february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents The Debate over Taliban

FEATURE ARTICLE Reconciliation 1 The Debate over Taliban Reconciliation By Kara L. Bue and John A. Gastright By Kara L. Bue and John A. Gastright

Reports 4 Looking Forward: Hizb Allah’s Evolving Strategic Calculations By Vera L. Zakem 6 The Taliban’s Versatile Spokesman: A Profile of Muslim Khan By Imtiaz Ali 8 Exploiting the Fears of Al-Qa`ida’s Leadership By James J.F. Forest 10 A Jihadist’s Course in the Art of Recruitment By Brian Fishman and Abdullah Warius 13 Deconstructing Salafism in Yemen By Laurent Bonnefoy 15 New Government in Thailand Struggles To Defeat the Insurgency By Zachary Abuza 18 After Action Report: COIN Operations in Rutbah, Iraq By Lt. Dan Alldridge, U.S. Marine Corps AFP

20 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity he challenges to peace and and white issue, guided by principles of 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts stability in Afghanistan right and wrong. For others, the issue spiked in 2008. The Taliban is grey, rooted in practicality. In the resurgence that began in 2006 end, however, it is one that needs to Tcontinued to gain strength, with militants be addressed in the context of a larger now capable of exerting influence strategy. Overall, it is critical to view over wide swaths of the countryside. the concept of negotiating with the Roadside bombs, assassinations, Taliban as one strategic element among and carefully coordinated attacks on others that has the potential to improve About the CTC Sentinel government and military targets have the chances for success in Afghanistan. The Combating Terrorism Center is an become common place. In the face of this independent educational and research rising violence, increased attention has U.S. Officials Open to Reconciliation institution based in the Department of Social been paid on how to resurrect positive Much of the conjecture about engagement Sciences at the United States Military Academy, momentum in a war and nation-building began in 2008 following a flurry of media West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses effort that has played second fiddle to reports about possible negotiations the Center’s global network of scholars and Iraq for the last five years. Strategy with the Taliban. The reports fanned practitioners to understand and confront reviews have been initiated, additional speculation of a formal dialogue by contemporary threats posed by terrorism and troops called for, and for the first time highlighting a meeting hosted by Saudi other forms of political violence. high level U.S. officials are talking King Abdullah in September with openly about engaging in dialogue representatives of the Taliban and of the with the Taliban. While many believe Afghan government.1 The reports quoted The views expressed in this report are those of that rethinking the existing strategy in Britain’s commander in Afghanistan, the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Afghanistan is necessary, mere mention the Department of the Army, or any other agency of talking to the Taliban has engendered of the U.S. Government. 1 Jason Burke, “Revealed: Secret Taliban Peace Bid,” heated debate. For some, it is a black Guardian, September 28, 2008.

1 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2

Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, who To many, these comments appeared to incompetent government.10 said that negotiations with the Taliban signal a significant change of approach could bring needed progress.2 Other in Afghanistan. Not only had the Taliban Today, with the worsening security reports focused on Afghan President intentionally been excluded from the situation and gains made by the Hamid Karzai’s appeal for peace to 2001 Bonn Agreement establishing Taliban, it is unclear whether they Taliban leader Mullah Omar.3 This the new Afghan state and institutions, have any incentives to negotiate. This approach has since been publicly but it had been pursued vigorously by is especially true given that a portion of endorsed by both senior envoys from international and Afghan forces with the movement’s motivation stems from little inclination to talk. Suggesting ideology and not politics. As Taliban that elements of the Taliban may now commander Mullah Sabir told Newsweek “The rationale for be allowed back into the fold through a magazine in November, “This is not a engaging the Taliban in form of political reconciliation seemed political campaign for policy change or a sharp turn of events that was given all power sharing or cabinet ministries. We substantive talks rests the more credence because of Petraeus’ are waging a jihad to bring Islamic law primarily on the belief incoming role in Afghanistan as back to Afghanistan.”11 commander of U.S. Central Command. that the Taliban cannot be Petraeus had been the chief architect Furthermore, there is the nature of the defeated militarily and any of the “Anbar Awakening” in Iraq, Taliban itself. Although the “Taliban” where the U.S. military successfully are identified as a group, it is more lasting peace requires a leveraged nationalist Sunni Arab correctly identified as a loose alliance, reconciliation process.” insurgents as a means of driving a wedge united in common violence. As Richard between them and Sunni jihadists; a Boucher, the assistant secretary of state counterinsurgency strategy that many for the Bureau of South and Central assumed he would employ against Asian Affairs, explained, Afghanistan and Pakistan, who met at insurgents in Afghanistan. a two-day Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal the component entities have elders jirga in Islamabad.4 Even Afghan Critics Remain Doubtful different motivations for fighting, warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader For critics of this approach, the once including religious ideology, of Hizb-i-Islami and one of the most unthinkable idea of talking to the Taliban political aspirations, tribal brutal commanders in Afghanistan, remains so. How could the Afghan solidarity, and even temporary has reportedly displayed a readiness government, the United States, and employment. They work together for peace talks with the Karzai their allies consider negotiating with tactically when their interests administration.5 fundamentalist Islamist extremists converge, but there is a lack of real who once brutally ruled Afghanistan, centralized command and control. Comments made last fall by senior U.S. harbored terrorist Usama bin Ladin, To the extent there is a leadership officials spurred much debate. Defense and continue to be al-Qa`ida’s allies and group, it resides in Quetta, Secretary Robert Gates and U.S. Army protectors? Would not a re-emergence Pakistan, with Mullah Omar as General David Petraeus each offered of the Taliban amount to a human rights a titular head. Other key figures public support for engagement with disaster and a giant leap backwards for include the extremist warlords, insurgents who are willing to reconcile the fledgling democracy?7 Moreover, Hekmatyar and Siraj Haqqani, as with the government as a means of what message would that send to well as many local figures who reducing violence and isolating hardcore hopeful Afghans about the future of fight on the provincial or district militants. As noted by Gates, “That is their country, as well as to the Taliban level for autonomy, tribal, or other one of the key long-term solutions in and other insurgent groups about the reasons. Afghanistan, just as it has been in Iraq… United States and its seriousness in the Part of the solution is reconciliation with war on terrorism?8 According to some, In addition to this complexity are the people who are willing to work with the “the sudden courting of the Taliban questions about what it means to “talk” Afghan government going forward.”6 leaders appears to be more an act of to the Taliban and whether any one desperation, than strategy”9 in the face element could enforce an agreement. It of growing threats in a complex and costly is also doubtful whether the approach war. For others, it reflects an attempt by used in Anbar Province could be easily 2 Christina Lamb, “War on Taliban Cannot be Won, says Karzai, in advance of upcoming elections, transferred to Afghanistan, where Army Chief,” Sunday Times, October 5, 2008. to cover up inadequacies of his often elements of the Taliban share much of 3 Aryn Baker, “Facing Reality in Afghanistan: Talking al-Qa`ida’s harsh brand of Islam and with the Taliban,” Time, October 13, 2008. believe that they are running their own 4 Paul Koring, “Time to Talk with the Taliban, Govern- 7 Terry Glavin, “The Price of ‘Peace’ with the Taliban,” war; two factors that did not exist for ments Say,” Globe and Mail, October 28, 2008. Vancouver Sun, February 5, 2008, reflecting on com- Sunni nationalists in the Iraqi context. 5 Javed Hamim, “Hekmatyar Show Readiness for Con- ments by Dr. Sima Samar, the chairperson of Afghani- ditional Peace Talks,” Pajhwok Afghan News, October stan’s Independent Human Rights Commission. 10 Ann Marlowe, “Don’t Negotiate with the Taliban,” 29, 2008. 8 Cheryl Benard, “Talk to the Taliban? Not Now,” United Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2008. 6 Jason Straziuso, “Taliban, Afghan Officials Meet in Press International, November 11, 2008. 11 Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Taliban Two-Step: Saudi Arabia,” USA Today, October 6, 2008. 9 Baker. Can’t Sit Down Yet,” Newsweek, November 10, 2008.

2 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2

Engagement Strategies policy in a speech before a gathering of success in Afghanistan that needs to The rationale for engaging the Taliban ulama in Kabul, and in 2005 the Afghan be considered as part of a larger, more in substantive talks rests primarily on government established the Independent coordinated strategy guided by well- the belief that the Taliban cannot be Peace and Reconciliation Commission. defined goals. defeated militarily and any lasting peace In subsequent years, the Afghan cabinet requires a reconciliation process.12 As adopted an action plan regarding That strategy would of course involve General Petraeus said at a Heritage reconciliation, and the Afghanistan increased military forces and action. Foundation forum in October 2008, National Assembly approved legislation What is clear is that any discussions “This is how you end these kinds of on amnesty. As noted by Mohammad with the Taliban must be approached conflicts.” There is “no alternative to Masoom Stanekzai, an adviser in the from a position of strength. To appeal to reconciliation.” Afghan government, the Taliban in the current environment would likely embolden them further and That baseline assessment results in attempts at outreach and validate their strategy. In this regard, a differing opinion on whether the reconciliation on a more local level the ongoing combat operations and Taliban can be reconciled. Those who also have been initiated with modest additional forces bound for Afghanistan are encouraging engagement suggest success by a number of actors— remain essential. that the looseness of the Taliban namely the Afghan government, organization actually supports the nongovernmental organizations and Despite the importance of increased troop argument for engaging in dialogue. It is the international community.15 levels in Afghanistan, they themselves the lack of a strong central command and cannot bring victory. Reconciliation is a Taliban elements’ varied motivations Most would agree, however, that necessary component of an overarching for fighting that make them vulnerable reconciliation efforts to date have lacked strategy. This does not only refer to to division.13 The focus in this context consistency and depth. As Stanekzai reconciliation with Taliban elements, would be to appeal to the non- suggested, “The Afghan government and ideological insurgents who are tired of its international partners have offered “What is clear is that the fight and ready to return to a more conflicting messages, and there has peaceful daily life. For the ideologically been no consensual policy framework any discussions with disposed and senior members of the through which to pursue reconciliation the Taliban must be Taliban, it is recognized that such in a cohesive manner.”16 The veracity of approaches may be insufficient absent this argument can be appreciated when approached from a position military action but that “the availability taking into account how Afghan officials of strength.” of these talks as a political solution is offered amnesty to individuals such as important to Afghanistan’s eventual Mullah Omar in direct contravention of peace.”14 In either case, supporters of UN Security Council resolutions that engagement acknowledge that certain sanctioned those very leaders.17 which has the potential for being part preconditions are necessary prior to of the solution by offering an avenue any dialogue. Current U.S. policy, Engagement Just One Element to Success for insurgents to come in from the cold, for example, demands the following In the discussions about engagement, it but it also refers to reconciliation of the preconditions: the Taliban must accept has been easy to characterize the issue Afghan government with its people. As the Afghan constitution, abandon as binary—whether or not to talk to Joanna Nathan, an Afghanistan analyst violence, cut all ties with al-Qa`ida, the Taliban. Given the complex nature with the International Crisis Group, and not be given power-sharing deals or of the Taliban and the social fabric of was quoted as saying in Time Magazine territory to control. The United States Afghanistan, however, the issue is far last year, also has consistently held that any such from that simple. Moreover, it is clearly negotiation talks be Afghan-led. not a question of whether talking to the real reconciliation should be taking Taliban will win or lose the war. Even place at the grass roots, with Afghans The idea of an engagement strategy is not supporters of engagement acknowledge who have become alienated from the a new concept in the Afghan struggle. that the Taliban have not publicly government. If they can be persuaded In April 2003, President Karzai first participated in talks and have not shown that the government is looking after announced plans for a reconciliation signs they are serious about negotiating. their needs, they are less likely to Even if they did, there is no guarantee support the Taliban.18 12 Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, “Thwarting Afghani- any accommodation could be reached. stan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace Much more is required to secure a lasting This means truly connecting the Afghan and Reconciliation,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Re- peace in Afghanistan. What is important people to their government through port, September 2008, p. 2. is to view the concept of talking to the more focused and effective development 13 Fareed Zakaria, television interview of Dr. David Kil- Taliban for what it is: one element with efforts that provide basic services cullen, an Australian counterinsurgency specialist who the potential for improving chances of to ordinary Afghans, real security advises the U.S. and British governments, CNN, Novem- sector reform such as that proposed by ber 16, 2008. 15 Stanekzai, p. 10. Afghanistan’s new Interior Minister 14 These comments were made by Assistant Secretary 16 Ibid., p. 1. Hanif Atmar, an Afghan government of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard A. 17 The Security Council resolutions in question refer to Boucher. UNSCR 1267 (1999) and 1735 (2006). 18 Baker.

