political reviews • melanesia 479 redress social injustices, including the tencies” of the (French) state. Frogier local economic monopolism of Lafleur emphasized the “stability” that would and his rpcr allies. His party voiced result from such a course, that is, a support for increasing devolution of potential boom in outside investment. powers to local authorities, and has The struggle for “Kanaky,” as opposed received some support from the flnks to quasi-colonial dependency on to be included in negotiations with France, continues, as the team of France. In September, Berger Kawa’s flnks-ustke bargains aggressively to National Council for the Rights of win concessions from both Paris and Indigenous People commemorated at the rpcr about steps toward sover- Bourail the French colonial takeover of eignty (including disempowering 1853 and reiterated the linkage Noumea). between the recovery of Kanak lands david a chappell and national independence. Recent public trials of French and Caldoche (local European) officials for financial References corruption have tended to undermine European. London. Weekly. accusations by loyalists that a sover- eign Kanak-run regime would only IB, Islands Business. Monthly. Suva. replicate the “stealing” that reportedly Maclellan, Nic, and Sarimin J Boengkih. goes on in some other Oceanian coun- 1996. France’s Decolonisation Process in tries. Moreover, massive French aid New Caledonia. Working paper. July. Mel- and the inflated “hardship” salaries bourne: Victoria University. paid to metropolitan officials (from MD, Le Monde Diplomatique. Paris. Paris) contribute to a very high cost of Monthly. living in Noumea. A vote on full sovereignty would be PIM, Pacific Islands Monthly. Suva. unlikely to attract a majority at the ran, Radio Australia News. English and moment. Nekiriai has estimated that French. only 37 percent of New Caledonians (ie, 80 percent of Kanak) favor com- plete independence. But Kanak, now Papua New Guinea only 45 percent of the total popula- tion, are expected to become a demo- This was a frustrating year for Prime graphic majority in about twenty years Minister Sir Julius Chan, who hoped (MD, Feb 1996, 7). On 28 December, to make progress in some key areas in a vote on the budget of the Territo- and boost his standing in the run-up to rial Congress, the flnks and rpcr the 1997 general elections. Develop- agreed on “sovereignty shared with ments in the mining and oil sectors France,” a process of change to begin kept the economy buoyant, but the in 1998 that, in the words of the government continued to struggle with rpcr’s Pierre Frogier, will affirm the the World Bank over policy reform special identity of New Caledonia issues. Tragically, Chan’s hopes for a while respecting the “proper compe- timely resolution of the Bougainville 480 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997 secessionist crisis were dashed as the and Morobe Governor Jerry Nalau, situation there took a definite turn for converged on the scene, only to be the worse in 1996, prolonging the suf- turned back, threatened, or assaulted fering of the people and exacerbating by the police. Governor Nalau later already strained relations with Austra- admitted in parliament that he had lia and, especially, Solomon Islands. By advised the people to maintain their the end of the year, with his parliamen- roadblock, but strenuously denied tary coalition in some disarray, Chan’s allegations that he had told them to chances of a further term in office blow up the bridge (PC, 19 Feb 1996, looked slim. 13–15). When he came to office in 1994, In May, the shooting deaths of Chan, like all recent prime ministers, senior public servant and one-time was determined to do something about director of the Institute for Applied the so-called law-and-order situation. Social and Economic Research (now However, the “year of law enforce- the National Research Institute) ment” got off to an inauspicious start Ephraim Makis and his brother Albert in mid-January when a conflict Uming in Port Moresby led to renewed between a group of people from the calls for a crackdown on crime (PC, 6 Eastern Highlands and residents of the May 1996, 1). After a particularly Waterise area in the Markham Valley intense wave of murders and armed erupted into violence. The Waterise robberies in Port Moresby in October, group blocked the nearby Highlands cabinet approved the imposition of a Highway to protest the incident and, two-month nationwide nighttime cur- after a Waterise youth died of gunshot few, which went into effect on 8 wounds, demanded 200,000 kina in November. The curfew was part of a compensation. Two weeks later, frus- series of measures designed to