand CEU. Withoutthisnot support theirat research patiencewould throughout study support, I am my deeply grateful to andmylittlewife forGulzat Aybike daughter theirinvaluable moral not easy study. toward my classmate “professor” Diana Babaeva as she encouraged me during three semesters of Kahancova Marta Professor and Nenad Dimitrijevic toProfessor am indebted research. I current the for theirSchneiderfor his valuable consultations and his change classesregime inspired start methat to Carsten Professor to commentsgrateful Iam in classroom. the discussions and lectures many interesting I would likeon to thank Professor Matteoearlier Fumagalli for the supervision myof research and for drafts of this thesis. I express my warm gratitudes ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii CEU eTD Collection ILORPY...... 65 BIBLIOGRAPHY CONCLUSION...... 60 CHAPTER III: Coalitional implications for the resulting regime type...... 41 change...... 27 CHAPTER II: Identification and assessment of causal factors for electoral mode of regime CHAPTER I: Theoretical framework for the study of electoral mode of regime change...... 9 INTRODUCTION...... 1 ...... v LIST OF TABLES TABLE OF CONTENTS...... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii ABSTRACT...... ii Coalition-building in Kyrgyzstan...... 52 Assessment of an opposition coalition’s cohesion...... 41 Elite defections and opposition coalition ...... 35 building Electoral mode of regime change...... 27 McFaul’s noncooperative model of regime transition...... 19 Agency and structure in the study of electoral mode of regime change...... 9 TABLE OF CONTENTS iv CEU eTD Collection Table 5 TheFreedom scores forHouse electoral 51 process______competitiveness______50 forthelevel factors electoral of causal of “coalitional” analysis 4Comparative Table Table 3International support for opposition______47 Table 2Mobilization 44 capacity of opposition______1 Table Comparative analysis of for mode Comparative electoral analysis of causal factors of regime change_____33 LIST OFTABLES v CEU eTD Collection divergent across cases of electoral revolutions. casesof electoral across divergent are outcomes the that shows evidence empirical Yet, similaroutcomes. thesameor produce countries with similar socio-economic conditions and shared post-communistlegacies would in thatoccurred electoral legacy. impliesrevolutions that This sharedpost-communist and with conditions socio-economic similar relatively with regimes authoritarian competitive place in took electoral revolutions. Another common feature of electoral or colored revolution is that they all cases of different during used were strategies and tactics The similar andrepertoire. features (Beissinger‘modularity’ 2007), 1998), and (Tarrow ‘international 2005). (Tarrow diffusion’ various scholars effect’, ‘contagion’ as‘demonstrational of (Whitehead 1996),‘power example’ activistsfrom previous events successful thattook protest place in countries is other called by strategies incumbents. Thisimitation andemulation protest by andthe of civic opposition activists usedsimilar strategies and symbols ofnonviolentresistance againstauthoritarian many identifiedscholars them as links of one phenomenon. and Theopposition, protesters, civic features, many similarities possess and common revolutions Becausecolored Kyrgyzstan (2005). and Ukraine (2004) (2003), Union Georgia former Soviet of republics the and spreadto then countries Croatia such as Slovakia (1998), (1999),and (2000)(Bunce andWolchik Serbia 2006b) from European Eastern started Electoral revolutions (2002). democratization wave” of “fourth “Colored revolutions”. These electoral revolutions became apart of what Michael McFaul calls INTRODUCTION An electoral revolution is a political phenomenon, which possesses some common some possesses which is phenomenon, a political revolution An electoral so-called of series witnessed region post-communist the century of XXI crossroads At the 1 CEU eTD Collection resulting revolution. after a regimetype electoral competitiveness,andconsequently, thelevelof influences revolution, on the question of in differentdemocratic precisely, research More concentrates outcomes. the thesis produced this democracy. in new results regime electoral inthe coalition dominate opposition groups If regimesuch change. placeafterwards more opposition electoral takes competition the opposition coalition. more cohesive The various organizationally in are distinct groups the an of cohesion of organizational degree is strong matters a What starts. revolution electoral possible if has opposition political been buildable to and astrong by united coalition timethe an is breakthrough democratic that demonstrate research thesis current the of results The revolution. regime change is opposition by determined is political the in that duringplace electoral more inthe first chapter. details in model noncooperative McFaul’s evaluate will I transitions. regime of problem the on insights new andcanoffer interesting is particularly mode change regime of the The electoral revolution revolutions. countries – electoral the inthepost-communist mode of with transitions particular by dealing arguments McFaul’s research refines current The model. noncooperative McFaul’s democratic imposes opposition its decisive power on incumbents.the This is claima core of in iscaseswhere only possible successful transition regime arguesthat (2002) his article, McFaul in approach is study the In that framework. revolutions basedelectoral of transitional McFaul’s anactor-centric Ipropose section, Inthis thesis. this of section first very in the accounts these itI will of overview accounts. hasinregion,provide ashort beenwidelydiscussed scholarly This paper seeks tounderstand why revolutionelectoral in post-communist space The main findings of thesisthis regimesuggest that type resulting from modeelectoral of Despite anelectoral is in anewrevolution phenomenon relatively thepost-communist how how political type of the opposition,which is in placeduring electoral Based on theoretical model proposed by McFaul for explaining regime 2 CEU eTD Collection an electoral fraud. The main goal of the opposition was to achieve a high electoral turnout and to turnout toachieveahighelectoral fraud. main The was an opposition the of goal electoral as electoral turnovers. The opposition coalitions in these countries rallied voters in anticipation of electoral canbecounted inSlovakia and those Croatia words, revolutions In other mobilization. regimes by contestation dictator elections challenged through mass and that oppositions the of regime character more confrontational by their Croatia and in Slovakia revolutions revolutions of the post-communist region. The colored revolutions are distinct from the electoral electoral from placeKyrgyzstan, other Ukraine, and inSerbia, Georgia, which took revolutions, revolution, colored revolution, and electoral turnover. I distinguish electoral or colored model. McFaul’s noncooperative to mainThese findings are the democrats. contribution in conducted suggests, toelectoral this transition the research canbedemocracy drivenbynon- analysis As comparative revolution). after groups these between arena(competition political in experienceparticipation of haveprior groups a These within of opposition. coalition the democratic butwell-organized of from commitments cohesive groups opposition the distinct from not result a greatextent to competition electoral fair and free and democracy electoral McFaul’s model andmany scholarsWolchik andKuzioother (Bunce 2006a; suggest that 2008)I of expectations the fair free Contrary to support and elections. thatinstitutions democratic promote able to not often are forces but democratic weak andcompeting condition. Numerous necessarily democracy produce itisas emphasized by McFaul (2002: 228). 232). In addition,am convinced I not dominance thatthe of in democrats opposition does argues (2002:228- as McFaul necessarilyin breakthrough not democratic change does result revolutionary that expectation the to me led observations empirical preliminary My change. change in the post-communist region, we can propose some hunches for electoral mode of regime To avoid confusion in the rest of the thesis I would like to clarify the terms electoral necessary butnot facilitating is opposition coalition in an democrats The of dominance 3 CEU eTD Collection independent set of countries that are appropriate for comparative analysis. Serbia, Georgia, Serbia, analysis. comparative for appropriate thatare set of countries independent an offers revolution colored the of phenomenon far.Thus, the so fouravailable cases only with various associated causesincludingprocess. an reasons electoral may have regime change whereasasimply fraud an electoral against preventive actions or/and protests mass asaresult of change occurs mode of regime Theelectoral liberal democracies. and in electoral usually elections, fair and free of ground the on holders office top of change the implies turnover electoral The change. regime and turnover electoral of concepts the from revolution. Thus, Idistinguish the electoral mode of regime change as well as electoral revolution electoral or ascolored in meaning same the change mode of regime electoral of the concept the I use Moreover, analysis. four cases under the regarding interchangeably terms use both I thesis, the of rest the In latter. the of a subtype considered be can former the as revolution electoral an from (again leaders Ukraine). power except buildingsgovernmentUkraine) (except (Way withforced 2008) consequent ousters of autocratic demonstrations, falsified massresults protest electoral blocking andthrough storming traffic, the contested opposition the fraud. Therefore, preventan electoral to community attempted (western) international of assistance the with forces opposition the although elections falsify incumbents from through revolutions,power elections. Incolored managed the incumbents to elections. Moreover, theSlovak andtheCroat opposition coalitionsin succeeded illiberalousting 9). Basically,in these cases, the opposition prevent was to thetrying incumbents from falsifying (2007: monitor the electoral process” encourage their andto participation elections, to the about as“ countries in two these campaigns electoral characterize andDemes Forbrig incumbents. awayfrom the more votes take As this research focuses on the assessment of outcomes of colored revolutions, there are there revolutions, ofcolored of outcomes ontheassessment focuses As this research and between a colored difference imply theconceptual not does this distinction However, a broad effort of civil society groups to provide voters with information 4 CEU eTD Collection explanatory power. In similar way, I conduct this method in the third chapter to identify the identify to chapter third in the method this conduct I way, similar In power. explanatory strongest the with variable the single out to allows cases successful and failed of tabulation cross The Azerbaijan. and Belarus in revolutions electoral failed but attempted of cases the analysis comparative into introduced I cases, failed with successful casesalong requires difference method AsMill’s cultural,indirect conditions. structural, diffusionist, andagency-based of mode for electoral the of represent causal variables variables regime change.These causal several in method totest competing secondchapter the comparative complexity. this conduct I undercausal reduce numberof explanations competing to enables a valuable that tool method indirect is in of difference thirdchapters.Themethod isandthe Mill’s the second utilized 687). variables arecontrolled” (1971: of relationships whilemany amongbecause afewvariables theyallowother theestablishment found, they offer particularly good opportunities for the application of the comparative method same in countries. “If outcomes puts: AsArend different be Lijphart such comparable casescan contrast cases can tell inthefourrelatively oppositions the us Comparing analysis. for comparative convenient cases much about why the same Kyrgyzstan are and Georgia, Inthissense,Serbia, Ukraine, legacies institutions. political and political phenomenon did as such communist similarities common share many Kyrgyzstan and Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, not result in the sametime, Atthe illiberal democracy. but electoral, to country the moved Revolution Bulldozer Serbian The one. another authoritarian to regime authoritarian from one transition led to to competitive whileinKyrgyzstan andin politics, Tulip andthe Georgia, Roserevolutions the in transition democratic resulted Revolution Orange the Ukraine, cases. In vary across outcomes the Indeed, revolutions. electoral of outcomes different can explain that factors causal alternative Ukraine, andKyrgyzstan agood offer foropportunity comparing andtesting several competing The research combines the comparative method with process tracing. The comparative tracing. with process method comparative the combines The research 5 CEU eTD Collection 206). variables)variablebetween anindependent ofdependentvariable” andtheoutcome (or (2005: attempts toidentify interveningthe –the causal process causal and chain and causal mechanism – the outcomemechanisms of independent variable. In thisof case, I evaluate the influence of coalition buildingthe on Tulipis in causal The process tracing employed case study tracing that allows Kyrgyzstan of Revolution. theory indevelopment a casestudy are given and byAlexander George Andrew (2005). Bennett As George and Bennett of Mill’smethod and other method of comparison” (Georgeand Bennett 2005:262) limitations the reduce substantially “can it as useful, argue: beespecially can Kyrgyzstan of study case in the “Theimplemented method tracing process the research, current the For Kyrgyzstan. in processpolitics tracing led causal failureof the links competitive to that illustrate case Tulipcan the Revolution of especiallymore cases other when pairedway” with in one or right the (Hancke 2009: 55).The unpack an existing arguments theory new, up and better come causal aboutwith mechanisms, and/or canbe“powerful to studies test tools last in Case thesis. Kyrgyzstan section the the of of study acase introduce I limitations, these reduce To factors. causal of characteristics qualitative represent fully not do and dichotomous are analysis under variables all as factors, explanatory of mechanisms causal identify cannot method This limitations. explanatory reports. country analytical Crisis Group’s and International articles, scholarly newspapers, analysis on-line of basis content of the the tables on comparative for the “presence/absence” “low/high” or gradations coding Idetermined phase. revolutionary causal variable thatpossibly explains successand the failure of competitive politics in thepost- Probably the best accounts of how the process-tracing method can be implemented for canbeimplemented method process-tracing the how of accounts best the Probably hasit some method of difference, indirect Mill’s of advantages significant Despite 6 CEU eTD Collection building as building mainthe forvariable explanatory electoral mode of regime change. analysis. On groundof the comparativethis analysis,this research identifies opposition coalition electoral revolution. Ithen turn explanationto interpretation and of the results of the comparative an of asaresult change regime explains that variables causal competing from several factor one on McFaul’s model of the post-communist transitions. reflect critically and then I present chapter, the same of section second the In approaches. above the reflect who scholars the of accounts the discuss critically then I change. regime of mode electoral the for explanations andagency-based diffusionist, (international) structural, represent approaches These revolutions. electoral of inthestudy approaches main the of description role in role important play can “they and of clarity lackcausal compensate might studies case The theory. in his gaps explanatory the clarify and fill extent some to framework, transitional communist electoral in revolutions post-communistthe in region (2005), which he utilizes his post- McFaul’s Ukrainian case study on electoral revolution (2007) and his comparative study of five revolutions. electoral on works of scholarly accounts theoretical use wecan Fortunately, theoretical is is testhis by employingit framework hardto process-tracing. underspecified,theory lackingbe might which mechanisms, causal these oridentify to us enables method This unclearmechanisms. in proposed does specifyMcFaul’s framework not its causal post-communist transitional enough theories. methodthe canbe and for2005: 209). helpful theory (George development Bennett Forexample, This is a part of theory development. As McFaul development In the second chapter, utilizing Mill’s indirect method of difference I try to singled out singled to try I difference of method indirect Mill’s utilizing chapter, second the In follows. Iprovide the chapter, of Inthefirst as proceeds The structure thesis the When process-tracing conducted in a case study is difficult to test underspecified test theories, in difficultisto