3 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 seen as rooting out corruption, and the Looking Forward: Social Influences development of a capable national army. In the immediate aftermath of the 2006 Without real progress in development Hizb Allah’s Evolving war, Hizb Allah stepped up its efforts and increasing the capacity of the Strategic Calculations to provide a variety of social services government to provide for its citizens, it to the Lebanese Shi`a who were most is difficult to imagine that any amount By Vera L. Zakem affected by the conflict. With help from of military action against the Taliban Iran, Syria, Islamic charities, and Shi`a and its associates will lead to a lasting it is no coincidence that many U.S. and groups,2 Hizb Allah’s reconstruction peace. Reconciliation must also involve international counterterrorism experts arm worked quickly to restore life regional actors such as Pakistan and view Lebanese Hizb Allah (also spelled in southern Beirut, Hizb Allah’s India to resolve some of the root causes Hizballah) as the “A-list of terrorist stronghold. Aside from providing of strife in Afghanistan and Pakistan. organizations.”1 It is Hizb Allah’s immediate health care to the wounded Action needs to be taken to end the use of successful employment of conventional and getting people back on their feet, Afghanistan as a proxy Indo-Pakistani and irregular warfare capabilities that Hizb Allah handed out $12,000 per battleground, as well as to eliminate lead many analysts to this conclusion. family for temporary housing, while Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. Hizb Allah’s ability to accrue political its construction company, Jihad al- power and provide essential services Binaa, began rebuilding residential and Indeed, there is much to reconcile. To to the Lebanese Shi`a and pro-Syrian commercial infrastructure. Considering the extent that the prospect of talking Christians in Lebanon, however, is the fact that the average per capita to or reconciling with the Taliban, or what makes it so unique. This allows income in Lebanon is only $6,200, elements of it, has garnered peoples’ Hizb Allah to influence its targeted receiving almost double that amount attention, it should be viewed in context population through the message of in cash within a matter of days was an as a single, complex, and possibly resistance and maintain its popularity impressive feat. With its rapid response, necessary element of a much larger in Lebanon, the Middle East region, Hizb Allah was clearly able to show the strategy for succeeding in Afghanistan. and the international community. Since world that it was capable of taking care its 2006 war with Israel, Hizb Allah of its people with greater speed and Kara L. Bue is a partner at Armitage has realized important political gains effect than the Lebanese government International, L.C. She served as Deputy among the Lebanese population. It is or the international community, who Assistant Secretary of State for Political- noteworthy, however, that since the only made exaggerated promises of Military Affairs from 2003-2005 and as 2006 conflict Hizb Allah has not carried assistance. The results were obvious. Special Assistant for South Asia to Deputy out any major attacks or retaliated Many Lebanese who were interviewed Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage from against anyone for the assassination of immediately after the war felt that Hizb 2001-2002. Prior to her service at the State Imad Mughniyyeh, Hizb Allah’s former Allah’s ability to provide these types Department, Ms. Bue practiced corporate law chief of military operations. of services to the affected populations in Washington, D.C. and held other positions generated the notion that “Hizb Allah is in government at the Department of Defense This article examines the strategic, the government” because it protects the and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. She political and military calculations people.3 This is precisely the influence currently serves on the Board of Directors of of Hizb Allah in the aftermath of the message that Hizb Allah wanted to National Interest Security Company, Kaseman 2006 Israel-Hizb Allah war and the spread. LLC, and Freedom Fields USA. She also is a assassination of Imad Mughniyyeh. member of the Board of Advisers of the Center Specifically, it will look at the way Immediately after the war, Prime for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Hizb Allah has been able to increase Minister Fouad Seniora’s government Postgraduate School and serves as the Military its political power following the 2006 attempted to highlight its infrastructure Outreach Fellow for the Center for U.S. Global conflict and provide essential services revitalization efforts. Nayla Mouawad, Engagement. to its constituents, while choosing not Lebanon’s minister of social affairs, to retaliate for Mughniyyeh’s death. said, “We are here. We are laying the John A. Gastright is Vice President for The article will explore the likelihood groundwork for a housing project Government Affairs at DynCorp International. that Hizb Allah will continue to play which would help people rebuild From 2005 to 2007, he served as Deputy the terrorism card when deemed the damaged homes.”4 Similarly, the Assistant Secretary of State for Pakistan, strategically important. Finally, some international community organized a Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, as well as the recommendations will be offered for major donor conference to raise funds to interagency Coordinator for Afghanistan. effective alternatives that could limit rebuild Lebanon and bolster Seniora’s From 2003 to 2005, he was Special Assistant Hizb Allah’s influence on relevant legitimacy. While it has been able to for South Asia to Deputy Secretary of State populations. distribute $500.4 million5 for the entire Richard L. Armitage. Prior to his service at the State Department, Mr. Gastright held 2 Thanassis Cambanis, “With Speed, Hezbollah Picks up several positions on Capitol Hill, including the Shovel,” Boston Globe, August 19, 2006. Chief of Staff to Congressman Jack Kingston 3 Ibid. and Projects Director and Military Assistant 4 Ibid. to Senator Strom Thurmond. From 1988 to 1 This is a view expressed by many U.S. counterterrorism 5 This is the current figure to date for the entire- coun 1994, he served on active duty as an officer experts who the author interviewed during the course of try based on figures from www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb, in the U.S. Navy. her research on the topic. January 19, 2009.

4 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 country, Seniora’s government and the Hizb Allah’s Strategic Calculation Post trying to further its political ambitions. international community moved slowly Mughniyyeh This is perhaps the reason why Hizb in providing badly needed services, The February 2008 assassination Allah chose not to get involved in the thereby enabling Hizb Allah to respond of Imad Mughniyyeh was a major most recent Israel-Hamas conflict in more swiftly and aggressively. According blow to Hizb Allah. It remains to be Gaza. Another reason might be that to one U.S. counterterrorism expert, in seen, however, whether Hizb Allah Hizb Allah is patiently waiting to the end the international community will retaliate for the assassination or strike on the international scene when made multibillion dollar plans, but they whether it will skip retaliation and the world is least expecting it. Even did not pan out. As a result, Hizb Allah begin taking steps to become solely a though Hizb Allah has not carried won over the population in southern political and social organization. While out a major international terrorist Beirut.6 some experts believe that Hizb Allah attack since Mughniyyeh’s death, it may choose the political road, others nevertheless is a robust transnational Political Influences are not as optimistic. A number of U.S. terrorist organization that is able to In addition to winning the “guts and counterterrorism experts who were pull the trigger when it is strategically souls”7 of the Lebanese Shi`a, Hizb interviewed for this article expressed important and necessary. Allah has made impressive political inroads in Lebanon since the 2006 war. “Despite Hizb Allah’s Concluding Thoughts and Recommendations This has enabled Hizb Allah to increase Despite Hizb Allah’s recent political its political voice and influence across recent political success, success, the United States cannot assume various diverse populations, even the United States cannot that it will cease all of its terrorist though it does not serve all of Lebanon’s activities. Furthermore, the United constituents. This was evident when assume that it will cease all States should not treat Hizb Allah as a Hizb Allah reached an agreement with of its terrorist activities.” solely “Lebanese” problem. Hizb Allah is Seniora’s government allowing the a transnational organization that has the organization to retain its weapons capability to influence globally, despite and gain ministerial posts within the the fact that one of its international parliament. Hizb Allah’s postings the view that, despite Mughniyyeh’s masterminds is dead. Hence, Hizb allowed the organization to effectively assassination, Hizb Allah draws Allah should be treated with as much have veto power over any major decision its core strength from its military priority as other major transnational with which the organization does not operations and will continue to engage terrorist organizations. While defeating agree. As such, Hizb Allah has been in terrorist activities as long as it is and disrupting the military arm of Hizb able to secure political legitimacy in the strategically important and useful for Allah is critical, it is equally important eyes of various sects in Lebanon. Since the organization. Furthermore, while to marginalize Hizb Allah’s political and 2006, Hizb Allah has been careful to the assassination of Imad Mughniyyeh social influence in Lebanon and beyond, avoid any major conflict as it seeks to might be a blow to Hizb Allah’s and provide unique political and socio- gain additional political representation international military organization, economic alternatives to the group’s in the June parliamentary elections. those who were interviewed expressed active and passive supporters. Through political influence, Hizb Allah that Hizb Allah’s central military arm has attempted to demonstrate that it will not be significantly impacted by his Providing the right mix of political and can serve the people and provide them demise; as one U.S. counterterrorism socio-economic alternatives is not an services, engage in terrorist activities expert said, Mughniyyeh was “one of easy task, especially in a country such regionally and globally, and represent several top guys.”9 as Lebanon that is made up of various Iranian and Syrian interests, all at the religions and ethnicities, where outside same time. With its political, socio- If Hizb Allah decides to retaliate in state actors compete for influence and economic, and military influence response to the assassination, it is legitimacy. Nevertheless, the United capabilities, Hizb Allah has been able to unclear what form of retaliation it might States and the international community effectively seal its status as an “armed choose and when it might act.10 As should aim to better empower Siniora’s state within a state.”8 Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah stated after government and partners, including non- the assassination, “We shall defend governmental organizations and local ourselves the way we choose, at the time institutions that enjoy the support of 11 6 Personal interview, U.S. counterterrorism expert, Jan- and place of our choosing.” Despite the local population. The best messages uary 6, 2009. the rhetoric, Hizb Allah has to pick its of empowerment and influence come 7 Dr. Shmuel Bar describes that Hizb Allah goes after battles carefully, especially since it is through fast and effective actions, not “guts and souls” versus “hearts and minds” of relevant merely words. Therefore, it is important populations. Hizb Allah tries to arouse emotions and re- 9 The author interviewed several U.S. counterterrorism to help Seniora and his partners provide ligious sentiment. experts in 2009 for the purpose of this article. alternative essential services to the 8 “State within a state” is a common term used to describe 10 It is not clear who was responsible for assassinating Lebanese in southern Beirut and other Hizb Allah’s role in Lebanon. Hizb Allah is a violent non- Imad Mughniyyeh, but Hizb Allah blames Israel for the parts of Lebanon the moment they are state actor that carries out terrorist and influence opera- car bombing that took his life in Damascus. needed. For instance, to counter Hizb tions against targeted populations, while at the same time 11 David Shenker, “Beyond Rhetoric: Hizballah Threats Allah’s influence, the United States has political representation and provides social services after the Mughniyeh Assassination,” The Washington and international partners should help to the people. Institute for Near East Policy, February 28, 2008. Lebanon raise money not just to pay off

5 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 debt from previous conflicts, but also to The Taliban’s Versatile Muslim Khan’s Rise to Prominence create a surplus of social services and a As Pakistan grapples with a growing reconstruction fund for future conflicts. Spokesman: A Profile of insurgency in its lawless FATA region, If Hizb Allah’s active and passive Muslim Khan there has been a rise in violence in supporters see that other entities are Swat, a picturesque valley in the NWFP. helping them build and rebuild their By Imtiaz Ali Swat has become another flash point in communities, Hizb Allah’s political and Pakistan’s struggle against extremism. social influence will likely lose some of following in the footsteps of the Dozens of military operations since its cachet. Afghan Taliban battling U.S.-led NATO November 2007 have proved ineffective. forces in Afghanistan, the Pakistani The valley has come under the control Finally, the United States and its Taliban are fighting on two fronts. In of Maulana Fazlullah, a radical mullah partners should explore ways to isolate addition to attacking Pakistani troops allied with the Taliban and al-Qa`ida.1 the divergent interests of Hizb Allah in the tribal belt and in some parts of Using an illegal FM radio station to from its two main state sponsors: Syria the settled areas of the North-West broadcast his propaganda—in addition and Iran. For Hizb Allah, Syria is a Frontier Province (NWFP), they are to commanding thousands of armed partner of convenience as it primarily also waging a stunning propaganda fighters—Fazlullah has converted the provides logistical and training support. campaign aimed at terrorizing security Swat Valley into a mini-Taliban state. Yet, Syria relies on Hizb Allah’s forces and gaining sympathy from the In this mini-state, women’s education is support for its own regime survival and local population. Tehrik-i-Taliban completely banned, and alleged bandits, legitimacy in the region. Iran, however, Pakistan (TTP)—an umbrella group drug smugglers and other criminals is an important strategic partner that of militants operating in the Federally provides spiritual and moral guidance, Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and as well as military and financial support. in parts of the NWFP—is running a full- “Muslim Khan’s To weaken these partnerships, the fledged insurgency under the leadership multilingual skills and his United States and its allies have to pursue of Baitullah Mehsud, a tribal militant different strategies. In regards to Iran, commander who is also suspected rich experience in working the United States and the international of assassinating Pakistani politician abroad in Western community should consider finding a Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. better way to address broader regional Pakistan’s security forces have made a countries make him a security issues such as managing the continuous effort to break the backbone rare talent for the Taliban nuclear proliferation issue in an effort of the insurgency. Despite successful to minimize Iran’s influence in the strikes against militant centers, Taliban movement, a group that region. With Syria, the United States spokesmen always counter government involves mostly madrasa should explore negotiation strategies claims in an amazing demonstration to mitigate the Arab-Israeli conflict of communication and propaganda graduates and illiterate that could eventually lead to a peace prowess; Pakistan’s newspapers publish activists.” agreement between Israel and Syria. statements by purported Taliban Such an agreement could set a precedent spokesmen almost every day. for the rest of the region, consequently weakening both Hizb Allah’s and Iran’s Recently, as Pakistani forces intensify are publicly lashed on the orders of legitimacies and influence given that operations in the Swat Valley of the Taliban courts. Since November 2007, much of their power derives from their NWFP, the spokesman for the local approximately 1,200 civilians and 189 anti-Israel stance. Taliban in Swat—a militant known military personnel have been killed in as Muslim Khan—has been making the Swat fighting, while 2,000 civilians Vera L. Zakem is a foreign policy and national more headlines than any other Taliban have been injured.2 security consultant in the Washington, D.C. spokesman. On February 15, for area. She specializes in irregular warfare example, Khan announced a 10-day As a result of Fazlullah’s lack of formal and counterterrorism, as well as U.S. policy cease-fire amid reports of fresh efforts education and aversion to the media, toward the Middle East and Eastern Europe. by the NWFP government to achieve his spokesman, Haji Muslim Khan, has During the last seven years, her research has a new peace deal in the war-torn Swat become the public face of the new mini- primarily focused on geopolitics, terrorism, Valley. Part of Muslim Khan’s rise to Taliban state in Swat. Although Khan and irregular challenges in the Middle East, public prominence is due to the growing has been part of Fazlullah’s militia as well as the relationship between states and militancy in the Swat region. It also, for approximately two years, he rose violent non-state actors. She holds a master’s however, is due to his multilingual to prominence in April 2008 when he degree in government and international skills and his wide range of experiences replaced Siraj Uddin as a spokesman security from Johns Hopkins University. The working abroad in Western countries, for the Swat chapter of the TTP. His views expressed in this article are based on including possibly in the United States. appointment occurred amid fierce the author’s research, and do not represent This article identifies Muslim Khan’s any government or industry. background and demonstrates his threat 1 “The Fall of Swat,” The News, December 28, 2008. to peace in the region. 2 “Fresh Strategy to Crush Swat Militants: Malik Names Terror Outfits Behind Insurgency,” Dawn, January 30, 2009.