trated by the lack of progress in strengthen police “firepower” and help attempts to negotiate a settlement, and them target “hard-core criminals” (TN, following a skirmish with police 6 Nov 1996, 1). Observers of previous attempting to clear the highway, the efforts to get tough on crime argued Waterise villagers used World War II that the effect of these measures would munitions to blow up the Yuang Creek only be temporary, and the National Bridge. newspaper went as far as to suggest The local police were particularly that the curfew would be “a bigger upset by the burning of a police vehicle inconvenience to the public than the and the loss of six firearms during the criminals” (TN, 7 Nov 1996, 4). confrontation prior to the explosion. As the government focused on When reinforcements arrived from “raskol” gang activity, some of its crit- Goroka, the police rampaged through ics urged more attention to corruption, Waterise and surrounding villages, another important aspect of the “crime shooting, looting, and burning down nightmare.” Although many in the pri- houses. Local leaders, including vate sector are clearly concerned about Markham MP and Forest Minister official corruption, few have been will- Andrew Baing, Lae MP Bart Philemon, ing to say so publicly. In May 1996, political reviews • melanesia 481 however, the issue gained considerable package of emergency funding, the media exposure when Oil Search World Bank had insisted on the reform Chairman Trevor Kennedy, whose of a long list of government policies. company is a major operator in the Some $200 million in aid and loans crucial oil industry, told shareholders was released in 1995, but the balance that he was concerned about growing was withheld pending evidence that levels of corruption and argued that the reforms had been implemented. the “biggest threat to the future” was Government officials were clearly irri- the government’s “lack of focus and tated by critical public comments made discipline” (PC, 9 May 1996, 11). Pre- by Marianne Haug, the World Bank’s dictably, the speech drew an angry regional director, shortly before a response from government leaders. World Bank team arrived for talks in Chan issued a lengthy statement that Papua New Guinea in February (PC, 20 called Kennedy a “peanut boy,” Feb 1996, 11). The talks quickly accused him of being ill-informed, became mired in “personality differ- paternalistic, and expendable, and ences,” and the World Bank team was invited him to resign (PC, 13 May asked to leave, apparently by senior 1996, 17). Finance Department official Morea Meanwhile the Ombudsman Com- Vele. However, the talks lasted long mission continued its lonely struggle enough to establish that the sides had against official wrongdoing, and lead- very different views regarding progress ership tribunals successfully pursued on the issues. Before departing the some high-profile cases. Three former country, team leader Pirouz Hama- cabinet ministers, Timothy Bonga, dian-Rad expressed “major concern” John Nilkare, and Paul Pora, were regarding the government’s “commit- found guilty of multiple counts of mis- ment or ability to implement its reform conduct in office, and in October a program in a transparent and consis- leadership tribunal was set up to hear tent manner” (PC, 8–10 March 1996, charges against Foreign Affairs and 1). Trade Secretary Gabriel Dusava. All The World Bank made it very clear protested their innocence except that it was not going to release the sec- Nilkare, who admitted that some of ond tranche of the loan, and on 17 his past actions might have “gone off April served notice that the deal could the mark” (PC, 2 July 1996, 5). Bonga be canceled unless all outstanding in particular appeared unrepentant, issues were settled within ninety days. arguing that he was “just unfortunate Government leaders complained that to be one of the few that have been these pressure tactics compromised prosecuted while the others have Papua New Guinea’s sovereignty, and walked free” (PC, 1 May 1996, 1). Prime Minister Chan told reporters The extraordinary standoff that that “no one is going to give me an began in 1995 between the govern- ultimatum” (PC, 23 April 1996, 32). In ment and the World Bank continued fact, the cabinet had already bowed to throughout the year (see Wesley-Smith the inevitable at its meeting of 11 1996). In return for a us$358 million March by endorsing a policy package 482 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997 designed to address major World Bank Matters came to a head in July concerns. Among other things, the cab- when parliament passed amendments inet endorsed a system to ensure that to the Forestry Act altering the