conducted a casestudy When process-tracing of andBennett of 2005:209). (George theories” 7 CEU eTD Collection sheds light on the reasons of the democratic failure in failure country. the of on democratic light reasons the the sheds final section of this provides thesis descriptive analysis of coalition building inKyrgyzstan and The phase. in post-revolutionary the level competitiveness the of impactelectoral on directthe has dimensions coalitional the of which identify, I then difference, of method indirect Mill’s of mobilizational and organizational of capacity inthefour oppositions the countries. Onthe ground In the third chapter, I operationalize cohesion of an opposition coalition by assessing anopposition coalition cohesion I operationalize of In thethird chapter, 8 CEU eTD Collection mentioned and authors approaches represented in their works. of works the on reflect critically then will I revolutions. electoral of inanalysis approaches actor-based and diffusion, international conditions, structural represent mainly that works few by limitonly my overview I will change. of mode regime electoral thatexplain approaches main will overview Imake a short of Second, for regime change. explaining centric approach change as follows. First, I will outline the work of Dankwart Rustow that emphasizes actor-are only supportive variable. As Michael McFaul argues: conditions structural forwhile regime transition factor arethe main explanatory political actors this throughout paper, AsIpropose respectively. “habituation” phase and “decision phase” stages as two these identifies Rustow Dankwart process. democratization of the stages different consolidation of democracy. democracy and from authoritarianism/to between transition distinguish wehaveto However, Transition todeny the importancedemocracy of structural or cultural factors for stability and consolidationand of democracy.consolidationpolitical actorsof of significance the indemocracy underlining By region. explaining post-communist in the developments recent explains theare process two of regime change and transition to democracy, I don’tAgency and structure in thestudy of electoral mode of regime change change regime of mode ofelectoral study the for framework Theoretical I: CHAPTER This chapter discusses agency based approach in the study mode of instudy the of regime based electoral approach discusses agency This chapter (2002: 214) especially important forexplaining how divergent outcomes result from similarstructural contexts. significance only if translated causal into have humanforces action. Individuals these ultimately and thebut decisions power, and they make preferences are of actors’ formation the influence suchas economic development cultural influences, and historical institutional arrangements Inert, invisible structures do not make democracies ordictatorships. People do. Structural factors best as Iclaim approach approach this Iuseanactor-centered current thesis For the 9 CEU eTD Collection measurement and analysis”, American Sociological Review, XVIII(April 1963) AmericanPolitical Science legitimacy”, Review,political and LIII (March development 1959, andeconomic Philips ofdemocracy: Cutright. requisites “National social “Some politicalLipset. Martin development: See Seymour 3 2 Memoryin of Dankwart A. Rustow. (Apr., 1997). lure, into “…maycircumstances that force,or cajole democratic behavior trick, non-democrats but alsoby-productimproving of of education as resultand economic of growing a prosperity memory of Dankwart the to Rustow. dedicated politics” See “Comparative journal ofthe issue inspecial wellrepresented are approaches structural 1 literature conditions tostructural opposed elites representvarious well-entrenched forces, usually social 1970: classes 352). (Rustow These elites. political emerged newly of a result as begin struggles political democratization, whichprecedes In preparatory phase, phase”. Rustow calls “preparatory during what role play supportive factors however, these factors; and cultural of structural importance the todemocraticpenetrate foreground. help to Structural conditions have to seek for some special mechanisms, preferably political ones that can politicalsubstitute cannot in factors democracy.andexplaining to understanding transitions perse requisites socio-economic However, andway around. other factors can influencepolitical conditions economic and Social interdependent. are They ones. andeconomic social with interact factors Political of prerequisites democracy. not but arerequisites factors social and economic It means thatbe confused (1970:342). structural to not with preconditions are notes, conditions Rustow (1970) puts forward actor centered inapproach study the transition of In his criticism to structural conditions or “functional” literature, Rustow refers to the works of Lipset Rustow and Cutright.does not specify the degree of national unity sufficient forproceeding to democratic transition) Reflections and refinements on Rustow’s work as well as the debate between proponents of actor-based and ofactor-based proponents between the debate as well as work onRustow’s refinements and Reflections Rustow’s work sets out an important argument unity on national is importancetransition democratic for precondition one Rustow’s of political elites. As adynamicdemocracy: toward model” to In hisseminalarticle“Transitions Dankwart Comparative Politics 3 , Rustow argues that democrats maynot only democrats , Rustowargues emerge that , Vol. 29, No. 3, Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue 10 2 . He does not. Hedoes deny 1 . As Rustow . CEU eTD Collection they create political networks that tend to be independent of the state. Educated voters are voters Educated of state. bethe independent to tend that networks political they create developmentof civil society. Theysupport promotion of political rights and civilliberties and tothe contribute they and information the to access have citizens Educated democracy. facilitates second is level condition ahigh of education. is Education of one conditions, which structural the citizenslink “to regime legitimacy with act the of voting” (Bunce Wolchik,and 2006a:8).The with fraudulent Eveniftheelections wereelections. during they communist period, taught long-experience of countries share post-communist civil regimes impededdevelopment society, democracy promoters. First and one of the important conditions is elections. Despite communist international for attractive region makes the region that in post-communist democratization electoral revolutions. They identify set of favorable conditions for electoral mode of is post-communistBeissinger for assertthat bestplace Wolchik (2007).Bunceand the region in mode of arebest works regimethe change represented Wolchik (2006a)andof of Bunce and individuals among political the elite” (Anderson 1997:255). are and skills less than of bargaining factors important perceptions, preferences, choices, calls in is whatRustow “a “decision phase” and cultural period which structural determining distinguish function between and genesis”1970:346). Thus, (Rustow transition democracy to or stable may not be the ones that brought it to existence: explanations of democracy must keep ademocracy it: that “Thehe puts factors cause democratic As that transition. factors and to become democrats) 4 (1970: 344-345) and that their beliefs may adjustin due course by some process of rationalization and adaptation” Forexample, institutional design may offerthe framework that gives institutionalist incentives for non-democrats Approaches combinethat structural both modelsand modular-diffusionist of electoral stable makea democracy that factors between distinction makes aclear Rustow In short, 4 . 11 CEU eTD Collection (2007: 260). facilitation, powerof institutional example, the and constraints” tradeoffs between structural is “on campaigns. of successful actions focused Thus,Beissinger’s approach the previous by emulating of example use power wereableto Theactors disadvantages. some structural cansubstitute of power example However, revolution. for successful lacking potential case were Beissinger If individually,occurred, argues(2007:260). structural the in taken conditions each revolutions in where color countries the wereweak conditions Structural change? regime international countries enjoyed considerable support. developed society civil and inexperiencedare likely opposition bemore uncertainto if even these less lessconditions, with structural favorable incountries revolutions Outcomes of electoral democracy. in to paths the difficulties experienced anddividedoppositions societies weaker civil rapid their of Georgiadue to to network Ukraineand democratization, NGOs proceeded whereas, civil and in society a strong Slovakiawith developments Thus, well-developed a country. during anti-authoritarian campaigns has important impact on post-revolutionary political activists NGOsanddemocratic bycivil accumulated capital political Furthermore, conditions. domestic in of succeed absence the cannot factor international yeteach other, to related by international thatarguing although promotion democracy areand structural conditions closely international regioncommunist facilitates of BunceandWolchik democracy. diffusion conclude in democratization in postcommunist in Inaddition, region. than post- anyother of region homogeneity relative result to likely most is activities such of outcomes as fruitful, organizations leaders. itauthoritarian is Finally, absence politicized military.of against campaigns electoral in complex participate and interests political their identify to capable Are the structural conditions the most crucial element in democratic transitions and transitions in democratic element crucial most the conditions structural the Are The above conditions make democracy promotion efforts of international donor 12 CEU eTD Collection syndrome. Hale gives an explanation of this syndrome as follows: by “ wereis revolutions triggered thatcolored argument Henry (2006)central Hale’s outcomes. less democratic stable leads tothe modular phenomenon whereas durable democracies, for establishing arenecessary conditions conditions. structural However, bystructural disadvantaged otherwise inthecountries, revolution electoral realization of on impact facilitating important has example of Power constraints. institutional override still shaped by and inmodular Innovations actionsmay institutional structural conditions responses. Beissinger’s conclusion is that political outcomes of modular phenomenon are not completely outcomemodular of effectthe of phenomenon oninstitutional depends regime.response of the constraintto preventspread ofmodular challenges totheir regime. The eventual political institutional impose incumbents secondtippingadditional elite point after However, defection. action diffusion. modular mayand shape Structural conditions interact. example tipping pointpowerthe of example diminishesand fades. eventually Thus and thestructure second After case matter. of time sequence and So, lowers. action for successful requirements structural case new each With context. political andrepressive exports oil rights, political rates, enrollment aseducation include suchconditions might which structural stronger advantages, with in cases emerges first phenomenon Modular examples. successful of weight cumulative by Afirstwith tippingcan bereached tipping afirst caseunless it point. point reaches each model. modular International or diffusion increases phenomenon of gradually example power of by introducing sophisticatedmore Beissingermakes hisanalysisdomination. point atipping was facilitated by structural analogues positions, frameworks, institutional histories, and modes Finally, there is a third view that is based on actor-based institutionalist explanations. institutionalist actor-based on based is that view a third is there Finally, Modular action between first second and points demoralizestipping institutions leading to cases across frames mobilizational and repertoires, strategies, similar of diffusion In turn, 13 lame-duck ” CEU eTD Collection (LEO) that lead to democratization or/and liberalization of authoritarian regimes. To explain To regimes. authoritarian of liberalization or/and democratization lead to that (LEO) outcomes” electoral “liberalizing call they what or breakthroughs, electoral study Roessler and Howard regimes, authoritarian in competitive changes regime on work their In (2006). Roessler andPhilip Howard of Marc work the from come change moderegime in of electoral approach) establishinginstitutional design with clearly defined system checksof and balances. institutions of patronal presidentialism by significantly andreducing presidential power Ukraine meets minimal requirements of a democratic state. Ukrainian opposition removed Drawing examplesfrom Georgia,Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, Hale that untilnow only suggests politics. in post-Soviet feature main the as remain will presidentialism patronal of institutions promotion. This lame-duckcyclic processof succession continuestruggles is likely to unless revolutions be can explained morestruggles byinternational bysuccession than democracy The electoral stakes. current by their elites,aredissatisfied which punish or those well to as as elites loyal of interests secure to in anymore position arenot because they irrelevant become identify “lameLame duck as byHalepresident asa presidents a patronal described duck”. revolutions with elite struggles for succession. This struggle islikely emergeto when elites electoral identifies Hale politics. machine and patronage on based authority informal on and and words,presidents elites. business In in post-Soviet formalother Eurasiaon relyboth power presidents entrenched inhavestrategicunless orpunishingpolitical office rewarding powerof But perhaps the strongest accounts on the importance of political opposition (actor-based opposition importance political of accounts the on perhaps strongest the But Patronal presidentialism”. “patronal he calls that institutions on based is syndrome This orhe she won’t be around after the election topunish those who defect (2006:308-309). the political future and to hence increasingly irrelevant as seen powerless to increasingly maintain is thewho unity someone of orhis duck”, herteam of“lame since kind a becomes incumbent the 14 CEU eTD Collection existence of formal elections of formal existence 5 democracy of dimensions various on based types five into regimes political Kenyan case. analysis of qualitative and analysis statistical cross-national both includes usenested which design, research LEO authors influence of the occurrence which factors explaining the electoral mode explaining electoral the of regime change. formation of coalition along with opposition mobilization has the strongest explanatory power in economic institutional Thus, and main theconditions. opposition’s research’s the isthat finding 375). Theresults of statistical analysis thatLEO suggest often inoccurs countries with even poor in (2006: isolation not factors although choices madebyof complete other political opposition, strategic is outcomes electoral liberalizing for matters what that conclusion to come Roessler and Howard regimes, authoritarian in competitive conducted elections fifty of analysis statistical national - cross of basis the On liberalization. prior and factors, international institutions, which political of suchasimportance literature, onexplanations are based factors, economic in democratization accepted widely democratization or/and regime variables change of substitute or precisely,reflect they More actor-based approaches. value to competing have explanatory that variables the variables Other reflect its mobilizational and capacities. by political opposition made choices strategic of importance particularly actors, of importance reflect analysis statistical to refine Levitskyconcept andWay’s “competitive(2002) of authoritarianism”. them helps democraticliberal) This regime disaggregation type (electoral and and regimes. two hegemonic, threeauthoritarian includes and competitive) (closed, contemporary political regimes Such dimensions include presence or absence of rule of law, free and fair elections, contested elections, and elections, contested elections, fair and free of law, rule of orabsence presence include dimensions Such In their research, before going to statistical analysis Howard and Roessler disaggregate In statistical In areanalyzed.analysis several factors variablesstatistical competing includedin The 15 5 . Their typology of CEU eTD Collection degrees and variation in outcomes in variation and degrees 6 elections liberalizing oppositional coalitions influence and cause LEO, it does not show variation in outcomes of to employ methods.these Proximity theWestto and thepossibility gainmembershipto EU andresources haswillingness which bepolitical opposition, leader. Theremust authoritarian the it is difficultyet countries, to those prove of leaders thatauthoritarian of overthrow implementation successful the for important undeniably of these strategies are enough were methods of resistance these While revolution. success an electoral for the of forinstrumental eventually toppling thatare oppositionnonviolent andregime civic bythe employed opponents resistance itself(Beissinger cause 2007) anotherelectoral iscannot revolution. It methodsandstrategies of modularity model of thatproponents ‘powerof example”recognize diffusionist the or one.Even cause another not revolution does One electoral cases. ‘colored” between relations prove links thesecausal interconnectedas linksofonepolitical cannot phenomenon. However, regimes. different produces LEO Thus regimes. pluralistic more favorable authoritarian toward democratic afterLEOfor changingperiod environment and use not various reasons does dueto opposition political countries, democraticother regime. In long-term liberalizing electoral is intopolitical outcomes theemergenceconsequences that of reforms, which often are embodied by constitutional reforms, allow transformation of short-term Democratic reforms. introducing of democratic for elections effects liberalizing opposition uses political countries, some In cases. across vary might politics competitive or openness political of the extent However, regimes. authoritarian in competitive space political liberalize can elections Mostof the variables inthis statistical analysis are dichotomous, and therefore, cannot take into consideration While Howard and Roessler’s statistical analysis convincingly demonstrates that strategic that demonstrates analysis convincingly statistical andRoessler’s While Howard The links between cases of electoral revolutions are obvious. They are easily identifiable easily are obvious. They are of revolutions cases between electoral The links 6 . In other words, their analysis shows that at least for a short-term period, short-term a for least at that shows analysis their words, other In . 