History and Identity Should Not Blight the Eu's
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HISTORY AND IDENTITY SHOULD NOT BLIGHT THE EU’S ENLARGEMENT POLICY TOWARDS THE WESTERN BALKANS Erwan Fouéré CEPS Policy Insights No PI2021-08/ MAY 2021 History and identity should not blight the EU’s enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans Erwan Fouéré Abstract The EU must reject any attempt to introduce notions of history and identity into its enlargement policy. Otherwise it risks trampling on its 70 years of experience in overcoming the legacy of the past and promoting a peace project based on reconciliation and the rule of law. Yet this is precisely what is happening with Bulgaria’s veto against the opening of EU accession negotiations with North Macedonia. Erwan Fouéré is CEPS Associate Senior Research Fellow. CEPS Policy Insights offer analyses of a wide range of key policy questions facing Europe. As an institution, CEPS takes no position on questions of European policy. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated. Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) © CEPS 2021 CEPS ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu The Bulgarian veto In March of last year the European Council gave the green light for the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. A date for the first intergovernmental conference to formally launch the negotiations with both countries remains – unfortunately, out of sight. This is due to the veto imposed by Bulgaria on the opening of accession negotiations with North Macedonia, until the country accepts a list of demands. These demands were adopted by government decision on 9 October 2019 and endorsed by all the political parties in the Bulgarian parliament. They include renouncing any claims to the ‘existence of a Macedonian minority’ in Bulgaria, something that flies in the face of repeated judgments by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which recognise the existence of Macedonian minority groups on its territory. Bulgaria also insists that North Macedonia accept that its language has Bulgarian roots, that a ‘Macedonian language’ or ethnicity did not exist before 1944, and that it endorses a Bulgarian version of the region’s past history. This version, set out in an explanatory memorandum circulated to all EU member states, presents a one-sided interpretation of the turbulent events during and after the two world wars in the Western Balkan region. Hidden behind this ideologically driven version of history lies a more general reluctance by Bulgarian political parties to confront the country’s own troubled history, particularly its role during the Second World War. The weight of history While the weight of history is undeniable, if one were to follow the approach of the Bulgarian government, Ireland and the UK, for example, would never have joined the European Union in 1973. Fifty years on, we are still debating our shared history, but in a non-confrontational manner and in a shared institutional setting. Debates over centuries of shared history between neighbouring countries cannot be resolved in one or two years, or even decades. It has often been said of the Western Balkans that it is a region that produces more history than it can absorb. This can equally be applied to the complicated and bloody history between Ireland and the UK. Our joint search for what Irish President Michael D. Higgins has aptly described as “an ethics of narrative hospitality” – a way of channelling and addressing the prejudices and entrenchments of the past – became much easier from 1973 when we sat as equal partners around the EU table. An atmosphere of respect prevails, despite our differences. There is nothing equal in the Bulgaria-North Macedonia dispute, the origins of which go back many decades, nor is there much respect. For reasons that seem to have more to do with domestic politics, Bulgarian political parties have decided that now is the best time to advance their version of history, even if it is at the expense of their nearest neighbour. They are taking the EU’s enlargement policy hostage in the process. By introducing notions of history and identity as part of the accession process, Bulgaria has undermined the criteria and conditionality principles for EU accession. This has added more | 1 2 | ERWAN FOUÉRÉ uncertainty to the European ‘perspective’ for the Western Balkan countries. There are many more bilateral disputes casting a shadow over the entire Western Balkan region, which the EU will ultimately have to deal with. Negative impact of further delay Successive European Council meetings have come and gone since the March 2020 decision, with no sign of any lifting of the veto. With the exception of eleventh-hour mediation efforts by the previous German and current Portuguese presidencies, and a statement by the Czech and Slovak governments last December against the introduction of history and identity issues into the accession process, there have only been half-hearted attempts by EU leaders to engage with the Bulgarian government. With a caretaker government now in place in Bulgaria (following the inconclusive April elections), and with new elections set for July 11th, there seems little hope of any breakthrough in time for the next European Council meeting on June 22nd. The electoral calendar in the autumn, with presidential elections set for November, doesn’t help either. A suggestion by Commissioner Vårhelyi – that should no breakthrough be reached in the dispute, negotiations with Albania might still be allowed to go forward – further darkened the mood, even though High Representative Borrell subsequently seemed to rule that out. Yet ambiguity and inconsistency in the EU’s overall approach remains. What is of particular concern is that if there is no breakthrough, and Bulgaria maintains its veto, by default the Bulgarian position becomes the EU position, creating an even worse precedent than that of the name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia. In that case, under the 2018 Prespa Agreement, North Macedonia agreed to change its name. It did so on the understanding that this would allow it to achieve its foreign policy objectives and open the door for EU membership, as had been promised by all the EU leaders. The Bulgarian veto destroyed that expectation, despite the Bulgaria-North Macedonia Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation signed in 2017, which established a joint commission on historical and educational issues. This is all the more reason to admire the perseverance of the Macedonian people who, despite having endured repeated failures by the EU to honour its commitments, continue to show support for EU membership. Many young people, however, have already left the country to seek their fortunes elsewhere. Over 120,000 Macedonians have meanwhile obtained Bulgarian passports, enabling them to travel and seek work in the EU. Possible solutions Quick fixes, or waiting for one side to succumb to unreasonable demands, will not work. What is required is a more robust and comprehensive diplomatic effort by the EU, together with other organisations such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE, which have extensive experience in conflict mediation and confidence-building measures. The EU needs to delve into HISTORY & IDENTITY SHOULD NOT BLIGHT THE EU’S ENLARGEMENT POLICY TOWARDS THE WESTERN BALKANS | 3 its institutional memory and deploy the many support measures it has used in other post- conflict situations. Northern Ireland is a notable example of the successful use of EU resources, where the Peace Fund established by former Commission President Jacques Delors played a huge role in fostering reconciliation between opposing sides in the conflict, following the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The History Observatory for Peace in Europe, established by the Council of Europe, is another mechanism that can provide the necessary expertise for joint history teaching projects. Whether it is history teaching, promoting development projects, or fostering networks of civil society organisations, the best way to build trust and promote reconciliation is to bring the sides together to work on common goals that benefit both communities. There is often a tendency to assume that once an agreement is reached, implementation of that agreement is an automatic process. This is far from being the case. Failure to invest sufficient resources in implementing a hard-won agreement invariably results in the agreement’s demise. In the case of the Bulgaria-North Macedonia 2017 Friendship Treaty, the question remains whether enough was done to support its implementation from the start. The excessive focus on the work of the Historical and Educational Commission led to many other aspects of the treaty being neglected. The EU’s cross-border cooperation programmes also provide a useful vehicle for channelling funds to support neighbouring communities who are coming together to work on joint projects. The recently launched ‘EU for Prespa’ project, funded by the EU, brings together border municipalities in Albania, Greece, and North Macedonia. It will provide the framework for the Prespa Forum for Dialogue initiated by the North Macedonian government. Most important of all is the necessity of ensuring that the EU accession process remains free from history lessons and from questions relating to identity. Dialogue not vetoes There are many initiatives and mechanisms which can be deployed in the Bulgaria-North Macedonia context that will bring benefits to both sides. It depends on the political will. Vetoes will solve nothing, and only feed into the historical narrative favoured by ethno- nationalist elements, of which there are already too many in the Western Balkans. Bulgaria should remember the words of Queen Elizabeth during her historic visit to Ireland in 2012: “With the benefit of historical hindsight, we can all see things which we would wish had been done differently or not at all”.