respec- major investment projects, such as oil tive roles of the Minister for Forests refineries and fish canneries, would and the Forestry Authority Board. The not violate the free market principles bank claimed these were not the of the structural adjustment program, changes they had endorsed on a recent and took steps to limit the amount of visit, and indicated they would have to tariff protection afforded to the be reversed for the loan to be approved Korean-owned Halla cement factory (PC, 30 July 1996, 1). For a while, gov- (PC, 14 March 1996, 3). By mid-May, ernment leaders adopted a defiant pos- the parties appeared to agree that all ture, with Chan claiming to have the necessary policy decisions were in alternative sources of finance and say- place, but that the process of imple- ing he was ready to tell the bank to mentation remained unsatisfactory (PC, “go to hell” (PC, 2 Aug 1996, 3; 5 Sept 20 May 1996, 11). As Deputy Prime 1996, 2). Relations deteriorated even Minister and Finance Minister Chris further in September, when the World Haiveta put it, “Cabinet can go ahead Bank’s Pirouz Hamidian-Rad joined a and make all these decisions but if the chorus of protest at the government’s [government] agencies do not imple- revenue budget. He was especially crit- ment them, then we have a big prob- ical of proposed new import duties on lem” (PC, 1 May 1996, 3). rice and fuel oil, and the reintroduc- However, government policy deci- tion of certain price controls. The gov- sions were to precipitate further show- ernment’s decision to hand down such downs with the bank later in the year. a budget, he said, “clearly indicated it The bank had placed considerable was no longer interested in continuing importance on reforms in the troubled the structural adjustment program” forestry industry, which received a (PC, 27–29 Sept 1996, 1). boost in March when the cabinet In the first of a remarkable series of endorsed the so-called Logging Code reversals, the government abandoned of Conduct, undertook to fast-track or modified the controversial revenue the implementation of a new logging measures less than a week after they tax and royalty system, and promised were announced. Finance Minister that amendments to the Forestry Act Haiveta immediately traveled to New would be limited to “technical mat- York to reopen talks with the World ters” (PC, 14 March 1996, 3). The Bank before their latest deadline amendment issue was crucial, because expired. In a faxed letter to Prime Min- Forest Minister Andrew Baing was ister Chan, Haiveta outlined five con- actively seeking to change the act in ditions to be satisfied before the loan ways that critics claimed would would be released, the most important enhance his own powers and under- of which was to reinstate the indepen- mine the independence of the National dence and integrity of the National Forest Authority Board (PC, 19 Feb Forestry Board through further 1996, 5). amendments to the Forestry Act. He political reviews • melanesia 483 indicated that the country’s “good ment to move ahead with its plans to image and credibility” would be dam- privatize more state assets, and to aged if the agreement with the World announce at the end of October “the Bank were allowed to lapse, jeopardiz- complete (or near complete) and early” ing other external aid and financing sale of its equity in financial institu- arrangements, and adversely affecting tions, including the Papua New the forthcoming public float of Oro- Guinea Banking Corporation and gen, a company set up to manage some Niugini Insurance Corporation (PC, 31 of the state’s mineral and petroleum Oct 1996, 27). assets (PC, 4 Oct 1996, 1, 5). Chan and Orogen investor confidence was, no his cabinet reluctantly agreed that doubt, boosted by some positive devel- these were compelling reasons for opments in the mineral and oil sectors compliance, and on 8 October parlia- during 1996. The smooth progress of ment passed the Forestry (Amend- the giant Lihir gold project toward a ment) Bill 1996 (PC, 9 Oct 1996, 1). 