16 CEU eTD Collection 7 as overall beweak. considered can Kyrgyzstan along with and Serbia Ukraine, Georgia, Europeancountries, civil Central-Eastern ofsome other societies compared to if Moreover, countries. two latter than the more democratic was before 1994 Kyrgyzstan explain uswhy cannot differences the However, andSerbia. in ones Georgia, to the Ukraine, relatively is weaker inKyrgyzstan society civil from The democracy. retreated Kyrgyzstan then Since region. post-communist inthe regimes democratic first the among viewed were Mongolia authoritarian regimes (e.g. Slovakia and Romania), while countries like countries Kyrgyzstan and still were statehood, independent of experience historical region Europe,the with Eastern structurally In countriesdisadvantaged (Beissinger2007). earlythe some1990s, of countries as Kyrgyzstan were considered Ukraine, and especially revolutions.colored Georgia, Serbia, initial regime stages of change in the disadvantages structural override can isactors point that The remaining stable. democracy chancesof theyincrease Moreover, is democratic path. It nottodeny likelytoemerge. favorable makedemocracy conditions that whereas follow withauthoritarian structural less the countries conditions countries the supportive they cannot tell usbe that might revolutions colored of cases why regarding change regime for explaining significant some countries withless are conditions structural why of reason The tooccur. likely is revolution an electoral more favorable conditions remain in the 2002). camp of (McFaul long-run in the work will context international that expect can we However, elites. incentives such assanctions arelikely have impact to strong democratic on choices of political bynegative aresupplemented incentives Positive incentives strong democratization. for create Beissingerplaces emphasis on modular phenomenon, which overrides structural disadvantages (2007). Structural Structural explain to conditions valuable have power analytical whereand probably when 17 7 . This is a case inthe is acase . This CEU eTD Collection introduced in the political arena. It is beyond a scope of this paper to discuss which institutions discuss which isof paperto a scope this beyond in It arena. introduced political the authoritarian newinstitutionsdemocracy rule.be old of institutions Instead conducive to are to constitutional removeinstitutions,modifyarrangements or which were discredited during phase, unfavorable structural by conditions mightbecompensated New constitutional reforms. opposition. In the second decisivebut of canbelack actions bynonviolent conditions overcome of political structural phase of electoral mode ofactors. Political actorsregime come about during contestation of authoritarian regime. In this phase,change even that is thechange post-revolution if other factorselectoral are absent. mode Lackof regime of my Internationalresearch. modularsupport, phenomena, and diffusion are supportive for structural change but conditions they are not can the be mainsubstituted variables higher. becan consolidation democratic for then chances the content, by andpolitical cannot cause setregime of rules of political game. If these rules are clearly defined and expressed by democratic power. Moreover, itinstitutional which framework, provides with provides political actors clear their abuse to tempted are who incumbents on constrains institutional imposes it term, short the In society. civil strong of development for incentives offers and culture political country’s institutionalterm, conducivedemocracydesign democratic to may nurture traditions in a institutional may design goodopportunitiescreate for consolidation democracy.of Inthelong- in new can by phase actors, be overridedisadvantages post-revolutionary the political breakthroughs. My isassumption like that ininitial stages of change,regime when structural for preservinglittle nostructural democratic democracy after have chances conditions or less with countries the is whether The question account. into be taken have to factors other In sum, none of the above approaches contradicts to the actor-centric model proposed in proposed model actor-centric the to contradicts approaches above the of none sum, In then sosignificant, not is cases researched between gap structural the that If weadmit 18 CEU eTD Collection democratization literature. Because the current research refines and builds on McFaul’s model McFaul’smodel of and builds research on Becausetherefines current literature. democratization noncooperative transitions basedon critique and reassessment modelsof by offered third wave In fact,model builds his McFaul of 2002: 213). and (McFaul type” regime resulting hypotheses of central literature concerning earlierthe modebetween the relationship of transition somethe “italsochallenges Europe, Southern America in and Latin transitions wave democratic on thirdthe literature in have preceding acceptance the wide gained that approaches, actor-centric the literature. models model Although thirdwaveof the democratization of McFaul’s supports proposes noncooperativethe model post-communist tothecooperativeof transitions asopposed pointsauthor’s and offers preliminary suggestions for refinementof model.the outlines mainissues addressedinMcFaul’sthe theoretical Then, work. it some questions of the section This McFaul. byMichael proposed framework theoretical the utilizes research thesis revolutions. Tounderstand electoral mode of regime change in post-communist context, this placeelectoral wheresince post-socialistchangethrough took 1998 regime countries underwent modesignificance of of electoral from Startingregime in change. Slovakia all 1998, virtually transitions inthe Eastern European and context.These Eurasian transitions highlightgrowing The recent electoralMcFaul’s noncooperative model ofregime transition revolutionsanalyzed. in the post-communist region demonstrate a new wave of context. 8 democracy to are conducive Hale (2006) provides his interpretationof how institutions may support democratization in post-revolutionary In his “Thearticle fourth wave of anddemocracy dictatorships”, Michael McFaul(2002) 8 . In this paper, only the first, the regime contestation phase will be will phase contestation regime the first, only the this. In paper, 19 CEU eTD Collection 9 masses…” (2002: 218).Thirdmode is revolutionary transition. Inthe revolutionary mode of agenda of change, the benefits dividing proportionally,marginalizingand andradicals and the As McFaul ofdemocracy-enhancing“Limiting defines pactsas: key components the transition the of transition. ismode pacted second transition. The of therules regimesets authoritarian incumbent supporters moderate which in imposition, by transition is it First, actors. political these of interaction from strategic result that transition modes of three identifies also McFaul literature, From ancienwave thirdthe regime”(2002:216). radicals to among the challengers and moderates and regime, ancien of elite the ruling the within hard-liners and“soft-liners in model, apactedtransition areidentifiable: four McFaul sets of actors which distinguishes elites. is moderate from resulted transition basically between arrangements negotiations power-sharing andfor so-called opt “pacted transition”. Pacted regimeregimeboth contenders supporters from moderates movement anti-regime of radicalization and developments political violent avoid imposehas Inorderto itsbecause preferences neither side enoughpower to onits opponents. is This compromise. go to to sides both from elites political encourage uncertainty and power approximately equal and uncertain, then,it is likely that democracy will emerge. Equal balance of balance its authoritarian between during of transitions challengersis and regime power if accounts literature’s third wave to According type. regime resulting the on impact direct its has of mode change on regime cooperative in as themain scholarly issues debate the well as details more in propositions main model’s the outline to is worth it model, noncooperative In discussionof the third wave of democratization literature’s propositions, I will mainly rely onMcFaul’s accounts Based on the works of O’Donnell and Schmitter, Karl, Huntington, andPrzeworski, Karl, Huntington, Schmitter, and O’Donnell of works the on Based mode of change regime isthat literature of third wave the arguments central One the of 20 9 . CEU eTD Collection nondemocratic outcomes, in the post-communist region, “hegemonic democrats” generally “hegemonic region,in democrats” post-communist nondemocratic outcomes, the of mode revolutionary literature the likelyregimedemocratization changeismost produce to from imposition thirdwave modelsthe of in While cooperative change. therevolutionary below suggests the First, transitions. wave third with compared as outcomes reversed have innoncooperative According post-communist transitions. to model, transitional three all paths below. from movements revolutionary but based pacts cooperative on democratic not on were transitions region, post-communist European Southern the and American Latin of transitions to contrast In region. post-communist the to extended be automatically cannot models their transitions, democratic European Sothern and American from Latin the evidence empirical draw of democratization of ‘third-wave” the accounts since theoretical that argues article The differences. on regional rests of democratization waves and“fourth” ‘third” between distinction McFaul, crucial to According the them.between differences considerable are there changes, of study regime inthe approaches actor-centric wave” transitions in and 1980s.Despite1970s “third-wave” both theorists and McFaul propose transition. of nature regime is change,democratic transition most likely fail to because of violent and confrontational The noncooperative model of transition proposed model by identifiesthreecausal The noncooperative paths transition McFaul proposed of McFaul calls in post-communist “fourth transitions 1990s the wave” as“third opposed to institutions emerge from abargain that provides gains foreveryone (2002: 220). importance of shared benefits that result from new institutional arrangements. Above all else, efficient orliberal institutions. These approaches to institutional emergence also emphasize the status quo for both sides. Uncertainty during the crafting of rules plays a positive role in producingoutcome but settle for second-bestoutcomes that nonetheless represent an improvement over the positive-sum game, inwhich a as both sidesframed is inthe negotiation institutions may obtainnot democratic theirof new most preferred crafting The theory. game cooperative from emerged This set of arguments has a close affinity withpositivist accounts of institutionalism that have McFaul on transitions argues: democratic Summarizingthird-wave accounts scholarly 21 CEU eTD Collection design. Democracy can under work anytypeinstitutional of if design and institutionsrules were such variable explanatory to as institutional insignificantpower centric approach designates thisactor- rule.Moreover, autocratic leaders establish former communist then democrats over if communistregime andonthe predominates contrary, then balance of results democracy power in Tajikistan. war civil and Ukraine, and inRussia democracy partial Mongolia, and balance of between power ancien andpoliticalregime led opposition to democracy in Moldova model,in the post-communist region such stalemates produce uncertain results. Even or uncertain noncooperative the According to uncertain. equal and is approximately contenders and regime as well Belarus. Asianfor states feature Central all is path distinct Thisauthoritarian autocratic rule. support that rules and institutions impose favor in their power of distribution enjoy who leaders communist 10 South the of transitions democratic tothe opposed as cause democracies than leaders dictatorships rather likely to by are imposed communist will on antidemocratic elites” (McFaul 2002: 223). demonstrations balancethe proved thatof power was in they favor opposition’sthe their imposed mobilized democracy of tactics orstreet massespromoted uncooperative because when“elections such in Europe Eastern However, in transitions. democracy for earlier force destructive confrontationalelite isnotchange wereconsidered mobilization and its as attitudes affair. Mass nonviolently butforcibly communist overthrow The dictatorships. moderevolutionary of regime by South I regard to the regions of Latin America and Southern Europe Southern and America ofLatin regions the to I regard South by In all three transitional paths, it is democrats who matter. If democrats dominate in dominate If democrats matter. who is democrats it paths, transitional In allthree Finally,it is mode the in of transition which distribution between incumbents of power A second iscausal path imposed transition by ruling communist regime. Transitions 22 10 . In this transitional path, the former the path, transitional this In . CEU eTD Collection Azerbaijan, it had the results much worse than Kyrgyzstan. Still is as“partial it placed Azerbaijan Still had Kyrgyzstan. much than results the Azerbaijan, worse toCroatia assigned scores AsforFreedom and Armenia. same approximately House the and wereonaverage“4”. for liberties political rights scores civil Freedom House Kyrgyzstan’s 1990s, electoral Croatiademocracy. throughout Second, shifted that to electoral revolution It wasonly 1999 after democrat. ascommitted and Tudjman regime democratic asa Yugoslavia, is hard to imagine Tudjman’s regime, which was amongst those responsible for wars in former democracy in case of Croatia and partial democracies in case of Armenia andAzerbaijan. First, it which Azerbaijan, Armenia,countries byMcFaulasfull-fledged asCroatia, or are defined table. typological of cells the authoritarian and in countries some democratic actual transitions began. However, the typology provided by McFaul casts doubt on location of evaluatetypological analysis hastocountries’ democracy beginningfrom when scores period the transitions inmostfrom post-communist started countries 1989-1991, weshould that expect clear what isnot is also It were used? for the typology what criteria words, other In measurement. typological starting of his isclear source point the not It always accurate. is not types regime of typology McFaul’s of regime scheme. used inregime data fewtypology besaid regarding change, remarks should corrective change or transitions and challengequestion somewill I of inthe pointsitself, in themodel discussed the the model.with and arguments the modelof most with agree While model. are examined. noncooperative McFaul’s on research, thesis to this iscentral change,which mode of regime As 225). (2002: to thedemocratic project” are committed powerful the is most that matters “What argues: AsMcFaul bydemocrats. crafted For example,For Kyrgyzstanworse in indices bydemocracy of theearly wasnotsuch 1990s moderegime of electoral the model to McFaul’s of application the to going Before Our next task is to refine the current model so as we could build the analysis of electoral 23 CEU eTD Collection across time or under particular circumstances. The circumstances can force democracy oriented force democracy can circumstances The circumstances. underparticular time or across external Political identities,observers. beliefs, preferences