DOCSLIB.ORG

Local Immigration Prosecution: a Study of Arizona Before SB 1070

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Local Immigration Prosecution: a Study of Arizona Before SB 1070 UCLA Program on International Migration Title Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070 Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3ks295cx Author Eagly, Ingrid V. Publication Date 2011 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California LOCAL IMMIGRATION PROSECUTION: A STUDY OF ARIZONA BEFORE SB 1070 * Ingrid V. Eagly Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 has focused attention on whether federal law preempts the prosecution of state immigration crime in local criminal courts. Absent from the current discussion, however, is an appreciation of how Arizona’s existing body of criminal immigration law—passed well before SB 1070 and currently in force in the state—functions on the ground to regulate migration. Drawing on statistical data, prosecution policies, trial-level court records, and interviews with stakeholders, this Article is the first to investigate the practice of local immigration prosecution. It does so in the hotbed of immigration enforcement—Maricopa County, Arizona—through a detailed case study of the implementation of a 2005 Arizona alien smuggling law. Specifically, this Article reveals four key aspects of the national immigration system that have shifted in the face of state criminalization: the functional definition of immigration crime, the breadth of state immigration enforcement authority, the allocation of federal resources for criminal prosecution, and the exercise of executive control over immigration policy. Through this analysis, this Article shows how Arizona, despite the formal prohibition on state and local immigration regulation, has redefined and restructured the federal system for punishing immigration crime. In so doing, this Article fosters a richer and more accurate understanding of the role of the local prosecutor in immigration federalism. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 1750 I. THE EVOLUTION OF ALIEN SMUGGLING PROSECUTION IN MARICOPA COUNTY ................................................................................................... 1755 A. The Case of Patrick Haab ....................................................................................... 1756 B. The Arizona Immigration Prosecution Regime .................................................... 1760 II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL IMMIGRATION PROSECUTION AND FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW ................................................................................. 1767 A. Criminal Law and Prosecutorial Discretion .......................................................... 1768 * Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. For their comments and helpful conversations, I am grateful to Norman Abrams, Aslı Bâli, Devon Carbado, Ann Carlson, Jack Chin, Susan Bibler Coutin, Scott Cummings, Joseph Doherty, Sharon Dolovich, Alice Eagly, Allison Hoffman, Guy Iversen, Daniel Kanstroom, Sung Hui Kim, Stephen Lee, Karla McKanders, Allegra McLeod, Jon Michaels, Marc Miller, Vivek Mittal, Hiroshi Motomura, Joanna Schwartz, Juliet Stumpf, Rick Su, Cecillia Wang, Ian Weinstein, Ron Wright, Stephen Yeazell, Noah Zatz, and participants in the 2011 Law and Society meeting. For their excellent research assistance, I also thank Mariana Newman, Jenny Osborne, Zachary Thompson, and the staff of UCLA’s Hugh & Hazel Darling Law Library. 1749 1750 58 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1749 (2011) 1. Formal Definition ............................................................................................ 1768 2. Implementation ............................................................................................... 1770 a. Self-Smuggling and Federal Law ........................................................... 1770 b. Plea Bargaining and Preemption ........................................................... 1773 B. Law Enforcement Authority and Policing Migration .......................................... 1777 1. Police ................................................................................................................ 1777 2. Civilians ........................................................................................................... 1781 C. Resource Allocation and Criminal Dockets ......................................................... 1784 1. Corpus Delicti, Cooperation, and Resistance ................................................. 1784 2. Measuring Concurrent State–Federal Jurisdiction ....................................... 1790 D. Executive Control and Immigration Policy .......................................................... 1797 1. Federal Supervision of Immigration Prosecution ......................................... 1797 2. Jurisdictional Gatekeeping ............................................................................. 1800 III. IMPLICATIONS .................................................................................................................. 1805 1. Ex Post Analysis and Preemption .................................................................. 1805 2. State Immigration Crime and Immigration Federalism ............................... 1810 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 1815 INTRODUCTION Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070) has focused national attention on the relationships between federal, state, and local governments in enforcing immigration law.1 In a lawsuit against the State of Arizona, the United States seeks to enjoin much of SB 1070 on preemption grounds.2 The federal chal- lenge, which the U.S. Supreme Court may ultimately decide,3 has provoked renewed interest in the appropriate scope of federal immigration power and the permissible role, if any, of states and localities in impinging upon that power.4 1. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S. 1070 (SB 1070), 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), amended by H.R. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). If implemented, SB 1070 would, among other things, expand state law enforcement authority to enforce federal immigration law and add immigration crimes to the Arizona code. 2. Complaint, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10 Civ. 1413). In addition to the federal suit, a coalition of civil rights groups has challenged the law on preemption and other constitutional grounds. See Order, Friendly House v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061- PHX-SRB (D. Ariz. Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/Friendly-House-Order- on-Motion-to-Dismiss.pdf. 3. For now, part of the law has been preliminarily enjoined by the federal district court. See Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011). 4. For examples of scholarship arguing that criminal immigration law should be preempted, see Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010); Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 60 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1648685; Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939 (1995); Karla Mari McKanders, Unforgiving of Those Who Trespass Against U.S.: State Laws Criminalizing Immigration Status, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 331 (2011). For contrary views, Local Immigration Prosecution 1751 According to conventional analysis, the immigration preemption standard is simple and clear: States and localities may neither directly select migrants nor impose burdens that conflict with federal immigration law.5 In this doctrinal context, the debate about the facial legitimacy of SB 1070 reasserts a familiar question,6 albeit in slightly different terms: Should localities be allowed to regulate immigration under the auspices of regulating crime? Against this doctrinal background, the academic debate over immigration preemption reaches a stalemate. Those who favor state enforcement describe state immigration crimes7 as “force multipliers” that merely “mirror,” without see Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57. 5. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”); Schuck, supra note 4, at 57 (“Probably no principle in immigration law is more firmly established, or of greater antiquity, than the plenary power of the federal government to regulate immigration.”). Some scholars have, however, critiqued the constitutional basis of exclusive federal power over immigration. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792, 811 (2008); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008). 6. For a sampling of the varied views on the subject, see Linda S. Bosniak, Immigrants, Preemption and Equality, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 179 (1994); Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609 (2010); Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341 (2008); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens With Guns: Equal Protection,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Downloaded by [University of Arizona] at 14:51 23 July 2013
    1 ARIZONA REPRESENTATIVE’S RATIONALE FOR ATTACK ON MAS IN TUSD _____________________________________________________________________________ Rationalizing Racism: Arizona Representatives Employment of Euphemisms for an Assault on Mexican American Studies Maryam M. Shakir University of Arizona Summer Research Institute 2 ARIZONA REPRESENTATIVE’S RATIONALE FOR ATTACK ON MAS IN TUSD _____________________________________________________________________________ Abstract This study details the political climate and logic priming the termination of Mexican American Studies in elementary and high school programs within the state of Arizona. The author applies conceptual content analysis and intertextuality to decode euphemisms incorporated by opponents of the program. Primary sources by the state’s Attorney General Tom Horne and school board Superintendent of Public Instruction John Huppenthal are examined for rationales used in the elimination of a pedagogically empowering program for Latina/o students within Tucson Unified School District. Repetitive paradoxes in arguments against Mexican American Studies are found to have implicitly formed a threat to the majority. Reasoning in public statements by the aforementioned politicians and frames for discussion of the program are concluded to have appealed to mainstream audiences as a decoy from alternative motives of maintaining current power structures with Latina/os subjugated to lower socio-economic statuses compared to White counterparts. Keywords: Mexican American Studies, education policy,
    [Show full text]
  • Fact Sheet: Operation Streamline What Is Operation Streamline? Operation Streamline Is a Program Under Which Federal Criminal Ch
    Fact Sheet: Operation Streamline What Is Operation Streamline? Operation Streamline is a program under which federal criminal charges are brought against individuals apprehended crossing the border illegally. Created in 2005 as a joint initiative of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), the program fast-tracks resolution of these immigration offenses, providing for mass proceedings in which as many as 80 unlawful border crossers are tried together in a single hearing, typically pleading guilty en masse. Under federal law, those caught making a first illegal entry may be prosecuted for a misdemeanor (under 8 U.S.C. § 1325) punishable by up to six months in prison, and those who reenter after deportation may be prosecuted for a felony (under 8 U.S.C. § 1326) punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Operation Streamline is a fast-track program: Migrants apprehended pursuant to it are targeted for accelerated prosecution for illegal entry or illegal re-entry.1 Several steps of a federal criminal case with prison and deportation consequences – including initial appearances, preliminary hearings, pleas, and sentencing – are combined into a single hearing that may last only minutes.2 The average prison sentence for unlawful entrants typically varies between 30 and 180 days, depending on whether the individual has a criminal record in the U.S. or has prior reentry convictions.3 Before Operation Streamline, agents with CBP’s Border Patrol agency routinely returned first- time undocumented border crossers to their home countries or referred them to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, ICE’s predecessor agency) to face removal charges in the civil immigration system.