6 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 fighting between Taliban militants and activist.7 In response to the crime, as an umma and form a single army and security forces competing for control Khan was placed in jail for 25 days on single currency.”14 When asked about of the valley. A month after assuming kidnapping charges.8 His association the aims and objectives of the Taliban the position of spokesman, he found with the PPP demonstrated his liberal movement, Khan said that “initially we himself at the center of a major political ideals during his youth. Khan claims, want implementation of Shari`a in our development when he led the Taliban however, that he was “emotional” during own region—Malakand division—and negotiations team that struck a peace deal this time, and did not truly understand then we would like the same in the with the new government in the NWFP, the real policies of the PPP.9 North-West Frontier Province and then led by the Awami National Party.3 ultimately the whole of Pakistan.”15 As the head of the negotiations team, In the early 1990s, Khan joined Tehreek- Khan put forth four main demands: the e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi (TNSM), Khan is harshly critical of the religious implementation of Shari`a in the Swat or the Movement for the Implementation party leadership in the country, Valley; the withdrawal of the Pakistan of Islamic Laws.10 TNSM was led by particularly of Maulana Fazal Rahman Army from the region; compensation Maulana Sufi Mohammad, who launched and Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the leaders to those affected by death or injury its struggle for the implementation of of Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam and Jamaat- due to military operations in Swat; and Shari`a in the Malakand region of the i-Islami respectively. He accused the the unconditional release of all people NWFP. As part of TNSM, Khan was leaders of using the name of Islam to detained during military operations. become members of parliament so that Although the peace deal failed bitterly, they could enjoy the privileges and the intense media attention surrounding “Khan purportedly lived “perks” that come with such titles.16 the negotiations, combined with the in the Boston area in the signing of a deal, propelled Muslim Overseas Experience Khan into the spotlight. This allowed state of Massachusetts on a In the mid 1970s, Muslim Khan him to play a leading role in the TTP. visitor’s visa until 2000.” abandoned his college studies without completing his degree. In the early 1980s, A Journey from Liberal Politics to Religious he apparently found a job as a seaman Extremism in a British company with the help of According to Muslim Khan’s own involved in many of the group’s protest the Pakistan Shipping Corporation.17 account, he is 55-years-old and was rallies, including the one against He worked for the company for two born in Koza Banda village in the Swat Benazir Bhutto’s second regime in 1994 years. He claims he visited most of Valley.4 After completing high school when the whole region was brought to Europe and many other countries in his native village in 1972, Khan a standstill due to the demand for the during his seamanship. Once he left said he attended further studies at the implementation of Islamic laws. A few that job, he went to Kuwait where he Government Graduate Jehanzeb College years ago, however, Khan fell out with worked in some transport companies.18 Mingora, which is in the main town of TNSM and began opposing its chief, When the Gulf War broke out in 1991, the Swat Valley.5 During that time in Sufi Muhammad, for adopting what he left Kuwait for Pakistan along with Pakistan’s politics, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, he calls a “soft approach” toward the hundreds of his countrymen.19 Once the father of slain politician Benazir implementation of Shari`a. In early back in Pakistan, Khan reportedly Bhutto, was the prime minister. Upon 2009, Khan called TNSM a “fiction of started his own business and opened a entering postgraduate college, Khan old men who can do nothing.”11 medicine store in his native town.20 was impressed by Ali Bhutto and the philosophy of the Pakistan People’s In July 2008, Khan said in an interview Most interestingly, when Khan was an Party (PPP). He joined the party’s that he had traveled to Afghanistan active member of TNSM, he allegedly student wing, known as the People’s to fight “foreign infidels.”12 He did came to the United States. Although the Students Federation (PSF). Khan viewed not, however, identify the details of exact date of this entry is not known, it is favorably a religious figure, Maulana the fighting. When asked about his estimated to be around 1997-1998. Khan Kausar Niazi, who was a central leader views of democracy, he firmly stated purportedly lived in the Boston area in in the party and who promoted Islam that the “concept of the Western form the state of Massachusetts on a visitor’s and Shari`a.6 of democracy is against Shari`a.”13 visa until 2000. According to some According to Khan, “I am all about sources, he worked as a craftsman in a Khan, however, was not a normal party khilafat and this is my appeal to the painting company.21 Although Khan has activist. He staunchly participated in Muslims around the world to get united made these claims to many journalists the party’s activities and once resorted to kidnapping two government officials 7 “Abul Hai Kakar’s Profile Interview with Muslim 14 Ibid. as revenge for killing a PPP student Khan,” BBC Urdu Online, October 2008. 15 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 9 Personal interview, Muslim Khan, June 2008. 17 “Abul Hai Kakar’s Profile Interview with Muslim 3 “Government Inks Peace Deal with Swat Militants,” 10 Ibid. Khan.” The News, May 22, 2008. 11 “Special Investigative Report about Swat Situation,” 18 Ibid. 4 Personal interview, Muslim Khan, June 2008. Geo TV, January 17, 2009. 19 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 12 Personal interview, Muslim Khan, July 2008. 20 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 21 Ibid.

7 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 during interviews, he has yet to provide Salafi-jihadi practice of declaring further details about his alleged stay in Exploiting the Fears of fellow Muslims “infidels” if they oppose the United States. Al-Qa`ida’s Leadership jihadist dogma).3 These actions by authorities that some radical Islamists Conclusion By James J.F. Forest look to for guidance possibly weaken Although Muslim Khan has stated al-Qa`ida’s ability to recruit and retain that he takes his overall orders22 from for the past several years, al-Qa`ida followers. Baitullah Mehsud, there is speculation has been portrayed by the press, pundits that the two factions have parted and the former Bush administration as Al-Qa`ida’s primary objective is to ways.23 Differences arose after Muslim a fearsome monolithic entity, a dark acquire political power. While they Khan adamantly proclaimed in January demon waiting to strike the United use the terms, images and symbols of that girls would not be able to attend States at a moment’s notice. Limited religious piety, al-Qa`ida is similar to school in Swat. The chief spokesman attention has been given to the glaring many groups throughout history that under Baitullah Mehsud, Maulvi Omar, vulnerabilities that al-Qa`ida’s leaders used political violence in pursuit of reacted to the proclamation, telling worry about every day. In addition to the change. Within the Muslim world, there reporters that the TTP had nothing to usual operational security challenges is little support for al-Qa`ida’s agenda, do with the closure of the girls’ schools with which any clandestine organization tactics, strategy or vision of the future. in Swat. These differences have yet to grapples, al-Qa`ida desperately seeks Al-Qa`ida, therefore, invests heavily in be resolved. to influence perceptions throughout the world of its legitimacy, organizational “Al-Qa`ida is trying to Muslim Khan’s multilingual skills and unity, relevance and competence. This his rich experience in working abroad article will briefly examine each of build a populist movement, in Western countries make him a rare these goals to illustrate the larger point and yet their terrorist talent for the Taliban movement, a group that al-Qa`ida’s fears can be made real, that involves mostly madrasa graduates producing a significant and lasting attacks kill or alienate and illiterate activists. His duties for impact on the organization’s future. potential supporters the Taliban range from the explanation of how Shari`a should be implemented, Legitimacy Lost throughout the Muslim waging jihad against U.S.-led NATO Al-Qa`ida fears fatawa (religious world.” forces in Afghanistan, and claiming decrees) more than bullets or Hellfire responsibility for the day-to-day bomb missiles. A central component of al- blasts and attacks on government Qa`ida’s propaganda requires gaining installations and girls’ schools in and maintaining legitimacy within the a massive propaganda campaign to try Pakistan. Muslim Khan has become a Muslim world. Failure to gain legitimacy and increase support among their target key leader in the Taliban movement, will undoubtedly doom their cause and audiences, and acquire the resources and it is likely that his responsibilities the future of the movement. Thus, al- that will allow them to survive. If they will increase as the conflict rages on. Qa`ida’s leaders were greatly concerned fail to effectively convince their target when Saudi Arabia’s top cleric, Grand audiences to support their cause, they Imtiaz Ali is a Pashtun journalist who has Mufti Shaykh Abdul Aziz al-Ashaykh, are doomed. This is a tall challenge. recently worked as a special correspondent gave a speech in October 2007 warning Al-Qa`ida is trying to build a populist for the Washington Post in Pakistan’s tribal Saudis not to join unauthorized jihadist movement, and yet their terrorist attacks belt and frontier province. Mr. Ali previously activities,1 a statement directed mainly kill or alienate potential supporters worked with the BBC Pashto Service and at those considering going to Iraq to throughout the Muslim world. London’s Daily Telegraph for five years fight U.S.-led forces. Similarly, Sayyid and extensively reported on the rise of the Imam al-Sharif, a former top leader of Finally, it is also necessary to remember Pakistani Taliban. He worked with Pakistan’s the armed Egyptian movement Islamic that many extreme Islamist groups— premier English-language newspapers, The Jihad and a longtime associate of Ayman including Hamas and the Muslim News and Dawn. Mr. Ali has recently served al-Zawahiri, recently published a book Brotherhood—have a deep animosity as adviser to the Network 20/20—a New that renounces violent jihad on legal toward al-Qa`ida. Pundits and York-based non-profit organization—in the and religious grounds.2 In Pakistan’s politicians too often lump all “radical preparation of their report “Another Kind North-West Frontier Province, Mufti Islamists” into a single category, of Partner: A Paradigm for Democracy and Zainul Abidin recently issued a fatwa implying that they are all of the same CounterTerrorism in Pakistan” (2008). He that declares the Pakistani Taliban to mindset. This is dangerously misleading. was a Knight Journalism Fellow at Stanford be “out of Islam” as a result of their It is a fact that Hamas has consistently University in 2006 and was a Yale World violence, failure to follow Islamic rejected even the suggestion that they Fellow in 2008. Currently, he is at Yale teachings, and the pursuance of takfiri align with Usama bin Ladin’s group, University. ideology (the latter referring to the and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in several countries have consistently condemned al-Qa`ida’s actions and 22 “Taliban, Government Optimistic About Resumption 1 Michael Jacobson, “Top Cleric Issues Warning,” Coun- of Talks,” The News, July 2, 2008. terterrorism Blog, October 10, 2007. 23 “Taliban Divided on Girl’s Education,” www.Islam- 2 Jarret Brachman, “Leading Egyptian Jihadist Sayyid 3 “Fatwa in Tribal Pakistan Declares Taliban ‘Out of Is- Online.net, December 26, 2008. Imam Renounces Violence,” CTC Sentinel 1:1 (2008). lam,’” Terrorism Focus 5:12 (2008).

8 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 leaders. Indeed, attacks carried out Finally, al-Qa`ida members are human, intelligence influences U.S. national by al-Qa`ida affiliates in Pakistan, and as such are not invulnerable to security agencies through the Washington Indonesia, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia fear. The organization’s leaders are Times, a newspaper controlled by the and elsewhere have not mobilized a aware of this, and are concerned about Unification Church.8 unified Muslim umma to the cause, cowardice (or the appearance thereof) but instead have driven wedges of within the ranks. Although they may The limits of al-Qa`ida’s knowledge ideological disagreement that only serve not entirely fear the U.S. legal system, impact the quality of intelligence to benefit nations prosecuting the global CIA secret prisons, the detention available to make strategic decisions. war against them. Moreover, al-Qa`ida facility at Guantanamo Bay, or being Just as in any other organization, the has failed to gain traction in Syria, killed by a U.S. airstrike, they do fear fear of taking action based on faulty Lebanon, or the Palestinian Territories, the middle ground between death and intelligence is unavoidable in al- and it has lost its tenuous footholds a humane Western legal system: their Qa`ida, where leaders constantly worry in Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. repatriation to Egypt, Jordan, Saudi about the unknown when planning In short, maintaining some sense of Arabia, Syria, Turkey or any number of their operations. As Gaetano Joe Ilardi legitimacy is a major challenge for al- countries where the respect for human recently observed, “by satisfying the Qa`ida, one that the United States and rights is often lacking. As demonstrated organization’s need for operational its allies could make far more difficult by postings on jihadist web forums (and certainty and providing a basis upon through a variety of information by recent “recantations” by Jordanian which detailed plans can be constructed, operations and other efforts. cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, intelligence is the fulcrum on which Saudi cleric Nasir bin Hamd al-Fadl al-Qaida exists.”9 Thus, one finds a The Threats from Within and others), there is significant concern consistent drumbeat of appeals for There is a considerable amount of among al-Qa`ida’s rank-and-file about intelligence from al-Qa`ida’s leaders infighting, conflict and disorganization the potential pain and suffering at throughout the online discussion forums within al-Qa`ida. Analysis of al-Qa`ida the hands of interrogators in those frequented by jihadist supporters and documents captured in several countries countries. This, in turn, impacts their sympathizers. (and now stored in the Department courage and commitment to actions that of Defense’s Harmony database) support al-Qa`ida’s ideology. Finally, there are fears about potential have brought to light a number of ineptitude (or perceptions thereof) ideological and strategic debates Ignorance and Ineptitude among al-Qa`ida’s rank-and-file. among al-Qa`ida’s top leaders.4 In one Al-Qa`ida’s leaders do not understand Some online jihadists have expressed letter, the author, ‘Abd al-Halim al- the United States as well as they claim. considerable disappointment at the Adl, expressed concern that al-Qa`ida The occasional propaganda blunder failure of al-Qa`ida’s leaders to conduct is “experiencing one setback after by Ayman al-Zawahiri and others an attack during the U.S. election another,” and placed the blame for this have illustrated their ignorance about period, portraying this as a major squarely on the shoulders of Usama bin American society and values.6 Few of opportunity squandered.10 Impatience Ladin. Other letters revealed corruption al-Qa`ida’s senior members have lived is a common attribute throughout the and malfeasance within al-Qa`ida’s or spent considerable time in a Western terrorist world. A more important rank-and-file. Captured documents country, and thus their knowledge of concern among al-Qa`ida’s members have illuminated several cases of culture, social and political trends is and supporters, however, revolves embezzlement, counterproductive drawn mainly from open sources via the around questions of organizational violence, insubordination, criminal media, the Internet, and books. capabilities. While the Arab mujahidin activity (including drug running) and had little to do with Soviet troops other activities that undermine the This lack of knowledge was reflected in leaving Afghanistan in 1989, they did desperately promoted perception of al- a 2006 study by Muhammed Khalil al- acquire useful skills in conducting Qa`ida members being devout Muslim Hakaymah on how the U.S. intelligence irregular warfare against a superior “holy warriors.” Indeed, Khalid Shaykh system works, and what the intelligence enemy. Many of these seasoned veterans Muhammad—the mastermind behind community can and cannot do legally formed the core of al-Qa`ida at the turn the 9/11 attacks—was a flamboyant, under U.S. law.7 His ambitious 152-page of the century and have been the focus globe-trotting womanizer and drinker report was circulated widely on Salafi- of various post-9/11 intelligence and who spent lavishly and stayed in jihadist websites, but cites a number of military actions. Presently, most new plush hotels until his 2003 capture in conspiracy websites and other dubious recruits to al-Qa`ida bring nothing of Rawalpindi, Pakistan.5 sources to support his assertions. As a value: no military training, specialized result, he provides bogus information, such as details of how South Korean 8 Bill Roggio, “The Myth of Delusion,” The Long War Journal, October 16, 2006; Eli Lake, “How Qaeda 4 Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al Qaeda’s Organi- 6 For example, when Ayman al-Zawahiri called Presi- Warned Its Operatives on Using Cell Phones,” New York zational Vulnerabilities (West Point, NY: Combating Ter- dent-elect Barack Obama a “house Negro,” it likely did Sun, October 18, 2006. rorism Center, 2006). more to unite Americans in Obama’s defense. 9 Gaetano Joe Ilardi, “Al-Qaeda’s Operational Intelli- 5 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (London: Pen- 7 Muhammed Khalil al-Hakaymah, Myth of Delusion: Ex- gence – A Key Prerequisite to Action,” Studies in Conflict guin Books, 2006), p. 235; Rohan Gunaratna, “Woman- posing the American Intelligence, published online on Oc- and Terrorism 31:12 (2008). izer, Joker, Scuba Diver: The Other Face of al-Qaida’s No. tober 8, 2006; Steve Schippert, “Al-Qaeda’s Guide to US 10 Such comments can be viewed on various Islamist 3,” Guardian, March 3, 2003. Intelligence,” RapidRecon.com, October 16, 2006. web forums.