and arenot fixed. They shiftcan and opponents by political asdemocrats are considered they or became democrats Democrats reforms, for example. At the same time, toput it simply, democrats were not born as democrats. (Weingast 2006;Sato2007). self-maximizers are actors political that I would argue Instead, democracy. to commitment ideal opposition coalitions. Nevertheless, in believe asMcFaul wedon’t actors’ does ideologically pragmatic coalition. This is not to deny importance of democrats in building revolution but politicalthe build opposition highlyable to well-disciplined,organized, and an electoral after change transition/regime successful explaining matter for that democrats not determinative condition for producing democratic outcomes of electoral revolution. It is not of mode transition. noncooperative play isdemocratic important opposition because democrats a key in role McFaul’s to communist regime might be considered as democrats. The discussion of the concept of all itthat challengers interpreted can be article, inthe examples From as democrats? themselves frame that individuals the to or commitments democratic with individuals the to refer McFaul Does conceptualize democrats. author doesthe Nor regime. resultsindemocratic democrats resulting regime. From the model, we cannot infer how exactly balance of power in favor of typological analysis. flaws in given schemebuttypological they can question the reliability of datausedthe for democracy” in McFaul’s typological scheme. These small inconsistencies cannot serve as major We can identify democrats in authoritarian regimes based on their commitments to liberal to commitments their on based regimes in authoritarian democrats identify We can and sufficient not but facilitating is coalitions in oppositional democrats of Dominance The model specify not exactly how does distribution of determinespower typethe of 24 CEU eTD Collection revolutions in electoral all cases, because, be moderate to “forced” are Incumbents incumbents. authoritarian excluded from oppositional coalitions because violent actions may violenttrigger response from occurred are Radicals arepresent. actors moderate model only this In regime. incumbent of opponents in includemoderate opposition usually noncooperative model. Inelectoral coalitions revolutions, competitiveand ideological cohesion. organizational and unity implies opposition democratic authoritarian of Quality opposition. democratic ensure existence of cannot forces strong notwell democratic various competing, and/or organized dispersed, words, other level. aggregate In on effect guarantee cumulative butthey cannot matter regimes. individuals of commitments democratic Personal limited. very is change regime of outcomes the For variousadjust in by due course some of process rationalization and adaptation” (1970:345). reasons“their may beliefs andthat behave can beforceddemocratically non-democrats to that suggests As Rustow incentives. international or institutional example, for through, democrats into turned such in authoritarianism.backslidended can be non-democrats regimes upasdictators Second, that to as presidents both Eventually, commitments. democratic initial their of expense the at authorities abuseinduced leaders presidential both nature to of theirtime,power unconstrained personal Over democrats. as committed their presidency started Akaev and Shevarnadze rulers enlightened and liberal countries, both In Kyrgyzstan. and Georgia from drawn be can backsliding of backslidefrom such examples democrats for Instructive democraticto incentives positions. powermay provide abusepersonal, andstate temptation repressions, office, environment, or to political unfavorable First, temporarily. least at views, liberal their change to actors political There is one more but not directly relevant observation regarding our discussion of the unitedIn sum,influence arenotorganizedthen if democratic forces theirto and capacity 25 CEU eTD Collection change. formoderegime electoral of causalfactors competing comparative of analysis to the proceed application of McFaul’stheoretical The framework. theoretical for the astartingprovides discussion empirical point model to electoralfor McFaul’s implications has theoretical aforesaid The of thirddemocratization. wave mode of regime change.in more literature mightbe on democratic coincidenceof nature with earlier political opposition In the next chapter,strong organizational networksand mobilizational and intra-coalitional discipline than rather I will fact, my proposition that emphasizes importance of building cohesive opposition coalition with actions. in repressive areconstrained their incumbents authoritarian together, international pressure or weakness of a given regime, but often all these reasons combined These practical observations are to some extent in opposition to what McFaul argues. In argues. what McFaul to in opposition some extent areto observations These practical 26 CEU eTD Collection causal factors that have less explanatory power and to concentrate on the key factors. key the on concentrate to and power less explanatory have that factors causal difference. Despite some of its limitations, this method offers us an opportunity to eliminate the method of indirect onMill’s rests that analysis comparative the conduct will I Beissinger. and Kuzio, byMcFaul, variables provided of based factors on lists explanatory the causal alternative of analysis comparative conduct will I explanation. probable most the out find is to task my mode exerted electoral of crucialmostthe factors to regime change, the contribution listed change. Since neither of the abovementionedKuzioand(2008), Beissinger (2007). authors made a clearmostinlists The extensive offactors explanations. were presented works of the McFaul (2007), distinction of which based actor and diffusionist, and/or international structural, of cultural, a set represent revolutions of the onthecolored works can beinvarious that identified factors Thecausal revolutions. colored for of arecommon allinstances some factors cases, butthe vary of across These explanations change. regime modeof of electoral success the for explanations alternative several forward Electoral mode of regimechange in section. second the conducted analysis comparative caseoriented of results the assesses section Thesecond analysis. comparative findchange themain infour countries through and seeksto factor out methodof the explanatory for regime factors causal mode possible competing section of examines change. first The regime change. regime of mode electoral for factors ofcausal assessment and Identification II: CHAPTER In this section, I will identify a key factor that most likely led to the successful regime puts revolutions onelectoral scholarship first the chapter, in earlierthe As Idiscussed This chapter tackles the question of who or what is the main driving force in electoral 27 CEU eTD Collection large/growing enrollment in higher education; recent tradition of large-scale protest; strong protest; large-scale tradition of inhigher education; recent enrollment large/growing inlegislature; opposition of representation (political significant rights); structure opportunity fraud; political electoral past useof extensive variables as: includessuch structural advantages list of The revolution. modular democratic facilitate that advantages structural listof identified colored revolutionspredict forthcomingand to electoral modular foropportunities revolution will breakthrough. in andfailure of factors most of democratic these revolution resultthe lackKuzio, According absence of the to or EU)”(Kuzio,the intervention 2008:98). or (Russia charismatic candidate; a united mobilized opposition; youths; and regionalism and foreign a elites; ruling unpopular city; capital legitimacy; a pro-democratic regime’s the weakened that crisis political a preceding society; civil mobilizing in assists that nationalism civic competitivefactors include Europe” “return The dimensions authoritarian to as: such regimes. by spaceforfacilitating represent democratic opposition offered factors causal Ukraine. These and Serbia, in Georgia, in Croatia, electoral revolutions five Slovakia, democratic breakthroughs divisions in security the forces (McFaul 2005: 7;Kuzio 2008:98-99). mobilize; and media; to opposition the independent of ability of some degree falsified election; of aperception a opposition; leadera united regime; and anunpopular authoritarian regime; are asemi- them identifiable of most The Revolution. of success Orange to the contributed to a single case study - Ukraine. He comes uprevolutions. with wide-range listUkraine, of factors that might led Georgia, successful in key factors the that to regime changes of Serbia, Identification have and Kyrgyzstan is essential for our understanding of outcomes of the colored Independently from Independently from McFaul andKuzio, MarkBeissinger (2007)inassess to an attempt Building on McFaul, Kuzio Taras (2008) distinguishes nine contributed factors that tothe Michael McFaul’s (2007)on Orange Revolution work model noncooperative hisextends 28 CEU eTD Collection constant. be fraud.electoral would called not “electoral”.revolutions electoral Otherwise, is This variable to asresponse start by definition protests electoral because in table the variable elections” not included in Although mentioned analysis.the by Idid all include authors, three not “falsified are listin of only author the one are present thatSo, thefactors authors. the abovementioned three leader in regime. and Iplacedeachvariable inif it table only the least appears at two liststhe of includespossiblyof overthrow unpopular ninevariables tothe comparative that table contributed influenceon insignificant The hadrevolution. successof the that electoral factors eliminate each case make of them look revolution successful (D’Anieri overdetermined 2006: 338). only additional supportive and/or fact,explanatory In power. presence the factors in of all these success of electoral revolution;and explanations. agency-based Thereis littleeach doubt that of these variables contributed to the however, I deriveinternational,are based structural, cultural, that on be tothe factors attributed can These variables from thevalue. and weight assumption varying has factors abovementioned the of each power, explanatory that of terms some of them have represent a broad range of variables that belongnumber of structural modular conditions themore likely willrevolution occur. to various political forandforthcoming prior Thehighercumulative revolutions presentconditions elections. and social phenomena. upcumulative number counted of variables negative of Beissinger positivethese outcomes or In promotion economy and of absence NGOs; energy On export (Beissinger 2007:272).basisthe of democracy- by transnational penetration andpolice/military; regime between ties weakened local over government; regionalcultural control withinopposition dominant group; divisions I constructed comparative table in order to reduce the number of variables to and reduce number of the to inorder table comparative I constructed they plausible, sound authors three the in of cited articles the factors these While all 29 CEU eTD Collection gain gain evena majority votes fraud.of electoral without mobilize people againstdictatorship.Russia, Putin’s In regime be would probably still ableto to is difficult it popular still are leaders its in which regime In concessions. territorial and defeat, Milosevic,Akaev Shevarnadze, corruption, Kuchma, theirmilitary lost and popularity to due democratic breakthrough (2007: 55). In all four countries of revolutions,colored presidents for McFaul, First, analysis. under placed variables is basedon literature the on colored revolutions. Below, justifiability Iwill stress nine of diffusion. international as NGOs” democracy-promotion by transnational “penetration and intervention” variablesthese measuringfor quality the Finally, opposition.of political “foreign Iregard these variables appear as “opposition coalition building”. In the next section, Iwill utilize most of various dimensions they represent one political phenomenon – political opposition. In theopposition”; youths”; “mobilized table and “ability While tomobilize”.of opposition the representing 1 “a united candidate”; “a charismatic local over government”; control “opposition legislature”; in opposition of representation “significant as variables such is example Next well. as unpopular elites are incumbent and president because isunpopular Regime a regime. they represent together rewards presidenthisdistribute to cronies loyal and in elites exchange All political for support. president distributional authoritarianthrough networks. Through informal networks these and relies elites support of inofficearetightlyelites. High-ranking connectedtothe on political the inleader even “unpopular“unpopular An state elites” regime”. or unpopular a semi-authoritarian and leader” as “unpopularfactors such between noinstance, difference significant is there For As I made clear earlier, justification of the causal factors that are included in areincluded that analysis the factors of causal justification the As Imadeclearearlier, werevariable. includedinto asonlyonecan factor one be that Such factors aggregated 30 unpopular regime is a necessary condition for condition necessary a is CEU eTD Collection opportunities for mass mobilization (D’Anieri 2006). Eighth, mass mobilization raises costs for costs raises mobilization mass Eighth, 2006). (D’Anieri mobilization mass for opportunities forces undermine andpolice, coercive regime’s (McFaul 2007:56)andopen capacity up political military among especially Seventh, I. elitedivisions, forinchapter thereasons discussed factor grievances can be used by regime challengers. Sixth, imbalancedincumbents conduct the regional regional policy, grievances may result. These breakthroughsimultaneously helpand inhibitdemocratic 106). If and(Kuzio revolutions” 2008: same time, accelerate and strengthen opposition. Fifth, as Kuzio argues: “ Kuzioargues: as Fifth, opposition. andstrengthen same time,accelerate (Kuzio2008: 102). protests” for democraticin the difficulties opposition insurmountable street launching sustained andin Bakuand Moscow, “therefore creates with Minsk, environment anti-democratic sustain one month-long throughout protests street cold 2004.This December, isin very contrast Tbilisi just one year prior to Rose revolution. Mayor of Kyiv helped Ukraininian opposition to mayor of became Saakashvili president andcurrent leader opposition Georgian fact of the that underlines Kuzio challengers. regime base for power into can be transformed events. It protest Ukraine and Serbia. in autocrats against protests political of for preceding effectiveness majorof the obstacles wasone opposition Divided opposition. and inweakunreliable invest resources to are reluctant opposition damage its credibility in both domestic and international arena. International donors opposition is manipulation. for fragile Various government’s competing easy and groups within emphasized by analystsmost engaged inthe study of Dividedrevolutions. anddisorganized 11 emphasis is mine Fourth, prior political crisis might undermine legitimacy of the ancien regime and, at the at and, regime ancien the of legitimacy undermine might crisis political prior Fourth, Third, Second, significance of significance Second, democratic capitalcity coalescing provides strong logisticalprovides for support opposition during opposition 31 international diffusion for toppling authoritarian regime is regime authoritarian toppling for is significant causal significant is regionalism ” 11 can CEU eTD Collection However Charles Ragin argues that this method “uses negative cases to reinforce to conclusions this“uses method negative Ragin cases Charles arguesthat However 41). 