    [Show full text]
  • Border Enforcement Developments Since 1993 and How to Change CBP
    Border Enforcement Developments Since 1993 and How to Change CBP Daniel E. Martínez The University of Arizona Josiah Heyman The University of Texas at El Paso Jeremy Slack The University of Texas at El Paso August 24, 2020 CMS Essays, https://cmsny.org/publications/border-enforcement-developments-since-1993- and-how-to-change-cbp/ Executive Summary Enforcement along the US-Mexico border has intensified significantly since the early 1990s. Social scientists have documented several consequences of border militarization, including increased border-crosser deaths, the killing of more than 110 people by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents over the past decade, and expanded ethno-racial profiling in southwestern communities by immigration authorities. Less attention has been paid to the pervasive and routine mistreatment migrants experience on a daily basis in CBP custody. This paper traces major developments in border enforcement to three notable initiatives: the “prevention-through-deterrence” strategy, the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Consequence Delivery System, initiated in 2011. Despite the massive buildup in enforcement, CBP has operated with little transparency and accountability to the detriment of migrants. The paper provides an overview of the findings of nongovernmental organizations and social scientists regarding migrant mistreatment while in CBP custody. It then highlights important shifts in migration patterns over the past decade, as well as changes in border enforcement efforts during the Trump administration. It discusses how these transformations affect migrants’ everyday encounters with CBP officials. The paper concludes by providing specific recommendations for improving CBP conduct. Its core theme is the need to emphasize and inculcate lessons of appropriate police behavior, civil rights, and civil liberties in training and recruiting agents and in setting responsibilities of supervisors and administrators.
    [Show full text]
  • 6Th Discussion Note on the Private Border Complex
    1 The Corporate Lobbying Alignment Project Discussion note no.6 Investor responses to corporate lobbying & public policy capture by Border Industrial Complex companies JANUARY 2021 PREVENTABLE SURPRISES 2 DISCUSSION NOTE NO.6 3 Index 4 Background on the Border Industrial Complex Human rights risks & lobbying by BIC companies 6 Influence & lobbying by BIC companies: opportunities for investor engagement Human rights risks in the Border Industrial Complex require systems-wide investor 10 engagement 11 Appendix 1 - BIC market segments 12 Appendix 2 - Trade Associations PREVENTABLE SURPRISES 4 Background on the Border Industrial Complex The privatisation and militarisation of international borders are well known. So are the associated human rights, reputational, and market risks to investors.1 Global asset owners such as CalPERS and Norges Bank Investment Management have recently made decisions to either engage with or exit their holdings in private prison companies on ethical and financial grounds, indicating the changing risk profile of companies operating in the Border Industrial Complex (BIC). BIC companies include private and public entities involved in border policing, detention, surveillance, and transportation of migrants. Growth in the BIC has been supported by heavy lobbying to enable a system of militarised borders and, increasingly, the criminalisation of migration and the erosion of basic human rights of migrants,2 including the UN Refugee Conventions in the case of refugees.3 Government support for BIC companies as part of global export- led growth strategies for the defence, security software and hardware industries4 and other influence channels show the extent to which these companies benefit from close government relations. The ability to influence government policy on migrant detention and the use of mass surveillance technology at borders speaks to the lobbying power of companies and trade associations across BIC industries.