1997 startup date was certainly This removed the major obstacle to encouraging, especially given its trou- settlement, although it took several bled early history. The oil industry also more months to satisfy a number of looked set to continue its expansion, other conditions. The second tranche with the Gobe field heading for pro- of the loan was finally released early in duction, and a promising new find by 1997. Chevron Niugini at its Moran IX drill The blaze of publicity surrounding site in the Southern Highlands, within the lengthy struggle with the World range of the Kutubu project’s process- Bank apparently did not affect public ing and exporting facilities. However, confidence in the future of Papua New the extractive industries continued to Guinea’s lucrative mining and oil sec- be plagued by disputes. The govern- tors. In September, some 49 percent of ment continued to resist landowners’ the state’s stake in large mining and oil demands to control a bigger stake in projects was transferred from the Min- the Kutubu project and the right to eral Resources Development Com- market their share of production (PC, 8 pany to a new company, Orogen Jan 1996, 13; 16 Jan 1996, 11; 6 Feb Minerals Limited. Shares in Orogen, 1996, 21). named after the geological process that Meanwhile, the key player in Papua produced the country’s mineral wealth, New Guinea’s oil industry expressed were first offered to residents of Papua frustration at delays at the Gobe New Guinea at a discounted price project. Speaking to a petroleum con- before overseas bids were invited. The vention in Port Moresby in September, float, which closed at the end of Octo- Oil Search Managing Director Peter ber, was heavily oversubscribed, Botten noted that agreement with attracting worldwide offers totaling landowners had yet to be reached. “It 2.6 billion kina for approximately 270 appears to me,” he said, “that the pri- million kina worth of shares (PC, 31 mary risk of development in Papua Oct 1996, 1). The highly successful New Guinea is not the vagaries of Orogen float prompted the govern- nature but the failure to manage 484 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997 expectations and aspirations of people Settlement of the Bougainville seces- in the project area” (PC, 10 Sept 1996, sionist crisis remained elusive in 1996. 23). The All Bougainville Leaders’ Talks in The people living on the Ok Tedi Cairns in December 1995 had initiated and Fly rivers downstream of the Ok a dialogue that looked promising Tedi copper and gold mine had some between the various factions in Bou- of their expectations met during 1996. gainville. However, the mood of In 1994, landowners had brought an optimism began to dissipate almost a$4 billion legal claim in Australia immediately, when Bougainville Revo- against mine operator Broken Hill Pro- lutionary Army (bra) and Bougainville prietary (bhp) for damage caused by Interim Government (big) leaders were the discharge of large quantities of attacked by Papua New Guinea secu- untreated tailings from the project into rity forces as they returned to Bougain- the river system. In 1995, bhp and the ville by sea from the Solomon Islands Papua New Guinea government tried after the Cairns talks. Prime Minister to defuse the challenge by providing Chan denied big leader Joseph Kabui’s compensation for affected villagers charge that this was a deliberate assas- under the terms of the Ok Tedi sination attempt, claiming that because Restated Eighth Supplemental Agree- the group was supposed to travel by ment. The first payments were distrib- helicopter the military unit involved uted in April 1996, shortly after a law had been caught unawares (PC, 11 Jan was enacted prohibiting the pursuit of 1996, 2). Papua New Guinea–based compensa- The situation deteriorated rapidly in tion claims in foreign courts (PC, 15 March after a firefight between secu- April 1996, 2; 23 April 1996, 3). Then rity forces in boats and a bra contin- in June, before the government had an gent on Motsungan Island off the west opportunity to exercise its new legal coast of Buka left six police and sol- powers, the case against bhp was set- diers dead (PC, 13 March 1996, 1; 18 tled out of court. In a major victory, March 1996, 1). Five days later the the landowners received a$110 million bra group, led by Ishmael Toroana, in compensation and the promise of a ambushed and killed four more police- tailings disposal system, while their men on Buka (PC, 19 March 1996, 1). Melbourne law firm, Slater and Gor- The Buka incidents were, it seems, the don, was awarded a$7.6 million in final straw for Prime Minister Chan, legal fees. By the end of the year the who had become increasingly disen- mining company was considering vari- chanted with the peace efforts initiated ous options to deal with the tailings since 1994 by Bougainville Transi- disposal problem. Meanwhile, govern- tional Government Premier Theodore ment officials were, no doubt, moni- Miriung. On 21 March he called off toring the cost of the various options, the two-year-old cease-fire and sig- and wondering when, if ever, the ten- naled a return to the military option. year-old, multibillion-dollar project “I am now convinced,” he told the would yield substantial revenues for nation, “that we have exhausted all the state (PC, 26 Sept 1996, 27). human tolerance....There