1987: (Ragin explanations some causal neither reject nor accept researcher cannot that fact the to multiple causation, in of situations some leads, competing explanations reject cases to negative on reliance Themethod’s inconclusive. canbeflawedand method of difference indirect The 40). imperfect (Ragin 1987: probabilisticrelationships givecross-tabulation and that us and correlation on rests method This limitations. explanatory potential some has difference, the number of variables and to concentrate only on particular variables. and Beissinger, represents simplesignificantimpact on intellectualelectoral revolution, based on causal conditions offered byexercise. McFaul, Kuzio, mighthad have that factors of possible Identification revolution. This of electoral cause potential exercise allows us to narrowinabsent infailed andthatis fourcases present successfulcases all beconsideredas will down is that condition/factor The variable. each of effect the identify to try will I revolutions failed failedattempted butin Azerbaijan revolutions Belarus. cases and Byintroducing these two of participatepreferences inand to campaigns (Buncecomplex electoral andWolchik 2006a:10). attractive emergencenew elites of High level makesand revolution (2007: 266). education of country the for the to democracyeducation higher of expansion an connects Beissinger Goldstone, and Lipset of works the promoters.youth Referring for movements” impetus (2007:266). to theorganization immediate of radical Educated in inthemidst independence the ofan of universities higher provided education expansion the of citizens torein “political education overhigher As exposure. and attempts controls suggests: Beissinger are capablegovernment’s propaganda to personsarelesssusceptible educated higher education. Highly to identifyin is growing enrollment largeor causal factor final The apparatus. of actions coercive repressive their political It is mentioningworth that this which method, is based on methodMill’s indirect of In addition to the cases of successful revolutions I introduced two more cases of 32 CEU eTD Collection Country change regime of mode electoral for factors causal of analysis Comparative 1. Table empirical evidence. opportunity that enableseffect. Iacceptme the results of this analysisto notas final focusand absolutely correct conclusions but as an on narrow set As factorsof under analysis arecausal dichotomous variables, they cannot explain us the degree of causal variables andfactors. abovementioned of representatives full-fledged serve as cannot test dimensions these factors, them basedelite-based and international, oncultural, structural, of dimensions various represent analysis in (1987:41). isinterest” phenomenon The the variables thatdespite of second limitation included rejected as they have present or absent instances in both positive and negative cases. Unpopular cases. negative and positive both in instances absent or present have they as rejected both in absent negativeis mobilization” “Mass cases. negative in both absent and cases positive in all present cases, are conditions These division. elite and building coalition and are opposition revolution success of present in positivecases in failed. which revolutions cases, except than conditions positive higher of number feature will cases successful that expectations authors’ Kyrgyzstan.in cases of successful revolutions. Cumulative numbers of present conditions confirmOther three conditionsAzerbaijan are Belarus Kyrgyzstan Ukraine Georgia Serbia embraces that of observations set identify the to investigator the allowing atheory negativecasespresupposes of …Theexamination cases positive drawn from Next, from the comparative table we can infer that the most probable explanationsLet us start from the simplest. Cumulative number of present/positive conditionsfor is higher leader Unpopular + 0 + + + + building Coalition 0 0 + + + + crisis political Prior + 0 + + + + capital Democratic 0 0 0 + + 0 Regionalism International 0 0 + + 0 0 33 diffusion 0 + 0 + + + division Elite 0 0 + + + + mobilization Mass 0 0 0 + + + possible education in higher enrollment Large 0 + + + + + instances of the of instances number Cumulative 2 2 6 9 8 7 CEU eTD Collection awareness is curvilinear. While highly educated peopleawareness is Whileto propaganda, canresisteducated middle-range highly curvilinear. political conclusion that Brazil, to come study ontheirof they Based political propaganda. governmental of exposure to people besusceptible educated suggestthat can Zaller (1989) This variable does not needmethod of difference. basis on indirect the of eliminated isalso in higher education” enrollment to be crucial“growing Finally, case. this in effective not factor was diffusion international factors for other absence the explanation of regime change.The Belarusian opposition enjoyed diplomatic considerable from support EUandthe US.In the Geddes and from protests counterparts. strategiesstreet andtechniques of Ukrainian emulated their activists civic Belarusian minimal. were results but diffusion international to exposed highly was Belarus example, cases. For varies across diffusion international of and the degree effect However, regions. from Belgrade to marched Demonstrators capital. for challenging regime. However, itis not necessary condition. People can come from outside of isimportant as capital of city protests as well residents of long-sustainedparticipation for street his violently crackingin regime after Logisticalon down opposition the parliament support 1993. might wayaround.also other delegimitization consolidated Yeltsin illiberal Itwork regime. of not sufficient condition for popular protest mobilization. Prior political crisis might contribute to inelectoral protests post-Sovietother countries aswell. Thus, unpopularleader andregime are inpopular domesticthe leader/regime arenaUnpopular (Kuzio not 2008:102). does trigger of leaders opposition the his (Silitsky like 2006:146) and regime in Russiais Putin’s regime valid votes receivedmorethan electoral despite Lukashenka opposition any revolution attempted Azerbaijan.enough was However, this not Aliev’sto overthrow regime. InBelarus, the and in revolutions colored protests of emergence electoral facilitated andregime leader, elites, International diffusion is one of the most important components in electoral revolutions. in electoral components important most the of one is diffusion International 34 CEU eTD Collection by rejecting causal factors with less explanatory with lesspower. factors explanatory by causal rejecting complexity causal simplify rather, to but one, except variables competing all completely reject to in my establishwords, of section,was The ideacausal invariance. is previous patterns task to not toproduce ininIn contexts ways and outcomes” different different differentother (1987: 52). struggle toexplain variation. Rather, they providefor basis explaining how conditions combine methods:forceoriented “They investigators view donot to in causal conditions asopponents the Asdialogue ideas 52). case- Ragin Charles aboutthe and between evidence”(Ragin 1987: argues arich “stimulate evidence”andthey the to in theirflexible “are approach of difference method competing At explanations. samethe time, caseoriented methods including Mill’s indirect Elite defections and opposition coalition building coalition buildingin followingthe section of chapter. this revolutionary Iwillperiod. specifically with the questionsdeal of elite defection and opposition itsin regime influence changeandconsequently, degreeof on the competitiveness post- electoral contributes to my expectations that highlight a key role of opposition coalition building for for regime change to the factor of opposition coalition building, in fact, it only endorses and invariabledefection appears analysis asindependent comparative and competingthe explanation Although elite type. regime inresulting of determination variable building asacrucial coalition contradict mynot mode These findingson of change. do to political regime opposition argument “opposition building”coalition have likely mostthe causal forstrong power explaining electoral forgovernment. authoritarian support of serve as political main to the source therefore, media, and togovernment-dominated mostbe exposed the likely to people are educated Under causal Under of Mill’sindirect method causal is complexity, a usefulfor difference rejectingtool and defections” as“elite such that variables show analysis of comparative this The results 35 CEU eTD Collection Middle East, and South and South-East Asia. And finally, byitself, elite defection cannotcause a Africa, America, Latin from of many becountries drawn can Theevidence response. violent with multiple examples whenan and us movement History provides to armedconflict. radicalization can leadcrack down to of permanent violent suppressiondefeating anti-regime massof movement.political In this case, butnotsucceed in do mass a down on protests loyal crack elites incumbent violentwe can that oppositionassume course of protests resultsis likely. Violent in a down on mass protests and eventually to the defeat of anti-regimemovement. By the same token, defection a regime. downfall tothe of contribute leadereventually and against authoritarian regime contestation phase contributes and enhances during opposition defection coalition elite how building. explain shortly will I Below, other. each reinforce mutually can they rather, but hypotheses exclusive mutually necessarily not are variables two The variation. addition, coalition building has for implications determiningdecisive in outcomes typeregime variablefailure independent thecases.positive In successandattempted both explains of that explains failure the of attempted electoral revolutions and opposition buildingcoalition is basis of this analysis, Iwill argue that elite defection isnegative independent variable that mainly section, Iwill analyze two causal factors: elite defection and opposition coalition building. On the In this revolutions. outcomesof invoked regimecolored changewith and different each other independentdifferencevariables present from in two independently eitherthat combination or method of indirect basedon analysis of comparative results the Moreover, analysis. detailed moreinto go should we revolutions, of led incolored variation the outcomes to that factors main does not gobeyond invariance. establishingpatterns identifyof causal To causal mechanisms of The logic of protest dynamics suggests that elite defection may facilitate popular protest popular may facilitate thatelite defection suggests dynamics The logic of protest Nevertheless, despite all the described advantages of the indirect method of difference, it that is, if incumbent elites remain loyal to the regime, can lead to the violent crack violent the to lead can regime, the to loyal remain elites incumbent if is, that 36 A non- CEU eTD Collection already already 2006:333). participating” (D’Anieri upon benefits numberof the “individual’s andpeople because of are dependent costs perception join protests to start People follows. effect snowball the point, atipping reaches Onceit protests. large-scale level the of grow to to in order point tipping reach aparticular to has mobilization tipping point, acritical numberof Accordingprotesting people. to his model,threshold protest a reach protests is whether analysis inhis question important most the that he claims model, threshold the Utilizing inoutcomes. variation in explaining elites of role crucial the underlines D’Anieri and Ukraine, in leaders Serbia totopple authoritarian failed attempts and successful success failure or post-communist of revolution. electoral By contrasting and comparing revolutions. electoral of outcomes the understanding for power explanatory strong presents it variable, positive incombined analysis factor such keycausal opposition building, with our as other coalition a failure of forelectoral than revolution rather explaining its success.However, when factor this the of for explanation suitable is more elite defection implies that It is variable. negative It rather rather it significantly contributes to its relatively peaceful and nonviolent outcome/course. but revolution failure of electoral success or the notcompletely determine does elite defection ispropose that whatI in later Nevertheless, section. accounts this more complex their provide defection inthey explaining can defect. Of course,movement, rebellion, insurgency,the regime orat least guerrillas.arguments In short, elites need some substance where of changethose inmass opposition,political you the For of agentshape popular regimewho this, needan change. highlight are a notkey role asof elitesstraightforward and elite as I have assumed. I will The factor of elite divisions is Paul D’Anieri’s (2006) central argument in explaining the in explaining argument central (2006) D’Anieri’s Paul is divisions elite of factor The one. main the not is it but change regime for explanations key the of is one defection Elite 37 CEU eTD Collection developing ties between various terrorist groups and groups developing betweenvarious terrorist ties same atthe time from relatively feels secure in successful hasproved terrorism instance, transnational mobile For phones. internet and insuch disruptitharder toageof contacts becomeshowever, the increasingly explanation, opposition by groups, relationaltargeting betweencontacts coalition Thatis groups. aplausible andlinks between protesters disrupt They building process. can intervene incoalition forces can security isthat assumptions central author’s the of one example, For bedebatable. them can of few thesis, my of arguments with coincide accounts these of many While change. regime of mode for electoral the understanding accounts andplausible realistic massof creates mobilization (D’Anieri 2006:336). media,mobilization andindependent popular fraud, expose electoral opposition,to ability the of McFaul’smainsuchasorganization variables among other elites encompasses regime’s D’Anieri, For factor elite’smass behavior of outcomes determines protests. divisions the to political opposition and media tycoons provide coverage contribute in favorfinancially of street protests.Businesspersons regime. In short,incumbent an to challenge effective pose can that longmobilization through period of The time. massopposition guides mobilization in direction and mass is abletocontrol,sustain operate, organized political opposition well-funded and Highly point. atipping mobilization beforereaches organizations leaders arrests of protest of or mobilization by measureslikeearly repressions Security services pre-emptive 347). prevent can 2006:346- movements, andsecurity (D’Anieri services well-organized protests pro-regime elites, eventually include lead tothe success.These components opposition unity of elites, defection of creates and thatidentifies crucial four favorable political structure opportunity components andmobilization capacity. D’Anieri political structure create opportunity These attitudes This dynamic approach with focus on the process of elite defection and threshold model of and threshold defection focuselite ontheprocess with This dynamicapproach reachWhether atipping political protests pointdepends on andeconomic elites’ attitudes. 38 CEU eTD Collection 12 incoalition years underminedprevious of its protests strength and legitimacy including themajor figures opposition likeKostunica joinand Yushenko to opposition the some elites of unwillingness in The general. opposition political thestrength of undermines strong figuresgroups in or oppositionthe tojoinrefuse opposition coalition, it then seriously after revolution as they anticipate that balance of power is in positions favor political of or oppositioneconomic their coalition.secure to is If goal main Their comers. late are them of Most withpreviously incumbentdefectin tojoinregime associated to start order coalition. opposition Elites building. coalition of part is defection elite Indeed, building. coalition opposition of process resemblancethe with demonstrates logic his the of accounts in fact, revolution, itsmobilization tipping point. Tobe point. asiffairhe D’Anieri, allow this interprets mass reaching to cooperatively elites incumbent mass supportpoliticalafter mobilizationitsbut elites hasreachedopposition, tipping forces and Often,one. security independent variable than rather forces isdependent security of intervention In such a case, protests. torepress costly becomes itwhen only forces defect security fall. many regimewill incumbent cases, In that the becauseit obvious becomes or opposition cooperation requires special andprevioustraining experience probably ofmassmobilization. opposition coalition. Thus, they avoidcan services’ security interference. This of kind level high an of members with other contacts relational direct minimum tothe reduce to allowthem that are techniques the groups they possess highly organized, If protest intervention. security forces’ puts: “Becauseputs: much Kuchma Yushenkohadsohisinauthority, support decision 2001fatally to see Kuzio 2005; 2008, Thompson andKuntz 2004 Although D’Anieri asserts that elite defection is a key factor for the success of for the successof electoral factor iskey elite a defection that asserts D’Anieri Although the forces defectbecause theysupport is security question whether The second debatable 39 12 . As D’Anieri CEU eTD Collection opposition coalition building. I will deal with the issues of political opposition and coalition and inchapter. next process the building opposition political of issues the with deal will I building. coalition opposition (Thompson andimplication has division Kuntz2004:162).Elite animportant for process of the whether itmight not be better to switch over to the opposition consider side to before begin it is regime the too late” of elements as calculations, opportunistic to rise “gives power galvanizes incumbent withinregime.elite divisions balance Theperception diminished of of from political butopposition and popular thereverse. protest Strength of political opposition always Notwithstanding, initial stagesof mutually protest start factors. popular are reinforcing I argue throughout this discussion, these two factors do notcontradict each other and in fact, they whether it is political opposition that makes incumbent elite to defect. Both options whethernotquestion isor for uppolitical regimeopportunities change elite defection opens can work. As Serbian opposition in 1997” (2006:346). the Vuk Draskovic’sdefection undermined just as undermined Ukrainainan the opposition, In sum, elite defection is an integral part of regime erosion and of regime change. The 40 CEU eTD Collection Seattle.” Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Washington 13 effectpool changeorganizational into to order resources entities thatpermitdistinct arrangements means-oriented as “Collaborative, defines a coalition works coalition building for regime transition. Sydney Tarrow building on the several social movements fourthe countries, Iwouldlikespend to some time discussingthe possible implications of Assessment of an opposition coalition’s cohesion revolution. anelectoral after regime a of type resulting the and consequently, competitiveness thelevelof andelectoral influence electoral revolution strategic an coalition andopposition actors’ of cause opposition choices an quality the how explain to seeks study Kyrgyzstan. case The a caseof study to section proceeds second The countries. four inthe quality coalitions the of or strength the assesses this chapter of an opposition coalition and its implications for the resulting strength the regimeevaluate is to types. chapter Thethis of first task main section The of variable. explanatory main the as building coalition opposition an out singled analysis comparative of basis the on and change regime type regime resulting the for implications Coalitional III: CHAPTER mobilizational, electoral, material, and other resources in order to effectively challenge the challenge toeffectively in order resources other and material, electoral, mobilizational, accumulate is to acoalition primary of goal the creating that imply quotations clearly These two (2006:371). power” the incumbent’sholdmounting on challengeto is aneffective capable of party that nationwide political build abroad, to material sufficientresources to lackaccess parties political “opposition because coalitions opposition building justify importance of Roessler the see Levi, Margaret, and Gillian Murphy. “Coalitions of Contention: The Case of the WTO Protests in Before going to the assessment of the strength or cohesion of the opposition coalitions in The examined explanations chapter previous for possiblecompeting electoral the mode of 41 13 ” (2005: 164). Howard and” (2005:164). CEU eTD Collection electoral electoral playing field incompetitive authoritarianism not providedoes equal foropportunities all elections in order to join efforts for exposing electoral cheating of authoritarian incumbents. As revolutions. Political opposition parties coalesceanticipatingfraud electoral evenbeforeto try provide good opportunities for political form opposition to a strong and viable coalition. media) andmass legislative, arenas(electoral, three other judicial arena, of With exception the authoritarian regimes clearly have contributing implications for opposition coalition building. Three fourout of Levitsky andWay’s (2002)“arenas of democratic contestation” in competitive conditions, build in links and with cooperation whichthey civilsociety.can other each with appropriate or special circumstances, needspace, forces a common opposition regimes, in Therefore, each 2005:124). authoritarian (Tarrow other should building trust in coalition massmobilization. anti-regime facilitates united coalition a incumbent elites from force themtotake neutral using illegalFinally, stance.and a repressions canrestrain a coalition Third, leadersother. each clash against opposition divide and to to maneuvers manipulative incumbents’ the for space limit forces opposition coalition a building by fraud. Second, electoral and repressions of increase incumbents’ the and costs votes electoral political liberalization First, astrong(2006: 371). andunited coalition more accumulate can and Howard Roessler indentify four anopposition ways through which coalition achieve can success. feasible a secure can they policies, manipulative government’s incumbent the resist Roessler 2006:371). manipulationseeks to marginalize, that and repress divide, co-opt, oppositionthe and (Howard for agovernment’s target become an easy forces Otherwise, opposition existing order. The first one, electoral arena, is obviously important for the analysis of for the analysis electoral of is important obviously arena, first electoral one, The participating Various groups requires efforts. networks Building considerable coalitional and to andunite cooperate their forcesif resources decideto efforts However, opposition 42 CEU eTD Collection electoral electoral is “a isrevolutions opposition”.This united synonymousconcept “opposition to revolution. coordinationisimportant Butthemost thatparliamentcoalesced opportunities forprovides dictators. against of Several inboth countries parties political largein hadparliaments. representations relatively opposition started. Ukrainianinmassbeforea certain parliamentprotests Serbian extentandopposition to as wellhave access to media. In all four “colored” countries the and opposition sessions possessedlegislative the as anumber during of questions seats important some raise publicly for can parliamentarians buildingcontrolled by majority the of loyal authoritariandeputies to oppositionistpresident, a new can groups gather for denouncing incumbents authoritarian (2002:56).Even if is parliament coalitionopposition where platform, a public is regimes authoritarian in competitive arena legislative that argue Way and evenLevitsky Similarly, coalition. anti-government astrong of formation after successfulpolitical in coordination opposition’s parliamentlinkagesfor civil its and with society the of importance crucial the Kenya demonstrate of incase study (2006) their and Roessler Howard close links with civil society. Suchlinks increase mobilization capacity of opposition parties. building aviable An coalition. has succeed littlecoalition opposition chance if to it not have does durability politicalof opposition. ensure can arena legislative the Finally, opposition. political joined and tycoons media some Georgia Ukraine In outlets. media some own might coalition in individuals or parties political second arenais independentmass media. It is not part of opposition coalition; nevertheless, some short, anticipation of fraudulent elections gives firstincentives for opposition to coalesce. The players, opposition increase political parties to prefer theirchancesbyforming acoalition. In A factor that both McFaul and Kuzio included in their lists of “real causes” of successful of “real causes” of lists in their included Kuzio and McFaul both that A factor forprovides a The parliament efforts its opposition space wherepolitical can coordinate 43 CEU eTD Collection 14 quality the assess dimensions The well. as dimensions other many include or explain dimensions benumber There butIthink moredimensions. of of dimensions that tables’ couldsome the limited only analysis under placed sake simplicity, I the of 4. For in 2,3and tables represented Kyrgyzstan Georgia Serbia Ukraine Country ofopposition capacity 2 Mobilization Table articles. andscholarly reports, analytical country Group’s Crisis International newspapers, of analysis content of basis onthe areelaborated data The table revolution. electoral after developments influence ancien overthrow also political but regime capacity to includes notonly to capacity the is of opposition cohesive mode issuefor understanding central electoral changethe that regime to evaluate the strength and effectiveness of opposition coalition-building. Coalition-building or in the works of McFaul, Beissinger, and Kuzio. opposition. presented factors from list of the political Iadopted in analysis the used thatare of Some dimensions of the strength coalitional and capacities mobilization show dimensions These opposition. of strength of the vision clearer us give thatwill several into dimensions concept itit means nottell this concept,actually I disaggregated abstract muchwhatempirically. does us is As inan opposition” work. “unitedthesis I proposed and effective current coalition” the that The numbers of mobilized protesters adopted from Mark Beissinger (2007) I wouldmeasurelike to quality the coalitions bythedimensions,of which opposition are is opposition political of dimensions qualitative mostly these assessing of goal main The (15 000) (15 Low-scale 000) (100 Medium-scale 000 700 High-scale 000) 000 (1 High-scale protesters of Mobilization Clan and regionally based networks based regionally and Clan networks society civil and based Regionally society networks civil and based, regionally partisan, networks society civil and based Regionally (dominant) mobilization of Type 14 44 Not significant Not Significant Significant Significant mobilization protest with Previous experience Mainly rural peasants rural Mainly dwellers city Mainly city dwellers Farmers, dwellers City coal miners,Mainly and mobilization Social bases of Low High High High Mobilization organizations Youth CEU eTD Collection 15 massof Allprotests. these facilitatedaspects political foropportunities mass mobilization. society activists. In Ukraine andSerbia,parties political significantly toorganization contributed political in opposition former three countriesestablished close with relations NGOs and civil is The important that so on. for and activists, civic training seminars Ukraine), (especially Kyrgyzfinancial in mediabetter oppositions,positionsto in contrast to support, one,had access might be explainedby number factors.of Serbian, Ukrainian, and tosome extent Georgian innumberprotesters of contrast sharp mobilization. The level youth of the shows specifically fifthin opposition during The Georgia Ukraine, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan. revolutionsdimension and regime. andensure illiberal a downfall the effectively challenge dictator after theirof political prosperity to mobilize theirsupporters areable to networks partisan established well with The parties mobilization. protest mass organize can society civil Lively dictator. illiberal toward opposition of strong is source a society civil regimes, authoritarian In competitive society. with civil mobilize largenumber often means of protesters that political opposition links established close changeopposition variable as crucial often that determines outcomes regime of mass capacity alsoconsider revolutions colored and change regime on The literature literature. in countries. four effectiveness the political oppositions’ of understandingdegree of it enhanceour will as these dimensions, cohesion organizational its and capacity mobilizational its of opposition coalitions during electoral Thestrength revolutions. of isa coalition measuredby See,for example, McFaul (2002 and 2007),Howard and Roessler(2006), D’Anieri (2006), Tucker (2007) The first fourThe first dimensions intable tomobilizational3 refer capabilities political of The importance mass mobilizationof is bysocialusually underlined movements 45 . Below, I will briefly examine each of 15 . Ability to CEU eTD Collection significantly to the success of revolutions in Slovakia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine (Bunce and (Bunce Ukraine and Georgia Serbia, in Slovakia, revolutions successof the to significantly 2004: 165). concessions made by Milosevic regime and defections from the opposition (Thompson and Kuntz Serbian inperiod. lastedprotests 1997 88days butthey partial were undermined dueto forkeep people in along and to police lackedresources streets grievances fireand Ukrainians the in by brutally andsix Kyrgyzstan werekilled were because suppressed people demonstrators Kyrgyzfailedsustain andUkrainian oppositions mainly respectively long-term to protests regime mobilization experience. During Aksy inevents 2002 and scandal Kuchmagate in 2000 skills opposition of (Beissinger 2007:271).The in hadoppositions fourthe countries anti some 2007). capital citiesand other 2004; Kuzio(Thompson and Kuntz McFaul 2007; 2005; Beissinger andresidentsof electorates, party society activists, bywell-trained civil supported wereones Kyrgyz opposition relied onpoorly rural trained people, while and Ukrainian, Georgian, Serbian society organizations (Thompson andKuntz, 2004: 166).One of mainthe differences was that DOS 2001: 105). (Democratic Opposition of mobilization reliedSerbia) on of capacities civil some cities were governedby mayorsoppositionist (ICGN94 2000: 17;Krnjevic-Miskovic 2005: 38; Hale 2005:153;McFaul 2007: 58).Massmobilization in in started Serbia regions as based Mostdemonstrators came patterns. toKyivfrom Western and Central (Kuzioregions largely civic activists, moderate nationalists, and party partisans. Mobilization also had regionally mobilized opposition In democratic Ukraine, networks. mobilize their patronage were ableto least, at “traditionalists”, torural areas wheremobilization protestshifted Bishkek andtherefore, As many scholars on colored revolutions emphasize, youth youth organizations emphasize, revolutions As manyscholarscolored on mobilizational might influenced have massmobilization with experience The previous In Kyrgyzstan, democratic opposition and civic activists failed to mobilize people in 46 contributed CEU eTD Collection Wolchik and (2006a), andBunce Minic and (2007), Dereta (2007). Beissinger from adopted are assistance financial and technical, training, and support diplomatic (2007). The of names organizations,international states, transnationaland youth organizations thatprovided 16 Georgia Kyrgyzstan Serbia Ukraine Country Table 3International support foropposition political andprograms consequently political followers. As backupfor did nothaveanyclear a their such organizational parties political activities. rule, with civil parties Mostsociety groups. individual represented politicians andserved as assigned to political parties. The leaders be can responsibility partof the Nevertheless, from newly formedparties. networks partisan of Kyrgyz political parties institutional inducedoes not environment that isit party-building, expect difficult to established Inthe started. before elections months several werecreated coalition in opposition parties political main The parties. political for incentives institutional unfavorable by the extent great a to development Kyrgyzof party mobilization Low politics. capacity canbe of explained opposition several factors including close links with of political opposition with civil society and the protests. In general,Kyrgyz youth passive itselfproved indifferent or participation regarding in to political events. revolutionary on impact little had which organizations, youth fragmented and weak were strong created activists young Wolchik 2006a;Beissinger2007;McFaul Kuzio 2007; Georgia,2008). In Serbia, and Ukraine, The data for The amount of money provided US foroppositionby government adoptedthe from Beissinger Mark In sum, mobilization of capacities political in oppositions fourthe countries depended on N/A N/A USD million 41 USD million 65 Support US financial High Low High High diffusion International Otpor, Kmara, 16 IRI, Freedom House Freedom IRI, Soros Foundation, NDI, NED, USAID Freedom House, IFES, Found-n Rockfeller West Institute, Int. Dev-mentAgency, East OSI,Canadian Marshal Fund, OSI and NED, NDI USAID,IRI, Freedom House, IFES, organizations International and 47 Pora youth organizations. In Kyrgyzstan, there Kyrgyzstan, In organizations. youth Otpor ? OK 98, Glas 99 Kmara, OK98 Zubr, Otpor, activists Transnational failed to establish close ties close establish to failed USA, Russia USA, US ambassador Slovakia Embassies, Dutch and Swiss OSCE, Poland US ambassador, support Diplomatic CEU eTD Collection international ones Way, 2008, and Linz and Stepan, 1996 17 revolutions electoral of insuccess role secondary and supportive playsinternational Isuggest that however, of enhances only effectiveness opposition; the support democratic community.Although international can support be among factors, important which from international attention received much Ukraine greater and inSerbia,oppositions Georgia, international andsupport diffusion. In each of the dimensions in represented tablethe 3, the Kyrgyzstan enjoyed and Georgia, Ukraine, inSerbia, oppositions the extent demonstrates influential DOS bloc that played a crucial role in overthrowing Milosevic. in the wereunited parties 18political InSerbia, anumberdeputies. opposition of accommodated parliament the however, role; significant any play not did parties Kyrgyzstan, In 36). Kuzio 2005: 31, 2007: 61; McFaul (Levitsky2002: 56; secret andWay related tapes Kuchmagate hemedia distributed which through have accessto to used parliament Moroz Aleksandr leaders, significant in numberseats Rada, theUkrainian One of of parliament. opposition the party (Levitsky and Way 2002). Evenbefore the Orange revolution Ukrainianthe hadopposition where place a president authoritarian an of power also executive check to itsis efforts mayconcentrate opposition the Parliament mobilization. mass for opportunities political create to able was in parliament becausetheopposition effectiveness forthe of coalitions important politics was yetitsupport, was able Akaev’s topple to regime. international