9 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 skills or knowledge. All they share is Qa`ida operatives work hard to shape A Jihadist’s Course in the a “desire to do something.” Some can a global perception that they are a avail themselves of opportunities to powerful movement with tentacles Art of Recruitment learn in rudimentary training camps in and cells everywhere. This perception Pakistan, but more often it appears that aids them by generating fear and By Brian Fishman and Abdullah Warius Iraq has provided much-needed “on the causing governments to overextend job training” for these new recruits. and overspend on homeland security jihadist recruiters have a new Therefore, a key challenge for al-Qa`ida and counterterrorism efforts. An handbook to guide them through the is trying to advance their organization’s occasional terrorist attack in some art of radicalizing and organizing a objectives with a restricted knowledge corner of the world—whether it kills fresh generation of operatives. The base among their personnel resources. dozens, hundreds or thousands—feeds 51-page handbook by Abu `Amr al- this perception. For al-Qa`ida to remain Qa`idi, A Course in the Art of Recruitment, is Irrelevance temporarily viable, the group is not designed to provide less-skilled jihadist As Brian Jenkins recently observed, required to conduct a steady drumbeat recruiters operating independently “these virtual jihadists are locked into of attacks on U.S. soil; it only needs of any cohesive terrorist organization a closed-loop discourse on the Internet to conduct12 a terrorist attack at some the tools to effectively recruit that is increasingly irrelevant…That’s location in the world, albeit preferably secular and moderate Muslims into the biggest fear of the terrorists: One day a media-rich Western target. the global jihadist movement. Abu Osama bin Laden will issue his 450th `Amr’s handbook prescribes a highly proclamation, and no one will really be Al-Qa`ida is in danger, however, of structured recruitment process with listening.”11 A catalyst for the attacks being stalemated by counterterrorism multiple stages and clear, simple on 9/11 was that al-Qa`ida’s leaders felt successes, opposition by prominent metrics to assess a recruit’s progress— a need to prove to the Muslim world clerics and Muslim groups, and essentially, the bureaucratization of that they could support their words problems within their own organization. decentralized jihadist recruitment. with deeds. Having captured center They fear the decline in legitimacy that Abu `Amr argues that structuring stage, they reaped the whirlwind of comes from a perception of inaction. recruitment and providing simple military-led responses and intelligence Eventually, members and sympathizers quantitative assessment tools will allow gathering that has seriously degraded will abandon all hope of achieving al- recruiters with less education and their operational capabilities. Since Qa`ida’s goals, and the overwhelming knowledge of Shari`a to recruit safely then, Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al- loss of money, recruits, safe havens and and effectively. Zawahiri have tried mightily to keep a other necessary enablers will lead to spotlight on themselves and their self- its demise. This has been the trajectory Abu `Amr’s handbook has been widely appointed vanguard group of “knights” of many terrorist groups throughout distributed on jihadist websites, but by issuing periodic audio and video history, and al-Qa`ida’s leaders surely it is not clear whether his recruitment statements and encouraging a viral recognize this reality. Understanding program is actually being applied marketing campaign to support the al-Qa`ida’s fears will better help by jihadist operatives. Rather than global spread of their ideology. They identify opportunities in which a definitive explanation of current clearly recognize the risk that, having information operations and strategic jihadist operations, Abu `Amr’s book been unable to orchestrate a follow-on communications efforts can lead to an is an insider’s look into the ideas attack equivalent (or greater) in scope acceleration of al-Qa`ida’s eventual and techniques critical to jihadist and scale as 9/11, perceptions of their decline and self-destruction. radicalization, and an attempt to prominence and capabilities within the simplify the difficult art of radicalization Muslim world are likely to diminish. Dr. James J.F. Forest is Associate Professor for a less-skilled generation of jihadist Combined with the concerns described of Political Science and Director of Terrorism recruiters. earlier about organizational ineptitude Studies at the Combating Terrorism Center and opportunities squandered, this at West Point. He has published 11 books Individual Da`wa Versus Collective Da`wa impatience among its followers may on terrorism, WMD, homeland security and Abu `Amr’s recruitment course pressure al-Qa`ida’s leaders into hasty, other topics, and has lectured to academic proceeds in five stages, designed to desperate and sloppy decision-making, and government audiences in over a dozen carefully introduce recruits to jihadist or even to a rapid downward spiral countries. His degrees are from Georgetown ideology and cell formation. Abu `Amr toward atrophy and disintegration. University, Stanford University and Boston describes detailed goals for each stage College. and provides recruiters quantitative Conclusion assessment tools to judge the progress Although al-Qa`ida must not be of their recruits and determine when underestimated, it is important they are ready to move from one stage to recognize the terrorist group’s to the next. Recruiters are advised organizational vulnerabilities. Al- to tally their recruit’s score on end- of-stage questionnaires (which are provided) to determine whether or not 11 James Kitfield, “How I Learned Not To Fear The Bomb: recruitment should continue. To make The Rand Corp.’s Brian Michael Jenkins on Facing the decisions even easier for recruiters who Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” The National Journal, Oc- 12 Or influence another group that shares its ideology to lack jihadist education themselves, the tober 18, 2008. conduct a terrorist attack.

10 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 handbook provides various “Go/No Go” more common and can generally be questions. If the recruit is deficient in a approached without alerting security key area, they are unqualified to enter services. the following stage. Stage Two: Building a Relationship Abu `Amr’s recruitment process is built According to Abu `Amr, a recruiter on the concept of “Individual Da`wa.”1 should build a close, friendly This is an approach of calling a single relationship with recruits before individual to Islam, and refers to the raising political or ideological issues. person being called, not the person doing He instructs recruiters to invite recruits the calling. Conversely, “Collective for lunch, send them text messages, Da`wa” invites multiple individuals and give them gifts. Since every recruit to Islam in a public manner through requires personal attention, recruiters lectures and sermons. According to Abu are told to only target two people at `Amr, Individual Da`wa is preferable a time. According to Abu `Amr, it is because it will not draw attention from important to urge recruits to embrace security forces. Abu `Amr explains that the ritual obligations of Islam as a way an individualized, highly structured to increase their sense of obedience, recruitment process increases security writing: because it gives the recruiter ways to assess whether the recruited individual Figure 1. The front cover of the document. The issues that you will talk has accepted certain key concepts about at this stage are what before exposed to the recruiter’s true Due to the private nature of Individual we call the refining issues, intentions. If the person being recruited Da`wa, Abu `Amr argues the technique meaning that you try to remedy is not ready for the next stage, the is applicable in the West and in his passiveness and make him entire process can be cancelled without countries ruled by “apostates.” The love the path of obedience and exposing the operative. individualized approach does not mean make him perform prayers on Abu `Amr is not ambitious; he boldly time, but nothing more than According to Abu `Amr, Individual explains, “if the preacher can recruit this so you will not burden or Da`wa is also useful because it does one person a year and that person can rush him.5 not require the recruiter to have a recruit one person a year, then after 30 thorough knowledge of Islamic Shari`a. years the total number of the jihadists Stage Three: Faith Awakening Unlike Collective Da`wa, which is a billion.”3 In stage three, recruiters are urged to requires recruiters who are capable of awaken passive religious sentiment making legal and political arguments Stage One: Acquaintance and Selection in recruits. Recruiters are advised to sophisticated enough to sustain public Abu `Amr argues that a recruiter’s first tread carefully and avoid demanding criticism, Individual Da`wa depends job is to identify a suitable recruitment “perfection or full commitment; you on eliciting emotional responses target. He advises recruiters to select “an should progress gradually.” During this from recruits and building a personal old friend or a relative who happens to be stage, recruiters should make recruits relationship. Abu `Amr’s approach not committed to Islam. Or close to your seriously consider the pleasures of illustrates a recruitment concept called age or close to your accommodation.”4 heaven and the torment of hell. Abu al-targhib wa’l-tarhib, which is a carrot- Abu `Amr is critical of jihadists who `Amr argues that this dichotomy is a and-stick technique of extolling the only want to recruit religious people. powerful motivator, explaining that benefits of action while explaining Indeed, he warns against recruiting radicalization “normally happens the frightening costs of inaction. The “Salafists and memorizers of the to those who fear the torment of the concept was introduced in the Qur’an Qur’an” because “most Salafists hold afterlife and who come to know that and is discussed by many Islamic opinions opposing to al-Qa`ida that jihad is the salvation from eternal thinkers exploring the best way to call were fed to them by their scholars.” damnation. The result is that jihad is people to Islam (several scholars, for Likewise, Abu `Amr does not trust desired and craved.”6 example, have written books titled al-targhib memorizers of the Qur’an and believes wa’l-tarhib).2 According to Abu `Amr, that many of them are spies. He also During stage three of the program, recruiters should apply the concept warns against recruiting certain types recruiters should ensure their recruits throughout the recruitment process, but of professionals, including scientists watch videos of Usama bin Ladin emphasize the benefits of action early and military officials, because they are and Ayman al-Zawahiri and focus in the process and the costs of inaction not amenable to al-Qa`ida’s message. on identifying and fixing any of the later. Abu `Amr does not exclude recruiting recruit’s shubhat (suspicions). For religious people, but he focuses on example, Abu `Amr says that many 1 Da`wa is the act of calling individuals to Islam and is secular individuals because they are Muslims blame jihadists for provoking best understood as evangelism. both illustrations of the Prophet 2 As stated in Qur’an 21:90, “Indeed, they used to hasten 3 Abu `Amr al-Qa`idi, A Course in the Art of Recruitment, to good deeds and supplicate Us in hope and fear, and undated, p. 8, available on jihadist web forums. 5 Ibid., p. 23. they were to Us humbly submissive.” 4 Ibid., p. 20. 6 Ibid., p. 28.

11 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2

Muhammad in the Western press and Basir al-Tartusi’s “Islamic Ruling on tools for measuring the progress of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Democracy and Multiplicity of Parties.” recruits, and an interesting explanation Such shubhat, even if they reflect hatred In addition to reading these texts, Abu of how to use al-Qa`ida propaganda. of the West, are disruptive to the `Amr recommends that recruiters teach By providing these tools, Abu `Amr recruitment process. Abu `Amr urges recruits to download jihadist media and aims to use structured bureaucratic recruiters to address them immediately, correspond on web forums. In general, techniques to empower a less-educated saying, “Know my beloved brother that however, Abu `Amr’s approach to generation of jihadist recruiters to one suspicion only is enough to move jihadist media is very cautious; he expand al-Qa`ida’s reach. In doing so, people off the road, particularly in the urges recruiters to only show recruits Abu `Amr also bridges the gap between beginning.” videos when they are in a contemplative al-Qa`ida’s bureaucratic organizations mood and are willing to internalize the in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Abu `Amr is particularly concerned political message of the propaganda. decentralized global jihadist social about shubhat related to the rulers of movement. Most al-Qa`ida handbooks Islamic states, and refers to Ibn Abbas’ Abu `Amr is adamant that recruits for the decentralized jihadist movement argument that “there is a Kufr that is less accept jihadist ideological doctrine are technical and focus on issues such as than another Kufr.”7 Ibn Abbas argued in its entirety, and eschew all other weapons or online security. Abu `Amr’s that a ruler who does not apply Shari`a interpretations of Islamic concepts. He handbook is important because it tries should not be considered an infidel—and argues that doubts and confusion of to bring the organizational efficiencies therefore should remain immune from any kind are disastrous to the effective of bureaucracy to individual jihadists attack—if he applies different rules out radicalization of a recruit. Abu `Amr everywhere. of ignorance or if he believes in his heart is particularly concerned that new that the Islamic Shari`a is the right jihadists will be dismayed if their Abu `Amr’s strict methodology reflects path yet does not know how to apply it fellow fighters commit illegitimate acts, the long-standing struggle of jihadists correctly. Ibn Abbas’ concept directly which presumably refers to the killing to operate securely but effectively, using contradicts Ibn Taymiyya’s more of Muslims in places such as Iraq and relatively unskilled people. Abu `Amr’s expansive understanding of takfiriyya— Algeria. To allay this problem, he entire concept of recruitment is founded denouncing a Muslim, including the explains that recruits must understand on the idea that recruiters—not just ruler of a state, as an infidel—that is that their only true relationship is with recruits—will have limited knowledge popular with jihadists. God; fighters should maintain their of jihadist ideological concepts, and relationships with flawed jihadists therefore need a highly structured Stage Four: Implanting Jihadist Concepts but focus on their personal religious program to walk them through the The purpose of stage four is to instill commitment rather than worldly recruitment process. Even though that jihadist interpretations of traditional concerns. program is designed to be applied in Islamic concepts in recruits. Abu secret, Abu `Amr’s rigorous evaluation `Amr highlights five concepts that are Stage Five: Formation of a Cell mechanisms will inevitably create a particularly important: Forming a cell is the fifth and final stage signature that less methodological of Abu `Amr’s recruitment course. The recruitment approaches might not. 1. Adherence to the book (Qur’an) and the fifth stage begins when the recruiter is Cautious recruiters will take care to sunna. convinced that a recruit has accepted minimize their risk of discovery, but 2. The religious duty of jihad and the the principles of jihadist ideology and in the real world not all of Abu `Amr’s necessity to be prepared. truly desires violent jihad. Abu `Amr recruiters will be so cautious. Abu 3. The acceptability of takfiriyya. argues that these newly radicalized `Amr’s program is a dangerous tool 4. Democracy is a religion and participation recruits are ready to read Abu Mus`ab that may empower unskilled jihadist in elections is unacceptable. al-Suri’s book The Global Islamic Resistance recruiters, but like all such innovations, 5. The concept of al-wala’ wa’l-bara’ (loyalty Call and suggests that al-Suri’s concept it is also a double-edged sword. and disavowal). of decentralized “individual jihad” is appropriate for the current struggle. Brian Fishman is the Director of Research Abu `Amr understands that the average Recruiters are to urge recruits to wage at the Combating Terrorism Center at recruiter will not be a theologian. jihad in their home country, but to West Point. He has published in the Rather than master complex ideological expect that recruits may be unwilling Washington Quarterly, the Annals of the arguments themselves, recruiters to do so and will be more interested American Academy of Political and Social are urged to instruct recruits to use in traveling to Iraq or Afghanistan. Science, and numerous edited volumes. classic jihadist texts to explain and Abu `Amr explains that recruits are Mr. Fishman co-authored the CTC reports substantiate critical ideas. Among emotionally drawn to high-profile Al-Qa`ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: others, Abu `Amr recommends several jihads and must be convinced that it is A First Look at the Sinjar Records and classic jihadist writings, including religiously legitimate and strategically Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and `Abdullah `Azzam’s “Liberation of wise to fight at home. “Other Means.” He sits on the editorial Muslim Lands,” the biography of Abu’l- board of the CTC Sentinel. Walid al-Ansari, the fatwa of Shaykh al- Conclusion Shaykh on illegitimate rulers, and Abu Abu `Amr’s greatest innovations are Abdullah Warius is an Arabic linguist and the detailed methodology he provides a consultant for the Combating Terrorism 7 Ibid., p. 37. lay-recruiters, the provision of specific Center at West Point.