is not one political reviews • melanesia 485 shed of proof, no indication at all, that 20–22 Sept 1996, 1). An internal the rebels are sincere.” He warned the investigation by the Papua New “criminals who continue to kill, destroy Guinea Defence Force later found that and destabilize the peace longed for by the attack had been initiated by resis- all” that their “darkest hour has tance fighters angry at the drunken arrived” (PC, 22 March 1996, 8). conduct of the soldiers and their ill- The new military offensive, which treatment of local people and residents came in June, made matters worse. of the Kangu Beach care center. Resis- Operation High Speed II involved two tance leaders had solicited the help of battalions of troops, one of which had the bra, who joined in the killing and recently arrived on rotation, backed up escaped with ammunition and more by police and resistance fighters. The than thirty military weapons. The plan was to seal the border with the report held the commanding officer of Solomons and advance on rebel the company stationed at Kangu Beach strongholds in the interior from points responsible for the breakdown in disci- on the east and west coasts of the pline that led to the massacre (PC, 25– island (SMH, 19 June 1996, 1). Troops 27 Oct 1996, 1; 21 Jan 1997, 1). The were deployed into bra-held areas, five hostages were still in captivity at and on several occasions exchanged the end of the year, despite concerted fire with rebel groups. These attempts by Premier Theodore Miri- exchanges claimed the lives of four sol- ung, senior local MP John Momis, and diers, bra commander Nathan Mat- Sir Michael Somare, the country’s first evai, and an unknown number of prime minister, to secure their release. others (PC, 2 Aug 1996, 4). However, The Kangu Beach incident also the stated objective of “wiping out” revealed the depth of the distrust that the bra was not achieved, and the had developed between Bougainville operation ended quietly on 15 July, Transitional Government Premier when the 520 troops who should have Theodoe Miriung and members of the been relieved in June were withdrawn Papua New Guinea Defence Force. to the Papua New Guinea mainland Along with many others, Miriung had (PC, 14 Aug 1996, 2). roundly condemned High Speed II and A further blow to military morale predicted its failure. Long suspicious was delivered less than two months of his pre-1994 connections with the after the ignominy of High Speed II. bra, the military responded by restrict- On 8 September an attack at Kangu ing his movements on several occa- Beach on the south coast of Bougain- sions. In September, Defence Minister ville killed twelve members of the secu- Mathias Ijape, citing military intelli- rity forces, their largest loss in a single gence, openly accused Miriung of incit- incident since the crisis began in 1988, ing the Kangu Beach attack. Although and a further five were taken hostage. Miriung categorically denied the The attack was originally blamed on charge, he was temporarily placed the bra, but reports that government- under house arrest in Buka (PC, 11 Sept trained “resistance” fighters were 1996, 1). involved soon began to surface (PC, In a tragic setback for the peace 486 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997 process on Bougainville, Theodore Guinea Defence Force, already reeling Miriung was shot dead on 12 October from the failure of Operation High 1996 in his wife’s village in the Siwai Speed II and the Kangu Beach fiasco. area of southwest Bougainville. The Solomon Islands was in the fore- assassination sent shock waves front of protests about the handling of throughout the nation and overseas. the Bougainville crisis by Papua New Anguished regional MP John Momis Guinea authorities, especially the secu- said that Miriung was “without doubt rity forces. For some years, Papua New one of Bougainville’s all-time great Guinea authorities have tried to block leaders” whose death had “taken a the traffic of people and supplies large part of me with him.” He said between Bougainville and Solomon the death marked the passing of an era Islands, and have sought Solomon “of dialogue, reconciliation, and great Islands’ full cooperation in doing so. hopes for peace on Bougainville” and However, the Solomons leaders have demanded to know “Who shot him, argued that they don’t have sufficient and why?” (PC, 17 Oct 1996, 12). resources to patrol the border area, Although Prime Minister Chan had and have refused to allow Papua New clearly lost his initial enthusiasm for Guinea hot-pursuit rights across the Miriung’s peacemaking efforts, he border. Although there have been described the killing as an act of mad- numerous border