levelof minimum received Kyrgyz opposition that demonstrates Kyrgyzstan evidence caused regime the from Inaddition, four factors changeinthese countries. crucial that ismostamong the not support international that alsosuggests in chapter conducted previous the see detailed discussions on the greater importance of the domestic factors in democratic transitions over the over transitions democratic in factors domestic ofthe importance greater the on discussions detailed see Table 3 provides the dimensions of international opposition supportfor of coalitions. It Table thedimensions provides 3 The next features in our analysis are party parliament. Party in andThe nextfeatures analysis independent politics our are party 48 17 . The comparative analysis comparative . The CEU eTD Collection electoral competitiveness. The score higher than 4.00, according Freedom electoral Freedom House according 4.00, higherthan Thescore electoral competitiveness. level accordingof to regime type for electoral resulting Idefine scores politics. Freedom House by competitiveness level the electoral measure of I competitiveness. level the electoral of is revolutions electoral of outcomes democratic for indicator The method of difference. indirect Mill’s utilized I revolution, anelectoral after competitiveness electoral level of the on impact regimes” (McFaul2002:228). newdemocratic produced of transition, process the not power, with “Democrats argues: McFaul of dominance in of democrats is opposition the emphasizedparticularly byMcFaul As(2002). forces. Sucha (2007:270-271). The significancefacilitates mobilizational baseregional success opposition’sthe control localover governmentensures basea regional forpower opposition that suggests in Beissinger opposition. the local democrats anddominance of over government parliamentin (ThompsonGeorgia andKuntz 2004: 168; Way 2008: 58). however,protests; crowdsviolently stormed the governmentbuildings some in and Serbia the generally peaceful out carried TheSerbian oppositions duringGeorgian and the order protests. nonviolent in andatwas lesssuccessful Kyrgyz sustaining period, same the the opposition time, well coped sustainmass nonviolentto demonstrations for million (one alongdemonstrators) evidence shows demonstrationsthat in Kyiv expertlywere Ukrainian organized. opposition The revolution. electoral of outcome democratic for factor causal aspossible table comparative in the dimension this Iplace democracy thefreedom of significantly (2005: 7-9). contributes to eventspresence civic that strong transitions of nonviolent protest during coalitions suggest To identify To which has “coalitional”dimensionsthe of strongest opposition the of the control variables astheopposition’s such thetwo includes table Finally, comparative the regime of analysis statistical cross-national of ground the on Ackerman and Karatnycky 49 CEU eTD Collection parliamentary laterparliamentary is electoral elections surprising thatturned to It revolutions. within not that posts. in andareabletogain some cabinet parliament the represented are They coalitions. electoral of winner apart were parties nationalist pro-Milosevic radical some fair InSerbia, gainfree and of elections. asa party is result to power able incumbent former the shows in isinstructivetaking even that sense.It politics. TheUkrainian case inthis part anactive They continue coalitions. opposition broad of disintegration andthe revolution anelectoral after even in remained politics These political groups andcohesive parties society and their electorate. revolutions in occurred The their respective countries. parties close created links with civil before electoral hadbeen the long parties Serbian opposition established and Ukrainian anddiscipline. The power with werecohesive organizational coalitions countries in strong these revolutions produced transitions with democratic outcomes to great extent due to opposition “party groups competition isinUkrainian anddistinctTheSerbian politics the opposition”. and that the coalitional dimension with the strongest explanatory power for the level of electoral Kyrgyzstan Georgia Serbia Ukraine Country Table 4 Comparative analysis of “coalitional” causal factors forthe level of electoral competitiveness authoritarianism. electoral democracy”indicates rating, regimethat indicatesprocess is“electoral thebelow score and 4.00 On parties contrary,the Kyrgyzstan in political and Georgia justwere formed before suggest difference method of indirect Mill’s on based analysis comparative of The results + + + + parliament in representation opposition’s The 0 0 + + opposition the in groups distinct and Party politics 0 0 0 + during protests violence Absence of 0 + + + government local over Control 50 0 + 0 + opposition the in democrats Dominance of F F S S Outcome 1 3 3 5 number Cumulative CEU eTD Collection countries followed different political trajectories. Kyrgyzstan and Georgia are backto Georgia and Kyrgyzstan trajectories. political different followed countries the regimes, ancien andoverthrowing coalitions anti-regime in building succeeded countries place during in revolutions electoral in case.Despiteparticular oppositionseach allfour the electoral revolution a regime type to great extenthand. depends other on the on regimes whatGeorgian and Kyrgyz typebetween and hand, one the on of regimes theUkrainian and opposition is in between Serbian variation qualitative not reflectdivision does regime between types this strict outcomes of electoral revolutions in regime variation and the level of electoral competitiveness, different reflect scores the While regimes. authoritarian competitive remained Kyrgyzstan and Georgia and democracies became electoral Ukraine Serbia and that table demonstrates shows post-revolutionary typeresulting regime andthelevel electoral of competitiveness. This Kyrgyzstan Georgia Serbia Ukraine Country process electoral for scores House 5 Freedom The Table lack in indicates forces opposition political coalition. the of still alternative Uzbekistan. While this high number of votes can be assigned to post-revolutionary euphoria, it figures in votes, electoral numbersthe with comparable with won his96% of presidency leader opposition TheSaakashvili effectively incumbents. Georgian to accountable new keep the opposition coalitions disintegrated no serious distinct groups leftin the political scene capable After from support able constituency. obtain period, they not any significant to were such ashort In sum, comparative the analysisin conducted sectionthis suggests the that resultingfrom and infour countries forprocess electoral scores House Freedom indicates the Table 5 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.25 5.25 4.75 4.75 4.50 4.75 4.754.50 5.25 4.75 5.005.25 4.00 4.50 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.25 3.75 5.50 4.75 3.00 3.253.00 4.25 3.50 4.504.00 3.50 4.00 1999 5.00 5.75 5.75 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 6.00 5.75 6.00 6.00 5.756.00 5.00 5.75 2001 2002 2003 2004 51 2005 2006 2007 2008 Competitive authoritarianism Competitive Electoral democracy Electoral democracy Resulting regime type regime Resulting Competitive authoritarianism Competitive CEU eTD Collection competitiveness, section this analysis provides descriptive of coalitionan buildingopposition in electoral revolution identifiedand “coalitional” factors influencethat thelevel electoral of an a critical showed played in theoutcomes that opposition of an rolecoalition determining resist cooptation manipulation and policies While new the of previousgovernment. the section rivalries andlack of vision clear democratic reforms,of political opposition notmanage did to revolution,go notinternal todecisive Kyrgyz opposition the did democratic reforms. Dueto electoral an of outcomes” “liberalizing Despite country. of the achieve democratization to unable was coalition opposition the president, autocratic inoverthrowing While successful plays a central role in strengthening the opposition’s potential challengeto authoritarian regime. overthrown by weak political opposition. TheRevolution Tulip has shown coalition that building Coalition-building in Kyrgyzstan rule. even Akaev’s if worse Kyrgyzstan early of and the are getting periods to Shevarnadze compared in in and both Georgia electoral processes the indicate, scores electoral Freedom House the Consequently, rather than civic on as networks activists. reliedpatronage leaders traditional on led by opposition the regional is that notsurprising mobilize masses.It notableto forces were own democratic as their on leaders ally regional with forced to They were case. inGeorgian than weaker even were inKyrgyzstan Democrats transition. indemocratic results of favor democrats authoritarian rule. This observation contradicts to McFaul’s claim that the balance of power in andprevent didpro-western someliberal regime not from to backto sliding extent Saakashvili’s in democrats dominanceauthoritarianism. weak andfragmented of Georgian the The opposition The case of the Kyrgyz Tulip Revolution demonstrates that authoritarian regimes can be can regimes authoritarian that demonstrates Revolution Tulip Kyrgyz the of case The 52 CEU eTD Collection International Crisis Group reported: “The prospect of regional police forces beginning to make forces of “The reported: to beginning regional prospect police International Group Crisis As remained. blamed for shootings for being central authorities with dissatisfaction police’s However, forthe feared firing demonstrators. persecution Aksy who at the officers police soil for elite during defections Thegeneral Tulip the revolution. amnesty down calmed convicted fully policethe not to afavorable The wascareful Aksy president. trustenough the created crisis revolution, Tulip is the that came crisis political next When quickly. learned elites incumbent that Akaev a hardannouncedlesson local bloodshed responsibleforprotests. during the taught police became oneof leadersthe of coalitionan opposition toppledthat Akaev. The president later who Bakiev, Kurmanbek minister prime and minister, interior administration, presidential head of resign including and some chiefofficials forced to “scapegoated” Akaev president influence leaders of opposition partof from southern the country the Third,2002). (Khamidov and political growing crisisshowed dissatisfaction the from Akaev. Second, themselvesdistance tried to regimesupporters core somethe of Even Akaev’s regime. of thelegitimacy undermined had important implications for future political developments in the country. First, it seriously of killed.between security supporters forcesBeknazarov six people crisis and got Thispolitical mobilizationactions provoked protest ofhis constituency.2002, during In clashes inAksy government effortsas ofindividual to opposed Azimbek whose deputy Beknazarov, anti-Akaev Kyrgyzwith government China (Khamidov seriously coalition2002). The failed to the challenge Kyrgyzstan” fourRevolution. formed“PopularCongressof in coalition opposition the 2001, parties In response to controversial in reforms country. the democratic secret the of failure the to led weaknesses internal opposition’s the how negotiationsshows also It Kyrgyzstan. on territorial concessions of the The first attempts to build anti-regime coalition were undertaken even before the Tulip 53 CEU eTD Collection to Akaev’s daughter’s brand party Alga Kyrgyzstan (Forward Kyrgyzstan). creation political of that coalition demonstrated in to cooperate opposition was willing resisting fact figures.But the political of opposition several prominent entities thatrepresented political symbolic wererather movements these Therefore, voters. for ordinary unknown were networks any without of movements names before.partisan The establishedthese several days only were coalition this initiated that movements four political these out three the However, formation Civicopposition of For Free coalition Fairand Solidarity (MSNElections 2004). the announced Democracy and Civil forSociety Coalition organization as non-government (New Direction), Popular Congress ofKyrgyzstan,and Popular Movement of Kyrgyzstan as well revolution. politicalthe 2004, Ata-Jurt(Fatherland), On 29 December, movements Jany Bagyt serious challengenever for Akaev’s posed rule. well chaotic next anddiversecoalition in before parliamentary disintegrated elections 2005 and media by joined protests president’sfamily criticizing corruption.for rampant However, this independentthe Some of anddemonstrations. someanti-Akaev rallies people” organized and parliament deputies. They formed amovement “For resignation of Akaev and reforms for involved not only parties butalsopolitical human activists,rights NGOs,andindependent new coalition the one, previous Incontrasttothe wascreated. coalition moreThis time viable a country beforepresidential next 2002). elections (Khamidov anticipatedAkaev the downfall presidentclaiming that would andflee suddenly the of the resign enoughCurious that loyal wideelites generated spread perceptions onAkaev asanon-reliable patron. partner or their own political decisions is 2002:11).Theworrying” (ICGN34 president’s toward attitudes The first signals of“Tulip”of emergence coalition only monthsappeared four before the coalition. a newanti-regime emergenceof for the point afocal became crisis The Aksy one of one of anti-Akaev Topchubek ardent the oppositionists Turgunaliev 54 CEU eTD Collection Georgia and Ukraine. Unlike “ambassadors”, who mainly relied on support of “ambassadors”,Georgia whoof mainly Ukraine.Unlike and onsupport politically passive relied “traditionalists”. wasless This group familiaradvanced employed with methods of protest in symbol of Tulip Revolution. initiator as revolutionsof yellow Shewasan eventsinKyrgyzstan. a protest color using during madeOtunbaeva in tomass several interviews references media toGeorgian and Ukrainian use powerof mobilizesymbols. mass thistheir exampledemonstrated to to support, eagerness failed Although in practice from of Revolution activists Orange “ambassadors” the Ukraine. the setup “ambassadors” intheir tents square of central Bishkekin January 2005, emulating this the elections, parliamentary for ascandidates from registration rejected were they When during Rose Revolution tried to implement some features characteristic for colored revolutions. inGeorgia organizations international onethe of arepresentative being RozaOtunbaeva context. international with familiar well became in service diplomatic abroad working of them while leaders, this group represented an intellectual opposition. That was a rather small circle, butmany society civil with Along head. at the minister, foreign and former ambassador Otunbaeva, Roza with byformersocalled ambassadors, diplomats, was firstone represented identifiable. The Bishkek andfew othertowns. youngsters (KelKel).Most of and politicaltheirsocial derived support urban from population of oriented democracy some and liberal intelligentsia, by mainly leaders, NGO represented society regions. Democratic leaders of opposition similarly of onsupport relied relatively viable civil could constituencies rely on narrow support of support on invotersor of single orinseveral by recognition most of citizens from of Kyrgyzstan. regionsthe Most of leaders opposition the The second opposition group includedThe second group opposition leaders. mainly Iwill regional call thisgroup Consequently, the Tulip during main Revolution three categories oppositionof were at political least, or support nation wide claim in could opposition Only afewleaders the 55 CEU eTD Collection attempted to provide the common links that would connect isolated political parties with civil with isolatedparties political would connect linksthat provide common the to attempted NGOs engaged in promotion of democracy, actively in participated demonstrations. NGOs organizationseffectiveness and mainlyhumanrights to Some opposition. NGOs, political of kinsmen. and relatives their mainly people, hundred several was based fordifficult for traditionalists.not mobilize support lost Itthe political candidates local and regionally reinforced districts member Single him. against resource administrative publiclyclaimingthatAkaev’s elections hemobilizednetworks regime hispatronage used the lost candidate traditionalist if a cases, many In rhetoric. revolutionary and democratic theyused protests the During regime. corrupt and authoritarian movementagainst protest (Radnitz 2006:136). protests expand the to in order regions other to emissaries send their to tried also Jalalabat objectslike main airports, main administrative buildingsor highways. The leaders inopposition seize attention important authoritiesattractin theyhadto of to that figuredorder quickly out in They their emulated regions protesters rural other buildings, strategies. seized administrative region Jalalabat in protesters first the When one. international than rather diffusion internal to modifications. some with revolutions “colored” other of from examples emulated have might strategies These Jalalabat. and the airport in Osh, as andnetworks their strategies welldiffered from those ones in Bishkek. They blocked main highways as took some administrative