12 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2

are stigmatized as sources of division cleric ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq Deconstructing Salafism in and corruption by al-Wadi`i’s followers. and Syrian Muhammad Surur Zayn al- Yemen Apolitical Salafists typically condemn ‘Abidin—for upsurges of violence. They violence and terrorist operations also considered al-Qa`ida an anomaly. By Laurent Bonnefoy targeting civilians. In fact, al-Wadi`i was highly critical of the jihadist In such a context, the wide spectrum of in the middle east, Salafism has gained strategy at the global level as well as Salafists in Yemen was eager to stress prominence during the last two decades. inside Yemen from the early 1990s the fact that it would not endorse violent This is especially true in countries such onward. During that time, he accused strategies against the state or its allies. as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia where Usama bin Ladin, who was then trying Abu’l-Hasan al-Ma’ribi, the leader of a a political version of Salafism, often to launch new wars after Afghanistan, dissident Salafist fringe and writer of labeled sahwa, emerged as a significant of preferring to invest in weapons rather an anti-terrorism manifesto,8 along with social movement.1 In Yemen, however, than in mosques. He even apparently his rival, Yahya al-Hajuri, supported the main Salafist trend is characterized botched some of Bin Ladin’s planned Yemeni President `Ali `Abdullah by an apparently apolitical stance. It operations against the socialist elites of Salih’s reelection for a new term during was developed by Muqbil bin Hadi al- South Yemen.4 the 2006 presidential ballot. A few years Wadi`i in the early 1980s around the before, Muhammad al-Imam, probably Dar al-Hadith institute in the small While bridges between apolitical the most charismatic heir of al-Wadi`i, town of Dammaj in Sa`da Province. Salafists (or “purists,” as Quintan had delivered a speech at a conference Al-Wadi`i was a cleric educated in Wiktorowicz describes them5) and in 2003 indirectly condemning jihad in the 1960s and 1970s at various Saudi armed movements may exist, its frequent Iraq against the U.S.-led occupation.9 religious institutions (including the association with jihadist groups or its He claimed that in order to be legitimate, famous Islamic University of Medina) depiction as the antechamber of terrorism jihad had to be endorsed by the Yemeni and maintained ambiguous links with can be misleading. By focusing on the government, which as a new ally of that country’s rulers and religious elites issue of violence, this article intends to the United States in the “global war until his death in July 2001.2 Rapidly, show how the Salafist doctrine is often on terrorism” would obviously not do. Dar al-Hadith expanded and educated flexible and reinterpreted by clerics and Such an assertion considered Yemenis thousands of students coming from activists. leaving for Iraq as illegitimate fighters. Yemen and abroad; other institutes spawned in other regions of the country. Yemen’s Salafists as Allies of Government? Through these steps, Salafists Theoretically, the main features of that In the post-9/11 period and after al- undoubtedly transformed themselves version of Salafism include a claim of Wadi`i’s death, condemnation of into allies of the Yemeni government loyalty to the political ruler (amir, king violence became a way for Yemen’s in a matter that was reminiscent of the or president) even when that ruler is Salafist movement to legitimize its Saudi religious authority’s capacity to corrupt and unjust, as well as a will to position in a precarious context. Such endorse its state’s policies and decisions transcend local and national contexts a condemnation was obviously not in all circumstances. Despite their by delivering a universal message based new but grew more explicit as state conservative and radical interpretation exclusively on the Qur’an and the hadith. repression became a possibility.6 of Islamic jurisprudence, the Salafists These Yemeni Salafists aim to preserve Saudi sources condemning terrorism appeared as advocates of loyalty or Muslims from strife by not engaging in written by clerics close to the official even moderation and as actors able to politics, nor participating in elections, religious establishment became more efficiently delegitimize violent strategies demonstrations, or revolutions. Yet, and more popular inside of Yemen.7 through theological arguments. they believe they can play a role in Essentially, these sources blamed the orienting state policies through advice politicized Islamist groups such as the Potential for Violence Remains given in private to the ruler. Muslim Brotherhood and some political This image, however, is incomplete, Salafists—including famous Kuwaiti and it obscures many of the practical Such positions clearly distinguish inconsistencies of the Salafist movement Yemeni Salafism from other Islamist 4 On al-Wadi`i’s criticism of Usama bin Ladin, see in Yemen. Deeds might at times appear trends and figures—including radical Muqbil al-Wadi`i, Tuhfat al-mujib ‘ala as’ilat al-hadar wa to directly contradict the peaceful and Muslim Brotherhood-associated figures al-gharib (Sana`a: Dar al-Athar, 2005), p. 281. Also see apolitical doctrine. In parallel to such 3 such as ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani —who Brynjar Lia, “Destructive Doctrinarians”: Abu Musab al-Su- condemnations of violence, Salafist at least formally endorse elections and ri’s Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current (Kjeller: Nor- individuals have supported actions wegian Defence Research Establishment, 2007), p. 4. against various other political and 10 5 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Move- religious groups, including socialists 1 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic ment,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 9:3 (2006): pp. Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge: Cambridge 207-239. 8 Abu’l-Hasan al-Ma’ribi, Al-tafjirat wa al-ightiyalat : al- University Press, 2007). 6 “Zawjat Bin Ladin ta‘ud ila al-Yaman ma‘a ‘asharat asbab, al-athar, al-‘ilaj (Riyadh: Dar al-Fadila, 2004), p. 2 Laurent Bonnefoy, “Salafism in Yemen: A Saudisa- min ‘anasir al-Qa‘ida,” al-Quds al-Arabi, December 29, 295. tion?” in Madawi al-Rasheed ed., Kingdom without Bor- 2001. 9 Muhammad al-Imam, “Hay ‘ala al-Jihad… lakin,” re- ders: Saudi Arabia’s Political, Religious and Media Frontiers 7 Zayd Bin Muhammad al-Madkhali, Al-Irhab wa athar- corded conference, 2003. (London: Hurst, 2008), pp. 245-262. uhu al-sayyi’ ‘alâ al-afrad wa al-umam (Cairo: Dar al-Min- 10 Muhammad al-Imam, Al-Hizb al-Ishtiraki fi rubu‘ qarn 3 Gregory Johnsen, “Profile of Sheikh Abd al-Majid al- haj, 2003), p. 128. (Sana`a: Dar al-Athar, 2008), p. 32. Zindani,” Terrorism Monitor 4:7 (2006): pp. 3-6.

13 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 and Sufis.11 is confronted to his earlier criticism of he asked God to destroy America by Muslim Brotherhood Yemeni clerics, sending “a heroic nation like the people The brutal rebellion in Sa`da between such as ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Daylami of Afghanistan who destroyed Russia,” the national army and a group of Zaydi who labeled the 1994 war against the yet he denies being a terrorist, claiming revivalists12 headed by Husayn al- socialist-led secession a holy war. For he “is even incapable of shooting a gun Huthi and then his kin since June 2004 al-Wadi`i, this was not the case, as correctly.” Furthermore, in the same emerged as another way for the Salafists labeling the war in this way would cause conference he said the Salafists “are to portray themselves as companions of Muslim civilian casualties. currently preparing the people to fight the government. It also highlighted the America through jihad” and recalled Salafists’ potential for violence. Indeed, Although September 11, 2001 and other how “America corrupted the nations Salafists actively participate in the operations were generally considered by supporting the governments and the stigmatization of Zaydi identity. Their illegitimate and wrong since they tribes but never the Salafis.”16 Rather propaganda often associates Zaydism had, in retaliation, fostered further than a double standard discourse, these to Iran and to a global Shi`a conspiracy casualties and war in the Muslim variations are better understood as ways that seeks to divert the Muslim world.13 of dealing with potential repression by In March 2007, two foreign students of not appearing as dangerous proponents the main Salafist center, Dar al-Hadith “These variations are of overt violence, while at the same time in Dammaj, were killed, supposedly better understood as showing the movement’s independence in combat against Zaydi groups in the of speech in order not to lose its wider framework of the war against the ways of dealing with legitimacy among activists. “Huthis.”14 These killings confirmed the potential repression by not rumors that Salafist groups assisted the Conclusion Yemeni army in the war. appearing as dangerous The ambiguous positions expressed proponents of overt by Yemeni Salafist clerics would tend From a more global perspective, the to suggest that apolitical Salafists positions defended by many Salafist violence, while at the and jihadist groups only diverge in clerics regarding the issue of jihad same time showing the matters of strategy. Consequently, outside of their country (or more apolitical Salafism (such as the one precisely outside of the Arab world) movement’s independence forged by al-Wadi`i and his successors) also show that both apoliticism and of speech in order not to would, according to this argument, be pacifism are not automatic options considered the antechamber of terrorism and that positions have been shifting. lose its legitimacy among or its ideological roots. While not A clear example of internal practical activists.” systematically incorrect (John Walker contradictions appeared when al- Lindh, the famous “American Taliban,” Wadi`i’s endorsement of jihad in the allegedly spent time in al-Wadi`i’s Molucca Indonesian Islands in 200015 institute in Dammaj before leaving for world, the condemnation of violence Pakistan17), such an interpretation is 11 Alexander Knysh, “Contextualizing the Salafi-Sufi targeting Western interests is not biased. Indeed, it misinterprets the Conflict (from the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt),” systematic. In fact, the principle of profile of most jihadist militants in Middle Eastern Studies 43:3 (2007): pp. 503-530. Also see confrontation between the West and Yemen as they in fact seldom have a Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim. Genealogy and Mobility the Muslim world is usually something strong religious background and do across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California that is acknowledged and supported. not use the apolitical Salafist clerics as 18 Press, 2006), p. 5. Nevertheless, in the dominant apolitical legitimizing sources for their actions. 12 Zaydism is a branch of Shi’ism present in the Yemen Salafists’ perspective, use of violence is Drawing a genealogy of violence highlands. The elites of this religious sect, which claimed considered counterproductive: Muslims through the writings of Salafist clerics to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (the sayy- are first of all not ready to fight as they is therefore insufficient as it often ids), ruled, under the authority of the imam, over parts are too weak and divided, and Muslim means overlooking the environment in or the whole of Yemeni territory for more than a millen- governments have not raised “the which these ideas are either produced nium, until the 1962 Republican Revolution. Since then, banner of jihad,” so fighting would only or reinterpreted. For example, the case Zaydism has been in crisis and has experienced impor- cause turmoil. In that context, while for loyalty is only bearable as long as tant theological and political evolutions, some of which the general objective of targeting a the Salafists are not themselves the blunted the main features that distinguished it from Sun- dominant West might be supported, it main victims of authoritarianism and nism. can only be attained in the long run; all 13 For examples of such stigmatization, see “Al-judhur current attempts are then bound to fail 16 Muqbil al-Wadi`i, “Jawâhir al-sunniya fî al-as’ilat al- al-fikriyya lil-fitna al-Huthiyya,”al-Muntada , April 2005 and as such are negative. faransiyya,” recorded conference, 1996. or Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Mahdi, Al-Zaydiyya fi 17 François Burgat and Muhammad Sbitli, “Les salafis al-Yaman: Hiwar Maftuh (Sana`a: Markaz al-Kalima al- In various instances, al-Wadi`i showed au Yémen ou…la modernisation malgré tout,” Chroniques Tayiba, 2008), p. 98. an anti-imperialist rhetoric not very yéménites, 2003, p. 143. 14 “Al-Huthiyun yuhaimun ma‘had Dammaj al-salafi,” different from that of al-Qa`ida-type 18 See, for example, Sa‘id ‘Ubayd al-Jamhi, Al-Qa‘ida fi al-Taghiyir, March 26, 2007. groups. In a 1996 conference, for example, al-Yaman (Sana`a: Maktabat al-Hadara, 2008), p. 424; 15 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and Mustafa Badi al-Lawjri, “Afghanistan: Ihtilal al-Dhaki- the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2006), p. 115. ra,” undated, p. 218.

14 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 indistinct criminalization. That is New Government in in 2007. In July of that year, the Thai precisely what al-Wadi`i meant when army chief, General Anupong Paojinda, he said: Thailand Struggles to launched his own “surge” in order to Defeat the Insurgency suppress the violence. Following the If I am censored, there will be drafting of a new constitution and the strong reactions…That is why I By Zachary Abuza restoration of democracy in December advise the government not to do it. 2007, a government comprised of You were courageous when people since the september 2006 coup in Thaksin’s former Thai Rak Thai Party abroad accused you of harboring Thailand, attention has been focused on emerged under Samak Sundaravej, re- terrorists and you answered the country’s rapid political turnover branded as the People’s Power Party “No, we only have `ulama’ that and instability. Yet the Malay-Muslim (PPP). Fearful of another coup, Samak teach the Qur’an and the sunna.” insurgency in the country’s three and his successor, Somchai Wongsawat, My brothers, I tell you, if the southern-most provinces of Pattani, had a completely hands off policy in government was intelligent, it Yala, and Narathiwat has continued the south, letting the military have full would leave us alone.19 unabated. The new government in control. Both offered no resistance to not Bangkok has stated that resolving the only the military’s massive budgetary As such, state repression and torture are insurgency is one of its top priorities, expenditures, but two waves of major probably more efficient incentives for and it has spoken of the need for weapons acquisitions, the vast majority violence than any given doctrine. As a reconciliation and social justice. The of which having little to no value in fugitive militant accused of involvement insurgents, unconcerned about who is in combating an insurgency.1 With no in various attacks (including the one power in Bangkok, have continued their civilian oversight, the Royal Thai Army on the U.S. Embassy on September 17, campaign of violence with no end in escalated their counterinsurgency 2008) asserted in a press interview, sight. This article addresses Thailand’s efforts, but at a tremendous cost to “The operations that are happening in political turnover, provides an analysis human rights, including the alleged Yemen are reactions from young people of the violence in the south, and finally systematic use of torture on detainees.2 tyrannized by torture in the prisons.”20 offers a review of new policies that the While these words should be interpreted government has initiated to quell the When Abhisit came to power in cautiously, they nevertheless show insurgency. December 2008, he quickly announced how the general political context plays that resolving the insurgency, now a fundamental role. It is largely this Political Turnover entering its fifth year, was a top priority context that will most often determine On December 15, 2008, the Thai for his government. He pledged to whether the Salafists, from the apolitical Parliament elected a new prime minister, overhaul the administrative structure starting point, will be violent or will Abhisit Vejjajiva, the fourth person to and streamline the chain of command stick to the principle of strict loyalty hold the post in a year. The backroom in the south. Unconcerned about the to the state, or possibly start playing dealings, combined with the actions of a possibility of a coup since he had a more overtly political and inclusive pro-monarchy and activist judiciary, as the full backing of the military and game. well as the support of the military and monarchy, ended a political stalemate 1 The Royal Thai Army rewarded itself with a significant Dr. Laurent Bonnefoy is a CNRS/ANR post- that has hobbled Thailand since budget increase following the September 2006 coup. In doctoral fellow at the Institut de Recherches February 2006. Yet, in the three years of December 2006, it announced major arms purchases et d’Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman elite political machinations in Bangkok, worth Bt7.7 billion. The purchases included Swedish (IREMAM – University of Provence, there was little attention paid to the Gripen jet fighters, Ukrainian armored personnel carri- France). A specialist of religious movements insurgency that has plagued Thailand’s ers, Chinese surface-to-surface missiles, and submarines, in the Arabian Peninsula, he is currently three majority Muslim provinces of hardly the weapons systems needed to combat an insur- conducting more fieldwork in Yemen and has Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat since gency. This was followed with a second wave of arms written various academic articles in French January 2004. The insurgency has left purchases worth $191.3 million in September 2008. This and English on Salafism and on the political more than 3,500 people killed and twice round included a Singaporean built amphibious frigate, effects of the “Global War on Terror” in that number wounded. It has led to a Russian anti-aircraft missiles, as well as Israeli arms. In Southern Arabia. breakdown of social services, law and January 2009, the RTA announced another wave of arms order, and the de facto ethnic cleansing imports, although these purchases are more oriented for of Siamese Buddhists from much counterinsurgency. They include six Russian-made Mi- of the countryside. Large swaths of 17 helicopters, nearly 100 South African-made armored southern Thailand have been, in effect, personnel carriers, and 80 Ukrainian APCs and assault ungoverned territory. rifles. “Cabinet Nod for B7.7bn to Buy Arms, Equip- ment,” Bangkok Post, September 26, 2007; Patrick Winn, The September 2006 coup that ousted “Thailand Plans $191.3M Arms Purchase,” Defense News, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra September 12, 2008; and Patrick Winn, “Muslim Insur- was an opportunity to reverse the gency Triggers Thai Military Spending Blitz: Military 19 Muqbil al-Wadi`i, “Hadhihi al sururiyya,” recorded insurgency’s gains. While interim Prime Shores Up Attack Helicopters, APCs and Assault Rifles,” conference, undated. Minister Surayud Chulanont committed Defense News, February 2009. 20 “Interview of Hamza ‘Ali al-Dabyani,” al-Nahar, De- inordinate time and resources to quelling 2 Amnesty International, “Thailand: Torture In The cember 4, 2008. the insurgency, violence actually peaked Southern Counter-Insurgency,” January 13, 2009.