violations in recent ness and vowed to bring the perpetra- years, such incursions became more tors to justice (TN, 13 Oct 1996, 1). He blatant in 1996. Especially after the appointed a Sri Lankan judge recom- lifting of the cease-fire early in the mended by the Commonwealth Secre- year, the Papua New Guinea forces tariat in London to head the official seemed to consider themselves free to inquiry. cross into Solomon Islands in hot pur- In early December, Judge Thiruvuk- suit of suspected bra fighters or to dis- karasu Suntheralingam presented his rupt suspected bases or supply lines. In report, which found that five defense March, Defence Minister Mathias force soldiers and several resistance Ijape warned Solomon Islands that “if fighters stationed at Tonu Camp had criminals cross the border and want to participated in the murder of Theodore get refuge in Solomon Islands, the Miriung (TN, 2 Dec 1996, 1). Defense pngdf will cross their border in hot force leaders claimed the investigation pursuit and deal with those criminals was biased, but the full report, which on Solomon Islands soil” (PC, 27 was not made public until early 1997, March 1996, 2). left little doubt about the complicity of Solomon Islands protested eighteen defense force personnel. The report did border violations in April and May not say who ordered the attack or who alone, some of which involved fire- in the military chain of command had fights with Solomon Islands police or knowledge of it, nor did it tackle the members of the Field Force. In June a question of motive. Nevertheless, the patrol boat reportedly fired on the vil- report served to damage even further lage of Liuliu in Choiseul Province, public confidence in the Papua New and suspected bra fighters were killed political reviews • melanesia 487 in Solomon Islands waters by a Papua and upset Chan’s aspiration to lead the New Guinea helicopter later the same People’s Progress Party to victory in month. In late June a series of incidents June 1997. occurred at the Solomon Islands post Terence Wesley-Smith at Tuluve, and in early July a Papua New Guinea patrol boat bombarded the Field Force observation post at References Ovau on several occasions (May 1996, May, R J. 1996. The Situation on Bougain- 12–14; PC, 15 July 1996, 11). Such ville: Implications for Papua New Guinea, incidents gave ongoing diplomatic Australia and the Region. Current Issues talks added urgency, and in July both Brief 9, 1996–97. Canberra: Parliamentary countries agreed to accelerate work on Research Service. a series of border treaties and to estab- lish a Joint Border Commission to PC, Post-Courier. Daily. Port Moresby. coordinate and oversee border man- SMH, Sydney Morning Herald. Daily. agement issues (PC, 8 July 1996, 5). Things did not look good for Prime TN, The National. Daily. Port Moresby. Minister Chan as 1996 drew to a Wesley-Smith, Terence. 1996. Papua New close. In particular, he had taken on Guinea in Review. The Contemporary the mighty World Bank and lost, while Pacific 8:428–436. failing to bring about a settlement of the Bougainville crisis, which had occupied much of his attention since Solomon Islands coming to office in 1994. He had, however, managed to keep his govern- In 1996 politics in the Solomon Islands ing coalition together and maintain his were turbulent, as usual, but by majority in parliament, despite some December the focus of political discus- significant conflicts between members sion was on the general election, of his People’s Progress Party and its scheduled for July 1997. Many poten- major coalition partner Pangu Pati tial candidates began campaigning for over cabinet appointments and minis- an election billed to be the most inter- terial responsibilities (PC, 31 July 1996, esting since independence from Great 2; 6–8 Sept 1996, 1). There were also Britain in July 1978, and coinciding problems within Pangu Pati. In Octo- with the nineteenth anniversary cele- ber, an unsuccessful move to oust brations. The year was also character- Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta ized by leadership squabbles and as leader of Pangu was apparently political discord that left many press- sparked by Haiveta’s controversial rev- ing issues unresolved. This, however, is enue budget (PC, 7 Oct 1996, 1). The not unusual in a country where the party also finally broke its ties with political landscape is often marked by founding member Sir Michael Somare, rapid and unpredictable changes. who had announced plans to set up a In early 1996 the country was still new political group, the National Alli- trying to deal with issues inherited ance, to contest the national election from previous years, particularly the