based mobilized They clanandregional networks. mobilize histraditional patronage preferred to office buildings urban of residents Bishkek, regionalleaders including Bakiev,afuture Kurmanbek president, in Talas, Osh, and The third group The thirdwasrepresentedby NGOshadcontribution society group activists. agreat civil In Kyrgyzstan, traditionalists framed their challengeAkaev’s to regime as democratic Ironically, the spread of protests in rural areas and middle size towns became possible due 56 CEU eTD Collection acknowledged: waslittlethere actions. andcoordinated cooperation As one of opposition candidate politician the in practice, started, parliamentary elections before even agreement coalitional hadsigned leaders opposition. words,it thatdeterminedunfolding.was often actions events unfolding of other the the In or react on what was goingopposition were not able to control the actionson. of the masses. They did not have Theytime anticipateto coordinatedopposition’s poororganizational management. Theleadersskills and mobilization the of their efforts depending on how events weresouthern controlledregions by opposition (ICG N972005:9). to preventnew in Bishkek from troops to sending police and airport Osh inorder captured localinJalalabat attacked stations police 10 morningthousand protesters Next movement. about protest radicalized police special of actions These effect. opposite the ledto measures But these fought back against demonstrators who occupied administrative buildings in Osh and Jalalabat. considerable effort itis forces Special reacha undertook mass goingmobilization before to tippingcan disrupt point. to stop mass mobilization before it wasexample. for case, Ukrainian going with comparison to growin limited very was to revolution on impact largeoverall their but nonviolently, act to people scale. train to They society activists and ordinary voters. They also contributed to moderation of the conflict and tried 2005:2) We didn't speak about[single] a leader. (Crisis Group interview,Osh,3 March2005 ICG N97 discussions; nobody spoke out about serious questions, about the presidency,programs. about our any never were There together. down sat really never opposition, the we, behonest, To The of process building opposition coalition Despitewas spontaneous. main opposition probablyThese eventsthat beyond occurred opposition elite’s control the demonstrate forces security that assumption toD’Anieri’s contradicts Kyrgyzstan from The evidence 57 CEU eTD Collection throughout 2006 withthroughout conductpoliticaldemands to reforms. culminated The in protests increased strength the of coalition opposition.political The of series organized demonstrations of apparently linksclose coalition. establishment In addition, the with society some civil groups formationfacilitated parliamentthe inthe of deputies Growingopposition coordination of formed. This coalition was more organized and representative than the one that overthrew Akaev. presidential andpower provision of conditions favorable for free andfair elections. promises wasfirst Bakiev’s of the revolution. One the after popular wereespecially constitutional reforms to conduct on Demands reforms. constitutional to particularly and political to inclination Bakiev’s constitutional of sign little was There networks. patronage and loyalty personal of basis the on appointments reforms made newgovernment Bakiev that itbecame more obvious rule, monthsBakiev’s of that wouldrepresentatives of all coalitional groups. That is anormal political process; however, after several be directedinclude failed to government the Afterreshuffles, several formerAkaev’s governments. from towardministers as well as leaders opposition some included that cabinet new the formed He reduction MovementKyrgyzstan leaderof of headed (NDK). government Popular Bakiev, byKurmanbek of plans, political programs, and political and constitutional or any other reforms. oppositionist theleaderselaborate their opposition suggests, of not political coalition possible did the of response honest an as Again, collapsed. actually regime the when do to what know Akaev’sexpect that regimefall wouldso soon. surprising Itis not leaders thatopposition not did opposition power.would gain To bestate fair oppositionthe to leaders, they didnotprobably Starting from Startingfrom springthe 2006, thenew of opposition coalition “For Reforms” was After deposing Akaev, the opposition coalition quickly disintegrated. The new provisional if the do to what know really not did opposition in the one no suggests, quotation this As 58 CEU eTD Collection Kyrgyzstan shifted to a new phase of authoritarian consolidation. a new phase to of shifted authoritarian Kyrgyzstan benefitthe for incumbents authoritarian whoeventually their Consequently, consolidated power. itselfproved inefficientdue tosplits in Thefailure coalition. united of opposition the to turned opposition succeededinthat pressureputting on incumbentsthe in November 2006,this time argument on parliamentary elections inDecemberOne more empiricalsupportmy that 2007. evidence importanceopposition ablewas demoralizednot and afterwas toraise new protests obviously fraudulent of coalitionblocs and some leaders opposition were byincumbent co-opted Asregime. a political result, buildingconsolidation was defeated in the Aprilcomes 2007 due to the opposition splittinginto two opposition fromconstitutional inconsistencies2008: 314).benefit forhis Thenew wave of (Marat coalitional events ofhis byusing back againstauthorities andregained opposition the Bakiev counterattacked April 2007. was adopted constitution theNovember later after month one In December, hispower. reduced The same significantly new version agreed toadopt that of constitution president the Novemberwhen 2006 59 CEU eTD Collection Serbia and Ukraine, where coalitions were well andincludedorganized long-established parties that shows cases “colored” four the analysis of The comparative in chapter. third the conducted analyses study case the and comparative the by is endorsed argument This country. in the process making decision influence to continue and in politics remain entities coalitional smaller other and disintegration organizationallyof strong coalition distinct such players political parties, blocs,as after the is main that difference The disintegrates. eventually also coalition cohesive A revolution. electoral asuccessful after immediately disintegrates coalition weakly organized The coalition. opposition an of cohesion organizational by influenced strongly are revolution scenario. latter may leadtothe favorableconditions economic absenceof inthe repressions permanent that shows Uzbekistan from evidence The movement. the anti-regime of radicalization leador to protests either prevent can increasing repressions defect.itis However,that to clear start elites when the incumbent stop mass-mobilizationhow much isneeded repression to as identify atippingas well to point a coalition-buildingfor protestis process massand mobilization. increases costs say hard It to successful regime change. But the solidarity within ruling elites imposes additional constraints on countries. The elite divisions within anincumbentregime reinforce the probability the of inrespective dictators overthrow to and coalitions build anti-regime to capable were Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, inSerbia,Georgia, oppositions the failedcases revolutions, of to contrast In revolution. an of electoral success the in explaining role acentral plays building coalition a that demonstrates research inthis analysis comparative The revolutions. of electoral outcomes CONCLUSION The main finding of the current research, however, is of The maindemocratic findingresearch, however, that the outcomes of current the in variation the for factors causal the identify to been has research this of goal main The 60 CEU eTD Collection not imply that the structural, cultural, institutionalist, and international factors are insignificant. transition. These findings endorse actor-centric approach proposed in my thesis. However, it does democratic andfor change regime successful for the chances increases significantly coalition broad-based in one unite to forces opposition the of decision the precisely, More revolution. orfailure of an probability electoral influencethe success the of interactions These strategic and madeby choices ofstrategic by importance actors particularly,political opposition. political democratic produced greater outcomes. democrats and bynationalists dominated equally coalition Serbian the whereas transition in democratic breakthrough. The in dominance offragmented democrats Georgian the revolution notresult did notnecessary for ademocratic in is but of condition facilitating opposition democrats the opposition.in Again, analysis comparative research thatthedominance conducted this suggests in the democrats of dominance the concerns modification important second The transition. mainly distribution but of power cohesion coalitionof an for isimportantopposition democratic “anotresearch effective unitedThefindingsthat and of only current opposition”. the suggest inhis original (McFaul article inhis2002). However, articles, later McFaul (2005; 2007) hints on clearly wasnot factor infavor of of distribution This democraticspecified power the opposition. result a as changes regime recent model concerns as of noncooperative McFaul’s the to modifications colored electoral thatmode considerable brings might argue of regime1990s, then, change we revolutions. in led authoritarian actors and opposition the country coalition back the to rule. organized The firstthe same time, the case study of Kyrgyzstan shows how weak cohesion and the absence of strong modificationand/or blocs with distinct political experienced groups, rise significant of competitive politics. At concerns McFaul’s argument on the The results of thesis the tothestudy contribute electoral of byhighlightingrevolutions the in transitions post-communist firstthe is regarding true states model McFaul’s If what 61 CEU eTD Collection I also suggest that the retreat to authoritarian rule became possible because democratic forces in forces democratic because possible became authoritarian rule to the retreat suggest that I also whichpolitics be has limit institutional securedto of arrangements, power byproper a president. full-scale competitive to revolution from electoral successful transition that suggest I opposition. their new authoritarian regimes. Cooptation diminishes power and internal cohesion of the change. The new incumbents in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia used cooptation in order to consolidate moderegime of electoral from resulted types regime the on research possible of directions future identifying for be helpful might below reflections speculative Some regimes. resulting four between the differences distinguish qualitative neededis to analysis complex typological more Some revolutions. of colored variation inof outcomes the differences reflectqualitative not does authoritarianisms and competitive democracies electoral into division strict same time, this the At 9). 2006b: Wolchik and (Bunce democracy for condition necessary a are they democracy fall into “electoral fallacy”. However, even if the elections do not account for full-blown play role. factors a supportive actors as the main explanatory factor determining the outcomes of regime transitions, while other Iconsiderpolitical andauthoritarianshort, In countries. especially inpoor groups, advocacy fosters (Beissingerof society Finally, international developmentthe support and civil 2007:271). revolution democratic for successful condition anecessary which are often protests, large-scale of tradition the involve may culture political Robust government. authoritarian an of policies illiberal resist to likely more are that citizens class middle aware politically and educated well parties and The programs. growth economic and social balanced increase development number of Favorablefactors. institutional design incentivesgives for creating and developing political importance byvarious for mightbeexplained cohesion coalitions of opposition considerable For example, the existence of strong political parties or other distinct political groups that have The fact that I consider elections as the main indicator of regime type does notmean that I 62 CEU eTD Collection political situation in these countries may change and does change very rapidly. The conclusions The rapidly. very change does and change may countries these in situation political is problem my of research project volatility four developments in of political countries. the The (Haleinstitutions may 2006:312). necessitate” existing build rather of concentration power than to thebroad-based that kinds coalitions other of democracy from committed to impose reforms even“through to are tempted above presidents good formightbe competitive makes not politics. Henry that asimilarclaim.Hesuggests Hale Drawing is on leader my Georgian suggestion thatexcessively experience speculative charismatic branches. by other is practically unconstrained power presidential The democratic standards. international of falls short electoral process the reforms, democratic andintroduce corruption torootout makingsome efforts Saakashvili president case.Despite a borderline represent resulted inassassination prime-ministerof Djindjic in2003 2004).Georgia(Pribicevic might of Milosevic’s to apparatus repressive newthe regime, and highly politics, which polarized of remnants incorporation affairs, state in intervention military by isdistinguished transition The (ICG politics in Serbian trends nationalist minorities ethnic for exclusionary fell short of freebeing andfair. new The inconstitution adopted illiberal2006 reflected and fraudit and by electoral was characterized newconstitution the referendum on the competitive, highly are elections Serbian Although one. Ukrainian the from distinct is regime Serbian Serbiaishowever, politicaland forces 2005:163). an the (Hale other democracy: electoral between Yushenko agreement by aconstitutional secured was electoral democracy to transition constitution, whichenvisaged serious reduction of power.TheUkrainianpresidential executive amendments to from newly adopted retreat Bakievto when allowed in December2006, its chance democratic Kyrgyz The wasted opposition hadoccurred. revolution immediately after constitutional reforms Bakiev to president decisively push capable to not were opposition the In the end, I have to highlight some limitations of this research. The first potential 63 N 44 2006:1,8-10). CEU eTD Collection space and time limitations of MA thesis. of limitations space and time emerge in the future. may outcomes distinct with cases potential asnew be modified can and are tentative research Finally, the depth in made this of Thegeneralizations revolutions. colored the analysis of for comparative available this research may notfar so of number cases isasmall problem second The outcomes. undermineor myresearch on the sufficient distort may developments political The time. in some irrelevant be might myanalysis from leveldrawn due to 64 CEU eTD Collection 2003 International 2003.Serbia Crisis Group. after Djindjic.N141, ICGBalkans 18 March Report, N°37,Report 20August Osh/Brussels International 2002.“Kyrgyztsan’s Crisis Group. political crisis: An exitstrategy” May 2000 International Crisis Group. 2000. Serbia’s 2000. Report EmbattledInternational Balkans Opposition. Group. Crisis ICG April 365–381 2006, Pp. Competitive Authoritarian Regimes”. Authoritarian Competitive MarcMorje´andHoward, “Liberalizing Philip 2006. G.Roessler. Electoral in Outcomes in thesocialsciences. Hancke, Bob. 2009. Eurasia. World Politics 58(October2005), 133-65 Hale, Henry. Cycles: Democracy, 2005.Regime Autocracy, and in Revolution Post-Soviet sciences AlexanderGeorge, 2005. andAndrew Bennett. Science American JournalofPolitical Geddes, Barbara and“Sources JohnZaller. of 1989. forPopular Authoritarian Support Regimes”. version democracy: Reclaiming Forbrig, Joerg and Pavol Demeš Communist andPost-Communist Studies D’Anieri, Paul. 2006.Explaining the Successand Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions. Communist Studies 39(2006) Promotion and Electoral Revolutions in Postcommunist Eurasia. Communist Wolchik.Bunce, ValerieAmerican Sharon 2006b.Bringing Down and Democracy Dictators: and Post- Journal ofDemocracy andElectoral Revolutions. Favorable Conditions Wolchik. andSharon 2006a. 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Radnitz, Really in Kyrgyzstan,Happened No. 4 Vol. 1, (January 107-118 2004) pp. Pribicevic, Ongjen. After 2004.Serbia Milosevic. SoutheastEuropean andBlack Sea Studies, Forbrig, and Pavol Demeš eds. Minic, Jelica and Miljenko Dereta. 2007. “IZLAZ 2000: An exit todemocracy in Serbia” in Joerg Available at Available MSN. 2004. Central andEasternEurope http://www.msn.kg/ru/news/9025/ Ɉɩɩɨɡɢɰɢɹɨɛɴɟɞɢɧɢɥɚɫɶ . Web version Reclaiming democracy: Reclaiming ! (The opposition is united!) 67 Journal ofDemocracy Volume 17,Number Journal ofDemocracy Volume 17, Civil Society and Electoral Change in Journal of Democracy of Journal Volume