    [Show full text]
  • Prosecuting People for Coming to the United States
    Prosecuting People for Coming to the United States Overview Over the last two decades, the federal government increasingly has utilized the criminal courts to punish people for immigration violations. Particularly on the Southwest border, federal officials are vigorously prosecuting migrants either for entering the United States without permission or for reentering the country without permission after a prior deportation or removal order (commonly referred to, respectively, as “illegal entry” and “illegal re-entry;” or collectively as “entry-related offenses”). Tens of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers are subjected to criminal prosecution for these crimes every year. Prosecutions for entry-related offenses reached an all-time high of 106,312 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, near the end of the Trump administration,1 before falling to 47,730 in FY 2020 after the government began rapidly expelling most people crossing the border in March 2020 rather than referring them for prosecution.2 The government’s approach to charging migrants with these entry-related offenses imposes heavy costs on both the migrants themselves and the federal government. The prosecution of individuals fleeing persecution or torture harms family members with whom the individual traveled and was apprehended. Spouses are often separated, as are parents from their minor children.3 Lawyers increasingly have observed federal prosecutions of adult family members for entry-related offenses which result in those family members being sent to a federal prison away from their children.4 The children are then placed with federal authorities at shelters for unaccompanied minors or in foster homes, while parents receive little or no information about their location and condition.5 With high conviction rates for these federal offenses, many migrants are subjected to mandatory incarceration in federal prison for months or longer.
    [Show full text]
  • Crossing Over: Assessing Operation Streamline and the Rights of Immigrant Criminal Defendants at the Border
    Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Volume 44 Number 4 Summer 2011—Developments in the Article 3 Law: Immigration Reform 6-1-2011 Crossing Over: Assessing Operation Streamline and the Rights of Immigrant Criminal Defendants at the Border Edith Nazarian Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Edith Nazarian, Crossing Over: Assessing Operation Streamline and the Rights of Immigrant Criminal Defendants at the Border, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1399 (2011). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol44/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CROSSING OVER: ASSESSING OPERATION STREAMLINE AND THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AT THE BORDER Edith Nazarian* Bent on curbing unauthorized immigration in the United States, the Department of Homeland Security has implemented Operation Streamline—a program aimed at criminally prosecuting all unauthorized immigrants along a five-mile stretch of the U.S.-Mexico border. While lauded by proponents as a success, Streamline has driven courts to conduct en masse hearings that ultimately compromise immigrant criminal defendants’ due process rights. Although the Ninth Circuit recently held in United States v. Roblero-Solis that these en masse proceedings violate Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Article argues that by basing its holding on a procedural rule, Roblero-Solis fails to fully protect the rights of immigrant criminal defendants at the border.
    [Show full text]
  • Gonzalez V. Douglas Trial Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7
    Seattle University School of Law Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality Centers, Programs, and Events 7-18-2017 Gonzalez v. Douglas Trial Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7 Steven A. Reiss Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP Luna N. Barrington Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP David Fitzmaurice Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP Richard M. Martinez Law Office of Richard M. Martinez Robert Chang Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law & Equality James W. Quinn JW Quinn ADR, LLC Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/korematsu_center Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons Recommended Citation Reiss, Steven A.; Barrington, Luna N.; Fitzmaurice, David; Martinez, Richard M.; Chang, Robert; and Quinn, James W., "Gonzalez v. Douglas Trial Transcript of Proceedings, Day 7" (2017). Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality. 72. https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/korematsu_center/72 This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Centers, Programs, and Events at Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 3 NOAH GONZÁLEZ; JESÚS ) Case No. 4:10-cv-00623-AWT GONZÁLEZ, his father and ) 4 next friend, et al., ) ) 5 Plaintiffs, ) ) Tucson, Arizona 6 vs. ) July 18, 2017 ) 7 DIANE DOUGLAS, ) Superintendent of Public ) 8 Instruction, in her ) Official Capacity; et ) 9 al., ) ) 10 Defendants.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'connor (Ret.) and Ariz
    Arizona Foundation for Legal Services & Education NAPOLITANO TO SIGN CIVIC EDUCATION BILL AT THUNDERBIRD - United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (Ret.) and Ariz. Chief Justice Ruth McGregor to Attend Event October 20, 2006 Contact: Carol Sunnucks 602-978-7272 GLENDALE, ARIZ. — In a bill signing ceremony on the campus of Thunderbird, the Garvin School of International Management, Governor Janet Napolitano will sign House Bill 2788, creating a nine-member state commission on civic education and civic engagement. The bill signing will kick off a daylong event "Strengthening Civic Mission of Arizona Schools Through Partnership” bringing together local, state and national leaders to discuss strengthening civic education in Arizona schools. WHAT: Governor Janet Napolitano will sign the civics education and engagement commission bill; state and national leaders will report on their plans and efforts to promote Civic Education; participants including leaders in state and local education policy will provide input and explore opportunities for partnership to strengthen civic education in Arizona; remarks by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. “We the People” students from Glendale’s Mountain Ridge High School and Mesa’s Dobson High School will engage leaders from Arizona’s three branches of government in a dialogue on the separation of powers; Justice O’Connor will also participate in the student dialogue. WHERE: Thunderbird: The Garvin School of International Management 15249 N. 59th Avenue Glendale, AZ 85306 WHEN: Tuesday, October 24, 2006 Bill Signing: 9:20 a.m. (Administration Building, Open to the media) Justice O’Connor & Policy Panel: 10 a.m. (Closed to Media) High school dialogue with Justice O’Connor: 12:30 p.m.
    [Show full text]
  • Community Dreams and Nightmares: Arizona, Ethnic Studies, and the Continued Relevance of Derrick Bell's Interest-Convergence Thesis
    \\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-4\NYU409.txt unknown Seq: 1 26-SEP-13 15:47 COMMUNITY DREAMS AND NIGHTMARES: ARIZONA, ETHNIC STUDIES, AND THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF DERRICK BELL’S INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THESIS KEVIN TERRY* In 2010, the Arizona State Legislature drew national attention to issues of ethnicity, pedagogy, and censorship in public schools by passing House Bill 2281. As inter- preted by Arizona officials, this law made the curriculum of the Mexican American Studies Department in Tucson public schools illegal. The ongoing conflict between supporters and opponents of the Department in public discourse—and in state and federal courts—raises important questions about the ways that majority and minority cultures interact in United States educational institutions. This Note uses Arizona’s ethnic studies ban to suggest that Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence thesis and Lani Guinier’s related theory of interest-divergence continue to be useful tools in assessing the dynamics between powerful and marginalized groups. The Note sets the facts of the ethnic studies controversy against recent criticism of Professor Bell’s work and, in doing so, rebuts the assertion that the interest- convergence thesis has become less relevant to understanding contemporary inter- group conflict in the United States. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1484 R I. THE POWERFUL, THE MARGINALIZED, AND INSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION: DERRICK BELL’S INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THESIS ....................... 1489 R A. Professor Bell’s Theory ............................. 1490 R B. New Frames and New Lenses in Constructing Interest-Convergence and Interest-Divergence ....... 1492 R 1. Contemporary Expanded Applications of the Interest-Convergence Thesis ..................... 1492 R 2. Interest-Divergence .............................. 1493 R C.