15 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 monarchy, he pledged to implement that since January 2004 the government police, seven soldiers, three rangers, greater civilian oversight. Abhisit spoke has spent more than Bt109 billion ($3.1 seven village defense volunteers and of the Democrat Party’s deep ties to the billion) to quell the violence, and predicts 42 civilians. The attacks include the south, their traditional stronghold. that the government may have to spend beheadings of two rangers, the 27th and He reiterated the failed pledges of the three times that amount annually over 28th decapitations in the past five years. Surayud regime to engage in samanchan, the next five to ten years.5 Since mid-December, 97 people have or reconciliation. “My basic assumption been wounded, including 15 police, 44 is that you will never have reconciliation Thai officials do not consider the fact that soldiers and five rangers. Twenty-four unless there is justice,” he said before violence is down simply because much bombs were detonated and seven more his one-day trip there in mid-January. of what the militants sought to achieve bombs either failed to go off or were “The same principle applies to the in the early stages was accomplished. defused.7 As one policeman noted, “The south.”3 This does not bode well for the More than 20% of the region’s 300,000 killing sprees in Yala have been less south and suggests that little progress frequent since last year, but there have will be made under the leadership of been more victims in each incident.”8 the Democrats in the coming years; “The insurgents are clearly While the rate of more than one death they still fail to see the insurgency capable of escalating the and two wounded per day is not for what it is, not acknowledging the exorbitantly high, it is unsustainable. goals of the insurgents to establish an rate of violence, but have The rate is near the 2006 average, when independent Islamic state. In five years, calculated the ‘right’ the violence started to spiral out of the insurgents have refused to negotiate control. The rate is unlikely to go down or even enter into talks with the amount to achieve their because Thai security forces continue to government; for them, there is nothing short-term goals: drive be deployed statically. to reconcile. away Buddhists, make the Most of the killings have been shootings. Analysis of the Violence region ungovernable, and While the militants in this period have Violence in 2008 was down considerably not arsoned schools or attacked economic from the peak in 2007. According eliminate political rivals targets such as cell phone towers, or to the Thai Journalists Association, while developing a parallel gone after Buddhist clergy as they have there were 1,056 violent incidents in in the past, this is not uncommon. When which 546 people were killed and 1,075 authority structure in the one analyzes the violence during the wounded, 47% lower than the 2007 villages.” five-year period, attacks on different figure (1,056 killed and 1,992 wounded). targets come in waves, often in response There was an annual average of 1,956 to government countermeasures and violent incidents between 2004-2008. defensive positions. Civilians comprised 77% of the dead, Buddhists have fled, while countless the remainder government officials and more have evacuated their farms to the Review of Government’s New Policies security forces. Of the 1,056 violent safety of the cities.6 Since early 2004, Upon taking office, Abhisit announced incidents in 2008, 741 of them were the militants have killed hundreds of that his administration would embark gun attacks, 218 bombing attacks, 37 suspected government informants, on new policies as well as streamlined arson cases, 35 cases of attacks on state and there is little military presence coordination. He announced that the property and a number of uncategorized in the villages. It is hard to imagine existing Southern Border Provinces incidents.4 Security officials cited the that the government has already Administrative Committee9 would be dramatic decrease in violence as signs recruited replacements. Finally, many “stepped up” without elaborating how or of their improved counterinsurgency government officials and services have what its new powers and resources would efforts as well as the weakening of the evacuated the villages, supplanted by be.10 He then announced the formation of militants. Yet the Thai government failed shadow government and services run a special panel of ministers for the deep to acknowledge the secessionist aims by the militants. With so many of their south, comprised of 16 cabinet members or Islamist ideology of the insurgents, goals accomplished, violence simply naively contending that the insurgency does not have to be at the same level. 7 These figures are based on daily press reports. was solely about social justice. 8 “Thailand: Four Die in Insurgent Attack,” Associated If Abhisit thought that the militants Press, January 25, 2009. Furthermore, despite the lack of would simply reduce their operations 9 The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Com- attention to resolving the conflict by and give his administration a chance mittee is a joint task force comprised of civilian adminis- the country’s leaders, it remains a drain to implement new policies, he was trators, police and army, established in the early 1990s on the government’s coffers. A leading mistaken. In the first 60 days since to administer the south. Then Prime Minister Thaksin scholar of the insurgency, Professor taking power on December 15, 2008, 64 Shinawatra dismantled the agency in 2002, declaring Srisomphob Jitrphiromsri, has argued people have been killed, including five that the insurgency had been quelled. The interim gov- ernment of Surayud Chulanont, installed after the Sep- 3 “Thai PM Launches Review of Emergency Law in 5 Don Pathan and Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Insurgency tember 2006 coup, reestablished the SBPAC in January South,” The Nation, January 15, 2009. Taking a Huge Toll,” The Nation, January 19, 2009. 2007. 4 Veera Prateepchaikul, “Situation Improves in Deep 6 “Deep South Violence Claims 3,195 Lives,” The Nation, 10 Waedao Harai, “New Agency Proposed to Tackle In- South,” Bangkok Post, January 22, 2009. December 29, 2008. surgency,” Bangkok Post, January 7, 2009.

16 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 and two representatives of the National infuriating the military.14 While part which they do not prioritize.18 The Economic and Social Development Board of the problem is the inability or lack establishment of these courts could and the Budget Bureau. It is hard to see of capacity of the police to acquire go a long way to curbing some of the how this new council will bring change: sufficient forensic evidence, the reality egregious human rights abuses by ministers of line agencies already had is that much of the violence is either security forces borne out of frustration purview over the southern provinces; unseen or witnesses are unwilling to with the current judiciary. At the same the south has just never been a priority cooperate with authorities. time, there is increasing pressure on the for them. In both these moves, the government to end the security forces’ prime minister said that the new groups The current detention policies have led blanket immunity. would “not duplicate the tasks of the to two other human rights concerns. Internal Security Operations Command On January 13, 2009, Amnesty Conclusion (ISOC) Region 4,”11 which means the International released a blistering While Abhisit has pledged to resolve the military remains firmly in charge, with report about the systematic use of conflict in the south and to demilitarize negligibly more civilian oversight. torture by the Thai army, citing the counterinsurgency strategy, it is cases of 34 detainees. Abhisit rejected unlikely that he will gain much traction. In terms of policies, Abhisit articulated accusations of “systematic” torture, The south remains an intelligence “less military-focused strategies,” stating, “I want to reassure you that it’s failure: few leaders of the insurgency explaining that “it makes no sense to be not government policy and it was not have been arrested, and the shadowy running the provinces under continuous carried out systematically. The Thai coalition of militant organizations (the application of the emergency decree. government does not support extra- BRN-C, GMIP, New PULO, among At the moment, we have actually also judicial power.”15 Muslims in the south others) remain intact. Most suspected martial law there. We also have the have decried the blanket immunity for insurgents who are captured are soon new security law. We should be aiming security forces that has led to egregious released, and the government has lost at lifting these special laws.”12 Yet on human rights abuses. There have been the support of the local population due January 20, the cabinet voted to extend a handful of cases in which the blanket to security force impunity, their failure the emergency decree for another three immunity has been lifted. On December to provide security—despite the fact that months, the 14th consecutive extension 25, 2008, for example, an inquest ruled almost 45% of the armed forces are based since October 2005. that soldiers tortured to death an imam in the south19—and the gradual erosion in their custody, Yapa Kaseng, in March of social services. Insurgent documents If Abhisit wants to make his imprint on 2007.16 have laid out a long-term strategy to the insurgency, there is no better place achieve their goal of an independent for him to begin than with a review of the The security forces’ frustration at the state, and make clear they see themselves detainee policy and the judicial process. court’s inability or unwillingness to in the early stages.20 The insurgents are The existing process has not only failed, convict and sentence detainees may be clearly capable of escalating the rate but has led to serious recriminations and responsible in part for a wave of alleged of violence, but have calculated the a breakdown in cooperation between the extrajudicial killings. For example, on “right” amount to achieve their short- military, police and courts. Under the January 30, 2009, a religious teacher term goals: drive away Buddhists, make existing Emergency Decree, suspects who had been previously detained by the region ungovernable, and eliminate can be detained for 30 days without security forces but acquitted by the political rivals while developing a trial, after which formal charges must courts due to a lack of evidence was shot parallel authority structure in the be brought against them or they must dead in front of a mosque in Pattani, villages. Abhisit continues to talk be released. Detentions surged in 2007, provoking outrage in the Muslim about reconciliation and social justice, but police often failed to build cases community, which blamed the security but until Thai security forces begin to against the suspects. The army tried to forces for the murder.17 gain the upper hand and dismantle the extend detentions through an initiative insurgent networks, the insurgents of involuntary vocational training To that end, several Thai officials have have little reason to reconcile. programs, but that was quickly struck called for the establishment of security down by the court. Some 1,544 suspects courts to expedite the judicial process. Dr. Zachary Abuza is Professor of Political have been arrested between January They argue that the eight courts in the Science and International Relations at 2004 and December 2008, yet the courts three provinces are not only overtaxed Simmons College, Boston. His forthcoming have only made rulings on 153 cases and understaffed, but are also ill- book on the Thai insurgency, Conspiracy of (10%).13 Charges have been dropped equipped to deal with security cases, Silence, will be published by U.S. Institute of on more than 70% of the detainees, Peace Press in mid-2009.

11 “Panel of Ministers to Oversee Far South,” Bangkok 14 Ibid. Based on personal interviews conducted in Post, January 17, 2009. 2007-2008, this number could be more than 90%. 18 Achara Ashayagachat and Muhammad Ayub Pathan, 12 Ambika Ahuja, “Thai PM Praises Obama’s ‘Politics of 15 “Abhisit Rejects Torture Claim,” Agence France- “Judges Say Region Needs Special Courts,” Bangkok Post, Hope,’” Associated Press, January 21, 2009. Presse, January 15, 2009. February 6, 2009. 13 Of them, 15 were sentenced to death. Some 33 others 16 “Amnesty Alleges 4 Tortured to Death in Thailand,” 19 “Thai PM Launches Review of Emergency Law in have received life imprisonment and 107 convicts were International Herald Tribune, January 13, 2009. South,” The Nation, January 15, 2009. given a 10-year jail term. “Deep South Violence Claims 17 “Imam Shot Dead in Front of His Mosque in Pattani,” 20 Some of these documents will be published in the au- 3,195 Lives,” The Nation, December 29, 2008. The Nation, January 31, 2009. thor’s forthcoming book, Conspiracy of Silence.