    [Show full text]
  • A New Conservative Approach to Immigration Enforcement
    CONTENTS Introduction 1 Conservatism and “Zero Tolerance” Immigration Policy 1 Zero Tolerance and the History of Criminal Immigration Enforcement 2 Zero Tolerance and Due Process 4 The Public Safety Implications of Zero Tolerance 4 A Poor Return on Taxpayer Investment 5 Fear and the Formulation of Immigration Enforcement Policy 6 Conclusion 7 About the Authors 7 Departments of Justice and Homeland Security met on mul- tiple occasions to craft a plan, which they knew would sepa- R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 212 rate migrant children from their parents, with the explicit November 2020 goal of deterring illegal border crossings. The resulting outrage eventually prompted President Trump to partially rescind the “zero tolerance” policy and fueled the political left’s opposition to the Trump administration’s handling of immigration laws.5 As a new administration takes A NEW CONSERVATIVE APPROACH office, immigration advocates have produced an exhaustive TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT list of border policies for the Biden White House to repeal, but this administration will have to prioritize which of the By Jonathan Haggerty and Arthur Rizer Trump-era immigration regulations to address first.6 And, while the political left undoubtedly presents a strong INTRODUCTION case against the “zero tolerance” prosecutions undertaken fter the Trump administration implemented its by its predecessor, a robust set of conservative arguments “zero tolerance” immigration policy in early 2018, against this policy offers the Biden administration ample, stories of children
    [Show full text]
  • Differential Criminalization Under Operation Streamline: Challenges to Freedom of Movement and Humanitarian Aid Provision in the Mexico-US Borderlands
    Volume 26 Refuge Number 2 Differential Criminalization under Operation Streamline: Challenges to Freedom of Movement and Humanitarian Aid Provision in the Mexico-US Borderlands Andrew Burridge Abstract visant l’incarcération massive des sans-papiers afin de On January 14, 2008, under the wider program of réduire les tentatives répétées de migration a été le plus the Arizona Denial Prosecution Initiative, Operation rigoureusement appliquée dans le secteur Tucson, couloir Streamline was put into effect in the Tucson Sector of the migratoire ayant la réputation d’être le plus achalandé et le Mexico-US borderlands . Initially implemented in Del plus meurtrier . Chaque jour, environ soixante-dix migrants Rio, Texas, this program—aimed at mass incarceration sont appréhendés par la US Border Patrol, puis condamnés of undocumented persons to reduce repeated migration à un maximum de 180 jours d’emprisonnement . L’auteur attempts—has been most rigorously applied in the Tucson considère le programme « Operation Streamline » et ses Sector, known as both the busiest and deadliest corridor for impacts sur les sans-papiers à travers le prisme de l’organi- migration . Every day approximately seventy migrants are sation locale, en particulier du groupe d’aide humanitaire apprehended by the US Border Patrol and then sentenced No More Deaths, affirmant que de telles politiques, qui for up to 180 days imprisonment . I consider Operation militarisent davantage la frontière et justifient la crimina- Streamline and its impacts on undocumented migrants lisation des migrants au yeux du grand public, exposent les through the lens of local organizing, particularly by the sans-papiers à un risque accru, avant même qu’ils soient humanitarian aid group No More Deaths, asserting that traduits en justice, à travers des pratiques de confinement such policies—which further militarize the border and jus- spatial qui ajoutent aux rigueurs de la traversée du désert tify criminalization of migrants in the public eye—put bod- de Sonora .
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Streamline Facts
    Operation Streamline Facts • Operation Streamline is a program of en masse, fast-track criminal prosecution of immigrants in federal courts along most sectors of the U.S.-Mexico border. • Operation Streamline began in Del Rio, Texas, on December 16, 2005 and was expanded to Tucson in 2008. At the height of the program, Streamline was operating in six of nine sectors on the southern U.S. border with Mexico, in every state on that border but California. It continues to operate in the Tucson, Del Rio, and Laredo sectors today. • Charges include 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (illegal entry) and/or 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (reentry after deportation), depending on jurisdiction. The District of Arizona leads the nation in prosecutions for reentry after deportation; the Southern and then Western Districts of Texas lead in prosecutions for illegal entry. • In Tucson, up to 70 people appear in court for the first time, plead guilty, and are sentenced in one mass court appearance lasting two hours or less. All of the defendants receive sentences of between 30 and 180 days in prison. Defendants are shackled during court proceedings. • Operation Streamline defendants serve their sentences in publicly and privately operated federal prisons throughout the country. Frequently they are sent to a prison located far from their U.S. family and community. • Personal belongings of Operation Streamline defendants, such as money and identification documents, are routinely confiscated by the Border Patrol upon arrest. Frequently these belongings are never returned. Migrants commonly find themselves deported after serving a prison sentence and stranded in a border city without their most critical possessions.
    [Show full text]