17 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2

In addition to these three LLOs, the With the new council president in After Action Report: COIN task force we were in direct support charge, we shifted our focus on building Operations in Rutbah, Iraq of worked across the security and cohesion between the city council, communication LLOs. FM 3-24/MCWP mayor and city department Directorate By Lieutenant Dan Alldridge, U.S. Marine Corps 3-33.5 notes that during this stage “the Generals (DGs). The only way to make host nation increases its legitimacy progress in the city was for these three in january 2008, as a lieutenant in 2d through providing security, expanding entities to cooperate with one another. Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Marine effective government, providing By developing appropriate city council Division, I was deployed as part of a essential services, and achieving sub-committees to partner with specific Provisional Civil Affairs Group attached incremental success in meeting public DGs, we were able to ensure weekly to Regimental Combat Team-5. Upon expectations.” interaction between the two. On top receipt of the mission, I was assigned of keeping the council informed, the a team and an Area of Operations Finally, the third stage is the battle DGs were also able to request support (AO) that consisted of 10 Marines and handover of the LLOs. FM 3-24/MCWP from the council on future projects the city of Rutbah in western Anbar 3-33.5 states that the goal “is to transition and funding requirements. Just as Province in Iraq. I turned immediately responsibility for COIN operations to with all our work so far, there were a to the Army and Marine Corps’ 2006 HN leadership.” According to FM 3-24/ few speed bumps. A fair amount of the counterinsurgency manual, Field MCWP 3-33.5, as separate LLOs move DGs knew little about the departments Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24)/ Marine Corps toward a state of relative functionality, of which they were in charge. This is Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 (MCWP the counterinsurgency must move in part due to appointments by past 3-33.5). into a more “supporting role.” It is officials based on familial and tribal ties through these latter two stages and the verse professional advancement in the This article first outlines key stages of a LLOs that this article will address the particular field. With these open lines CounterInsurgency (COIN) fight as laid accomplishments, shortcomings, and of communication, however, we were out in FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5. From this difficulties in my team’s COIN fight. able to make informed decisions on the foundation, the article focuses on my type of projects we would be completing actions to execute counterinsurgency Governance in the city. operations through each stage in Rutbah. The goal of stage one had already been The concluding section offers some met when we arrived, allowing us to Project development with the city critiques and realities that influenced focus on building and developing the council and DGs became a significant my work through the deployment. My local government. As we began work focus of my team’s tour. With the use of experience is limited to 2008 and 2009 in Rutbah, we were already falling in a projects sub-committee, we were able within Rutbah, but hopefully the lessons on an established local government; to establish a project flow that facilitated learned by my team will be utilized there was an elected mayor and all city communication between all levels of the by future civil affairs teams deployed council member seats were filled. Our local and provincial government. Before throughout the Middle East. immediate focus was on finding the any project was proposed to my team, key leaders that would help progress it had already been through the local Counterinsurgency the city along. We were able to identify project submission process. Between the FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 outlines three several individuals that became vital local DG and city council, a project idea stages of a counterinsurgency operation. to our success in the city. We did, would develop. From the idea, the local The goal of the first stage is to “protect however, run into those less supportive government engineers would create a the population, break the insurgents’ of our presence. These hard liners were scope of work outlining what specifically initiative and momentum, and set the only interested in progress that would the project would entail. After reviewing conditions for further engagement.” directly benefit their own personal well- the scope, the projects committee would This first stage sets the foundation for being. The biggest personnel hurdle then invite local contractors to bid on the counterinsurgency force. with which to deal was the current the project. It was at this point that my city council president, who maintained team would sit down with the projects FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 emphasizes in direct ties to the local insurgency. committee to discuss the selection of the second stage utilizing the conditions During the insurgents’ reign in the city, the contractor for that project. Once set by the first to “develop and build this individual was their puppet head approved, the projects committee would resident capability and capacity in in the local government. Our immediate be responsible for day-to-day oversight the Host Nation (HN) government and focus was to help facilitate the council of the project, with my team conducting security forces.” It is in this stage that expel him as their president. After weekly inspections to ensure payments the manual lays out Logical Lines of months of work with coalition force were warranted. Through our weekly Operation (LLOs) as a focal point: “each intelligence as well as the local Iraqi projects committee meeting, we were LLO represents a conceptual category police, we were able to bring up several able to develop projects that fit inside along which the HN government and criminal charges against the now ex- the larger government of Iraq projects COIN force commander intend to attack president. With him out of the picture, planned for the district. the insurgent strategy and establish HN the council was able to elect a new council government legitimacy.” My team’s president. Fortunately from our point of It is within this system that my team was primary focus was in the governance, view, it was one of those key individuals able to transition to the third stage of economic, and essential services LLOs. we had identified earlier in the tour. strategic oversight. The council and the

18 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2

DGs now have a process in place to cycle leadership. Conclusion projects through with minimal need for My team’s work with the local coalition force support or funding. Economics government of Rutbah has been Due to the security limitations in the extremely challenging and frustrating. Essential Services city, our influence on the local economy It would be a mistake to state that As our work with the projects committee was unfortunately mostly negative. The our work in Rutbah has beaten the continued to take shape, the primary city was and still is being controlled by insurgency. We were not able to solve focus of our projects was on providing two checkpoints that limit traffic flow all the problems that plague the city. essential services to the city. Due to in and out. This has put a strain on the Nevertheless, across our different the lack of government funding outside local economy and its ability to mature. LLOs we have been able to see small of directed projects, the local DGs The city has historically been a stopping improvements in the quality of life in did not have an ability to do work on point on the Baghdad to Damascus Rutbah. As my team worked through their own. This is where my team was highway; however, with the checkpoints the deployment, we identified targets able to greatly affect the ability of the this commerce has slowed over the years. of opportunity and engaged them as local government to provide essential Instead, the business has been pushed effectively as we could. Our work across services for its citizens. Through the to gas stations and markets just off the each LLO allowed us to accomplish city council sub-committees mentioned interstate. Over time, the security in the several objectives while setting the city above, we were able to work one on one city has progressed to a point where the up for future success. It is my hope that with local DGs. This relationship gave checkpoints are manned and controlled the conditions we have set in Rutbah the DGs control over what projects solely by the Iraqi police. will allow the local leadership to further should be funded. mature through its own capacity. Although our team was limited in the As our bond developed, so did the resources we were able to provide First Lieutenant Dan Alldridge graduated effectiveness of our projects. In one individual business owners, we from Southern Illinois University at instance, the local DG of electricity did have a significant impact on a Edwardsville with a degree in Criminal was given 33 electrical transformers government owned enterprise. Through Justice Studies and received his commission to install throughout the city. The our work with the projects committee, through OCS on August 11, 2006. After government, however, failed to we identified the city’s neglected completing The Basic School in March 2007, provide his department with all the slaughterhouse as a source of income First Lieutenant Alldridge attended the Field essential items needed to hook up the for the area. After several months Artillery Officer Basic Course at Fort Sill, transformers. Upon his request, my of work on the site and some word Oklahoma. Upon graduating from Fort Sill, team developed a project to provide of mouth advertising in the city, the he reported to 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. all necessary equipment to hook the Rutbah slaughterhouse was reopened. After only a week at 1/11, he was assigned to transformers into the local power grid. The success of the slaughterhouse is Detachment 1, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, With the transformers in place, the limited not just to economics, but it also Provisional Civil Affairs Group. From department was able to provide 80% has the added bonus of bettering public January 2008 through February 2009, he of the population with access to the health by taking the slaughtering off the served as a civil affairs team leader in support national power grid, compared with streets. of seven different battalion task forces under the 50% prior to the new transformer RCT-5 and RCT-8 in Rutbah, Iraq and later installation. It was only through this Recent attempts at economic growth in Ninawa Province. Upon completion of the joint effort that we were able to see our have been through the use of micro tour with Detachment 1, First Lieutenant projects have the greatest impact on the grants in the city to help stimulate the Alldridge returned to 2d Battalion, 11th city. economy. These grants are given to Marines and was assigned to G Battery. local business owners that have been This close relationship also facilitated identified as a trusted friend of the city. my team’s transparency in the process. Due to our short duration and experience By allowing the local DG to inspect and with the grants, it is hard to assess how control the work, the public saw its own they will affect the city in the long run. officials out in the city. Building the Currently, they have been a resource rapport between government officials to immediately reopen a business and and citizens was extremely important provide employment opportunities. in a city that has been plagued with corrupt leaders. By taking a coalition With the improved security and more face off the project, we were able to reliable essential services, conditions avoid the “save the day” label with the have been set in the city for economic local populous. growth. It will be up to the local entrepreneurs and business owners to Although not all essential services exploit these conditions for continued are fully functioning, the work with expansion. the local DGs has allowed the primary responsibility of providing services to shift from coalition forces to the local

19 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2

Recent Highlights in Almrei will remain on house arrest January 4, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): until authorities decide whether or not An Australian soldier was killed Terrorist Activity he can be deported. – UPI, January 3 by a Taliban rocket attack in Uruzgan Province. – AP, January 5 January 1, 2009 (IRAQ): The U.S. January 2, 2009 (IRAQ): At least 23 military formally handed control of people were killed after a suicide January 4, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Baghdad’s “Green Zone” to the Iraqi bomber struck a predominately Sunni suicide bomber killed six people in Dera government. – CNN, January 1 Arab tribal meeting in al-Yusufiyya Ismail Khan in the North-West Frontier near Baghdad. One of the reasons for Province. According to reports, a January 1, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): the Quaraghuli tribal gathering was for small bomb went off near a café, and Taliban insurgents attempted to attack a the tribe’s Shi`a minority and Sunni 10 minutes later the suicide bomber joint base of Afghan and U.S.-led troops majority to reconcile their differences. targeted police and others who flocked in Helmand Province. Three insurgents They also had gathered together to to the scene of the initial blast. – UPI, were killed. – Reuters, January 2 discuss candidates in the upcoming January 4 provincial elections. The bomber was a January 1, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): member of the tribe. – AFP, January 2; Los January 4, 2009 (THAILAND): Today An insurgent driving an explosives- Angeles Times, January 3 marked the fifth year anniversary of laden vehicle toward Canadian troops the resumption of violence in southern was shot and killed before he reached January 2, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Thailand. According to Thailand’s the target. The incident occurred in suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drone MCOT media conglomerate, which cited Shah Wali Khot district of Kandahar fired two missiles at targets in South police figures, “Since the raid on the Province. – Reuters, January 2 Waziristan Agency of the Federally army base in Narathiwat on January 4, Administered Tribal Areas. Distinct 2004 to November 2008, nearly 9,000 January 1, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): from a similar attack the previous day in insurgent attacks and more than 3,000 A suicide bomber attacked an Afghan the same agency, the latest strike killed deaths were recorded. More than 50 security force vehicle in Herat Province, an estimated four militants. – Reuters, percent of the assaults were shooting killing one person. – Reuters, January 2 January 2; RTT News, January 2 attacks.” – MCOT, January 4

January 1, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A January 2, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani January 5, 2009 (FRANCE): French suspected U.S. unmanned aerial authorities reopened the Khyber Pass, authorities placed three al-Qa`ida drone fired two missiles at separate allowing transport trucks to make their suspects on trial for plotting the 2002 targets in South Waziristan Agency way into Afghanistan to supply Western suicide bombing of a historic synagogue of the Federally Administered Tribal forces. Authorities shut down the pass in Tunisia that killed 21 people. Two Areas. An estimated three foreign for three days in an attempt to weaken suspects include German national militants were killed in the attack. U.S. the militants who have been increasingly Christian Ganczarski and Tunisian counterterrorism officials later revealed attacking transport vehicles. – Reuters, national Walid Nawar. The third suspect, that one of the dead, Usama al-Kini, was January 2 Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, who is a Kenyan national and al-Qa`ida’s chief being held at Guantanamo Bay, will be of operations in Pakistan. Al-Kini’s January 3, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani tried in absentia. Nawar was the suicide Kenyan lieutenant, Shaykh Ahmad security forces arrested Ustad Yasar, a bomber’s brother, while Ganczarski Salim Swedan, was also reportedly senior Afghan Taliban official who was converted to Islam and allegedly played killed in the strike. According to the released from prison in Afghanistan as a large role in al-Qa`ida’s European Washington Post, both al-Kini and Swedan part of a prisoner swap in 2007. Yasar network. – AFP, January 4 “were ranked among the 23 most- was apprehended in Peshawar after wanted terrorists by the FBI, with a security forces received a “tip-off” about January 5, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban bounty offering of $5 million for their his present location. – Reuters, January 3 militants in Mohmand Agency of the capture.” Al-Kini has also been accused Federally Administered Tribal Areas of organizing the failed assassination January 3, 2009 (SOMALIA): A roadside (FATA) kidnapped an 11-member peace attempt on Benazir Bhutto in October bomb killed four Ethiopian soldiers near delegation from neighboring Bajaur 2007, along with the September 16, Mogadishu. – Voice of America, January 4 Agency. The kidnapped tribal elders 2008 car bombing on the Marriott Hotel were reportedly in Mohmand to ask the in Islamabad, which killed 53 people. – January 4, 2009 (IRAQ): A female suicide Taliban to stop firing rockets into Khar, Reuters, January 2; Washington Post, January 9 bomber killed 35 people during a Shi`a the main town in Bajaur Agency. – AFP, religious procession near the Kadhimiyya January 6 January 2, 2009 (CANADA): Canadian shrine in Baghdad. – AFP, January 5 authorities released from detention January 6, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al- Syrian citizen Hassan Almrei, who January 4, 2009 (IRAQ): The U.S. Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman al- had been in custody since 2001 due government gave the Iraqi government Zawahiri released an audio statement on to suspected ties with al-Qa`ida and control of the anti-al-Qa`ida Sunni Arab Islamist web forums accusing Israel of other terrorist groups. He was the last fighters aligned with the Sons of Iraq conducting a “crusade against Islam and suspect being held without charges movement in Diyala Province. – AP, Muslims” due to its current offensive in on Canadian “security certificates.” January 4 Gaza. He vowed revenge for the deaths

20 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 of Palestinians, stating, “We will never January 9, 2009 (YEMEN): Usama bin January 13, 2009 (ISRAEL): Israeli stop until we avenge the death of all Ladin’s former driver, Salim Hamdan, military officials announced that their who are killed, injured, widowed and was released from a Yemeni prison offensive in the Gaza Strip has weakened orphaned in Palestine and throughout after serving out his sentence. A U.S. Hamas, but that the terrorist group may the Islamic world.” Al-Zawahiri also military tribunal convicted Hamdan in survive. – Washington Post, January 14 called the offensive “Obama’s gift to August 2008 for aiding al-Qa`ida; he Israel” before he takes office. – Fox News, was sentenced to five and a half years. January 13, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): January 6; ABC News, January 6 Since he had already served five years Approximately 13 prisoners—including at Guantanamo Bay by the time of the one with ties to the Abu Sayyaf Group January 6, 2009 (UNITED STATES): conviction, Hamdan was transferred to (ASG)—managed to escape from a jail According to State Department Yemen at the end of 2008. – AP, January in Patikul in the southern Philippines. Counterterrorism Coordinator Dell 10 The prisoners dug a 10-meter long Dailey, Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al- tunnel that brought them to the outside. Zawahiri have been unable to launch a January 9, 2009 (SOMALIA): A top The ASG suspect was identified as successful major terrorist operation due official in the Islamic courts movement, Magambian Sakilan, who was in jail to international anti-terrorism efforts. identified as Mohamed Abdi Gelle, for the illegal possession of firearms. “Bin Laden can’t get an operational was assassinated by masked gunmen – Reuters, January 14; Philippine Daily Inquirer, effort off the ground without it being in Galgadud region in central Somalia. January 14 detected ahead of time and being There was no claim of responsibility. thwarted,” he said. “Their ability to – Shabelle Media Network, January 9 January 13, 2009 (SOMALIA): Ethiopian reach is nonexistent.” – Reuters, January 6 troops withdrew from key military bases January 10-11, 2009 (PAKISTAN): in Mogadishu as part of their departure January 6, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Hundreds of Taliban fighters attacked from Somalia. – New York Times, January 13 U.S.-led coalition forces engaged a Frontier Corps military base in Taliban insurgents in Lagham Province Mohmand Agency of the Federally January 14, 2009 (GLOBAL): A new and killed 32 of them. – Reuters, January 7 Administered Tribal Areas. Between audiotape purportedly from al-Qa`ida six and ten security personnel and 40 leader Usama bin Ladin was released on January 6, 2009 (SOMALIA): A Taliban fighters were killed during the Islamist internet forums. On the tape, roadside bomb killed a Ugandan soldier fighting. According to al-Jazira, which Bin Ladin urged Muslims to launch a in Mogadishu. – Reuters, January 6 received its information from a Pakistani holy war against Israel in response to military official, “most of the force of its recent offensive in the Gaza Strip. He January 6, 2009 (THAILAND): An about 600 came from Afghanistan and also claimed credit for the U.S. financial unknown number of separatist militants were joined by local Taliban fighters.” crisis, stating, “Today the United States attacked a military base in Pattani – al-Jazira, January 12; Radio Netherlands, is staggering under the attacks of the Province in southern Thailand, killing January 11; New York Times, January 11 mujahidin and their consequences...It at least one Thai army ranger. – AFP, is drowning in a financial crisis.” – AP, January 5 January 11, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): January 14; UPI, January 15 The Australian Defense Ministry January 8, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): announced that its special forces January 14, 2009 (UNITED STATES): A suicide car bomber attacked killed a senior Taliban commander in President-elect Barack Obama international troops in Kandahar Uruzgan Province. The exact date of responded to a new audiotape of Usama Province, reportedly killing two U.S. the commander’s death was not made bin Ladin by telling reporters that “Bin soldiers and one civilian. – Voice of clear, although it was likely in the last Laden and Al-Qaeda are our number America, January 8; Voice of America, January 9 week. The commander was identified one threat when it comes to American as Mullah Abdul Rasheed and his death security. We’re going to do everything January 9, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): has “significantly disrupted insurgent in our power to make sure that they Three U.S. soldiers were killed by a operations in Uruzgan Province,” cannot create safe havens that can roadside bomb along Highway One, according to the Australian military. attack Americans. That’s the bottom which links southern Afghanistan with – Reuters, January 11 line.” – AFP, January 14 Kabul. – AFP, January 9 January 11, 2009 (SOMALIA): Rival January 14, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): January 9, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A Islamist groups fought for control of a Two British NATO soldiers were killed suicide bomber killed at least 10 people, small town in Galgadud region, causing in an explosion while fighting Taliban including two police officers, in an the deaths of approximately 30 people. forces in Helmand Province. – AFP, attack at a market in Nimroz Province. The fighting was between the radical January 15 – Voice of America, January 9 Islamist military group al-Shabab and the newly-militarized Sufi Muslim group January 14, 2009 (MAURITANIA): January 9, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): The Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama`a. Members of Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb U.S. military killed five militants in an Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama`a claimed that (AQIM) released a new video statement attack on a bomb-making network in they repelled the al-Shabab assault on on Islamist websites urging attacks Zabul Province. – Voice of America, January the town. – Voice of America, January 12 on Israeli and Western interests in 9 Mauritania in retaliation for Israel’s

21 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2 recent offensive in the Gaza Strip. AQIM daylight on Jolo Island in Sulu Province number of U.S. soldiers and German leader Abdelmalek Droukdel said in the in the southern Philippines. The nationals were wounded. The Taliban video, “We urge you to blow up this evil workers included a Swiss national, an claimed responsibility for the attack. relationship as support of your brothers Italian national and a Filipino engineer. – Washington Post, January 18 in Gaza. We ask you to go to jihad and The Abu Sayyaf Group is suspected of we urge you to rise to strike Western being behind the abduction. – Philippine January 17, 2009 (PAKISTAN): interests everywhere.” – Reuters, January Daily Inquirer, January 16 Pakistani security forces raided a 18 militant stronghold in Mohmand January 16, 2009 (UNITED STATES): Agency of the Federally Administered January 14, 2009 (SOMALIA): Islamist The U.S. Treasury announced that it Tribal Areas. During the attack, they fighters fired mortars at Somalia’s would freeze the assets of one of Usama killed 14 militants and lost two of their presidential palace in Mogadishu. At bin Ladin’s sons, Sa`ad bin Ladin, and own. – AFP, January 17; Reuters, January 18 least five civilians were killed during the three other al-Qa`ida members believed clashes between the Islamist militants to be operating in Iran. – Reuters, January January 17, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): The and government forces. – AP, January 14 16 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) received “proof of life” on January 15, 2009 (UNITED STATES): January 16, 2009 (UNITED STATES): the three ICRC workers kidnapped by A U.S. federal judge ordered the release Director of National Intelligence suspected Abu Sayyaf Group militants of Guantanamo detainee Mohammed Michael McConnell told reporters that on January 15. No other details were al-Gharani, who was apprehended one of Usama bin Ladin’s sons, Sa`ad offered. – AP, January 17 in Pakistan seven years ago when he bin Ladin, “has left Iran…He’s probably was 14-years-old. U.S. prosecutors in Pakistan.” McConnell saw this January 18, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide maintain that al-Gharani, who is development as encouraging, stating, bomber attacked and killed Hassan from Chad, “stayed at an al-Qaeda- “It’s better for my world if any of these Zaidan al-Lihebi, a deputy leader of affiliated guesthouse in Afghanistan,” players are in places that we have the Iraqi National Dialogue Front, an “received military training at an al- access.” – Reuters, January 16 influential Sunni Arab political party. Qaeda-affiliated military training The attack occurred south of Mosul in camp,” “served as a courier for several January 16, 2009 (SOMALIA): The northern Iraq. – Reuters, January 18 high-ranking al-Qaeda members” and United Nations Security Council “fought against U.S. and allied forces unanimously adopted a resolution January 19, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A at the battle of Tora Bora” ahead of expressing its intention to create a UN suicide car bomb attack occurred near the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The peacekeeping force in Somalia. The the gates of a U.S. forward operating judge, however, wrote that government resolution renewed the mandate of the base in Khost Province, killing one evidence amounted to “a mosaic of African Union (AU) peacekeeping force Afghan. A second suicide bomber allegations.” – AFP, January 15 currently deployed in Somalia for six waited for emergency officials to arrive, months. It also encouraged AU states and then attempted to detonate his January 15, 2009 (UNITED STATES): to increase the size of the deployment explosives. Police, however, detected CIA Director Michael Hayden told from the current 2,600 troops to 8,000, the second bomber and he was forced reporters that the tribal regions in which was the number originally to detonate his explosives early, killing Pakistan are not as welcoming for al- authorized. The UN peacekeeping force only himself. – AP, January 19 Qa`ida than they used to be. He said that will not be created, however, for at al-Qa`ida and its allies are “beginning least several months until the situation January 19, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemen’s to realize, beginning to think, this is on the ground in Somalia can be better official state news agency reported that neither safe nor a haven.” – Bloomberg, assessed. – AP, January 16 government forces killed two suspected January 15 al-Qa`ida militants and wounded a third January 17, 2009 (GLOBAL): A new al- during a raid in Sana`a. A fourth al- January 15, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Two Qa`ida video bearing the logo of al-Sahab Qa`ida member part of the cell escaped. Pakistani paramilitary soldiers were was released on Islamist websites. The – Reuters, January 20 killed by a roadside bomb in South video addressed Germany’s involvement Waziristan Agency of the Federally in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan January 20, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Administered Tribal Areas. – AFP, and warned that German “soldiers are General David Petraeus, the head of U.S. January 15 safe nowhere.” According to Reuters, in Central Command, said that the United the video the masked man who leveled States has struck deals with Russia January 15, 2009 (SOMALIA): The the threats had a sign behind his head and several Central Asian countries last Ethiopian troops withdrew from that read “Abu Talha the German” and to let U.S. supplies pass through Mogadishu; however, troops are “spoke in German with a slight foreign their territories to U.S. soldiers in expected to remain along border areas. accent.” – Reuters, January 18 Afghanistan. The deals will reduce U.S. – Voice of America, January 15 dependence on supply routes through January 17, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Pakistan, which have been increasingly January 15, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): Three A suicide car bomber exploded outside interrupted in recent months. – AP, International Committee of the Red the German Embassy in Kabul, killing January 21 Cross workers were kidnapped in broad one U.S. soldier and two Afghans. A

22 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2

January 20, 2009 (PAKISTAN): fighters in Khost Province. – AP, January in the foreseeable future. U.S. citizens Pakistani security forces killed 38 22 in Yemen are advised to exercise caution Taliban fighters during an offensive and take prudent security measures in in Mohmand Agency of the Federally January 22, 2009 (MALI): Four all areas frequented by Westerners.” Administered Tribal Areas. – Reuters, European tourists were kidnapped – AFP, January 26 January 20 by armed assailants in Mali near the Niger border. The hostages include January 26, 2009 (YEMEN): Police January 20, 2009 (THAILAND): two Swiss, one German and a Briton. A exchanged fire with gunmen in a car Thailand decided to extend an Malian military source told reporters on at a checkpoint near the U.S. Embassy emergency decree in its three southern- January 29 that al-Qa`ida in the Islamic in Sana`a. The gunmen fled the scene, most provinces of Yala, Pattani and Maghreb was most likely holding the and there were no injuries. The incident Narathiwat for another three months, Europeans. – Reuters, January 29 occurred after the U.S. Embassy starting January 19. The three provinces released a warden’s message warning have been plagued by a Muslim-Malay January 23, 2009 (YEMEN): A U.S. that threats were made against the insurgency. – Bangkok Post, January 20 counterterrorism official told reporters facility. – AP, January 27 that a Saudi militant released from January 21, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Guantanamo Bay has become a leading January 27, 2009 (UNITED STATES): A suicide bomber killed two Afghan figure in the Yemen branch of al-Qa`ida. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates soldiers in Herat Province. – Reuters, The militant, identified as Said Ali al- told Congress that “there is little doubt January 21 Shihri, was released to Saudi authorities that our greatest military challenge in 2007. – AP, January 23 right now is Afghanistan.” – AP, January January 21, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): 27 U.S.-led coalition forces killed six January 23, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Taliban fighters during a raid in Zabul suspected U.S. missile strike killed at January 27, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide car Province. – AP, January 22 least five suspected militants in North bomber killed three Iraqi soldiers in Waziristan Agency of the Federally Mosul, Ninawa Province. – AFP, January January 21, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Administered Tribal Areas. Another 27 Pakistani security forces claimed to five people were also killed. – AP, January have killed the chief of Tehrik-i-Taliban 23 January 27, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for Mohmand Agency. militants destroyed a boys’ school and The leader, identified as Umar Khalid, January 23, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A the houses of six pro-government tribal was reportedly killed with four other suspected U.S. missile strike killed at elders in Bajaur Agency of the Federally key militant commanders during the least eight people in South Waziristan Administered Tribal Areas. – AFP, raid in the Lakaro area of Mohmand. Agency of the Federally Administered January 27 The Taliban, however, denied that Umar Tribal Areas. – AP, January 23 Khalid was killed. – Dawn, January 21 January 27, 2009 (JORDAN): A January 23, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Jordanian military court put on trial January 21, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani suicide car bomber killed two soldiers 12 men accused of conducting terrorist forces arrested a senior Saudi al-Qa`ida in the Swat Valley of the North-West attacks on a Christian church and operative wanted in connection with Frontier Province. – AP, January 23 cemetery. The primary suspect, Shakir the July 7, 2005 terrorist attacks in al-Khatib, allegedly received training London. Security forces arrested Zabi ul January 24, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide car from an al-Qa`ida operative in Lebanon, Taifi and six other suspected militants bomber killed at least five policemen at although the court is not charging in Peshawar. – AFP, January 21 a checkpoint in Garma, 20 miles from him with al-Qa`ida membership. – AP, Baghdad. – Reuters, January 24 January 27 January 22, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida leader Abu Yahya al-Libi released a January 24, 2009 (SOMALIA): A suicide January 27, 2009 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida’s new video statement in which he called car bomb ripped through Mogadishu, factions in Yemen and Saudi Arabia on “mujahidin all over the world [to] killing at least 14 civilians. The announced that they are merging their rise up like a raging lion” and strike intended targets were African Union operations. The deputy of the new at Western capitals in retaliation for peacekeepers. – AFP, January 24 consolidated group has been identified Israel’s recent offensive in the Gaza as Said Ali al-Shihri, who was released Strip. – CBS News, January 22 January 25, 2009 (SOMALIA): Ethiopia from Guantanamo Bay in 2007. – al- completed its withdrawal from Somalia. Jazira, January 28 January 22, 2009 (UNITED STATES): – AFP, January 25 President Barack Obama signed an January 28, 2009 (PAKISTAN): executive order to close down the January 26, 2009 (YEMEN): The U.S. Pakistani security forces killed 12 U.S. military detention facility at Embassy in Sana`a released a warden’s suspected Taliban militants in Dara Guantanamo Bay. – Guardian, January 22 message, stating that “the U.S. Adam Khel in the North-West Frontier embassy has received a threat against Province. – AFP, January 28 January 22, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): the embassy compound regarding a Afghan troops killed eight Taliban possible attack which could take place

23 february 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 2

January 28, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani CTC Sentinel Staff authorities arrested nine men suspected of involvement in the June 2, 2008 attack Editor-in-Chief on the Danish Embassy in Islamabad. Erich Marquardt The men were also accused of organizing Senior Editor, CTC the bombing of an Italian restaurant in Islamabad in March 2008, an attack that Editorial Board killed one individual and injured four FBI COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. personnel. – AP, January 29 Department Head Department of Social Sciences (West Point) January 28, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): A Philippine government official visited COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. three International Committee of the Deputy Department Head Red Cross workers who were kidnapped Department of Social Sciences (West Point) by the Abu Sayyaf Group on January 15. The official reported that the three MAJ Reid Sawyer workers are “in good condition.” Director, CTC – Reuters, January 28

Brian Fishman January 29, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Director of Research, CTC Afghanistan’s election commission announced that the country’s Christopher Heffelfinger presidential elections will be delayed FBI Fellow, CTC until August 20 due to logistical and security concerns. – CNN, January 29

January 29, 2009 (TURKEY): Turkish Contact authorities announced that police had killed Combating Terrorism Center an al-Qa`ida militant who tried to rob a U.S. Military Academy post office branch in Istanbul. Three other 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall al-Qa`ida suspects were captured during West Point, NY 10996 the operation. – Reuters, January 29 Phone: (845) 667-6383 Email: [email protected] January 30, 2009 (UNITED KINGDOM): Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ Nicky Reilly, a convert to Islam, was sentenced by a UK court to life in jail * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 with a minimum term of 18-years for his role in an attempted suicide bombing in Exeter. Reilly tried to detonate a nail bomb in a restaurant, but it exploded prematurely and he injured only support himself. – AP, January 30 The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial January 30, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A supporters, for without their support and roadside bomb ripped through a shared vision of the Center products like Pakistani Army convoy in a village near the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If the Swat Valley, resulting in the deaths you are interested in learning more about of three soldiers. – AP, January 31 how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. January 31, 2009 (IRAQ): Provincial edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at elections took place in Iraq. The West Point’s Association of Graduates at elections were largely peaceful. 845-446-1553. – Bloomberg, January 31

January 31, 2009 (SOMALIA): Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad, the former head of the Islamic Courts Union, was elected as the new president of Somalia The views expressed in this report are those of after an all-night parliamentary session the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, in neighboring Djibouti. Shaykh Sharif the Department of the Army, or any other agency is viewed as a moderate Islamist leader. of the U.S. Government. – Reuters, January 31

24